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(b)(3):10 USC 424

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(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

1. COUNTRY: ARGENTINA (AR)/CHILE (CI)
2. REPORT NUMBER: (b)(3):10 USC 424
3. TITLE: (U) BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE.
4. PROJECT NUMBER: N/A
5. DATE OF INFORMATION: 781219
6. DATE OF REPORT: 781219
7. DATE AND PLACE OF ACQUISITION: 781219, (b)(3):10 USC 424
8. REFERENCES: (b)(3):10 USC 424 CONTINUES

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9. ASSESSMENT: (b)(3):10 USC 424

10. ORIGINATOR: (b)(3):10 USC 424

11. REQUEST EVALUATION: OMIT

12. PREPARING OFFICER: (b)(3):10 USC 424

13. APPROVING AUTHORITY: (b)(3):10 USC 424

14. SOURCE: (b)(3):10 USC 424

15. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: DIRC-NO

16. SUMMARY: (b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT ARGENTINA HAS MADE ITS LAST ATTEMPT TO INVITE CHILE TO NEGOTIATE.

22. DETAILS: (S) AT A (b)(1);1.4 (c) ON 781219, (b)(1);1.4 (c)

TALKED WITH (b)(1);1.4 (c)

PROBLEM. (b)(1);1.4 (c)

ARGENTINE CLASSMATE (b)(1);1.4 (c)

HAD DISCUSSED BRIGADIER LAMI DOZO'S TRIP TO SANTIAGO OF 781218.

(b)(1);1.4 (c) REMARKED THAT THE TRIP HAD BEEN FRUITLESS, ALTHOUGH

ARGENTINA'S (b)(1);1.4 (c) IF THE

VISIT HAD BEEN A FINAL OFFER BY ARGENTINA TO ELICIT SINCERE NEGOTIATIONS FROM CHILE, (b)(1);1.4 (c) IN THE

AFFIRMATIVE. (b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT ARGENTINA'S NEXT STEP WOULD PROBABLY BE OCCUPATION OF ONE OR MORE UNOCCUPIED ISLANDS

IN THE BEAGLE AREA. (b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT EVOUT AND BARNEVELT ISLANDS WERE THE MOST LIKELY, SINCE THEY ARE SUPPOSEDLY UNOCCUPIED.

WHEN (b)(1);1.4 (c) IF OCCUPATION OF CASO DE HORNS (CAPE HORN) WAS A POSSIBILITY, (b)(1);1.4 (c) YES. (b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT

ACCORDING TO SOME PEOPLE, CHILE WOULD FIGHT TO PREVENT ARGENTINE OCCUPATION OF CAPE HORN, (b)(1);1.4 (c) CONVINCED

THAT CHILE WOULD NEVER FIGHT TO RETAIN CAPE HORN BUT (b)(1);1.4 (c)

THE MESSAGE IN HOPE THAT IT WOULD BE RELAYED BY (b)(1);1.4 (c)

COMMENT: (S) (b)(1);1.4 (c) OF THE POTENTIAL BATTLE AREA TO EVOUT, BARNEVELT AND CAPE HORN ISLANDS.

(b)(1);1.4 (c) HOWEVER, WAS TOLD BY A HIGH-LEVEL FLAG OFFICER IN THE NAVY GENERAL SECRETARIAT ON 781218 THAT AS MANY AS

TEN ISLANDS COULD BE INVOLVED IN AN ARGENTINE OCCUPATION ATTEMPT. (b)(1);1.4 (c) REMARK THAT LAMI DOZO'S FRUITLESS TRIP

TO SANTIAGO HAD BEEN A LAST CHANCE FOR CHILE MAY INDICATE THAT HOSTILITIES ARE IMMINENT IF A DIPLOMATIC

BREAKTHROUGH IS NOT FORTHCOMING.

THIS MSG AMEMBASSY COORDINATED. OECL 19 DEC 84.

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