
SECRET (b)(3):10 USC 424



November 26, 2003

Subject: (U) Indonesian Defense Ties with the United States: A Window Narrowing

(b)(1);1.4 (b);1.4 (c);1.4 (d)

(U) Unhappiness and Waning Interest

(b)(1);1.4 (b);1.4 (c);1.4 (d)

(C) Complaints also continue to relate to perceived U.S. interference in the country's domestic affairs, "arrogance," and a double standard toward Indonesia, with particular criticism underscoring unhappiness with U.S. Congressional pressures to resolve last year's killing of American mine employees in Timika, Papua Province.

(b)(1);1.4 (b);1.4 (c);1.4 (d)

frustration that their efforts to cooperate with the FBI have not been publicly recognized.

• (C) Skepticism of U.S. motives also appears more apparent, with many officers believing Indonesia's sovereignty will be jeopardized by the U.S. pursuit of its

counterterrorist and human rights objectives.

(C) Military officials are now voicing open disinterest in overseas training. Foreign military education is no longer a factor in advancement, with Army Chief Gen Ryamizard most prominent in publicly snubbing foreign training as unnecessary.

(b)(1);1.4 (b);1.4 (c);1.4 (d)

(U) Personnel Changes in the Offing

(C) Several U.S. military trained officials now reaching the end of their term in office have been instrumental in sustaining quiet cooperation on a number of security fronts, despite often internal opposition.

• (C) Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs (b)(6) (b)(6) has played a leading role in counterterrorist cooperation, FBI access to the Timika case, and a political settlement in troubled Aceh province, but is on the verge of running for President and could resign by the end of the year according the Indonesian press.

• (S) The post election future of State Intelligence Agency (BIN) Chief (b)(6) likewise is uncertain. Criticized by Muslim fundamentalists for counterterrorism cooperation with the United States, his replacement could well exercise greater caution in dealing with U.S. counterparts.

• (C) Defense Minister (b)(6) another proponent of close security ties, is now gravely ill following a stroke and also unlikely to return.

(C) The greatest setback in military cooperation could well be the departure of Armed Forces Chief (b)(6) who while probably remaining on until next year's elections, has twice petitioned the president for early retirement.

• (C) $Gen^{(b)(6)}$ has championed American military training as key to raising professional standards and backed FBI involvement in the Timika case in an effort to overcome this latest obstacle to resumed training.

• (C) His public backing for Indonesian democratic transition and a military free from politics also is congruent with U.S. interests. Most recently, the general moved to eliminate a major corruptive influence by discontinuing the military's role of protecting strategic industries.

(U) New Leadership Uncertainties

(S) President Megawati recognizing the critical importance of a U.S. role – has

repeatedly affirmed strong support for U.S. defense assistance, although election uncertainties will lead her to avoid close identification with U.S. security policies.

(C) The next government may well support U.S. security cooperation, but top security officials and the next military chief could exercise less influence and commitment to military reform.

• (C) Indonesian law requires the new commander to be a former service chief, leaving three currently in the running. The Navy and Air Force chiefs generally have welcomed U.S. defense ties, but would have less authority, given the Army's clear dominance within the armed forces.

(b)(1);(b)(6);1.4 (b);1.4 (c);1.4 (d)

(U) Narrowing Opportunities for Security Cooperation

(C) Notwithstanding (b)(6) pervasive nationalist sentiment and distrust of U.S. intentions inevitably will color future U.S. access to the military.

• (C) Xenophobic officers in key posts could reinforce such tendencies, with a propensity to retaliate for U.S. sanctions by limiting U.S. access. Vetting Indonesian officers for U.S. training will likely remain a particularly sour point.

• (C) In addition, proposed reforms perceived as contrary to the military's core interests, such as scraping military businesses and the army's territorial structure, would likely be rejected by an officer corps more resistant to fundamental change.

(C) Still, programs congruent with Jakarta's security interests still may be acceptable, particularly U.S. training programs to improve military professionalism and trade craft, including logistics and maintenance.

• (C) U.S. assistance on human rights and international norms likewise is conceivable given strong emphasis by (b)(6) in this area. (b)(1);1.4 (c) (b)(1);1.4 (c) Ryamizard's new "raider" battalions set to deploy to Aceh have received extensive training in human rights so as to uphold the military's image.

• (C) Counterterrorism training is another area where U.S. cooperation would likely still be welcome. Despite recent police improvements, the military expects its more capable counterterrorist units will still take the lead in a major hostage crisis.

(U) Value of Timing

(C) Restoration of U.S. assistance programs during Gen(b)(6) remaining tenure conceivably would help validate his accommodating approach toward the United

States and help sustain acceptance of U.S. efforts following his departure.

(C) However, more fundamental changes in military culture would likely require a decades long training effort, with potential payoffs for U.S. interests years in the future.

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