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
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SUBJ:/SOUTH AFRICA-TRANSKEI DEFENSE	
VIEW OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND A NEW SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE	
FORCE. (U) WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT	
FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED	
-SECRET.	
- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (b)(3):10 USC 424	
DOI: (U) 930126.	
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(b)(1);	; Sec. 1.4(c)
SUMMARY: <del>(C)</del> HOLOMISA BELIEVES THAT HIS FUTURE IN	
POLITICS IS NOT CERTAIN BECAUSE HE REALIZES HE CANNOT	
COMPETE WITH NELSON MANDELA FOR SUPPORT IN TRANSKEI. HE	
WANTS TO BE A PLAYER IN THE NEW GOVT AND WILL USE HIS MILITARY CREDENTIA LS TO SEEK A POST IN THE SADF.	
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TEXT: 1. <del>(S)</del> IN JANUARY 1993 THE OFFICIAL VIEW OF THE	
TRANSKEI DEFENSE FORCE (TDF) HAS THAT NEGOTIATIONS	
BETWEEN THE SAG, ANC, IFP, TVBC STATES AND OTHER	
POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS WERE NOT GOING WELL AND THAT	
THERE WAS NO WAY AGREEMENT ON AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT WOUL BE REACHED IN 1993.	
DE REACHED IN 1995.	
	(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(c); Sec. 1.4(d)
	(b)(3):10 USC 424


Page 3 of 5 Search Display (b)(3):10 USC 424 (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(c); Sec. 1.4(d) 2. A. (S) ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT ISSUES FACING THE NEGOTIATIONS IS WHAT TO DO ABOUT THE VARIOUS MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES. THE TDF BELIEVES THAT COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THESE FORCES DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS AND PARTICULARLY DURING AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT PHASE WILL BE CRITICAL. THE TDF WILL CALL FOR A INTERIM DEFENSE COUNCIL WHICH WILL HAVE REPRESENTATIVE OF EACH MAJOR PARTY ON IT. THIS COUNCIL WILL IN EFFECT BECOME THE CIVILIAN EXECUTIVE ARM (SUBORDINATE TO THE INTERIM EXECUTIVE) WHICH WILL MAKE THE BROAD POLICIES FOR THE NEW DEFENSE FORCE. THESE POLICIES WILL REFLECT THE WILL OF THE NEW INTERIM EXECUTIVE. (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(c); Sec. 1.4(d) B. (S) DIRECTLY SUBORDINATE TO THIS ORGANIZATI ON THE TDF ENVISIONS AN INTERIM MILITARY COUNCIL WHICH WILL HAV SENIOR UNIFORMED MEMBERS FROM ALL THE PARTICIPATING PARTIES. THIS COUNCIL WILL ISSUE THE NECESSARY ORDERS 0 A DAY TO DAY BASIS. THEY WILL DIRECT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NEW DEFENSE FORCE. THE TDF ENVISIONS THAT THE SENIO MEMBERS OF EACH ORGANIZATION'S MILITARY OR PARAMILITARY FORCES WOULD BE ON THIS COUNCIL. THE CHAIRMANSHIP WILL BE ROTATED REGULARLY AMONG THE MEMBERS. (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(c); Sec. 1.4(d) 3.(S) ROLE OF MAJOR GENERAL HOLOMISA:

ULTIMATELY, MAJOR GENERAL HOLOMISA DOES NOT SEE HIMSELF AS A CIVILIAN POLITICAL LEADER WITHIN A NEW SOUTH AFRICA POLITY. HOWEVER, HE WOULD NOT BE ADVERSE TO BECOMING CHIEF OF THE NEW SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE. HE KNOWS THAT HE HAS NO POLITICAL SUPPORT WITHIN THE TRANSKEI, WHICH IS SOLIDLY BEHIND THE ANC AND NELSON MANDELA. HOWEVER, HE DOES BELIEVE THAT HE HAS SUPPORT WITHIN THE RANK AND FILE OF THE ANC FOR THE POST OF CHIEF OF THE DEFENSE FORCE. HE BELIEVES HE HAS THIS SUPPORT BECAUSE OF HIS CONSIDERABLE PROFESSIONAL MILITARY QUALITIES AND EXPERIENCE. HE DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE ANY MK SENIOR LEADERS WHO HAVE THE PROFESSIONAL MILITARY

(b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3):10 USC 424





(b)(3):10 USC 424