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	BODY
	(U) DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE REPORT - TERRORISM (U) 20 MAY 2011
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USC 424	OPERATIVES BOTH FORMALLY AND INFORMALLY ALIGNED WITH AL-QAIDA TO
	PURSUE RETALIATORY ATTACKS AGAINST U.S. AND OTHER WESTERN TARGETS,
	PARTICULARLY THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. OVER THE LONG TERM, HOWEVER, WE EXPECT AL-QAIDA'S TRANSNATIONAL
	NETWORK WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY DECENTRALIZED AS AL-QAIDA'S REGIONAL
	NODES DIVERGE FROM AL-QAIDA LEADERSHIP AND FOCUS ON INDIVIDUAL
	PRIORITIES. THE IMPACT WOULD BE COMPOUNDED BY A RAPID, SUCCESSIVE
	LOSS OF BIN LADIN DEPUTY AYMAN AL-ZAWAHIRI, ESPECIALLY AS AL-QAIDA STRIVES TO PORTRAY ITSELF AS A VIABLE AND UNIFIED MOVEMENT DESPITE
	THE LOSS OF ITS MOST PROMINENT LEADER.
(b)(3):10	(S) BIN LADIN WAS A SYMBOLIC AND UNIFYING FIGURE, AND WE JUDGE
USC 424	THAT HIS DEATH WILL EXPAND EXISTING FISSURES AMONG AL-QAIDA'S
	OPERATIONAL CADRES, PARTICULARLY AMONG SUPPORTERS AND MEMBERS FOR WHOM BIN LADIN RETAINED IMPORTANT STANDING AND AUTHORITY. HIS

(b)(3):10 USC 424

SECRET (b)(3):10 USC 424

PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT WAS CRITICAL IN ADVANCING AL-QAIDA'S STRATEGIC GOALS AND SOME AL-QAIDA SENIOR MEMBERS REMAINED IN THE ORGANIZATION LARGELY OUT OF PERSONAL RESPECT FOR HIM. IN PAKISTAN, WE JUDGE THAT AL-QAIDA WILL FACE CHALLENGES MAINTAINING STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIPS WITH LOCAL INSURGENT AND MILITANT LEADERS, SOME OF WHOSE RELATIONSHIPS WITH AL-QAIDA WERE BASED ON LOYALTY TO BIN LADIN. EROSION OF THOSE RELATIONSHIPS WILL SIGNIFICANTLY UNDERMINE AL-QAIDA'S ABILITY TO OPERATE IN THE REGION.

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(b)(1),1.4 (c)

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