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RUEKJCS

98379
SECT 01 OF 98379
SECT 1-2 OF 2

ACTION

IDIA(15)

DISTR

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

NOFORN

(056) *nm*

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

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REC'D (b)(3):10 USC 424 6 FEB 78

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ NOFORN SECTION 1 OF 2 (b)(3):10 USC 424

SUBJ: THIS IS (b)(3):10 USC 424

1. COUNTRY: ARGENTINA (ARY)
2. REPORT NUMBER: (b)(3):10 USC 424
3. TITLE: (U) POLITICAL - CHILEAN POSITION ON THE BEAGLE CHANNEL
4. PROJECT NUMBER: N/A
5. DATE OF INFORMATION: 7801
6. DATE OF REPORT: 780131
7. DATE & PLACE OF ACQUISITION: 780130

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8. REFERENCES: (b)(3):10 USC 424
9. ASSESSMENT:
10. ORIGINATOR:
11. REQUEST EVALUATION: OMIT
12. PREPARING OFFICER: (b)(3):10 USC 424
13. APPROVING AUTHORITY:
14. SOURCE: (b)(3):10 USC 424
15. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: DIRC NO - NOFORN (b)(3):10 USC 424

16. SUMMARY: (C/NOFORN) CHILEAN OFFICIAL OUTLINES MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE NEGOTIATING POSITION FOR HIS COUNTRY IN BEAGLE DISPUTE. REITERATES THAT GOC PERCEIVES PROBLEM IN BEAGLE AREA IS ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT COVER UP FOR DOMESTIC PROBLEMS.

(b)(1);1.4 (c)

ARMED CONFLICT IN THE BEAGLE CHANNEL AREA, UNLESS ARGENTINA ATTEMPTS TO LAND TROOPS ON SOME OF THE ISLANDS THAT ARE IN DISPUTE. (b)(1);1.4 (c) CHILEAN ADHERENCE TO THE DECISION ON THE BEAGLE CHANNEL AREA, AND THE LACK OF SERIOUSNESS ON THE PART OF ARGENTINA. ACCORDING (b)(1);1.4 (c) THE ARGENTINE REJECTION OF THE ARBITRATION REFLECTS THIS LACK OF SERIOUSNESS, AND THE FACT THAT ARGENTINA IS USING THE BEAGLE DISPUTE TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM SERIOUS DOMESTIC POWER STRUGGLES.

2. (C/NOFORN) (b)(1);1.4 (c) THE KEY TO SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BEAGLE ISSUE IS THE ARGENTINE AIR FORCE. (b)(1);1.4 (c) IS THAT THE AIR FORCE WILL AGAIN PLAY ITS ROLE OF DECIDING THE VOTE WITHIN THE JUNTA WHEN THE FINAL DECISION IS MADE ON WHAT ARGENTINA CAN ACCEPT. (b)(1);1.4 (c) SAID THDL HE THOUGH THE MOST IMPORTANT PERSON IN DETERMINING THE FINAL GOA POSITION WILL BE BRIGADIER LAMI DOZO, THE ARGENTINE AIR FORCE SECRETARY GENERAL, (b)(1);1.4 (c)

(b)(1);1.4 (c) THE AIR FORCE WILL HAVE THE FINAL WORD IN THE DECISION BECAUSE THE ARMY AND THE NAVY WILL HAVE OPPOSING POSITIONS AND THE AIR FORCE WILL VOTE WITH ONE OR THE OTHER. (b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT ADMIRAL MASSERA, AND THE NAVY, WERE TAKING A HARD LINE, WHILE VIDELA IS TRYING TO FIND A SOLUTION THAT WILL BE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH COUNTRIES. ACCORDING (b)(1);1.4 (c) IS PERCEIVED IN CHILE AS AN EXCELLENT NEGOTIATOR, BUT A REALIST WHO KNOWS THE LIMITS EACH NATIONS IS

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WILLING TO ACCEPT.

3. ~~(C/NORM)~~ (b)(1);1.4 (c) THE SEVERAL PROPOSALS THAT CHILE IS REPORTED TO SUPPORT, INCLUDING ONE THAT WOULD CARRY CHILEAN TERRITORIAL SEAS OUT TO THE SANDWICH ISLANDS.

(b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT ALL THE THEORIES AND SUPPOSED CHILEAN POSITIONS ARE SIMPLY BEST CASE POSTURES THAT CHILE PUT FORTH TO BE ABLE TO NEGOTIATE. (b)(1);1.4 (c)

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SECT 02 OF 98379

ACTION

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC (b)(3):10 USC 424
INFO RULPALJ/USCINCSO QUARRY HTS CZ

(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~/NOFORN SECTION 2 OF 2
 HAS NO REAL PRETENTIONS IN THE ATLANTIC. RUMORS THAT THE
 GOC IS SEEKING A TWO HUNDRED MILE LIMIT TO THE EAST OF NUEVA
 ISLAND ARE POSTURES DEVELOPED FOR DOMESTIC CHILEAN
 CONSUMPTION, AND TO MAKE IT APPEAR THAT CHILE IS THE MOST
 FORTHCOMING WHEN IT EVENTUALLY ACCEPTS A MORE REASONABLE
 SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM. [REDACTED] THEN TOOK OUT A MAP OF
 THE AREA AND DESCRIBED [REDACTED] THE FUNDAMENTAL POSITION OF THE
 CHILEAN GOVERNMENT. THIS POSITION IS AN ARC WHICH GENERALLY
 FOLLOWS FROM TWELVE MILES TO THE EAST OF NUEVA ISLAND AND

(b)(1);1.4 (c)

(b)(1);1.4 (c)

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PROCEEDS SOUTH TO CAPE HORN, KEEPING TWELVE MILES TO THE EAST OF ALL THE SMALL ISLANDS SOUTH OF THE BEAGLE CHANNEL, AS DEFINED BY THE ARBITRATION. (b)(1);1.4 (c) THIS WAS THE ESSENCE OF THE ARGENTINE POSITION THAT ADMIRAL MONTES BROUGHT WITH HIM TO CHILE ON 22 DEC, AND LATER WAS DISAVOWED BY THE JUNTA. (b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT HE FEELS ONCE THE POLEMICS, GENERATED IN LARGE PART BY MASSERA, HAS DIED DOWN, THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WOULD ACCEPT A BILATERAL AGREEMENT SIMILAR TO THE CHILEAN POSITION. (b)(1);1.4 (c) THEN ADMITTED THAT POSSIBLY BOTH GOVERNMENTS HAD BEEN TOO ACTIVE IN THEIR ATTEMPTS TO GENERATE DOMESTIC SUPPORT, AND THAT AS A RESULT, A COOLING OFF PERIOD WOULD BE NECESSARY BEFORE AN AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED AND PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED. (b)(1);1.4 (c) THE 180 DAYS FOR NEGOTIATIONS THAT REPORTEDLY WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE DOCUMENT TO BE SIGNED BY THE TWO PRESIDENTS WHEN THEY MEET IN EARLY FEBRUARY, WILL IN EFFECT BE A COOLING OFF PERIOD TO PERMIT DOMESTIC PUBLIC EMOTIONS TO SUBSIDE.

COMMENT: (C/NORON) (b)(1);1.4 (c) IN THE PAST, THAT GOC SEES THE ARGENTINE RESISTANCE TO NEGOTIATE AS AN ATTEMPT TO DRAW THE PUBLIC'S ATTENTION FROM SERIOUS DOMESTIC QUESTIONS (b)(3);10 USC 424 (b)(1);1.4 (c) OF BRIGADIER LAMI DOZO'S SKILL AS A NEGOTIATOR, BUT FEELS (b)(1);1.4 (c) SIMPLISTIC IN HIS ANALYSIS OF THE POSITIONS OF THE SEVERAL ARGENTINE MILITARY SERVICES AND THE DECISION MAKING WITHIN THE JUNTA. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE ARMY AND NAVY ARE SUPPORTING DIVERGENT POSITIONS CONCERNING ARGENTINA'S FINAL NEGOTIATING POSTURE. ALTHOUGH THE AIR FORCE HAS TENDED TO CAST THE SWING VOTE IN OTHER ISSUES BROUGHT BEFORE THE JUNTA, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE NOW THAT LAMI DOZO OR AGOSTI COULD CONVINCE THE OTHER TWO MEMBERS OF THE JUNTA TO ACCEPT A POSITION THAT IN THEIR VIEW COULD NOT BE "SOLD" TO THE ARGENTINE PUBLIC. THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL SOLUTIONS PROPOSED BY THE TWO SIDES. THE POSITION THAT (b)(1);1.4 (c) IS SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT FROM ALL THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PROPOSED TO DATE. THE POSITION THAT (b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c) WOULD IN EFFECT BE A COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE PROPOSALS MADE BY MONTES AND CHILEAN FOREIGN MINISTER CARVAJAL ON 22 DEC 77. (b)(1);1.4 (c) THE CHILEAN POSITION WOULD PERMIT ARGENTINA TO RETAIN CONTROL OVER MORE OF THE WATER TO THE EAST OF THE CAPE HORN MERIDIAN THAN WAS THE CASE IN EITHER THE MONTES OR THE CARVAJAL PROPOSALS. IF CHILE DOES IN FACT RENOUNCE ALL CLAIMS TO THE SEA BEYOND THIS TWELVE MILE ARC, THE GOA WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO REJECT THE POSITION. THIS MSG COORD W/AMEMBASSY, GDS DEC 84

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