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(b)(3):50 USC 403-1
(i)

~~NOFORN//MR~~

Defense Intelligence Agency

Defense Analysis Report

~~TS-39,446-04~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

23 June 2004

(S//NF) Pakistan: Policy Toward Lashkar-e-Tayyiba's Operations in Iraq

(S//NF) Although limited evidence suggests the Pakistani government and President Musharraf oppose Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) operations in Iraq, a single HUMINT source reports some of the group's Pakistani intelligence contacts provided encouragement for such operations. We assess Musharraf can severely weaken the Pakistan-based LT, but he remains reluctant to end support because he values its cooperation in Kashmir.

(U) LT: Kashmir-Focused, Anti-US Jihadists

(S//NF) Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT, aka Jamaat ud-Dawa), a Pakistan-based extremist group focused on Kashmir, declared jihad against the United States following the August 1998 US missile attack on Afghanistan. The United States declared the LT a foreign terrorist organization when the organization was implicated in the 13 December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament. This incident nearly provoked a war between Pakistan and India. President Musharraf officially banned the LT in January 2002. Although Pakistan arrested LT leaders and closed some offices, the crackdown was short lived; leaders were released and restrictions lifted in the ensuing months.

(S//NF) Pakistan continues to covertly provide training, supplies, weapons, funding, and infiltration support through the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID) to LT operations in Kashmir, according to multiple sources. However, multiple sources report that the ISID imposed severe restrictions on militant operations, especially infiltration, beginning in November 2003 to avoid disrupting the ongoing India-Pakistan rapprochement.

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i), 1.4 (c)

(U) LT in Iraq

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i), 1.4 (c)

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(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i),1.4 (c)

(U) Iraq: ISID Involvement?

~~(S//NF)~~ Although ISID leaders deny supporting LT's Iraq aspirations, sensitive reports from a single source suggest sympathetic ISID officers have encouraged LT efforts in Iraq. We do not know if this alleged encouragement was sanctioned by more senior ISID officials.

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i),1.4 (c)

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~~(S//NF)~~ Other evidence suggests ISID leaders oppose LT operations in Iraq, implying that ISID encouragement, if it occurred, probably was unsanctioned.

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i), 1.4 (c)

(U) The Kashmir Connection

~~(S//NF)~~ Pakistan continues to support the LT in Kashmir, albeit at a reduced level. Despite the official “ban” and concerns over LT operations against the United States, Musharraf is reluctant, in our judgment, to end support to the group because he values its cooperation in Kashmir and fears a greater militant backlash in Pakistan. Musharraf and ISID have taken steps to increase control over LT and other militant groups and have attempted to strictly limit their activity to Kashmir.

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i), 1.4 (c)

(U) Musharraf's Options for Weakening the LT

~~(S//NF)~~ Pakistan can severely weaken LT and its overall capabilities, reducing the risk of terrorist attacks on US interests in Iraq and attacks on India that could provoke renewed tension or war. Pakistan can:

- ~~(C)~~ Arrest LT chief Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, LT operations chief Zakir Rehman Lakvi, and other top LT leaders. Saeed moves freely and appears publicly.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ Halt or severely reduce ISID's Kashmir-related support to LT (training, supplies, weapons, funding, and infiltration), particularly any support for LT Iraq operations.

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i), 1.4 (c)

- ~~(C)~~ Close LT headquarters in Muridke, Pakistan, and other LT offices and training camps.
- ~~(C)~~ Prevent LT recruitment and fundraising activities in Pakistan.

~~(S//NF)~~ Musharraf assumes some risk taking any combination of these actions. Resentful militants are likely to turn their anger on Pakistan's government and Western interests, increasing the already high risk of terrorist attacks and additional assassination attempts. Although unlikely to provoke popular outrage, actions taken against LT may stir opposition among Islamist parties already critical of Musharraf.

~~(S//NF)~~ We assess Musharraf will be responsive to increased diplomatic pressure to take further action against the group if the United States emphasizes the growing LT threat to US interests and the threat that LT's rising independence poses to Pakistan. Musharraf may be especially sensitive to the suggestion that association with LT could lead to punitive sanctions. We judge that Musharraf is unlikely to move decisively against the LT unless he feels he has no choice. His preferred response will be half measures designed to better conceal ISID ties to the LT and to constrain its anti-US operations.

(b)(3):10 USC 424

Derived from: ~~Multiple Sources~~

Declassify on: ~~Source marked X5, Subject to treaty or international agreement~~