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-	FROM (b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)
	CONTROLS
	SECTION 1 OF 2
	QQQQ
	DOCNO SERIAL: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424
	/******* THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *******/
	BODY
	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INFORMATION REPORT , NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
	COUNTRY: (U) AFGHANISTAN (AFG).
	(b)(3):10 USC 424
	<u>4(b)(1);(b)(3):10 USC 424;1.4 (b);1.4 (c)</u>
):10 424	to Prevent Green on Blue Attack, Kandahar Province,
	Afghanistan ($\sqrt{(b)(3):10 \cup SC 424}$
	DOI: (U) 20120406.
	(b)(3):10 USC 424
	SOURCE:
	SOURCE A. (b)(1);1.4 (c);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

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(b)(1);1.4 (b);1.4 (c)

successful operation to arrest an ANA soldier who was suspected of having been persuaded by **the** Taliban to **attack** ISAF soldiers.

(b)(1);1.4 (b);1.4 (c)

arrest an ANA soldier who was suspected of having been persuaded by the Taliban to attack ISAF soldiers. (b)(1);1.4 (b);1.4 (c) the soldier in question admitted that he had been planning to kill as many ISAF soldiers as possible.

3. $(S/\sqrt{(b)(3):10 \cup SC 424}$ Suspicions about the loyalties of the soldier (b)(1);(b)(6);1.4 (c) had been raised amongst his chain of command after he had returned in November 2011 to his unit following four weeks of leave in his home district of Khugyani in Nangahar Province. On returning from leave (b)(1);(b)(6);1.4 had claimed that he had become a qualified Mullah while at home, and asked his fellow soldiers if he could lead them in prayers.

(b)(1);1.4 (b);1.4 (c)

4. (S (b)(3):10 USC 424 Subsequently, in the months between his return from leave and his arrest (b)(1);(b)(6);1.4 (c) preaching had become strongly anti-ISAF.

(b)(1);1.4 (b);1.4 (c);(b)(3):10 USC 424

that while he was on leave

he had been approached by Talibs local to his area, who had persuaded him to stay with them for 10 days. While living amongst **the** Talibs (b)(1);(b)(6);1.4 had been told by **the** Talibs of **the** many pleasures which awaited him in paradise if he were to kill ISAF soldiers, and how these pleasures would be multiplied if he were able to nersuade other ANA soldiers to conduct such attacks as well. (b)(1);(b)(6);1.4 (c) confessed to being influenced by **the** arguments of **the** Talibs, and that on returning to his unit it had been his intention to **attack** as many ISAF soldiers as possible (b)(1);1.4 (c)

(b)(1);1.4 (b);1.4 (c)