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## Campaign Analysis Report

PO04  
T-DIA

~~S~~-8,198-03 (b)(3):10 USC 424  
10 Jan 2003

(U) **Subject:** Indonesia's Troubled Investigation into the Timika Incident

1. (U) **Purpose:** To provide a status report on the 31 August killing of American mine employees in Papua province.

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

~~(S)~~ The faltering four month-long investigation into the ambush killing of American mine employees in Papua province has taken on renewed urgency, driven by an Indonesian leadership eager to prevent further hemorrhaging of US defense ties. Jakarta now has accepted FBI help, but an outcome that fully satisfies US justice concerns remains problematic and is unlikely to ease bilateral problems over stalled military reforms and heightened mistrust of US intentions among Indonesian senior officers.

2. (U) **Key Points:**

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(b);Sec. 1.4(c);Sec. 1.4(d)

B. ~~(S)~~ **Identifying Suspects:** Jakarta hurriedly kicked off the new investigation late December by deploying a joint police-military team in an apparent failed effort to resolve contradictory police and military inquiries. Instructing the team to continue work until the perpetrators are found, (b)(6) named three possible culprits - pro-independence rebels, a rogue military element, and a disgruntled third party--presumably involving a local dispute with the mine.

- From the start, US embassy and press theories have given most credence to an attempt by military members to implicate separatist rebels to discourage foreign backing for independence or as part of an extortion scheme. Prime police suspects remain soldiers responsible for mine security.
- (b)(1);(b)(3):10 USC 424;Sec. 1.4(c) blame on poorly educated Special Forces NCOs who he said staged the attack with Papuan allies in a "crude attempt" to extort money from the mine. Consistent with this account, (b)(1);1.4 (c)

(b)(3):10 USC 424

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(b)(1);1.4(c)

[redacted] local Special Forces are now very nervous about an FBI role.

C. ~~(S)~~ **Questions of Senior-level Involvement:** Earlier reporting suggesting possible complicity by top security officials in the attack have not been corroborated, and other embassy sources tend to discount a leadership plot. Contrary to press reports, all-source intelligence has failed to disclose a command role or orchestrated military conspiracy.

D. ~~(S)~~ Still, actions by military officers, including the local commander, suggests a rush to exonerate army personnel, shift blame and otherwise cover up the facts.

- (b)(1);(b)(3);10 USC 424;Sec. 1.4(c) [redacted] various officers early on concealed the rogue Special Forces behavior to avoid being held accountable, with subsequent senior-level complicity to try to protect the military institution itself.
- The latest military investigation dealt almost solely with rebutting police claims of possible military foul play rather than pursuing guilt.
- Closing ranks to conceal the truth has been common military practice. Excesses are often handled quietly, although local and foreign pressures have forced backtracking, resulting in public trials of accused military personnel.

E. ~~(S)~~

(b)(1);(b)(6);Sec. 1.4(b);Sec. 1.4(c);Sec. 1.4(d)

[redacted] Upset over press claims against him, he told US officials last week that an FBI role was necessary to obtain a credible resolution.

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(b);Sec. 1.4(c);Sec. 1.4(d)

POC: (b)(3);10 USC 424

Enclosures:

(b)(3);10 USC 424

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1. (S) Annex 1: Details of the Crime
2. (S) Annex 2. Insights into a Cover-up

## Annex 1

### Details of the Crime

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(b)(1);(b)(3):10 USC 424;Sec. 1.4(c)

the ambush was jointly hatched between several locally-assigned Special Forces NCOs and native Papuan clan members, who previously had been co-opted as a "Third Column." The (b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c) local regional commander and senior Special Forces officer had no prior warning of their subordinate's actions.

~~(S)~~ The Papuan agents reportedly included former army soldiers, as well as common criminals with strong tribal connections. (b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c) the Papuans actually may have been the primary instigators who, motivated by money and power, pushed their NCO patrons to back the ambush. An initial scheme to demand monetary restitution for native lands from the mine failed, leaving the conspirators purportedly to resort to more traditional violence, hoping to force company officials to relent to their demands. Even though Special Forces personnel did not participate in the actual attack, they supposedly provided weapons and ammunition and were posted nearby to provide security for the operation.

## Annex 2

### Insights into a Cover-up

~~(S)~~ (b)(1);(b)(3):10 USC 424;Sec. 1.4(c) senior officials -- including Armed Forces Commander Gen (b)(6) and Army Chief Gen (b)(6) -- early on harbored suspicions of possible army involvement in the Timika attack and purportedly learned of Special Forces troop complicity weeks after the incident. The responsible commanders, who had sought to protect their careers by immediately covering up the facts, eventually admitted the truth to their superiors (b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c). The involved NCOs continued to deny involvement, but purportedly were withdrawn from the province and quietly punished. (b)(1);1.4 (c) that members of the follow-on military investigations were aware of these facts, but contributed to the cover-up.

~~(S)~~ The military's failure to pursue justice in a transparent manner reflects an institutional preoccupation with its image (b)(1);(b)(3):10 USC 424;Sec. 1.4(c) General (b)(6) was angry over troop complicity and eager to improve discipline, but also concerned over adverse publicity discrediting the military's reputation, which was badly damaged from the Soeharto era. The continued surfacing of wrongdoings, such as the Timika case, poses a major setback for the leadership's efforts at "social rehabilitation" (b)(1);1.4 (c). Adding to the leadership dilemma is awareness of many dark secrets left hidden. Public court martials of special forces personnel risk particular disclosures of misdeeds and "black operations" sanctioned by their commanders in past years. Thus,

(b)(1);(b)(6);Sec. 1.4(c)

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