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From: svcSMARTMFI
Sent: 2/11/2009 7:38:55 AM
To: SMART Core

Subject: [REDACTED]

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MRN: [REDACTED]
Released (DTG): Feb 11, 2009 / 1236Z (111141Z FEB 09)

From: [REDACTED]
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TO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

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RHMFIS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUZEHA/CDR USEUCOM [REDACTED] VAHINGEN GE/
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RHMFIS/SAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM [REDACTED] MACDILL AFB FL

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RUCQSAB/USSOCOM [REDACTED] MACDILL AFB FL

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A. AFGHANISTAN HAS NO CULTURE OF CONVENTIONAL POLITICS; NEITHER IT HAS ANY HISTORICAL PRECEDENCE OF WESTERN STYLE DEMOCRACY OR STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.

B. LOCAL CONCILIATION AND COMPROMISE ARE KEY TO SECTARIAN, ETHNIC AND FACTIONAL ISSUES.

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C. VILLAGE, TRIBAL AND REGIONAL LEADERS EXERT SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE OVER THEIR LOCAL POPULATION AND DOMINATE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE OF THE COUNTRY

D. SOME OF THESE LEADERS TERMED AS WARLORDS HAVE THEIR OWN MILITIA. THESE WARLORDS ARE FILTHY RICH, HOLD HIGH POLITICAL OFFICES AND POSITIONS.

E. THE MOST IMPORTANT EVENT IN THE RECENT POLITICAL HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN WAS CONDUCT OF PRESIDENTIAL AND PARLIAMENTARIAN ELECTIONS.

F. AS A RESULT OF THESE ELECTIONS MOST OF THE INFLUENTIAL WARLORDS, DRUG BARONS AND FORMER MUJAHIDEEN OCCUPIED THE POWER SEAT. HENCE, THE BICAMERAL PARLAIMENT OF AFGHANISTAN IS A COMPROMISE BETWEEN CENTRAL POWER AND REGIONAL INTERESTS.

G. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS ARE LIKELY TO BE CONDUCTED IN SEPTEMBER 2009. OUT OF FOUR PHASES FOUR WHICH WAS POSTPONED FOR A MONTH DUE TO SECURITY AND ECONOMIC REASONS HAS STARTED SINCE 20 JAN.

J. PRESIDENT KARZAI IS LIKELY TO HAVE A TOUGH CONTEST FROM THE MAIN RIVAL PARTY "UNITED NATIONAL FRONT" WHICH IS DOMINATED BY WARLORDS INFLUENTIAL EX ERSTWHILE NORTHERN ALLIANCE.


K. TO COUNTER THE GROWING INFLUENCE OF UNF, PRESIDENT KARZAI HAS ALSO

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FORMED A POLITICAL PARTY CALLED "HIZB-E-JAMHURI KHWAHAN AFGHANISTAN". IT IS A COALITION OF 13 POLITICAL PARTIES WHICH HAVE SECULAR INCLINATION AND WESTERN BACKING, HOWEVER, IT IS LEAST POPULAR IN THE RURAL AREAS.




N. IF THE CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION IN THE SOUTH DOES NOT IMPROVE DRAMATICALLY THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF NEXT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.

O. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS DETERMINED TO HOLD ELECTIONS IN 2009

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IT WAS AGREED FOR JOINT EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE DRUG SMUGGLING AND
TERRORISM IN AFGHANISTAN.

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(c),Sec.
1.4(d)

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A. 2008 HAS SEEN A MARKED WORSENING OF SECURITY SITUATION IN
AFGHANISTAN WITH VIOLENT INCIDENTS INCREASING BY ABOUT 50 PERCENT

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THAN PREVIOUS YEARS.

B. A RECENT REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON SECURITY AND
DEVELOPMENT (ICOS) / SENLIS COUNCIL REVEALS THAT TALIBAN NOW HOLD A
PERMANENT PRESENCE IN 72 PERCENT OF AFGHANISTAN, UP FROM 54 PERCENT A
YEAR AGO.

C. THE INSURGENCY EXPANDED GEOGRAPHICALLY IN 2007 AND INCREASED IN
INTENSITY IN 2008, ERODING THE CREDIBILITY OF NATO AND US.

D. HIGH PROFILE ATTACKS CONDUCTED DURING THE PAST FEW MONTHS INDICATE
THE SOPHISTICATION OF EQUIPMENT / IEDS AND TALIBAN / MUJAHIDEEN
INGRESS.

E. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS GETTING DESPERATE OVER THE BRUTE USE OF
FORCE AND HIGH COLLATERAL DAMAGE.

F. IN THE YEAR 2008, 262 NATO PERSONNEL, 6445 ANA, 2248 CIVILIANS AND
7645 ANTI COALITION MILITANTS WERE KILLED.

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A. OPIUM WAS THE MAJOR SOURCE OF FUNDING FOR THE MUJAHIDEEN
RESISTANCE AGAINST SOVIET OCCUPATION. THIS ILLEGAL BUSINESS WHICH

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WAS DELIBERATELY IGNORED AND PROLIFERATED, AFFORDED MANY WARLORDS THE
OPPORTUNITIES TO OBTAIN PERSONAL ARMIES, POLITICAL POWER BASES,
WEAPONS, ALLIES AND REPUTATIONS.

B. AFTER SOVIET WITHDRAWAL THESE ARMED GROUPS IN ORDER TO SURVIVE AND
FIGHT REQUIRED BOTH FINANCES AND WEAPONS THEREFORE THE RELIANCE ON
THE FUNDS GENERATED FROM THE OPIUM ASSUMED GREATER IMPORTANCE.

C. TODAY POPPY IS BEING CULTIVATED OVER 157,000 HECTARES OF AREA
WHILE MORE THAN 70,000 HECTARES OF LAND IS BEING USED FOR THE
CULTIVATION OF CANNABIS.

D. MORE THAN 70 PERCENT OF THE DRUGS TRAFFICKING IS WITH THE
CONNIVANCE OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, PROVINCIAL GOVERNORS ELECTED
MEMBERS AND POLICE CHIEFS.

E. UNODC REPORTS THAT TALIBAN ARE COLLECTING 10 PERCENT USHR TO OPIUM PROCESSING AND TRAFFICKING THAT MAY HAVE RAISED AN ADDITIONAL USD 200-400 MILLION SUFFICIENT TO KEEP THE INSURGENCY ON HYPE.

F. NUMBER OF POPPY FREE PROVINCES GREW TO 18 IN 2008 FROM 13 LAST YEAR. THERE WAS 19 PERCENT DECREASE IN POPPY CULTIVATION DURING CURRENT YEAR, WHILE CANNABIS CULTIVATION HAS BEEN REPORTED OVER 70,000 HECTARE.

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AFGHAN REFUGEES

6. SOME FACTS ARE:

A. TOTAL AFGHAN REFUGEES - 4.467 MIL (FROM 1990 TO 2005)

B. TOTAL REPATRIATED - 5.241 MIL (FROM 1990 TO DATE)

C. BALANCE - MINUS 0.774 MIL

D. CURRENT GROUND BALANCE - 2.5 TO 3 MIL

7. GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN DEvised A PROACTIVE STRATEGY FOR REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES BETWEEN THREE YEARS FROM 2007 TO 2009. HOWEVER, IN A MEETING WITH UNHCR PAKISTAN HAS AGREED TO EXTEND THE DEADLINE OF REPATRIATION BEYOND 2009. UNHCR AND PAKISTAN HAVE ALSO LAUNCHED A JOINT APPEAL TO RAISE USD 135 MILLION FOR DEVELOPMENT OF AREAS IN AFGHANISTAN.

8. AN INTERNATIONAL DAY CONFERENCE HELD ON 19 NOVEMBER IN KABUL. IT WAS ACKNOWLEDGED BY UN AND AFGHAN GOVERNMENT THAT REPATRIATION AND REHABILITATION OF THREE MILLION REGISTERED AFGHAN REFUGEES (TWO MILLION IN PAKISTAN AND ONE MILLION IN IRAN) WAS A BIG CHALLENGE FOR

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AFGHANISTAN AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. AFGHAN GOVERNMENT ENVISAGES RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES BY 2013 REQUIRING APPROXIMATELY USD 600 MILLION.

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A. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY NEED TO UNDERSTAND THAT IT IS NOT PAKISTAN ONLY WITH WHOM AFGHANISTAN SHARE ITS BORDERS. THERE ARE FIVE MORE COUNTRIES BORDERING AFGHANISTAN WHO ALSO HAVE CONSIDERABLE STAKES IN AFGHANISTAN AND THROUGH WHICH WEAPONS FLOWS IN TO AFGHANISTAN AND INSURGENTS MAINTAIN THEIR BASES.

B. MOST OF THESE COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN PLAYING THEIR ROLE IN ONE WAY OR THE OTHER IN KEEPING THE AFGHAN CAULDRON BOILING.

C. BESIDES GEOGRAPHICAL CONTIGUOUS NEIGHBOUR THERE ARE FAR DISTANT NATIONS RETAIN SUFFICIENT POCKETS OF INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN AND ARE EQUALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR AFGHAN INBROGLIO.

D. PAKISTAN NEVER DENIED CROSS BORDER MOVEMENT.

E. MOST OF THE BORDER CROSSING TAKES PLACE FROM UNFREQUENTED ROUTES.

F. PRESENCE OF REFUGEES - MAJOR CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IN THE CONTEXT OF QQQQ

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11. THE SOLUTION TO AFGHANISTAN'S PROBLEMS IS INHERENTLY POLITICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL. GIVEN ENORMOUS ETHNO - POLITICAL COMPLEXITIES OF THE PRESENT CONFLICT, A STABLE AFGHANISTAN SEEMS TO BE A TALL ORDER. INTERNAL DIMENSION OF AFGHAN CONFLICT NEEDS TO BE ADDRESSED FIRST, I.E. RESOLVING THE ISSUE OF WARLORDISM, DRUG TRADE, REPATRIATION/REHABILITATION OF AFGHAN REFUGEES, BUILDING OF SECURITY

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AND JUSTICE APPARATUS AND PROVISION OF BASIC AMENITIES TO COMMON AFGAN.

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