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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

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	PAGE 2	_ 	2 	<u>112</u> 13
i.	12. (U)	PREPARING OFFICER: (b)(3):	10 USC 424	
	13. (0)	APPROVING AUTHORITY		
	14. (0)	SOURCE: (b)(3):10 USC 424		
K	15. (U)	SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: D	IRC-NO , NOF ORN (b)(3):10 USC 424	4
	(b)(3):10 US	C 424		
C				
- IC		THIS REPORT PROVIDES		
		THE ARGENTINE ARMY 5TH		
1		ATION EXERCISES WHICH OC		
C	SOUTHER	PART OF ARGENTINA, ALS	O REPORTED ARE EVENTS W	HICH
		ACE I <u>n the 3rd corps are</u>	A OF OPERATIONS IN THE	VICINITY
		OCHE (b)(1);1.4 (c)		
(C)		TION RECEIVED INDICATES		
	WERE GI	VEN THE ORDER TO ATTACK	CHILE WITH H-HOUR SET F	OR
	2460 HO	JRS ON 781222. THE ORDER	WAS REVOKED AT 1630 HR	5
	THE SAM	E DAY AND THE LAST UNIT	TO RECEIVE THE REVOCATI	ON ORDER
	WAS INF	DRMED AT 2130 HOURS.	$(h)(1)\cdot 1 + (c)$	
	22. 137	ORMED AT 2130 HUURS. Voforn) details: A. (8/n		
	(b)(1);1.4 (c)			
C				
(b)(1);1.4(c)	EXERCIS	ES. INDICATED THE FOL	LOWING OOB INFORMATIONS	j
(-)(-);(-)	(1) TEN	MARINE BATTALIONS WERE	STATIONED IN TJERRA DEL	
(FUEGO D	HRING THE PERIOD 7810/78	12. ADDITIONALLY THERE	WERE
		7) COMBAT SERVICE AND CO		
		ORT THE TEN (17) MARINE		
((2)(b)(1);		WERE TEN-THOUSAND (10,	000)
		ON THE ISLAND OF TIERRA		
		INDICATED THAT THERE WER		
ί.	ASSIGNE	N TO THE MARINE BATTALIO	NS FOR GENERAL SUPPORT.	ONE OF THE
		R COMPANIES WAS AN ARMY		
		CALLY FOR THE MOBILIZATI		
((4) (b)(1)		WERE APPROXIMATELY THE	NTY-
-	THOUSAN	C (20,000) ARMY TROOPS W		
		ON DURING THE PERIOD MEN		
((5) (b)(4)	Sec. 1.4(c) THAT THE NINE FRE	NCH PUMA HELTCOPTERS FR	OM
•		IATION COMMAND WERE PLAC	FO IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF	THE MARTNES
		ON TIERRA DEL FUEGO.	LA TH NTHER AGELONI OF	True control to the state of th
ť			E COVENTEEN /171 GELL H	U_4 TVD#
l		HIN 5TH CORPS, THERE WER		
		TERS EQUIPPED WITH ROCKE	TO WHICH PORMED PART OF	INC CURPS
(RESERVE			
L	(7) (b)(THE F	RENCH PANHARD ARMORED V	CUICES
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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

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C	PAGE 3	- 8 E C R E T	11213	
(IN COUNTRY DURING THE 7810/781	2 TIMEFRAME	
<i>, 1</i> 4,	OF FIVE PANHARD VI	ATION AND ASSIGNED WITHIN 5TH (Ehicles to each reconnaissance	TROOP ASSIGNED	
(TO THE SEPARAGE BI	RIGADES.	and the second	
	(8) HE INDICATED '	THAT THE 181ST ARMORED RECONNA: ARD VEHICLES ASSIGNED.	ISBANCE SQUADRON	
(.	B (b)(1);1.4 (c)	THAT A GREAT DEAL OF THE IN	FORMATION	
	(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)		INED AS A RESULT	
((b)(1);1.4 (c)			
· ·	CHILEAN POSITIONS.	AS A RESULT OF THESE (b)(1);1.4 (c)	THAT	
c	THE 5TH CORPS HAD	FIXED THE CHILEAN DISPOSITION	OF FORCES	
<u>(b)(1);1.4 (c)</u>	ALMOST_DOWN_TO_TH DTHERS) (b)(1);1.4 (c)	E_ FOXHOLE.	MONG ·	
	\Box C. WHEN (b)(1);1.4 (c)	THAT THE RECONDITION	NED SHERMAN	
(TANKS ASSIGNED TO	THE 2ND TANK BRIGADE (THEN OPE	RATING WITHIN THE	
	5TH ARMY CORPS) FL	INCTIONED BEAUTIFULLY. THE TANK	S WERE DUG INTO	
C	THILEAN SIDE, (b)(1);	<u>SIDES OF HILLS FOR CONCEALMENT</u> 1.4 (c) THAT THEIR TANKS		
	UIG INTO CONCEALED			
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T TR IA06(01) J5(02) J3:NMCC SECOEF(07) SECOEI ATSO:AE(01) ASO:PA&E(01) ::DIA(20) USDRE CMC CC WASHINGTON DC CNO WASHINGTON OC CIA WASHINGTON OC CIA WASHINGTON OC SECSTATE WASHINGTON OC NSA WASH DC FILE 7) NSIT/0021946/0022056/001:10TOR0022054 RUESDAA 0281 0021946 35355 117457 JA 80 NO VUC 424 RUEKJCS/OIA WASH OC(b)(3):10 USC 424 O RULPALJ/USCINCSO QUARY HTS PN(b)(3):50 USC 30 AHGA/HQ USAF WASH OC(b)(3):50 USC 30 AHGA/HQ USAF WASH OC(b)(3):50 USC 30 AHGA/HQ USAF WASH OC(b)(3):50 USC 30 C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 NOTORN 222. H-HOUR (ATTACK HOUR) WAS DESIGNATED FO 781222. THE ORDER RWSCINDING THE ATTACK ORD 1630 HRS TO ALL ELEMENTS PREVIOUSLY ORDERED IR ATTACK POSITIONS. THE LAST ELEMENT TO RE RESCISSION ORDER WAS AN INFANTRY UNIT WHIC O AT 2130 HRS ON 781222. (2)(b)(1):1.4 (c) WHERE THE MAIN ATTACKS EN PLACEJ TO WHICH HE INDICATED THAT THIS WO O TO FIGURE OUT, ALL ONE HAO TO DO WAS FINC K REGIMENTS WERE; ONE OF WHICH WAS LDCATED	
DIA: TR IA08(01) J5(02) J3:NMCC SECOEF(07) SECOEL ATSO:AE(01) ASO:PA&E(01) ::DIA(20) USDRE CMC CC WASHINGTON DC CNO WASHINGTON DC CSA WASHINGTON DC SECSTATE WASHINGTON OC NSA WASH DC FILE 7) NSIT/0021946/0022056/001:10TOR0022054 RUESBAA 0281 0021946 35355 117457 JA, 80 HOUSC 424 RUEKJCS/DIA WASH OC(b)(3):10 USC 424 O RULPALJ/USCINCSO QUARY HTS PN(b)(3):50 USC 30 AHQA/HQ USAF WASH OC(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i) BARA/COMNAVINTCOM ALEXANDRIA VA 10 USC 424 C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 NOFORN 222. HHOUR (ATTACK HOUR) WAS DESIGNATED FO 781222. THE ORDER RWSCINDING THE ATTACK ORD 1630 HRS TO ALL ELEMENTS PREVIOUSLY ORDERED IR ATTACK POSITIONS. THE LAST ELEMENT TO RE RESCISSION ORDER WAS AN INFANTRY UNIT WHIC 0 AT 2130 MRS ON 781222. (2)(b)(1):1.4 (c) HHERE THE MAIN ATTACKS EN PLACEJ TO WHICH HE INDICATED THAT THIS WAS D TO FIGURE OUT, ALL ONE HAO TO DD WAS FINC K REGIMENTS WERE; ONE OF WHICH WAS LDCATED	YUW 11216
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ATSO:AE(#1) ASO:PA&E(#1) ::DIA(2#) USDRE CMC CC WASHINGTON DC CNO WASHINGTON OC CIA WASHINGTON OC CIA WASHINGTON DC SECSTATE WASHINGTON OC NSA WASH DC FILE 7) NSIT/##21946/##22#56/##1:1#TOR##22#54 RUESBAA #281 ##21946 SSSSS 117452 JA. ## 10 USC 424 RUEKJCS/OIA WASH OC(b)(3):10 USC 424 O RULPALJ/USCINCSO GUARRY HTS PN(b)(3):50 USC 34 AHGA/HG USAF WASH OC(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i) BARA/COMNAVINTCOM ALEXANDRIA VA 10 USC 424 C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 NOFORM 222. H-HOUR (ATTACK HOUR) WAS DESIGNATED FF 781222. THE ORDER RWSCINOING THE ATTACK ORF 1630 HRS TO ALL ELEMENTS PREVIOUSLY ORDERED IR ATTACK POSITIONS. THE LAST ELEMENT TO RE RESCISSION ORDER WAS AN INFANTRY UNIT WHICO O AT 2130 HRS ON 781222. (2)(b)(1):1.4(c) EN PLACEJ TO WHICH HE INDICATED THAT THIS WO D TO FIGURE OUT, ALL ONE HAO TO DO WAS FINCK K REGIMENTS WEREJ ONE OF WHICH WAS LDCATED	
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IR ATTACK POSITIONS. THE LAST ELEMENT TO RE Rescission order was an infantry unit whic o at 2130 Hrs on 781222. (2) (b)(1):1.4 (c) Where the main attacks en placej to which he indicated that this w o to figure out, all one had to do was find k regiments were; one of which was located	TER WAS ISSUED
RESCISSION ORDER WAS AN INFANTRY UNIT WHIC O AT 2130 HRS on 781222. (2)(b)(1);1.4 (c) Where the main attacks En place; to which he indicated that this w O to figure out, all one had to do was find K regiments were; one of which was located	
0 AT 2130 HRS ON 781222. (2)(b)(1);1.4(c) En place; to which he indicated that this w D to figure out, all one had to do was find K regiments were; one of which was located	LEIVE Nu dérétver tuf
(2)(b)(1);1.4(c) En placej to which he indicated that this w D to figure out, all one had to do was find K regiments were; one of which was <u>located</u>	,, negezy <u>e</u> n ine
EN PLACEJ TO WHICH HE INDICATED THAT THIS W D TO FIGURE OUT, ALL ONE HAD TO DO WAS FIND K regiments werej one of which was <u>located</u>	WERE TO HAVE
K REGIMENTS WERE; ONE OF WHICH WAS LOCATED	AS NOT TOO
	OUT WHERE THE
;1.4 (c)	IN ZAPALA (b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c) JRD ARMY
PS AREA, THE OTHER MAIN ATTACK WHICH WAS TO	
THE 5TH CORPS AREA WAS TO BE SPEARHEADED BY	THE 1ST TANK
IMENT WHICH HAD HOVED FROM 2ND CORPS AND WA	A ATATTONED
THE NIGHT OF 781222 OUTSIDE THE RIO GALLEGO	

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<i>C</i>	PAGE 2		11216
C	SANTA CRUZ PROVI	NCE. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE 1ST TANK RE	
	HAS TO ATTACK TO	WARDS PUNTA ARENAS. (b)(1),1.4 (c)	
_		HAT A MAIN ATTACK WAS TO HAVE TAKEN F	21 ACE
C	TOWARDS THE PUNT		
	(3) (b)(1);1.4 (c)		ti 🕈
		THE FACT THAT HE	
C		FANTRY ABOARD) HAD LAUNCHEG FROM RID	
(E MOVING TOWARDS PUNTA ARENAS WHEN TH	-
			RY OF THE
r		K AIRCRAFT WHICH HAD BEEN LAUN <u>ched an</u>	ID (b)(1);1.4 (c)
(THEIR FLIGHT OT AN OBJECTIVE.	
	MENTIONED THAT TH	HERE WAS DNE PILDT WHD INITIALLY IGNE)REC
<i></i>	THE RETURN TO BAS	SE ORDER, APPARENTLY THIS STORY HAS B	JEEN
(WELL PUBLICISED N	WITHIN THE ARGENTINE MILITARY AS AN	
		LOSE THE COUNTRY GID COME TO WAR.	(b)(1);1.4 (c)
		AWARE OF ANY UNITS THAT ACTUALLY COR	ASED
(NDICATED "NO", BUT THAT UNITS LOCATED	
(b)(1);1.4 (c)		ORPS AREAS WERE VERY NEAR TO THE BORE	
			ICK IN PANT
(ERMINATION ORDER WAS RECEIVED.	
`		RN) THIS REPORT IS OF INTEREST IN TH	
		N INDICATING THAT THE ACTUAL ORDER TO	
1		AT MID-DAY ON 791222 AND RESCINDED TH	
(HAT THE POPE WOULD MEDIATE THE BEAGLE	
	DISPUTE BECAME K	NOWN. THIS REPORT ALSO PROVIDES INFOR	IMATION
	INDICATING THAT	THE ARGENTINE ARMY HAD A MAIN ATTACK	PLANNED
(IN THE 3RD CORPS	AREA TO BE LAUNCHED FROM ZAPALA WHIC	H HAD
	BECOME A MAJOR S'	TAGING AND TROOP CONCENTRATION AREA.	
		ANCE IS THE FACT THAT PUNTA ARENAS BE	
Ć.		CTIVE FOR THE 5TH ARMY CORPS LOCATED	
		DF ARGENTINA. THE FACT THAT ARMY ENGI	
		ELICOPTERS WERE ASSIGNED TO SUPPORT 1	
(-		
`		EGO IS ALSO OF INTEREST AND SHOWS A D	
ł		DPERATION WHICH THE ARGENTINE FORCES	FAVE
C	NOT PREVIOUSLY PR		·
K.		CONCERNING THE EVENTS OF DEC 1978,	
		DATE PROVE WORTHWHILE SHOULD	
· ·	THE BEAGLE CHANNE	EL SITUATION AGAIN BECOME A VOLATILE	ISSUE.
C	(b)(1);1.4 (c)		· ·
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF **MESSAGE CENTER** VZCZCMAY490SCP104 ZYUW NULT 11221 SECT 02 OF 11213 ACTION DIAS DISTR IADB(01) J5(02) J3:NMCC SECDEF(07) SECDEF: USDP(15) ATSDIAE(01) ASDIPASE(01) IIDIA(20) USDPE(03)((b)(3):10 USC NIDS CMC CC WASHINGTON DC CNO WASHINGTON DC CSA WASHINGTON OC CIA WASHINGTON OC SECSTATE WASHINGTON OC NSA WASH DC UTURN FILE (959) TRANSIT/0021915/0022057/001:42TDR0022055 DE N'IESBAA #0281 0021915 ZNY ----R 9117452 JAN 80 (b)(3):10 USC 424 TO RUEKJCS/OIA WASH DC (b)(3):10 USC 424 INFO RULPALJ/USCINCSD QUARRY HTS PN (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i) RUEAHQA/HQ USAF WASH DC (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i) RUEBARA/COMNAVINTCOM ALEXANDRIA VA (b)(3):10 USC 424 BT S-C-R-C-T SECTION 2 OF 3 NOFORN D. IN DISCUSSING OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES, (b)(1);1.4 (c) STATED THAT THE MARINES WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR TAKING CERTAIN ISLANDS SOUTH OF THE BEAGLE CHANNEL AREA, DEPENDING UPON CHILEAN REACTION TO THE MARINE ASSAULT, 5TH CORPS HAD THE MISSION OF ATTACKING BASED UPDN PRIDE OPERATIONAL PLANS (b)(1);1.4 (c) WHAT GEN MENENDEZ IN 3RD CORPS WOULD BE DDING AT THIS TIME. HE INDICATED THAT THIS ALSO DEPENDED UPON WHAT TRANSPIRED WITHIN THE AREA SOUTH OF THE BEAGLE CHANNEL AND IN 5TH CDRPS. HE STATED THAT HE DID NOT HAVE 3RD CDRPS' TDTAL PLAN, BUT DID KNOW THAT GEN MENENDEZ HAD ORDERS TO CUT CHILE IN HALF, DDUR DID NOT SPECIFY WHERE CHILE WAS TO BE CUT IN HALF. E. SOURCE INDICATED THAT IN THE 5TH ARMY CORPS MORALE WAS HIGH DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD, THE ECONOMIC MINISTRY SENT THE TROOPS CANDY, CAKES, ETC., ON A DAILY BASIS IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN HIGH MORALE, MOVIES WERE SHOWN BEGINNING AT 1800 HRS

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PAGE 2 <u>3 E C R E T</u> 11221
IN THE MORNING AND TERMINATING AT 2100 HRS WHENEVER TROOPS WERE
NOT IN THE FIELD CONDUCTING MANEUVERS.
F. ALL TROOPS WERE GUARTERED UNDER ROOFS, BY THIS HE MEANT
THAT ALL SCHOOLS WITHIN 5TH CORPSI-AREA-WERE USED AS BARRACKS.
G (b)(1);1.4 (c)
INDICATED THAT IN RIO TURBID THE ARGENTINES AND CHILEANS
WERE ACTUALLY IN FRONT OF EACH OTHER FOXHOLE=TO=FOXHOLE, THE
OPPOSING C <u>ommanders traded</u> whiskey, wine and other social
GESTURES, (b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT ON DIFFERENT NIGHTS, CHILEANS
WOULD COME TO THE ARGENTINE CAMP AND ON OTHER NIGHTS THE
ARGENTINES WOULD RECIPROCATE BY VISITING THE CHILEAN CAMP. WHEN
IT WAS ANNOUNCED ON 7912222 THAT THE POPE WOULD MEDIATE THE
OISPUTE, (b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT THE FRONT-LINE TROOPS HAD A BIG
PARTY TO CELEBRATE,
H, DURING THE PERIOD790905-790907, RD WAS ON AN AMBASSADORIAL
(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c) TO BARILOCHE, WHILE THERE, (b)(1);1.4 (c)
(b)(1);1.4 (c)
CONCEPNING THE MOBILIZATION EXERCISE OURING 7810/7812:
(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)
TO A SPECIAL COMMAND LOCATED WITHIN THE BARILOCHE AREA.
THAT A GREAT DEAL OF 1ST CORPS ELEMENTS (TO
INCLUDE THE PATRICIO REGIMENT - NORMALLY A GUARD REGIMENT FROM
BUENDS AIRES) HAD BEEN MOVED TO THE BARILOCHE AREA. ALSO
MOVED TO THE BARILOCHE AREA WERE ADDITIONAL 1ST CORPS UNITS TO INCLUDE
THE 8TH TANK REGIMENT WHICH WAS IN ZAPALA AND THE 10TH BRIGADE
(NORMALLY STATIONED IN BUENDS AIRES, PROVINCE) WHOSE ELEMENTS
WERE ALL ON VER TO THE BOOMINGE OF NEUCORALLY WHERE ELECTRICAL
WERE ALSO MOVED TO THE PROVINCE OF NEUQUEN.
(STNOFORN) COMMENT: PREVIOUSLY IT WAS BELIEVED THAT ELEMENTS
FROM THE 1ST COPPS HQS IN BUENDS AIRES ALONG WITH OTHER
1ST CORPS UNITS HAD MOVED TO THE BAPILOCHE AREA OR THE ZAPALA
APEA AS PART OF 1ST CORPS FOREWARD, (b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT
1ST CORPS UNITS OPERATING IN NEUQUIN PROVINCE IN THE VICINITY
OF ZAPALA AND BARILOCHE WERE NOT UNDER 1ST COPPS CONTROL.
BUT IN FACT WERE ATTACHED TO GENERAL MENENDEZ'S 3RD CORPS.)
(2) (b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT ON 781222, THE ATTACK
ORDEP WAS ISSUED AND UNITS IN HIS VICINITY MOVED TO LOCATIONS
ORDER WAS ISSUED AND UNITS IN HIS VICINITY MOVED TO LOCATIONS On the Border in Preparation for the H-Hour Attack. (b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)
ORDER WAS ISSUED AND UNITS IN HIS VICINITY MOVED TO LOCATIONS On the Border in Preparation for the H-Hour Attack. (b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c) That the 8th Tank regiment (when the Attack Order Was Finally
ORDEP WAS ISSUED AND UNITS IN HIS VICINITY MOVED TO LOCATIONS On the Border in Preparation for the H-Hour Attack. (b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c) That the 8th Tank regiment (when the Attack Order Was Finally Rescinded) had Moved from Zapala and Was five Kilometers from the
ORDEP WAS ISSUED AND UNITS IN HIS VICINITY MOVED TO LOCATIONS On the Border in Preparation for the H-Hour Attack. (b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c) That the 8th Tank regiment (when the Attack Order Was Finally Rescinded) had Moved from Zapala and Was five Kilometers from the
ORDER WAS ISSUED AND UNITS IN HIS VICINITY MOVED TO LOCATIONS ON THE BORDER IN PREPARATION FOR THE H-HOUR ATTACK. (b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c) That the 8th Tank regiment (when the attack order was finally Rescinded) had Moved from Zapala and was five kilometers from the Chilean Border when they received the order to halt. Units
ORDER WAS ISSUED AND UNITS IN HIS VICINITY MOVED TO LOCATIONS ON THE BORDER IN PREPARATION FOR THE H-HOUR ATTACK. (b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c) THAT THE 8TH TANK REGIMENT (WHEN THE ATTACK ORDER WAS FINALLY RESCINDED) HAD MOVED FROM ZAPALA AND WAS FIVE KILOMETERS FROM THE CHILEAN BORDER WHEN THEY RECEIVED THE ORDER TO HALT. UNITS WITHIN THE BARILOCHE AREA HAD ALSO RECEIVED WORD TO MOVE TOWARDS
ORDER WAS ISSUED AND UNITS IN HIS VICINITY MOVED TO LOCATIONS ON THE BORDER IN PREPARATION FOR THE H-HOUR ATTACK. (b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c) That the 8th Tank regiment (when the attack order was finally Rescinded) had Moved from Zapala and was five kilometers from the Chilean Border when they received the order to halt. Units
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C	OCCUR IN THE ZAPALA AREA. THE ATTACK IN THE BARILOCHE AREA WAS
	TO BE THIRD CORPS' SECONDARY ATTACK, A GREAT DEAL OF USE WAS
	HADE OF COVER AND DECEPTION OPERATIONS, (b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT
C	THE 8TH TANK REGIMENT WAS MOVED SERERAL TIMES FROM ZAPALA TO
	BARILOCHE IN ORDER TO TRY AND CONFUSE THE CHILEAN ESTIMATE AS
C	TO THE EXACT LOCATION DF THE MAIN ATTACK. (b)(1);1.4 (c)
$ \langle$	THAT ON THE NIGHT DF 781222, A REGIMENTAL SIZE INFANTRY UNIT WAS
-	TRUCKED ALL THE WAY FROM MENDOZA DOWN TO THE ZAPALA AREA TO
C	BE IN POSITION FOR THE ATTACK, SEVERAL REGIMENTAL SIZE
(UNIT AND ARTILLERY BATTALION MOVEMENTS TOOK PLACE ON THE ROAD
	BETWEEN BARILOCHE AND <u>San Martin de lo</u> s andes to try to
	CONFUSE THE CHILEANS, (b)(1);1.4 (c) WHAT THE OBJECTIVE OF
1	THE 4TH AIRBORNE BRIGADE WAS OURING THE ATTACK PLANT TO WHICH
	(b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT (b)(1);1.4 (c) TD THIS INFORMATION, BUT
L. (b)(1);1.4 (c)	BELIEVED THAT THE 4TH AIRBORNE BRIGADES DBJECTIVE WAS THE
(0)(1);1.4(c)	CITY OF CONCEPCION IN CHILE. HAD NO FURTHER DETAILS TO
1	JUSTIFY THIS SUPPOSITION. (b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c) THAT WITHIN THE
C	STH CORPS AREA OF OPERATION THE ATTACK ORDER HAD ALSD
(b)(1);1.4 (c)	BEEN GIVEN AND HELICOPTERS HAD BEEN LAUNCHED TOWARDS PUNTA ARENAS. ONE INCIDENT WHICH TODK PLACE WITHIN THE
(0)(1), 1.4(0)	AIR FORCE WHICH INDICATED HOW CLOSE THE ARGENTINE FORCES
TV T	WERE IN MAKING CONTACT WITH THE CHILEANS, A SQUADRON OF
	ARGENTINE AIR FORCE ATTACK AIRCRAFT WAS LAUNCHED FROM RIO
	GALLEGDS (51 385-69 13W) WITH AN UNSPECIFIED TARGET (WHICH
C	(b)(1);1.4 (c) WAS PROBABLY PUNTA ARENAS) (b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)
	THAT HALF-WAY TO THE TARGET, THE AIRCRAFT WERE TOLD TO RETURN. ALL
	DID EXCEPT ONE
(THIS LONE AIRCRAFT ACKNDHLEDGED RECEIPT OF THE ORDER TO
	RETURN. BUT INDICATED THAT HE WAS NOT DBEYING THESE ORDERS
	AND WAS CONTINUING TO ATTACK, AFTER CONSIDERABLE CONVERSATION
	WITH THIS PILOT, HE WAS CONVINCED TO RETURN TO HIS BASE, AT WHICH
	TIME HE WAS PLACED UNDER ARREST.
	I. DN 791108, (b)(1);1.4 (c) WHEN A
	DISCUSSION DF THE BEAGLE CHANNEL CRISIS ARDSE. (b)(1);1.4 (c
(b)(1);1.4 (c)	THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE EVENTS
	ON 7812221
N	(1) THE DRDER TO ATTACK WAS ISSUED AT 1200 HRS DN
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