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PEMUDA PANCASILA. HÉ EXPRESSES CONCERN ABOUT AVAILABILITY OF BLACK MARKET WEAPONS IN JAKARTA AND FRUSTRATION WITH THE CHRONICALLY INADEQUATE MILITARY BUDGET. HE STRONGLY SUPPORTS MILITARY REFORMS AND ABRI NEUTRALITY DURING THE ELECTIONS. TEXT: 1. (C) VISITED JAKARTA AREA (KODAM JAYA) COMMANDER MG DJAJA ((SUPARMAN)) ON 990105 AT HIS CILILITAN HEADQUARTERS IN EAST JAKARTA. MG SUPARMAN SAID THE NORMAL STRENGTH OF KODAM JAYA

IS ABOUT 6,000 SOLDIERS, BUT DURING THE LATER HALF OF 1998, HE HAD ABOUT 22,000 TROOPS DUE TO THE ATTACHMENT OF VARIOUS MILITARY UNITS FROM THE OTHER REGIONAL COMMANDS. SOLDIERS FROM MOST OUT OF

TOWN UNITS HAVE BEEN RELEASED TO RETURN HOME AND VISIT THEIR FAMILIES DURING THE RAMADHAN MUSLIM HOLIDAY PERIOD BECAUSE THE SITUATION IN JAKARTA HAS BEEN QUIET. SUPARMAN SAID THE KODAM JAYA

STRENGTH WILL RETURN TO ABOUT 22,000 BY THE END OF RAMADHAN AND SHOULD CONTINUE AT THAT LEVEL THROUGH THE ELECTION PERIOD.

2. (E) MG SUPARMAN SAID SECURITY F ORCES HAVE LEARNED FROM THE PAST YEAR'S OPERATIONS IN JAKARTA. TACTICS HAVE BEEN MODIFIED, UNITS ARE NOW MORE FAMILIAR WITH THE AREAS WHERE TROUBLE IS LIKELY

TO OCCUR, AND FORCES ARE DEPOLYED ACCORDINGLY. UNITS ARE BEING ROTATED SO SOLDIERS ARE NOT POSTED AT THE SAME SITES ALL THE TIME. SUPARMAN ALSO SAID HIS COMMAND NOW HAS ENOUGH PERSONNEL SO SOLDIERS CAN BE PERIODICALLY RELIEVED AND DO NOT HAVE TO BE ON DUTY CONTINUOUSLY. ACCORDING TO SUPARMAN, THE DEPLOYMENT OF SECURITY FORCES IN JAKARTA IS BEING DONE AT CONSIDERABLE COST. HE POINTED OUT THAT BECAUSE SO MANY SOLDIERS HAVE BEEN MOVED TO JAKARTA, IT HAS CREATED AN "IMBALANCE" OF FORCES IN OTHER AREAS WHERE THERE MAY BE TROUBLE.

3. (C) SUPARMAN SAID THE POLICE ARE UNDER-STRENGTH, POORLY MOTIVATED AND ALWAYS HAVE TO BE BACKED UP BY ABRI MILITARY UNITS.

FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS ABRI LEADERS HAVE RECOGNIZED THE NEED TO EXPAND AND STRENGTHEN POLICE FORCES, BUT HAVE LACKED THE FUNDS TO

REMEDY THE PROBLEM THE POLICE ORGANIZATION WILL BE OFFICIALLY SEPARATED FROM ABRI IN APRIL, BUT SUPARMAN ADMITTED THIS CHANGE WILL MAKE LITTLE DIFFERENCE OPERATIONALLY IN THE STREETS OF JAKARTA.

4. (C) MG SUPARMAN DOWNPLAYED REPORTS OF PROBLEMS BETWEEN ARMY AND POLICE PERSONNEL. HE SAID THAT COOPERATION BETWEEN POLICE AND MILITARY UNITS IN JAKARTA HAS

BEEN GOOD. GENERAL RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE) HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED

AND DISSEMINATED TO SECURITY FORCES. THESE ROE DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN RESPONSE TO DEMONSTRATIONS, RIOTS, LOOTING AND OTHER CRIMINAL ACTS. SUPARMAN SAID THAT JAKARTA POLICE ARE IN CHARGE OF

METRO SECURITY AND RIOT CONTROL OPERATIONS. MILITARY UNITS ARE ATTACHED TO THE POLICE. ONLY IF THE SITUATION BECOMES CRITICAL

(b)(1), 1.4(c)

WILL THE ARMY TAKE OVER OPERATIONS.

5. (C) SUPARMAN SAID NEW CIVILIAN MILITIA RECRUITS (WHICH HE REFERRED TO AS "KAMRA," NOT "RATIH") ARE CURRENTLY BEING TRAINED BY THE INDUK (TRAINING) REGIMENT AT KODAM JAYA. MOST OF THE INSTRUCTORS ARE FROM THE POLICE - THE KODAM IS PRIMARI LY PROVIDING

TRAINING FACILITIES. SUPARMAN CONTENDED THE MILITIA FORCES ARE DEFINITELY NEEDED. THEY WILL BE ARMED WITH BATONS AND SHIELDS. THEY WILL BE ADEQUATELY TRAINED AND SUPERVISED TO ASSIST THE POLICE IN MAINTAINING LAW AND ORDER. HE SAID THAT AFTER THE ELECTIONS, HE EXPECTS THE MILITIA FORCES TO BE INCORPORATED AS FULL-TIME PARAMILITARY MEMBERS. (b)(3):10 USC 424 KAMRA (KEAMANAN

RAKYAT - PEOPLE'S SECURITY) IS AN ALREADY EXISTING PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATION THAT IS UNDER CONTROL OF THE POLICE.)

6. (C) MG SUPARMAN SAID DURING THE 13 NOVEMBER "SEMANGGI INCIDENT" POLICE RETAINED COMMAND CONTROL OF SECURITY OPERATIONS

THROUGHOUT. HE SAID HE WAS OVERHEAD IN A MILITARY HELICOPTER OBSERVING THE ACTION. BASED ON THE SCALE OF THE CONFRONTATION THAT TOOK PLACE, SUPARMAN SAID HE EXPECTED A LARGER NUMBER OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES, AROUND 200. THE ACTUAL FIGURES, HE SAID, WERE 55 PERSONS INJURED OR KILLED BY RUBBER BULLETS AND FIVE OR SIX HIT BY LIVE 5.56MM BALL AMMUNITION.

(b)(1),1.4(c)

7. (C) SUPARMAN SAID HE WAS JUST AS SURPRISED AS EVERYONE ELSE WHEN HE FIRST HEARD THE REPORTS ABOUT USE OF LIVE AMMUNITION. SOLDIERS WERE NOT ISSUED BALL AMMUNITION AND NO COMMAND WAS ISSUED

TO USE LIVE AMMUNITION. SUPARMAN SAID HE AND HIS PERSONNEL IN KODAM JAYA HAD COOPERATED FULLY WITH MILITARY POLICE INVESTIGATORS

WHO HAD QUESTIONED SOLDIERS, COLLECTED SUSPECT WEAPONS AND (BALL4SQIC EVIDENCE. HE AGREED WITH COMMENT THAT THE INVESTIGATION IS DRAGGING ON AND IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR ABRI TO RELEASE THE RESULTS QUICKLY. SUPARMAN SAID HE DIDN'T THINK THE BALISTICS TESTS HAD PRODUCED ANY CLEAR ANSWERS YET, NOTING THAT BALLISTICS TESTING TECHNIQUES IS AN AREA WHERE HE THOUGHT ABRI COULD USE SOME ASSISTANCE. SUPARMAN SAID THAT KODAM JAYA OFFICERS

ON SECURITY DUTY ARE NOT ARMED WITH LIVE AMMUNITION, BUT DO CARRY

TEAR GAS PISTOLS.

8. (C) REGARDING THE PRESS REPORTS THAT MORE THAN 100 SOLDIERS HAD BEEN DISCIPLINED FOLLOWING THE SEMANGGI INCIDENT, MG SUPARMAN

SAID SOLDIERS WERE IDENTIFIED AND CHARGED WITH USE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE ON THE BASIS OF VIDEO EVIDENCE OF THE INCIDENT, MOSTLY FOR DISCHARGING THEIR WEAPONS (WITH RUBBER BULLETS) WITHOUT PERMISSION

AND USE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE AGAINST DEMONSTRATORS. BASED ON THE

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SEVERITY OF THE VIOLATION, SOLDIERS HAD BEEN GIVEN ONE OF THREE LEVELS OF PUNISHMENT - 21 DAYS DETENTION, 10 DAYS DETENTION, OR EXTRA DUTY/CONFINEMENT TO BARRACKS. ALL OF THOSE DISCIPLINED HAVE

RETURNED TO THEIR UNITS. SUPARMAN DESCRIBED MORALE IN THE COMMAND

(b)(1), 1.4(c)

AS "TETAP" TRANSLATION "RELATIVELY GOOD").

9. (C) MG SUPARMAN SAID THAT ALTHOUGH HE AND HIS STAFF ARE MAINTAINING OPEN DIALOGUE WITH THE VARIOUS STUDENT GROUPS, HE EXPECTS MORE TROUBLE IN THE MONTHS BEFORE THE ELECTIONS. HE SAID SOME OF THE STUDENT GROUPS HAVE ADOPTED AN AGGRESSIVE STRATEGY TO

CONFRONT AND PROVOKE THE SECURITY FORCES. THEIR AIM IS TO DISCREDIT THE MILITARY AND THE GOVERNMENT. ACCORDING TO SUPARMAN,

THE STUDENTS EXPECT TO TAKE CASUALTIES - WHICH WILL SERVE THEIR GOAL OF BRINGING DOWN THE GOVERNMENT.

10. (C) SUPARMAN SAID HE HAS BEEN DELUGED BY CALLS AND VISITS FROM VARIOUS POLITICAL FIGURES, INCLUDING LTG (RET) KEMAL ((IDRIS)) AND GEN (RET) ((RUDINI)). HE EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION ABOUT SOME OF THESE POLITICIANS' ATTITUDES AND THEIR CONTENTIONS THAT STUDENT GROUPS ARE INNOCENT AND PEACEFUL. ACCORDING TO SUPARMAN, IT IS THE STUDENTS WHO HAVE BECOME OVERLY AGGRESSIVE

ARE TRYING TO PROVOKE THE SECURITY FORCES BY THROWING ROCKS. MOLOTOV COCKTAILS AND HUMAN EXCREMENT. (b)(1),1.4 (c)

RIGHTS COMMISSION AND MEDIA GENERALLY HAVE NOT PORTRAYED STUDENTS

AS "OVERLY AGGRESSIVE." OUR CLOSE MONITORING OF STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS ALSO WOULD NOT SUPPORT THIS CHARACTERIZATION.) 11. (C) SUPARMAN EXPRESSED CONCERNS OVER THE POSSIBILITY OF DEMONSTRATORS EMPLOYING FIREARMS. HE SAID THAT DURING THE SEMANGGI INCIDENT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE HAD RECEI VED REPORTS THAT

SOME STUDENTS POSSESSED PISTOLS. HE ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THERE IS A PROBLEM WITH SMUGGLING AND BLACK MARKETING OF FIREARMS IN JAKARTA.

HE SAID WEAPONS ARE COMING INTO JAKARTA FROM OTHER AREAS LIKE ACEH. THE EXISTENCE OF A BLACK MARKET FOR TRADE OF PISTOLS AND RIFLES IN JAKARTA CREATES THE TROUBLING POSSIBILITY SECURITY FORCES COULD FACE ARMED RIOTERS AND DEMONSTRATORS.

12. (C) ASKED ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE PEMUDA PANCASILA YOUTH GROUP. IN RESPONSE, MG SUPARMAN SAID HE HAS A VERY POOR OPINION OF THE GROUP, DESCRIBING THEM AS THUGS AND CRIMINALS (PREMEN) OPERATING UNDER THE BANNER OF PANCASILA. HE EXPLAINED THAT YOUTH

GROUPS LIKE PEMUDA PANCASILA ARE PERMITTED BY LAW UNDER THE PURVIEW OF THE HOME MINISTRY. BUT IN REALITY, HE SAID, THE PEMUDA OPERATES LIKE A "MINI MAFIA," OBTAINING INCOME FROM INVOLVEMENT IN

ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES LIKE DRUGS, PROSTITUTION AND NIGHTCLUBS. HE CONCEDED THAT ABRI HAD PROVIDED UNIFORMS AND BASIC TRAINING TO

COMMENTS: 1.-(C) (b)(3):10 USC 424 MG SUPARMAN SPOKE OPENLY AND

FRANKLY. HE APPEARED SINCERE AND PROVIDED DIRECT RESPONSE TO SUPARMAN SPEAKS AND UNDERSTANDS EVERY QUESTION ASKED

ENGLISH REASONABLY WELL, ALTHOUGH HE HAD A TRANSLATOR PRESENT	
AND	
MOST OF THE CONVERSATION WAS IN INDONESIAN. AT SEVERAL POINTS	
DURING THE CONVERSATION REQUESTED CLARIFICATION FROM THE	
TRANSLATOR, TO MAKE SURE HE UNDERSTOOD THE GENERAL'S MEANING.	(b)(1),1.4 (c)
2. (C) IT IS CLEAR MG SUPARMAN UNDERSTANDS THE DIFFICULTY OF HIS	
MISSION TO MAINTAIN SECURITY IN THE CAPITAL DURING THE ELECT ION	
YEAR. HE APPEARS STEADFAST IN HIS RESOLVE TO MAINTAIN LAW AND	
ORDER DURING THE UNCERTAIN MONTHS AHEAD. SUPARMAN SERVED AS	
ASSISANT FOR TERRITORIAL OPERATIONS UNDER GEN WIRANTO IN 1995	
WHEN	
WIRANTO WAS THE KODAM JAYA COMMANDER. AS MENTIONED, HE	
SUBSEQUENTLY BECAME LTG YUDHOYONO'S CHIEF OF STAFF IN KODAM II.	
THUS, IT APPEARS HE IS WELL-CONNECTED AND LIKELY TRUSTED BY BOTH	
WIRANTO AND YUDHOYONO. SUPARMAN COMMANDED A BATTALION IN	
KODAM V,	
WAS COMMANDER OF KOSTRAD 13TH INFANTRY BRIGADE, AND, SERVED	
BRIEFLY AS THE KODAM V COMMANDER BEFORE BEING BROUGHT TO	
JAKARTA	
TO REPLACE MG ((SJAFRIE)) SJAMSOEDDIN AFTER THE MAY 1998 RIOTS.	(b)(1),1.4 (c)
ONE OF HIS STAFF OFFICERS TOLD SUPARMAN HAD ALSO SERVED WITH	
UNITED NATIONS FORCES IN BOSNIA, APPARENTLY HIS ONLY OVERSEAS	
DUTY. ASIDE FROM THAT, AND THE ONE YEAR STINT AS CHIEF OF STAFF	
FOR KODAM II IN SOUTH SUMATRA, HE HAS SPENT HIS ENTIRE CAREER ON	
THE ISLAND OF JAVA.	
E MODE ALONG AND	
3. (C) WHEREAS SUPARMAN WAS FRANK AND HONEST ABOUT THE WEAKNESSES OF THE POLICE FORCE, HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE POLICE IS	
,	
TYPICAL, I.E., THE POLICE WERE IN CHARGE OF OPERATIONS AT	
SEMANGGI, THEREFORE, THE BREAKDOWN OF COMMAND AND CONTROL	
WAS NOT	
REALLY AN ARMY PROBLEM. THE POLICE ARE ON THE FRONT LINES FACING	
ANGRY DEMONSTRATORS. WHEN THINGS GO WRONG, LIKE THE SEMANGGI	
INCIDENT OR THE TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY SHOOTINGS IN MAY 1998, ITS	
EASY FOR ABRI LEADERS TO BLAME THE POLICE. 4. (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424 (b)(3):10 USC 424	
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