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SUBJ: THIS IS IR NO. (b)(3):10 USC 424 (U)

THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL

1. (U) COUNTRY: ARGENTINA (AR) CHILE (CI)
2. (U) REPORT NUMBER: (b)(3):10 USC 424
3. (U) TITLE: HOSTILITIES - MAJORITY OF ARGENTINE ARMY OFFICERS VIEW THE BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE WITH CALM (U)
4. (U) PROJECT NUMBER: AB
5. (U) DATE OF INFORMATION: 790831-790919
6. (U) DATE OF REPORT: 790925
7. (U) DATE AND PLACE OF ACQUISITION: 790831-790919, BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA
8. (U) REFERENCE: (b)(3):10 USC 424 CONTINUES
9. (U) ASSESSMENT: (b)(3):10 USC 424
10. (U) ORIGINATOR: (b)(3):10 USC 424
11. (U) REQUEST EVALUATION: NO
12. (U) PREPARING OFFICER: (b)(3):10 USC 424

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13. (U) APPROVING AUTHORITY: (b)(3);10 USC 424

14. (U) SOURCE: A. (b)(3);10 USC 424

15. (U) SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: DIRC-NO; NOFORN (b)(3);10 USC 424

16. (S/NOFORN) SUMMARY: THIS REPORT PROVIDES INFO GAINED (b)(1);1.4 (c) PRESENTLY (b)(1);1.4 (c)

NEITHER OF THESE INDIVIDUALS FORESEE THE BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE WITH CHILE BECOMING A REPLAY OF THE NEAR CONFRONTATION WHICH OCCURRED DURING THE 7810-7901 TIMEFRAME. (b)(1);1.4 (c)

(b)(1);1.4 (c) THE VIEW THAT OTHER MATTERS MORE PRESSING TO ARGENTINA'S NATIONAL INTEREST HAVE TAKEN PRECEDENCE OVER THE BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE AND BOTH EXPECT THAT THE GOVERNMENTS OF ARGENTINA AND CHILE WILL ACCEPT DECISIONS REACHED IN THE PAPAL MEDIATION.

22. (S/NOFORN) DETAILS:

A. (S/NF) (b)(1);1.4 (c), WHILE (b)(1);1.4 (c) (b)(1);1.4 (c) ON 790831, WHEN ASKED, (b)(1);1.4 (c) CONCERNING THE BEAGLE CHANNEL SITUATION. (b)(1);1.4 (c)

(b)(1);1.4 (c) AND ALTHOUGH (b)(1);1.4 (c) DAILY BASIS IS NATURALLY ATTUNED TO THE CURRENT MOOD AND THINKING CIRCULATING WITHIN (b)(1);1.4 (c)

(b)(1);1.4 (c) DOES NOT SEE THE BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE DEVELOPING INTO A MILITARY CRISIS SITUATION AS OCCURRED IN LATE 1978 (I.E. TO THE POINT OF WAR). (b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT OTHER INTERNATIONAL INCIDENTS HAD TAKEN PRECEDENCE OVER THE BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE. IN EXPLAINING THIS, (b)(1);1.4 (c) THE SITUATION IN IRAN AND NICARAGUA, ARGENTINA'S FOREIGN INTEREST HAVE TURNED FROM A QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY (SPECIFICALLY IN THE BEAGLE CHANNEL AREA) TO A QUESTION OF THE "MARXIST" THREAT IN LATIN AMERICA. IN EXPRESSING (b)(1);1.4 (c)

(b)(1);1.4 (c) THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY'S ((GEN VIOLA'S)) TRIP TO PARAGUAY IN AUG 79. HE INDICATED THAT VIOLA WENT TO PARAGUAY OBSTENSIVELY TO DISCUSS THE YACRETA AGREEMENT. (b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT WHILE DISCUSSING THE YACRETA PROBLEM, GEN VIOLA "GOT DOWN TO BRASS TACKS" WITH ((STROESSNER)) AND (b)(1);1.4 (c) VIOLA STATED TO STROESSNER THAT ARGENTINA AND PARAGUAY HAD TO CUT OUT THE DIPLOMATIC MANEUVERING BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AND START WORKING TOGETHER AGAINST THE POTENTIAL COMMON THREAT WHICH COULD THREATEN THEIR VERY EXISTENCE.

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(b)(1);1.4 (c)

GEN VIOLA SAID WHILE HE WAS IN PARAGUAY, BUT THIS IS THE RUMOR HE HAS BEEN PRIVY TO. (b)(1);1.4 (c)
PAPAL MEDIATION WILL PROBABLY BE PROLONGED THROUGH THE SUMMER MONTHS (BEST TIME FOR MILITARY ACTION) TO AVOID MAKING A DECISION WHICH MIGHT BE USED BY ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER FOR BEGINNING A SABER RATTLING EXERCISE OR ACTUAL MILITARY ACTION. (b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c) THAT THE POPE WAS SCHEDULED TO VISIT BRAZIL IN APPROXIMATELY 0005 (NFI). IT IS DURING THIS TIME THAT ARGENTINA EXPECTS THE POPE TO RENDER A DECISION AND UTILIZE THE OPPORTUNITY OF HIS TRIP TO

(b)(1);1.4 (c)

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

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INFO RULPALJ/USCINCSO QUARRY HTS CZ (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

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SECTION 2 OF 2

(b)(1);1.4 (c)

CONCERNING THE BEAGLE CHANNEL SITUATION, THE CONVERSATION

(b)(1);1.4 (c) ON 790919 DURING AN

(b)(1);1.4 (c), AGAIN, (b)(1);1.4 (c) AS A RESULT OF

(b)(1);1.4 (c)

(b)(1);1.4 (c), IS PRIVY TO OPINIONS WHICH ARE CURRENTLY CIRCULATING WITHIN THE HIERACHY OF THE ARMY. (b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT THE MAJORITY OF THE ARMY OFFICERS DO NOT VIEW RESOLUTION OF THE BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE COMING THROUGH A CONFLICT.

(b)(1);1.4 (c) THERE ARE A NUMBER OF FOOLS (BOLUDOS) WALKING AROUND WHO ARE STATING THAT A MILITARY SOLUTION IS THE BEST SOLUTION FOR ARGENTINA IN THE BEAGLE CHANNEL SITUATION. THESE INDIVIDUALS HAVE A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF SUPPORT, HOWEVER,

(b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT OFFICERS WHO THINK IN THIS MANNER ARE

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THINKING ABOUT THEIR OWN PERSONAL AMBITIONS RATHER THAN THE COUNTRY AND THEY ARE (b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c) IN THE MINDRITY. AGAIN, LIKE (b)(1);1.4 (c) ARGENTINA'S INTEREST NOW ARE CENTERED UPON THE THREAT OF MARXISM IN THE AMERICAS. (b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c) THE SITUATION IN IRAN AND NICARAGUA AS BEING TWO OF THE INTERNATIONAL EVENTS WHICH CHANGED ARGENTINE THINKING FROM THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE BEAGLE CHANNEL AREA TO QUESTIONS OF SURVIVABILITY AGAINST THE POTENTIAL MARXIST THREAT. (b)(1);1.4 (c) STATED THAT THE POPE WOULD RENDER A MEDIATION DECISION AND BOTH COUNTRIES (ARGENTINA AND CHILE) WOULD ABIDE BY THE MEDIATION. (b)(1);1.4 (c)

(C/NOPORN)

(b)(1);1.4 (c)

LONGER HOLDS THE PRIORITY INTEREST IN ARGENTINE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. ARGENTINA'S INTEREST, AS A RESULT OF EVENTS WHICH HAVE TRANSPIRED IN IRAN AND NICARAGUA, HAS SHIFTED TO THE INTERNATIONAL MARXIST THREAT TO THE AMERICAS. ALL OF (b)(1);1.4 (c)

IN THE PAST, HOWEVER, THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE ALL STATED

(b)(1);1.4 (c)

THE ARGENTINE MILITARY OFFICERS WANT TO SEE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION REACHED IN THE DISPUTE WITH CHILE. DURING 7809 AND 7810, HOWEVER, THE MAJORITY OF THE ARGENTINE OFFICERS WERE ALSO OF THIS SAME OPINION AND WANTED A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO BE REACHED AND ONLY A MINDRITY SPOKE ABOUT A RESOLUTION THROUGH ACTUAL CONFLICT. THERE IS STILL A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF VOCAL OFFICERS WHO WOULD RATHER SEE A MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT. AT THE PRESENT TIME, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT REASON IS STILL PREVAILING AND THAT THE MAJORITY ARE SEEKING A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION THROUGH PAPAL MEDIATION.

REVW: 25 SEP 1999.

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