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RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC

RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC

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SERIAL: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

/\*\*\*\*\* THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE \*\*\*\*\*/

BODY

(b)(3):10 USC 424

COUNTRY: (U) **BURMA** (BM).

SUBJECT (b)(3):10 USC 424 **BURMESE MILITARY/GOVERNMENT  
VIEW OF THE KACHIN NEGOTIATIONS (U).**

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY  
EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED

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- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 901018-930928.

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SUMMARY: ~~(C)~~ THE BURMESE MILITARY STATES THAT THE  
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE **KACHIN** ARE COMPLETE WITH NO MAJOR  
DISCUSSION POINTS TO BE RESOLVED. FINAL ACCORD SIGNING  
CEREMONY TO OCCUR WITHIN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. A HISTORY  
OF THE NEGOTIATIONS EXPLAINED IN DETAIL.

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TEXT: 1. (C)

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

THE HISTORY AND CURRENT STATUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE **KACHIN** INSURGENTS. THE PRESENTATION WAS DESCRIBED AS "PRIVILEGED INFORMATION"

(b)(1), 1.4 (b), 1.4 (c)

2. (C)

EXACTLY WHAT POINTS HAD BEEN JOINTLY AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE BURMESE GOVERNMENT AND THE **KACHIN INDEPENDENCE ORGANIZATION (KIO)** AND THE **KACHIN INDEPENDENT ARMY (KIA)** TO DATE. FIVE POINTS FOLLOW --

- BOTH CAMPS AGREE TO END ALL MILITARY FIGHTING AND DECLARE A "SUPER CEASE FIRE"

(b)(1), 1.4 (b), 1.4 (c)

- BOTH THE BURMESE GOVERNMENT AND THE **KACHIN** JOIN FORCES IN DEVELOPING THE **KACHIN** STATE.

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- **KACHIN** REPRESENTATIVES WILL ATTEND THE BURMESE GOVERNMENT'S NATIONAL CONVENTION IN OBSERVER STATUS, WILL VISIT AND STUDY OTHER BORDER AREA DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, AND WILL STUDY AND LEARN ABOUT THE STEPS TAKEN BY NUMEROUS STATE LAW AND ORDER RESTORATION COUNCIL (SLORC) COMMITTEES TO DEVELOP THE NATION.

- THE **KACHIN** WILL BE ALLOWED TO RETAIN ARMS AND MOVE FREELY THROUGHOUT THEIR OWN "AREAS"

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

- THE **KACHIN** WILL ACT AS EMISSARIES TO OTHER INSURGENT GROUPS. THESE EMISSARIES WILL REPRESENT THE **KACHIN** AND NOT THE BURMESE GOVERNMENT.

3. ~~(c)~~ A SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT BACKGROUND INFORMATION LEADING UP TO THE FINAL NEGOTIATIONS FOLLOWS --

- IN LATE 1990 THREE **KACHINS**, ((U LA WAN)), A FORMER BURMESE AMBASSADOR; REVEREND ((U SABOI JUM)), GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE KACHIN BAPTIST CONVENTION; AND ((U KHUN MYAT)), A **KACHIN** BUSINESSMAN, CONTACTED THE BURMESE GOVERNMENT INDICATING THAT THE **KACHIN** DESIRED TO NEGOTIATE. THE INITIAL **KACHIN** NEGOTIATION PROPOSAL WAS REJECTED BY THE BURMESE GOVERNMENT BECAUSE IT DEMANDED THAT THE **KACHIN** REPRESENT THE ENTIRE DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE OF **BURMA** (DAB) AND THAT A FOREIGN POWER BE EMPLOYED AS A NEGOTIATION'S OBSERVER. THE BURMESE GOVERNMENT FLATLY STATED THAT **KACHINS** MUST REPRESENT **KACHINS** ISSUES ONLY. NEGOTIATIONS BROKE AT THAT TIME AND WERE RENEWED ONLY AFTER A SERIES OF **KIA** MILITARY DEFEATS AT THE HAND OF THE BURMESE MILITARY IN APRIL 1992. SOON AFTER, THE SAME THREE **KACHIN** NEGOTIATORS SURFACED AGAIN IN RANGOON STATING THE **KIO/KIA** WERE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE **KACHIN** ONLY ISSUES WITH THE BURMESE GOVERNMENT.

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- AFTER SOME PRELIMINARY CONTACTS IN LASHIO [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE FIRST OF SEVERAL SIGNIFICANT MEETINGS OCCURRED IN MYITKYINA ON 930122. AT THIS MEETING THE BURMESE MILITARY WAS REPRESENTED BY THE COMMANDER OF THE NORTHEAST COMMAND, MAJOR GENERAL (MG) ((AYE KYAW)) AND BY MAJOR GENERAL, THEN BRIGADIER GENERAL, ((SAW LWIN)) THE NORTHERN COMMAND COMMANDER (SOURCE COMMENT -- THE **KACHIN** AREA FALLS WITHIN THE BURMESE MILITARY'S NORTHERN COMMAND. MG SAW LWIN WAS THOUGHT TO BE TOO HARD LINE AND INFLEXIBLE FOR THE FRAGILE NEGOTIATION PROCESS. MG AYE KYAW WAS PICKED TO BE THE LEAD REPRESENTATIVE AS HE IS MUCH MORE OPEN AND PRESENTS A FRIENDLY, CONDUCIVE DEMEANOR). THE **KIO** WAS REPRESENTED BY ((U LAMUN TUAI)), **KIO** VICE CHAIRMAN; DR. U LA MON TU JAI, **KIO** HEALTH OFFICER; AND ((U TEINT BAWN)), **KIO** CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER. LTCOL KYAW THEIN AND THE ORIGINAL THREE **KACHIN** NEGOTIATORS ATTENDED THIS AND ALL SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS.

- THE SECOND SERIES OF MEETINGS OCCURRED AT MYITKYINA ON 930318 - 930323 AND 930406. THE NEGOTIATIONS PARTICIPANTS REMAINED THE SAME AS IN THE FIRST MEETING.

- THE THIRD MEETING OCCURRED AT MYITKYINA ON 930405 - 930408. THE PREVIOUS PARTICIPANTS WERE THEN JOINED BY **KIO** GENERAL SECRETARY, ((U ZAUNG HARA)).

- THE FOURTH MEETING OCCURRED IN MYITKYINA ON 930526 - 930528 WITH THE SAME PLAYERS PRESENT.

- THE FIFTH AND FINAL MEETING OCCURRED IN MYITKYINA ON 930927 - 930928. AN ADDITIONAL **KIO** REPRESENTATIVE, ((U ZAW HPAN)), **KIA** GSO 1, WAS ALSO PRESENT.

4. ~~(C)~~ A LISTING OF THE **KIO** CENTRAL COMMITTEE ACCOMPANIED THE BRIEF; MAJOR MEMBERS ARE AS FOLLOWS --

- NUMBER 1 - ((G SAW SAING))
- NUMBER 2 - ((MANGYI ZAW AIN)), DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
- NUMBER 3 - ZAW HPAN, GSO 1

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- NUMBER 4 - ((SAING HPON))
- NUMBER 5 - ((KAM DWE))
- NUMBER 6 - ((T ZAW SHEN))
- NUMBER 7 - ((LAHKAN SHAUNG))
- NUMBER 8 - DR ((TU JA)), FOREIGN AFFAIRS
- NUMBER 9 - DR LA JA
- NUMBER 10 - U TIENT BAWN

5. ~~(C)~~ A LISTING OF THE KACHIN INDEPENDENCE ARMY ORGANIZATION WHO ACCOMPANIED THE BRIEF FOLLOWS --

- CHIEF OF STAFF - ((ZAU MAI))
- DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF - ((MANGYI ZAW AIN))
- MEMBER - ((KAN DWE))
- MEMBER - ((ZAW HPAN))
- MEMBER - ((LAHKAN SHAUNG))
- MEMBER - ((TAN LAI))
- MEMBER - ((KON HTAGAN))
- NO 1 BRIGADE COMMANDER - ((LANIN URANAW))
- NO 2 BRIGADE COMMANDER - ((LA ZEIN BOK))
- NO 3 BRIGADE COMMANDER - ((ZAW TAN))
- NO 4 BRIGADE COMMANDER - ((LUN TONG))

(b)(1), 1.4 (b), 1.4 (c)

(b)(1), 1.4 (b), 1.4 (c)

; A CEASE IN SIGNIFICANT CHINESE GOVERNMENT AID TO THE **KACHIN** OCCURRED WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE MILITARY DEFEATS EXPERIENCED BY THE **KIA**. STILL, NON-CHINESE GOVERNMENTAL AID STILL FLOWS ACROSS THE CHINESE BORDER TO THE **KACHIN**.

(b)(1), 1.4 (b), 1.4 (c)

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A -- APPROXIMATELY 4000 KIO/KIA MEMBERS AND THEIR FAMILIES ARE IN THE RETURNING GROUP. TOTAL NUMBERS ARE PRESENTLY UNKNOWN DUE TO INDIVIDUAL FAMILY SIZES.

(b)(1), 1.4 (b), 1.4 (c)

A -- THE KACHIN BAPTIST CONVENTION GROUP WILL BE THE ON SITE MONITOR AND WILL CANVASS THE RAN K AND FILE **KACHIN** TO CHECK ON THEIR CONDITION WITHIN THE **KACHIN** AUTONOMOUS AREAS.

(b)(1), 1.4 (b), 1.4 (c)

A -- PEACE AND PROSPERITY IN THE **KACHIN** STATE. THERE IS NO TURNING BACK NOW. THE ACCORD HAS AS ITS FIRST STEP THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS WILL FOLLOW IN TIME. FIGHTING HAS OCCURRED IN **KACHIN** STATE FOR OVER 30 YEARS AND IT WILL TAKE SOME TIME TO RESOLVE ALL THEIR LOCAL PROBLEMS.

(b)(1), 1.4 (b), 1.4 (c)

A -- THE **KACHIN** HAVE NOT BEEN ASKED BY THE GOVERNMENT TO BE PARTICIPANTS YET. ONCE THEY LAY DOWN THEIR WEAPONS COMPLETELY

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

THE **KACHIN** MAY ESTABLISH A POLITICAL PARTY, JOIN THE CONVENTION AND PARTICIPATE IN NATIONAL ELECTIONS.

Q -- ARE THE **KACHIN** STILL A MEMBER OF THE DAB?

A -- YES, AND THE SLORC GOVERNMENT IS NOT ASKING THEM TO QUIT THE DAB AT THIS TIME. THE DAB HIERARCHY HOWEVER HAS GIVEN THE **KACHIN** AN ULTIMATUM THAT BY 931115, THE **KACHIN** SHOULD SUBMIT A LETTER OF RESIGNATION FROM THE DAB IF AN ACCORD IS REACHED BETWEEN THE **KACHIN** AND THE SLORC. **KIO** MEMBERS ARE INSTRUMENTAL IN THE DAB'S FOREIGN RELATIONS' SECTION AND **KIO** PARTICIPANTS WILL STILL

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BE OBSERVED IN DAB FOREIGN AFFAIRS PROCEEDINGS. ACTIONS THAT THEY MAY TAKE OVERSEAS (AS AT THE U.N., ETC.) ARE NOT CLEARED OR DEMANDED TO BE CLEARED BY THE SLORC.

(b)(1), 1.4 (b), 1.4 (c)

A -- THE SLORC WILL START REPAIRING ROADS AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND COMMERCE. THIRTY SEPARATE ROADS AND BRIDGES HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED FOR RENOVATION. FOREIGNERS WILL SOON BE ALLOWED TO VISIT **KACHIN** STATE.

(b)(1), 1.4 (b), 1.4 (c)

A -- THE **KIO** SENIOR LEADER, BRANG SEIN, IS ILL AND HOSPITALIZED IN KUNMING, CHINA. WE ARE WAITING FOR HIS HEALTH TO IMPROVE SO HE CAN REPRESENT HIS **KACHIN** PEOPLE AT THE CEREMONY. IF HIS ILLNESS PERSISTS WE WILL STILL PROCEED WITH THE FINAL ACCORD CEREMONY IN THE AFOREMENTIONED TIME PERIOD.

(b)(1), 1.4 (b), 1.4 (c)

A -- THE **KACHINS** WILL ADMINISTER BUSINESS IN THEIR OWN AREAS. LEGAL BUSINESSES WILL BE HANDLED BY PRIVATE CONCERNS. THERE WILL BE NO RESTRICTIONS ON LEGAL BUSINESSES. AS MENTIONED PREVIOUSLY, THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IS THE PRESENT PRIMARY CONCERN. ECONOMICS WILL FOLLOW.

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
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