



(b)(3):10 USC 424


(b)(3):10 USC 424; (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

Pages 7 thru 9 Withheld in full



(b)(3):10 USC 424

R 080753Z SEP 92  
FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC  
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC  
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC  
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC  
RUFGAID/USEUCOM [redacted] VAIHINGEN GM



(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

RHHMMCY/JICPAC HONOLULU HI



(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)


RUCBSAA/USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA [redacted]  
RUWSMXI/AMC [redacted] SCOTT AFB IL [redacted]  
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC [redacted] MACDILL AFB FL

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)




RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GM

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)



RUEALGX/SAFE  
R 080741Z SEP 92


(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)



(b)(3):10 USC 424

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC  
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

(b)(3):10 USC 424




(b)(3):10 USC 424

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC  
RUSNNOA/HQUSEUCOM VAIHINGEN GM  
RUGAID/USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GM//

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)



(b)(3):10 USC 424; (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

BT  
CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 06

(b)(3):10 USC 424

~~CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN~~

(b)(3):10 USC 424; (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

SERIAL: (U)

/\*\*\*\*\* THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE \*\*\*\*\*/

BODY

(b)(3):10 USC 424

COUNTRY: (U) SOUTH AFRICA (SF).


SUBJ: SOUTH AFRICA--SADF VIEW OF  
INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION - THE SAP MAY DISAGREE (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY  
EVALUATED INTEL. REPORT IS CLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN~~.


- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

(b)(1); (b)(3):10 USC 424; (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i); Sec. 1.4(c)

DOI: (U) 920826.



(b)(3):10 USC 424



(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(c)

[REDACTED] SOUTH AFRICAN INTERNAL

SECURITY SITUATION BASED ON A MILITARY-STRATEGIC APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION AS FOLLOWS--

## -MAIN CHARACTERISTICS

--SECURITY SITUATION - THE SECURITY FORCES ARE INCREASINGLY INHIBITED/RESTRICTED/DISCREDITED AS THEY ATTEMPT TO DEAL WITH UNREST. THEIR INFLUENCE IS INCREASINGLY BEING MARGINALIZED BY THE INCREASING VIOLENCE. THERE IS MULTIPOLARIZATION ACROSS THE TOTAL SOCIAL SPECTRUM AND A NEGATIVE CUMULATIVE POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT.

--THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SITUATION IS THAT SOUTH AFRICA'S POPULATION CURRENTLY HAS UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS OF WHAT THE FUTURE BRINGS. ADDED TO THIS ARE INTIMIDATION BY SOME GROUPS TO GAIN SUPPORT FOR STRIKES AND MASS ACTION, A MISTRUST OF THE SECURITY FORCES (LARGELY DUE TO THE ROLE OF PROPAGANDA), AND A GROWING CAMPAIGN OF VIOLATIONS OF PEACE ACCORDS BY THE ANC AND OTHER ALLIANCE MEMBERS. THE SADF BELIEVES THAT THE VIOLENCE HAS CREATED A "CLIMATE OF SUBORDINATION" WHICH SPELLS TROUBLE IN ANY FUTURE DEMOCRATIC ELECTION PROCESS. IN OTHER WORDS THE SADF BELIEVES THAT MANY OF THE PEOPLE ARE AFRAID TO ACT ON THEIR OWN AND ARE EASILY INTIMIDATED BY THE VARIOUS POLITICAL GROUPS.

[REDACTED] (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(c)

--SOCIAL SITUATION - SOUTH AFRICA CURRENTLY SUFFERS FROM RISING UNEMPLOYMENT (CURRENTLY OVER 6 MILLION AND EXPECTED TO INCREASE BY ANOTHER 500,000 NEXT YEAR), INADEQUATE HOUSING (EXACERBATED BY THE URBAN INFLUX BROUGHT ON BY THE DROUGHT), INADEQUATE INFRASTRUCTURE, THE POLITICIZATION OF EDUCATION AND YOUTHS WHO ARE OUT OF CONTROL.

--ECONOMIC SITUATION - THE ECONOMY IS IN DECLINE, AND THE POINTS OF PRODUCTION HAVE BEEN MADE A "BATTLEFIELD" BY OPPOSITION GROUPS. UNEMPLOYMENT WILL LIKELY RISE AND INVESTOR CONFIDENCE WILL FALL, WHILE EXTERNAL AID WILL BE LINKED TO INTERIM GOVERNMENT.

## -MAIN ACTORS:

--ANC/SACP/COSATU ALLIANCE - CURRENTLY DOMINATED BY RADICALS, AS SHOWN BY THE ALLIANCE'S WITHDRAWAL FROM NEGOTIATIONS. [REDACTED] CHARACTERIZED THREE DIVISIONS IN THE ALLIANCE - THE RADICALS (CHRIS ((HANI)), JOE ((SLOVO)), RONNIE ((KASRILS))); THE PRAGMATISTS (NELSON ((MANDELA)), CYRIL ((RAMAPHOSA))); AND THE REALISTS (OR "DOVES")(JOE ((MODISE))(WHO IS NOT A COMMUNIST), THABO ((MBEKI)). THE ASSESSMENT IS THAT THE PRAGMATISTS CAN GO EITHER WAY IN SUPPORT OF THE RADICALS OR REALISTS. RIGHT NOW THE RADICALS HAVE THE UPPER HAND, AS SHOWN BY THE WITHDRAWAL FROM NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND THE

[REDACTED] (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(c)

[REDACTED] (b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3):10 USC 424

REPRIMAND MANDELA RECEIVED AFTER HIS APPARENT FLEETING RAPPROCHEMENT WITH PRESIDENT ((DE KLERK)). THE SADF CONTINUES TO CLAIM THAT 60 PERCENT OF THE ANC'S NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ARE SACP MEMBERS.

--INKATHA - WILL REMAIN REACTIONARY IN RESPONDING TO VIOLENCE AGAINST IT, BUT WILL NOT INITIATE VIOLENCE

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(c)

--AFRICANISTS - MILITANT POSTURE, BUT LIMITED INVOLVEMENT  
--WHITE REACTIONARIES - LIMITED MEANS BUT POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE REMAINS HIGH.

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(c)

--SECURITY FORCES - ONLY IMPLICATED IN VIOLENCE BY DOING THEIR JOB

-MANIFESTATIONS OF VIOLENCE

--AUG 92 SAW THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF VIOLENCE EVER, WITH 1331 INCIDENTS TO 23 AUG, AND 514 ON 3/4 AUG DAYS OF MASS ACTION. THERE WAS ALSO AN INCREASE IN VIOLENT METHODS, SUCH AS "NECKLACING", WITH 1641 DEATHS SO FAR IN 1992.

--CHARACTERISTICS - THE WITWATERSRAND WAS STILL THE FOCAL POINT OF VIOLENCE, WITH AN INCREASING VIOLENCE IN THE EASTERN AND WESTERN CAPE. LATERAL VIOLENCE IS ON THE RISE, AND THERE IS INCREASING INVOLVEMENT OF YOUTH IN VIOLENCE.

-CRITICAL ISSUES

--THERE MUST BE A FIRM RESOLVE ON THE PART OF ALL PARTIES TO NEGOTIATE FOR A WIN-WIN SITUATION IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST.

--ALL LEVELS OF THE POPULATION MUST BE INVOLVED, AND ALL MUST UTILIZE RESPONSIBLE STATESMANSHIP.

--ALL PARTIES MUST REALIZE THAT VIOLENCE IS NOT A VIABLE OPTION. CONTINUING VIOLENCE MUST BE ADDRESSED.

--TO ACCOMPLISH AN ECONOMIC UPTURN, WHICH IS NECESSARY, THERE MUST BE A CLEAR DECLINE IN VIOLENCE, INVESTOR CONFIDENCE MUST BE RESTORED AND MEANINGFUL PROGRESS MUST BE MADE TOWARDS A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL DISPENSATION.

-THE FUTURE

--THE CODESA PROCESS MAY BE FINISHED, AND PROGRESS MAY NOW HAVE TO BE MADE ON A BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL BASIS. NATIONAL PARTY NEGOTIATIONS WITH OTHER GROUPS COULD PRESSURE THE ALLIANCE IN FAVOR OF THE DOVES. THE ALLIANCE CANNOT AFFORD A SPLIT NOW - THE SACP IN PARTICULAR CANNOT DIVORCE ITSELF FROM THE ALLIANCE UNTIL AFTER THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT.

--THE ALLIANCE HAS NOT AS YET PLAYED THE MILITARY CARD.

(b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3);10 USC 424

ARMS SMUGGLING INTO SOUTH AFRICA CONTINUES TO RISE, AND MK STRUCTURES EXIST IN THE COUNTRY ON A WIDER BASIS THAN EVER BEFORE. THE MK CONTINUES TO TRAIN PERSONNEL BOTH INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY. MASS ACTION IS NOT YET OVER.

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(c)

ON CURRENT SADF/SAP

COOPERATION.

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(c)

-UNDER THE DEFENCE ACT

THE SADF CAN BE EMPLOYED IN THE DEFENSE OF THE COUNTRY, IN PREVENTION/SUPPRESSION OF TERRORISM, IN PREVENTION/SUPPRESSION OF INTERNAL DISORDER, IN THE PRESERVATION OF LIFE, HEALTH AND PROPERTY, AND IN THE MAINTENANCE OF ESSENTIAL SERVICES, INCLUDING MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER AND PREVENTION OF CRIME IN COOPERATION WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE (SADF CANNOT INVESTIGATE CRIME).

--THE SADF CAN ONLY WORK IN COOPERATION WITH THE SAP IF THE MINISTER OF LAW AND ORDER FORMALLY ASKS FOR HELP. --SADF ASSISTANCE TO THE SAP CAN BE DISCONTINUED OR SUSPENDED IN ANY AREA OR AT ANY PLACE IF THE MINISTER OF LAW AND ORDER REQUESTS THIS OF THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE, OR IF THE MINISTER OF LAW AND ORDER DEEMS IT EXPEDIENT FOR ANY OTHER REASON.

--SADF SUPPORT OF THE POLICE IS PERFORMED IN A CCORDANCE WITH--

---GUIDELINES REGARDING COOPERATION BETWEEN THE SADF AND SAP (NOT YET WORKED OUT IN DETAIL, SO NOT YET IN FORCE), AND UNDER THE COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE SADF AND SAP.

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(c)

---DIRECTIONS IN ORDERS ISSUED BY CHIEF SADF IN CONSULTATION WITH THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE REGARDING SPECIAL IDENTIFICATION MARKS TO BE WORN BY THE SADF WHILE PERFORMING SUCH SERVICE (CURRENTLY THE SADF IS NOT INVOLVED IN ENFORCING LAW AND ORDER, BUT IN SUPPRESSING UNREST).

--EMPLOYMENT OF SADF PERSONNEL ON SERVICE IN MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER OR IN PREVENTION OF CRIME IN COOPERATION WITH THE SAP MUST BE PUBLISHED IN THE GOVERNMENT GAZETTE WITHIN 24 HOURS OF SUCH AN OPERATION.

-JOINT SECURITY STAFF

--CONSISTS OF A POLICE LIEU TENANT GENERAL, CO-CHAIRING WITH THE CHIEF OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY (LGEN ((MERING))).

--MEETS AT SAP HEADQUARTERS IN PRETORIA AND DECIDES ON THE TYPES OF OPERATIONS THE SADF WILL CARRY OUT.

--ONCE THE BROAD STRATEGIC OUTLINE IS DEFINED, A PLANNING DOCUMENT IS ISSUED THROUGH THE SADF TO SADF-EXECUTING COMMANDS, THROUGH SAP COMMAND CHANNELS TO ALL POLICE COMMANDS AND TO THE SECURITY COMMITTEE IN EACH OF THE TEN

(b)(3);10 USC 424

(b)(3);10 USC 424

(b)(3):10 USC 424

Pages 7 thru 9 Withheld in full

POLICE REGIONS OF THE COUNTRY.

-REGIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEES

--CHAIRD BY THE LOCAL SAP REGIONAL COMMISSIONER

--INCLUDES BOTH SAP AND SADF PERSONNEL

--WHEN THE BROAD STRATEGIC OUTLINES ARE RECEIVED FROM SAP HEADQUARTERS, PLANS HOW TO IMPLEMENT THE OUTLINE IN THE REGION.

-ALL SADF ELEMENTS MUST HAVE ONE POLICEMAN WITH IT WHEN PERFORMING DUTIES IN SUPPORT OF THE SAP. NO POLICEMAN ISSUES ORDERS TO SOLDIERS, AND VICE VERSA (UNLESS MARTIAL LAW IS DECLARED).

-THE SOUTH AFRICAN NAVY, AIR FORCE AND MEDICAL SERVICE CAN BE TASKED BY THE REGIONAL SECURITY COUNCILS AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVE S BROUGHT IN AS NECESSARY. THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY IS NORMALLY THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE.

-THE SADF CURRENTLY HAS ABOUT 10,000 TROOPS INVOLVED IN INTERNAL SECURITY OPERATIONS. THIS INCLUDES 4,500 ON BORDER DUTY (THE SADF MANS BORDER POSTS ON SOUTH AFRICA'S BORDERS WITH MOZAMBIQUE, LESOTHO, SWAZILAND, ZIMBABWE AND BOTSWANA). THE REMAINDER ARE PERFORMING IN SUPPORT OF THE SAP OR ARE IN THE "SELF-GOVERNING STATES" (READ HOMELANDS).

-THE LIMIT ON THE NUMBER OF TROOPS THE SADF CAN PROVIDE IS DEPENDENT ON HOW MANY ARE AVAILABLE. IF NUMBERS ON HAND ARE NOT SUFFICIENT, THE CHIEF OF THE ARMY CAN CALL UP CITIZENS FORCE OR COMMANDO UNITS AS NEEDED (NO PERMISSION IS REQUIRED TO CALL UP OR DEPLOY TROOPS BEYOND THAT OF THE CHIEF OF THE ARMY). THE SAP OUTLINES THE REQUIRED TASKS; THE SA ARMY DECIDES ON THE FORCE LEVEL TO BE APPLIED.

[Redacted]

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(c)

-WHEN ASKED IF SADF TROOPS FIND TOWNSHIP DUTY DISTASTEFUL,

[Redacted] THE SADF WOULD LIKE TO NOT BE INVOLVED IN

DUTIES IN SUPPORT OF THE SAP AT ALL. HE SAID SOME PERSONNEL DON'T LIKE IT, BUT MOST WILL FOLLOW THEIR ORDERS. IT WAS ADDED THAT, ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, YOUNG NATIONAL SERVICEMEN (READ DRAFTEES) ARE EXPOSED TO THE REAL NATIONAL SITUATION. WHILE THIS REALLY IS NOT A PROPER SADF FUNCTION, IT MUST BE DONE.

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(c)

[Redacted]

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(3):10 USC 424

[Redacted]