JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
MESSAGE CENTER

VZCZCIEC#15 RUEKJCS ACTION	* ** ****	ZYUW	80618 50
DISTR CJCS(04) DJS(W ASD(1SA(10) DI CMC WASHINGTON CSAF WASHINGTO	ĎC	CC SECDEF(07)	
CNO HASHINGTON CSA HASHINGTON CIA SECSTATE HASHI HHITE HOUSE WA	DC HOR	REORN IMMEDIAT	ŧ
NSA WASH DC FILE(1) (056)			·
TRANSIT/041225Z/041 DE RUESBAA #0054 03 ZNY 8868 ZZK RUEKJ D 041225Z FEB 78 (b)(3):10 USC 424	51230		
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASH INFO RULPALJ/USCINC: (b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(3):50 USC	SO BUARRY HTS		171
BT		(b)(3):10 USC	7 FEB'78
SUBJ: THIS IS IR (b)(1. COUNTRY: (AR) 2. REPORT NUMBER:	b)(3):10 USC 424 3):10 USC 424 (b)(3):10 USC 424 ITARY INTENTIONS - BEAG	SLE CHANNEL	_
4. PROJECT NUMBER: 5. DATE OF INFORMA 6. DATE OF REPORT: 7. DATE AND PLACE 8. REFERENCE: (b)(3):	TION: 780203 - 780203 DF ACQUISITION: 780203	3 . Sky link fone:	
2 FEB, (b)(3):10 USC 424 PAGE: 1	S E C R E T		5 <i>6</i>

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PAGE: 2.	- SECHET	89.618
9. ASSESSMENT:	(b)(3):10 USC 424	
10. ORGINATOR:		
11. REQUEST EVA		
12, PREPARING O	FFACSITY	
13, APPROVING A		
14, SOURCES VA		(3):10 USC 424
15g. SPECIAL INS	TRUCTION: DIRC - NO - NOFORN	
1.2 SILMMADVE (U) THIS IR PROVIDES AN INTERIM R	FRPONSE TO DIA
MSG 2853 DTG 038		EOI ONOE. TO DEN
22. DETAILS: 1		NO INFORMATION
TO CONFIRM THE P	OSSIBILITY OF AN IMPENDING INVAS	
WOLLASTON ISLAND	GROUP BY THE ARGENTINE MARINE C	ORPS. DN 780111.
(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c) TO THE		THE BEAGLE
PROBLEMS, THE ES	SENCE OF: WHICH WAS (b)(3):10 USC 424	· · ·
(b)(1);1.4 (e) (b)(1);1.4 (THAT THE NAVY WAS PREPARED T	O OCCUPY SOME
ISLANDS NEAR THE	BEAGLE CHANNEL (NOT FURTHER IDE	NTIFIED)
(b)(1);1.4 AND MARINE ELEME	NTS IN SEVERAL STRATEGIC SOUTHER	
(c) HAD SEEN REINFOR		BO SAN ANTONION
ON 20 JAN 78 WM)	TE IN PUERTO BELGRANU" (D)(
	LOCATION AT LEAST ON THAT DATE.	
(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)	THAT THIS VESSEL ALONG WITH AN	LDU. AND
OTHER SUPPORT CE	APT WERE IN USHUAIA HARBOR (b)(3):1 IT IS QUITE# POSSIBLE THAT! TH <u>es</u>	E SMTDS COLL D
	D SOUTH IN: 10 DAYS. FINALLY, (b)	
	ED ARMY UNITS IN THE RID GALLEGE	
	IND 50 TANKS. THE IDENTIFICATION	
UNITS AND HELTCO	PTERS IS REASONABLE BUT IS DIFFI	CULT TO
BELIEVE THAT AM	13 TANKS IN THOSE QUANTITIES HAY	E BEEN
	THE MAJORITY OF AMX13 TANKS ARE	
	LOCATED AT MAGDALENA, BUENOS AL	
	IT WOULD BE' A VERY DIFFICULT, BE	
IMPOSSIBLE LOGIS	STICS: TASK TO MOVE: THE TANKS: TO F	10
GALLEGOS,	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
2. (C/NOFORN))(1);1.4 (c) WAS RECENTLY IN	PUERTO
BELGRANO STATE	HAT AS OF 2"FEB THE ARGENTINE N	VY15. LSD
AND THE NEW LAT	"CABO SAN ANTONIO" WERE NOT IN	UKT (b)(1);1.4 (c)
	THAT ALL BUT ONE DESTROYER (THE	
	RE: A TANKER'S THE HERCULES AND TI	
	CONTINUED THAT HOST OF THE NAV	
HELICOPTERS (SE	KNIGHTS, AND ALQUETTES) THAT A	RE USUALLY
STATION IN PUER	TO BELGRANO HAVE NOT BEEN THERE	SINCE-REPURE.

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	PAGE: 3	SEGRET	80618
		AS HEARD THAT THEY HAVE BEEN DEPL USHUAIA. ANDTHER (b)(1);1.4 (c)	DYED
(b)(1)		CHMENTS OF MARINES OCCUPIED THE I	SI AS
(-/(-/		W) LAST NEEK. FINALLY, ANOTHER (
	(b)(1);1.4 (c)		
		EEK AN ARMY RFT FROM COMODORO RIV	ADAVIA
		SUMABLY THE STHEINF RGT) AND AN	
		SOO FROM PUERTO: DESEADO (b)(3):10 USC 42	
		RECON SOO) REDEPLOYED TO THE AREA NEAR THE CHILEAN FRONTIER (A G	
(1);1.4		AGAINST THE CHILEAN 5TH AUSTRAL: D	
	3. (C/NOFORN) THE		(1);Sec. 1.4(c)
		FOR USHUAIA ON 020900Z FE	
		RON AT COMODORO RIVADAVIA, ON 2	
	USHUAIA ON 3, 4 FE		(b)(1);1.4 (c)
	TAKE PLACE IN RIO		
	(b)(1);1.4 (c)	E-TRIP (b)(3):10 USC 424 SHOULD HAVE	AN
		ARE EXPECTED TO RETURN TO BUENOS	ATDES
		THE INTERIM IT IS ALMOST IMPOSSI	
	TD (b)(1);1.4 (c)	SECAUSE OF THE VERY (b)(1);1.4 (
	(b)(1);1.4 (c)	. IN AUDITION, NO SECUR	
		AVAILABLE . (b)(3):10 USC 42	
		IS A GENERAL CONSENSUS AMONG OBS	
		T BE AN ARMED CONFRONTATION BETWE VERTHELESS, THE ARGENTINE ARMED F	•
	WILL WERELITUMS AC.	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	nurra
	HAVE IMPROVED THEIR	R MILLIARY POSICRE IN THE SOUTH	
	•	R MILITARY POSTURE IN THE SOUTH REFORE. DNE CAN NOT TOTALLY DISMI	SS THE
	CONSIDERABLY, THE	R MILITARY POSTURE IN THE SOUTH REFORE, DNE CAN NOT TOTALLY DISMI E ACTION SUCH AS THE OCCUPATION D	
	CONSIDERABLY. THEF POSSIBILITY OF SOME	REFORE, DNE CAN NOT TOTALLY DISHI	F THE
	CONSIDERABLY, THEF POSSIBILITY OF SOME WOLLASTON ISLAND GE USHUAIA, THE CAPAB	REFORE, ONE CAN NOT TOTALLY DISMI E ACTION SUCH AS THE OCCUPATION D ROUP. IF THE ARA LAD AND LST ARE ILITY EXISTS FOR SUCH AN ACTION.	F THE IN However,
	CONSIDERABLY. THEF POSSIBILITY OF SOME WOLLASTON ISLAND GE USHUAIA, THE CAPABE THE ABSENCE OF COME	REFORE, ONE CAN NOT TOTALLY DISMI E ACTION SUCH AS THE OCCUPATION D ROUP. IF THE ARA LAD AND LST ARE ILITY EXISTS FOR SUCH AN ACTION, BATANT AND SUPPORT SHIPS IN THE A	F THE IN However, Rea
	CONSIDERABLY. THEF POSSIBILITY OF SOME WOLLASTON ISLAND GROUND THE CAPABLE THE ABSENCE OF COME WOULD INDICATE THA	REFORE, ONE CAN NOT TOTALLY DISMINE ACTION SUCH AS THE OCCUPATION OF ROUP. IF THE ARA LAD AND LST ARE ILITY EXISTS FOR SUCH AN ACTION, BATANT AND SUPPORT SHIPS IN THE AT NO ACTION IS ANTICIPATED IN THE	F THE IN HOWEVER, REA IMMEDIATE
	CONSIDERABLY. THEF POSSIBILITY OF SOME WOLLASTON ISLAND GE USHUAIA, THE CAPABE THE ABSENCE OF COME WOULD INDICATE THAT FUTURE. AS FOR THE	REFORE, ONE CAN NOT TOTALLY DISMIE ACTION SUCH AS THE OCCUPATION DO ROUP. IF THE ARA LAD AND LST ARE ILITY EXISTS FOR SUCH AN ACTION, BATANT AND SUPPORT SHIPS IN THE AT NO ACTION IS ANTICIPATED IN THE E (b)(1);1.4 (c)	F THE IN HOWEVER, REA IMMEDIATE ATION OF THE
	CONSIDERABLY. THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME WOLLASTON ISLAND GOODS THE CAPABLY THE ABSENCE OF COME WOULD INDICATE THAT FUTURE. AS FOR THE ISLAS ORCADAS, IT	REFORE, ONE CAN NOT TOTALLY DISMIE ACTION SUCH AS THE OCCUPATION DO ROUP. IF THE ARA LAD AND LST ARE ILITY EXISTS FOR SUCH AN ACTION, BATANT AND SUPPORT SHIPS IN THE AT NO ACTION IS ANTICIPATED IN THE (b)(1);1.4 (c) DF THE OCCUP IS DIFFICULT TO SEE WHAT IMPACT 8	F THE IN HOWEVER, REA INMEDIATE ATION OF THE UCH AN
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,	CONSIDERABLY. THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME WOLLASTON ISLAND GOOD WHO THE CAPABLE THE ABSENCE OF COME WOULD INDICATE THAT FUTURE. AS FOR THE ISLAS ORCADAS, IT ACTION WOULD HAVE OF A NEW ARGENTINE POLICIAMS TO PREVENT	REFORE, ONE CAN NOT TOTALLY DISMIE ACTION SUCH AS THE OCCUPATION DO ROUP. IF THE ARA LAD AND LST ARE ILITY EXISTS FOR SUCH AN ACTION, BATANT AND SUPPORT SHIPS IN THE AT NO ACTION IS ANTICIPATED IN THE (b)(1);1.4 (c) DF THE OCCUP IS DIFFICULT TO SEE WHAT IMPACT SON THE BEAGLE SITUATION, IT COULLICY OF OCCUPYING ALL ISLANDS THA	F THE IN HOWEVER, REA INMEDIATE ATION OF THE UCH AN D REFLECT
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SECRET

OF PRESIDENT VIDELA'S LATEST LETTER TO PRESIDENT PINOCHET,
AMONG OTHER THINGS, VIDELA SAID THAT ARGENTINA HAD THE NONORABLE
TRADITION OF INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT OF NAVER HAVING USED THREATS
AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING ITS GOALS. TO EXECUTE A MILITARY
DPERATION ON THE HEELS OF SUCH A STATEMENT WOULD SERIOUSLY
DAMAGE VIDELA'S CREDIBILITY, THEREFORE, WHILE SUCH A
POSSIBILITY CANNOT BE DISCARDED, IT IS UNLIKELY. THIS MSG
CDDR W/AMEMBASSY, GDS DEC: 84
BT
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ANNOTES
BH 117

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