



~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

~~NOFORN//X5~~

Defense Intelligence Agency

***Defense Executive Intelligence Note (DEIN)***

~~TS-4477-03~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

30 July 2003

**SUBJECT: ~~(C)~~ President Musharraf's Support to Militants in Kashmir**

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i),1.4 (c)

- ~~(S//NF)~~ Although Musharraf assured US officials that Pakistan closed militant camps operating in Pakistani Kashmir, they instead redeployed these militants to locations elsewhere in Pakistan. According to imagery, camps abandoned in summer and fall 2002 and May 2003 have been reactivated just outside Pakistani Kashmir in the Northwest Frontier Province. One camp in a remote area of Pakistani Kashmir also showed significant activity.

**~~(S//NF)~~ Musharraf's duplicity is driven by competing interests.**

- ~~(S//NF)~~ Musharraf is eager for aid from Washington, but he recognizes US interest in Pakistan as an ally in the war on terror and in Pakistani stability as leverage for furthering his agenda. Abandoning the fight for Kashmir would alienate him within the Army and the Pakistani populace, jeopardizing his leadership and possibly paving the way for a takeover by someone less favorable to US interests.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

- ~~(S//NF)~~ Pakistan's support to anti-Indian militants includes active support of groups designated as terrorist organizations by the US and banned by Pakistan. Some of

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these groups have sheltered, supported and funded top Al Qaeda members escaping Afghanistan, and have targeted – but not yet struck – the United States.

- ~~(S//NF)~~ Musharraf probably views the Kashmir militancy as a vent for extremists who might otherwise destabilize Pakistan, as well an asymmetric lever to compel India into negotiations on Kashmir. At the same time, Musharraf seeks to hide and restrain the militants in order to reduce the risk of massive Indian retaliation or US pressure.

~~(S//NF)~~ **Balancing conflicting international and domestic pressures leads Musharraf to calibrate militant support based on prevailing pressures.**

- ~~(S//NF)~~ When tensions with India are high, when US diplomatic pressure is strong, or when progress with India appears likely, Musharraf restricts and better disguises militant activity. He responded to pressure in Jan/Feb 2002 and May/June 2002 by cracking down on militants. When confronted with evidence of continued militant support this spring, Musharraf reacted immediately by promising to disband militant camps. We saw the relocation of militants to camps outside Kashmir to hide them from our satellites, militant groups were ordered not to carry out high profile attacks, and infiltration decreased. This indicates that Musharraf responds to external pressure by reducing militant visibility and support

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- ~~(S//NF)~~ He is acutely aware of his position with the United States. He perceives that Pakistan's strategic value to the United States allows for greater leniency regarding militant support, but he wants US economic and military aid packages.

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*This Note is produced biweekly in response to continued interest by senior Pentagon officials.*