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Military Intelligence Summary, Volume IV, Part III, Africa South of the Sahara (East Africa) (U)

Defense Research Reference Series



Defense Intelligence Agency

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Part III
November 1987

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**Military Intelligence Summary (MIS),
Volume IV, Part III,
Africa South of the Sahara
(East Africa) (U)**

Defense Research Reference Series

*This is a Department of Defense Intelligence Document
Prepared by the Middle East/Africa Division,
Directorate for Research, Defense Intelligence Agency*

*This publication supersedes the applicable portion of
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Part III**

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PREFACE

(U) The Military Intelligence Summary (MIS), published in eight volumes, is a synopsis of military intelligence worldwide. Intended to serve as a ready reference, the MIS presents a compilation of intelligence on those forces that contribute to the military security of each country, and on the political and economic factors affecting the country's military capability. Published annually, the MIS serves to update information in other DIA publications.

(U) Given the growth of the MIS, Volume IV has been subdivided into three parts: Part I — Southern and Central Africa, Part II — West Africa, and Part III — East Africa.

(U) Information summarized in the MIS is available in detail in numerous DIA publications. A list of related publications, both completed and scheduled, is published in the *Register of Intelligence Publications* (DDB-2600-37 series) and in the *Defense Intelligence Production Schedule* (DVP-2600-35 series). *The Intelligence User's Guide* (DDM-2600-397 series) explains how to obtain finished intelligence products and services from DIA.

(U) Specific publications that may be of particular interest and have been produced since the last edition of this MIS in March 1985 are as follows: *Comparative Military Strengths: Sub-Saharan Africa* (U), DDB-2680-299-86, June 1986; *Foreign Military Assistance, Volume VI — Africa South of the Sahara* (U), DDB-1940-1A-85, June 1986; *Air Order of Battle, Volume IV — Africa South of the Sahara* (U), DDB-1300-104-85, June 1986; *Naval Order of Battle, Volume IV — Africa South of the Sahara* (U), DDB-1200-104-86, August 1986.

(U) Word processing was provided by Mrs. Patricia A. Brackett of the DB-8X Word Processing Center.

(U) Each classified title and heading has been properly marked; all those unmarked are unclassified.

(U) This study has been fully coordinated with the Directorate for Current Intelligence.


(U) Questions and comments concerning *MIS Volume IV — Part III* should be referred in writing to the Defense Intelligence Agency [redacted] Washington, D.C. 20340-0001. Requests for additional copies should be forwarded through command approval channels, as appropriate, to DIA, [redacted] using DD Form 1142, Interagency Document Request, in accordance with DIA Manual 59-1, *Intelligence Dissemination/Reference Services*.

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Eastern Region



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Marker Index
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Comoros Islands ■

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COMOROS ISLANDS

1. POLITICAL-MILITARY SITUATION

~~(C)~~ The Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros comprises three of the four main islands of the Comoran Archipelago. Mayotte, the fourth island, remains a French territory, although still claimed by the Comoros. Independence from France was unilaterally declared by the Comoran Chamber of Deputies in 1975. Ahmed Abdallah Abderemane, a wealthy landowner and politician from Anjouan Island, was elected President, then deposed in a mercenary-led coup less than a month later. The new government, led by strongman Ali Soilih, was ousted in a coup by the same foreign mercenaries in 1978. Abdallah once again assumed power in the Political-Military Directorate, sharing power with Mohamed Ahmed, a wealthy Comoran businessman. Quickly consolidating his power base, Abdallah eliminated the Directorate; as the only candidate in a 1978 national referendum, Abdallah was elected President for a 6-year term. The mercenaries command the Presidential Guard, which remains the President's primary power base. He easily won reelection in 1985.

~~(C/NF)~~ The Constitution, adopted by popular referendum in 1978, set up a federal system of government. The President is elected, and has constitutional power to appoint governors for each island. A Federal Assembly is also elected and is the legislative branch of the government. The islands have some autonomy in issues not assigned to the President or Federal Assembly.

~~(C/NF)~~ Traditionally the scene of much political rivalry, the Comoros have become more and more unstable. By mid-1986 opposition to Abdallah was increasingly vociferous, emboldened by his declining popularity at home. Incidents of violence erupted among Comoran youth, reflecting frustration over the deteriorating economy and the government's inaction and corruption. Inter-island tension also increased over recurring charges of President Abdallah's favoritism toward his home island of Anjouan in economic development. The Federal Assembly in May 1986 for the first time openly opposed the President, rejecting Abdallah's nomination for speaker. Threatening to use the Army to dissolve the Assembly, Abdallah averted a political crisis only on the urging of the mercenary contingent's current leader, "Commandant Charles," who advised the President against the Army's use.

~~(C/NF)~~ Several opposition movements had been identified. The Democratic Front is an illegal coalition of moderate to left organizations, and may have as many as 2,000 members. Believed to be a front organization for the Marxist-Leninist Communist Movement of the Comoros (MCMLC), the Front may have links with Tanzania and the French Communist Party. The Front is known to have contacts among Comoran students abroad, military members, and government officials. Little is known, however, about the movement's leadership. An unsuccessful March 1985 coup by several members of the Army was linked to the Democratic Front.

~~(C/NF)~~ The "Constitutional Opposition" is composed of former government ministers dismissed in a September 1985 Cabinet reorganization. Led by former ministers Ali Bezim Selim and Ali Mroudjae, the movement lacks popular support and is largely disunited, agreeing only that Abdallah should be removed from power. Contacts between the constitutional opposition and other Abdallah opponents in power, including former Foreign Minister Abdallah Mouzaoir, are likely underway.

COMOROS ISLANDS

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~~(C/NF)~~ Numerous external opponents reside in France. Former Federal Assembly President Mohamed Taki, removed from his position by Abdallah, is believed to be actively seeking support in Europe for a mercenary-led coup attempt. Taki is known to have Comoran business and political contacts, although he has little popular support.

~~(C/NF)~~ Islamic fundamentalism, with possible links to Iran, is a growing threat in the Comoros. Strikes and subsequent riots on Anjouan are believed in part to have been initiated by Islamic extremists.

~~(C/NF)~~ Despite increased opposition to President Abdallah, no individual or organization is in a position to force his imminent overthrow. Factions remain disunited, with no clear political agenda. In the short term, this has worked to Abdallah's advantage, enabling the security forces to effectively monitor opposition activities. However, as popular support for Abdallah deteriorates, assassination or sudden coup attempts are possible. Should Abdallah be suddenly overthrown, political chaos would evolve as political factions vied for power.

~~(S/NF)~~ The issue of Mayotte's return to the Comoros is central to the nation's relationship with France. Believing that their relatively high standard of living would be jeopardized if the island were incorporated into the Republic, the Mayorais have continually voted in favor of retaining ties with France. The inhabitants of Mayotte not only want to retain French ties but want full departmental status. Mayotte retains the status of "special territorial collective," which is between that of a department and an overseas territory. France currently maintains approximately 100-150 Gendarmerie and 240 Foreign Legionnaires on Mayotte. The French Parliament passed a bill on 6 December 1979 extending the special status of Mayotte, to be approved every 5 years by referendum. The United Nations, however, has passed a resolution to reaffirm the Comoros' sovereignty over the island and has called on France to negotiate with Comoros on the status of Mayotte. France refuses to be bound by the UN resolution.

~~(C/NF)~~ Strained relations with France could threaten future economic assistance, on which the Comoros is dependent. Special funds are regularly allocated to cover back pay for Comoran Government employees. Government revenues seriously declined in 1985, following the economy's deterioration. Civil servants were not paid for months, and rations to the military were reduced. Rather than responding immediately to Abdallah's urgent requests for assistance by midyear 1985, the French held up funds pending inquiries into alleged irregularities on the allocation of earlier aid. In the face of rising political tensions, Abdallah won stopgap assistance from Paris. The French have also expressed displeasure over the role of the mercenary-led Presidential Guard, and have pressed Abdallah to integrate the Guard with the regular Army. The French, however, have grudgingly acknowledged the Guard's role in maintaining internal stability. Abdallah has complained bitterly over apparent contact by some French officials with exiled Comoran dissident groups. The French have made clear that they remain circumspect in their future relations with Abdallah.

~~(S/NF)~~ Despite current tensions, the Comoros remains heavily dependent on French economic and security assistance. As head of a European consortium, the French recently completed construction of the Comoros' first deepwater port at Mutsamudu, Anjouan. Monies were provided by various Arab and African development funds. Since the Comoros has no inherent capability to produce military equipment, France, as the country's primary military supplier, has given the country \$2.5 million worth of trucks and armored vehicles since 1978. The Comoros has maintained a security agreement and a technical assistance accord with France since Abdallah regained power in 1978. The agreements provide for

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French military intervention, if requested by the Comoran Government and approved by French authorities, and for French advisers to train the national armed forces.

~~(S/NF)~~ Apart from his relations with France, President Abdallah continues to seek international support. He has encouraged increased relations with the West. Repeated appeals for American presence and assistance to the Comoros in part reflect a desire to offset the nation's dependency on France. Abdallah has tried to promote US interest in the Comoros with offers of military access, hoping to secure additional economic assistance. Comoran leaders have expressed growing frustration at not receiving the level of aid requested from the US. An increase in aid would be viewed by Comoran leaders as proof of a US commitment to the islands. Abdallah also expects his relations with other foreign governments, and, in particular, African nations, to continue to improve. The Comoros has received, however, Organization of African Unity (OAU) criticism for its ties with South Africa. Although President Abdallah denies that diplomatic accords exist with South Africa, privately he has admitted to an excellent working relationship with Pretoria. This relationship includes financial and arms assistance for his Presidential Guard, as well as landing rights at Moroni for South African Airways. The South Africans gained landing rights in July 1983 in exchange for paying all costs to extend the runway at Moroni. Ties between the two countries significantly improved in 1986. South Africa has invested extensively in several hotel projects, part of the Comoros' efforts to establish a tourist industry. Several small South African military teams have reportedly visited the Presidential Guard to monitor ongoing training programs. Growing South African ties in part are an attempt by Abdallah to lessen dependency on France and gain increased tourism and budget support.

~~(C/NF)~~ The government fosters close relationships with the more conservative (and oil-rich) Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, and Oman, and has been on friendly terms with China. The Chinese apparently wish to maintain contact with the Comoros to counterbalance growing Indian and Soviet influence in the Indian Ocean.

~~(S/NF)~~ The Comoros considers itself nonaligned. President Abdallah is less receptive, however, to proposals by Seychelles President Rene for a regional security cooperative among "progressive" states in the Indian Ocean region. Abdallah fears that Soviet influence in the region could increase through such an agreement.

~~(S/NF)~~ Since the Soviet military ouster from Somalia in November 1977, Moscow has made numerous overtures to the Comoros for improved relations, probably to ultimately secure anchoring privileges. A nonresident Soviet ambassador was accredited to the Comoros in 1978. Since early 1983, the Soviets have offered over 315 scholarships and TASS has offered its wire service to Radio Comoros.

~~(C/NF)~~ The Comoros maintains cool but correct relations with the Soviet Union. The President apparently accepted some offered scholarships to assuage the fears of Comoran ministers who felt he was needlessly antagonizing the Soviets and as an attempt to pressure the West for additional economic assistance. Abdallah's fear of Soviet assistance to the opposition has blocked establishment of an embassy on Grande Comore.

~~(C/NF)~~ Comoran security forces are tasked with maintaining internal security and defending the nation from external attack. They include the Comoran Armed Forces (FAC), Presidential Guard (GP), and Federal Gendarmerie. There is no national service or draft, yet there is no shortage of recruits due to the country's poor economic conditions.

~~(C/NF)~~ The Presidential Guard is a paramilitary force under the command of 65-70 foreign mercenaries. Well equipped and well trained, it is the most capable force in the Comoros.

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The GP could easily quell an internal uprising, and could probably defend Grande Comore against a small-scale dissident invasion force. A new Guard detachment was permanently stationed on Anjouan in 1985 to provide protection to the new port at Mutsamudu and other government installations on the island.

~~(C/NF)~~ The FAC is the nation's regular Army. The force is incapable of defending the country from external attack. The Federal Gendarmerie is responsible for general police duties and is capable of achieving its mission.

(U) The Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros is among the poorest countries in the world, and is considered by the United Nations to be one of the least developed countries. The economic picture in the Comoros can best be described as desperate, and prospects for improvement are poor. The nation has virtually no natural resources and is forced to rely almost exclusively on foreign aid. The Comoros has a rural economy, with agriculture the nation's primary occupation. The islands are the world's largest producers of ylang-ylang perfume essence and the second largest producer of vanilla. Ylang-ylang, vanilla, cloves, and copra account for nearly all of the Comoran export earnings. The industrial sector centers largely on crop processing and handicrafts, and accounts for only 5 percent of GDP. Total GDP amounted to \$92 million in 1984, or \$330 per capita.

2. (U) KEY OFFICIALS

President: Ahmed *Abdallah* Abderemane

Minister of Defense: Salim Ben *Ali*

Chief of Staff and Commander of the Comoran Armed Forces (FAC): Commandant Ahmed *Mohamed*

Commander of the National Gendarmerie: Captain Abdoulhamid *Abourazakou*

Commander of the Presidential Guard: Roger *Ghuys* (alias "Commandant Charles" Comoran alias Mohamed Abdoul Hakim). Ghuys is a Belgian mercenary.

3. MILITARY BUDGET

(U) (Most current information available) \$2.4 million for fiscal year ending 31 December 1981; 12.06 percent of the central government budget, and 3 percent of GNP. Dollar values converted from Communaute Financiere Africaine (CFA) francs at the official exchange rate of 271.73 francs equal \$1.00.

4. (U) POPULATION

420,000 estimated as of 1986, average annual growth rate 2.9 percent

Males (age 15-49): 93,000; physically fit, 55,000

Ethnic divisions: Mixture of Arab, Malay, and Negroid. Ethnic groupings include Antalote, Cafre, Makoa, Oimatsaha, Sakalava

Literacy: 15 percent

5. ~~(C)~~ ARMY

Personnel Strength: 600

Combat Units: The headquarters for the FAC is on Grande Comore. The combat units consist of three companies located on Grande Comore, Anjouan, and Moheli. The FAC

COMOROS ISLANDS

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suffers from poor weapon and vehicle maintenance, a lack of spare parts, no interisland transportation, and few competently trained personnel.

Equipment: Two 81-mm mortars, armored personnel carriers (unidentified), 500-600 small arms (including .30-caliber rifles, 400 Chinese-built SKS rifles, 7.62-mm SIG, and 100 M.A.B. 9-mm P15 pistols), two .50-caliber heavy machineguns, nine .30-caliber light machineguns, 4 Saviem SM8 4-ton trucks, 4 VLRA 2.5-ton trucks, 20 Peugeot 404 light trucks, and 44 unidentified French-built trucks, possibly Renault or Cournil SAMO. The SKS rifles are held in reserve in a Grande Comore armory and are used for recruit training. The pistols are issued to headquarters staff and officers. French assistance in an ongoing FAC modernization program has resulted in new deliveries of unknown types and quantities of small arms.

6. NAVY

~~(C/NF)~~ The Comoros does not have a navy. One ex-LCT(8) Class medium landing ship was donated by the French in 1975, and is operated by the Ministry of Interior as an interisland ferry. Two Japanese-built Yamayuri Class patrol craft have limited firefighting capabilities. There is no merchant marine.

7. AIR FORCE

~~(C/NF)~~ Comoros has no air force. A Piper Cheyenne IIIA, piloted by a retired French Air Force major, serves as the Presidential aircraft. This aircraft may have an extensive avionics package, including a KWX-56 color radar system, that could allow it to be used for limited surveillance missions, search and rescue operations, and medical evacuations. One Fokker F-27-200 Friendship is operated by Air Comoros. The number of licensed civilian pilots in Comoros is unknown.

8. ~~(C)~~ PARAMILITARY

a. Presidential Guard

Personnel Strength: 780 (with 200 civilians) and 65-70 foreign mercenaries. The mercenary contingent was augmented in 1985, reflecting the government's concern over increased civil unrest. The Presidential Guard performs guard duty at the Presidential residence, airport, radio station, and other key points. Its members are stationed primarily on Grande Comore, with a small detachment on Anjouan to guard the newly constructed port.

Equipment: 30 Land Rovers (10 with Chinese .50-caliber heavy machineguns), six 106-mm truck-mounted recoilless rifles, SIG 7.62-mm rifles, AK-47 assault rifles, RPG-2/7 rocket launchers, two 14.5-mm ZPU-1 AD machineguns, various types of small arms, and numerous Renault IV trucks.

b. Gendarmerie

Personnel Strength: 325. Performs police duties such as guarding government buildings and assisting the Army in controlling civil disorders.

Equipment: The Gendarmerie is armed with various types of small arms, including Chinese SKS rifles, M.A.B. P15 pistols, and MAT-49 submachineguns. Available transportation, if any, is unknown.

9. (U) KEY US OFFICIALS

Chief of Mission (Antananarivo, Madagascar): Ambassador Patricia Gates Lynch

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Charge d'Affaires (Moroni, Comoros): Edward Brynn

10. ~~(C)~~ FOREIGN MILITARY PRESENCE

a. Foreign Military In-Country

France	21	6 Army	Train infantry
		14 Gendarmerie	Train/assist Gendarmerie
		1 retired Air Force major	Civilian contracted to fly/maintain Piper Cheyenne IIIA
Other	65	Mercenaries (French, Belgian, South African, British, and Swiss)	Command and train the Presidential Guard

b. Presence Abroad

France: Two FAC officers are receiving training at French military schools. As many as 30 Comoran military personnel may be in training at Reunion, although this has not been confirmed.

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Appendix

Installation BE List (U)

Name	BE Number	Category	Latitude	Longitude
Anjouan-Ouani Afd	1155-08006	80104	12-07-35S	044-25-47E
Fomboni-Moheli Fac Co HQ	1155-00071	90110	12-17-00S	043-44-00E
Kandani-Grande Comore Camp and Presidential Guard HQ	1052-00028	90110	11-39-40S	043-15-30E
M'De-Grande Comore Military Camp and Fac HQ	1052-00033	90110	11-44-10S	043-14-15E
Moheli-Bandaressalam Afd	1155-08002	80104	12-17-30S	043-45-50E
Moroni-Grande Comore HQ Fed Gendarmerie	1052-00018	91170	11-42-00S	043-15-00E
Moroni-Hahaia Afd	1052-09902	80082	11-31-55S	043-15-40E
Moroni-Hahaia Airport GP Detachment	1052-00014	90110	11-31-53S	043-15-42E
Moroni-Iconi Afd	1052-08200	80104	11-42-27S	043-14-03E
Patsy-Anjouan Fac Co HQ	1155-00070	90110	12-10-00S	044-24-00E

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ETHIOPIA

1. GOVERNMENT

a. (U) Key Government Officials

Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE), Chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), and Commander in Chief of the Revolutionary Armed Forces: *Mengistu Haile-Mariam*

Secretary General of the PMAC and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers: Capt *Fikre Selassie Wodgeress*

Deputy Secretary General, PMAC: Lt Col *Fisseha Desta*

Minister of Foreign Affairs: *Berhanu Bayih*

Minister of National Defense: Maj Gen *Haile Ghiorgis Habte-Mariam*

Vice Minister of Defense: Maj Gen *Abebe Wolde-Mariam*

Minister of the Interior: Brig Gen *Taye Tilahun*

b. Type and Stability of Government

(U) Ethiopia is in a state of transition. September 1986 marked the 12th anniversary of the fall of Emperor Haile Selassie and the effective end of the nation's 3,000-year monarchy. On the surface, Ethiopia is currently ruled by a military oligarchy the members of which belong to two organizations: the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) and the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE). Known locally as "The Dergue" (Committee of Equals), this originally anonymous group of 140 officers and enlisted men from all ranks and backgrounds replaced the royal family and various government ministries. Ethiopia, in fact, is an autocracy, in the form of Mengistu Haile Mariam.

(U) Postimperial Ethiopia with the subsequent rise of Mengistu has moved through three distinct phases as it transitioned from a feudal to a military-ruled Marxist state. The three completed stages include the transition to and legitimization of military rule (8 July 1974-21 March 1975); survival of the Dergue (April 1975-December 1979); and Mengistu's rise to dominance (September 1974-December 1979). A fourth stage that may confer a greater degree of stability than enjoyed in the past may begin with the creation of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE). Although the military rulers have had control of the instruments of coercion throughout the phases, they have faced numerous challenges from several directions, including the military. Thus, stability of government has not been assured.

(U) Despite its announcements and draconian measures used to eliminate dissent, the Dergue faced numerous constraints on its freedom to act. These constraints emerged from two major sources: the unwieldy size of the Dergue itself, and the problems inherited from the imperial regime. Decisionmaking within the Dergue was difficult given the various backgrounds, educational levels, abilities, and priorities of its many members. Thus, the conditions existed for the emergence of a strong if not charismatic leader. Additionally, the conditions of famine, rising prices, the Eritrean separatist movement, and poor relations with Sudan and Somalia which contributed to the emperor's fall still existed, resulting in continued unrest among disparate groups within the Ethiopian population.

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~~(S/NF)~~ The rise to political dominance by Mengistu Haile Mariam commenced when he joined the Dergue as an Army major at some point after it was originally formed in June 1974. His presence on the Dergue was announced in November 1974. Mengistu moved into predominance on the Dergue by first engineering the fall of Lieutenant General Andom, the first PMAC spokesman and de facto head of state. He became dominant when he was elected Chairman of the Dergue on 12 February 1977 following the executions of his last seven competitors. Mengistu's consolidation of power continued when he was named Chairman of Congress of Organizing the Party of the Workers of Ethiopia (COPWE) upon its formation in 1979.

~~(S/NF)~~ As the undisputed leader of Ethiopia, Mengistu has been the principal force behind Ethiopia's foreign policy shift from pro-West to pro-Soviet. He makes all major decisions and mid- to high-level personnel appointments within political, administrative, and military institutions. There is considerable evidence that the most important criterion for individual advancement is demonstrated loyalty to Mengistu rather than to ideology or a concept of the nation.

~~(S/NF)~~ The final transition from a monarchy may occur as the WPE evolves and the PDRE is created. In February 1986, the committee to draft the constitution for the new republic had been nominated. Mengistu's goal had been to announce formation of the PDRE during September 1986, but it has been delayed until September 1987. Whether it will be a distinct phase or merely a tool used by Mengistu to continue his rule remains to be seen. The party's formation has long been a goal of Soviet diplomacy; however, it is not certain whether the new party will be in the Soviet tradition beyond its outward symbols and public pronouncements. DIA currently believes that party membership will be limited to 35,000 out of a population of 40 million. The military makes up the greatest percentage of its membership (67 percent). However, the government has expended great efforts to organize the population into neighborhood and regional party associations in order to gain civilian support. Therefore, it cannot be discounted that a civilian-military coalition similar to that in the Soviet Union is a long-term Ethiopian goal.

(U) The issue that the new party must address if it is to contribute to government stability and become an evolutionary phase in Ethiopian political history is the institutionalization of programs and procedures to execute the many functions of government that will survive Mengistu.

(U) The postimperial decade in Ethiopia follows the pattern of military rule in many African countries where a predominant, if not dominant, figure arises from the ruling group and attempts to build an alliance of various social forces that is controlled by the military for the purpose of regenerating society. As long as the leader lives or is able to sustain that alliance, there is some degree of stability or at least continuity. If the leader is unsuccessful or dies, the usual pattern is that he is replaced either by another military regime or by a civilian government subject to the same conditions that caused the original coup or revolution. Currently there are two major unknowns in Ethiopian politics. The first is whether Mengistu has the ability to solve the nation's problems to the satisfaction of military and civilian leaders outside of his immediate inner circle. The second unknown is the degree of Soviet penetration of Ethiopian politics. The Soviets may have to sustain Mengistu against determined Ethiopian opposition or replace him with another pro-Soviet official. Soviet success or failure will be determined by how thoroughly influential Ethiopians have embraced Soviet doctrine.

c. Internal Threat

~~(S/NF)~~ Ethiopia's greatest internal threat is the disintegration of central government

ETHIOPIA

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and Air Force. There is no joint staff arrangement that would provide for independent commanders of ground, air, and naval forces. All unit commanders remain under direct control of the Commander in Chief, Djiboutian Armed Forces, or his deputy. Djibouti's ultimate goal is to create a small but efficient national armed force capable of deterring foreign aggression. However, the young and inexperienced Djiboutian Armed Forces will require improved training and weapon inventories to achieve their objective.

2. ~~(S)~~ KEY OFFICIALS

President: *Hassan Gouled Aptidon*

Director of the Cabinet: *Ismail Guedi Hared*

Prime Minister: *Barkat Gourad Hamadou*

Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation: *Moumin Bahdon Farah*

Minister of Defense: Vacant

Minister of Interior: *Youssouf Ali Chirdon*

Commander of French Forces: Brig Gen *Claude Carreau*

National Army Commander: Maj Gen *Ali Mehidal Waiss*

3. MILITARY BUDGET

~~(S)~~ Approximately \$28.4 million (US), or 22 percent of Djibouti's budget, will go for defense. This pattern will likely continue for the next few years. There are no statistics as to what portion of the military budget is spent on the different services, weapons procurement, salaries, support costs, etc. Until 1983, all elements of the budget were paid from one pool of funds. Foreign military equipment is supplied on a grant basis as is military training in a variety of countries, including France, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and the US.

4. (U) POPULATION

304,000 (1 July 1986); average annual growth 2.6 percent

Males (ages 15-49): About 66,000; about 39,000 fit for military service

Ethnic divisions: (Approximate figure) 182,000 Issas; 106,000 Afars; 15,000 Arabs, French, Ethiopians, and Italians

Literacy: About 20 percent

5. ~~(S/NF)~~ ARMY

Personnel Strength: 3,500-3,800

Major Units: One general headquarters and staff, with a parachute company and an armored squadron assigned; one commando intervention regiment; one border commando group; one gendarmerie corps.

Major Equipment: 20 Panhard AML armored cars (4 AML-60s and 16 AML-90s), 10 BTR-60 APCs and 10 BRDM-2 armored recon vehicles, 4 ZU-23 AA guns, 5 20-mm AA guns (NFI), ten 106-mm recoilless rifles, 9 LRAC 89-mm antitank rocket launchers, six 120-mm mortars, twenty 81-mm mortars.

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6. ~~(S)~~ NAVY

Personnel Strength: 50

Ships: Six patrol boats.

Length of Coastline: 170 NM (includes offshore islands)

7. ~~(S)~~ AIR FORCE

Personnel Strength: 80

Aircraft: Two Noratlas 2501 transport, one Rallye Socata transport, one Cessna 402-C, one Cessna 206G transport, one Alouette II helicopter, one Fan Jet Falcon 20. Two Ecureuil AS-355F helicopters are also believed to be part of the aircraft inventory.

Additional Air Assets: In case of national emergency, Djibouti's civil aircraft and indigenous civilian aviation personnel could be mobilized. The only civil transport aircraft in Djibouti with a maximum takeoff weight of at least 9,000 kilograms is one medium-range Boeing 737-200, which is leased from Sobelair and operated by Air Djibouti. The airline also operates two lighter weight DHC-6 Twin Otters on regional and domestic flights.

8. ~~(S)~~ PARAMILITARY (National Security Force)

Personnel Strength: 1,200

9. (U) KEY US OFFICIALS

Ambassador: John P. Ferriter

Defense Attache: None

Chief, US Liaison Office (USLO) (Djibouti): MAJ Joseph B. McMillan, USA

10. ~~(S)~~ FOREIGN MILITARY PRESENCE

a. French Ground Forces

Personnel Strength: 3,800

Major Units: Three infantry companies, two armored squadrons, and two artillery batteries.

Major Equipment: 33 AMX-13 light tanks (10 with SS-11 ATGMs), 11 armored reconnaissance vehicles, 16 howitzers, 8 ADA weapons, twelve 81-mm mortars.

b. French Navy

Personnel Strength: 200. The naval component based in Djibouti is headquarters for the French Indian Ocean Fleet. These vessels perform maritime surveillance in the local zone. A French Navy Breguet Atlantic conducting a surveillance mission was destroyed in mid-May 1986 when it crashed west of Tadjoura. French vessels operating in the Indian Ocean call regularly for repairs, rest and relaxation, and provisioning.

c. French Air Force

Personnel Strength: 850

Aircraft: 10 Mirage III-C fighters, 1 Transall C-160F, 3 Nord 2501 Noratlas transports, 5 SA-330 Puma helicopters, 3 Alouette II helicopters, 5 Alouette III helicopters.

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d. Other French Forces:

France also provides 105 "cooperants" who are assigned to various Djiboutian military units or staffs.

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Appendix

Installation BE List (U)

Name	BE Number	Category	Latitude	Longitude
Djibouti-Ambouli Afd	0790-08005	80053	11-32-48N	043-09-33E
Djibouti Military HQ	0790-00022	91011	11-36-11N	043-09-10E
Obock Military Instl N	0790-00187	90110	11-58-25N	043-17-40E
Tadjoura Mil Bks Area	0789CA0048	90110	11-47-05N	042-53-03E

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ETHIOPIA

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1. GOVERNMENT

a. (U) Key Government Officials

Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE), Chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), and Commander in Chief of the Revolutionary Armed Forces: *Mengistu Haile-Mariam*

Secretary General of the PMAC and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers: *Capt Fikre Selassie Wodgeress*

Deputy Secretary General, PMAC: *Lt Col Fisseha Desta*

Minister of Foreign Affairs: *Berhanu Bayih*

Minister of National Defense: *Maj Gen Haile Ghiorgis Habte-Mariam*

Vice Minister of Defense: *Maj Gen Abebe Wolde-Mariam*

Minister of the Interior: *Brig Gen Taye Tilahun*

b. Type and Stability of Government

(U) Ethiopia is in a state of transition. September 1986 marked the 12th anniversary of the fall of Emperor Haile Selassie and the effective end of the nation's 3,000-year monarchy. On the surface, Ethiopia is currently ruled by a military oligarchy the members of which belong to two organizations: the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) and the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE). Known locally as "The Dergue" (Committee of Equals), this originally anonymous group of 140 officers and enlisted men from all ranks and backgrounds replaced the royal family and various government ministries. Ethiopia, in fact, is an autocracy, in the form of Mengistu Haile Mariam.

(U) Postimperial Ethiopia with the subsequent rise of Mengistu has moved through three distinct phases as it transitioned from a feudal to a military-ruled Marxist state. The three completed stages include the transition to and legitimization of military rule (8 July 1974-21 March 1975); survival of the Dergue (April 1975-December 1979); and Mengistu's rise to dominance (September 1974-December 1979). A fourth stage that may confer a greater degree of stability than enjoyed in the past may begin with the creation of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE). Although the military rulers have had control of the instruments of coercion throughout the phases, they have faced numerous challenges from several directions, including the military. Thus, stability of government has not been assured.

(U) Despite its announcements and draconian measures used to eliminate dissent, the Dergue faced numerous constraints on its freedom to act. These constraints emerged from two major sources: the unwieldy size of the Dergue itself, and the problems inherited from the imperial regime. Decisionmaking within the Dergue was difficult given the various backgrounds, educational levels, abilities, and priorities of its many members. Thus, the conditions existed for the emergence of a strong if not charismatic leader. Additionally, the conditions of famine, rising prices, the Eritrean separatist movement, and poor relations with Sudan and Somalia which contributed to the emperor's fall still existed, resulting in continued unrest among disparate groups within the Ethiopian population.

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~~(S/NF)~~ The rise to political dominance by Mengistu Haile Mariam commenced when he joined the Dergue as an Army major at some point after it was originally formed in June 1974. His presence on the Dergue was announced in November 1974. Mengistu moved into predominance on the Dergue by first engineering the fall of Lieutenant General Andom, the first PMAC spokesman and de facto head of state. He became dominant when he was elected Chairman of the Dergue on 12 February 1977 following the executions of his last seven competitors. Mengistu's consolidation of power continued when he was named Chairman of Congress of Organizing the Party of the Workers of Ethiopia (COPWE) upon its formation in 1979.

~~(S/NF)~~ As the undisputed leader of Ethiopia, Mengistu has been the principal force behind Ethiopia's foreign policy shift from pro-West to pro-Soviet. He makes all major decisions and mid- to high-level personnel appointments within political, administrative, and military institutions. There is considerable evidence that the most important criterion for individual advancement is demonstrated loyalty to Mengistu rather than to ideology or a concept of the nation.

~~(S/NF)~~ The final transition from a monarchy may occur as the WPE evolves and the PDRE is created. In February 1986, the committee to draft the constitution for the new republic had been nominated. Mengistu's goal had been to announce formation of the PDRE during September 1986, but it has been delayed until September 1987. Whether it will be a distinct phase or merely a tool used by Mengistu to continue his rule remains to be seen. The party's formation has long been a goal of Soviet diplomacy; however, it is not certain whether the new party will be in the Soviet tradition beyond its outward symbols and public pronouncements. DIA currently believes that party membership will be limited to 35,000 out of a population of 40 million. The military makes up the greatest percentage of its membership (67 percent). However, the government has expended great efforts to organize the population into neighborhood and regional party associations in order to gain civilian support. Therefore, it cannot be discounted that a civilian-military coalition similar to that in the Soviet Union is a long-term Ethiopian goal.

(U) The issue that the new party must address if it is to contribute to government stability and become an evolutionary phase in Ethiopian political history is the institutionalization of programs and procedures to execute the many functions of government that will survive Mengistu.

(U) The postimperial decade in Ethiopia follows the pattern of military rule in many African countries where a predominant, if not dominant, figure arises from the ruling group and attempts to build an alliance of various social forces that is controlled by the military for the purpose of regenerating society. As long as the leader lives or is able to sustain that alliance, there is some degree of stability or at least continuity. If the leader is unsuccessful or dies, the usual pattern is that he is replaced either by another military regime or by a civilian government subject to the same conditions that caused the original coup or revolution. Currently there are two major unknowns in Ethiopian politics. The first is whether Mengistu has the ability to solve the nation's problems to the satisfaction of military and civilian leaders outside of his immediate inner circle. The second unknown is the degree of Soviet penetration of Ethiopian politics. The Soviets may have to sustain Mengistu against determined Ethiopian opposition or replace him with another pro-Soviet official. Soviet success or failure will be determined by how thoroughly influential Ethiopians have embraced Soviet doctrine.

c. Internal Threat

~~(S/NF)~~ Ethiopia's greatest internal threat is the disintegration of central government

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authority in the territories over which the monarchy gained control during the late 19th century. It is currently possible to identify more than a dozen dissident organizations throughout the nation. Although many of these groups became active after Haile Selassie was deposed, the origins of their claims can be found deep in Ethiopian history. The attempt to integrate diverse provinces and assimilate heterogeneous populations into the Ethiopian core is a major and historically consistent national policy goal.

~~(S/NF)~~ Two ethnically based insurgencies — one separatist and one revolutionary movement — currently pose the greatest challenges to Ethiopian territorial integrity. They are located in Eritrea and Tigray. Additionally, separatist sentiment continues in the eastern provinces, including the Ogaden region. The Eritrean insurgency is the most serious of the three.

~~(S/NF)~~ Armed rebellion in Eritrea began in 1962 when Haile Selassie annexed Eritrea, disregarding a UN resolution recommending a federal relationship between the province and the central Ethiopian government. The Emperor's consistent position from the end of Italian occupation in 1941 until his overthrow was that complete union was the only acceptable solution. The Eritreans demanded complete independence. Except for a brief period during the first 60 days of rule by the PMAC when a political solution to the fighting was thought possible, neither the position of the central government nor that of the separatists has changed. Both the United States and the Soviets have argued in Addis Ababa that a military solution will not be possible to achieve; nevertheless, all protagonists remain intransigent in their demands.

~~(S/NF)~~ Key Eritrean separatist groups, all of which expound Marxist ideology, include the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), the most militarily capable, estimated at approximately 20,000-25,000; the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), estimated at less than 1,000; and the Eritrean Liberation Front-United Organization (ELF-UO), which is estimated to have few armed members but which plays a diplomatic role in Sudan soliciting support. These three groups are not united although there have been attempts to develop an alliance to facilitate coordinated operations. When these groups have not been fighting the Ethiopians, there has been serious fighting among them in which the EPLF emerged as the most powerful. Nevertheless, they do have a common purpose: Eritrean independence. Control of Ethiopia is not a goal of these groups.

~~(S/NF)~~ The Eritreans scored major gains against Ethiopian military authority early during PMAC's rule when Eritrean troops conquered nearly all of the province; however, internecine fighting compounded by multidivisional Ethiopian Army operations planned and supported by Soviet advisers pushed the rebels back during the late 1970s. Ethiopian Army campaigns occurred annually between 1978 and 1985, although there was a lull in large-scale operations in 1984.

~~(S/NF)~~ During 1984, the civil war continued with the insurgents scoring some significant victories when they seized important towns and launched a commando attack against Johannes IV Airfield at Asmara. The Army reacted locally but no serious counteroffensives were conducted. Given Mengistu's refusal to negotiate a settlement and Soviet reluctance to support a futile cause, it is probable that the Army had taken the time to recover from its hard fighting and to regroup, refit, and absorb replacements. Also, successive large-scale offensives resulting in heavy casualties and low morale caused distrust of Mengistu's judgment among senior officers. A possible coup attempt during this period and a large number of desertions were other factors militating against large-scale operations. Additionally, the 10th anniversary of the Ethiopian revolution consumed much government attention and resources.

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~~(S/NF)~~ In 1985, northern Ethiopia was again the scene of major military operations. During July, the EPLF in a major surprise offensive captured Barentu, at a critical road junction in western Eritrea. Following Barentu's fall, the Ethiopian Army began a major buildup of forces and in less than 3 weeks redeployed more than 50,000 troops. Faced with overwhelming odds, the EPLF withdrew from Barentu at the end of August 1985. The Ethiopian forces continued their advance to the Sudanese border, capturing the towns of Teseney and Haykota, which the EPLF had held since 1984. By October, the Ethiopian Army mobilized a large number of troops for an offensive against the guerrilla stronghold of Nakfa. The Ethiopians failed to take Nakfa after launching several offensives and taking numerous casualties, and by late fall they fell back to regroup and absorb new replacements. During early 1986, the Ethiopians consolidated their defenses around towns captured from the EPLF and conducted several battalion-size sweeps in an attempt to interdict insurgent supply lines. Although EPLF military activity was generally low, EPLF commandos attacked Johannes IV Airfield in January 1986, inflicting considerable damage to aircraft deployed there.

~~(S/NF)~~ The Marxist movement in Tigray has its roots in Ethiopian history and the efforts of Tigrayans to resist and supplant Amhara domination. Armed resistance to central government authority began during the early 1940s following the expulsion of the Italians by the British. However, the current insurgency is 10 years old and the major group is the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). Its goal is to establish an autonomous Tigray. The TPLF's estimated strength is currently 8,000-10,000 and the movement had coordinated some of its military operations with the EPLF. However, ideological and personal differences have caused serious strains in the relationship and the two groups have occasionally fought each other, with clashes again breaking out early in 1986.

~~(S/NF)~~ The TPLF has been successful in cutting lines of communications, controlling the countryside, and extending its operations into the neighboring provinces of Welo and Gondar. The Ethiopian Army controls the major towns in Tigray and must escort convoys between them. Nevertheless, the TPLF overran the religious center of Lalibella in October 1984, capturing 10 foreign nationals. This attack was the TPLF's first major operation in 1984. During 1985, the TPLF continued to harass the Ethiopian Army by attacking several small garrisons and ambushing convoys. In early February 1986, the guerrillas successfully attacked Makelle, freeing several hundred prisoners and destroying a large number of trucks and a fuel depot. In April 1986, the TPLF conducted a series of offensives along the key Inda Selasi-to-Gonder road and captured the Tekeze River Bridge. In November 1986 the TPLF overran the defensive positions of an Ethiopian brigade at Sekota, in northern Welo region, and captured the town. The TPLF's tactics have not included retention of towns they conquer. Unable to defend against a concerted Ethiopian counterattack, they usually withdraw after a few days, content to reap the political benefits of embarrassing the central government. The Ethiopian Army has not launched a major campaign against the TPLF in the last 2 years. It has been using the time to refit and regroup after taking heavy losses in the 1985-86 Eritrean offensive.

(U) The third major insurgent movement is in the eastern provinces of Harerge, Bale, and Sidamo. The movement originates from the following: the inability of the Ethiopian Government to fully consolidate its control over these individuals, tribes, and ethnic groups since the 16th century migrations; conflicts arising out of Italian and British decolonization of their Somali territories; and the stated interests of Ethiopia and Somalia. Movements in the eastern region include the Oromo (the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia) and Sidamo Liberation Fronts; however, neither of these groups has the organization or assets to pose a

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major threat to government control. The best that can be achieved is low-level harassment of Ethiopian forces.

(S/NF) Another separatist movement, with the most significant armed rebel group in eastern Ethiopia, is the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF), which was formed in 1963. The Ethiopian Army was committed against the WSLF in 1966 when local police and militia forces could no longer cope with the threat to Ethiopian control of the territory. The WSLF is currently estimated to have 1,000 armed insurgents and it relies on external support from Somalia although it has tried on several occasions in the past to obtain support from other countries, mostly Arab, without noticeable success. It traditionally employs hit-and-run guerrilla attacks on lines of communications and isolated Army units, and in January 1984 it attacked a train on the Ethiopia-Djibouti rail line, causing numerous casualties and major damage. However, during 1985 and early 1986, the WSLF, while quiet militarily, was active on the political front, attempting to elicit aid from sources other than Somalia.

(S) The seemingly unending involvement of Ethiopian forces in military operations has placed a serious strain on the morale of Ethiopian forces in combat zones. Mengistu has responded severely to acts of mutiny within the armed forces and military dissatisfaction presents an additional potentially dangerous, but for now controllable, internal threat. It is very likely that there is a cleavage between those military leaders serving in the field and those in political power over the viability of military solutions, especially in the case of Eritrea; however, there is also a reluctance to agree to a political solution that would dismember the nation. Since the separatists are adamant in their demands, no end to the fighting is foreseen even in the event of Mengistu's departure from the scene.

d. External Threat

(S/NF) Ethiopia perceives Somalia as its major external threat. In July 1977, the Somali Government sent regular forces into the disputed Ogaden to join Somali-supported guerrillas in joint operations that pushed Ethiopian defenders from most of their garrisons in the region. The Somali regular forces were pushed out of the Ogaden in late March by Cuban armored units backed by Ethiopian troops. Following renewed Ogaden fighting in late 1980, Ethiopian forces were able to consolidate their gains and military control along the disputed border. In July 1982, Ethiopian forces, fearing closer cooperation between Somali regular forces and the WSLF and sensing an opportunity to topple the Siad regime in Somalia, launched an attack on two Somali-administered border towns. Mechanized units overran the lightly defended Somali positions and occupied Somali territory. Sporadic and isolated incidents of violence have continued to occur, and Ethiopian forces remain deployed in strategic operating bases throughout the Ogaden. However, during January 1986 the leaders of both countries met in Djibouti for the first time and pledged their governments to undertake discussions aimed at improving relations. Although tensions have been temporarily reduced, the two sides have serious differences to overcome and must make major concessions if they are to achieve normalized relations.

(S) Sudan represents a threat to Ethiopia's security only in the sense that it supports the major Eritrean insurgents with sanctuary and some limited medical aid and weapons. Neither Sudan nor Ethiopia desires open conflict. However, Ethiopia continues to provide training camps for the dissident Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA). These camps are scattered throughout the western border area and present a focus for conflict between these two countries. The largest camp is at Gambella in Ethiopia's Ilubabor Province. Sudanese forces or Libyan aircraft in support of Sudan, intent on attacking these camps or in hot pursuit of dissidents or bandits, could cross into Ethiopian territory with the possibility

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of hostile action occurring between Ethiopian and Sudanese forces. Sudan, however, does not pose a conventional military threat to Ethiopia.

~~(S/NF)~~ In spite of massive US famine relief assistance during 1985, Ethiopia perceives the US as an increasing threat to its security. Ethiopia fears that US military involvement with its neighbors is directed at undermining the Ethiopian regime. US military assistance to Kenya, Sudan, and especially Somalia, particularly in light of the present Ethiopian-Somali border situation, is viewed by the Ethiopians as US support for some form of action against Ethiopia.

e. Communist Influence

~~(S/NF)~~ The Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, Cuba and East Germany are seen by the PMAC and much of the Ethiopian population as the nations which came to Ethiopia's aid during 1976 and 1977, when the country was in real danger of being dismembered by large-scale conflicts in Eritrea and the Ogaden. Since 1976, Ethiopia and the Soviet Union have signed agreements for military equipment totaling some \$5.6 billion, and the Soviets have provided over \$5.2 billion worth of military equipment including jet fighters, advanced attack helicopters, armored vehicles, tanks, rocket launchers, artillery, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and naval combatants. In addition, the USSR continues to provide at least 1,700 Soviet advisers to Ethiopia and also supports the stationing of 3,000-4,000 Cuban combat troops and advisers in the country.

~~(S/NF/WI/NC)~~ A substantial portion of the estimated 6,000-7,000 Cuban combat troops that were in Ethiopia in 1983 departed during 1984. The total Cuban military presence in Ethiopia was estimated at the time to be 9,000 personnel (6,000-7,000 combat troops and 2,000-3,000 military advisers). DIA now believes that the Cuban strength is 3,000-4,000 — 1,500-2,500 advisers and 1,500-2,500 combat troops. Personnel reductions were the result of drawdowns in the four brigades (two armor, one artillery, and one mechanized infantry) that were in Ethiopia as of late 1983. The mechanized brigade was withdrawn and the remaining brigades consolidated into one. Remaining Cuban forces serve as a strategic reserve ready to respond to any military contingency and as support for the Mengistu regime. They are far from Addis, however, and would not provide a rapid response.

~~(S/NF/NC)~~ In partial return for Soviet military aid and backing, Chairman Mengistu has allowed the Soviets to establish military access to naval and air facilities. On Dehalak Island, 50 km off the northern Ethiopian port of Mitsiwa, the Soviets have constructed an installation that provides their Indian Ocean squadron with logistic support, light repair, and replenishment services. The Soviets had also stationed two Il-38 naval reconnaissance aircraft at Asmara. Il-38s have not been deployed to Asmara since the 1984 commando attack by Eritreans which destroyed one Soviet aircraft and damaged another. Although the Soviets probably planned to resume Il-38 operations upon completion of a security enhancement which began soon after the assault, another attack by Eritreans in early 1986, which destroyed or damaged at least 11 Ethiopian MiG aircraft, will preclude resumption of their Asmara-based air operations for the near term.

~~(S/NF)~~ Even though the Soviet Bloc is its primary source of military supplies, Ethiopia has not been a fully cooperative client. Chairman Mengistu continues to put off issues which the Soviets feel are key to maintaining their control in the country, such as the establishment of a civilian-based Marxist Party. The Ethiopian Workers Party may have the form of a Communist party, but not the substance. In the past, Moscow's minimal economic assistance to Addis has been a primary source of friction in Ethiopian-Soviet relations, and as a result Ethiopia has maintained negotiations with the West in an attempt to obtain badly needed economic aid. Because of its deteriorating economic situation, declining hard-

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currency reserves, and continued need for military and petroleum supplies, Ethiopia will probably continue to seek closer relations with the USSR and its Bloc allies. It is noteworthy that in the past 3 years several high-level Soviet economic delegations have visited Ethiopia. At present, there are five Soviet economic planners serving with the Ethiopian National Revolutionary Development Campaign, indicating that the Soviets may be willing to offer more development assistance in order to maintain their considerable degree of leverage in the Ethiopian Government. However, it is most likely that any economic funding for regional development will be overshadowed by Ethiopia's continued need for large amounts of Soviet military equipment.

(S) Ethiopia's need for military aid, generally coinciding with foreign policies and ideological kinships between the Mengistu regime and the Soviet Bloc, makes the prospects for continued close cooperation good. In an attempt to ensure this relationship, the Soviets, their East European allies, and the Cubans are continually pursuing activities such as establishing friendship treaties and signing economic, scientific, and cultural accords to forge stronger bonds between themselves and Ethiopia.

(S/NF) Ethiopia also has relations with China. Relations between Ethiopia and the PRC have been strained in past years, although remarks by Ethiopia's Chairman Mengistu in 1984 have indicated the possibility of a gradual improvement in their relationship. The importance of Ethiopia's ties to the Soviet Union will continue to hamper any improvement in its present relationship with the PRC. However, the PRC will be prepared to exploit any opportunity which would hinder Soviet attempts to expand their strategic position.

(S/NF) In January 1984, Ethiopia and North Korea signed an economic assistance agreement, but the terms are unclear. Reportedly, North Korea will initiate a series of projects over the next 7 years that will have a combined value of \$250 million. All but one of the projects involve civilian economic projects. The agreement also calls for a small arms munitions factory to be built and, based on a 1985 agreement, North Korea reportedly sent engineers to assist in construction of a maritime facility on Haleb Island, near Aseb.

f. Economic Factors

(S) Ethiopia, the world's sixth poorest country on a per capita basis, relies on its agricultural sector for nearly half of its GNP and 85 percent of its employment. Nevertheless, Ethiopia has been unable to feed itself since prior to the 1974 revolution. In 1985, the country suffered its worst famine since 1972-74 and perhaps in this century. Foreign trade provides Ethiopia with most of its government operating revenues. Ethiopia relies on coffee exports as a major source of foreign exchange earnings. Other major exports are hides, skins, and refined petroleum products. Leading imports are petroleum and foodstuffs. Major sources of imports are Saudi Arabia, Japan, Italy, and West Germany. Most of Ethiopia's exports go to the US, Djibouti, Saudi Arabia, and Japan.

(S) Gross domestic product grew at an average rate of 2.3 percent during the decade ending in 1982-83. However, the economy is currently suffering not only from the drought and civil strife (military expenditures take 22 percent of the budget), but also from ideological constraints, notably in the government's efforts to impose upon its nation of small, independent farmers a system of collectivized agriculture and state farms, especially in the resettlement areas. The government also imposes artificially low official market prices on the sale of basic foodstuffs and forces farmers to sell at these prices. Lacking essential incentives to produce, Ethiopia's farmers have tended to reduce their production to that amount needed for their families. At the same time, industrial production is stagnating due to overcentralization (there is government ownership of almost all industrial facilities),

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shortages in spare parts (due to chronic foreign exchange problems), a lack of capital investment, and managerial inefficiency.

(S/NF) In February 1985, the government announced an austerity program which has further slowed economic activity. Imports have again been reduced, gasoline rationed, and a special drought emergency tax of 1 month's salary per annum imposed on all individuals earning over US \$25 per month. While consumer prices have soared, wages have not risen in 10 years. The rates of underemployment and unemployment in Ethiopia's cities and villages are reportedly around 50 percent.

(S/NF) Ethiopia has the capability to produce support materiel to include small arms of 7.62 mm and .30 caliber at the Addis Ababa Ammunition Plant. It has an annual ammunition production capacity of 5 million rounds and a current annual production rate of 1.5 million rounds. The primary supplier of major weapons is the USSR and to a lesser degree other Communist countries. Soviet supplies include aircraft, helicopters, tanks, armored personnel carriers (APCs), field artillery, mortars, ADA, small arms, frigates, and patrol boats. Agreements for Communist-supplied military equipment are valued at over \$5.6 billion with equipment deliveries in excess of \$5 billion. To date Free World agreements and deliveries have totaled only \$270 million for the same period.

g. Military and Political Alignment

(S/NF) Despite Ethiopia's dramatic shift away from the US and the West, there remain a number of factors that complicate and qualify its relationship with Moscow. First, Chairman Mengistu and the PMAC are highly nationalistic and do not consider themselves Soviet puppets. Moreover, there are many indications that the military, as an institution separate from the PMAC, is dissatisfied with the Soviets, their equipment, and their training. Second, there is tension over Soviet efforts to influence internal events within Ethiopia. The USSR desires to negotiate a peaceful solution to the Eritrean conflict against the PMAC's desires and may have threatened to reduce or halt military aid to Mengistu if orders for more large-scale offensives are made against Soviet advice.

(S/NF) Third, Ethiopia is heavily dependent on the West for economic assistance. Mengistu's strong anti-Western rhetoric stops short of completely antagonizing the West in order to prevent the flow of aid from being stopped; however, he consistently supports the Soviet Union on most international issues. Soviet operations in Afghanistan, the Soviet boycott of the 1984 Olympics, and the 1986 Soviet position on nuclear disarmament are three examples.

(S/NF) Regionally, Ethiopia has varying alignments with other nations in the area. Ethiopia maintains correct relations with Kenya, with which Ethiopia has a defense treaty directed against presently subdued Somali irredentist claims. Ethiopia's relations with South Yemen and Libya had been close and in 1981 the three countries signed a Tripartite Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation. However, relations with Libya became seriously strained in 1985 because of Libya's rapprochement with Sudan and Tripoli's withdrawal of support to southern Sudanese rebels. Ethiopia's close relationship with South Yemen ended early in 1986 with the overthrow of the al Hasani government. This event also induced strains in Ethiopian-Soviet relations, since Mengistu supported al Hasani while the Soviets backed the rebels. The major political alignment in the region which Chairman Mengistu sees as a threat to Ethiopia is that of the Arab nations. This threat is a recurring theme in Ethiopian history. The country perceives itself as a Christian island in an Islamic sea. Nevertheless, Mengistu's fear is justified. Arab States have been heavily involved in supporting Islamic Eritrean insurgent groups in northern Ethiopia. One example is Saudi Arabia, which has been a major supplier of aid to Ethiopian insurgent groups and

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has attempted to unify various Eritrea opposition groups to increase their effectiveness. However, since the groups have not joined their efforts, and have even fought among themselves, present Saudi support is minimal.

h. (U) Key US Officials

Charge d'Affaires (Addis Ababa): James Cheek

Defense Attache: None

2. MILITARY, GENERAL

a. (U) Key Military Officials

Armed Forces: Commander in Chief, *Mengistu Haile-Mariam*; Chief of Staff, Maj Gen Merid Negussie

Army: Ground Forces Commander, Maj Gen *Hailu Gebre Mikael*

Air Force: Commander, Brig Gen *Amha Desta*; Deputy Air Commander (Unknown)

Navy: Commander, Rear Adm *Tesfaye Berhanu*

Police: Chief Commissioner, Brig Gen *Worku Zewede*

Military Intelligence: Chief, Brig Gen *Tadesse Tekle-Hayimanot*

b. Position of the Armed Forces

~~(S)~~ Mengistu, with the assistance of his immediate military subordinates, controls Ethiopia. In their roles as Chairman and the top leadership of the WPE, they are in charge of the civilian functions of government. As the leaders of the PMAC, they command the armed forces. Mengistu is Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces since he is the PMAC Chairman. The PMAC Defense Affairs Committee controls the National Revolutionary Operations Command (NROC), which administers the regular armed forces as well as the nation's paramilitary forces. Chairman Mengistu has stayed in power by shrewdly maneuvering elements in the armed forces, consulting with the officer corps before setting major policies, and ruthlessly using force when necessary; however, the loyalty of all military units is not assured. Continuing morale problems stemming from harsh field conditions, low pay, significant military setbacks in the north, and divisions within the armed forces along ethnic, religious, or ideological lines may have undermined the PMAC's position by creating a cleavage between those leaders in the field and those in the capital over the issue of national strategy and the Soviet alliance. If such a gap exists, Mengistu's future may well rest on how he attempts to solve the problem of the separatist movements.

c. Military Trends and Capabilities

~~(S)~~ The Ethiopian Armed Forces are large, experienced, and capable in comparison with other Sub-Saharan nations. The Army is the largest on the subcontinent and the Navy and Air Force rank second only to South Africa in personnel strengths.

~~(S)~~ The most significant military trend has been expansion as a direct result of the Ethiopian revolution, Soviet aid, the insurgencies, and the 1977-78 Ogaden war against Somalia. The most significant increases occurred in the Army and Air Force. The Army expanded from 35,000 to 240,000 men between 1975 and 1981. Then the Army's manpower level dropped to an estimated 180,000 between 1981 and 1983. National military service was revived in January 1984 to raise the personnel level to its present estimated strength of

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260,000. The Air Force has increased since 1973 from 53 assorted aircraft and 2,100 men to over 350 aircraft and 4,500 men. The Air Force expansion appears to be continuing.

(S) The services are capable of integrating their efforts to execute a national military strategy while the ground forces have additionally demonstrated their capability to fight on two fronts simultaneously. The most recent example of a major combined-service offensive operation occurred during the northern Ethiopian offensive of the summer and fall of 1985, when ground forces supported by airstrikes recaptured the towns of Barentu, Haykota, and Teseney. The coastal town of Mersa Tekly was also retaken with the support of an estimated battalion-size amphibious landing.

(S) Major deficiencies within the armed forces as well as the tenacity of the opposition have prevented the Ethiopians from achieving victory in spite of the large quantities of equipment, supplies, and advisers from the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other East European nations. Even with Soviet-directed improvements, four general deficiencies can be identified. First, morale is a serious problem, with numerous desertions a manifestation of the problem. Second, rapid expansion has produced large numbers of personnel, but many lack proper training. Nevertheless, the Ethiopian soldier compares favorably in quality with the personnel of other east African armies although he may be marginal by Western standards. Third, the military lacks sufficient numbers of personnel with the ability to master the complex weapons that have been supplied by the USSR, creating dependence on the Cubans and Soviets to man and maintain many of the more sophisticated weapon systems. Likewise, leadership has been impaired by a shortage of properly trained and motivated officers. A fourth problem is the politicalization of the armed forces. Following the revolution that ushered in the present military regime, the officer corps was beset with executions, defections, arrests, and involuntary retirements. In this highly charged political atmosphere, less capable officers were able to assume command positions. Officers also were required to "consult" with troops before conducting military operations. Heavy losses in the Ogaden and Eritrea during 1976 and 1977, plus severe discipline problems, caused the PMAC to reevaluate its criteria for leadership and to reinstate some of the experienced officers in command positions. To assure complete PMAC control of all units, a parallel chain of command based on the Soviet model has been established in all units. These "political cadres," trained in Soviet doctrine and propaganda techniques, make sure that all actions taken by unit commanders are in the best interest of the revolution and the PMAC. While the political cadre perhaps enhances the political reliability of the armed forces, it suppresses tactical initiative.

d. Military Budget

(S/NF/NC) \$425,930,000 for fiscal year ending 7 July 1985; this is 22.1 percent of the central government budget. No service allocations are available. Dollar value converted at the official exchange rate of 2.07 birr equal \$1.00.

e. (U) Population

43,882,000 as of 1 July 1986

Males (ages 15-49): 9,941,000; physically fit, 5,340,000; draft age, 18

Ethnic divisions: 40 percent Galla (Oromo), 32 percent Amhara and Tigray, 9 percent Sidamo, 6 percent Shankella, 6 percent Somali, 4 percent Afar, 2 percent Gurage, 1 percent other

Literacy: About 5 percent

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3. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

a. Army

(1) Missions

(U) To protect the territorial integrity of the country, by conducting operations across national borders if necessary as directed by national command authorities, and to aid the police and other paramilitary organizations in maintaining internal security by conducting counterinsurgency operations.

(2) Capabilities

~~(S/NF)~~ The Ethiopian Army is the largest ground force in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is capable of securing large populated areas and contesting other areas where insurgents operate within the country, such as the Ogaden, Eritrea, and Tigray. Additionally, it is capable of conducting multidivisional operations involving up to 110,000 troops, as it has in Eritrea. The Army is also capable of defending against a conventional invasion from any one of the neighboring states, and of conducting cross-border military operations against them. In the case of Somalia, the Ethiopian Army is capable of making significant penetrations across the border in force.

~~(S)~~ The capabilities of the Ethiopian ground forces can be attributed directly to expanding force levels and the large amount of Soviet military equipment and advisory aid that has been provided to the country over the last 8 years. Ethiopia has formed and equipped 18 new infantry divisions and 2 mechanized divisions since 1977, in addition to the 5 original divisions, with sufficient firepower and mobility to field deploy for counterinsurgency operations in both the Ogaden and Eritrea. Improvements in command, control, and communications have resulted in the more effective employment of units. This, in part, has allowed Ethiopian forces to remain in control of the Ogaden, including the possession of Somali territory along the border, with simultaneous focus on military operations in the north. A third factor that has helped improve the effectiveness of the ground forces has been the expansion of the Ethiopian Air Force (EAF), which has allowed the Army to receive increased levels of close air and logistic support. Additionally, the acquisition of utility, Mi-14 HAZE, and advanced attack helicopters has allowed isolated units to be resupplied, their wounded to be air evacuated, artillery fire to be directed, and accurate airstrikes to be delivered.

~~(S)~~ The ground forces are almost totally dependent upon the USSR for materiel support. As long as the Soviets continue to supply the Army with equipment, spare parts, and training, the country's plentiful manpower resources will enable the Ethiopian ground forces to remain superior to those of neighboring countries. Ethiopian forces are capable of conducting extensive military operations within their borders. However, in most cases sustained cross-border operations could be accomplished only with external, primarily logistic, support from the Soviet Union.

(3) Personnel Strength

~~(S)~~ 260,000

(4) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

~~(S)~~ Headquartered at Addis Ababa, the Army consists of 23 infantry divisions, 2 mechanized divisions, and 1 support division. Deployment and tactical operations of military forces are controlled by the NROC through six regional command headquarters. Although the

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regional command headquarters control military operations in their regions, during special operations the NROC establishes forward campaign headquarters to assume operational command. Additionally, subcommands in the form of multibrigade or multidivision task force headquarters are established to react to serious military threats. Task force headquarters bypass regional command headquarters during operations and report directly to the NROC campaign headquarters.

(b) ~~(S/NF)~~ Ground Combat Units

Major Tactical Units	Strength per Unit	
	Authorized	Average/Actual
23 infantry div HQ	Unk	800
130 infantry bdes	Unk	1,500
541 infantry bns	500	250-450
25 infantry bns (mech)	500	300
10 paracommando bns	500	400
48 artillery bns	200	180
2 mechanized div HQ	Unk	500
43 armor bns	150	150
27 air defense bns	100	100

(c) Deployment

~~(S/NF)~~ Most of the Ethiopian Army's 23 infantry divisions and 2 mechanized divisions are deployed to combat major insurgent movements in the north and east, and to control the borders with Somalia and Sudan. The majority of Ethiopian forces are deployed in the north (15 divisions consisting of about 170,000 men) against insurgent threats in Eritrea and Tigray. A second major concentration of Ethiopian combat personnel (6 divisions numbering 60,000 men) is in the Ogaden to defend against a perceived threat from Somalia and combat Somali-backed insurgents. The remaining 3 divisions, with 30,000 personnel, are deployed to combat smaller insurgent groups. Two of these divisions are deployed in southern Ethiopia, and one division is stationed in central Ethiopia to protect the regime and guard the road from Addis Ababa to the port of Aseb. A support division also exists, and functions as a strategic reserve by detaching its subordinate units to territorial commands as needed. Each regular infantry division normally has four brigades plus support units. In actual practice, Ethiopian combat divisions vary greatly in size; some have a strength of approximately 4,000 while others may contain more than 10,000 men. The two mechanized divisions, formed in 1985, have approximate strengths of 5,500 men each. Within the next few years Ethiopia hopes to establish a restructured/standardized Army that would field each infantry division with four infantry brigades plus support elements and a battalion each of field artillery, armor, air defense artillery, transportation, engineers, communications, and medical personnel.

(5) Weapons and Equipment

(a) General

~~(S/NF/WN/NC)~~ Older equipment is principally of US origin and is likely nonoperational. The Soviet Union and its allies commenced delivery in 1977 of a wide variety of modern equipment, ranging from T-55 medium tanks to small arms and ammunition. In addition to standard weapons and support equipment, the USSR has supplied the Ethiopian Army with large amounts of electronic warfare (EW) equipment. Effective use of EW has been noted in Ethiopian military operations, both in the Ogaden and Eritrea. Despite the support of Soviet and other foreign advisers, trucks, armored vehicles, and artillery pieces frequently

have fairly high deadline rates. Also, frequent shortages of radio batteries, particularly for older US-supplied models, have been noted. The Army is currently increasing the size of its logistic support to correct this problem and most units are now able to keep enough of their equipment operational to perform their missions. In addition, foreign military advisory support continues to be concentrated in this area in an attempt to obtain higher overall equipment readiness rates.

(b) ~~(S/INT)~~ Ground Weapons and Equipment

		Country of Origin	Total Inventory	
Mortars:	60-mm, M19 ¹	US	100	
	81-mm, M1/M29	US, UK, IS	200	
	82-mm, M1937	UR	850	
	4.2-in, M24A1	US	100	
	120-mm, M1938	UR	36	
Antitank Rkt Lchrs (RL) and Rcl Rifles (RCLR):	57-mm RCLR, M18A1 ¹	US	100	
	75-mm RCLR, M1A1/M20 ¹	US	100	
	82-mm RCLR, B-10	UR	492	
	106-mm RCLR, M40A1 ¹	US	50	
	107-mm RCLR, B-11	UR	100	
	3.5-in rkt launcher, M20 ¹	US	100	
	AT-3/SAGGER launcher	UR	306	
	RPG-7	UR	1,400	
	AD Artillery/ Missiles:	14.5-mm, ZPU-1/2/4 ¹	UR	146
		23-mm, ZU-23	UR	464
23-mm, ZSU-23/4		UR	134	
37-mm, M1939		UR	217	
37-mm, M1939 (twin)		UR	25	
57-mm, S-60		UR	58	
100-mm, KS-19		UR	40	
SA-7/GRAIL SAM launcher		UR	325	
SA-9/GASKIN SAM		UR	6	
Artillery:		76-mm, ZIS-3, M1942	UR	316
		85-mm, gun, D-44	UR	89
		105-mm, howitzer, M2A1 ²	US	36
	122-mm, howitzer, D-30	UR	400	
	122-mm, rkt launcher, GRAD P	UR	45	
	122-mm, MRL, BM-21	UR	110	
	130-mm, gun, M-46	UR	109	
	155-mm, howitzer, M14A1 ²	US	10	
	155-mm, SP howitzer, M109 ²	US	5	
	Armored Vehicles:	APC, BTR-60PB	UR	636
APC, BTR-152		UR	157	
APC, M113 ²		US	20	
ARC, M-20 ²		US	5	
ARC, M-82		US	5	
ARC, Panhard		FR	56	

	Country of Origin	Total Inventory
	UR	198
	UR	35
	UR	41
Tanks:	UR	40
	YO	59
	UR/LY	801
	UR	Unk

~~(C)~~ Pre-Ogaden war or captured Somali equipment whose status is unknown.

~~(C)~~ Pre-Ogaden war or captured Somali equipment included US M-41 and M-47 tanks. Some of this equipment may have been turned over to Somali insurgents, but the equipment is likely not operational.

~~(C)~~ Unconfirmed reports indicate Ethiopia has these tanks.

(6) Logistics

~~(S/NP)~~ The large amount of Soviet military equipment and advisory aid provided to Ethiopia over the past 8 years has significantly enhanced the firepower, mobility, and support capability of the Ethiopian Army. Although marginal by Western standards, the Ethiopian logistic system is advanced and efficient in comparison with those of most other African countries. Distinct changes in support procedures, reflecting Soviet/Warsaw Pact logistic principles, have been introduced since 1977. Centralized control of logistic functions has resulted in relatively efficient resource accounting and allocation. Institution of principles of automatic resupply and strict prioritization of deliveries are indicative of an increasing level of logistic sophistication. Although overall support capability has increased, the serious defects are the country's meager military production capability and lack of indigenous petroleum resources. Consequently, Ethiopia's nearly total dependence on external sources for military supplies limits its flexibility both militarily and politically. Ethiopia's nearly total dependence on the Soviet Union for military equipment has permitted a high degree of standardization.

~~(S)~~ Support facilities and lines of communication are favorably located for operations against Somalia, Djibouti, and northeast Sudan. Materiel precedence afforded by regional depots allows repositioning of additional assets concurrently with combat operations in these sectors. However, there is a chronic shortage of replacement parts, particularly radio batteries.

~~(S/NP/WN)~~ The central supply depot in Addis Ababa distributes military supplies and equipment to regional command headquarters depots as directed by national-level logistic plans. The regional depots, located at Asmera and Dire Dawa, normally maintain inventory levels for 3 months of projected operations. Forward supply depots at task force headquarters are established when needed, which enables priority supplies to be stocked as close as possible to the rear of supported units.

~~(S/NP/WN)~~ Maintenance organizations exist at regional command headquarters level only. The Command Repair Battalion controls distribution of spare parts, allocation of mobile repair teams, and administration of regional repair facilities. For major repairs, equipment must be transported to one of three major repair facilities. Major depots located at Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa, Keren, and Kagnaw Station (Asmera) are capable of complete rebuild of ground equipment. Currently, however, there is a deficiency of specialized technicians within the maintenance organizations. Operator crew maintenance takes place

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at the user level although there is no indication that this includes a preventive maintenance program.

(S) Despite its inadequacies, the logistic infrastructure is capable of supporting combat forces engaged in military operations necessary to maintain internal security and deter external aggression. Administration of the logistics system is competent and experience with automatic resupply operations, movement of material in a hostile environment, and centralization of logistic command functions have resulted in a support capability superior to that of any neighboring country. Strategic or tactical operation plans are limited not by capability of support services, but by availability of material from external sources. Sustained combat operations on a large scale which are dependent solely on indigenous Ethiopian resources are not feasible. With the influx of material at the current rate, Ethiopia is capable of countering an attack by conventional forces from neighboring countries; however, prolonged large-scale offensive actions outside its borders would require a significant increase in military deliveries.

(7) Personnel Procurement and Retention

(S) The Ethiopian Army has undergone three major expansions since 1975. In July 1973, a compulsory military service law was enacted, but it was not implemented until 1975 when the Eritrean insurgency, the threat of a Somali attack, and outbreaks of violence in other provinces demanded a larger ground force. Additionally, reservists were activated, and students were recruited. These measures increased the Regular Army from 35,000 to 40,000. By the time of the 1977 Somali invasion, tens of thousands of militia were also in training. The second expansion occurred between 1977 and 1981 when recruits were drafted again and volunteers were required to serve an initial term of 7 years. The product of these first two Army expansions was a ground force increase from 35,000 to 240,000. The third expansion was directed by a 1 January 1984 conscription law designed to replace losses due to combat and desertions which reduced the force size to 180,000, its high end-strength of the 1981-83 period. Under the law all citizens both male and female in the 18- to 30-year age group are required to register for military service. DIA believes that the current strength is approximately at 260,000.

(S/NF) Morale is the most serious and most rapidly growing problem for the Ethiopian Army. Officer morale is frequently low, mainly because of low pay, slow promotions, and the inability to resign one's commission. Purgés and arrests also have had a negative impact on morale. Rapid expansion has produced large numbers of personnel, but there is a shortage of qualified officers and noncommissioned officers. In some infantry brigades, the ratio of enlisted men to officers is as high as 75 to 1. An additional problem is the emphasis on political reliability as a factor in determining promotions and command assignments. The most significant morale determinant, however, is the high number of casualties that have been suffered in northern campaigns. It is not likely that morale will improve until such time as the military builds a record of undisputed success in the field, and the government can establish a higher degree of economic and political stability than currently exists.

(8) Training

(S/NF) Training at all levels had been disrupted by the turmoil that arose in the wake of the 1974 coup, but the regime is now attempting to build a competent and loyal cadre. Basic training for enlisted personnel is conducted in four large camps, while advanced training is under the control of division commanders at centers located throughout the country and is not standardized. In the past, newly formed divisions generally were created by combining newly trained officers and enlisted men, who then conducted division-size training exercises for about 3 months to make the unit a cohesive organization. However, the two most recently

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formed infantry divisions as well as the two armored divisions departed from this procedure in that they were formed primarily from existing units. Officer training is conducted at three different military academies — Holeta, Guenet, and Harer. These institutions are thought to produce about 1,000 officer graduates a year. The academic curriculum of all three schools is based heavily on basic fundamentals of soldiering and the physical sciences. Emphasis on political indoctrination is highly important in Ethiopian military units. Officers are being trained to fill political commissar positions within the armed forces. These officers are normally graduates of the Holeta Academy and receive additional training in the Soviet Union before being placed in operational units. Political indoctrination will help to prepare Ethiopian forces to serve the Workers Party of Ethiopia established in 1984.

~~(S/NF)~~ Foreign military advisory programs continue to be integral parts of the ground forces training effort. Officers and technical personnel received training at US service and technical schools prior to 1977. The Soviet Union and Cuba currently are involved in instructional programs to train Ethiopians in the use of Soviet-manufactured equipment that has been delivered. Ethiopians also have been sent to the Soviet Union for training in tactics and maintenance. East Germany is assisting in establishing the country's intelligence and security operations. Other East European countries are providing specialized short-term training courses as needed.

(9) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

~~(S)~~ Haile Selassie created two reserve organizations, the Territorial Militia and the Provincial Militia. The Territorial Militia, now called the Militia, was integrated into the regular force structure in 1976, which allowed for rapid expansion of the Ethiopian force structure. The integrated militia continues to wear different uniforms and receive less pay. Militia members also do not receive the same level of training as do regulars. Although both groups receive basic training, only the regulars go on to specialist skill training; i.e., armor, artillery, mechanized infantry, and airborne infantry. Militiamen serve as "straight leg" infantry and in other roles not requiring training beyond the basic level.

~~(S)~~ The second group of militia, the Provincial Militia, is now known as the People's Army. Members remain near their homes and augment the integrated active duty force when additional infantrymen are required or when other missions, such as reconnaissance, require detailed knowledge of the local surroundings. People's Army members frequently lead attacks in their role as basic infantry with the integrated regular and militia components of the force following behind. There may be approximately 125,000 to 275,000 People's Army members available for service, but not all are actively engaged at the same time. There are probably 40,000-50,000 People's Army members on active duty at any given time.

(b) Mobilization

~~(S/NF)~~ Ethiopia has demonstrated its ability to expand a small ground force to nearly 10 times its size in a short time. National military service, revived in 1984, raised the personnel level to its current strength. Mobilization is a continuing need given operational requirements.

b. Navy

(1) Missions

(U) Defend the sea approaches to the nation, protect territorial waters, coastal shipping, and maritime activities, and provide logistic and fire support for the Army.

(2) Capabilities

~~(S/NF/WN/NC)~~ The Navy is unable to patrol the entire 630-nautical mile coastline; however, it is capable of short patrols in coastal waters. These patrols are conducted mainly in the vicinity of the country's two major ports, Aseb and Mitsiwa, and along the northern coastal area. Patrols along the northern coast are aimed at stopping arms smuggling to Eritrean rebels in this region. The Navy has proved itself capable of moving materiel and supplies along the Eritrean coast to resupply Ethiopian Army units. When performing this logistic support role, the squadron is under the operational control of the Ethiopian Army. The Navy also conducted a battalion-size amphibious landing during the summer 1985 counterinsurgency operation. The Navy suffers from three major weaknesses: a lack of technically trained personnel to maintain complex equipment, low morale, and dependence on foreign military assistance.

(3) Personnel Strength

~~(S)~~ 3,700 (estimated 400 officers, 2,900 enlisted, 200 Marines, and 200 civilian). The Marine force may be expanded to about 500.

(4) Ships and Aircraft Strength

(a) ~~(S/NF)~~ Ships (Total 35)

Type	Op	Nonop	In Reserve	Status Unknown
FFL (Corvette)	2			
LSM (Medium amphibious assault landing ship)	2			
PTG (Missile attack boat)	4			
PTH (Hydrofoil torpedo boat)	2			
PC (Patrol craft)	7		1	
PB (Patrol boat)		3		2
PBR (River/roadstead patrol boat)	4			
LCU (Utility landing craft)	2			
LCM (Medium landing craft)	4			
AG (Miscellaneous auxiliary)	2			
Subtotal	29	3	1	2
Total:	35			

(5) Organization and Development

~~(S/NF)~~ The Navy is headquartered at Addis Ababa with primary training facilities located at Asmera and operational bases at the country's two major ports, Mitsiwa and Aseb, which are the locations of the Navy's Northern and Southern Commands, respectively. The Northern Command is responsible for all naval operational missions and the Southern Command acts as a port authority at Aseb. Most ships are now based at Mitsiwa. However, the newer Soviet-provided missile attack boats are home-based at Aseb, where a missile-handling facility was built to support them. Surface-search radar sites have been built at both Mitsiwa and Aseb to support naval operations in these areas.

(6) Status of Equipment

~~(S)~~ Usually several ships are inoperable at any given time. The Navy itself has no capability for major overhaul of its primary ships. The bulk of the Navy's fleet will have to be replaced soon because of the age of the craft and the inability to obtain spare

parts. In November 1975, the Navy acquired a used patrol craft from Yugoslavia, and four Swiftships 105-ft medium patrol ships (PGMs) were delivered by the US in 1977, although radar-controlled guns were not installed. In January 1978, the first combatants from the Soviet Union, consisting of one missile attack boat and two torpedo boats, were delivered. Since that time, the USSR also has supplied Ethiopia with four landing craft. Two additional landing craft have been delivered from France, the first ships in the Ethiopian inventory from this source. The POLNOCNY medium amphibious assault landing ship (LSM) was delivered to Ethiopia in November 1981. In 1982 a POLUCHAT I torpedo retriever and a ZHUK patrol boat were delivered. The most recent additions to the Ethiopian Navy are two antisubmarine warfare (ASW) frigates delivered in 1983 and 1984 and two TURYA Class hydrofoil patrol craft delivered in 1985 and 1986. There is no evidence that the Soviets have upgraded Ethiopian naval communications, which have traditionally used US-supplied high-frequency radio equipment. Ethiopia purchased 10 high-frequency/very-high-frequency radios in 1984.

(7) Logistics

~~(S)~~ The Navy is totally dependent upon foreign sources for ships and all naval equipment. Ethiopian naval personnel have criticized the Soviet Union for the poor condition of ships provided, and the lack of maintenance training. Additionally, engines must be sent back to the USSR for rebuilding and major repair, placing these ships in a nonoperational status. Inadequate operating funds and the poor use of available resources have also eroded the Navy's overall capabilities. Small ships can put in for minor repairs at the small shipyard in Mitsiwa, which has a marine railway with a handling capacity of 300 tons. This facility can also perform minor engine repair in shops and minor repairs afloat. Ethiopia's naval craft also have limited use of the 8,500-ton Soviet floating drydock located at the Soviet Naval Facility on Dehalak Island. However, Soviet permission is not routinely given and reportedly requires advance coordination. Ethiopian crews surrender all responsibility for their vessels in Dehalak and are confined to their quarters while vessels are being repaired. Marine engines in need of major repair or rebuilding are sent back to the Soviet Union.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

~~(S)~~ Poor morale is a continuing problem, and a number of naval personnel have defected abroad while undergoing training programs; defections to the Eritrean insurgents have also occurred, and in the fall of 1983 the crew of one of the 105-ft Swiftships defected with the ship to Somalia. The government response to the latest defection has resulted in even more disgruntlement among naval personnel. Now Ethiopian naval ships, except for the smallest boats, carry either a political commissar or a Soviet naval officer. The personal relationships between the adviser and the vessel's crew are factors in performance and efficiency. The presence of the political officer and the Soviet adviser also affects leadership performance at the individual vessel level. In addition, ships have their fuel requirements strictly computed before departure on missions in order to make crew defections more difficult.

(9) Training

~~(S/NF)~~ The Ethiopian Naval Training Center was moved from Mitsiwa in late 1978 and early 1979 to a more secure location in Asmera. It consists of two facilities, one for naval officer cadets and one for enlisted personnel. The officer school, since returned to Mitsiwa and known as the "Naval College," has a course of instruction 3 years long, including classes in military science, navigation, maintenance repairs, nursing, and other fields. Total number of cadets in the college is approximately 80. These students are divided into 3 classes of 25 to 30 each. Classes of instruction include navigation, gunnery, mathematics, and communications. After completion of the naval college, many officers go to the USSR

for additional training. The enlisted training center conducts a course of instruction which is 6 months long and the school has 220 students at the center at any one time. Classes of instruction include mathematics, navigation, seamanship, engineering, and gunnery. An unknown number of enlisted personnel have also been sent to the USSR for additional training after graduation from this school.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

~~(S)~~ Ethiopia has no formal reserve or mobilization organization for the naval force. The merchant marine fleet consists of 13 ships of at least 1,000 gross registered tons (GRT). Of this number, only the nine breakbulk carriers have a military lift capability. Although two are aged, they are considered to have military support potential. Their total lift capacity is 77,000 deadweight tons (DWT). The remaining four ships include two tankers, one livestock carrier, and one refrigerated cargo ship. It is likely that all of these ships would be made available to the military in the event of a national emergency. None of the ships were built in Ethiopia, since the country has no commercial shipbuilding industry.

c. Air Force

(1) Missions

~~(S)~~ Provide the first line of defense against air attack, conduct close air support and reconnaissance for the ground forces and Navy, project power to foreign soil in support of national objectives, and perform logistic and airlift missions.

(2) Capabilities

~~(S/NF)~~ The Ethiopian Air Force (EAF) is capable of performing close air support and reconnaissance missions effectively, and has a limited night attack capability. A ground-based radar network gives the Air Force the ability to conduct all-weather intercepts over most areas of the country. Pilot proficiency is generally high, and jet fighters have performed impressively against Somali ground and air units and against insurgent groups in both Eritrea and the Ogaden. The delivery of Soviet MiG-21 and MiG-23 fighters has added considerably to EAF effectiveness. The Air Force's technical and support skills have been refined through daily combat missions against insurgent targets, and occasional reconnaissance and attack sorties into Somalia. Also, the EAF has been able to augment its Soviet-supplied equipment by repairing some US-supplied aircraft. Transport capability, which had been inadequate, has been supplemented by 12 An-12 aircraft provided by the USSR and 2 DHC-5 Buffalo delivered in 1981 from Canada. Even with these additional assets, Ethiopian Airlines (EAL) aircraft often are called into service for troop transport.

(3) Personnel Strength

~~(S)~~ Estimated 4,500 (700 officers, including 240 pilots; 3,600 enlisted; and 200 civilians).

(4) ~~(S/NF)~~ Aircraft Strength

Total: 388 (fixed-wing: 238 jets, 14 turboprops, 50 props; helicopters: 86 turbines)

In operational units: 338

(26 fighters: 10 multipurpose; 11 ground attack; 5 trainers)

(190 fighters: 186 all-weather, 4 day;

15 photo recon

60 trainers: 22 non-operational;

26 transports: 12 medium-range, 14 short-range;

11 utility: staff transport, communication;

86 helicopters: 48 attack, 38 utility)

(5) Organization and Deployment¹

(a) General

~~(S)~~ The EAF Commander is directly subordinate to the National Revolutionary Operations Command. The commander is assisted by a deputy commander and a chief of staff. Each airfield has one or more squadrons which are subordinate to an air group. The air group controls all assets at the airfield, and air group commanders report directly to the Commander of the Air Force at Harar Meda Air Base, EAF Headquarters. Operating elements consist of fighter, transport, trainer, reconnaissance, and air rescue units at Harar Meda, and fighter units at Aba Tenna Dejazmatch Yilma, Gode, and Yohannes IV Airfields.

(b) ~~(S/NF)~~ Summary of Units

Units	Aircraft Type	Total	Principal Base
5 Ftr Sqdns	FLOGGER E	12	Aba Tenna Dejazmatch Yilma Afd
	FLOGGER C	6	Harar Meda Afd
	FLOGGER F	41	Harar Meda Afd, Yohannes IV Intl Afd
	FISHBED L	83	Harar Meda Afd Yohannes IV Intl Afd Aba Tenna Dejazmatch Yilma Afd
2 Helicopter Sqdns	FISHBED C	4	Harar Meda Afd
	Mi-14 HAZE	2	Asmera Afd
	Alouette III	4	Liddetta Afd
	HIND	48	Harar Meda Afd
	HIP	31	Liddetta Afd
1 Transport Sqdn	UH-1H Iroquois	3	Liddetta Afd
	CUB	11	Harar Meda Afd
	DHC-5 Buffalo	1	Harar Meda Afd
	Douglas Skytrain	9	Harar Meda Afd
	T-41A Mescalero	4	Harar Meda Afd
	CODLING	1	Harar Meda Afd
	HS Dove	1	Harar Meda Afd
	Cessna 185 (U-17A)	3	Liddetta Afd
	U-1A Otter	2	Yohannes IV Intl Afd
	DHC-6 Twin Otter	2	Yohannes IV Intl Afd
1 Reconnaissance Sqdn	FISHBED H	12	Harar Meda Afd
1 Tng Sqdn	SF-260	10	Harar Meda Afd
	FLOGGER C	6	Harar Meda Afd
	MONGOL	15	Harar Meda Afd
	T-28A Trojan	10	Harar Meda Afd

~~(S/NP/W/N/C)~~ On 14 January 1986, Eritrean insurgents staged an attack on Yohannes IV International Airfield, inflicting serious damage to aircraft deployed there. One FISHBED was destroyed and four others were damaged. Also three FLOGGERS sustained moderate damage from bomb fragments. A previous attack in May 1984 had resulted in the destruction of three HIPs, eight FLOGGERS, and one FISHBED. In addition, one Soviet I1-38 MAY was destroyed and another I1-38 seriously damaged. The Soviets stopped deploying their I1-38s to Asmera after the first attack, and are more reluctant than ever to conduct operations from that site.

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Units	Aircraft Type	Total	Principal Base
	T-28D Trojan	5	Harar Meda Afld
	L-29	11	Harar Meda Afld

(6) Status of Equipment

~~(S/NF)~~ The large quantities of late-model MiG-21 and MiG-23 fighter aircraft and An-12 transports are thought to be in good operating condition, with Soviet advisers performing major maintenance functions. The US-supplied fighters, reconnaissance aircraft, and trainers are suffering from a severe parts shortage, and most of these aircraft have been cannibalized and are rarely flown. Transports obtained from US and other Western sources are maintained in fairly good order because spare parts for these aircraft are more easily purchased on the world market. However, many of these planes will have to be replaced because of the excessive number of flying hours that have been put on the airframes. In addition, the Ethiopians in the past have experienced serious difficulties with their HIND helicopters in Eritrea, principally because of operating conditions. Because of the altitude, the lift capability of the HIND is limited, and combat missions are flown with limited ordnance. The acquisition of Mi-14 HAZE helicopters, with their improved engines, should enable the Ethiopians to transport troops and equipment more effectively. Besides the altitude problems, terrain difficulties affect the operation of the helicopters; the steep mountainous areas deny the Ethiopians close-in air-ground support.

(7) Logistics

~~(S)~~ The EAF relies heavily on foreign sources, especially the Soviet Bloc, for aircraft and related equipment, ammunition, POL, and advisory support. Although the logistic system is hampered by limited availability of parts for the Western-produced aircraft, shipments of Soviet aircraft to Ethiopia may permit them to be phased out and sold to other Third World nations who can obtain needed parts.

~~(S)~~ Aircraft maintenance capability is an untapped strength of the Ethiopian Air Force. Owing to Soviet policy, it is an asset not fully utilized. In the past, the Air Force's record of successful maintenance on US-supplied aircraft was impressive. Additionally, Ethiopian Airlines (EAL), whose services are available to the military, operates a maintenance service and training program with an excellent international reputation. EAL has contracts with other African airlines (e.g., Zambian Airways) to service their jet fleets.

~~(S)~~ When the Air Force changed to Soviet fighter and transport aircraft it did not receive maintenance training on the new equipment. Soviet technicians perform all major maintenance and troubleshooting. Major overhaul of most aircraft components is accomplished only after shipment to facilities within the Soviet Union. Ethiopian mechanics are allowed to perform only routine, relatively simple maintenance tasks. This policy is a reflection of the Soviets' desire to protect their technology and promote client dependence rather than inability of Ethiopian mechanics to successfully perform sophisticated maintenance tasks. In fact, such friction has developed between Ethiopia and the Soviet Union that the Soviets have conceded to Ethiopian desires and will build a repair facility in Ethiopia to service some military aircraft.

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ The level of stockage of all types of spare parts for Air Force equipment is critically low. Lack of success in obtaining parts for US-supplied aircraft has led to extensive cannibalization and drastic reduction in the number of operational US-manufactured planes. Supply of parts for Soviet-supplied aircraft has been inadequate in terms of both amount

and timeliness. Chronic shortages of even routine replacement items such as tires and wheel hubs have periodically resulted in temporary cannibalization, operation of unsafe aircraft, and degraded operational readiness rates. The Air Force has been the most vocal of the services in its dissatisfaction with the Soviet supply performance.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

~~(S/NF)~~ Procurement and retention of Ethiopian military personnel is believed to be based on the Soviet military induction system. Military service is obligatory for all males between the ages of 18 and 30 years. Prior to entry on active duty youths between the ages of 16 and 18 years are called for pre-military training. At this time a determination is made as to the branch of service assigned, which youths will attend the academies, and/or whether induction into the armed forces will be deferred. Induction may be deferred to enable recruits to complete educational pursuits, and for family or physical problems. Deferments for personal matters may be indefinite while educational deferments are for the duration of study. At age 18 all males not deferred are inducted into the armed forces for 2 years and 6 months. During hostilities their enlistment may be extended. Youths that have successfully completed semestral training may be selected to attend courses at the armed forces and police academies. Upon graduation these youths are commissioned junior lieutenants (2Lts). Potential pilot candidates must either be a graduate of the Air Force Academy or Addis Ababa University. Selection for training is based on intellect and physical condition. Technicians are obtained in a manner similar to the application process for pilot candidates.

(9) Training

~~(S/NF)~~ Recruits receive 4 months of basic training followed by technical training in the field assigned. Cadets, both flying and nonflying, are enrolled in the officer candidate school, which has an output of about 20 second lieutenants annually. Pilots receive their advanced training in the units to which they are attached. The number of hours each pilot flies while with operational units is more than sufficient to maintain a high level of pilot proficiency. In the past, the EAF flight training program was closely patterned after that of the USAF, and pilot graduates were well qualified upon graduation. However, the nature of training is now rapidly being shaped by the Soviet Union and the skill level of new pilots is unknown. At least 50 pilots, who in the past flew US fighters, have now completed MiG-21 and MiG-23 training in the Soviet Union and large numbers of transport pilots and maintenance personnel have also taken short courses in the USSR. At the present time, an unknown number of additional pilots and technical personnel are in the Soviet Union for longer term training programs that run 3 to 5 years. More than 150 fixed-wing pilots have been through a 5-year training course at Frimorskoakhtask, USSR. The Air Force Academy is located at Harar Meda and provides a 3-year course in military science, navigation, maintenance and repair, nursing, and other fields.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

~~(S)~~ There is no known reserve system. There are some former EAF members (both pilots and ground crew) serving with Ethiopian Airlines (EAL).

(b) Mobilization

~~(S)~~ All of the country's civil aircraft and indigenous civilian aviation assets could be mobilized for military or other government use in the event of war or comparable national emergency. Ethiopian Airlines provided valuable cargo and troop airlift support to the government during the 1977-78 Ogaden war.

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(U) Approximately 22 civil transport aircraft with a gross takeoff weight of at least 9,000 kilograms currently are registered, owned, and operated by Ethiopia. These aircraft include two Boeing 707-320C and five Boeing 720B long-range transport aircraft; three Boeing 727-200s; one DHC-5 Buffalo; and nine McDonnell Douglas C-47/DC-3 Dakotas, medium-range transport aircraft. All of these aircraft are in the fleet of Ethiopian Airlines (EAL), which is wholly government owned. Some of the Douglas C-47/DC-3s may not be operational. EAL has taken delivery of two long-range Boeing 767-200ER (extended-range) aircraft, and placed options on two more. The airline added five De Havilland Canada Twin Otter light transport aircraft in 1985 as replacements for the aging DC-3 aircraft used on domestic flights.

(U) In addition to the above aircraft, approximately 20 light, fixed-wing aircraft of various types are operated by Admas Air Service, which is also wholly government owned. It performs a wide variety of general aviation operations, including aerial photography, disaster relief, and air ambulance services.

(U) According to Ethiopian Government figures, approximately 260 civilian pilots of all types hold valid licenses in Ethiopia. Ethiopian Airlines reportedly employs about 100 pilots.

d. Air Defense Regiment

(1) Mission

~~(S)~~ To defend, in conjunction with the Air Force, vital installations of military importance and provide warning of hostile air action.

(2) Capabilities

~~(S/NF)~~ The Air Defense Regiment, because of heavy Cuban and Soviet adviser involvement, is able to provide a good level of low- and medium-altitude air defense coverage in the port area of Aseb. The number of SAM sites currently located near the airfields at Debre Zeyt and Jijiga allow for only limited air defense coverage at these locations. Because of an increase in SAM sites in Dire Dawa, protection has recently improved at this airfield. The limited number of sites at most locations allows the system to serve only a tripwire function against foreign air attacks. The Ethiopian Air Force remains the nation's first line of defense against hostile air action.

(3) Personnel Strength

~~(S/NF)~~ The strength of the Air Defense Regiment is estimated at 3,000 personnel, but because it is not clear which air defense systems belong to the Air Defense Regiment and which air defense weapons are organic to Army units, the exact strength remains undetermined. In addition, many positions currently are being manned by Cuban/Soviet advisers and technicians who are controlling the systems and providing on-the-job training for Ethiopian personnel.

(4) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

~~(S)~~ Little is known about the Air Defense Regiment organization. The headquarters is located in or around Addis Ababa. This headquarters is believed to coordinate operations between air defense and Air Force assets.

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ Operational SAM sites and early warning/air surveillance sites are located at Aseb and Addis Ababa, and around military airbases at Debre Zeyt (Ethiopian Air Force HQ), Dire Dawa, and Jijiga.

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(b) ~~(S/NF)~~ Summary of Units

Units	Aircraft		Principal Base
	Type	Total	
2 SAM battalions 1 support battalion 1 radar battalion	SA-3	9	Aseb
1 SAM battalion 1 radar battalion	SA-2	6	Addis Ababa
2 SAM battalions 1 support battalion 1 radar battalion	SA-2	12	Debre Zeyt
2 SAM battalions 1 radar battalion	SA-3	15	Dire Dawa
2 SAM battalions 1 SAM battalion 1 radar battalion	SA-2 SA-9 ¹	12 2	Jijiga Galdogob
1 radar battalion			Gode
1 radar battalion			Asmera

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ Six SA-9 GASKIN SAM transporter-erector-launchers were first located at Addis Ababa/Lidetta Airfield in June 1984. Two SA-9 launchers have been deployed at Galdogob, an Ethiopian-occupied Somali town. The remaining four are currently unlocated.

(5) Equipment

~~(S/NF)~~ SA-2: 30 launchers and 150 missiles; SA-3: 24 launchers and 150 missiles; SA-9: 6 launchers and 96 missiles; SA-7 missiles are organic to ground units and strength figures for the system can be found in the ground forces inventory table. An additional 12 SA-2 launchers and 9 SA-3 launchers have been delivered. These may be used for additional SAM sites or to upgrade existing sites. Radars (including target tracking at SAM sites): about 35.

(6) Status of Equipment

~~(S)~~ The general state of the air defense equipment is thought to be good. Cuban and Soviet personnel operate and maintain most of these complex weapon systems. Ethiopian technicians are in the process of being trained on them.

(7) Logistics

~~(S)~~ The logistic system for the air defense equipment appears to be well planned, with major maintenance and logistic support facilities located near deployed equipment. The facilities are thought to be heavily manned by Cuban and Soviet personnel.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

~~(S)~~ Little information is available on the procurement of personnel. When the organization was established, some personnel probably were obtained from both Air Force and Army units to provide a basic core upon which to build the organization.

(9) Training

~~(S)~~ Training probably consists of special instruction in air defense systems, after a period of basic training. An unknown number of Ethiopians also have gone to the USSR for

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advanced training on SAMs and radar systems. Cuban and Soviet advisers also provide onsite training in Ethiopia as well.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

~~(C)~~ There are no known reserve units or mobilization plans.

e. Paramilitary Forces

(1) Emergency Strike Force Police

(a) Mission

~~(C)~~ Border patrol and counterinsurgency operations; it also serves as a highly mobile reserve to reinforce regular police as well as military units.

(b) Capabilities

~~(C)~~ Members of the Emergency Strike Force Police are trained and equipped as a light infantry force. This unit's primary limitation has been the slow adoption of coordinated intelligence functions and operations with the Army. It has excellent communications and good mobility and is capable of contributing to the country's combat strength.

(c) Strength

~~(S)~~ 9,000

(d) Organization

~~(S)~~ The force consists of a headquarters, at least 2 training centers, approximately 14 battalion headquarters, and 50 companies of 150 men each. The largest segments are stationed in Eritrea and the Ethiopian-Somali border area.

(e) Status of Equipment

~~(C)~~ Arms include rifles, submachineguns, and light mortars. Mobility since 1978 has been enhanced through acquisition of trucks, Land Rovers, and motorcycles, most of which appear to be in adequate supply and in good condition.

(2) National Police

~~(S/NF)~~ In addition to the Emergency Strike Force Police, there is a 30,000-man National Ethiopian Police Force. This force has traditionally served as a ready reserve for Army units, and all police inductees routinely receive basic military training.

(3) Other

~~(S/NF)~~ Ethiopian forces are augmented along the Ethiopian/Somali border by Somali insurgent forces under the Army's de facto control. These include two primary groups — the Somali Democratic Salvation Front (SDSF) and the Somali National Movement (SNM). Although they are not officially part of the Ethiopian Government's military structure, they are listed here because they are an important force controlled by Addis Ababa.

~~(S/NF)~~ The SDSF was formed in October 1981 when the Somali Salvation Front (SSF) aligned itself with two minor ideologically oriented organizations opposed to Somali President Siad. The insurgents have received training and assistance from Ethiopia and Libya, material from South Yemen, and limited support from the Soviet Union. The SDSF can operate as independent units, but also in joint military operations with Ethiopian forces in the Ogaden and along the disputed border in attempts to consolidate Ethiopian military control of the region. Weapons for the SDSF are primarily supplied by the Ethiopian Army,

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although Libya had also provided weapons in the past. Most weapons are Soviet arms and a mix of older US equipment. In addition, the Ethiopians have given the SDSF captured Somali equipment, which includes Italian APCs/armored cars and some West German and French-manufactured small arms. Present combat strength is estimated at 2,000.

~~(S/NF/NC)~~ The SNM originated in the mid-1970s when thousands of Somali workers emigrated to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and other Persian Gulf countries. They soon began to organize themselves under the leadership of political dissidents, mainly on a tribal basis. During its first month of existence, the SNM, primarily based in London, confined its activities to publishing a newsletter and placing anti-Siad propaganda in the media. It was not until 1982 that the SNM developed a military arm and began receiving assistance and training from Ethiopia. In March 1982, SNM headquarters was moved from London to Addis Ababa. At present, SNM military personnel strength is estimated at 3,000-3,500 personnel. The SNM has demonstrated its capability to conduct small raids into Somali territory and to attack government facilities. Efforts continue to unite the SDSF and the SNM.

f. ~~(C)~~ Total Military Personnel Strength

Army and People's Militia	260,000
People's Army	50,000
Navy	3,700
Air Force	4,500
Air Defense	3,000
Emergency Strike Force Police	9,000
National Police	30,000
Total	360,200

g. Foreign Military Presence

(1) ~~(S/NF)~~ Foreign Military In-Country

Cuba	3,000-4,000	One mechanized brigade as well as advisers to ground forces and militia.
USSR	1,700	Technicians and advisers to Ethiopian Armed Forces.
GDR (East Germany)	500	Advisers assisting in development of intelligence organizations.
SDSF and SNM	5,000	Ethiopian-controlled Somali insurgent forces.

(2) Military Presence Abroad

(U) 750 receiving military training in the Soviet Union and East Germany.

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ETHIOPIA

Appendix

Installation BE List (U)

Name	BE Number	Category	Latitude	Longitude
Aba Tenna Dejazmatch Yilma Airfield	0789-08009	80051	09-37-30N	041-51-10E
Addis Ababa Bks Area A Div HQ	0789-00029	91130	09-00-25N	038-45-10E
Addis Ababa Civil Air Fleet HQ	0789-00019	81520	09-00-38N	038-43-20E
Addis Ababa Ministry of Defense	0789-00037	89310	09-01-08N	038-45-16E
Addis Ababa Nat Mil HQ/Army HQ/Cent Cmd	0789-00028	91011	09-01-20N	038-46-00E
Addis Ababa SAM Site A15 02	0789CA0015	87220	08-53-47N	038-50-36E
Aseb Naval Base A HQ	0687-00192	95131	12-59-54N	042-44-39E
Aseb SA 3 Site A17 03	0687CA0040	87230	12-57-31N	042-44-03E
Asmera Air Orp HQ Yohannes IV Afd	0688-00568	81320	15-17-28N	038-55-00E
Asmera Grp/Dist/Div/ Bn HQ A Bks	0688-00037	90110	15-20-24N	038-54-50E
Balenbale Military Concentration NW	0809CA0107	90220	05-52-20N	045-39-52E
Barentu Mil Bde A Bn HQ	0688-00818	90110	15-07-00N	037-36-00E
Dehalak Island Naval Support Fac	0688CB0005	95000	15-43-25N	009-56-43E
Dire Dawa SA3 Site NW A03 03	0789CA0047	87230	09-42-09N	041-47-32E
Dire Dawa Tnk Bde Complex A HQ	0789CB0023	90110	09-36-36N	041-47-22E
Dongollo Naval Tng Center	0688-00566A	95520	13-47-00N	039-37-00E
Gode Afd	0809-08010	80060	05-56-40N	043-34-50E
Gondar Inf Div HQ/ Spt Bn/Militia Bde	0688-00800	91160	12-36-30N	037-28-00E
Gorgora Mil Tng Area	0688CA0015	90120	12-15-35N	037-14-20E
Harar Meda Afd	0789-08011	80053	08-42-51N	039-00-17E
Harer Bks Mil Academy	0789-00101	90110	09-19-50N	042-05-10E
Harer Inf Div HQ	0789-00032	91130	09-18-08N	042-07-50E
Harer Meda SAM Site A20 02	0789CA0011	87220	08-41-35N	038-58-30E
Imbatikala Tng Cen	0688-00565	95520	15-25-00N	039-05-00E
Jijiga Mil Camp A/Arty Depl Area NE	0789CA0044	90110	09-23-10N	042-57-14E
Jijiga Mil Camp A/Veh Maint/Stor	0789CA0038	90140	09-20-50N	042-53-37E
Jijiga SAM Site A10 02	0789CA0016	87220	09-20-06N	042-53-37E
Kebri Dehar Mil Complex A Bde A Bn HQ	0809-00018	90110	06-44-40N	044-15-49E
Keren Dply Area N A Bn HQ	0688CB0015	90210	15-53-30N	038-28-20E
Mekele Bks Area/Div HQ/Bde HQ	0688CA0010	90110	13-37-57N	039-29-00E
Mitsiwa Naval Base A/Sch Abd El	0688-00538	95121	15-37-17N	039-28-22E
Nacfa Deployment Area	0667-00223	90110	16-40-00N	038-29-00E
Nacfa Mil Depl E	0667CA0091	90000	16-39-06N	038-39-30E
Nacfa Mil Depl Area NE	0667CA0097	90200	16-66-69N	038-46-18E
Nazret Armor Tng Cen A Bks A HQ	0789-00672	90120	08-31-52N	039-14-59E
Negele Tng Area	0810DA0001	90120	05-15-10N	039-40-25E
Werder Bks Area	0809CA0016	90110	06-58-07N	045-20-14E
Yohannes IV Intl	0688-08002	80051	15-17-26N	038-54-37E

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ETHIOPIA

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~~KENYA~~

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KENYA

1. GOVERNMENT

a. (U) Key Government Officials

President and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces: Daniel T. arap *Moi*

Vice President and Minister of Home Affairs: Mwai *Kibaki*

Minister of State in the Office of the President: Justice Ole *Tipis*

Minister of State in the Office of the President: Hussein Maglim *Mohamed*

Minister of State in the Office of the President: Jackson *Angaine*

Minister for Foreign Affairs: Dr. Zachary *Onyonka*

Commissioner of Police (Acting): Bernard Kiarie *Njiru*

Chief Secretary in the Office of the President: Simeon *Nyachae*

b. Type and Stability of Government

(S) Kenya is a single-party state that has experienced relative political stability since its independence in 1963. President *Moi* continues his firm control over the government and party, the Kenyan African National Union (KANU), by maintaining acceptable tribal balances and surrounding himself with loyal followers. The role of the KANU was enhanced in 1987 when President *Moi* declared it superior to the Parliament and the courts. Despite the one-party system, there is still considerable competition for parliamentary seats.

(S) Since coming to power 8 years ago, after the death of Jomo Kenyatta, *Moi* has persisted in his effort to consolidate the reigns of power in the office of the president. Though the presidency has traditionally been the strongest branch of government, other institutions also had significant influence in the activities of the government. Under *Moi*, however, things are not quite the same. Parliament, which historically has been an avenue for venting dissatisfaction with corruption in the government, has been removed from Kenyan politics, like the judiciary and the church. By alienating these institutions, *Moi* is able to build his powerbase by strengthening the party. KANU has been given disciplinary authority and a greater role in developmental matters.

(S) *Moi*, a member of the Kalenjin tribe, never felt quite secure in his position as Vice President under Kenyatta, a Kikuyu (the Kikuyu are the largest tribal group in Kenya, they control most of the wealth, and are better educated than other tribal groups). Therefore, to secure his position as President, *Moi* finds it necessary to shut out the Kikuyu, and surround himself with advisers who cannot challenge him intellectually.

(S) As a result, Kenya's political scene is now starting to resemble that of many other African countries, with increasing disregard for democracy and human rights, as well as increasing consolidation of power in a one-party state. Though his government faces no near-term significant threat, *Moi's* refusal to tolerate criticism, his reactionary personality, and his consolidation of power may serve as the catalyst to unite dissidents against the government.

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c. Internal Threat

~~(S/NF)~~ Although ethnic rivalries and political infighting constitute a primary internal threat, Kenya's ability to maintain relative domestic stability hinges on the well-being of the economy. Despite the improved world coffee market and a decline in world oil prices in early 1986, Kenya still faces an acute lack of jobs and inadequate resources for basic services, and a perception that corruption is on the rise. In addition, a very high population growth rate, increasing rural competition for scarce productive land, and a growing crime rate have resulted in more public discontent and increased levels of discontent within the military. At present, there is a low probability of internal threat from the military. Most military members can generally live on their military salaries. There are also provisions by which military officers, as well as other civil servants, can acquire government land, which in turn most officers use for commercial agricultural projects. The military is also aware that foreign exchange from tourism is important for national stability and that instability would impact negatively on tourism. An evolving dissident group, Mwakenya, has produced uneasiness within the Kenyan Government; however, to date its activities have been nonviolent.

d. External Threat

~~(S/NF)~~ There is currently no significant external threat to Kenya despite the fact that most of its neighbors possess larger military forces. In the past, Kenya has perceived a significant external threat from Somalia. This perception was based on Somalia's historic claims to northeastern Kenya, inhabited largely by ethnic Somalis. While Kenya continues to project some forces against Somalia, Kenyan military power is generally oriented toward a potential threat from Ethiopia.

~~(S)~~ Ethiopia is a signatory ally of Kenya, retaining its bilateral Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, and has in the past participated in joint border patrols. Nevertheless, Ethiopia is now perceived by Kenya as a growing potential threat because of its radical Marxist orientation. More specific factors that bode ill for future bilateral relations are the large Communist military presence in Ethiopia; improved relations between Kenya and Somalia; US access to Kenyan military bases; and Kenya's dependence upon Western military and economic assistance. However, at this time, the threat to Kenya from Ethiopia is minimal due to friendly relations and Ethiopia's military preoccupation with fighting insurgent forces.

~~(S/NF)~~ Kenyan concerns over Tanzania abated considerably with the departure of Tanzanian occupation forces from Uganda in early 1982. However, relations again were strained in August 1982 following the Kenyan Air Force coup attempt when two coup participants were granted asylum in Tanzania. Their extradition in November 1983, in exchange for Tanzanian dissidents living in Nairobi, was largely responsible for warming relations between the two nations. This event, coupled with the successful conclusion of negotiations for distribution of assets held by the defunct East African Community, was primarily responsible for the opening of the long-closed Kenya-Tanzania border in late 1983. In addition, Tanzania supported President Moi in his handling of the Uganda peace negotiations in late 1985 and the two countries are basically in accord in the relationship with Museveni's Ugandan government. In January 1986, two Kenyan naval vessels visited the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam on a goodwill mission and routine training cruise. This was the first known visit of this type since 1972. While Kenyan military and government officials desire to move cautiously in military cooperation with Tanzania, limited military training exchanges are also being considered. In spite of these improvements in Kenya-Tanzania relations, further significant advances will be limited by the widely divergent ideological views.

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~~(S/NF)~~ President Moi quickly recognized Yoweri Museveni's new government in Uganda after it gained military control of the country in January 1986. Since then, relations between the governments have continued to worsen. While not worried about any direct threat from Uganda, Kenya is concerned about growing Libyan-Ugandan relations. Armed banditry along the northern border — where the Kenyan Government has had to deploy infantry units and helicopter gunships, Museveni's increased interest in Libya, and perceived Ugandan support for Mwakenya dissidents have served to strain Kenya-Uganda's tenuous relationship.

e. Communist Influence

~~(S)~~ Kenya maintains an official policy of nonalignment but with a decidedly pro-West inclination. There is no Communist party in Kenya and President Moi is wary of efforts by the Soviet Union and its Eastern Bloc allies to make political inroads into the region. The Kenyan Government is not working toward closer economic ties with these countries although it is in the realm of trade that most substantive exchanges occur. Kenya remains staunchly in favor of its capitalistic and democratic economic and political systems, respectively, and thus is philosophically beyond the aims and reach of Communist countries. It has no military assistance agreements with any Communist country. Relations with China are approached differently from those with the Soviets and their allies. Since President Moi's 1980 visit to Beijing and the KANU delegation visit in 1986, bilateral relations have continued to progressively improve. Chinese Vice Premier Tian Juyan's 1985 visit to Kenya, and a Chinese Communist Party delegation visit in January 1987 further indicate both countries' desire to maintain an open, cordial relationship. At this time, Moi's increased interest in the Chinese appears related to expanding the political role of KANU and not to seeking closer ties with the Communist Bloc.

(U) The USSR, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and several East European countries have resident ambassadors in Nairobi.

f. Economic Factors

~~(S)~~ Due to high coffee prices, low oil prices, record tourism, and improved weather conditions that led to a record grain harvest, Kenya's economy grew by about 4.5 percent in 1986. According to Nairobi, inflation declined to about 7 percent in 1986 from its high point of 23 percent in 1982; however, the rate is reportedly closer to 15 percent.

(U) In spite of its success in 1986, Kenya still faces serious economic difficulties, such as a population growth rate of 4.2 percent (the highest in the world), an economy overly dependent on exports of coffee and tea, and an unemployment rate of more than 12 percent. Kenya remains heavily dependent on foreign assistance, especially from the United States and the United Kingdom — about 15 percent of the government budget is foreign financed. Real per capita income declined by about 5 percent between 1980 and 1985, and the total national debt reached \$4.5 billion in 1986.

~~(S)~~ Approximately 80 percent of all Kenyans live in rural areas, and most are involved in subsistence agriculture. Only 1.1 million people (out of the 7.4 million estimated to be in the work force) are in the formal sector (i.e., the wage economy), and 50 percent of those are government employees. Kenya's work force in the year 2000 will number approximately 14.6 million, putting even greater strain on the country's society and economy. About 10 percent of the urban population and 55 percent of the rural population was estimated in 1978 to live below the poverty level.

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g. Military and Political Alignment

~~(S/NF)~~ Although nominally nonaligned, Kenya has long fostered close ties with the West, principally the United Kingdom and the United States. Major weapon systems have been acquired from these countries. Kenya has also been host to limited military exercises conducted by both countries, and the UK maintains a small advisory contingent in-country. Additionally, Kenya and the US concluded a 10-year facilities access agreement in June 1980, allowing the US increased utilization of Kenyan port and air facilities. A midterm review of this agreement was cordially agreed upon in 1985, signifying Kenyan satisfaction with the US military presence and construction work at the Port of Mombasa.

~~(S)~~ Kenya has no formal regional military agreements except its mutual defense pact with Ethiopia. In being since 1963, this treaty has seen little use, with the exception of periodic bilateral military operations against the Shifta bandits along the Ethiopia-Kenya border.

h. (U) Key US Officials

Chief of Mission (Nairobi): Ambassador Elinor G. Constable

(b)(3):10 USC 424

2. MILITARY, GENERAL

a. ~~(S/NF)~~ Key Military Officials

Department of Defense: Permanent Secretary for Defense (Office of the President): J. K. Ndoto

Chief of the General Staff: Gen Haji Mohamud Mohamed

Deputy Chief of the General Staff: Lt Gen Jackson Munyao

Army: Lt Gen James L. Lengees

Navy: Commander: Maj Gen Eliud S. Mbilu

Air Force (82 Air Force): Commander: Maj Gen Dedan Gichuru

Kenya Military Intelligence Service: Commander: Col Lazarus K. Sumbeiywo

Armed Forces Training Center: Commander: Brigadier Edward G. Kihia

Kenya Police Force: Commissioner: Bernard Njiinu

General Service Unit: Acting Commandant: Jackson Kiplotot Koshe

b. Position of the Armed Forces

~~(S)~~ The political influence of the Armed Forces in Kenya has been expanding since Moi's rise to power in 1978. The military, and more specifically the Kenya Army (KA), has become more aware of its political clout since its suppression of the 1982 Air Force coup attempt. The Kenyan Air Force was disbanded after the August 1982 coup attempt and reconstituted as the 82 Air Force (82 AF). The status of the Air Force was severely damaged and it has been largely a second-class service due to its demonstrated lack of political reliability. Until recently, virtually all leadership positions in the 82 AF were held by Army personnel. The appointment of an Air Force general as commander of the 82 AF in early 1986 may indicate the beginning of a restoration of the stature it enjoyed prior to 1982. As the senior service, the Kenyan Army has succeeded in making certain gains with the Kenyan Government. However, with competing funding requirements, further increases in military allocations will not completely satisfy military officials. Overall, the Kenyan Armed Forces

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are considered loyal and would not make any moves against the government unless the military began to enjoy fewer benefits or tribal imbalances became unpalatable.

c. Military Trends and Capabilities

(S) While the acquisition of new weapons for the military services has improved combat capabilities, the modernization and expansion program has not been without problems. The program has placed considerable strain on the national economy. Lack of management at the Kenyan Department of Defense (KDOD) and service headquarters has caused significant delays in decisionmaking on policy and program issues. Logistic and training programs in the services at present are not capable of supporting the more sophisticated weapon systems. In addition, the Defense Ministry has fallen seriously behind in the provision of more basic items for its personnel. Fewer than 500 new military housing units have been constructed since 1982 although the Defense Ministry had developed plans which called for 9,500 new units to be completed by 1988.

(C/NF) President Moi has maintained a hands-off policy for the most part in his relationship with his Armed Forces. While he has changed the roles of certain elements within the military, he has left the tribal makeup intact. His noninterference with the traditional Kikuyu and Kamba dominance of the Armed Forces contrasts with developments in the civilian sector. Advancement in the military depends primarily on merit and ability rather than tribal affiliation. His policies reflect overall confidence in the military establishment and enhance the prospect for continued stability within Kenya.

(S) There are at present no facilities in Kenya for the indigenous production of military equipment, spare parts, and munitions. The Kenyan Armed Forces are totally dependent upon foreign sources for these needs. Further, they will continue to require extensive foreign assistance for their more technical weapon systems for some time to come.

d. Military Budget

(U) \$148 million for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1986; this is 9.2 percent of the central government budget. Dollar values converted from shillings at the official exchange rate of 17.0 shillings equal \$1.00.

e. (U) Population

21,044,000 as of July 1986

Males (ages 15-49): 4,185,000; physically fit: 2,576,000

Ethnic divisions: 98 percent African; 5 percent Asian; 1 percent European, Arab, and others

Literacy: 47 percent

Languages: English and Swahili (official), and over 30 tribal languages and dialects

3. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

a. Army

(1) Mission

(U) To defend national borders and assist the Kenya Police Force (KPF) and the General Service Unit (GSU) in the maintenance of internal security.

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(2) *Capabilities*

(S) While by African standards the Army is an efficient combat force, in terms of overall combat capabilities the KA would have little chance of defending Kenya against an attack from its much stronger neighbor, Ethiopia. The KA would be somewhat more successful in defending against an attack from either Somalia or Tanzania. Although incapable of preventing penetration of Kenyan territory by these two nations, the Army may well be capable of containing any such conventional attacks. Kenya could be reasonably confident of defending against any conventional military threat from Uganda or Sudan, although chances of attacks from these quarters are remote. Kenya is not capable of launching a viable military campaign against any of its neighbors except Uganda.

(S) The KA is capable of containing the present low-level bandit (Shifty) activity in the north-eastern province. If relations between Kenya and Somalia were to deteriorate, however, and Somalia were to renew major support to the Shifty, the Army would be hard pressed to counter them.

(S) To fulfill the terms of a defense agreement between Kenya and Ethiopia, the two countries have participated in joint operations against Somali guerrilla groups operating along their common borders.

(S) The KA has grown substantially in the past few years, but remains a small force when compared with most other east African armies. Although the modernization and expansion program is slowly improving the Army's combat capabilities, problems remain. These are chiefly in the areas of logistics and training. The acquisition of the new weapons is compounding existing equipment maintenance deficiencies, logistics handicaps, and management shortcomings. Plans to create new units based on newly acquired weapons have been delayed due to military budget constraints. Because the Kenyan Army cannot modernize or expand at the expense of the nation's economy, plans to do so are long term in nature. Further, there is a lack of technically qualified personnel, and the mid-level officer and NCO ranks lack supervisory training and experience. The dispersion of qualified personnel from older operational units to newly formed units has to some extent degraded the capabilities of the overall organization.

(S) Kenya's most capable unit is its air cavalry battalion. The availability record for its antitank (TOW), Scout, and trainer helicopters and associated weapon systems is good. In addition, the air cavalry battalion has performed well in border operations against rustlers and bandits. However, it has not been tested in combat against a sophisticated opposing force.

(S) There are serious shortcomings in the Kenyan Army's air defense capabilities primarily because there are too few weapons to accomplish their mission, poor maintenance of weapons, a lack of repair parts, and a lack of mobility for the towed weapon systems. In addition, communication links between the sole air defense unit and the Air Force do not exist.

(S) Army field operations and joint operations with the Kenya Navy and Air Force are limited by insufficient communications and poorly defined rules of engagement. There is a lack of clarity in the national chain of command, further limiting command and control. Tactical intelligence is provided to the military by the KPF and the GSU, which have primary responsibility for border control and surveillance of the interior; however, neither organization adequately fills the Army's intelligence needs. The KA involvement in amphibious and land-based combined military exercises with the US is providing the Kenyans a hands-on opportunity to learn modern warfare techniques.

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(3) Personnel Strength

~~(S)~~ 18,345 (1,100 officer; 17,245 enlisted)

(4) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

~~(S/NF)~~ The combat forces of the Kenyan Army are divided into four combat brigades: two infantry, one armor, and one artillery. Infantry brigades have a total of five battalions. These units are the Army's primary tactical maneuver forces. Plans to form a sixth battalion to bring both brigades to full strength have been postponed due to budgetary considerations. The Army's deployment pattern for its infantry forces indicates a strong concern over defense of the Nairobi area. Brigade headquarters are located in Gilgil and Nanyuki. Garrisons for the five infantry battalions are in Eldoret, Nanyuki, Lanet, Gilgil, and Nairobi.

~~(S/NF)~~ The armor brigade, headquartered at Lanet, consists of two tank battalions and one armored reconnaissance battalion. One tank battalion is located at Isiolo and the other is colocated with the brigade headquarters. The armored reconnaissance battalion is headquartered at Gilgil. Artillery assets have their organizational headquarters in Gilgil. Subordinate to the brigade are two artillery battalions and one air defense artillery (ADA) battalion. The ADA battalion is located in Embakasi and one artillery battalion is located in Mombasa while the other is colocated with the artillery brigade. Kenya's air cavalry battalion is located at Embakasi and the parachute battalion is in Gilgil.

~~(S/NF)~~ Providing engineering support for the Army's ground combat forces is Kenya's combat engineer brigade. Headquarters for this organization and one of the brigade's two battalions is in Thika. The other battalion is located in Nanyuki. A variety of other support units exist to support Kenyan Army combat units. Most of these are headquartered in Nairobi, and some (such as logistics and maintenance units) are field deployed with combat forces as required.

(b) ~~(S)~~ Ground Combat Units

Major Tactical Units	Strength per Unit	
	Authorized ¹	Assigned Average/Actual ²
2 Infantry Brigade HQ	Unk	1,250
5 Infantry Battalions	Unk	500
1 Armor Brigade HQ	Unk	950
2 Armor Battalions	Unk	425
1 Armored Reconnaissance Battalion	Unk	
1 Artillery Brigade	Unk	825
2 Artillery Battalions	Unk	450
1 Air Defense Artillery Battalion	800	400
1 Combat Engineer Brigade	Unk	1,600
2 Combat Engineer Battalions	Unk	700
1 Parachute Battalion	550-600	300
1 Air Cavalry Battalion	Unk	750
1 Signals Battalion	Unk	200

¹ ~~(S)~~ Authorized strength levels in most cases are estimated to run 10-30 percent higher than assigned strength.

² (U) Estimated strength per unit.

(c) *Deployment*

(S) The Kenyan military maintains a forward operating base (FOB) in Wajir in the Northeast Province (NEP). The FOB in Wajir is under the permanent administration of the 82 Air Force Air Defense Headquarters. While Kenyan Army units are garrisoned at the locations discussed in (4) (a), battalion-equivalent units are deployed to the Wajir FOB on a rotating basis. Unit rotation normally occurs every 6 months in January or July. In the past, Wajir-based forces have been called upon to deal with banditry and tribal feuding in that area. Wajir has also been used as a base for joint Army-Air Force training exercises.

(d) (S) *Ground Weapons and Equipment (major items only)*

		Country of Origin	Total Inventory
Armored Vehicles:	Medium tank, Vickers	UK	84
	ARV, Panhard, AML-45/90	FR	24
	ARV, Panhard, AML-45/60	FR	12
	APC, Panhard, AML-VTT, M-3	FR	4
	APC, UNIMOG, UR-416	GE	52
	ARC, Shorland, NFI	UK	8
Artillery:	Howitzer, 105-mm	IT	8
	Light gun, M-118, 105-mm	UK	58
	Gun-howitzer, 87.6-mm	UK	6
Air Defense Artillery:	Oerlikon, single barrel, 20-mm	SZ	12
	Twin Cannon Mount, 20-mm	IS	54
	Bofors, 40-mm	SW	13
Mortars:	120-mm	IS/FI	18
	81-mm	UK/IS	50
	3-in	UK	10
	2-in/60-mm	UK	76
Antitank Weapons:	ATGM, TOW (helicopter platform)	US	13
	ATGM, Milan	FR	40
	ATGM Swingfire Ichr	UK	14
	RCLR, 84-mm Carl Gustav	SW	80
	RCLR, 3.5-in	UK	95
Helicopters:	Hughes 500MD Scout	US	13
	Hughes 500MD TOW	US	13
	Hughes 500MD Trainer	US	4
Transport:	Tank Transporter, Mack	US	14
	Tank Transporter, Scammel	UK	24
	Trk, 10-ton, Mercedes Benz	GE	25
	Trk, 5-ton, Mercedes Benz	GE	400
	Trk, 3-ton	UK	125

(5) *Weapons and Equipment*

(S) The addition of sophisticated weapon systems (Vickers tanks, 105-mm artillery, and Hughes 500MD helicopters) to the KA inventory has enhanced the combat capabilities of the Army. The lack of properly equipped workshop facilities at Isiolo precludes virtually all tank repair and can be regarded as a major deficiency. The Scammel tank transporters

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used to move the Vickers tanks also present problems due to low operational readiness (OR) rates. However, the recently acquired Mack tank transporters will significantly enhance Kenya's tank deployment capability. The Army also is currently having difficulties equipping artillery units with appropriate prime movers.

(S) The air cavalry battalion is equipped with 13 Hughes 500MD Scout, 13 Hughes 500MD TOW, and 4 Hughes 500MD trainer helicopters. The Scouts are equipped with 7.62-mm chain guns and 2.75-in rocket pods. The remaining 13 Hughes 500MD are equipped with TOW antitank guided missiles (ATGMs). This program will require foreign technical assistance for some time if the current level of combat capability is to be sustained.

(6) Logistics/Maintenance

(S) The Army is totally dependent upon foreign sources for materiel. Equipment acquisitions have come from the United Kingdom, West Germany, France, and the United States. Israel and Belgium are also suppliers of equipment and spare parts. Generally, the preventive maintenance and organizational maintenance posture of the Army is good. Adherence to instruction and procedures outlined in operators' manuals is strict, and supply personnel and first-line supervisors are knowledgeable. However, at higher levels the maintenance system is ineffective. Logistic problems generated by the multiplicity of equipment suppliers have been further complicated by the lack of emphasis on logistics at senior command levels, inadequately and inaccurately stocked inventories, and insufficiently qualified technical and supervisory personnel. In an effort to correct its logistics and maintenance shortcomings, the Army has elevated the rank of its Chief of Logistics to brigadier and has expanded the functional areas of his staff to provide better command and control.

(S/NF) The Kenyan Kahawa Corps (Ordnance Corps) is responsible for maintenance, supply, and transportation operations of the Kenyan Armed Forces. The Kenyan maintenance organization is broken down into four levels: operators/unit, battalion workshop, field workshops, battalion and depot maintenance. Maintenance is seriously hampered by a lack of facilities and repair parts; however, preventive and organizational maintenance is being performed at the unit level. Support maintenance needs to be decentralized to eliminate the excessive distances between the organizational and support maintenance facilities.

(7) Personnel Procurement and Retention

(S) There is no conscription, and manpower needs are adequately met by volunteers. Soldiers enlist for a period of 9 years for their first enlistment. The armed forces in general, however, are losing some skilled personnel, both officer and enlisted, to private industry. Personnel trained in foreign technical schools have found civilian pay more attractive, and employment readily available in the private sector. Still, the Army is considered a good occupation and pays slightly more than the majority of civilian jobs in Kenya. Most Army officers feel that they could easily recruit three times the numbers currently in the military if they were authorized to do so.

(S/NF) The Kenyan Women's Service Corps is part of the Kenya Army and is located at Laikipia Air Base. These women fill clerical and technical positions and have no operational command or leadership responsibilities. Advancement in the military is extremely limited for women. The approximately 250 women are commanded by a female lieutenant colonel — the highest rank these women can hope to attain.

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(8) Training

~~(S)~~ Army recruits attend a basic training course at the Armed Forces Training College (AFTC) at Lanet, near Nakuru. With the exception of combat support personnel who receive specialty training at Kahawa, recruits receive advanced individual training with their units.

~~(S)~~ Officers receive their training both in-country and overseas. Officers attend courses covering the entire spectrum of combat arms and staff training through the staff college level at the AFTC. They also attend basic, advanced, and staff college courses in the United States, the United Kingdom, India, Canada, and Israel.

~~(S)~~ Small-unit training is generally considered very good, reflecting a high state of individual discipline and professionalism within the Army. While military training exercises are held periodically, weaknesses exist with regard to combined-arms maneuvers and the coordination of joint-service operations.

(9) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

~~(S)~~ The Army does have a reserve organization plan to supplement the active duty force during a national emergency. However, specifics regarding this plan are unknown.

(b) Mobilization

~~(S/NF)~~ Mobilization plans are unknown; without significant foreign logistic support, expansion of the force would be difficult, due to the shortage of air transport and the low operational rate of Army trucks.

b. Navy

(1) Mission

(U) To defend territorial waters, protect coastal shipping, and prevent smuggling.

(2) Capabilities

~~(S)~~ The Kenya Navy (KN) is capable of performing only limited coastal patrols along its 289-NM coastline; however, it is reasonably efficient considering its small size and limited resources. The addition of the Gabriel missile system to the Brooke Marine patrol craft has given the KN a capability to interdict shipping. All combat vessels in the Kenyan Navy are equipped with surveillance and identification, friend or foe, radar.

~~(S)~~ The Kenyan Navy operates from Mombasa with seven patrol boats. Budgetary constraints, poor equipment reliability, and insufficient onboard crew provisions have hampered the Navy's coastal patrol mission. With the exception of the older Vosper boats, one or two of the Kenyan patrol boats periodically conduct patrols along the coast, remaining within radar range (approximately 30 NM) of land to facilitate navigation. Operations seldom last longer than 2-5 days. When boats transit together, formation steaming and coordinated tactics are not employed.

~~(S)~~ Two Kenyan patrol boats participating in an exercise with the US Navy in late 1984 were found to have only three personnel trained in communications assigned to each boat (two operators and one supervisor). Since the personnel were trained as both radiomen and signalmen, either the signal bridge or radio room was left unmanned during normal port/starboard watch organization.

~~(S/NF)~~ Three patrol craft are equipped with the Israeli-manufactured Gabriel missile

system. Although this missile has been successfully test-fired by the Kenyan Navy, most Kenyan naval personnel possess only a rudimentary knowledge of the system.

(3) Personnel Strength

(S) Estimated 650-700

(4) (S) Ship Strength

Type	Op	Nonop	In Reserve	Status Unknown
PCF (Fast Patrol Craft)				
Vosper 31.4-m	0	3	0	0
Brooke Marine 37.5-m	1	0	0	0
PGG (Guided Missile Patrol Combatant)				
Brooke Marine 32.6-m	3	0	0	0
Total: 7	4	3		

(5) Organization and Deployment

(S) Naval headquarters is located at Mombasa, Kenya's only deepwater port. The Navy consists of two major elements, the Mombasa Naval Base and the Patrol Craft Squadron, both subordinate to the Kenya Navy Commander. The Patrol Craft Squadron is further divided into two patrol boat squadrons, the 76th and the 66th (numbers based on date of squadron creation). The squadron commander controls fleet operations from naval headquarters, and the commanders of the two patrol boat squadrons are the senior officers afloat. Additionally, the naval organization consists of a communications center, munitions bunkers, a training facility, and a maintenance support base, each of which is located within the naval complex at Mtongwe, in Mombasa. There is a small naval mooring at Lamu, some 250 km northeast of Mombasa.

(S) Although the command link between the Commander of the Navy and the Chief of the General Staff is clear, the latter's staff often issues directives on his behalf. This is especially true for matters of supply, personnel, and budget. As for operations, the Kenyan Navy appears to be relatively autonomous. The Navy Commander and his staff plan and execute their own operations.

(6) Status of Equipment

(S) The three Vosper 31.4-meter patrol craft are armed with 40-mm dual-purpose Bofors guns. These vessels were provided to Kenya by the UK in 1966 and have reached the end of their economic service life. Hull deterioration caused by climatic factors makes refitting and overhauling an unacceptable alternative. Spare parts are increasingly difficult to obtain due to the age of the craft. Two of the vessels are totally unseaworthy and the third is believed nonoperational.

(S) The four Brooke Marine patrol craft (three 32.6-meter and one 37.5-meter) also are equipped with 40-mm dual-purpose guns. Radars, communication equipment, and weapons aboard these vessels are well maintained. The 37.5-meter vessel was delivered to Kenya in 1974. The three 32.6-meter vessels were delivered in 1976. Four of these craft have undergone modification to accept the Gabriel missile system.

(C/NF/NC) Kenya has contracted with Vosper Thornycroft of the United Kingdom for construction of two 55-meter fast attack craft (FAC). The craft are expected to be delivered mid- to late 1987; armament will consist of one Oto Melara 76-mm gun mount

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forward, and Otomat 55-meter launchers and one Breda twin compact 40-mm gun mount aft. Although Vosper expects Kenya to contract for two additional FAC in the near future, such expenditures severely strain Kenya's tight military budget.

(7) Logistics/Maintenance

(S) The KN is completely dependent upon foreign sources, principally the United Kingdom, for equipment and spare parts. Because of the Navy's small size and limited manpower, the Army provides the logistic support. All common-use items are controlled, stocked, and issued by a central Army depot in Nairobi. Some specifically designated naval supplies are retained in Mombasa.

(S) It is difficult for the KN to convince the KDOD to meet its budgetary priorities even for such crucial needs as fuel. Another constraint which can adversely affect naval readiness is the procurement procedure for external purchases, including spare parts which are not maintained in existing stocks. For an external purchase, foreign exchange must be allocated, then import licenses obtained and orders placed. Consequently, if something breaks, there may be a long wait for a replacement.

(S) The Navy's support facilities are efficient and well managed, and adequately provide limited maintenance support to the operational forces. However, the Navy has difficulty maintaining its older vessels partially due to its inability to compete with the private sector for trained personnel.

(S) All diesel engine repair is accomplished at the small naval base at Mombasa. Major hull repair, machining, and electrical work are contracted to the African Marine and General Engineering Company (shipyard) in Mombasa. The shipyard's new drydock for ships up to 20,000 deadweight tons (DWT) can repair ships in excess of Kenya's needs but it does not have a capability for ship construction. The Navy has developed preventive maintenance schedules which include periodic maintenance and planned overhaul of all patrol craft.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

(S) Applicants for vacancies in both officer and enlisted ranks are plentiful (as many as 10 for each opening), but most candidates cannot meet the high entrance requirements. The Navy often has difficulty recruiting an adequate number of Kenyans with the potential to learn required engineering skills.

(S) Few recruits have any technical skills or familiarity with naval operations. A term of service is 7 years. During this period enlisted men usually acquire useful skills such as welding, mechanics, and ship handling. Retention of skilled personnel is difficult, since private-sector employment is often more lucrative. However, officers with better pay and benefits tend to remain in the service.

(9) Training

(S) The KN is well trained and disciplined. All officers and enlisted members receive basic military training at the Armed Forces Training College (AFTC) at Lanet, and naval indoctrination at the Mombasa Naval Base. Personnel have attended armed forces colleges and naval schools in the United Kingdom, Canada, India, and the United States. Kenya relies on the United Kingdom for seamanship, engineering, and tactical training for junior and mid-level officers. Periodic combined exercises and other contact with the US Navy provide Kenyan naval personnel an opportunity to gain up-to-date knowledge and practical operational experience. However, the joint Army-Air Force exercises conducted by the Kenyan military seldom include naval participation.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

(S) The Navy has no reserve organization to supplement the current force during a national emergency.

(b) Mobilization

(S) Mobilization plans are not known, but would depend upon ship acquisitions and recruitment programs. The present manpower base does not provide for expanded or improved capability.

(c) Merchant Marine

(S) The Kenya Merchant Marine consists of a break bulk ship of 1,168 gross registered tons (GRT). Its deadweight tonnage (lift capacity) is 1,590 tons of cargo. Since the ship is over 20 years old, it has minimal military support potential.

c. Air Force

(1) Mission

(S) To defend territorial airspace; provide close air support for ground forces; and conduct logistic, airlift, and reconnaissance support for the Army and Navy.

(2) Capabilities

(C/NF) Successor to the Kenya Air Force (KAF) (disbanded for its role in the aborted August 1982 coup), the 82 Air Force (82 AF) remains out of favor with the Kenyan Defense Department. Despite the well-trained, highly qualified personnel in its ranks, it has received less than its fair share of the KDOD budget and personnel promotions since 1982 and morale is poor. There are now indications that the 82 AF may be regaining some lost trust, but the rehabilitation process is slow. One positive sign is the appointment of an Air Force officer as commander for the first time since 1982.

(C/NF) In addition to the broad missions mentioned earlier, the 82 AF claims five operational aircraft missions: air to air, air to ground, night intercepts, interdiction, and air shows. Indications are that the real emphasis in the last several years has been on air shows and to a lesser extent air-to-ground training. The other missions have increasingly suffered since 1982.

(C/NF) The primary air defense fighter of the 82 AF is the US-supplied F-5E Tiger II, although the F-5F trainer could be tasked to perform air defense missions as well. Although the F-5 is an effective combat fighter, Kenya's few operational aircraft would be easily overcome by a determined and well-equipped opponent such as Ethiopia, with superior numbers of MiG-21/FISHBEDs and MiG-23/FLOGGERS. Also, the concentration of all Kenya's fighter assets at Laikipia Air Base renders them vulnerable to attack either by air or unconventional ground warfare tactics.

(S) The Hawk and Strikemaster aircraft, which represent the balance of Kenya's combat aircraft, have maintained an operational rate of about 50 percent. The shortages of operational aircraft and fuel restrict the number of training sorties. During early May 1984, however, the Air Force flew several combat missions into eastern Uganda in support of government forces against tribal dissidents. The use of F-5 and Hawk aircraft in these operations indicates at least some recovery of operational combat capability. Flight time for aircrews of transport aircraft is more readily available than for fighter pilots since the transports are frequently used to fly support missions for the military as well as various

government agencies. Although the transport aircrews have the benefit of additional flight time, they are also faced with the problem of aircraft down time for maintenance deficiencies or shortages of spare parts, which result in lower operational rates than the 50-percent average.

(3) Personnel Strength

~~(S)~~ Estimated 3,000

(4) ~~(S)~~ Aircraft Strength

Total: 67 (58 fixed-wing: 25 jets, 33 props; 9 helicopters)

In operational units: 67

(25 fighters: 6 multipurpose; 11 ground attack; 8 trainers

12 basic trainers

19 transports: 11 short-range; 8 intermediate range

2 utility

9 helicopters: 9 medium transport)

(5) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

~~(S)~~ The headquarters of 82 AF is located at Moi Air Base (AB) (formerly Eastleigh Air Station), Nairobi. Moi AB also houses the transport, air support, and helicopter squadrons; the depot-level supply; depot maintenance facilities; and the basic flying training wing. In addition to Moi AB, the 82 AF also operates from Laikipia Air Base, where the F-5, Hawk, and Strikemaster squadrons are deployed, and Embakasi Air Station, the location of a new technical training center. A forward operating base in Wajir has no aircraft assets assigned although aircraft are occasionally deployed there on a short-term basis. Air defense radar units are headquartered at Laikipia Air Base with units at Moi and Wajir.

~~(S)~~ The Air Force is operationally controlled from Moi Air Base. Colocated is the Air Operations Center, the focal point for command and control of all 82 AF assets and current status of Kenyan airspace activity. Operational commitments of 82 AF assets are made by the Air Force Commander through subordinate air station and squadron commanders.

(b) ~~(S)~~ Summary of Units

Units	Aircraft		Principal Base
	Type	Total	
1 air defense sqdn	F-5E	6	Laikipia Air Base
	F-5F	3	Laikipia Air Base
2 ground attack sqdn	Hawk T-1	11	Laikipia Air Base
	Strikemaster	5	Laikipia Air Base
1 transp sqdn	Caribou	5	Moi Air Base, Nairobi
	Buffalo	8	Moi Air Base, Nairobi
	Navajo	2	Moi Air Base, Nairobi
1 air spt sqdn	Skyservant	6	Moi Air Base, Nairobi
1 helicopter sqdn	Puma	9	Moi Air Base, Nairobi
1 flight tng sqdn	Bulldog	12	Moi Air Base, Nairobi
	Total	67	

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(6) Status of Equipment

(S) Because of the fairly rapid expansion of the Air Force and its various sources of aircraft and supplies, the operational status of the units varies. While the 82 AF is one of the best in sub-Saharan Africa at assimilating new and modern equipment, maintenance and logistics are the important limiting factors affecting aircraft readiness. Full-time operational radars are operated at Laikipia, Moi, and Wajir. The Israeli-supplied air defense guns are seldom used. The Tigercat missiles are reportedly assembled and maintained under British contract. The continued presence of foreign contract technicians is required if the air defense radar systems are going to remain operational. Even with continued foreign technical assistance, because of the poor serviceability of these systems, confidence in the Air Force is declining, particularly with regard to its early warning and ground-controlled intercept capabilities.

(C/NF) Aircraft availability in the Kenya Air Force prior to the 1982 coup attempt was among the best in Africa, sometimes reaching 80 percent. However, the loss of trained personnel after 1982 drove the rate to well below 50 percent. The current availability rate in the 82 AF hovers around 50 percent, with F-5s somewhat higher (60 to 70 percent), largely due to US assistance.

(C/NF) Aircraft availability rates are somewhat misleading since the 82 AF spends little time in the air (approximately 100 hours per month for the F-5s; much less for other aircraft). Strikemaster and Puma aircraft are flown only when absolutely necessary. In the spring of 1985, the Kenyan Army called on the 82 AF for support of ground operations in the Northeast Province (NEP). The 82 AF was unable to provide support because the F-5 aircraft had not been fitted with external fuel tanks. Although the 82 AF had all the necessary parts and connections, they never applied the modifications. Therefore, they could not sustain themselves that far away from Laikipia. The 82 AF also could not provide Puma helicopter support for medical evacuation for a parachute drop in late 1985. Scheduled at the drop zone at 1900 hours, the helicopter did not arrive until 0800 hours the next day, 6 six hours after the jump.

(7) Logistics

(S/NF) Approximately 75 percent of the Air Force's qualified aircraft maintenance and support personnel were lost through arrests and forced retirement following the 1982 coup attempt. The destruction of the technical order library has decreased the Air Force's maintenance capability, and the lack of flyable aircraft has affected the proficiency of many Kenyan pilots. These factors have contributed to the delay of operational readiness of the F-5 squadrons.

(S) The 82 Air Force is heavily dependent upon several foreign suppliers for repair parts and technical support. This dependence produces complex problems that often are beyond the capability of the Air Force to address. The Air Force's central parts depot and the headquarters of its logistic and supply functions are located at Moi AB. Other smaller spare parts and supply stockpiles are maintained at the operating bases. Lack of spare parts and qualified maintenance and supervisory personnel are key factors limiting the operational capability of the 82 Air Force.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

(S) All manpower requirements in the 82 Air Force are met by volunteers. Difficulties arise in securing recruits who can meet the minimum educational and physical standards for technical training. The Air Force, perhaps more than the other services, is experiencing some problems with the loss of technical personnel to private industry. The technical

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manpower pool was severely drained following the August 1982 coup attempt, when many Air Force technicians were convicted of coup involvement and sentenced to long jail terms. Most of these vacancies had been filled with untrained Army personnel, although the Government of Kenya (GOK) is now placing qualified Air Force personnel back in command billets.

(9) Training

(S) Air Force officers and enlisted members receive basic training at the Armed Forces Training College (AFTC) at Lanet near Nakuru.

(S) Advanced training for 82 Air Force personnel is conducted both in Kenya and abroad (US, UK, India, Canada, and Israel). The 82 Air Force operates a technical school, the Armed Forces Technical College, as well as basic flying training. The 82 Air Force relies primarily on the US and British schools for advanced pilot and aircraft maintenance training.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

(U) The Air Force has no reserve organization to supplement the current force structure during a national emergency.

(b) Mobilization

(C) Mobilization plans are not known but would depend upon aircraft acquisitions. Civil aircraft probably would be pressed into service if a national emergency were declared.

(11) Civil Aviation

(a) Aircraft

(U) Approximately 10 civil transport aircraft with a gross takeoff weight of at least 9,000 kilograms currently are registered, owned, or operated in Kenya:

**Long-Range Transport Aircraft
(greater than 3,500 NM or 6,500 km)**

3 Boeing 707-320B
1 Boeing 720B
1 Airbus Industrie A310-300 Airbus
5 Total

Owner/Operator

Kenya Airways
Kenya Airways
Kenya Airways

**Medium-Range Transport Aircraft
(1,200-3,500 NM or 2,200-6,500 km)**

1 McDonnell Douglas DC-9-30
2 McDonnell Douglas DC-3
3 Total

Kenya Airways
Sunbird Air Charter

**Short-Range Transport Aircraft
(less than 1,200 NM or 2,200 km)**

2 Fokker F-27-200 Friendship
2 Total

Kenya Airways

(U) In 1985, the government-owned Kenya Airways embarked on a fleet modernization program which included the purchase of two A310-300 Airbuses as replacements for the aging Boeing 707s. One of the two A310-300 aircraft purchased by Kenya Airways entered

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the inventory in May 1986. Delivery of the second Airbus has been delayed due to mechanical problems encountered with the A310-300 received in May.

(b) Pilots

(U) The total number of licensed civilian pilots of major transport aircraft in Kenya is approximately 212. Kenya Airways employs approximately 76 pilots.

(c) Mobilization Potential

(S) Virtually all of Kenya's indigenous civilian aviation personnel and the civil transport aircraft operated by the government or by Kenya Airways could be mobilized in the event of war or comparable national emergency. Without foreign assistance, a lack of fully qualified indigenous maintenance personnel would prevent maximum effective use of the mobilized aircraft, especially if prolonged or intensive air transport operations were required.

d. Paramilitary Forces

(1) General Service Unit

(a) Mission

(S) The General Service Unit (GSU) is responsible for border patrol, controlling inter-tribal raiding, and mounting counterinsurgency operations. It also serves as a reserve to reinforce regular police and Army units. The Presidential Escort Unit, an elite element of the GSU, is tasked with protecting the President.

(b) Capabilities

(S) The GSU is mobile and its companies are capable of operating independently for short periods as light infantry units. The units are capable of performing their assigned missions on a small scale. However, in the event of a significant escalation of activity (such as a major rise in Shifta activity in the North-Eastern Province) the GSU would quickly be forced to call for military assistance.

(c) Strength

(S) Estimated: 2,000

(d) Organization

(S) The force consists of a headquarters and 2 training centers in Nairobi, 11 rifle companies, 1 reconnaissance company, and possibly a stock (cattle) theft unit. The rifle companies are rotated every 6 months among permanent positions throughout Kenya. Approximately 200 men are assigned to GSU headquarters in Nairobi.

(2) Kenya Police Force

(S) The Kenya Police Force (KPF) has an estimated personnel strength of 8,000 with an additional reserve force numbering an estimated 4,000. A conventional police force, it does not contribute significantly to Kenya's military combat strength; however, it would be available to serve as a local defense or rear area security force.

(S) The force is equipped principally with older British equipment, including rifles, automatic weapons, rocket launchers, armored cars, and trucks. Reconnaissance, liaison, and medical evacuation support are available from the Police Air Wing, which has two US-made Bell helicopters and nine Cessna aircraft.

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e. ~~(S)~~ Total Military Personnel Strength

Army	18,345
Navy	650-700
Air Force	3,000
GSU	2,000
Total	23,995-24,045

f. Foreign Military Presence

(1) ~~(S)~~ Foreign Military In-Country

United Kingdom:	6	6 Army advisers
Israel:	4	1 Air Force adviser (Puma instructor pilot) 3 Navy technicians (Naval Missile Conversion Program)
France:	2	2 Air Force advisers (Puma instructor pilots)
Canada:	1	1 Military adviser

(2) ~~(S)~~ Presence Abroad

United Kingdom	77 Military training
	17 Army
	20 Navy
	40 Air Force
Federal Republic of Germany	1 Naval training

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KENYA

Appendix

Installation BE List (U)

Name	BE Number	Category	Latitude	Longitude
Moi Air Base	0932-08007	80060	01-16-42S	036-51-37E
Eldoret	0909-09988	70220	00-31-15N	035-15-57E
Embakasi Air Base	0932-08028	80110	01-19-00S	036-55-51E
Garissa	0931-09983	70220	00-27-30S	039-38-30E
Gilgil Ammunition Depot	0932-00109	92010	00-28-30S	036-19-05E
Isiolo Military Camp	0910CA0004	90140	00-20-56N	037-36-27E
Jomo Kenyatta Intl Afd	0932-08028	80051	01-19-00S	036-55-51E
Kahawa Army Barracks	0932-00084	90110	01-11-24S	036-55-02E
Laikipia Air Base	0931-08840	80111	00-04-10S	037-02-20E
Lamu	0931-09970	70220	02-16-00S	040-53-45E
Lanet	0932-00405	42130	00-18-02S	036-08-10E
Langata Army Barracks	0932-00132	91150	01-17-33S	036-47-59E
Mariakani	0931-09987	70220	03-51-44S	039-28-32E
Mombasa Port Facility	1031-00053	95520	04-04-22S	039-37-52E
Mtongwe Naval Facility	1031-00053	96100	04-04-22S	039-37-52E
Nairobi Central Army Depot	0932-00366	92010	01-18-27S	036-50-22E
Nairobi National Army HQ	0932-00132	90110	01-17-33S	036-47-59E
Nakuru Airfield	0932-08009	80105	00-17-41S	036-09-15E
Nakuru Army Barracks	0932-00198	90110	00-17-52S	036-04-00E
Nanyuki	0910-09997	70220	00-01-00N	037-04-35E
Old Archers Post	0910-09999	70220	00-38-28N	037-39-54E
Thika	0931-09996	70220	03-22-00S	037-42-30E
Wajir	0910-09995	70220	01-44-45N	040-03-30E

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MADAGASCAR

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MADAGASCAR

1. GOVERNMENT

a. (U) Key Government Officials

President: Adm Didier Ignace *Ratsiraka*

Prime Minister: Gen Desire *Rakotoarijaona*

Minister of Foreign Affairs: Jean *Bemanjara*

Minister of Defense: Brig Gen Christopher *Raveloson-Mahasampo*

b. Type and Stability of Government

(C) The Democratic Republic of Madagascar received its independence on 26 June 1960 after 64 years of French colonial rule. Following independence, the country underwent 15 years of political turmoil with many divergent groups controlling the new nation's government. Finally, in June 1975, then Lieutenant Commander Didier Ratsiraka was elected the Head of State and Chairman of the Supreme Revolutionary Council and since that time has been able to consolidate his power. The President ostensibly rules the country in conjunction with the Supreme Revolutionary Council (the country's principal policymaking body, which is chosen by the President) and the National Assembly. In fact, real power remains vested in the President. The President is elected by universal direct suffrage for a 7-year term. Although the electoral process is not completely open, there is a broad spectrum of opinion represented in the country and elections are allowed to be contested within the political framework sanctioned by the government. The President has broad constitutional powers and his position is strengthened by the extensive majority of the President's political party, AREMA (Avant-Garde de la Revolution Malgeche), in the National Assembly. The President was also instrumental in creating a National Front for the Defense of the Revolution into which he brought seven political parties that form his opposition. Only parties that agreed to back Ratsiraka's policy of "revolutionary socialism" were incorporated into the Front and no party was allowed to legally exist outside the Front. Many political parties not truly socialistic initially agreed to support the "revolution." However, their true party ideologies ranged from a relatively moderate, pro-Western stance to pronounced radicalism.

(C/NF) Opposition in Madagascar is threefold. First, there is growing popular discontent due to governmental policies, particularly in economics and foreign relations. Second, there is a basic ideological difference between the government and the people. And, finally, there are ambitious individuals who oppose the present regime because they want to take control. At present the elements of a potential threat to Ratsiraka are dispersed. However, if the three elements came together with an idealist to fire the popular opposition and a ready opportunist to provide leadership, any small event could create instability for the Ratsiraka regime.

c. Internal Threat

(S/NF) The primary internal threat to Madagascar comes from the public's general dissatisfaction with the government's management of the economy. Large numbers of unskilled peasants are migrating to the capital, where little work is available and housing is either nonexistent or substandard. Due to governmental mismanagement, there are sporadic

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shortages of day-to-day necessities such as rice, cooking oil, and petroleum products. In the past, similar shortages have led to large-scale civil unrest, but the use of limited low-level military force has been effective to date in quelling such incidents. Student riots at universities in central Madagascar in early 1987 met with a similar limited government response. The government remained fearful, however, over possible widespread public support. Although student leaders apparently were in contact with opposition party leaders, the actual threat to the government did not appear acute. As the economic situation in Madagascar continues to deteriorate, violent crime has become a way of life for a large number of island inhabitants. In the capital, Antananarivo, the police, backed by the military, have mounted campaigns against lawless elements in the capital's population with some success. In the countryside over the past 2 years, many villages have turned to stealing cattle and other forms of banditry. Since late 1983 Gendarmerie and military units stationed throughout the countryside have been able to suppress this activity to some extent in all but the Fivondronana D'Ambalavao region. The ability of the Malagasy Armed Forces to conduct joint operations against opponents of the regime was effectively demonstrated in August 1985. A joint Popular Army (FAP) and Gendarmerie (ZP) force suppressed an uprising by Kung Fu martial arts clubs which had generated opposition to the regime and enjoyed some popular support. The leader of the clubs was killed and his followers were scattered and are in hiding from security forces. Nevertheless, internal security remains fragile and is of utmost concern to the government, especially in the capital and major cities.

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(S/NF/WI/NC) Ethnic differences also strongly influence political developments within the country and could pose an additional threat to the present regime. President Ratsiraka is from a coastal tribe (Cotier), whereas traditionally the central highland tribes (Merinas) have controlled and governed the island. Despite tribal factionalism, the nationalistic spirit and increasing importance of the military in Malagasy society brought about by Ratsiraka have allowed many military leaders to transcend traditional biases and support the present regime. However, there have been reports that there is growing discontent among some junior officers that may be rooted in ethnic rivalry and tribal factionalism. A possible coup attempt by senior officers, although unconfirmed, may have been thwarted in September 1986. Future similar threats, though remote, cannot be ignored.

(C) In spite of longstanding economic problems and ethnic rivalries, there exists no organized opposition to Ratsiraka, nor has there emerged any significant organization, open or clandestine, which has as its goal the overthrow of the Malagasy Government. Nevertheless, since he has had no success in improving the country's economic situation, the possibility of an individual or small faction assuming power by force cannot be ruled out. Such an event would result in little immediate change and its instigators would require the support of the military to stay in power.

(C) Reportedly, in late 1984 President Ratsiraka wanted to hold a referendum to amend the constitution and establish a one-party state. Strong opposition from the major political parties was expressed and the idea has been dormant since that time.

d. External Threat

(C) Malagasy President Ratsiraka has identified the primary external threat to his country as an attack from South Africa. In the past, this perception was reinforced by the staging of mercenaries from South Africa during the attempted coup d'etat in the Seychelles in November 1981. However, despite the influx of Soviet-supplied equipment and technicians, including air defense artillery and armored vehicles, Madagascar remains incapable of repelling its perceived external threat without extensive foreign assistance because of the

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low operational readiness of the equipment and generally low combat readiness of the Malagasy military. In reality, the external threat to Madagascar's security is negligible.

e. Communist Influence

(S/NF) Relations with Communist countries have expanded over the last several years. The Soviet Union and North Korea have been the primary supporters of the regime's desire to expand its military by supplying large amounts of military aid. Included in the Soviet military package have been aircraft, radars, tanks, armored cars, and artillery. Soviet advisers are providing maintenance and instruction on much of this equipment. In addition, an increasing number of Malagasy military personnel are training in the USSR. The Soviet Union has also provided limited economic assistance. Significantly, the Soviet Union provides almost half of Madagascar's petroleum needs. In recent years, this growing dependence upon, and indebtedness to, the Soviets was putting increased pressure on the President to allow Soviet access to Malagasy air and naval facilities. Communist influence remains strong despite Ratsiraka's rhetoric about reducing the amount of Soviet military assistance and influence.

(S/NF/WN/NC) In 1983, the Soviet Union established three FULL HOUSE direction-finding signals intelligence sites on the island. These sites were located at Tamatave on the central east coast, Majunga on the northwestern coast, and Fort Dauphin on the southeastern coast. These sites provided a cross-island intercept network and allowed monitoring of international shipping through the Mozambique Channel. The sites could be used by the Soviet Union to analyze more effectively US naval movements and air traffic in the area as well as other strategically important US facilities in the Indian Ocean region including the US tracking station on Mahe Island in the Seychelles and the US naval facility located on Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago. By February 1985, after strong US pressure, all three sites were dismantled. However, equipment remains in storage guarded by Malagasy security forces.

(S/NF) Ratsiraka has courted the Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc countries since Madagascar turned toward "revolutionary socialism" in 1975. Ratsiraka rhetorically has given the impression that he wants to move away from Soviet aid and positions on international issues in order to encourage additional Western aid. However, despite Ratsiraka's statements, Madagascar will remain heavily dependent upon Soviet assistance for the foreseeable future. The Malagasy military has grumbled about the cost of supporting increased numbers of Soviet advisers on the island. The Soviets have responded by stepping up their military assistance with Malagasy Government consent.

(S/NF) Aware that Ratsiraka is interested in looking toward the West for future military and economic aid, and that the military is beginning to chafe over the Soviet Union's military assistance programs, the Soviets, in November 1984, obtained a new military assistance agreement with Madagascar. Among the military items furnished in 1985 were PT-76 tanks, BRDM-2 armored personnel carriers (APCs), large-caliber artillery pieces, BM-14/16 multiple rocket launchers (MRLs), an An-26 CURL, and an Mi-8 HIP. Additionally, spare parts for the repair of existing military equipment and communications equipment were provided. The acceptance of this military package also required acceptance of Soviet military advisers and technicians for training and maintenance. These actions, while partially fulfilling military desires for new equipment, also increased Madagascar's dependence on the Soviet Union and provide a counterpoint to Ratsiraka's overtures to the West for military and economic aid.

(S/NF/WN/NC) North Korean military aid began to decline after 1980 with a sharp decrease in the numbers of both advisers and military equipment. The present number

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of advisers is estimated at 50. Economic assistance by North Korea has included road construction and agricultural improvement projects.

~~(S/NF/WN/NC)~~ Other Communist countries which have, or have had, military assistance programs with Madagascar are East Germany, Cuba, Romania, and Bulgaria. East Germany has maintained an estimated 15 communications technicians in Madagascar since 1981. Romania has provided a small amount of ground force equipment in the last several years. Romania has trained Malagasy military personnel in Romania as recently as 1984. The current extent of military assistance provided by Cuba and Bulgaria is unknown but believed to be minimal.

f. Economic Factors

~~(S)~~ Economic conditions in Madagascar are extremely poor and the socialist policies of government have proved ineffective in terms of stimulating industry or initiative. The economy remains agrarian, based on cash crops with an uncertain market demand. Leading exports include coffee, vanilla, cloves, and livestock. Major imports are crude oil, fertilizers, foodstuffs, and consumer goods. There are occasional food shortages growing out of an antiquated distribution infrastructure and poor yields. The failure of President Ratsiraka's economic programs has saddled Madagascar with a substantial national debt and the country's failure to meet its obligations on schedule has led to disagreements with the International Monetary Fund. Recently, Ratsiraka completed a tour of both Eastern and Western nations in which he received some pledges of food and financial aid. Leading trading partners are France, West Germany, US, Japan, and other European countries.

~~(S/NF)~~ Madagascar has no military capability for producing equipment. The current principal military supplier is the USSR, who as of mid-1986 had delivered \$175 million in military shipments since 1980. North Korean military shipments have virtually ceased since 1982. Major items from Moscow in 1984 and 1985 were armored personnel carriers, multiple rocket launchers, artillery, light tanks, communications equipment, and aircraft spare parts. French military assistance tapered off in the late 1970s. In 1984 and 1985, the French delivered some ground force equipment and one landing ship (LSM). Additionally, France provided military training in France for Malagasy military personnel as late as 1985.

g. Military and Political Alignment

~~(S/NF)~~ Madagascar is a member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and a regular participant in Third World forums such as the Nonaligned Movement. President Ratsiraka aspires to be a respected Third World leader. He repeatedly declares Madagascar's nonaligned status and has strictly adhered to a policy of denying military basing or access to foreign powers. In pursuing the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace concept, he supports regional efforts to reduce superpower presence in the area.

~~(C)~~ While officially adhering to a nonaligned policy, President Ratsiraka ideologically embraces the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, he plays East against West in hopes of improving Madagascar's economic and military situation. Since 1975, Ratsiraka has expanded political and military relations with the Soviet Union.

~~(S/NF)~~ However, Ratsiraka continues to foster relations with the Western world in an attempt to gain greater economic and military assistance from Western sources, particularly France, and thereby lessen his dependence on the Soviet Union. In 1985, the US instituted a modest military assistance program (MAP) to assist in the training and formation of a mobile engineering group. When trained, this engineering unit will be able to repair small bridges, coastal barges, and roads. The objective of the US security assistance program for 1987 is the continuation of the IMET program for Malagasy military personnel. Ratsiraka

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has seemed supportive of the US security assistance program and continues to deny the Soviets military access to Diego Suarez naval base and other Malagasy facilities. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) is highly supportive of the program in spite of Soviet protests over its existence.

(S) Madagascar's relations with the other island nations in the southwest Indian Ocean are cooperative. In April 1979 approximately 250 Malagasy military personnel were deployed to the Seychelles to assist that nation during a threatened coup attempt. Although no coup materialized, the morale of Malagasy Army personnel was enhanced simply because they were able to respond to this request by another government.

h. (U) Key US Officials

Chief of Mission (Antananarivo): Ambassador Patricia Gates Lynch

(b)(3):10 USC 424

2. MILITARY, GENERAL

a. (U) Key Military Officials

Minister of Defense: Brig Gen Christopher *Raveloson-Mahasampo*

Chief of Staff, People's Armed Forces (PAF): Brig Gen Lucien *Rakotonirainy*

Assistant Chief of Staff, PAF: Brig Gen Pierre *Rabibisoa*

Commander, Intervention Forces (IF): Col Ismael *Mounibou*

Commander, Forces Aeronavale (FAN): Col Robert *Rabemanantsoa*

Deputy Commander, FAN: Cdr Rakoto *Ramahavonjy*

Commander, Gendarmerie (ZP): Col *Randrianasoavina*

Inspector General, ZP: Col Mijoro *Rakotomanga*

Director, Malagasy Intelligence and State Security Service (DGIDIE): Philippe *Razanajouy*

b. Position of the Armed Forces

(S/NF) The Malagasy Popular Armed Forces (PAF) are generally apolitical, leaving President Ratsiraka to set policy and other civilian politicians to carry out day-to-day national administration. However, the President has not succeeded in creating a military united and uncritical in its loyalty to him; he cannot count on the officers as a group to agree with whatever he might do. At this time the armed forces play no significant role in national-level policy formulation. However, President Ratsiraka remains aware of the potential threat posed by his military. When he assumed power in 1975, he worked to lessen ethnic tensions in the military and to balance the various forces. At that time the Army was primarily Merina and the Gendarmerie primarily Cotier. Ratsiraka, a naval officer, was not liked by either group. Initially Ratsiraka reduced the Army's dominance by unifying the Air Force and Navy officer corps and providing the Air Force with priority military assistance such as Soviet MiG aircraft. Additionally, he weakened the Army by removing the Development Corps and creating the Development Armed Force. He then strengthened his position by moving the Gendarmerie from the Ministry of Interior (headed by Ratsiraka opponents) to the Ministry of Defense. He ensured internal security by placing the internal security service, the Directorate General for Information and Documentation (DGID), now the Directorate General for Investigations and Internal and External Documentation

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(DGIDIE), subordinate to the Presidency. In weakening the military, or at least neutralizing the threat it initially posed to the early days of the regime, he also attempted to build prestige and good will within the military toward his regime. Today the military is better paid than the civilian government. The primary threat remains small elements of the older Merina Army officers as the Cotiers begin to expand their numbers in the officer ranks. Here tribal factionalism helps ensure Ratsiraka's regime, since the growing Cotier ranks would not support a Merina-backed coup.

(C) Rumors of coup plots surface from time to time, but one deterrent to an attempt to overthrow Ratsiraka has been the rightwing opposition's belief that the Soviet Union might uphold Ratsiraka or, even worse, that they might be instrumental in installing a Soviet puppet follow-on regime.

c. Military Trends and Capabilities

(S/NF) The Malagasy military comprises the People's Armed Forces (PAF), or Army; the Forces Aeronavale (FAN), which include the Air Force and Navy; and the Gendarmerie. The Army, by virtue of its size, is the predominant force. Total armed force strength is estimated at approximately 26,000 men.

(C) The President of the Republic is currently the Supreme Commander of the Malagasy Armed Forces. The chain of command runs from the President through the Ministry of Defense, to the Chief of Staff, to the commanding officers of the three forces, then extends from the respective service commanders to the regional commanders and their subordinate units. President Ratsiraka monitors defense matters on a day-to-day basis. His extreme fear of being overthrown or assassinated is reflected in the fact that he will not delegate matters of state to other officials.

(C) The primary mission of the Malagasy Armed Forces is to protect national integrity and maintain internal security. The secondary mission is to carry out civic action activities. The Development Force units of the PAF, in particular, are responsible for building and improving roads so that surplus food production can be transported and distributed from one region to another. To assist the development units, the Air Force also utilizes its transport aircraft to distribute supplies throughout the country. Yet, with aging equipment and a paucity of spare parts and qualified personnel, the Armed Forces remain severely restricted in performing these missions.

(S) In September 1984, personnel from the national police, the National Gendarmerie, and the People's Armed Forces were combined to form a mixed brigade to fight the rising crime rate in the capital. Other such mixed brigade operations are underway in the other areas — Antsirabe, Tulear, and Majunga. These operations are aimed at reducing crime by patrolling high-crime areas. The men involved in the operations do not care for this type of service; however, these mixed operations are likely to continue. These operations are largely ineffective in controlling crime.

(C) Even though the Ministry of Defense has the highest percentage of the national budget, morale among the Armed Forces is on the decline. The country's overall economic crisis and its impact on the standard of living, and renewed ethnic rivalries are the key problems causing discontent among the military. Junior officers, in particular, are finding they have no opportunities to advance through the ranks. As Cotiers (Malagasy from the coastal regions) trained in the Eastern Bloc or by Soviet advisers, they believe that the senior officers, who are predominantly Merina (Malagasy from the high plateau) educated and trained in France, are getting more than their fair share of scarce resources (i.e., jobs, promotions). The junior officers are complaining that the socialist revolution has been

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betrayed by the lack of revolutionary zeal on the part of the Western-oriented Merina senior officers.

~~(S/NF)~~ In November 1983, the Malagasy Government announced a personnel drawdown that affected all branches of the Armed Forces. The Gendarmerie was the first force to undergo this large-scale force contraction. It had 9,000 men at the end of 1983, and now has an estimated strength of 5,000. The force drawdown in the Gendarmerie was accomplished by giving "early outs" to those enlisted personnel who wanted to leave, stopping all recruiting, and discharging those individuals who were marginal or below-average performers.

~~(S/NF)~~ The morale of the Aeronaval Forces is also at an all-time low. Morale is poor among the naval personnel due to a lack of government emphasis on naval activities and equipment shortages. Pilots also are discontented because of the almost total lack of flight operations. Many of the Malagasy MiG-21 pilots have inadequate flying time and lack confidence. To overcome this problem, some military pilots fly as copilots on Air Madagascar's Boeing 737s. This decision, in turn, has caused conflict between displaced airline pilots and the military.

~~(S/NF/WF)~~ Madagascar continues to rely on Communist Bloc military equipment, particularly that from the Soviet Union. In the last several years, Soviet military deliveries have included radars, communication and electronic intelligence equipment; artillery, tanks, armored vehicles, spare parts, and assorted types of ammunition and aircraft. French military assistance has increased since 1984 and the US has a small military assistance program.

d. Military Budget

~~(S/NF)~~ \$58.9 million is budgeted for the fiscal year ending 31 December 1985; this is 9 percent of the central government budget. Dollar value is converted from Malagasy francs at the official exchange rate of 662.48 francs equal \$1.00. This military budget represents a decrease of 11.7 percent over the amount budgeted for 1984. No service allocations are available.

e. (U) Population

10,227,000 estimated as of July 1986

Males (ages 15-49): 2,260,000; physically fit, 1,383,000; draft age, 20

Ethnic divisions: Basically split between highlanders of predominantly Malayo-Indonesian origin, consisting of Merina and related Batsileo on the one hand, and coastal tribes with mixed Negroid, Malayo-Indonesian, and Arab ancestry on the other; coastal tribes include Betsimisaraka, Tsimihety, Sakalava, and Antaisaka; there are also French, Indians of French nationality, and Creoles

Literacy: 53 percent of population age 10 and over

3. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

a. Army

(1) Mission

~~(S)~~ The primary mission of the Army is to defend national borders and assist in maintaining internal stability. The Army is also responsible for growing and transporting agricultural produce, working on engineering projects, and distributing food supplies. Two organizations comprise the "Army": the Intervention Force and the Development Force.

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Each is in fact equally subordinate to the Chief of Staff, People's Armed forces. Both organizations have internal security missions.

(2) Capabilities

~~(S)~~ The overall capability of this force has increased slightly due to the increased deliveries of equipment and a streamlining of the command and control system in the military. The Army can maintain internal security in the capital and Diego Suarez, but would be hard pressed to respond to widescale unrest in other areas. It is incapable of defending national borders, and can only perform part of its secondary civil development mission.

(3) Personnel Strength

~~(C)~~ 20,000 (11,600 are Intervention Force personnel; 8,400 are Development Force personnel)¹

(4) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

~~(S)~~ The President exercises authority over the Army, the largest force in the military, through the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff. Headquarters for the Army is located at the capital, Antananarivo. The two intervention force regiments, combat units responsible for territorial defense and internal security, are stationed at Antananarivo and Diego Suarez. The intervention forces are not combat ready because they are not able to conduct realistic combat training, although they do conduct small arms firing practice. Nine Development Force regiments, responsible for public works, are deployed throughout the six military regions with two units assigned to the more remote Majunga military region. Madagascar is divided into six military regions. Each military region (MR) commander has an MR regiment of undetermined size. All other military units are located around the capital and are available for deployment throughout the country as needed. The term regiment as used in the Malagasy Army does not denote a regiment in US terminology. The personnel strengths for these regiments are listed below.

(b) ~~(S)~~ Ground Combat Units

Major Tactical Units	Strength per Unit	
	Authorized	Average/Actual
7 military region regiments	Unk	817
2 intervention force regiments (infantry) (bn size)	750	375
3 air defense regiments (bn size)	Unk	220
1 heavy artillery group (bn size)	Unk	750
1 armored regiment (bn size)	Unk	500

(c) ~~(S)~~ Combat Support Units

Major Tactical Units	Strength per Unit	
	Authorized	Average/Actual
1 communications and support regiment	Unk	400
1 administration and personnel regiment	Unk	750
1 combat support regiment	Unk	600

¹(C) Over the next year some decline in this strength is expected.

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MAURITIUS

1. POLITICAL-MILITARY SITUATION

(U) Mauritius is an Indian Ocean Island nation lying 450 miles to the east of Madagascar, 400 miles south of the Seychelles, and 1,000 miles southwest of Diego Garcia. The nation also includes the island of Rodrigues, approximately 300 miles to the east of Mauritius, and two tiny dependencies situated to the north of Mauritius, which are virtually unpopulated: the Agalega Islands and the Cargados Carajos Shoals. Mauritius is one of the few developing countries that have maintained their democratic institutions. It has maintained its democracy since gaining independence from Great Britain in 1968, despite factors such as severe overpopulation (more than 1 million people crowded into 720 square miles), racial and ethnic tensions, and extremely high unemployment.

(U) The Constitution, which guarantees the fundamental rights and freedoms of the people, calls for a parliament comprising the Governor-General, representing the British monarch as titular head of state, and a legislative assembly elected from 23 member constituencies and one 2-member district on Rodrigues. In addition, eight assembly seats are apportioned to the "best losers" among the unreturned candidates, according to their ethnic affiliation — (two each for the Hindus, Muslims, Chinese, and the "general population"). The assembly is responsible for all legislation and appropriations and may amend the Constitution by either a two-thirds or a three-quarters majority, depending on the part of the Constitution in question.

(U) The rights and duties of the Governor General — appointing a Prime Minister and a leader of the opposition, approving legislation, dissolving the assembly, and declaring states of war or emergency — are closely circumscribed by law and convention. The real seat of executive power is in the Cabinet. The Prime Minister, appointed from the ruling party or coalition, may appoint a maximum of 20 ministers in addition to the attorney general, who also has Cabinet rank. The Prime Minister, on the advice of the Cabinet, recommends individual appointments to the position of Governor-General. As titular head of state, the British monarch officially approves such nominations.

~~(C/NF)~~ The current government is led by Prime Minister Aneerood Jugnauth, and comprises several widely divergent political parties. Referred to as the Alliance, the coalition was created primarily in opposition to Paul Berenger's Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM), a leftist organization with widespread popular appeal, sympathetic to the Soviet Union. The MMM-Mauritian Socialist Party (PSM) coalition won a landslide victory in June 1982, ousting the Labor Party of Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, Prime Minister since independence. As Minister of Finance, Berenger alienated the country's Hindu majority and trade unions. Economic reforms undertaken to fulfill International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan requirements benefited the French-owned sugar industry, at the perceived expense of the country's lower classes. Berenger was forced to resign after 6 months in office. The MMM-PSM coalition split; Jugnauth adjourned parliament and created the Alliance, a coalition of political parties opposed to the MMM. The Alliance currently is composed of Jugnauth's Mauritian Socialist Movement (MSM), Gaetan Duval's Mauritian Social Democratic Party (PMSD), Beergoonath Ghurburrin's Worker's Assembly Party (RTM), and the Mauritius Labor Party (MLP), currently led by Sir Satcam Boolell.

~~(C/NF)~~ Despite the diversity of the Alliance, often noted for its fierce Cabinet debates and

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extensive public backbiting, unity in overall government policy normally has been achieved. The economy was quickly identified as the nation's primary problem. Unemployment had risen to record levels, due to the declining tourism and sugar industries which comprise about 70 percent of the economy's output. Despite continuing problems, the Alliance has implemented economic policies which promise to contribute to the nation's industrial potential. Comprehensive plans to restructure the sugar industry have been approved. Foreign investment is increasing, while domestic private sector development has been encouraged through reduced corporate and personal tax rates. Tourism has improved, while incentives have been provided for foreign hotel construction. Successfully agreeing on economic policy, Alliance unity was achieved despite the government's original lack of clear vision or platform when it assumed power.

~~(C/NF)~~ Despite its initial popularity, the Alliance has increasingly alienated the same constituency which rejected the MMM-PSM coalition. Jugnauth's emphasis on foreign investment has alienated the nation's lower classes, who feel their interests are under attack. The Labor Party, attempting to organize Hindu voters in an effort to survive as a single party, was expelled from the Alliance in 1984. Substantial popular support has shifted to the MMM and Labor Party, which, following Ramgoolam's death in 1985, fell under the leadership of Satcam Boolell.

(U) The government continues to woo Western capital and investment, and the current budget has been geared toward this end. Jugnauth has promoted a Mauritian "export processing zone" in the Far East (Japan and Taiwan) and South Africa, which will offer fiscal benefits to foreign investors and create jobs on the national front. However, many Mauritians oppose involvement with South Africa because of that country's apartheid policies. International reaction to events in South Africa has forced the Jugnauth government to distance itself publicly from Pretoria. Mauritius remains tied, however, to trade with South Africa, benefiting from food imports and tourism-generated foreign exchange.

~~(C/NF)~~ The principal factor linking the Alliance's diverse membership is a desire for power, and a belief that should the MMM win a new election, Mauritian democracy would be abolished. Despite the country's democratic tradition and respect for human rights, Alliance fears of the MMM have led to adoption of unpopular, repressive policies on the opposition. Press restrictions include imposition of large import duties on newsprint and making criticism of government ministers without proof of wrongdoing a felony. Alliance-sponsored changes in parliamentary procedures have further restricted the opposition. While numerous opposition parliamentarians have been suspended from the assembly, that body has been limited in its ability to question the activities of government officials. The Alliance has also taken a firm stand against politically active Mauritian labor unions.

~~(C/NF)~~ Reflecting increased popular opposition, Prime Minister Jugnauth's Alliance lost all five municipalities to the MMM in district elections held on 8 December 1985. Calling the elections a referendum on the government's successful efforts to create jobs and stimulate the economy, Jugnauth had hoped an Alliance victory would set the stage for general elections to be held by 1988. However, seizing on longstanding communal tensions between Hindus and the smaller Muslim, Asian, and Creole communities, the MMM gained new support and achieved easy victory. The Alliance appears to have alienated voters by soliciting support only from Hindus, traditionally its chief constituency.

~~(C/NF)~~ The Hindu vote, traditionally important to the Alliance, is increasingly divided. Many Hindu voters, already angered by the Labor Party's 1984 expulsion from the Alliance, further resented Jugnauth's sharp personal attacks on Boolell prior to the 1985 elections.

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Although the Labor Party rejoined the Alliance in September 1986, mistrust of Boolell by other Alliance members continues. The Hindu vote is likely to remain divided in the months ahead, and that will continue to weaken the Alliance.

~~(C/NF)~~ The Alliance is under increased scrutiny for probable participation of key government officials in the nation's pervasive drug trafficking. The opposition has used the 27 December 1985 arrest of four junior members of Parliament in Amsterdam on drug charges to challenge the Alliance. Three were released by Dutch authorities and since have returned to Mauritius. Although not directly implicated in the affair, Jugnauth has received harsh criticism for allowing the Parliament members to resume their seats. Mounting opposition towards the Alliance resulted in a no-confidence vote in May 1986. The government survived the challenge, however, due to jointly held fears that the resulting election would almost certainly result in an MMM victory. However, the narrow margin of victory indicates that the Alliance's parliamentary majority is fragile, and subject to repeated challenge.

~~(C/NF)~~ Prime Minister Jugnauth has made a concerted effort to move Mauritius to a more openly pro-Western (though still nonaligned) stance in its foreign policy. In January 1984, all Libyan diplomats were expelled for meddling in internal Mauritian affairs. Jugnauth has refused to let Cuba establish an embassy and maintains a cool relationship with the USSR. Mauritius welcomes visits of US Navy vessels to Port Louis Harbor, notwithstanding the fact that Mauritius claims sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago (which includes the US Naval Support Facility on Diego Garcia). US P-3 aircraft occasionally transit through Plaisance Airfield. Several hundred laborers are provided for Diego Garcia. Mauritius appears to have privately accepted the reality of the US presence on Diego Garcia. Jugnauth has sought to exploit the financial benefits of the facility rather than renew claims to Diego Garcia in international forums. However, in keeping with his policy of nonalignment, Soviet warships also make occasional port calls in Mauritius. A variety of Soviet civilian passenger liners and scientific research ships also visit Mauritius.

~~(S/NF/WN/NC)~~ Despite their unwillingness and/or inability to furnish any significant economic assistance to Mauritius, the Soviets have made major, but unsuccessful, efforts to cultivate political influence with Prime Minister Jugnauth. Unfulfilled Soviet promises of economic assistance, and Jugnauth's continuing perception that the Soviets are assisting Berenger's MMM, have led to rejection of Soviet overtures. The Soviets offered two coastal patrol boats in 1982, but the offer was refused. Meanwhile, the Soviets pressed for an air service agreement which would allow for Aeroflot service to Mauritius and urged the conclusion of a bilateral fishing agreement. These initiatives were considered by the Mauritian Government until Jugnauth received confirmation that the Soviets had supported the opposition MMM. Jugnauth decided to test Soviet willingness to assist Mauritius by asking in 1984 for a small cargo ship in place of the Soviet offer of two coastal patrol boats. The Soviets initially denied his request. In an effort to improve relations with Mauritius, the Soviets in January 1986 renewed the longstanding offer of two patrol boats and a cargo ship. Although Mauritius needs patrol boats to effectively police its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the offer reportedly was refused. Jugnauth does not want to jeopardize relations with the West and fears the vessels would be too costly and difficult to maintain. However, a 1961 Soviet-Mauritius Fisheries Agreement, renegotiated in 1978, allows the Soviets the use of harbor facilities at Mauritius' primary port, Port Louis (BE 1280-00059, CAT 47400, 20-09-22S 057-29-37E), and also grants them aircraft landing rights to support trawler operations. The Soviet Union, however, has not provided much assistance to Mauritius in developing the country's own fishing industry.

~~(C/NF)~~ The Soviet exchange program remains the only significant program operated by a Communist country in Mauritius. Signed in 1969, the program promotes the study

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of Russian literature in Mauritius and the exchange of delegations of artists, producers, writers, and editors. Ties between the two countries are encouraged in the fields of health and sports, with special emphasis on medicine, science, and engineering. Participation in these programs is limited to a relatively small number of individuals. The influence of the exchange program in the Mauritian Government is minimal.

(U) The only economic assistance projects financed by a Communist country during 1983 included a PRC agricultural assistance program, which focused on rice and citrus growing, and a project to modernize Plaisance International Airport, which began in June 1983 after Jugnauth's official visit to China. The project involves a long-term interest-free loan of 13.5 million pounds sterling (about \$22 million) and technical assistance from a visiting team of 150 Chinese engineers. The project is scheduled for completion in 1987.

~~(S/NF)~~ The PRC's presence and economic assistance is welcomed because it is perceived as nonideological. Mauritius has a small, economically vital ethnic Chinese community, integral in the nation's textile industry and export trade. Although occasional overtures toward Taiwan have strained relations with the PRC, relations between the two nations have generally improved over the past year. A generous economic assistance agreement was reached with the PRC on 1 July 1985. Approximately \$12.5 million in interest-free loans for development projects is to be disbursed over a period of 5 years. Financing was also provided for the purchase of sports equipment for the Indian Ocean Games. Several academic scholarships are offered each year. Cooperation in agricultural research and fishing was initiated in 1985.

(U) There are no military assistance agreements or military alliances between Mauritius and any Communist country.

~~(S)~~ There is no external or internal military threat to Mauritius. However, Mauritius could face serious social upheaval unless solutions are soon found for serious economic and unemployment problems.

~~(S/NF)~~ A paramilitary Special Mobile Force (SMF) (with its subordinate Special Mobile Wing (SMW)), Groupe d'Intervention de la Police Mauricienne (GIPM), and a general duty police force with its subordinate Special Support Unit (SSU) compose the Mauritian security forces. Mauritius has no military equipment production capability and has received small amounts of military equipment from Free World countries — France, the UK, and India. France has provided APCs, light weapons, training, and technical support. The UK conducts infantry training and has provided light arms and vehicles. India provides engineering support for the nation's police patrol craft and helicopters. All assistance received has been grant aid. Most foreign assistance is for training rather than equipment.

~~(S)~~ In addition to these forces, a 130-man National Intelligence Unit (NIU) is tasked to collect information on subversion within the country. Other duties assigned to the NIU include monitoring the Soviet Embassy. The NIU is armed with small arms and is now undergoing weapons training with the SMF.

~~(S)~~ The Mauritian Police Force and its paramilitary component are adequate at present to meet the potential threat to internal stability. As long as the security forces remain loyal, there is no group on the island capable of seizing power.

2. (U) KEY OFFICIALS

Governor General and Commander-in-Chief: Sir Veerasamy *Rigadoo*

Prime Minister, Minister of Defense and Internal Security, Minister of Justice, Minister

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of Interior, Minister of Outer Islands, Minister of Information, Minister of Administrative Reform, Minister of External Communications: Aneerood *Jugnauth*

Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Tourism and Employment: Sir Gaetan *Duval*

Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of External Affairs: Sir Satcam *Boolell*

Minister of Finance: Seetannah ("Mishnu") *Lutchmeenaraidoo*

Minister of External Affairs, Minister of Emigration: Madun *Dulloo*

Commissioner of Police: M. Bhimsun *Kowlessur*

Special Mobile Force Commander: Col Raj *Dayal*

National Intelligence Unit Commander: Goodrooduth *Buramdoyal*

3. MILITARY BUDGET

(U) \$13.4 million for fiscal year ending 30 June 1983 (latest available); this was 3.2 percent of the central government budget. (Special Mobile Force \$4,149,820; police, \$393,714). Dollar value converted at the official exchange rate of 11.706 rupees equal \$1.00.

4. (U) POPULATION

1,020,000 estimated as of July 1986

Males (ages 15-49): 272,000; 142,000 fit for military service

Ethnic divisions: 68 percent Indo-Mauritian, 27 percent Creole, 3 percent Sino-Mauritian, 2 percent Franco-Mauritian

Literacy: Estimated 61 percent for those over 21 years and 90 percent for those of school age.

5. ARMY

(U) None. See section 8.a.

6. NAVY

~~(C/NF)~~ Mauritius does not have a Navy. The *Amar*, an ex-Indian *Abhay* Class large patrol craft, is assigned to the police force and tasked with search and rescue over a 127-NM coastline, and provides transport for the SMF. The crew of the craft is composed of men from the police force and three Indian naval officers (the commanding officer, executive officer, and navigation officer) and four Indian enlisted personnel. Training for the Mauritian crew was provided by the Indian Navy. The vessel regularly goes to *Platte* Island to conduct military exercises with a group of SMF personnel.

~~(C/NF)~~ The Mauritius merchant marine consists of four ships of over 1,000 gross registered tons (GRT). Types include three breakbulk ships and passenger/cargo ships with a total deadweight tonnage (lift capacity) of 40,200 tons of cargo. All ships are over 10 years old.

7. AIR FORCE

~~(C)~~ None. The Special Mobile Force of the Police has a Helicopter Branch equipped with one SA-315 *Alouette II* Lama and two SA-316B *Alouette III* (Cheetah) helicopters, only one of which is operational.

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8. ~~(S/NF/WN/NC)~~ PARAMILITARY FORCES

a. Special Mobile Force (SMF)

Personnel Strength: 750

Major Units: One headquarters company, three rifle companies, one engineering squadron, one helicopter section, one training wing, and a mobile wing composed of two squadrons. Well trained and apolitical, the SMF remains capable of maintaining internal security, although its operational readiness has declined in recent years. Weapons and vehicle spare parts are in short supply. The SMF would be unable to defend the nation in the unlikely event of an external attack. The Special Mobile Wing operates the SMF's armored personnel carriers and mortars, and is considered to be its rapid reaction force.

Major Equipment: 11 VAB APCs (1 VAB-PC command vehicle, 8 troop transport VAB-VTTs, 2 VCS TG 120s with 20-mm cannons), several Land Rovers, two 81-mm mortars, numerous assorted trucks, and a variety of small arms (FN and G-3 rifles, and 20 L4A1 Bren light machineguns).

b. Special Support Unit (SSU)

Personnel Strength: 240

Units: Formerly called the Police Riot Unit. There are four SSUs; each contains four baton sections and a rifle section.

Major Equipment: None

c. Other

The 4,000-man regular police force (strength includes personnel assigned to PRUs) is capable of helping the paramilitary forces to perform their internal security mission. The Group D'Intervention De La Police Mauricienne (GIPM) is a well-disciplined counterterrorist commando unit comprising approximately 20 select officers and enlisted men from the SMF. The GIPM has received training in France to respond to hijacking and/or hostage situations. The GIPM is under the direct control of the Commissioner of Police.

9. (U) KEY US OFFICIALS

Chief of Mission (Port Louis): Ambassador Ronald D. Palmer

(b)(3):10 USC 424

10. ~~(S)~~ FOREIGN MILITARY PRESENCE

a. Foreign Military In-Country

India:	9 (7 naval advisers/technicians, maintenance team for antiquated ex-Indian patrol craft, 1 adviser to the SMF Helicopter Branch; 1 adviser to the SMF)
France:	2 (one adviser and one enlisted technician who maintains APCs purchased from France)
United Kingdom:	2 (engineer and training adviser)

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b. Presence Abroad

United Kingdom: 6 (Staff College)
France: 1-4 (technical training)
India: 6 (SMF personnel in photography course;
paramilitary company commanders' course;
Indian Staff College; medium machinegun course;
81-mm mortar course)

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Appendix

Installation BE List (U)

Name	BE Number	Category	Latitude	Longitude
Amitie Afd	1280-08801	80112	20-07-12S	057-40-27E
Grand Baie Afd	1280-08800	80112	20-01-00S	057-33-48E
Mont Choisy Afd	1280-08803	80130	20-00-56S	057-33-02E
Plaisance Afd	1280-08403	80081	20-25-38S	057-40-36E
Port Louis Bks and HQ	1280-00139	91010	20-09-45S	057-29-30E
Rodrigues-Plaine Corail Afd	1171-08800	80111	19-45-27S	063-21-42E
Vacoas Phoenix Bks Abercromby	1280-00045	90110	20-17-24S	057-29-30E

SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT

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REUNION

1. POLITICAL-MILITARY SITUATION

(U) The island of Reunion is an overseas department of France lying 420 miles east of Madagascar. The island is administered by a Prefect appointed by the French Minister of Interior, assisted by a Secretary General and an elected 36-man General Council. The department is represented in the French Parliament by three delegates to the National Assembly and two senators.

~~(S/NF)~~ While Reunion enjoys one of the more stable economies in the region because of its relationship with France, there are political factions within the island nation that are attempting to alter Reunion's present status. Most political candidates are affiliated with French parties which do not maintain permanent organizations in Reunion. The Rally for the Republic (RPR) party, which dominates the General Council, is the primary party in support of the present French status of the island. This party represents the largest political group on Reunion and recognizes both the economic benefits and the degree of internal stability derived from French control. The RPR retained its solid control of the General Council following March 1985 French District elections. The Reunion Communist Party (PCR), led by Paul Verges, is the primary opposition party on the island. The PCR, funded by the French Communist Party, is the best organized political party, second in membership only to the RPR. It has a 34-member Central Committee, an 11-member Political Bureau, and a Secretariat. The PCR does recognize the importance of French economic aid to the survival of the island's stability and, as a result, does not advocate complete independence from France. Rather, it advocates local autonomy, arguing that the island cannot be adequately governed from metropolitan France. Prior to the French District elections, the PCR claimed 10,000 members and controlled about one-third of the seats on the General Council. The PCR lost several seats to the RPR in March 1985, although the party's role and influence remain strong.

~~(S/NF/WN/NC)~~ On the other hand, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Reunion (MPLR), formerly called the Communist Marxist-Leninist Organization of Reunion (OCMLR), does advocate total independence from France. Led by George Sinimale, a former member of the PCR, the Liberation Party maintains contacts with various African liberation groups and Libya. To date, Libya has provided financial assistance to the MPLR, and some training on the use of explosives, firearms, and clandestine communication. The MPLR has approximately 200 members on Reunion, organized into cells in the south. Ideological differences between the antigovernment movements have prevented the organization of large-scale opposition on the island. Reunion has experienced some sporadic labor unrest, however. The MPLR is capable of conducting isolated acts of violence on Reunion.

(U) The Reunion economy is dominated by the cultivation and processing of sugarcane. A gross national product is not separately available, as Reunion is an overseas department of France. The country is dependent on imports for manufactured goods, food, beverages, tobacco, machinery, transportation equipment, raw materials, and petroleum products. Local industries include sugar processing mills, rum distilling plants, canning, and a cigarette factory. France and Mauritius are Reunion's major trading partners. It is estimated that France supplies 69 percent of the department's imports and purchases two-thirds of its exports.

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~~(S/NF)~~ France applied, through Reunion, for membership on the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) in 1985. Seychelles attempted to block Reunion's admission to the IOC, arguing that the movement's nonaligned status would be jeopardized. Membership was approved in January 1986, ensuring increased French influence on regional economic and security issues.

~~(S)~~ As a French department, Reunion's security is maintained by French military and paramilitary units. Reunion is the headquarters of France's southern Indian Ocean forces and has been since French troops were expelled from Madagascar in 1973.

2. (U) KEY OFFICIALS

Prefect: Michel *Blangy*

President of the General Council: Dr. Pierre *Lagourgue*

Commander in Chief, French Military Forces of the Southern Indian Ocean (FAZSOI):
LTG Jean Marie *Lemoine*

Commander, French Naval Forces, Indian Ocean (ALINDIEN): Rear Admiral Gilbert *LeMeledo*

3. MILITARY BUDGET

(U) None. Department of France.

4. (U) POPULATION

539,000 estimated as of July 1986, average annual growth rate 1.1 percent

Males (ages 15-49): 156,000; 81,000 fit for military service; draft age, 18

Ethnic divisions: Most of the population is of thoroughly intermixed ancestry of French, African, Malagasy, Chinese, Pakistani, and Indian.

Literacy: Over 80 percent among the younger generation.

5. ARMY

~~(S/NF)~~ 1,800 French Army personnel. A command and support battalion, one overseas paratroop regiment, one training regiment, and an airborne company (on rotation) are assigned to Reunion.

6. NAVY

~~(S/NF)~~ 300 French naval personnel. Ships homeported at the Ports-des-Gatets Naval Base include one patrol craft, two patrol boats, three amphibious warfare craft, one amphibious warfare ship, one maintenance and repair ship, and two harbor tugs. Three frigates also operate out of Reunion. Reunion has a 144-NM coastline.

7. AIR FORCE

~~(S/NF)~~ 300 French Air Force personnel. The Air Force operates two Transall C-160 medium-range transports and two Alouette III helicopters. The modern airbase at Saint Denis provides the support facilities necessary for launching small-scale military operations in Africa and the southwestern Indian Ocean. Limited staging capabilities are available to

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French forces at St. Pierre-Pierrefonds Airfield, and at facilities maintained on other islands in the region, including Europa, Grande Glorieuse, and Juan de Nova.

8. PARAMILITARY

~~(S/NF)~~ 550 gendarmes. Equipped with small arms and 5-9 helicopters.

9. (U) KEY US OFFICIALS: None

10. ~~(S/NF)~~ FOREIGN MILITARY PRESENCE: None

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REUNION

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REUNION

Appendix

Installation BE List (U)

Name	BE Number	Category	Latitude	Longitude
Le Reunion Port Facility	1280-00001	95121	20-55-00S	055-18-00E
Saint Denis/Gillot Afd	1280-08400	80061	20-52-38S	055-31-17E
Saint Denis HQ A Bks	1280-00124	90110	20-52-00S	055-29-00E
Saint Leu HQ A Bks	1280-00123	90110	21-12-00S	055-22-00E
St Pierre-Pierrefonds Airfields	1280-08804	80101	21-18-15S	055-25-29E
St Pierre HQ A Bks	1280CA0001	90110	21-17-59S	055-25-31E

SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT

REUNION

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SEYCHELLES

1. POLITICAL-MILITARY SITUATION

(U) The Seychelles, a cluster of some 100 islands (various sources reflect 85-115 islands) in the Indian Ocean about 1,000 miles east of the African coast, became an independent republic within the British Commonwealth on 29 June 1976.

~~(S/NF)~~ President France Albert Rene, who heads the Seychelles' only political party, the Seychelles People's Progressive Front (SPPF), came to power in June 1977, seizing control of the Government while then-President James Mancham was out of the country. Upon gaining the Presidency, Rene abrogated the Constitution, dissolved the National Assembly, and ruled by decree until a new Constitution, which incorporated his socialist ideology, took effect on 5 June 1979. Steadily consolidating his power, Rene won the June 1984 elections, gaining an additional 5-year term. Constitutional changes instituted at the 1984 Party Congress installed Rene as Secretary General of the SPPF, the most powerful position in the country. He has announced a government monopoly on all imports, has continued dedication to socialism, despite cultivating Western economic assistance, and has actively repressed all attempts at division inside the party and the nation.

~~(S/NF)~~ Rene's leftist regime has been characterized by political chaos, racial tension, and economic decline. Since 1977, the country has experienced numerous coup scares, a foreign mercenary invasion, and a major mutiny in the Army. The government continues to look to its enemies abroad, particularly the Movement for la Resistance (MPR), as the country's most serious threat to stability. While some anti-Rene coup plotting undoubtedly goes on, an invasion by MPR-backed mercenaries is unlikely at this time.

~~(S/NF)~~ Perhaps the most serious threat to Rene's government exists within the military. The August 1982 mutiny, sparked by junior officers and enlisted men in the Seychelles People's Liberation Army (SPLA), attempted to overthrow senior officers as a challenge to Rene's power. The government has not yet faced some of the key causes of dissatisfaction within the enlisted ranks and risks of another Army mutiny remain high. Morale is a serious problem. The SPLA is very jealous of the nation's other security organizations. Opportunities for promotion are infrequent, and the force is often confined to barracks, rarely participating in the regular exercises conducted by other Seychelles People's Defense Force (SPDF) elements.

~~(S/NF)~~ A coup attempt by several members of the elite Presidential Guard, previously considered the most loyal security organization to President Rene, was uncovered in May 1985. Racial tensions between the predominantly black rank and file toward the leadership appear to have caused the rebellion. Although Rene effectively thwarted the coup, it is evident that the issue of race, suppressed although not eliminated in the military following 1982 purges, remains a serious threat to the regime.

~~(S/NF)~~ Several enlisted personnel were arrested, and three senior SPLA commanders forced to resign, following September 1986 reports of coup plotting within the SPLA. Defense Minister Ogilvie Berlouis, claiming that President Rene had in fact engineered the event to remove opponents within the SPLA, resigned in protest. Berlouis and the senior SPLA officers still retain a degree of influence and support within the Army, which remains a potential challenge to the government.

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(S/NF) The country is beset with other problems which pose even greater threats to Rene's government. Rene's participation in growing government corruption may jeopardize the support of the far-left elements of the SPPF. They resent what is seen as Rene's rejection of original revolutionary ideals in favor of personal gain. The President's close ties with G. Mario Ricci, an Italian businessman resident on Mahe with possible connections to organized crime, had received close attention from the left and the general population. The relationship was seen as symbolic of increasing corruption in the government. Suspected of providing support to former Defense Minister BerLouis, Ricci suddenly lost favor with Rene in October 1986. Corruption remains a significant problem for the government.

(C) Racism threatens to become a key division among the Seychellois as well. The majority black population is dominated by a small group of whites and mulattoes, descendants of the former plantation owners, who are better educated and more experienced in politics. The nation's poor economy has exacerbated this problem, increasing tensions in Seychelles society.

(S/NF) Youth unemployment and drug abuse are growing problems. As an expression of their frustration over the few employment opportunities many Seychelles youth have openly voiced sympathy toward the MPR. Following the assassination in London of former MPR President Gerard Horeau, civil unrest in the Seychelles has increased. The MPR has charged President Rene with responsibility for the murder, and has threatened reprisals.

(S/NF/WN/NC) The fragile economy also poses a serious threat to the long-term viability of the Rene regime. Tourism, which accounts for 90 percent of the Seychelles' foreign revenue, experienced a serious decline in the early 1980s mainly as a result of the government's radical image and the recession in Europe. The Seychelles has been able to attract Western economic assistance for ongoing development projects. Efforts are currently underway to improve the capabilities of Victoria's commercial port, financed primarily by Belgian loans. However, increased governmental economic authority through imposition of a Marketing Board and new trade tax has alarmed the business community. Limited efforts have been made to diversify the economy through establishment of light industry on Mahe. Agriculture and fishing are other primary sources of revenue. However, the economy remains dependent on a volatile world tourism industry. Fluctuations could quickly erode Seychelles' limited economic growth, adding to the already high level of unemployment. Government officials worry that bomb threats against Air Seychelles, apparently part of a stepped-up campaign by the MPR in 1986, will jeopardize tourism. The Seychelles has enjoyed one of the highest standards of living among Indian Ocean and African nations.

(S/NF) Although Rene will become more vulnerable as challenges to his regime continue, he remains on balance the dominant political figure in the Seychelles; he is expected to retain power throughout 1987. Loyal SPDF security forces and an effective domestic intelligence network have protected the President from challenges to his regime. His death or retirement almost certainly would precipitate a power struggle between moderate and radical factions, destroying the present system of government. Should a successor regime turn toward the West, a small number of key military officers (Soviet-trained and Soviet-influenced) could attempt to assume control and pattern it along Marxist lines.

(S/NF) As the regime's stability is likely to remain fragile, Rene continues to depend on security support from the Soviet Union, backing that guarantees a degree of influence. Rene is gambling that he can maintain a delicate East-West balance between his economic and security requirements.

(S/NF/WN/NC) The Seychelles has attempted to distance itself publicly from close political-military ties with the Soviet Union and its allies, as part of its efforts to ensure

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continued Western economic assistance. Longstanding offers of a small Soviet-built floating drydock remain under consideration. The number of Soviet military advisers has been reduced. Approximately 15 advisers remain to assist the SPDF naval wing as engineers, conduct infantry training, and possibly install a long-range communications facility on northern Mahe. As many as 11 Soviet advisers were temporarily deployed to help the Seychelles commission its TURYA patrol craft in 1986. Their present status is unknown. Although formal military cooperation was generally limited over the past year, ties between the two nations remain strong.

(S/NF) Since 1977, the Seychelles has relied almost exclusively on weapons supplied by the Soviet Union. Initially, however, Rene sought Soviet-built Tanzanian military equipment and, more recently, ZPU-4 air defense guns and ammunition from North Korea. In 1978, the Soviets began supplying the Seychelles with various military equipment, including naval patrol craft, antiaircraft guns, trucks, and small arms and ammunition. In 1981, as the Seychelles continued to move toward a closer ideological identification with the Soviet Bloc, President Rene accepted military advisers to instruct the SPLA in communications and vehicle maintenance. This move provided a departure from the past Seychelles policy of accepting Soviet military equipment but rejecting Soviets advisers and technicians. During 1983, the SPLA acquired three mobile coastal SHEET BEND radars equipped with SQUARE HEAD identification, friend or foe (IFF), an antiaircraft defense system comprising 10 shoulder-launched SA-7 surface-to-air missiles and two BM-21 multiple rocket launchers. Antiaircraft defenses also were improved with the acquisition of additional 14.5-mm cannon. A fourth SHEET BEND was delivered in 1984. Soviet naval visits are often made during Rene's absence to bolster security when he is abroad. The Seychelles wants to enhance its currently inadequate patrol boat fleet and has expressed interest in acquiring greater capability for air surveillance of its widespread island realm. A Soviet TURYA-Class patrol craft was delivered in April 1986, although its torpedo tubes and hydrofoils had been removed.

(S/NF) In April 1983, 56 North Korean military personnel arrived in the islands to train the SPLA in basic military skills and air defense techniques, and restructure the Army, emphasizing the use of small arms and quick-reaction forces. By 1985 as many as 180 advisers were in the Seychelles, although the level was probably reduced to about 100 by early 1986. North Korean advisers also trained and augmented the Presidential Guard and assisted with airport security. Infantry training was provided to the SPLA and the Militia. All remaining North Korean advisers had departed Seychelles by August 1986.

(S/NF) The North Korean departure likely reflects tensions that had developed in the relationship. The President remains apprehensive over internal security, and is likely to seek additional foreign military assistance from Third World or Soviet sources. Rene was acutely aware of the resentment by SPLA rank and file toward the North Koreans, who acquired a reputation for arrogance, harsh discipline, and racism. Rene resented attempts to pressure his support of North Korean foreign policy objectives, including a boycott of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, in return for security assistance. Security assistance was requested from Tanzania in 1986, although a formal agreement has not yet been achieved. Additional sources of Third World security assistance could possibly include India, which is attempting to extend its military influence throughout the Indian Ocean region.

(S/NF) President Rene maintains a nonaligned posture and has relied heavily on Third World sources to provide necessary military training and equipment to his fledgling force. Officers and enlisted personnel have been trained primarily in the USSR, Tanzania, Algeria, and India. About 200 Tanzanian military advisers were stationed in the Seychelles until 1984, and were responsible for internal security and infantry training. The Tanzanians,

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however, developed a reputation for criminal behavior. Public dissent toward their presence led to their phased withdrawal in 1983 and replacement by North Korean advisers. All Tanzanians had departed by late 1984. Return of a small contingent of Tanzanian military advisers, however, remains possible.

~~(S/NF)~~ The SPDF consists of the SPLA, the Presidential Protection Unit (PPU), composed of the Presidential Guard and Commando Force, and the People's Militia. The Seychelles Police, with its paramilitary Police Mobile Unit (PMU), is a separate organization from the SPDF. The security forces have a combined active duty strength of approximately 2,100 personnel. There is no formal reserve system.

2. (U) KEY OFFICIALS

President; Secretary-General, Seychelles People's Progressive Front (SPPF);
Minister of Defense; Minister for External Relations: *France Albert Rene*
Minister for Education, Information, and Youth: Lt Col *James Michel*
Minister for Planning and National Development: *Jacques Hodoul*
Minister for Political Organization (SPPF, Youth League and Commander, People's Militia): *Esme Jumeau*
Department of Economic Planning and Foreign Relations: *Danielle de St. Jorre*
Commander, Presidential Guard: Maj *Claude Vidot*
Commander, Commando Forces: Col *Bob Noddyn*
Commander, Naval Forces: Capt *Paul Hodoul*
Commander, Air Wing: Capt *David Savy*
Commissioner of Police: *Anthony Camille*
Commander, Police Mobile Unit: *Andre Kilindo*

3. MILITARY BUDGET

~~(S)~~ \$11.7 million for fiscal year ending 31 December 1986; this is 10.3 percent of the central government budget. Dollar value converted from the official exchange rate of 6.05 rupees to \$1.00.

4. (U) POPULATION

67,000 estimated as of July 1986, average annual growth rate 0.9 percent (approximately 75 percent of the population lives on the main island of Mahe)

Military Manpower: Males (ages 15-49): 16,000; 8,000 fit for military service

Ethnic divisions: Seychellois (a mixture of Asians, Africans, Europeans)

Literacy: 60 percent adult; 75 percent school-age children

5. ~~(S/NF/WN)~~ GROUND FORCES

a. Army:

Personnel Strength: 800-man Seychelles People's Liberation Army (SPLA).

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Combat Units: Eight infantry companies (vary in size from 50 to 200 men), associated headquarters, 4 radar units.

Major Equipment: Most equipment has been supplied by the Soviet Union, North Korea, and Tanzania. The SPLA inventory includes 6 BRDM-2 armored cars, 10 75-mm recoilless rifles, 44 RPG-7 grenade launchers, and 4 SHEET BEND coastal surveillance radar systems.

b. Presidential Protection Unit

Personnel Strength: 300

Combat Units: One Presidential Guard Unit (150 men) and one Commando Unit (150 men). Each unit reports directly to the President. The Commandos, commanded by a Belgian mercenary, are structured as a rapid-reaction and military police force. They are the elite SPDF unit and receive regular training in helicopter assault, patrolling, demolition, ambushes, and small-unit tactics. The Presidential Guard protects the President and key government installations. The Guard controls all SPDF air defense weapons.

Major Equipment: The PPU inventory includes 3 BM-21 multiple rocket launchers, 6 37-mm antiaircraft guns, 10 SA-7/GRAIL shoulder-launched SAM systems with reload capability, sixteen 14.5-mm AAMGs, and nine 12.7-mm AAMGs. The two Air Force Alouette (Chetak) helicopters are operationally assigned to the Commandos (see section 7).

6. ~~(S)~~ NAVY

Personnel Strength: 100 (estimated)

Ships: To patrol its 491-km coastline (93 km on Mahe), and one of the world's largest exclusive economic zones (EEZ), the naval wing operates two ZHUK-Class and one Junon patrol boats, one FPB 42, one Sirius, one TURYA-Class patrol craft, and one LST.

7. ~~(C)~~ AIR FORCE

Personnel Strength: 12 (estimated)

Aircraft are shared, along with additional personnel, with other government ministries. The force has six pilots.

Aircraft: Two Alouette III helicopters (Chetak) (operationally assigned to Commando Force), two Rallye utility aircraft (also operates as necessary the President's Beechcraft BE-200 Super King Air), a Merlin III B aircraft that belongs to the Island Development Company, shares three Pilatus Britten-Norman BN-2 Islander/Defenders with the Ministries of Agriculture and Fisheries, and a BN-2 III Trislander normally flown by Air Seychelles.

Civil Aviation

(U) The following aircraft are believed to be registered, owned, or operated in the Seychelles:

1 McDonnell Douglas DC-8-63	Seychelles International/Air Seychelles
1 Airbus Industrie A300-600	Seychelles International/Air Seychelles
1 McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30	Martinair Holland

3 Total

(U) Seychelles International is affiliated with the African Safari Club of Kenya and operates regular passenger tour group flights between the Seychelles and Europe utilizing the DC-8-63 and A300-600. Air Seychelles, the wholly government-owned airline, was

established in 1979 when the Seychelles Government acquired and combined Air Mahe and Inter-Island Airways. The DC-10-30 is operated by Martinair Holland on a contract/lease basis for Air Seychelles. According to Seychelles Government figures, approximately 48 civilian pilots of all types hold valid licenses in the Seychelles.

(C) The DC-8-63 probably could be mobilized in the event of war or national emergency. The A300-600 is currently leased from Air France, and has French aircrews. The status of the DC-10-30 belonging to Martinair Holland is unknown. Considerable foreign assistance would be required to achieve maximum effective use of the mobilized aircraft because of a lack of fully qualified indigenous flight and maintenance personnel.

8. (S) PARAMILITARY

a. Police

Personnel Strength: Approximately 500. This force remains separate from the Army and continues to be responsible for the maintenance of law and order. It consists of a Commissioner, a Deputy Commissioner, 6 senior and about 30 junior officers, as well as a number of policewomen. The force is centered on Mahe with small detachments on Praslin, La Digue, and Silhouette Islands. Included in the above is a special paramilitary force, the Police Mobile Unit, which has about 125 personnel and has been formed to respond rapidly to emergencies in any part of the country.

b. Militia

Personnel Strength: 500-1,000. At one time composed of 2,000 men, the Militia was cut due to poor discipline and a lack of training resources. Occasionally it is called on to assist at roadblocks and checkpoints. Normally militia personnel are unarmed. Efforts have been underway since mid-1985 to improve the Militia's capabilities through improved training and recruitment.

9. (U) KEY US OFFICIALS

Chief of Mission (Victoria): Ambassador Irvin *Hicks*

Defense Attache: None

10. (S/NF/WN/NC) FOREIGN MILITARY PRESENCE

a. (S/NF/WN/NC) Foreign Military In-Country

USSR	43 Advisers	Responsible for infantry training and engineering for Soviet-built naval patrol boats.
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b. (C) Presence Abroad

USSR	10 Air Force	Reported to be in MiG-21 pilot training since July 1983. Their current status is unknown.
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Appendix

Installation BE List (U)

Name	BE Number	Category	Latitude	Longitude
L Exil-Mahe Presidential Res a Mil Fac	1034-00027	90110	04-38-51S	055-26-57E
Petit Paris-Mahe Police Mobile Unit HQ	1034-00026	90110	04-39-30S	055-29-30E
Point Larue Army Camp	1034-00015	90110	04-40-00S	055-31-00E
Pointe Police SPDF Training Base	1034-00014	90120	04-48-00S	055-32-00E
Port Victoria Long Pier Navy Base	1034-00012	95140	04-37-00S	055-27-00E
Seychelles International Afd	1034-08800	80081	04-40-18S	055-31-20E
Victoria Port Fac	1034-00002	47400	04-37-00S	055-27-00E

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SEYCHELLES

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Major Tactical Units	Strength per Unit	
	Authorized	Average/Actual
1st Presidential Security Regiment ¹	Unk	500
1 engineer regiment	Unk	933

~~(S)~~ The Presidential Security Regiment (PSR) has overall responsibility for movement security and liaison with the security organizations of visiting dignitaries. The PSR is armed with 7.62-mm AK-47 assault rifles and 7.62-mm Dragunov sniping rifles. The PSR also mans a ZPU-4 antiaircraft gun on the palace grounds.

(d) ~~(S)~~ *Civic Action Forces*

Major Tactical Units	Strength per Unit	
	Authorized	Average/Actual
9 Development Force regiments	Unk	1,400-1,500
1 engineer regiment	Unk	933

(5) *Weapons and Equipment*

(a) *General*

~~(S)~~ The Army inventory has been improved primarily as a result of Soviet equipment deliveries. This aid has allowed the Malagasy military to expand the Army and at the same time develop a better command and control network. Army expansion over the last several years has included the addition of an artillery group, an armor regiment, and an air defense regiment. These units are all equipped with military equipment delivered from Communist bloc nations.

(b) ~~(S)~~ *Ground Weapons and Equipment*

		Country of Origin	Total Inventory
Mortars:	60/81-mm	FR	12
	120-mm, NFI	UR	Unk
RCLR & AT Weapons:	73-mm, Model 1950	FR	5
Artillery:	75-mm, recoilless rifle	FR	9
	68-mm, SARPAC	FR	5
	40-mm, RPG-7	UR	200
	76-mm, field gun, ZIS-3	UR, KN	24
	85-mm, field gun, D-44	UR, KN	32
	122-mm, field gun, D-74	UR	18
	122-mm, howitzer, M-30	UR	12
	122-mm, howitzer, D-30	UR	4
	122-mm, howitzer, A-19	KN	6
	140-mm, MRL, BM-14/16	UR	20
AD Artillery & SAM:	14.5-mm, ZPU-4	KN	55
	20-mm, AD, M621	FR	5
	23-mm, ZU-23	UR	18
	37-mm, AD, 1939	CH	24
	SAM, SA-7	UR	18+

		Country of Origin	Total Inventory
Armored Vehicles ¹ :	BRDM-2 armored car	UR	35
	M3A1 armored car	FR	6
	Ferret scout car	FR	6
	BTR-40	UR	Unk
Tanks:	PT-76 light amphibious tank	UR	17

¹ (S/NF) Totals include Gendarmerie (ZP) equipment holdings. Seven of the PT-76s, 18 of the BRDM-2s, and all 6 of the M3A1s are believed to be operated by the ZP.

(6) Logistics

(S) Madagascar is not capable of producing military equipment, nor does it have depots or reserve stock. A cartridge factory at Moramanga has not operated for several years. All materials and spare parts are supplied by foreign sources, primarily Soviet. There is a slow response time when ordering spares from the Soviet Union, due to a lack of foreign exchange and Soviet requests for payment in advance. Madagascar contracts out, usually to Communist bloc countries, for maintenance of equipment and training of personnel.

(7) Personnel Procurement and Retention

(S) There is no conscription; manpower needs are adequately met by volunteers, although some difficulty exists in securing recruits with an educational level acceptable for technical training. Morale is difficult to assess at this time. The recent deliveries of modern equipment and improved salaries should have improved morale. These positive steps were countered, however, by arrests and interrogations of ethnic Merina and Betsileo officers in conjunction with the martial arts clubs' uprising in August 1985. A further cause for a morale drop may be charged to Ratsiraka's political games of alternately favoring a branch of the military with equipment and prestige and then allowing that branch to deteriorate.

(U) The Malagasy National Service, which is under Army auspices, was initiated in 1980 to recruit men and women ages 18 through 34 to perform civic action duties. The service requires 6 weeks of basic military training at a local Gendarmerie station or the Antananarivo stadium, followed by 12-18 months of national service. Jobs include some military duties, but primarily comprise duties of a more humanitarian nature such as teaching in outlying schools and agricultural or rural development projects. The service is compulsory for all men of high school age and for those women who have received high school diplomas. Compulsory service may be waved if the individual already holds a permanent job. No statistics are available on the strength of this organization, or on how many participants the service has recruited in the past.

(8) Training

(S) Military training is conducted in Madagascar as well as abroad. Soviet, East German, and North Korean technicians have been responsible for training the Malagasy military at air and naval bases in-country. The Military Academy at Antsirabe, which offers a firing range, is the only formal Army training facility in Madagascar. Senior officer military training is accomplished principally in France. Most training for junior officers occurs in the Soviet Union. To a lesser extent, junior officers also have received counterinsurgency and antiaircraft artillery training, and attended the war college in North Korea. Some training in past years has taken place in Cuba and Romania.

(9) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

(S) There is no known Army reserve; however, the National Service provides minimal military training to its recruits prior to assigning them civic action roles. Service personnel could be mobilized in a national emergency.

(b) Mobilization

(S) Mobilization plans are not known; however, Army units can call on the Gendarmerie and police elements to augment their ranks.

b. Navy

(1) Mission

(S) The primary mission of the Navy is to protect the 3,453-NM coastline. It is also tasked to support ground and air force units by transporting materiel between coastal cities.

(2) Capabilities

(S) The capability of the naval force to perform its mission is poor. The force's overall performance is limited because of a lack of trained personnel, low operational rates of its equipment, and the lack of adequate funding by the Government.

(3) Personnel Strength

(S) Estimated at 400

(4) (S/NF) Ship Strength

Type	Op	Nonop	In Reserve	Status Unknown
PB (fast patrol craft)	1			
PC (patrol craft)	1			
LSM (medium amphibious assault landing ship) ¹	1			1
ATA (ocean tug)	1			
AXT (training ship)			1	
Total:	4	0	1	1

¹(S/NF) One delivered by the French to the Malagasy Navy in January 1986.

(5) Organization and Deployment

(S) The Navy makes up half of the organization called Forces Aeronavales, which also includes the Air Force. Navy units are primarily based at the country's major port, Diego Suarez, with other units deployed at Majunga, the country's second largest port, located on the west coast. Headquarters for naval forces is at the Forces Aeronavales headquarters in the capital, Antananarivo.

(6) Status of Equipment ²

(S) The Navy is experiencing numerous operational and maintenance problems with its naval craft principally due to storm damage, age, and a lack of repair parts. As a result, only limited numbers of vessels are operational at any one time.

(7) Logistics

(S) Naval logistics is dependent on foreign sources, primarily North Korean. Poor maintenance and the lack of spare parts are the major logistic problems facing this naval force. Drydock repairs can be accomplished at Diego Suarez when and if spare parts are available. The presence of several French naval technicians at Secren Naval Facility and acceptance of French aid offered in late 1983 could improve the situation.

(S) Naval ship repair is accomplished at the former French Naval Base at Diego Suarez, the country's largest port. Drydock repairs can be accomplished here, but Madagascar's capability to use this facility is dependent on French technical assistance.

(S) The Madagascar merchant marine fleet consists of 16 ships of at least 1,000 gross registered tons (GRT). Included in this number are 10 breakbulk carriers and two roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ships with a total lift capacity of 84,300 deadweight tons (DWT). The four remaining ships are tankers.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

(S) Little information is available on procurement and retention procedures. Little attention is paid to obtaining high-quality recruits because of the low emphasis placed on this unit.

(9) Training

(S) The level of unit training and combat proficiency is not high. The majority of naval personnel receive their training in Madagascar at Diego Suarez. It is believed that naval training by North Korean personnel may have been terminated in 1984 or 1985.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserve

(U) No formal reserve unit exists.

(b) Mobilization

(S) There is no mobilization pool of either reserve personnel or ships. The only vessels that could possibly be called on to support naval operations would be the ships that compose the merchant marine fleet.

c. Air Force

(1) Mission

(S) The primary mission of the Air Force is to defend territorial airspace and provide air transport/liaison for the Armed Forces. The force is also tasked to perform VIP transport duties.

(2) Capabilities

(S) Malagasy air capability remains heavily dependent on the Soviet Union. Without

²(S) The April 1984 cyclone that hit Diego Suarez seriously damaged the naval base and destroyed many naval vessels including the North Korean supplied NAMPO Class patrol boats.

Soviet technicians and advisers the Air Force would have only a limited ability. The Air Force, which in the past has had little combat capability and only limited transport capability, is improving its overall ability as a result of the recent influx of Soviet-supplied equipment and advisers. The addition of jet fighter aircraft and transport aircraft gives the Air Force the ability to conduct some air intercept missions, provide close air support for the Army and Navy, and better fulfill its transport requirements.

(3) Personnel Strength:

(C) Estimated at 500

(4) ~~(S/NF)~~ Aircraft Strength

Total: 38 (18 jets, 16 props, 4 helicopters)

In operational units: 38

- (16 jet fighters: 4 day, 10 all-weather, 2 trainers;
- 13 transports;
- 5 utility;
- 4 helicopters)

(5) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

~~(S/NF)~~ The Air Force is another branch of the Forces Aeronavales. The Air Force is headquartered at the military side of Ivato Airfield, an international airport just outside the capital, Antananarivo, and includes 10 MiG-21/FISHBEDs. Future plans call for a reorganization of this force to provide a better command and control network. This will result in the MiG-21s being based at Arivonimamo Airfield, located 25 miles west of the capital. Runway construction at Arivonimamo was completed in 1985. Support facilities were largely complete by late 1986, and equipment for the airfield's use in poor weather conditions was installed. There is also a possibility that one of the two squadrons could be based or deployed to Andrakaka Airfield at Diego Suarez. A third airfield may be built in southern Madagascar at a site as yet undetermined.

(b) ~~(S/NF)~~ Summary of Units

Units	Aircraft Type	Total	Principal Bases
1 combination fighter/transport/helicopter unit	MiG-21/FISHBED	10	Antananarivo/Ivato
	MiG-17/FRESCO	4	Antananarivo/Ivato
	MiG-21/MONGOL	2	Antananarivo/Ivato
	Yak-40/CODLING	2	Antananarivo/Ivato
	An-12/CUB ¹	1	Antananarivo/Ivato
	An-26/CURL	4	Antananarivo/Ivato
	C-47 Douglas Skytrain	5	Antananarivo/Ivato
	HS 748 Series 2A	1	Antananarivo/Ivato
	Reims-Cessna F-337	2	Antananarivo/Ivato
	BN-2 Defender	1	Antananarivo/Ivato
	MH-1521 Broussard	1	Antananarivo/Ivato
	U-11A Aztec	1	Antananarivo/Ivato
Mi-8/HIP	4	Antananarivo/Ivato	

~~(S/NF)~~ This aircraft is leased by the Malagasy Government and is flown by Soviet crews.

(6) Status of Equipment

~~(S/NF)~~ Aircraft are primarily of Soviet origin and for the most part are flown by the Malagasy but maintained by Soviet technical personnel. Because of the relatively recent delivery of the Soviet-supplied equipment, these aircraft are mostly operational; however, there have been some problems obtaining adequate repair parts. A MiG-21 crash-landed at Ivato Airfield in early November 1983, suffering irreparable damage to the landing gear and wings. This aircraft may be cannibalized for parts. The four MiG-17s are on loan from North Korea and are flown and maintained by North Korean pilots and technicians. In 1985, the Malagasy Government negotiated with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) for the turnover to Madagascar of the MiG-17s and training on this aircraft for Malagasy pilots. The operationally-ready rates of these aircraft are limited by the lack of repair parts and the age of the MiG-17 fighters. Aircraft of Western origin suffer from age and a lack of spare parts and also suffer from limited operationally-ready rates. For instance, all five C-47s were inoperable by early 1987; several had been cannibalized for several years. The Malagasy have requested US technical assistance to rehabilitate the C-47s.

(7) Logistics

~~(C)~~ Until the signing of the military assistance agreement in late 1984, the maintenance of MiG-21 aircraft had suffered, but it has improved since then due to a renewed flow of spare parts and Soviet cooperation. Maintenance of aircraft, except for the MiG-17s, is performed by Madagascar personnel who are capable of performing extensive repairs. Madagascar Air Force technicians are generally competent. The Soviet Union is the primary supplier of spare parts to Madagascar. The Air Force is also experiencing periodic shortages in supplies such as engine hydraulic fluid and jet fuel.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

(U) All members of the Air Force are volunteers. There is no conscription of personnel at the present time to fill the Armed Forces' personnel needs. For this reason, Madagascar has had problems procuring recruits with requisite aptitudes and skills necessary to support Air Force needs.

(9) Training

~~(S)~~ Training for Malagasy Air Force personnel is being conducted primarily in the Soviet Union. This training includes courses for fighter, transport, and helicopter pilots, mechanics, and air defense personnel. At the present time, as many as 174 Air Force personnel are undergoing instruction in the Soviet Union. Training for Western fixed-wing aircraft has been conducted in France and Canada in the past. In 1983, two Aeronaval Force pilots received Boeing 737 conversion training for 6 weeks at the Air Lingus facility in Dublin, Ireland. In 1978, several Malagasy pilots attended the Air Force Flight Mechanics School in Indonesia. The National School for the Teaching of Aviation and Meteorology, located at the old airport in Arivonimamo, is Madagascar's only formal Air Force training facility. Flight training on light aircraft is offered at this facility.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

(U) There is no formal air force reserve. However, there is a limited reserve capability for personnel and military aircraft from the civil air fleet.

(b) Mobilization

~~(C)~~ The major problems limiting mobilization of civil air assets are the same as those in

the Air Force — the shortage of pilots and technical personnel and a shortage of spare parts. Civil air assets available to the Malagasy Armed Forces include two Boeing 737s, one Boeing 747, and three HS 748s. In the event of a national emergency, all of the country's aircraft and indigenous civil aviation personnel would be available for government service. Without foreign assistance, a lack of fully qualified indigenous flight and maintenance personnel would prevent maximum effective use of the mobilized aircraft, especially if prolonged or intensive air transport operations were required.

(C) All of the above aircraft are considered to be in the fleet of Air Madagascar, which is owned by the Malagasy Government (66 percent) and Air France (30 percent). The Boeing 747 is operated jointly by Air Madagascar and Air France but currently is flown only by French pilots. One of the HS-748s is VIP-configured and is for the use of the President and other senior officials. FAN transports carry civil registration markings and sometimes fly civilian-related passenger and cargo missions on behalf of the government.

d. Paramilitary Forces

(1) Gendarmerie

(a) Mission

(C) The primary mission of the Gendarmerie is to maintain national stability in conjunction with the Armed Forces and assist the Army in the event of any external threat.

(b) Capabilities

(S) Although the Gendarmerie (ZP) has been reduced in strength from 8,000 to an estimated 5,000 personnel, it has significantly improved its mobility/firepower and command, control, and communications (C³). This was demonstrated in August 1985, when ZP reinforcements were sent to the capital to aid in suppressing an uprising by martial arts clubs. The ZP has received new tanks (PT-76) and armored cars (BRDM-2) from the latest Soviet arms deliveries and has emerged as a counterweight to the People's Armed Forces and the Forces Aeronavale.

(c) Strength

(C) Estimated at 5,000

(d) Organization and Deployment

(S) The Gendarmerie is headquartered in the capital, Antananarivo. The force is composed of six regional groups and one ZP intervention group (regiment size) with approximately 600 personnel in each regional group and roughly 1,000 personnel in the intervention group. These units are deployed at major population centers throughout the six major military regions: Antananarivo, Fianarantsoa, Tamatave, Majunga, Tulear, and Diego Suarez.

(e) Status of Equipment

(S) The equipment holdings of the Gendarmerie have improved markedly due to recent Soviet equipment deliveries. These have included 7 PT-76 light amphibious tanks, 18 BRDM-2 armored cars, 6 M3A1 armored cars, and assorted light arms and ammunition. This upgrade of the force's equipment holdings has augmented previous deliveries of equipment from Western sources, which have combined to improve the capabilities of this force.

(2) Other

(C) In addition to the Gendarmerie, local police forces throughout Madagascar island

assist in maintaining law and order. In the capital the police control traffic and have roving patrols armed with night sticks.

e. ~~(S)~~ Total Military Personnel Strength

Army	20,000
Navy	400
Air Force	500
Gendarmerie	5,000
Total	25,900

f. ~~(S)~~ Foreign Military Presence

(1) ~~(S)~~ Foreign Military In-Country

Soviet Union: 98 advisers/technicians³ to maintain radar equipment and MiG-21 and An-12 aircraft, train in the use of BM-14/16 MRLs, and provide general military assistance.

North Korea: 50 pilots/air technicians to fly and maintain MiG-17 aircraft, advisers with Presidential Security Regiment.

France: 3 advisers

Marine engineers at Diego Suarez, advisers with Gendarmerie.

(2) ~~(S)~~ Presence Abroad

Soviet Union: 107 Primarily Air Force trainees, unknown number of Army trainees.

France: 96 Air Force trainees¹ May be as high as 174.

~~(C)~~ Madagascar requested 150 training positions in France for 1984. Ninety-six positions were granted. The Malagasy also requested five quotas for service war colleges, of which three positions were granted.

³ ~~(C)~~ Presence may vary from time to time from 75 to a high of around 110.

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MADAGASCAR

Appendix

Installation BE List (U)

Name	BE Number	Category	Latitude	Longitude
Antananarivo/Arivonimamo Afd	1173-08001	80050	19-01-32S	047-09-52E
Antananarivo/Ivato	1173-08004	80061	18-47-47S	047-29-10E
Antsirabe Military Academy	1173-00212	90130	19-51-01S	047-02-20E
Antsiranana/Andrakaka Afd	1156-08002	80010	12-15-12S	049-15-10E
Diego Suarez/Naval Base A Shipyard	1156-00001	95110	12-16-26S	049-17-18E
Mahajanga/Amborovy Airfield	1156-08009	80081	15-39-57S	046-21-11E
Toamasina Airfield	1173-08003	80081	18-06-23S	049-23-31E
Tananarive Army Barracks NE	1173-00005	90110	18-54-17S	047-32-28E
Tolagnaro Airfield	1297-08004	80104	25-02-17S	046-57-20E

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SOMALIA

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SOMALIA

1. GOVERNMENT

a. (U) Key Government Officials

President and Secretary General of the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP): Maj Gen Mohamed *Siad Barre*

First Vice President and Prime Minister: Lt Gen Mohamed Ali *Samantar*

Minister of Foreign Affairs: Abduraham Jama *Barre*

Commander, National Security Service: Brig Gen Mohamed *Jibril Mussa*

b. Type and Stability of Government

~~(S/NF)~~ The Somali Democratic Republic is ruled by Mohamed Siad Barre on the basis of an interlocking system of authority and control. Siad exercises great power by the skillful and simultaneous manipulation of traditional clan relations, unofficial elite groups, and military leadership.

~~(S/NF)~~ On 21 October 1969, Somalia's parliamentary government was overthrown in a coup d'etat led by Major General Siad and other senior military officers. The coup leaders stated that their action was motivated by the increasing corruption and nepotism that were prevalent in the civilian regime. They established the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) consisting of military and police officers. Parliament and political parties were abolished. The country's name was subsequently changed to the Somali Democratic Republic.

~~(S/NF)~~ The SRC, under the direction of Siad Barre, who was named president of the republic, established a socialist society and economy guided by the doctrine of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. The Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) was formed in 1976, with Soviet prompting. Although the change was intended to reduce the role of the military in governmental affairs, real power continued to be exercised by Siad and a small group of military and police officers. The Somali political structure evolved further in 1979 with the introduction of a new constitution that provided for a national legislature, the People's Assembly, which elected Siad President in 1980. The changes ushered in by the new Constitution were very limited. The political supremacy of the SRSP, particularly its Central Committee composed of Siad's small circle of advisers, was reaffirmed by this document.

~~(S/NF)~~ The new constitution and reorientation toward greater civilian involvement in the decisionmaking process came after an abortive military coup attempt in 1978. Opposition to Siad's rule had surfaced in the armed forces in response to his handling of the 1977-78 Ogaden war, particularly its latter phase when he decided to withdraw from the region without organizing any final defensive efforts. The coup attempt was harshly suppressed by Siad and his supporters with the execution of leading plotters followed by the purge of the upper echelon of the Army. Many of the surviving coup sympathizers, primarily Majertain clan members, fled to Ethiopia, where they formed the core of the Somali Salvation Front (SSF), which has since become the Somali Democratic Salvation Front (SDSF).

~~(S/NF)~~ Siad's movement to greater civilian participation in government came to an abrupt halt in October 1980 when he declared a state of emergency and reconstituted his

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group of military counselors, the SRC. This renewed official collaboration with the armed forces followed a series of military setbacks in the Ogaden that precipitated the inundation of Somalia by refugees and exacerbated already severe economic conditions. Siad ended the state of emergency in March 1982, attempting to placate growing criticism within his regime and subdue instances of civil unrest in the north. In response to the allegations that his policies were directly contributing to the growing economic deterioration, tribalism, and corruption in Somalia, Siad made numerous Cabinet changes and enacted some economic reforms. The discontent failed to subside, however, and actually gained impetus in the north due largely to the Somali National Movement (SNM), an anti-Siad organization established in the mid-1970s and dominated by the Issak clan.

~~(S/NF)~~ In an apparent effort to capitalize on these various sources of instability, Ethiopia launched attacks against Somali positions along the central border area in June 1982. The Ethiopian forces, reinforced by the SDSF, overwhelmed the undermanned and underequipped Somali Army units in the vicinity of the villages of Balenbale and Goldogob. These incursions, rather than bringing about the demise of the Siad regime, resulted in an alliance of the central government with its opponents against the common enemy, Ethiopia. In addition, Siad's status as the preeminent national and military leader of Somalia was enhanced by the rapid and generous Arab and Western responses to appeals for assistance. This period of unusual national unity lasted only a couple of years as the border situation stabilized and the threat posed by the Ethiopian occupation of traditional Somali territory began to lose its sense of urgency.

~~(S/NF)~~ By early 1986, President Siad seemed to be taking a new approach toward resolving his problems with Ethiopia in the Ogaden. A historic meeting took place in January 1986 between the Ethiopian and Somali leaders in which Siad and Ethiopian Chairman Mengistu discussed their differences face to face. The Djibouti-based meeting has yet to produce a major breakthrough in Somali-Ethiopian relations but it did set in motion a process for dialogue aimed at normalizing relations between the two nations. With this initiative, President Siad may be able to improve his popularity at home, except among the Ogadenis, who suspect an impending sellout.

c. Internal Threat

~~(S/NF)~~ Since coming to power, Siad has ruled Somalia by keeping the Army placated and the tensions among the different clans and subclans within controllable limits. Using this political strategy he has succeeded in maintaining his rule but has been left with little time for effective administration. Though the Siad regime has encountered only one narrow-based coup attempt in 1978, it has to confront several other sources of internal instability. Coup-plotting rumors led to the arrest of several mid-level military officers from all services in mid-1986 but most officers were released after questioning.

~~(S/NF)~~ Among the most serious internal obstacles to stability is the rampant ethnic tension that defines Somali society. There are six major clans in Somalia, further divided into subclans, to which nearly all Somalis feel they owe first loyalty. President Siad has displayed favoritism to his own Marehan clan, which, in turn, is an important source of his power to the detriment of nationalism. Though there is no question of the Marehan's loyalty, there is a major problem of allegiance among several subclans of the Majertains, who inhabit strategic areas along the central border with Ethiopia. The dissident elements of the Majertains have extended significant support to the anti-Siad Somali Democratic Salvation Front (SDSF), whose successful insurgent activities have served in the past as a model for other dissatisfied ethnic groups.

~~(S/NF)~~ Unrest also exists among the Issaks and has taken on a regional character

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pitting the north against the southern-based central government. The Issaks, who dominate the north, have long felt discriminated against in matters relating to the allocation of economic development funds, inadequate access to commercial services, and inadequate representation in the central government. Discontent came to a head in early 1982 with riots in Hargeisa and civil disturbances in other northern locations. Following a crackdown by the northern sector commander, BG Mohamed Hashi Ganni, many important Issaks defected to the dissident Somali National Movement (SNM) based in Ethiopia. President Siad attempted to defuse the northern situation by sending delegations to negotiate with local dignitaries, but was compelled to travel there himself in February 1983, following a daring SNM raid on Mandera Prison the previous month. The popularity of the central government temporarily increased somewhat after Siad promised several economic reforms and declared an amnesty, whose scope was originally thought to cover northerners arrested for crimes against the state. Much of this good will was lost, however, when several political prisoners were returned to custody. President Siad again visited the north in early 1986 while returning from the Djibouti-based meeting with chairman Mengistu of Ethiopia. In general, Issak leaders are said to believe that the Siad-Mengistu meetings were orchestrated by Siad specifically to neutralize the Somali National Movement (SNM). They, reportedly, do not believe a peace agreement will be reached. If Ethiopia were to withdraw support for the SNM, the Issaks would probably continue to actively resist the Somali central government. Problems have also surfaced with the Hawiya clan family, the subtribes of which have warred openly against Siad Barre's Marehan clan and even against Somali regular Army units. Problems with the Issaks and Hawiya have been so serious that, during 1983, President Siad virtually removed all ethnic Issak and Hawiya from significant military commands.

~~(S/NF/WN/NC)~~ President Siad's traditional political base appears to be changing. In the past, the political base for the Siad government was collectively provided by an informal understanding among the Marehan, Dolbahante, and Ogadeni clans and portions of the Majertain clan. As part of this understanding, the Ogadeni clan receives the support of the other tribes in their struggle against Ethiopian rule and the Ogadenis have supported the Siad government. However, in 1985 and early 1986, Ogadeni military officers and security officials, as well as Ogadeni civilian and government leaders, began to criticize the Siad regime for its failure to support them against the Ethiopians. At the same time, the other clans accused the Ogadenis of not participating sufficiently in the government's efforts. The result is that the Ogadenis are now seen to be losing key positions in the Somali establishment and are being replaced by Dolbahante and Majertain clansmen. This trend is further exacerbated by Somali-Ethiopian peace initiatives.

~~(S/NF)~~ The stability of the Siad regime is also threatened by a host of economic problems. Somalia is one of the world's poorest nations. Its current economic difficulties are a result of a poor resource base, centralized mismanagement, corruption, lingering dislocations caused by a severe drought, a large refugee population, and the burden of heavy military spending. Popular discontent has been kept in check by Western and Arab largesse, assistance programs by international lending institutions, and Somali Government economic reforms designed to strengthen the private sector at the expense of previous socialist practices.

~~(C/NF)~~ Although limited progress was made toward improving the ailing economy in 1985 and 1986, major problems remain. President Siad's commitment to the badly needed economic reform is uncertain but he is well aware that the economic crisis will worsen if he does not take some action. Somalia's underlying structural deficiencies — a resource gap stemming from a level of consumption exceeding domestic production, high import dependence in combination with few export products and markets, and low productivity

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of investment — will probably persist for many years despite reform, requiring continued foreign assistance to keep the economy afloat.

~~(S/NF)~~ The Armed Forces present Siad with the greatest potential internal threat though they are also his most important source of power. Siad has managed to keep the military under control by the use of a network of informants, a pervasive intelligence apparatus, the placement of fellow clansmen in key military assignments, and efforts to upgrade and increase the equipment and weapons inventories. In spite of these precautions and military expenditures, however, discontent within the military persists because of the country's poor economic condition, weapon obsolescence, inadequate training, poor morale resulting from adverse conditions of service, and the embarrassing stalemate in the conflict with Ethiopia. Military assistance from the United States, Italy, and certain Arab countries has improved morale somewhat, but morale remains an overall problem.

~~(S/NF)~~ Most Somali military have reportedly expressed satisfaction with the prospects of lessened hostilities between Somalia and Ethiopia based on the January 1986 talks between the two countries' leaders. Those who were opposed to the talks were Ogadeni military officers who commented that Somalia was in the process of selling a portion of the country to the Ethiopians. Senior military officers of the Ogaden tribe who had apparently been meeting to discuss the impact of the Siad-Mengistu talks include the commanders of the Somali Navy and air defense forces and the chief of the Military Construction Directorate. However, due to the positive reaction of the majority of Somali military officers, it is unlikely that Ogadeni officers would take any direct action against the Siad regime.

d. External Threat

~~(S/NF)~~ The greatest external threats to Somalia are the Ethiopian regular forces and Somali dissident groups. The relationship between the two states has been one of open hostility that has resulted in ongoing conflict with the possibility of widening in scope at any provocation. Although the possibility exists for a major conventional attack by Ethiopia, the current probability is somewhat reduced due to the peace initiative taken by Somali and Ethiopian leaders in January 1986, and Addis Ababa's preoccupation with its northern counterinsurgency problems. While results of the meeting in Djibouti and two subsequent meetings are inconclusive, both leaders stand to gain politically from any agreement which will lessen the military strains along their common border. Traditionally, Ethiopia has been interested in the overthrow of President Siad's regime, its replacement with a weaker government more favorable to Ethiopia's position on the Ogaden issue, and a government that would remove US facilities from the country. Ethiopian support of two major Somali dissident groups, the Somali Democratic Salvation Front (SDSF) and the Somali National Movement (SNM), is the primary vehicle through which Ethiopia has been attempting to accomplish its objectives in Somalia.

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ The SDSF was formed in October 1981 when the Somali Salvation Front (SSF) aligned itself with two minor ideologically oriented, anti-Siad organizations. The SDSF has been noted operating in all regions of the Ogaden but has usually concentrated its activities in the central border area where large numbers of Majertains live. The SDSF insurgents have received training and backing from both Ethiopia and Libya; material assistance from Ethiopia, Libya, and South Yemen; and at least moral support from the Soviet Union. The strength of the SDSF is estimated to be about 2,000 men formed into units that can operate independently or in conjunction with Ethiopian ground units. The SDSF has a variety of weapons and equipment including small arms, crew-served weapons, trucks, and armored vehicles. In an attempt to broaden its base and preserve its position as the primary anti-Siad organization, the SDSF has been seeking a more formal alliance with the Somali

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National Movement (SNM). Ethiopia has encouraged such a unification, though in the past it has been repeatedly and successfully resisted by the more independent and moderate SNM. Prospects for serious merger talks were increased somewhat in late 1985 with the ouster of the former SDSF chief, which was an SNM precondition for forming a joint organization. Although the SDSF has continued to pose a threat to Somali positions along the border in the Ogaden region, its effectiveness is hindered by leadership turbulence, lack of a strong tribal cohesiveness, and a possibly increasing number of defections following the Siad-Mengistu peace initiative. Additionally, Ethiopian support for the SDSF may be lessened if agreements between Siad and Mengistu to discontinue support to insurgent groups are successful.

(S/NF/WN) The SNM is primarily composed of Issaks, the predominant tribe of northern Somalia. The SNM originated in the mid-1970s when Issaks working in Persian Gulf countries organized under the leadership of political dissidents. In 1971, the SNM was formally established in London but moved its headquarters to Addis Ababa in March 1982. In concert with this shift, the SNM began to organize a military wing with support from both Ethiopia and Libya. By the fall of 1982, the SNM threat to Somalia became a reality with increasing attacks on both road traffic and police posts as well as kidnappings. The raid on Mandera Prison and the nearby military training camp in January 1983 indicated much improvement in the SNM's capability to project its military forces, as well as a significant base of support for the movement among the local populace. The SNM, for instance, currently has a fighting force of between 3,000 and 3,500 men and has been attempting to gain access to sophisticated arms and equipment. Nevertheless, the threat to the Siad regime from the SNM also depends on that organization's ability to extract greater assistance from Ethiopia and Libya. These nations have been reluctant to extend more aid to the SNM in the absence of greater linkages, especially those creating cooperation and unification with the SDSF. While the SNM has been reluctant to consider a joint insurgent organization in the past due to the SDSF's close association with Ethiopia, the SNM is now dependent on Ethiopia and may be under more pressure to effect a merger. The SNM considers itself the stronger of the two groups and would likely seek a dominant role in any unified organization. Like the SDSF, the SNM may begin to experience lessened support from Ethiopia as a result of the talks between President Siad and Chairman Mengistu. However, Issak support in northern Somalia may remain extensive enough to allow SNM forces to continue operations if Ethiopian backing is reduced or discontinued.

(S/NF) Somalia is also a protagonist in this relationship with Ethiopia. Since the early 1960s, Somalia has intermittently supported and directed insurgency in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia as part of an effort to unite under one flag all ethnic Somalis, many of whom live in or migrate into the Ogaden for pastorage. Somalia ultimately launched an invasion of the Ogaden in July 1977 in an attempt to capitalize on a revolution-torn Ethiopia. However, with massive Soviet assistance and a Cuban expeditionary force which ultimately numbered 17,000, the Ethiopians managed to drive the Somalis from the region in March 1978. Since the end of the war, the Ogaden insurgency has undergone phases of varying intensity, with regular Somali units again operating in the region in 1979. In 1980 a dramatic shift in the conflict occurred with a carefully planned and well-executed offensive that enabled Ethiopian forces to reoccupy much of the extreme eastern Ogaden and gain military superiority along the border. As Ethiopia consolidated its gains in the Ogaden, it conducted incursions into Somalia until June 1981 and then limited its activity to sporadic artillery and small arms exchanges until the summer of 1982. In June 1982, Ethiopian military units, in cooperation with the forces of the SDSF, attacked Somali positions in the vicinity of the disputed central border area. The Ethiopians, supported by superior air, artillery, and armor forces, overwhelmed the poorly equipped, undermanned, and dispirited Somali

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units. Since July 1982, static, fortified positions have been manned by both sides within Somali-claimed territory around Balenbale and Goldogob, which have been the scenes of intermittent light fighting. The Somalis have wanted to launch major attacks to retake Balenbale and Goldogob but they do not feel they have sufficient armor or air cover to do so with the equipment they currently possess or expect to receive. For the foreseeable future, Ethiopia, with one of the largest and best-equipped armed forces in Sub-Saharan Africa, will continue to pose the most significant external threat to Somalia.

~~(S/NF)~~ Neither neighboring Kenya nor Djibouti poses a significant threat to Somalia. Mogadishu's preoccupation with forming a Greater Somalia uniting all Somali peoples, some of whom reside within the territorial boundaries of Djibouti and northeast Kenya, established the basis for irredentist claims to those areas. This concept remains a source of tension between Somalia and its neighbors although President Siad is now taking a less aggressive stand toward pursuing these traditional Somali objectives. Somali relations with Kenya and Djibouti have improved somewhat during the mid-1980s. Somalia has not acted overtly to implement its objective in those countries primarily due to the French military presence in Djibouti and the Somali realization that such actions would be incongruous with US interests.

e. Communist Influence

~~(S/NF)~~ The Soviet Union first gained a foothold in Somalia in the mid-1960s by providing military assistance. Soviet influence increased dramatically after Siad came to power in 1969, primarily because of ideological compatibility between Soviet Communism and Siad's Marxist brand of "scientific socialism," and the Somali desire to upgrade its military capabilities. By the mid-1970s the Soviet-Somali alliance was cemented by military and economic assistance and capped by a 1974 Friendship Treaty -- the USSR's first such treaty with an African nation. The Soviets developed and utilized extensive military facilities there in exchange for the provision of military equipment and advisory assistance to Somalia.

~~(S)~~ During this period of close Soviet-Somali association, Somalia's exposure to Communist influence was substantial within the government and the military. In late 1976, the Soviets also started to provide limited military assistance to Somalia's chief rival, Ethiopia. By supplying military equipment to both Somalia and Ethiopia, the Soviets hoped to control the amount of arms flowing into the region and, thereby, the level of conflict between these two historical antagonists. As the source of arms for both countries, the USSR felt that it would eventually be able to assume the role of arbitrator and negotiate a settlement between Somalia and Ethiopia that would leave the Soviets with a high degree of influence in the area. In July 1977, Soviet plans received a setback when Somali forces invaded the Ogaden. Because of the increasing quantities of arms the Soviets were supplying to the Ethiopians, and the impact those weapons were having on the fighting in the Ogaden, President Siad terminated 14 years of close military cooperation with the USSR in November 1977. Until that time, the Somalis had been the principal recipients of Soviet military aid in Sub-Saharan Africa, receiving some \$400 million worth of equipment. All Soviet military advisers were expelled in 1977 and Somalia renounced the 1974 Soviet-Somali Friendship Treaty. Though Somalia and the Soviet Union still maintain diplomatic ties, their relationship remains strained and is characterized by Somali accusations that Moscow supports Ethiopian aggression. There are signs that Somalia is attempting to improve relations with the Soviets. Relations with Cuba, which were also broken at the time of the Soviet expulsion, remain severed.

~~(S/NF)~~ Relations between Somalia and the PRC reached a low point in early 1982 primarily due to Somalia's inability to pay for Chinese military assistance. After the

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border incursions by Ethiopia in June 1982, however, Chinese interest in Somalia increased. Chinese military assistance agreements, for the most part, have been made on a cash payment basis. An exception to this was an agreement for the Chinese to provide spare parts for Somalia's two OSA II patrol boats in 1984 in exchange for selected Somali weapon systems, mostly of Soviet origin. In addition, China has provided technicians and advisers for Somali F-6 aircraft, training for 130-mm artillery, and some economic assistance.

(S/NF) North Korea provided Somalia with \$3-4 million worth of small arms and ammunition early in 1982. The North Koreans also had a small group of advisers involved in the operation of an ammunition factory outside of Mogadishu until 1985. Relations between Somalia and North Korea steadily deteriorated after 1983 due to North Korea's increasing support to Ethiopia.

(C) Despite the fact that relations with Communist nations are currently low key, individuals remain within the armed forces who spent formative years in training in the USSR. Some would like to return to the Soviet style of military assistance. However, clan politics is more likely to determine the government in Somalia than Communist ideology. While the possibility exists that Somali-Soviet relations may improve somewhat if a peace accord can be reached with Ethiopia, it is unlikely that Moscow would consider any type of renewed military assistance.

f. Economic Factors

(C) Somalia, one of the world's poorest countries, has few natural resources on which to base economic development. Manufacturing is rudimentary and primarily involved in food processing and producing import substitutes. Agricultural production in Somalia increased significantly in 1985 due to favorable weather conditions and government policy changes but Somalia's most important economic activity remains livestock husbandry, with live animals generating 80-85 percent of this country's export earnings. Other leading exports are bananas, hides, and skins. Major imports are textiles, cereals, transport equipment, machinery, construction material and equipment, and petroleum products. Leading trading partners are Arab countries and Italy.

(C/NF) The Somali economy has not recovered from the severe drought of 1974-75. The Ogaden war prompted a steady flow of refugees into Somalia and an end to Soviet financial and technical assistance. To counter these problems, Mogadishu substantially increased government expenditures in 1978 and 1979 while foreign grants declined, leading to high budget deficits. Government borrowing to finance the deficits pushed the inflation rate higher and widened the account deficit. The combined effects of a failing stabilization effort, a Saudi Arabian ban on livestock imports due to disease, and the fallout from the 1983-84 drought brought Somalia's economic and financial situation to crisis proportions in 1984. Economic reforms introduced by President Siad in early 1985 achieved mixed results. While exports have increased due to more favorable weather conditions, and Saudi Arabia lifted the ban on noncattle livestock, extreme difficulties remain. External debt is mounting steadily and foreign aid has been less than the Somali Government expected. Mogadishu's commitment to reform is far from certain but Siad is aware that the economic crisis will worsen if he does not take some action.

(S/NF) Somalia has no military equipment production capability. Although a factory in Mogadishu produced small arms ammunition in the past, this production stopped with the departure of three North Korean technicians in early 1985. In terms of value of equipment delivered (over \$400 million) the USSR has been the major supplier. The last Soviet military agreement with Somalia, however, was in 1976 and final shipments were made in 1977. The principal suppliers since 1978 have been Italy (\$525 million) and Egypt (\$149 million), with

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Saudi Arabia picking up most of the payments. In addition, US military assistance has thus far totaled over \$76 million worth of equipment per terms of the 1980 access agreement.

~~(S/NF)~~ Saudi Arabia has provided the Somalis with economic support although levels of assistance have declined since 1982. Economic assistance has included payment of the crude oil contract between Somalia and Saudi Arabia. As of early 1984, the Saudi petroleum agency offered to renew the basic crude oil contract but the Saudi Government did not show a willingness to assume payment as they did in 1983. In February 1984, the Saudis provided Somalia a limited amount of military equipment which included Panhard armored cars, Panhard armored personnel carriers (APCs), artillery, and anti-aircraft weapons. President Siad's successful negotiations with the Saudi Government in August 1984 resulted in balance-of-payments support that permitted Somalia to close out 1984 without a major financial crisis. The Saudi Government also reportedly offered Somalia 100,000 metric tons of crude oil and financing for approximately \$2 million worth of military communications equipment. In 1985, Saudi Arabia paid a \$16.5-million debt owed by Somalia to the Saudi fund for development. This was the first time the Saudi Government had paid off the debts for any of the fund's 56 recipients. This more probably reflects Saudi Arabia's concern over Somalia's stability, particularly following a coup in Sudan, but it may also have been an attempt to counter Libyan political overtures to Somalia.

g. Military and Political Alignment

~~(S)~~ Fourteen years of close military cooperation with the Soviets ended in 1977. Concurrently, relations between Somalia and Arab nations improved as many of these nations began to provide military assistance. A limiting factor on the amount of aid from many Arab countries had been Somalia's support of Egypt on the issues of the Camp David Accords. Egypt repaid Somalia for this support by supplying Somalia with significant amounts of heavy military equipment such as medium tanks and artillery. Somalia has subsequently repaired its relations with other conservative Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia. Relations with Western nations also have improved. Increased interest in Southwest Asia led to the signing of a facilities access agreement with the United States in August 1980, granting the US use of ports and airfields at Mogadishu and Berbera. In exchange for use of these facilities, the US has provided some \$76 million (US dollars) worth of defensive military equipment to Somalia. Somalia is a member of the Organization of African Unity, was the first non-Arab member of the Arab League, and is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement and the UN.

~~(S/NF)~~ In April 1985, Somalia announced the restoration of diplomatic relations with Libya. President Siad's motivation in renewing relations with Tripoli was primarily to end Libyan support to Somali insurgents. Although Siad may also hope to benefit from Libyan financial assistance, he is well aware of Colonel Qadhafi's customary conditions placed on such help. Somalia's rapprochement with Libya has also strained its relations with the US. Siad will, therefore, use discretion in any attempt to benefit monetarily from the new relationship.

h. (U) Key US Officials

Chief of Mission (Mogadishu): Ambassador T. Frank Criegler

(b)(3):10 USC 424



2. MILITARY, GENERAL

a. (U) Key Military Officials

Vice Minister of Defense: Maj Gen Ahmed *Sahal* Ali

Vice Minister of Defense: Maj Gen *Aden* Abdullahi Nur

Vice Minister of Defense: Maj Gen Mohamed Hashi *Ganni*

Army Chief of Staff: Vacant¹

Navy: Commander, Rear Admiral Mohamed Omar *Osman*

Air Force: Commander, Brig Gen Mohamed Nur *Dudi*

Air Defense: Commander, Col Siad Daoud *Judal*

Commander, 21st Sector: Brig Gen Mohamed Abdi Aden

Commander, 26th Sector: Brig Gen Mohamed Said Herzi Morgan

Commander, 54th Sector: Brig Gen Mohamed Ali Abokar

Commander, 60th Sector: Col Musa Hassan

Military Intelligence:

Chief, General Directorate of Security and Reconnaissance: Brig Gen *Hussein* Hassan Ali

Chief, Defense Intelligence Security Agency (Counter Intelligence): Lt Col *Dahir* Eid Almi

Chief, Reconnaissance Directorate (Tactical and Order of Battle Intelligence): Col *Bashir* Mohamed Hassan

National Police: Maj Gen Abdi *Duale*

b. Position of the Armed Forces

~~(S)~~ The President, Major General Siad, is the Commander in Chief of the Somali National Army (SNA). The Navy, Air Force, and Air Defense Forces are subordinate to the SNA. Historically, the military has been held in reasonably high regard by the Somali people; however, its image has suffered due to Ethiopia's continued occupation of Balenbale and Goldogob. This state of affairs has seriously hurt officer morale and Siad Barre has done what he could to remedy this situation and bolster the image of the Army within the society by acquiring new and more sophisticated military equipment and training from abroad. His efforts thus far have helped, but grumbling within the ranks of the Somali officer corps continues due to perceived shortcomings of foreign military assistance. Today, many younger officers advocate closer ties to the West and hope for strengthened relations with Western Europe and especially the United States. Nevertheless, a few senior officers remain pro-Soviet.

~~(S/NF)~~ The image of the Somali military has also been marred by the periodic practice of forced conscription in the form of military press gangs who operate primarily in Mogadishu. Reports of some would-be conscripts shot while fleeing appear to be valid. This is partly in an effort to make up for losses through casualties and desertions and it is a very visible

¹(U) This position has been absorbed into the functions of the Minister of Defense/Commander of the Armed Forces.

sign to everyone of the decaying situation within the military and the lengths to which the Siad regime is willing to go to bolster the enforcement arm of national policy.

(S) Despite public protestations against tribalism, balanced clan representation in the military remains a sensitive if not a critical issue. During the past years President Siad has removed virtually all Hawiya and Issak officers from major commands and has replaced them with officers from more loyal tribes. Within the Ministry of Defense, most senior officers hold prestigious positions because of their demonstrated loyalty to the current regime and not as a result of their military record or capabilities. These strategies are used by Siad to increase his personal control over the military. Although President Siad survived the 9 April 1978 coup attempt, just as he had survived previous power struggles, he remains vulnerable to future challenges from a dissatisfied military.

c. Military Trends and Capabilities

(S/NF) The SNA underwent a period of rapid expansion and reorganization during the 1977-78 Ogaden war, reaching an estimated strength of about 60,000 in the ground forces. During the expansion, militia and police were integrated into regular ground units. Some 40,000 personnel were deployed to the Ogaden at the height of the fighting. When the tide turned in Ethiopia's favor, most Somali units were forced to withdraw. While taking only moderate casualties, the SNA was forced to leave large amounts of heavy equipment behind. An estimated 30 to 40 percent of prewar inventories of major items of equipment were lost to the advancing Cuban and Ethiopian forces. The results of the war, together with the abrogation of the Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union, and the inability of Siad to obtain a major source of arms, marked the beginning of a steady decline in SNA capabilities.

(S/NF) While it is difficult to assess results of the January 1986 talks between the leaders of Somalia and Ethiopia, hostilities between regular units of the two countries seem to be significantly lessened. However the Somali National Movement dissidents have continued cross-border attacks on Somali positions, and Somali units in the North have responded by pursuing the insurgent forces a few kilometers into Ethiopian territory. Continuation of these insurgent attacks, without visible Ethiopian restraint, will be seen by Somalis as a lack of good faith on the part of Ethiopia in the peace negotiations.

(S/NF) As evidenced by recent equipment acquisitions, the SNA has been making a concerted effort to reverse the downward trend by upgrading its mobility and antiarmor capabilities, both of which are essential to an effective defense of Somali borders. The Army's equipment acquisitions, however, have not begun to match the amount of Soviet equipment flowing into Ethiopia and the downward trend appears not to have been arrested. The continuing border conflict with Ethiopia and the resulting loss of weapons and equipment have further detracted from any gains that might have been made by the SNA. The steady expenditure of scarce ammunition and POL stores has placed an increasingly severe strain on the logistic system. As a result, the SNA has not come close to approaching military parity with Ethiopia, and will remain hard pressed to defend against any further Ethiopian attacks into Somali territory. Foreign military assistance to the Somali military has not significantly altered the inferior state of Somalia's readiness compared with Ethiopia's.

(S/NF) Somalia's overall military capability in a technical sense is extremely poor. The Somali military lacks a significant offensive capability and does not have a logistics system which can sustain an offensive effort. There are severe ammunition and spare parts shortages in the forward units along the Ethiopian border. This situation is further complicated by food shortages experienced by forward units periodically since 1984, as well as poor morale.

~~(C/NF)~~ The Somali military is controlled centrally by the Ministry of Defense (MOD), limiting initiative and reducing efficiency. Guidance is dispatched from the MOD headquarters to the sector commanders, through long-range radio communication; however, communications equipment within Army units is in short supply.

~~(C/NF)~~ Officer leadership tends to range from very good to extremely poor. Military unit proficiency tends to be directly tied to the ability of the commander. Where the officer is motivated and has received training, the unit has some combat efficiency. Nevertheless, overall poor leadership tends to outweigh good leadership. In addition, lack of adequate pay for military personnel causes many soldiers to work second and third jobs to support their families, thus limiting their time and enthusiasm for military duties.

d. Military Budget

~~(C/NF)~~ \$111.6 million for the fiscal year ending 31 December 1984; 28 percent of the central government budget. No service allocation is available. Dollar value is converted at the official exchange rate of 40.6 shillings equal \$1.00.

e. (U) Population

7,825,000 estimated July 1986. Average annual growth rate 3 percent

Males (ages 15-49): 1,528,000; physically fit, 825,000

Ethnic divisions: 85 percent Hilo-Hamitic speaking. The rest mainly Bantu speakers; 30,000 Arabs, 3,000 Europeans, 800 Asians

Literacy (1979): 60 percent

3. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

a. Army

(1) Mission

(U) To protect the territorial integrity of the nation and assist police and other paramilitary organizations in maintaining internal security.

(2) Capabilities

~~(S/NF)~~ The poor overall condition of the Somali National Army has been highlighted repeatedly over the past several years by its marginal performance in the border conflict with Ethiopia. The SNA has not recovered from the major equipment losses suffered in the the 1977-78 Ogaden war. These losses, coupled with a Soviet cutoff of the flow of equipment, ammunition, spare parts, and technical advisers, resulted in a rapidly deteriorating logistics base. In addition, the task of defending an extremely broad front (some 1,800 km), with many of its divisions undermanned, has rendered Somalia's capability to protect its border marginal at best.

~~(S/NF)~~ The main problems facing the SNA continue to be low inventories of serviceable equipment (especially armor, field artillery, and antitank weapons); an inadequate logistics system (characterized by low stores of ammunition, fuel, rations, and repair capability); a primitive communications network; and units plagued by leadership, manning, and morale problems. There are no full-strength; divisions, brigades, or battalions in the SNA. Most are at 50-75 percent of authorized strength.

~~(S/NF)~~ Some of these Somali military deficiencies are being partially addressed by US and Italian military assistance programs. Weapons deliveries in 1985 included howitzers

(155-mm and 105-mm), recoilless rifles (106-mm), and mortars (81-mm and 60-mm). Italy delivered 25 additional M-47 tanks in late 1986 and included 5 aging 105-mm howitzers in the shipment. One US-sponsored project, aimed at upgrading the Somali command, control, and communications capabilities, will provide a modern facility in Mogadishu for a C3 center and improved communications (to include secure-voice) between the Somali Ministry of Defense and its sector command headquarters. In addition, Somalia continues to receive limited amounts of equipment, spare parts, and technical assistance from a variety of other Western and some Arab countries. The influx of aid, however, has not been great enough to offset the numerically superior, Soviet-backed forces fielded by its traditional enemy, Ethiopia.

~~(S/NF)~~ Somalia continues to rely heavily on foreign military assistance instead of developing the individual skills necessary to maintain and properly utilize its weapons and equipment. This dependence on outside help, along with soldiers who generally lack motivation and discipline, will likely continue to result in a substandard ground fighting force.

~~(S/NF)~~ In addition, the attacks by the Somali Democratic Salvation Front (SDSF) and the Somali National Movement (SNM) at numerous locations within Somalia have demonstrated the Somali Army's inability to conduct effective counterinsurgency operations in coordination with local paramilitary forces.

(3) Personnel Strength

~~(S/NF)~~ 40,000

(4) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

~~(S/NF)~~ The President exercises authority over the Armed Forces through the Ministers of Defense. The Somali National Army consists of the SNA headquarters at Mogadishu and four defensive headquarters: 26th Sector headquartered at Hargeisa, 54th Sector headquartered at Garoe, 21st Sector headquartered at Dusa Mareb, and 60th Sector headquartered at Baidoa. These sector commands have 13 subordinate divisions. Additionally, there are two administrative military districts in the Mogadishu and Chisimaio areas.

(b) ~~(S/NF)~~ Ground Combat Units

Summary of Major Tactical Units	Strength Per Unit	
	Authorized	Average/Actual
4 Sectors	Unk	9,075
13 divisions	Unk	3,300
39 infantry brigades	Unk	700
2 mechanized infantry brigades	Unk	700
4 armor brigades	Unk	700
3 field artillery brigades	Unk	500
5 commando brigades	Unk	700
1 motorized infantry brigade	Unk	2,000

(c) Army Aviation Units

(U) None

(d) Deployment

~~(S)~~ Somalia's 13 infantry divisions are divided among the sector areas, with 4 assigned to the northern, 3 to north central, 3 to the central, and 3 to the southern. The combat brigades of the divisions are deployed across the most likely avenues of approach to Somalia from Ethiopia, control key transportation and communication junctions, or are stationed in areas potentially disloyal to the central government. However, with Somalia's extensive common border with Ethiopia, significant gaps remain.

(5) Weapons and Equipment

(a) General

~~(S/NF)~~ The USSR was the primary supplier of equipment to Somalia from 1963 to 1977. Major items the Somali Army acquired included medium tanks, field artillery, armored cars, and armored personnel carriers. A significant percentage of Somalia's ground equipment was destroyed or captured in the Ogaden war and many of the losses have not been replaced. Small arms, ammunition, artillery pieces, recoilless rifles, mortars, trucks, medium tanks, and APCs have been provided by both Western and Arab countries, but there still remains a shortage of major items of military equipment in the ground inventory.

~~(S/NF)~~ The categories of weapons that the Somali ground forces have the most critical requirements for include antitank weapons, field artillery, and armor. Two of the most effective weapons in the Somali inventory are the M113A1 armored personnel carrier (APC) with the TOW missile system and the jeep-mounted 106-mm recoilless rifle. It has been reported, however, that the poorly maintained jeeps often break down during use in the rough terrain that typifies the current combat area. Somalia's thorny terrain has also been a significant factor in tire wear. Special 12-ply tires supplied by the US have begun to show promising signs of countering this problem. The 22 remaining APCs with the TOW antitank missile systems (2 were destroyed in combat with Ethiopian forces in 1984) are believed to be nonoperational for lack of maintenance.

~~(S/NF)~~ Somali field artillery generally suffers from problems associated with aging, which result in decreased tube life and deteriorated sighting mechanisms. Some relief to this situation has been brought about by the 105-mm howitzers, numbering over 100, which have been received primarily from Italy. Over 70 were delivered in 1982, 31 in 1985, and an additional 35 in late 1986. The US provided twelve 155-mm howitzers in 1985 and an additional six in mid-1986. As with other significant weaponry, these arms will support units in the central border area.

~~(S/NF)~~ The Somali armor inventory is also suffering from a lack of maintenance and problems associated with age, including some of the most recently acquired items, the T-54/55 medium tanks from Egypt and the M-47 medium tanks from Italy. An upgrade program for the M-47s is ongoing and an additional 25 M-47s are expected to be provided by Italy in 1987. Italian maintenance teams have been an essential factor in preventing the M-47s from becoming inoperable. The operational rate for M-47s is higher than the average although only about 25 percent are capable of moving, shooting, and communicating while some others can manage one or two of these critical combat tasks. Most of the operable M-47s are from the Mogadishu-based armor brigade and are the display tanks used almost exclusively for parades. They are also on call for the palace guard at the President's villa. The higher deadline rate in the military sectors is reflective of the inadequate Somali logistic system. The Somalis have not been capable of maintaining the M113 APCs for very long without US or other foreign assistance. A maintenance assistance program for this equipment is currently under consideration. Overall, it is estimated that only 50 percent of Somalia's

armor is operational, and these vehicles are severely limited in their effectiveness due to transportation problems, poor roads, and the shortage of tank transporters.

(b) ~~(S/NF)~~ *Ground Weapons and Equipment*

		Country of Origin	Total Inventory	
Mortars:	60-mm	IZ, PK, IT	270	
	81-mm	IT, EG, US	120	
	82-mm	UR, PRC, KN	280	
	120-mm	UR	50	
	160-mm	UR	10	
RCLR and AT Weapons:	40-mm AT rkt lchr, RPG-2	UR	10	
	40-mm AT rkt lchr, RPG-7	UR, EG	450	
	75-mm RCLR	IT	50	
	82-mm RCLR, B-10	UR	60	
	82-mm SPG-82	UR	8	
	106-mm RCLR, jeep-mounted	PK	300	
	106-mm RCLR	US	63	
	107-mm RCLR, B-11	UR	16	
	STRIM rkt lchr	FR	300	
	MILAN ATGM lchr	FR	100	
	MILAN ATGM	FR	500	
	Field and Rkt Arty:	57-mm ATGN, NFI	UR, IT	66
76-mm ZIS-3, M1942		UR	60	
85-mm gun, D-44		UR	60	
88-mm gun, NFI		IT	12	
100-mm gun, 1955		UR	15	
100-mm gun, M53		CZ	8	
105-mm how, NFI		IT	108	
105-mm how, M101A1		SA	8	
106-mm how, M-79		PK	12	
117-mm how, NFI		IT	5	
122-mm how, D-30		UR	7	
122-mm how, M-30		UR, EG	85	
130-mm field gun		PRC	18	
122-mm MRL, BM-21		UR, EG/RO	20	
130-mm MRL, M51		UR	8	
132-mm MRL, BM-13		UR	20	
152-mm how, M1937, ML-20		UR	45	
155-mm how, M198		US	18	
Armor:		Mdm tank, T-34	UR, EG	30
		Mdm tank, T-54/55	UR, EG	110
	Mdm tank, Centurion	KU	30	
	Mdm tank, M-47	IT	123	
	Lt tank, PT-76	UR	10	
	Lt tank, M-41	ET	10	
	APC, M113A1, TOW	US	22	
	APC, Fiat 6614	IT	220	
	APC, Fiat 6616	IT	90	
	APC, BTR-40	UR	4	

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	Country of Origin	Total Inventory
APC, BTR-50	UR	50
APC, BTR-60	UR	10
APC, Panhard M3	SA	10
APC, BTR-152	UR	100
ARC, BRDM-2	UR	30
ARC, Panhard AML-245	SA	20
ARC, Ferret	TC	11
ARC, Saladin	TC	30
ARC, VLRA AMCAT	FR	50

(c) *Aircraft*

(U) None

(d) *Individual Weapons and Equipment*

(S) A wide variety of small arms exist in the Somali National Army. Most older small arms are of Soviet origin although some machineguns, rifles, grenade launchers, and pistols have been provided by Western and Arab donors since 1977. There is also a general shortage of uniforms, boots, helmets, and other individual soldier items, which contributes to low soldier morale and a lack of motivation.

(6) *Logistics*

(S) The overall support capability of the Somali logistics system has markedly deteriorated over the past decade. The cessation of Soviet military aid and equipment deliveries combined with massive materiel losses in the Ogaden conflict resulted in a significant decline in operational capabilities. Although Somalia has received some military material and technical assistance from various Western and Arab countries, the amount is much less than that being provided to Ethiopia by the USSR. Furthermore, the equipment delivered to Somalia has, in most cases, not been successfully assimilated into the operational levels of the Somali National Army due to logistics and training shortcomings. No aspect of the Somali logistics infrastructure — organization, administration, procurement, and operations — is without major deficiencies.

(S/NF) The Somali logistics system is not responsive to the needs of the Army in the field. It is fraught with bureaucratic red tape, hampered by a cumbersome, decentralized directorate organization, and plagued by "personalities." Repair parts and maintenance operations are controlled by separate directorates. Although a requisitioning procedure exists, it is largely ignored. Repair parts tend to be hoarded in the warehouse at Mogadishu and are released to vehicle mechanics only upon submission of a letter from one director to the other. Requisitions from sector commanders are often ignored. In addition, no effective control or accountability of resources exists at the operational level. The management/control problem is further exacerbated by the scarcity of trained logistics officers in the Somali Armed Forces.

(S) Only two major maintenance and supply depots serve the Somali National Army. Located at Mogadishu and Hargeisa, the depots are intended to support the southern front and northern front, respectively. The maintenance facilities at these depots are adequately equipped to conduct major repairs on most types of military equipment; however, machinery breakdown, lack of spare parts, few competent technicians, and poor management severely

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erode maintenance capabilities. Depot stockage levels of most major military classes of supply are inadequate to support sustained large-scale military operations.

~~(S/NF)~~ Excessive deadline rates are the norm for all types of military equipment due to acute shortages of spare parts, paucity of competent technicians, and haphazard or nonexistent preventive maintenance procedures. First-phase deliveries and resupply operations are severely hampered by poor operational readiness rates of military transport vehicles and chronic misuse of these vehicles. Although the Ministry of Defense (MOD) is acutely aware of logistic system deficiencies and is making an effort to remedy the problems, continued large-scale external aid and assistance will be required to revive the support infrastructure. Somalia's poor readiness posture contributes to its inability to counter an effective attacking force.

(7) Personnel Procurement and Retention

~~(S)~~ In early 1984, the Somali Government implemented a new national draft law that established a 2-year compulsory military service obligation. Under terms of the plan, the names of male secondary school graduates are assembled by existing National Service workers and from that list 20-30,000 recruits are to be selected and trained for a 2-year military obligation. It is believed that the term of service was reduced to 18 months in mid-1985.

~~(S/NF)~~ The Mobilization Directorate within the Somali Ministry of Defense is charged with procuring eligible male recruits for military service; however, it has done little to contribute to the success of the program, and practically nothing has been accomplished in surveying the numbers of possible recruits. Little emphasis is placed on the success or failure of the program within the rest of the Ministry of Defense. The Minister of Defense has expressed only mild concern over the success or failure of the mobilization effort. This situation is further complicated by the fact that the present induction infrastructure is not prepared and cannot handle a heavy recruit influx. Although the Somali Army is short on qualified personnel within its ranks, it cannot properly train, equip, or support a sudden substantial increase of new personnel.

~~(S/NF)~~ In practice, the Somali laws providing for conscription have seldom worked. Rather, periodic "sweeps" are conducted, such as in late 1985, when efforts on the streets of Mogadishu were expected to provide several thousand recruits for induction. In October 1984, President Siad pardoned some 4,000 persons who had been earlier convicted of petty crimes, black marketing in foreign currency, or dealing in Khat (a mild narcotic). Although it was traditional for the Somali President to grant amnesty during Revolution Day celebrations to a fairly large number of petty criminals, these released individuals were shipped off to army training camps. In addition to these methods, recruits are acquired occasionally from various refugee camps. It is possible that this latest acquisition of new recruits formed the nucleus for the SNA's new 13th division, formed in early 1986.

(8) Training

~~(S/NF)~~ The Somali Army training program has not changed significantly since the departure of Soviet advisers. It is controlled by the Ministry of Defense and takes place primarily at the Division level. Training is generally based on experiences gained in the 1977-78 Ogaden war, but is frequently limited by the scarcity of resources (funding, ammunition, spare parts, classroom space, training aids, etc.). In addition, the effectiveness of training is reduced by a lack of knowledgeable instructors. Training is conducted at both the individual and unit levels. The SNA operates a number of basic training centers and specialty schools for enlisted personnel. Subsequent training is conducted at the unit level

in accordance with detailed guidance emanating from the MOD and sector training plans. NCOs are usually returned to their specialty school for additional training or sent to the General Daud NCO Academy for a development course lasting about 4 months. Officers, following graduation from high school or the university, begin a 2-year course at the Siad Military Academy in Mogadishu. Additional or advanced officer training is continued at the Ahmed Gurey Staff College in Mogadishu, the Army's senior officer professional development school.

(C/NF) A new institution, the Somali National Defense and Strategic Academy, has begun in 1986. This academy is modeled after a similar one in Egypt and has four retired Egyptian generals forming the nucleus of a faculty. Strategic studies will not be taught for a year or more. The lack of a properly equipped library and of qualified instructors will delay the implementation of full course curricula.

(S/NF) The SNA does not conduct combined arms training with infantry, armor, artillery, etc. Joint training, involving other military services, is not performed.

(9) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

(C/NF) A militia was formed in 1972, primarily as a civil guard. Members of this force are reportedly present in every district in Somalia and have been observed in roles such as crowd control, traffic control, agricultural projects, and parade formations. The militia, about 15,000 strong, is made up largely of unpaid volunteers who would be armed and expected to fight in a time of national crisis. They possess only small arms that come out of storage almost exclusively for the Somali Revolution Day parade each October. While the militia's strength is down from a high of about 20,000 and is a declining factor in terms of overall Somali military forces, it could still muster thousands of volunteers should the need arise.

(S/NF) Responsibility for the administration and training of the reserves rests with civilian regional governors. Compulsory military training is provided to all graduates of secondary schools, high schools, and the university. Regional training centers provide 3 months of initial training and 1 month of refresher training every 3 years until age 48. Secondary school graduates fill the enlisted ranks of the reserves, while high school graduates are trained as NCOs and university graduates as officers.

(b) Mobilization

(C/NF) The Mobilization Directorate (also known as the Organization Directorate) is commanded by a brigadier general and is charged with the mobilization of civilian and nonmilitary government personnel and equipment in the event of war. During peacetime, this directorate maintains records of the location, amount, and condition of materiel that could be acquired to supplement military equipment in time of war. The directorate also maintains lists of individuals with technical skills, such as physicians, technicians, and heavy equipment operators. In the past, Somali officials have claimed that during emergencies or at times of increased alert, trained mobilization designees would bring significantly undermanned SNA units to 80-85 percent strength in about 4 to 5 days. Mobilization plans also called for one militia division to be formed for each sector as a sector reserve. Since the Ethiopian incursion in June 1982, however, the majority of Somali units are still undermanned and there has been no evidence that sector reserves have been activated. Instead, the Somalis have focused their efforts on the time-consuming process of forming new units such as battalions, brigades, and a division.

b. Navy

(1) Mission

(U) The Navy is charged with the following missions: coastal surveillance, coastal defense, defense of the economic zone (200 NM), fishing protection, mine countermeasures, military cargo lift, and convoy escort.

(2) Capabilities

(S) The Somali National Navy (SNN) has insufficient craft to patrol the 1,638-NM coastline. Coastal patrols have been performed only on a very irregular basis in the past in specific areas such as Berbera, Mogadishu, and Chisimaio. Since mid-1985, however, only two patrol boats have been observed moving on their own. Each of these (one OSA II and one Swiftship) vessels remained in the vicinity of their home base, Berbera. The intent is to provide early warning of attack to shore installations and to enforce claims on coastal waters.

(S/NP/WN) With the present personnel and equipment, none of the Navy's missions can be adequately accomplished. The Navy's two OSA II missile attack boats, which compose the main antishipping capability, are based at Berbera to counter threats from Ethiopia or South Yemen. Shore-based facilities in Berbera are sparse, but adequate for minor upkeep and hull repair. However, marine growth is excessive, amounting to as much as 4 inches a year. Previously believed to be nonoperational, one of the OSA IIs and the Swiftship 104-ft patrol boat were found to be in good material condition, with no structural damage, and only minimal corrosion and deterioration. While there are no drydocking facilities in Berbera, the Somali Navy has developed a method of drydocking the OSA IIs, using a cradle system and tidal lift. With this method, the OSAs can be cleaned and painted twice a year. Adaptation of this method to the Swiftships patrol boat has been hampered by lack of docking plans and hull data. Until late 1985, the Somali Navy was utilizing 20- to 30-year-old Italian and Soviet navigation charts.

(S/NP/WN) The Somali Navy personnel assigned to the OSA IIs and Swiftships patrol boat are highly qualified and capable of operating and maintaining their equipment, given training and a sufficient level of logistic support. Each of these ships has a central core of competent personnel with 10 years' experience on assigned platforms.

(S) The inability of the Somali Air Force to provide air superiority would prevent the Somali Navy from conducting effective operations against attacking naval forces. Coastal defense is severely hindered by the limited number of coastal defense weapon systems, operational radars, and reliance on visual observation posts. Additionally, with the bulk of military funds committed to ground and air forces, the Somali Navy will continue to be hard pressed to obtain the necessary funding to significantly increase its combat effectiveness.

(3) Personnel Strength

(S) 2,000-2,500

(4) (S) Ship Strength

Type	In		Status	
	Op	Nonop	Reserve	Unknown
PTG (OSA-II missile attack boat)	1	1		
PT (MOL torpedo boat)		2		
PTL (P-6 torpedo boat)		4		

Type	Op	Nonop	In Reserve	Status Unknown
PB (MOL patrol boat; POLUCHAT-1 patrol craft)		2		
LSM (POLNOCNY landing craft)	1			
LCM (T-4 landing craft) YDT NYRYAT II		1		2
Swiftship 104 ft	1			
Total:	2	13	0	2

(5) Organization and Deployment

~~(S/NF)~~ The Navy was established in 1965 with Soviet aid and is subordinate to the SNA. Naval Headquarters is located at Mogadishu, with operational bases at Berbera, Chisimaio, and Mogadishu responsible for the three coastal defense areas. Two 100-mm coastal artillery batteries provide coastal defense at Berbera and Mogadishu; however, one of the batteries was moved from Mogadishu to the central sector in support of operations in that area. The operational status of the guns at either location is unknown. The Somali Navy also maintains six radar and four visual surveillance sites, as well as nine signal stations along the coast. The serviceability of the radars and the signal equipment is questionable.

(6) Status of Equipment

~~(S/NF)~~ The general condition of the Soviet-supplied Somali vessels is marginal to poor. The MOL patrol craft are not operational, due to engine, fire control, and weapons problems. Few of the combat vessels are believed to be combat effective. The latest addition to the Somali Navy inventory is a Swiftship 104-ft which was brought to Somalia by a defecting Ethiopian crew in the early 1980s. The armament and machinery of this boat and one of the two OSA IIs appeared to operate normally in early 1986, although the radars were nonoperational for lack of spare parts. While each of the boats lacked spare parts and needed technical assistance, a well-trained cadre of officers and NCOs was present. The OSA II hulls reflected periodic cleaning of marine growth. The ability of the Somali Navy to maintain its equipment has been and will continue to be limited by the availability of spare parts and the lack of support facilities.

~~(S/NF)~~ Coastal surveillance radars (SHEET BEND) are reported to be inoperable due to poor maintenance and a shortage of spare parts though a refurbishment program is being considered.

(7) Logistics

~~(S)~~ While the organization of the logistics system of the Navy is fundamentally sound, inadequate quantities of fuel, repair parts, and technical equipment inhibit its effective operations. Somalia is totally dependent on external sources for Navy materiel. All but one ship and most of the vehicles organic to the Navy are of Soviet origin, and are old, and most are worn out. Spare parts for maintenance and repair of Soviet-supplied equipment are not available from the USSR. The inability of the Somali Navy to drydock and replace defective equipment will continue to hinder its efforts to maintain any degree of operational readiness. The probability that the operational readiness rate of the existing Soviet-supplied equipment will improve is low.

~~(S)~~ Machine shop repair facilities, located at Chisimaio and Berbera, have limited repair capabilities and the number and skill level of maintenance technicians available are inadequate. While proper training can marginally improve the Navy's logistics operations,

a significant infusion of new support equipment and repair parts is necessary to attain an effective logistics capability.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

~~(S/NF)~~ Personnel initially enlist in the Navy for 4 years. At the end of the enlistment, personnel can be recalled if necessary.

(9) Training

~~(S/NF)~~ Training in the Somali Navy is primarily operational in nature and includes officer cadet, staff officer, enlisted recruit, enlisted rating specialty, and shipboard crew. Initial recruit training is conducted at the Naval Training Center at Brava, while advanced job specialty training is done at the bases in Chisimaio and Berbera. The scope of the unit training is very limited and the standards are very low due to disorganization, lack of teaching aids, and lax discipline. All officer training, including cadet and staff officer training, is conducted outside the country, notably in Egypt, Italy, and the US. Several officers also have received training in the Soviet Union or Romania. While the lack of a viable training program is generally a hindrance, some officers and NCOs appear to have spent several years on the same boat, and procedures are passed orally rather than on paper.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

~~(S)~~ No reserves are identifiable apart from the Army reserves. Being subordinate to the Army, the Navy could draw upon the Army's reserve pool.

(b) Mobilization

~~(S)~~ There is no evidence that the Somali Navy has mobilization plans. Somalia has a small merchant fleet which could possibly be called upon to support the Somali Navy in times of crisis. The Somalia Merchant Marine Fleet consists of five ships of at least 1,000 gross registered tons (GRT). Only the two breakbulk carriers have a military lift capability. Their total lift capacity is 14,200 deadweight tons (DWT). The remaining ships include two refrigerated cargo carriers and one dry bulk ship.

c. Air Force

(1) Mission

~~(S)~~ To secure Somalia's airspace and provide tactical support, airlift, reconnaissance, and liaison to support the Army and Navy.

(2) Capabilities

~~(S/NF)~~ The offensive potential of the Somali Air Force (SAF) was reduced considerably during the 1977-78 Ogaden war by the loss of many fighter aircraft and the best pilots in the force. Ethiopia established air superiority over the battlefield early in the conflict, and continued to enjoy that strategic advantage throughout the 9-month duration of the war. Since the end of conventional fighting, Ethiopia has used its large and modern air force to strike at Somali targets in an attempt to punish President Siad for his continued support of the Ogaden insurgency. The SAF, lacking sufficient numbers of trained pilots and operational aircraft, as well as adequate radar support, has been unable to challenge these incursions into Somali airspace. The SAF has not been able to provide tactical support to ground forces inside Somali borders during the current border conflict aside from a few strafing runs and an occasional reconnaissance flight over the combat area. The transport capability of the SAF is inadequate to provide any but the barest of support. Heavy

dependence upon foreign suppliers for spare parts, training, and technical assistance is a prime factor hampering SAF capabilities, and there is no indication that this dependence will be reduced in the foreseeable future.

(3) Personnel Strength

(S) Estimated 2,000

(4) ~~(S)~~ Aircraft Strength

Total: 104 (fixed-wing: 59 jets, 10 turboprops, 25 props; helicopter: 6 turbines, 4 pistons)

In operational units: 104

(51 fighters: 25 all weather, 19 day, 7 general purpose (fighter-bombers);

2 bombers: 2 intermediate-range;

13 transport: 11 short-range, 2 medium-range;

24 trainers: 20 fighters, 4 transports;

4 utility

10 helicopters: 10 medium)

(5) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

(S) The SAF is subordinate to the Somali National Army. The Air Force is commanded by a brigadier general who directly supervises the commanders of the several airbases in the country from the Air Force Headquarters in Mogadishu. The commander, Brigadier General Mohamed Nur Dudi, was promoted to his current rank in late 1985 and is expected to remain as Commander of the SAF for the foreseeable future. He has a very close relationship with President Siad. The SAF headquarters is a horizontally developed chain of command with at least 10 coequal directorates that report to the SAF commander. Several of the directorates serve no useful function. For example, the Reconnaissance Directorate attempts to compile airborne intelligence data collected by SAF pilots. However, there is at present no effective aerial intelligence program in the SAF. One reason for the large number of directorates is probably to provide jobs for the large number of colonels, which far outweighs command requirements. This also allows President Siad to place trusted senior officers in positions which will keep them content (and in Mogadishu). The chief of the Personnel Directorate has been actively pushing for a major reorganization of the SAF headquarters based on his frustration with the lack of coordination that exists because of multiple direct access to the SAF commander. The six primary Somali airbases are located at Mogadishu, Baidoa, Berbera, Baledogle, Chisimaio, and Hargeisa.

(b) ~~(S/NF)~~ Summary of Units

Units	Aircraft Type	Total	Principal Base
3 fighter squadrons	MiG-15/MIDGET	3	Baledogle
	MiG-15/MIDGET	2	Hargeisa
	MiG-17/FRESCO	5	Baledogle
	MiG-17/FRESCO	6	Hargeisa
	MiG-21/FISHBED	8	Baledogle
	F-6/FARMER	20	Baledogle
	F-6/FARMER	5	Hargeisa
	F-74A/HUNTER	7	Baidoa
	T-77/HUNTER	1	Baidoa

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Units	Aircraft Type	Total	Principal Base
1 Flying Training Squadron	SF-260 Marchetti	14	Chisimaio
1 Transport Squadron	P-166, Piaggio	4	Mogadishu
	P-148, Piaggio	3	Mogadishu
	An-24 COKE	1	Baledogle
	An-24 COKE	1	Mogadishu
	An-26 CURL	2	Baledogle
	AB-212, Agusta-Bell	3	Mogadishu
	AB-212, Agusta-Bell	1	Hargeisa
	An-2 COLT	3	Mogadishu
	Mi-4 HOUND	4	Mogadishu
	Mi-8 HIP	2	Mogadishu
	T-6 N. Amer. Texan	2	Mogadishu
	G-222 Aeritalia	1	Mogadishu
	BN-2 Islander	4	Mogadishu

(6) Status of Equipment

(S) The operational readiness of SAF equipment varies significantly from the more modern F-6 aircraft acquired from the PRC in 1980 to completely unserviceable airframes delivered by the USSR in the late 1960s. When Somalia broke relations with the USSR, the major source of spare parts was eliminated. This resulted in a rapid and irreversible decline in the readiness rate of the Soviet-supplied equipment. Systematic cannibalization and Egyptian and Chinese assistance have enabled some of the aircraft to remain flyable.

(C/NF) The operational readiness is also affected periodically by availability of fuel. While readiness rates tend to be higher just prior to and during the annual 21 October Revolution Day celebrations, at other times it is not uncommon for the Ministry of Defense to cut off or greatly decrease aviation fuel supplies to its flying units. The MOD directives which put most aviation fuel back into a "war reserve" status also effectively ground most aircraft except for a few SF-260s, the P-166s, and an occasional helicopter flight. In addition, as time passes without fuel, all the indicators of declining morale appear. Desertions and requests to leave the country become commonplace. While there are no signs of alarm in the field units, staff meetings, parades, and promotions continue at Air Force Headquarters. In its fuel-starved state, the Somali Air Force becomes basically a transport service for the Ministry of Defense and senior officers.

(S/NF) Egyptian and Chinese technicians have assisted the Somalis with the maintenance of the F-6 (MiG-19) aircraft and a small number of flight instructors from these countries have taught F-6 flight training to Somali pilots. Although Chinese technicians have brought the Somali F-6 force to its highest operational status in several years, the absence of the maintenance personnel will probably eventually ground these planes, which are the most sophisticated ground-attack and reconnaissance fighter aircraft in Somalia's inventory. The readiness of Western aircraft will continue to depend on the Somali ability to obtain spare parts and requisite maintenance assistance. Somalia's recurring inability to pay for this foreign support results in sporadic aircraft availability.

(S/NF) Since early 1984, no Egyptian personnel have provided aircraft technical support and none are expected in the near future. At the present time, only the Chinese F-6 maintenance team remains. In addition, Pakistan may have agreed to train Somali F-6 pilots and mechanics and to overhaul F-6 engines.

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~~(S/NF)~~ Other outside assistance is responsible for most other airworthy aircraft in the Somali inventory. Italian technicians in Mogadishu in late 1985 were providing maintenance for the P-166 and Agusta-Bell 212 helicopters. Instructors from Italy also provide recurrency flight instruction to Somali SF-260 pilots in Chisimaio while their maintenance teams keep many of them operational. Zimbabwe contract personnel repair and provide flight instruction for the Hawker Hunters at Baidoa. Although the Somalis have several systems for mounting the Soviet AA-2 Atoll missiles on Hawker Hunter aircraft, only one aircraft to date has been modified to carry the missile.

(7) Logistics

~~(S)~~ Without the current level of foreign assistance, Air Force logistics capability would be nearly nonexistent. While there are a small number of semiskilled maintenance technicians in the Somali Air Force, the majority of logistics problems endemic to the air operations are beyond their level of expertise. Primary training and maintenance support is currently provided by China, Italy, and former pilots of the Rhodesian Air Force. Facilities and support equipment for the Air Force are marginally adequate for routine or preventive maintenance operations, and major engine or airframe overhaul must be conducted out of country. Even with continued foreign assistance, the Air Force logistics system is incapable of providing the quality of support required for efficient air operations, especially with the severe fuel rationing limits.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

~~(S/NF)~~ All SAF personnel are volunteers and are obligated to serve 4 years on active duty at the completion of their technical training or, in the case of pilots, after they receive their wings. Because of the ineffectiveness of the Air Force, retention of officers and enlisted men has become a problem. As a result there is a severe shortage of trained pilots.

(9) Training

~~(S)~~ Primary flight training is conducted at Chisimaio Training Center. The classroom portion of this training has been rated highly for its syllabus and training aids. Actual flight instruction, however, suffers from the frequent periods when training aircraft are inoperable due to a lack of spare parts or fuel. One hundred and fifty Somali pilots normally receive basic flight training at the Chisimaio pilot training school; however, due to an insufficient amount of aviation gasoline for the SF-260s, the pilot training program is frequently suspended. Nevertheless, pilot training is generally accomplished in the following sequence: SF-260, MiG-17, F-6, (MiG-19). Follow-on jet training takes place at Baledogle Airfield. Combat squadrons have prepared training plans, but often lack the resources to implement them, which adversely impacts on pilot proficiency. The Somali Air Defense Forces (SADF), who operate Somalia's radars, do not work well with the Air Force in training scenarios for aerial intercepts. Finally, there is no evidence that either all-weather or night-flying training is being provided to Somali pilots.

~~(S)~~ Air Force maintenance technician training is also conducted at Chisimaio. The training program effectively covers subjects such as pneumatics, hydraulics, and avionics with the aid of mockups. Approximately 100 maintenance technicians are trained annually.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

~~(S)~~ No reserves are separately identifiable from the Army reserves.

(b) Mobilization

~~(C/NF)~~ In the event of a national emergency, the mobilization of civil aviation can be expected. Three civil transports with at least 9,000-kg cargo capacity are operating currently or are available for use in Somalia, including two Boeing 707s and one Fokker F-27. All of these aircraft are in the fleet of Somali Airlines, which has been in existence since 1964 when the Somalis and Alitalia began joint operations. In 1978, the airline was nationalized and is now a total Somali operation except that maintenance on the two 707s is contracted to Lufthansa. One or two 707s could transport hundreds of troops in short order during a crisis. This option was reportedly used early in 1985 to fly troops to Berbera for operations and reinforcement to the Northern sector. Somalia reportedly has bought six CASA C-212 aviocar transport aircraft from Spain. The intended use of these aircraft is unknown. Two Dornier D-228 aircraft are expected to be added to the Somali Airlines inventory based on a previous arrangement financed by the Federal Republic of Germany. In a national crisis, use of these assets could be restricted by the limited availability of indigenous maintenance personnel.

(U) The total number of licensed civilian pilots in Somalia is not known. Somali Airlines reportedly employs about 40 pilots.

d. Air Defense Command

(1) Mission

~~(C)~~ The Air Defense Command (ADC), in conjunction with the Air Force, has the responsibility for defending Somali airspace with its missile units, providing air defense artillery protection for the sectors, corps commands, and various airbases in the country, and supplying warning of hostile air action with its radar network.

(2) Capabilities

(U) The capabilities of the Somali Air Defense Force (SADF) have deteriorated steadily since 1977. Some air defense artillery units which were formed in 1977, prior to receiving equipment from the Soviets, still have no ADA equipment. Approximately 50 percent of the ADA guns are inoperative and the missile systems are old and poorly maintained.

~~(S/NF)~~ Although the Air Defense Command is responsible for collaborating with the Somali Air Force in the defense of Somali airspace, there are no dedicated communication lines or networks between the Air Defense Force and the Air Force. This greatly limits Somali air defense capabilities. In fact, there are few dedicated lines between any of the radars and the air defense gun or missile sites.

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ The Somalis claimed to have only 19 Soviet radars in 8 different locations in late 1985 but they were found to have components of up to 50 different radar systems. The current backbone of the SADF is the American TPS-43 radar program. However, with only three of these systems, the Somalis lack the depth and redundancy of coverage to provide an effective early warning system. Although augmented with the aging Soviet radars, early warning capability is further hampered by limited operating hours caused by fuel shortages.

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ As a result of joint US-Somali efforts in late 1985, some SA-2 missiles in the Berbera area along the north coast of Somalia are in better shape than missiles at other sites. Unlike the other SA-2 sites, this unit would probably be able to launch six SA-2 missiles, given adequate early warning, fuel, and electrical power. Also, all indications are that the FAN SONG F radar at that site can once again perform its guidance mission.

~~(S/NF)~~ In general, there are still numerous impediments to an effective Somali air defense

system. A shortage of fuel and spare parts, poor condition of the equipment, limited training opportunities, a lack of basic preventive maintenance, and insufficient communications have impaired air defense capabilities. Without significant outside assistance, the Air Defense Command is unable to satisfactorily perform its mission.

(3) Personnel Strength

~~(S/NF)~~ 3,500 (tactical air defense units — 2,000; strategic air defense units — 1,500)

(4) Organization and Deployment

~~(S/NF)~~ The Air Defense Command is headquartered at Mogadishu. Although air defense units are organized on the basis of a separate service and retain responsibility for their own administration, logistic support, and technical training, they are operationally subordinate to the Army. Tactical air defense units such as artillery battalions are frequently attached to and controlled by Army field forces, while strategic air defense units such as surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and radar battalions remain sector/corps assets and defend airfields.

~~(S/NF)~~ The Air Defense Command is organized into seven brigades equipped with anti-aircraft guns and SAM systems and one brigade equipped with radar equipment. It is estimated that the majority of the 2,000 men assigned to tactical air defense are organized into approximately 15 deployed combat battalions. The 1,500 personnel assigned to strategic air defense units are primarily organized into 10 SAM battalions. In addition, personnel are assigned to radar sites located all over the country. Somalia's newest and most capable radars, the American TPS-43s, are located at Galcaio, Baidoa, and Hargeisa.

(5) Weapons and Equipment

(a) Tactical Air Defense, General

~~(S/NF)~~ The USSR was the primary supplier of air defense guns, related equipment, and spare parts to Somalia until 1977. Since that time, China, Saudi Arabia, France, and Egypt have provided a limited quantity of equipment.

(b) ~~(S/NF)~~ Summary of Tactical Air Defense Equipment

Air Defense Guns:	Country of Origin	Number in Inventory
12.7-mm, DSHK	UR	60
14.5-mm MG, ZPU-2	UR	40
20-mm NFI	IT	80
20-mm, HSS-804	EG	10
20-mm, Centaure	FR	20
23-mm, ZU-23	UR	10
30-mm, HSS 831	EG	4
37-mm, M1939 (twin)	UR, EG, PRC	160
40-mm NFI	Unk	30
40-mm, M42	SA	8
40-mm, Bofors L/70	SA	8
57-mm, S-60	UR	20
85-mm gun, M1944	UR	10
90-mm gun, NFI	IT	4
100-mm, KS-19	UR	25
Man-Portable Missile Type		
SAM, SA-7 Lchr	UR, EG	5-10

(c) *Strategic Air Defense, General*

~~(S/NF)~~ The Soviet Union provided Somalia with SA-2 and SA-3 missiles in two phases. In 1973, SA-2 missiles were installed in classic Soviet style in Mogadishu. Buildings, bunkers, and the necessary support structures were constructed, then the missiles were delivered. In 1976-77, the remaining SA-2 battalions and all the SA-3 battalions were established but were deployed in a short period of time. During this time period, some of the units had no permanent site preparation as the units were deployed directly into desert locations where they remain.

~~(S/NF)~~ There are three missile brigades in Somalia — two for SA-2 and one for SA-3 missiles. Each SA-2 battalion site has six launchers and each SA-3 site has three four-rail launchers.

(d) ~~(S/NF)~~ *Summary of Strategic Air Defense Units*

Unit	Location
3d (SA-2) Missile Brigade	Mogadishu
1st (SA-2) Battalion	Baledogle
2d (SA-2) Battalion	Mogadishu
3d (SA-2) Battalion	Mogadishu
U/I (SA-2) Technical Battalion	Mogadishu
U/I (SA-2) Training Battalion	Mogadishu
4th (SA-2) Missile Brigade	Berbera
1st (SA-2) Battalion	Hargeisa
2d (SA-2) Battalion	Berbera
3d (SA-2) Battalion	Berbera
4th (SA-2) Battalion	Hargeisa
5th (SA-2) Technical Battalion	Zeila (unconfirmed)
25th (SA-3) Missile Brigade	Baledogle
1st (SA-3) Battalion	Baledogle
2d (SA-3) Battalion	Mogadishu
3d (SA-3) Battalion	Baledogle
U/I (SA-3) Technical Battalion	Baledogle

(6) *Status of Equipment*

(a) *Tactical Air Defense Equipment*

~~(S/NF)~~ The condition of most air defense guns and associated equipment is poor. Many of the weapons suffer worn gear assemblies and barrels, rusty and missing components, and inoperative sights. In addition, a large number of the electronic fire control systems are not functioning due to poor maintenance procedures and a shortage of spare parts. Reporting indicates that Ethiopia has flown in the past over Somali positions along the border with almost virtual impunity due, in part, to the ineffectiveness of the Somali tactical air defense.

(b) *Strategic Air Defense Equipment*

~~(S/NF)~~ One of the SA-2 missile sites in Berbera was upgraded in late 1985 but most are in extremely poor condition and not effective. The guidance radar at Berbera is reportedly operational; however, at some of the other SA-2 sites, a missile could probably be fired but could not be tracked to its intended target. In general, the SA-3 missile sites are in the best condition and are the easiest to repair and put into operational condition. An important problem to missile units is the lack of a dedicated communication between the battalions

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and their brigade headquarters. The R-405 radio provides a common net for all air defense missile units.

~~(S/NF)~~ Somali maintenance and upkeep of missile systems varies from one site to the next. For example, at the 2d Battalion SA-2 site in Berbera, missiles were badly weathered and corroded in October 1985. They were reportedly last fueled around 1981. With only four of the six launchers loaded, one of those was not completely hooked up. By contrast, 3d Battalion missiles in the same area were not nearly as corroded. The commander of this site had taken better care of his assets. The launchers were oiled and lubricated and were capable of 360-degree azimuth and 90-degree vertical movement during testing and maintenance. In addition, the optical guidance system appeared operational.

(7) Logistics

~~(S/NF)~~ The logistic system supporting the Air Defense Command is generally unsatisfactory. There is no capability in Somalia to calibrate testing equipment. Although the Somalis have a knowledge of electrical and electronic calibration, they cannot accomplish it. As a result, calibration support must be accomplished out-of-country. With equipment out of calibration, the missiles cannot be accurately prepared for firing.

~~(S/NF)~~ In each brigade, there is reportedly a five-vehicle support van set, described as one mechanical van, one test van, one spare parts van, one workshop van, and one calibration van. The test vans are new and have never been used. Although there are numerous spare parts in Somalia for repair of missile systems, distributing parts to units in need is a very significant problem. The Somalis do not conscientiously distribute spare parts to units in need as a result of lacking an established maintenance management system.

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ For radars, there is no central storage distribution system available to assemble and disperse vital spare parts. Consequently, there is no way to move a spare part from a unit holding it to a unit needing it. The logistical support concept dictates that each radar system keeps a supply of spare parts for its own use. This hoarding of spare parts is often a detriment to the entire radar system operational posture.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

~~(S/NF)~~ All gun crews coming to the SADF receive basic military and air defense instruction at the Jalle Siad Military Academy in Mogadishu. Though organized as a separate branch, personnel in the SADF retain their status as members of the Army. A potential, yet mostly unexploited, source of personnel for surveillance radar operators is the Somali Air Force. Dozens of navigators have been essentially unemployed for years since their transport fleet is practically nonexistent. However, they tend to be placed in nonoperational assignments at Mogadishu airport or assume low-level staff functions at SAF headquarters. Information on personnel retention is not available.

(9) Training

~~(S/NF)~~ The missile units lack fully qualified personnel resulting from minimal training, lack of qualified instructors, and inoperative equipment. Virtually all field grade officers in the SADF were trained in the Soviet Union. They now have reached command positions. A US-sponsored radar intercept course produced several Somalis in mid-1985 who were judged capable of identifying tracks (altitude, speed, and heading) and forwarding this information to higher authority using the TPS-43 radars. In addition, six air navigators were said to be capable of controlling, using the TPS-43 radar, two simultaneous intercepts and returning each fighter to an orbit point for further engagements. These skills, however, will diminish with time unless follow-on training is conducted. Effective follow-on proficiency training

normally involves the purchase of simulators. However, certain of these skills may be maintained if the operators practice on civil targets as has been recommended. In April 1983, one SA-2 missile was launched at two US Navy F-14 aircraft. Since the pilots did not note a lock-on by the missile's radar system, the missile may have been fired at the aircraft without the benefit of any guidance radar. A more recent incident in March 1985 involved a private geodetic aircraft, a Cessna 404, which was fired upon by a surface-to-air missile in the Hargeisa area. Again, the aircraft was not hit or damaged. The condition of most air defense equipment suggests a lack of training on basic preventive maintenance procedures.

~~(S/NF)~~ Indications in early 1986 were that Somali air defense radars in Baidoa and Hargeisa and colocated air force units were operating practically autonomously of one another. Attempts by instructors at Baidoa to include the air defense unit in air force training scenarios have been unsuccessful. The radar continues to be used solely for air defense/antiaircraft artillery early warning.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

~~(S)~~ There are no known reserve units or mobilization plans.

e. Paramilitary Forces

(1) Somali National Police (SNP)

(a) Mission

~~(S/NF)~~ Responsible for the protection of national buildings and foreign embassies. The SNP also maintains checkpoints in urban areas for monitoring undocumented movement and coordinates closely with the Somali military.

(b) Capabilities

~~(S/NF)~~ The SNP is headquartered in Mogadishu and deployed countrywide. It is more highly regarded by Somalis than the military forces and considered the best of all military and/or paramilitary units in Somalia despite critical personnel shortages in some areas. The Somali Police force is well trained, well disciplined, and well equipped. West Germany has provided advisers to the SNP since independence.

(c) Personnel Strength

(S) 20,000

(d) Organization

~~(S/NF)~~ In a mid-1984 reorganization, the SNP was taken from the Ministry of Defense and placed under the Interior Ministry. In the past, the SNP had been organized into 50- to 100-man divisions commanded by police colonels and had headquarters in every regional capital. Subordinate district commands with four or five policemen were led by captains or first lieutenants. Under the districts were outposts with one or two policemen. Almost all SNP personnel are volunteers. While the basic structural organization has not changed, some police maneuver battalions were noted in joint military-police operations in northern Somalia targeted against insurgent activities.

(e) Status of Equipment

~~(S/NF)~~ The SNP equipment, specifically trucks, are more suited to the environment than those of the Army. Individual weapons are service revolvers or rifles (mostly AK-47s); however, the SNP are rarely seen armed except for special embassy guards or members on security details. The communications structure is such that the policeman at an outpost

can start a message which can reach the headquarters of the SNP in a matter of a few hours. Eighty percent of the communications equipment is considered serviceable at any given time. The SNP is expected to receive two Dornier D-228 aircraft from West Germany at which time two older aircraft (Dornier D-28s) will be retired. In addition, at least 60 new 5-ton trucks from West Germany were delivered in late 1985 and early 1986. Some small arms have been provided to the SNP from France as well as personnel equipment and clothing from Italy.

(2) Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF)

(a) Mission

~~(S/NF)~~ Historically, the WSLF mission has been to oppose Ethiopian forces in the Ogaden and to ultimately free that region from Ethiopian domination. Its mission in the past also included recruiting and training small groups of Ethiopian Ogadenis to perform subversion/sabotage operations against their government. The current WSLF mission closely supplements the Somali military mission within the Ogaden border region.

(b) Capabilities

~~(S/NF)~~ The WSLF is included as a Somali paramilitary force because of its long close association with Somalia. The WSLF has relied heavily upon Somali financial, material, and political support. In early 1982, President Siad ordered the Somali Army to take complete control over the activities of the WSLF because of problems stemming from internal feuds, inefficiency, and corruption.

~~(S/NF)~~ The WSLF has been one of the primary insurgent forces in the Ogaden since the mid-1970s, when it was moderately successful in harassing Ethiopian convoys and outposts. During the 1977-78 Ogaden war, the WSLF was integrated with the Somali Army. After the Somali defeat in that conflict, President Siad loosened the WSLF's ties with the SNA, which resulted in disarray for the WSLF. In January 1984, the WSLF successfully sabotaged the Ethiopia-Djibouti rail line, causing numerous casualties and major damage. For the most part, though, the WSLF has been limited in the 1980s to holding defensive positions on the disputed border and conducting limited harassment raids against the Ethiopians in the Ogaden. Peace initiatives between Somalia and Ethiopia, begun in early 1986, could reduce levels of support from Somalia for the Ogadeni-dominated WSLF.

(c) Personnel Strength

~~(S)~~ 1,000

(d) Organization

~~(S/NF)~~ The WSLF is believed to be organized into three guerrilla operation commands with a total of six divisions.

(e) Status of Equipment

~~(S/NF)~~ The primary weapons of the WSLF are small arms, AK-47 and G-3 rifles, grenades, and antitank and antipersonnel mines.

(3) Police Field Forces (Darawishta)

(a) Mission

~~(S)~~ Border patrol, counterinsurgency, and reinforcement of conventional police to control serious civil disorders. The Darawishta has a military mission in wartime and coordinates its operations with the Army on a regular basis.

(b) Capabilities

~~(S)~~ The Darawishta Division (mobile division) is capable of independent operation as light infantry. The Darawishta is well trained for controlling limited border violations but has been overwhelmed by the current insurgency by the SDSF and SNM.

(c) Personnel Strength

~~(S)~~ 2,400

(d) Organization

~~(S)~~ The Darawishta Division is subordinate to the National Police, who report directly to the President. The division is organized into six battalions. Each battalion has about 400 men. Each battalion is composed of three regular companies and a command company, each manned by about 110 men. Each company has a command platoon; three troop platoons of three squads each armed with antitank rockets; a weapons platoon of two mortar squads; and two machinegun squads.

(e) Status of Equipment

~~(S)~~ The Darawishta is equipped as light infantry and armed primarily with rifles, pistols, and machineguns.

(4) Other

~~(S)~~ In addition to the foregoing paramilitary force the following forces also have some potential for augmenting the regular forces in the event of hostilities.

(a) Territorial Police

~~(S)~~ There is a territorial police or guard force of about 4,000 men, which could serve as a substantial local defense or rear area security force in the event of major hostilities. The territorial police comes under the operational control of the SNP. It consists of one division command HQ for each of the 16 regions in Somalia. Each division is commanded by a major or lieutenant colonel. The 16 divisions are further divided into 84 district offices commanded by lieutenants or noncommissioned officers. Territorial police man positions along the border and the large villages. In all, there are about 300 offices of 3 to 15 men each.

(b) National Security Service (NSS)

~~(S/NP)~~ The NSS mission is to maintain internal security and coordinate all domestic and foreign intelligence collection activities. It effectively monitors possible threats to the regime and enforces stringent security laws enacted by Siad. It operates in the general areas of intelligence, counterintelligence, espionage, and technical intelligence. Its external efforts are focused primarily on collecting and evaluating information on the capabilities and intentions of Ethiopia and Kenya, and on reporting on border incidents and the activities of dissidents in neighboring countries. It also keeps abreast of the activities of foreign nationals in Somalia, monitors foreign radio broadcasts, and provides security for top-level government officials. Its total strength, organization, and equipment are unknown. At the present time the NSS maintains an antiterrorist unit to respond to increased insurgent terrorist activities. The group includes a combat department composed of paramilitary forces trained by West German police advisory personnel. The combat unit responds to terrorist acts and assists the SNA and police in counterinsurgent activity. The total strength of this unit is about 60 men.

f. ~~(S/NF)~~ Total Military Personnel Strength

Army	40,000
Navy	2,000+
Air Force	2,000
Air Defense	3,500
Darawishta	2,400
Western Somali Liberation Front	1,000
Total	50,900+

g. ~~(S)~~ Foreign Military Presence

(1) ~~(S)~~ Foreign Military In-Country

West Germany:	7	Advisory team training police and maintaining police vehicles
Italy	50	Technical assistance for M-47 tanks and some pilot training for SAF.
Zimbabwe	10(est) ¹	Assisting Air Force with Hawker-Hunter Aircraft.
People's Republic of China:	20	Assisting Air Force with F-6 aircraft
Pakistan (possible)	5-10(est)	Assisting Air Force with F-6 aircraft.

¹~~(S)~~ Mercenaries, not sponsored by the Zimbabwe Government.

(2) ~~(S/NF)~~ Presence Abroad

West Germany:	2	Selected Military Training
Italy:	10-15	Police

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SOMALIA

Appendix

Installation BE List (U)

Name	BE Number	Category	Latitude	Longitude
Baledogle Air Defense School	0911-00208	90130	02-37-00N	044-54-00E
Baledogle Air Field	0911008807	80051	02-40-32N	044-47-30E
Balenbale Area	0809CA0023	70200	05-45-52N	045-45-51E
Berbera Afd (NEW)	0790-08819	80080	10-23-30N	044-57-00E
Berbera Port A Naval Fac	0790-00006	95100	10-26-30N	045-00-30E
Berbera SAM Site	0790CA0018	87220	10-21-30N	044-59-45E
Berbera SAM Site	0790DA0002	87220	10-22-20N	044-56-50E
Berbera SAM Support Facility	0790DA0001	87722	10-23-32N	044-58-43E
Chisimaio Port A Naval Fac	0931-00044	95000	00-23-03S	042-32-50E
Chisimaio Afd	0931-08843	80050	00-22-57S	042-28-30E
Chisimaio Naval Stor A Supply Base	0931DA0001	97000	00-22-03S	042-33-16E
Dusa Mareb Mil Instl	0808-00015	91120	05-31-00N	046-24-00E
Galcaio Afd	0808-08002	80104	06-46-43N	047-27-10E
Goldogob Area	0808XDC123		06-57-00N	047-19-00E
Garoe Mil Instl	0790CA0030	91120	08-24-35N	048-28-15E
Hargeisa Intl Afd	0790-08003	80053	09-31-07N	044-05-21E
Hargeisa SAM Site NW	0790CA0026	87220	09-35-08N	044-00-21E
Hargeisa SAM Site SW	0790CA0025	87220	09-31-55N	044-02-10E
Hargeisa Mil Instl	0790-00090	91120	09-33-03N	044-03-50E
Iscia Baidoa Afd	0911-08004	80051	03-06-11N	043-37-38E
Iscia Baidoa Mil Instl	0911-00033	91120	03-06-40N	043-28-35E
Mandera Mil Instl	0790CA0016	90100	09-55-00N	044-42-50E
Mogadishu	0911-09997	70210	02-01-56N	045-19-59E
Mogadishu SAM Site	0911CA0019	87230	02-07-55N	045-17-15E
Mogadishu SAM Site	0911CA0020	87220	02-05-50N	045-21-36E
Mogadishu SAM Site	0911CA0023	87220	02-02-29N	045-15-19E
Mogadishu Ord Eq, Depot	0911-00026	90110	02-00-20N	045-17-45E
Mogadishu Coastal Defense	0911-00021	98100	02-01-16N	045-20-20E
Mogadishu Naval Command HQ	0911-00168	96100	02-04-00N	045-22-00E
Support Fac	0911CA0007	87722	02-04-27N	045-17-32E
Mogadishu International Afd	0911-08003	80060	02-00-33N	045-18-33E
Mogadishu Army HQ/MOD	0911-00006	89300	02-04-25N	045-18-35E
		91110		
Uanle Uen SAM Site	0911CA0030	87220	02-39-15N	044-49-20E
Uanle Uen SAM Site	0911CA0029	87230	02-38-38N	044-47-08E
Uanle Uen SAM Site	0911CA0027	87230	02-42-02N	044-46-59E
Uanle Uen SAM Support Fac	0911CA0028	87722	02-38-24N	044-46-27E

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SUDAN

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1. GOVERNMENT

a. (U) Key Government Officials

Prime Minister and Minister of Defense: *Sadiq Siddiq al-Mahdi*

Minister of Foreign Affairs: *El Sherif Zein El Abdin El Hindi*

Minister of Interior: *Sid Ahmed El Hussein*

Chairman, Supreme Council: *Ahmed Al Mirghani*

Other Members, Supreme Council: *Mohammed Abdallah Hassan Yassin, Idris Abdallah El Banna, Dr. Ali Hassan Taj El Din, Dr. Pacifico Lado Loleik*

b. Type and Stability of Government

(U) Sudan's contemporary political history, since the country gained independence from the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium on 1 January 1956, has been marked by coups, antigovernment plots, and the legacy of a nation divided between northern Arabs and animist or Christian black Africans in the south. In 1958 a military coup overthrew the postindependence civilian parliamentary regime. Although surviving its own military coup attempt, the government collapsed in 1964 against a background of public demonstrations over its inability to solve Sudan's political and economic problems. The successor civilian parliamentary regime was unable to govern decisively, as its various political and religious factions could not gain broad popular support. This government was ousted in a 1969 coup of leftist field grade officers led by then Colonel Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiri.

(U) Nimeiri quickly moved to consolidate his political power and control over the military. Constitutional changes granted Nimeiri broad appointive and emergency powers, in effect authorizing the President to unilaterally act on any measure. Nimeiri used this power to create a parallel court system of security and military tribunals to guarantee his rule.

~~(S/NF)~~ By 1983, two decisions eroded Nimeiri's preeminent position. Administrative subdivision of the semiautonomous Southern Region alienated southern Sudanese, who viewed the action as a northern attempt to dilute the region's influence as a single political unit, and to remove protections of local customs and lifestyles. Application of Sharia (Islamic legal code) in 1983 further alienated southern Sudanese, including a number of northern Muslims. Many resented its radical tenets and disrespect for Sudan's tradition of religious tolerance. These actions sparked a resurgence of the longstanding southern insurgency, currently waged by the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA). Senior military officers increasingly began to question Nimeiri's judgment, believing that his actions only intensified the insurgency and increased instability throughout the country. Longstanding opponents to Nimeiri became strident in their calls for his overthrow. These organizations included the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP), Ansar and Khatmiyyah sects, Muslim Brotherhood, Baath Party, Beja People's Congress, Abyei Liberation Organization, and disparate western Sudanese dissidents. Strikes and other public demonstrations paralyzed the government by late 1984 and senior military leaders, fearful of coup attempts by radical younger officers or political and religious extremists, ousted President Nimeiri in a bloodless coup on 6 April 1985 while he was out of the country.

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(S/NF) A Transitional Military Council (TMC) and a civilian-led cabinet were established. The TMC composed six of the country's senior military officers by rank, six officers who commanded key combat units or vital military districts in the Khartoum area, two "token" southerners, and the Director of Military Intelligence. Despite early optimism and a promise to hold national elections by 1986, Sudan's political situation was chaotic throughout the transitional period. Although early communiqués called for national reconciliation with the south, the insurgency continued throughout 1985, as the TMC rejected SPLA conditions for a cease-fire. Unable to reach decisions in the face of internal political factionalism and increasing public demands, the TMC failed to effectively address Sudan's deteriorating economy and political stability.

(S/NF) Despite fears of a military coup or a possible extension of the transitional period, elections were held as scheduled in April 1986, installing a civilian government to replace the TMC. The Ansar Movement's Umma Party, led by Sadiq Siddiq al-Mahdi, won an electoral majority and was able to form a coalition government. The newly created Constituent Assembly, comprising 301 members, elected Sadiq as Prime Minister. Ahmed Al Mirghani, leader of the Khatmiyyah's Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), was elected as Chairman of the Supreme Council, formally the head of state. The Prime Minister retains control over all Cabinet-level government ministries. Eighteen ministries were created, and are proportionally led by representatives of the Constituent Assembly's primary parties.

(S/NF) Sadiq pledged to create a "national unity" government, representing Sudan's varied political parties and diverse ethnic groups. Sadiq subsequently called for a national conference to negotiate an end to the southern insurgency. However, Sadiq has not yet proven to be a commanding leader or builder of effective coalitions. Cabinet appointments appear to be based more on patronage than regional proportion, reducing the prospects for a national consensus. Southern Constituent Assembly members' demands, including a secular constitution and equal distribution of national resources, have been ignored. Additionally the southern membership requested two seats in the Sovereignty Council and immediate abrogation of Sharia. Inaction on these demands led to a southern walkout from the assembly on 6 May 1986, indicating that cooperation and compromise in the coalition government will be difficult to achieve and maintain. When the Constituent Assembly reconvened in September 1986 after a recess, a continuing southern boycott of the meetings, two adjournments due to a lack of a quorum, and partisan behavior further risked discrediting Sadiq's government in the eyes of the public.

c. Internal Threat

(S/NF) The primary threat to Sudan is the southern insurgency. The SPLA was created in 1983, following the desertion of the SPAF's 104th and 105th Infantry Battalions. By late 1983, the dissidents announced creation of the SPLA, under the leadership of John Garang de Mabior, a US-educated former SPAF lieutenant colonel.

(S/NF) Despite Nimeiri's overthrow, the SPLA has continued to expand its area of operations in the south. Approximately one-quarter of Sudan's 51,000-strong armed forces are engaged with the SPLA. Since late 1985, the SPLA has increased the tempo and scope of its military activities throughout southern Sudan. Operating from base camps inside Ethiopia, and from the Boma Plateau in southeastern Sudan, SPLA units clashed with elements of the Sudanese People's Armed Forces (SPAF) in eastern Equatorial Province and conducted several probing actions near Kurmuk in southern Blue Nile Province. Insurgent activity also increased throughout Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal provinces. By mid-1986 the SPLA had captured Yirol, Rumbek, and Pachala. Insurgent movements were reported in central Equatoria and southern Kordofan Provinces, increasing the likelihood of additional

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SPLA military operations in regions considered to be outside of its normal operational area. The SPLA controls the lines of communication in the south. Government forces retain control only in the region's key towns. The SPAF has been unable to conduct effective counterinsurgent sweep operations against the SPLA. SPLA insurgents equipped with SA-7s have attacked SPAF aircraft, successfully destroying a Buffalo and a Puma helicopter by mid-1986. A Sudanese F-27 civilian airliner was also downed near Malakal by SPLA forces, who claimed that the government was using civilian aircraft to resupply their southern garrisons.

~~(S/NF)~~ Expanded SPLA operations have placed increasing pressure on Khartoum and have defined the major vulnerabilities of the SPAF. Widespread insurgent activity has taxed the SPAF's limited logistics capability. Logistic inadequacies and insufficient manpower have precluded the SPAF from mounting counterinsurgency operations and protecting likely guerrilla targets simultaneously. Many garrisons have reported desperate conditions, with serious deficiencies in ammunition, rations, and medical supplies. Consequently, morale within the SPAF is a growing problem. Desertion from southern garrisons facing rebel assaults has increased, and several SPAF officers reportedly have refused orders detailing them to the south. The growing morale problem and the inability of the SPAF to adequately resupply or reinforce key garrison towns threaten the government's entire position in the south. The SPAF does not have an effective counterinsurgency doctrine and has not conducted operations aggressively. Consequently, with secure base areas and little threat of counterattack by government forces, the SPLA will continue to dictate the military situation in the south for the foreseeable future.

⊕ SPAF elements were successful in resupplying the two besieged garrison towns of Malakal and Wau in the south by November 1986. Military escorts for barges reaching Malakal and further shipments to Wau by train created a more favorable mood in these towns from the "siege" mentality which had existed for several months. With the exception of Bor, the government seemed to enjoy some success in opening resupply routes to all major southern garrison areas and towns which had been cut off by rebel activity during the rainy season.

⊕ In November 1986, Bor remained cut off from resupply by road, river, or air landing and required resupply primarily by airdrop. However, many of the airdropped supplies have missed the SPAF-controlled areas and have been recovered by SPLA forces. Army forces were gathering in Juba in October and November 1986 for the purpose of conducting a relief operation of the Bor garrison. This operation, which was a high priority for the military, was reportedly being delayed by government leaders who believed that such an operation could harm the chances for anticipated negotiations with the SPLA.

~~(S/NF)~~ In May 1985, the TMC reestablished relations with Libya in an attempt to end support for the SPLA. Qadhafi quickly agreed and as an additional incentive for improved relations promised to provide substantial famine relief assistance to Sudan. The TMC's policy of rapprochement, however, resulted in the release of Libyan-trained dissidents from prison, the return of Sudanese dissidents from Libya, and the reestablishment of a Libyan People's Bureau in Khartoum.

~~(S/NF)~~ Libya has pursued a dualistic policy of diplomacy and subversion to influence and weaken the TMC. Libya has built a large clandestine network in Sudan. A network of Libyan-supported Sudanese Revolutionary Committees have been financed and armed throughout western and central Sudan. Libyan intelligence and terrorist operatives are known to be operating in Khartoum, organizing the activities of the Sudanese Revolutionary Committees. Since Sudan's security services were undergoing reorganization following the

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coup, Libyan activities are not being effectively monitored and subversion could pose a serious threat in the long term.

d. External Threat

~~(S/NF)~~ Sudan perceives its primary external threat as emanating from Ethiopia, largely through its increased assistance to the SPLA. Libya, despite normalized relations, remains a threat to Sudan through its support to the Revolutionary Committees. Militarily, both Libya and Ethiopia would find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to sustain large-scale military operations for any length of time given the inhospitable terrain, the distances involved, and the concomitant difficulties in establishing lines of supply and communications. These difficulties would be particularly hard for Libya's relatively small military to overcome. Ethiopia's Armed Forces are vastly superior to their Sudanese counterparts in both numbers and weaponry, and they could initiate, if not sustain, a major occupation of Sudanese territory. However, the Ethiopian forces currently are preoccupied in fighting a counter guerrilla war in Eritrea and Tigre Provinces, and they are likely to remain so committed for the foreseeable future. Also, the success of an Ethiopian military operation in Sudan would be dependent on Soviet logistic support. There is a threat of further Ethiopian airstrikes into Sudan, however. Limited attacks on refugee camps were undertaken in 1985 and 1986, believed by the Ethiopians to support dissident activity.

~~(S/NF)~~ While there is no potential for a lengthy invasion and occupation of Sudan, important military and commercial targets (including the capital city, Khartoum) are located within the combat radii of both Ethiopian and Libyan military aircraft. At the present time, Sudanese air defenses are inadequate to defend against even limited airstrikes from either country.

e. Communist Influence

~~(S)~~ The Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) may have as many as 15,000 members and some 10,000 additional sympathizers among labor groups, urban intellectuals, and students. The party was decimated after the failure of the 1971 coup in which the SCP was heavily involved. Popular support for the SCP is limited, however, reflected by the party's poor showing in the 1986 elections.

~~(S)~~ Despite a rapprochement with the Soviet Union in 1985, the Sudanese remain suspicious of Soviet intentions. The Soviet support of the unsuccessful Ansar coup attempt in 1976 prompted Sudan to expel all Soviet advisers in 1977, which halted military assistance from the USSR. Sudan maintains correct diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and has made initial efforts at a rapprochement to give Sudan a more nonaligned image. Moscow would welcome better ties with Khartoum at the expense of the US to consolidate the Soviets' position in the Horn of Africa. Increased Soviet pressure and influence would give Moscow a direct link to the SCP, which has demonstrated good organizing capabilities and has developed contacts among junior officers in the Sudanese Armed Forces. Sudan has expressed interest in Soviet military assistance to replace or repair aging Soviet equipment. A Soviet delegation visited Sudan in late 1985 and a limited military assistance agreement may have resulted from a visit to Moscow by Sadiq in August 1986. Spare parts and maintenance have been identified by the Sudanese as priority objectives. Relations with other Communist countries such as the People's Republic of China (PRC), Romania, and Yugoslavia remain friendly. Indeed, the PRC has become a major supplier of military equipment to Sudan.

f. Economic Factors

~~(S)~~ The social, religious, and political strains that affect the Sudanese society are further

exacerbated by the continuing decline of the economy. High rates of unemployment, underemployment, and inflation, increasing balance-of-payment and foreign debt gaps, and periodic shortages of gasoline, medicine, and consumer goods all contribute to declining living standards. The country's financial situation is still characterized by heavy foreign debt, a large trade deficit, and high inflation.

(U) The economy of Sudan remains strained due to budgetary problems and the effects of drought. Although there has been some relief from drought conditions in much of Sudan, locust and pest infestations have damaged or destroyed a significant portion of agricultural products. Sudan remains dependent upon foreign donor support to feed its population in areas affected by these problems and in areas where the civil war has hindered agricultural production and the transport of relief supplies. There are more than 200 million acres of arable land, much of which is yet to be developed or has significant potential for improved utilization. Cotton is the principal foreign exchange earner followed by gum, arabic, sorghum, peanuts, livestock, and oil seeds. Wheat, sugar, and vegetables are important crops for domestic consumption. Oil has been discovered in Sudan, yet limited reserves, the expanded southern insurgency, and the mercurial nature of the international market militate against oil as a boon to the economy. The country may contain minerals such as asbestos, chromite, uranium and zinc, but they are largely unexplored. Sudan's size, lack of infrastructure, and shortage of capital will limit mineral exploration in the immediate future. The population of almost 23 million is not a burden but its high growth rate of 2.7 percent and the very large refugee population (1.1 million) advance the date when population will become a serious issue. Sudan's 1984 GDP was \$7.31 billion.

(S) The primary problem in Sudan involves a serious balance-of-payments gap and excessive foreign debt. Past policies which encouraged excessive large project development, constrained exports, and permitted import growth have resulted in a severe negative balance of payments and a debt which cannot be serviced. Since 1978, the government has begun to reverse export/import trends and the donors have responded by regularly rescheduling debt. This joint recovery effort will have to continue into the 1990s.

(S/NF) Military equipment production is limited to the manufacture of ammunition for 5.56-mm, 7.62-mm, .30-caliber, and .303-caliber small arms. Although total annual production capacity is 30 million rounds, the average annual rate of production in recent years has been only 12 million rounds. Until 1976 the Soviet Union was Sudan's leading arms, military equipment, and spare parts supplier. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the United States and the PRC had become Sudan's primary military suppliers. Egypt and Yugoslavia have provided limited quantities of the spare parts Sudan needs to keep its aging Soviet arms inventory operational. Since Nimeiri's ouster, Sudan has attempted to diversify its supply of military assistance, limiting its previously close relationship with the US.

g. Military and Political Alignment

(S) Sudan is a member of the Nonaligned Movement, Organization of African Unity (OAU), League of Arab States, and Arab League Collective Security Pact. A bilateral joint defense pact was signed by Egypt and Sudan in July 1976, as a direct result of the coup attempt earlier that month. The broader historical ties between Egypt and Sudan were reflected and their special military relationship reaffirmed in the Integration Charter, signed by the two countries in October 1982. The Charter emphasizes close cooperation in economic development and provides for increased coordination in military planning and training. Relations with Egypt have stabilized after strains that developed over Sudan's rapprochement with Libya and popular Sudanese demands for the extradition of Nimeiri. Terms of the Integration Charter have languished, however, although both nations continue

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to honor the mutual defense pact. Egypt supported the electoral process in Sudan, although it probably remains wary of the ruling Umma Party, which has traditionally opposed a strong Egyptian presence in Sudan.

~~(S/NF)~~ Reducing foreign support for the SPLA was the major objective in the TMC's efforts to normalize relations with Libya and Ethiopia. Sudan signed a military protocol with Libya in July 1985, and has accepted delivery of trucks, ammunition, and various other military supplies. Two Libyan BLINDER bombers deployed to Khartoum in March 1986 and conducted several bombing missions against SPLA insurgents. One of these aircraft remained in Sudan in late 1986 but was not performing missions in southern Sudan against dissident forces. While Sudan is not expected to become a staunch Libyan ally, promises of economic and security assistance will serve as an incentive to Sudan to support Libya's position on regional issues. During a visit to Tripoli in August 1986, Sadiq discussed with Qadhafi economic cooperation between their two countries and also persuaded Qadhafi to withdraw the 900 or so military personnel who had been in western Sudan and a source of concern to many government and military leaders. Continuing suspicion of Libyan intentions among key military officials may moderate Sudan's ties with Libya.

~~(S/NF)~~ Sudan was the first Arab country to offer to accept Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) fighters, after Israel's 1982 siege of Beirut caused their expulsion from Lebanon. As many as 600 PLO fighters maintain a base at Arkowit, approximately 50 km southwest of Port Sudan.

~~(S/NF)~~ Relations with the US are generally good, although not as close as they were under the Nimeiri regime. Prime Minister Sadiq visited the US in October 1986 to discuss bilateral relations and US assistance to Sudan. Continued US military assistance is considered crucial, but Sudan will avoid forms of cooperation that might fuel accusations that the US is establishing "bases" in Sudan.

~~(S/NF)~~ The Sadiq government is likely to continue these policies to demonstrate that it has broken cleanly with the policies of Nimeiri. While the new Sudanese Government may recognize the importance of US aid in the long term, relations with Sudan may become increasingly strained, as budget limitations restrict the amount of US assistance available to Sudan and continued influence by Libya could create a hostile political environment.

~~(S/NF)~~ The 1976 Sudanese-Egyptian mutual defense pact is Sudan's most important military agreement. Military assistance agreements have been concluded with other countries, however, including the Soviet Union (1968), Yugoslavia (1968), Czechoslovakia (1970), the PRC (1972), and the United States (1977). Egypt, the US, the United Kingdom, the USSR and the PRC, and (periodically) Yugoslavia maintain military missions in Sudan.

h. (U) Key US Officials

Chief of Mission (Khartoum): Ambassador G. Norman Anderson
Defense/Army Attache (Khartoum): LTC Michael R. Kenney, USA
Chief, Office of Military Cooperation: Col John C. Cody, USAF

2. MILITARY, GENERAL

a. (U) Key Military Officials

Prime Minister and Minister of Defense: *Sadiq Siddiq al-Mahdi*
Commander-in-Chief, Sudanese People's Armed Forces (SPAF): Gen *Fawzi Ahmed El Fadil*

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Chief of Staff, SPAF; Commander, Army: Maj Gen *Abdel Azim* Siddiq Mohamed

Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration: Maj Gen *Faisal* Mansour Shawir

Deputy Chief of Staff Operations: Maj Gen *El Sir* Mohamed Ahmed

Deputy Chief of Staff Logistics: Maj Gen *Mohatassim* El Saraj Ahmed

Navy Commander: Maj Gen *El Nur* Abd El Nur Idris

Air Force Commander: Maj Gen *Khalid* El Zein Ali

Air Defense Commander: Maj Gen *Mahdi* Babo Nimir

Military Intelligence Commander: Brig *Salah* Mustafa

National Police Commander: Lt Gen *Faisal* Mohammed *Khalil*

b. Position of the Armed Forces

(S/NF) The Prime Minister is the Commander in Chief of the Sudanese People's Armed Forces (SPAF). Command and control currently runs from the Prime Minister through the SPAF Chief of Staff to the individual service commanders. At present, the Prime Minister also holds the portfolio of Minister of Defense. Deputy Chiefs of Staff are responsible for functional directorates, including Administration, Operations, and Logistics. There are four military services: Army, Navy, Air Force, and Air Defense. SPAF General Headquarters and Air Force Headquarters are located in Khartoum. Navy and Air Defense Headquarters are located in Port Sudan. Army officers, however, occupy key positions in all services.

(S/NF) The SPAF is reorganizing; planning was well underway by mid-1986, although details are unknown. A division structure will likely be implemented, similar to that in place before 1984, replacing existing regional independent brigades. There are indications that the SPAF will increase its personnel strength, forming a second airborne division, increasing the Border Guards from a brigade to a reinforced division, and forming additional independent units. The complete implementation will probably take at least 3 or 4 years.

(C) As a professional, national force, the SPAF would defend the current regime against threat from Communists, fundamentalist Muslims, Baathists, and similar interest groups. However, their defense of the regime against any genuine popular uprising — most likely brought on by the weak economy and declining living conditions — is less certain. Indeed, knowledgeable Western officers express doubt that the average SPAF soldier would fire on his civilian countrymen.

(S/NF) Although traditionally considered apolitical, the SPAF has not hesitated to intervene in politics when civilian or military regimes appeared incapable of administering the country. Increased dissent noted in the SPAF in late 1985 has continued, despite the election of the new civilian government. SPAF officers remain frustrated as a result of the army's continuing stalemate in the south. Incompetence and indecisiveness have been blamed for the Army's defeats. SPAF garrison commanders have occasionally threatened desertion, citing poor resupply of food and ammunition.

(S/NF) Several senior SPAF officers expressed optimism in early 1987 due to a series of tactical victories in the south. Virtually all (including Prime Minister Sadiq) agree, however, that a total victory in the south is not feasible and a political solution must be vigorously sought.

c. Military Trends and Capabilities

(S/NF) Together with the command and control situation, the SPAF continues to face

severe problems in keeping its inventory of military equipment operational. Age, weapons of mixed origin, and lack of spare parts have been the major contributing factors that have caused as much as 70 percent of all equipment to be nonoperational. Nimeiri's demand that Soviet military advisers be withdrawn in the spring of 1977 led to a complete cutoff of spare parts from the USSR. The diversity of Sudan's equipment inventory makes logistic and maintenance support all the more difficult. A significant upgrade in SPAF combat capability came with the delivery by Libya of four MiG-23/FLOGGERS. Sudan also receives some spare parts and military assistance from Egypt and Yugoslavia for the Soviet weapons still in the inventory. This allows some Soviet air, air defense, and armor equipment to be kept operational. Additionally, in late 1986, the Soviet Ambassador to Sudan announced that the USSR was considering limited military assistance to the SPAF. Western sources have been contracted to provide spare parts and assistance for Western equipment in the inventory. A limited US program involves refurbishing SA-2 missiles and associated radar in Port Sudan. However, Sudan's scarcity of funds has restricted major arms purchases.

~~(S/NF)~~ Despite significant command problems and the low operational rates of weapons and equipment, the Sudanese People's Armed Forces (SPAF) are capable of maintaining internal order. The exception to this, however, is the deteriorating situation in southern Sudan where government forces are experiencing mounting defeats by the SPLA. Lack of operational aircraft and SPLA use of SAM missiles have degraded the Air Force's capability to provide close air support. At the same time, Sudan has little or no air defense and naval capability, and its military inventory continues to age and is poorly maintained. Sudan depends on its 1976 mutual defense pact with Egypt to meet any serious external threat from neighboring states such as Ethiopia and/or Libya.

d. Military Budget

~~(U/NF)~~ The military budget was \$134.4 million for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1986; this was 5.5 percent of the central government budget. In addition to the budgeted figure, Sudan obtains significant amounts of foreign military aid and loans for military activities. No service allocations are available. Dollar value converted at the official exchange rate of 2.5 pounds equals US \$1.00.

e. (U) Population

22,932 (estimate as of 1 July 1986); annual growth rate of 2.7 percent

Males (ages 15-49): 5,275,000; 241,000 annually reach military age (18); 3,224,000 fit for military service

Ethnic divisions: 39 percent Arab, 6 percent Beja, 52 percent black, 2 percent foreign, 1 percent other

Literacy: 20 percent

3. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

a. Army

(1) Mission

(U) To defend the national territory and maintain internal security.

(2) Capabilities

~~(S)~~ The SPAF could not defend against an attack from Egypt, Ethiopia, or Libya, although it could repel small-scale ground incursions from its other neighbors. In its

internal security role, the Army is capable of retaining control throughout the country, except in Bahr al Ghazal, Upper Nile, and southern Kordofan provinces. Recent SPLA advances threaten continued SPAF control of Equatoria and portions of Blue Nile Province.

(3) Personnel Strength

~~(S)~~ 51,000 estimated

(4) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

~~(C)~~ Noninfantry ground forces are organized into corps, except for the small Airborne Brigade. Each corps has its own command structure and is responsible for administrative matters such as personnel promotions, transfers, and specialized training. The Armored Corps includes one division, which is composed of two brigades. The corps attach units to regional commands where they fall under the operational control of the local infantry commander. The attached unit remains formally subordinate to its parent corps, however.

~~(S/NF)~~ Until 1983, there were six regional commands for the Southern, Eastern, Western, Northern, Red Sea, and Khartoum areas. (The Red Sea Command combines the Air Defense Force and the Navy within a joint organizational framework, but both services remain directly and individually subordinate to SPAF Headquarters.) Effective 1 September 1983, however, the other four regional commands were reordered and doubled in number. In addition, some of the new regional commands were subdivided into military sectors. The reinforced brigade (infantry brigade, plus attached units from other branches or services) is the ordinate military unit in each regional command. The regional command and infantry brigade headquarters are colocated in all but the Equatoria and the Roseires Regional Commands. SPAF reorganization, which began in 1986, will replace some independent brigades with a division structure.

~~(S/NF)~~ To combat acts of terrorism, such as hostage situations, there is the 144th Counterterrorist (CT) unit, an element of the Airborne Brigade. The unit was formed in 1978 and is designed for counterterrorist duties at Khartoum International Airport and for rapid deployment elsewhere in the country, transported by the Air Force's C-130 aircraft. The unit's personnel were trained initially by a British Special Air Service (SAS) Regiment team. They are armed primarily with 9-mm pistols and submachineguns, as well as 7.62-mm assault rifles and machineguns. As in the case of the Sudanese military generally, the unit suffers from inadequate communications, maintenance, and logistics support.

~~(S/NF)~~ Normal attrition has reduced the ranks of the 144th CT Unit to about one-third of its original 120-man strength. Specialized skills, such as sniping and building assault techniques, have atrophied from lack of training. In its only live hostage situation (Boma Game Park, July 1983), members of the rescue element were delayed in reaching the operational area and did not participate in the rescue mission. This unit did not become involved in the initial response to an attempted aircraft hijacking in early July 1986 when a would-be hijacker tried to divert a Sudan Air Boeing 707 en route from Baghdad to Khartoum to Israel. The military adamantly refused to accept any responsibility because they had been told by government officials to stay out of internal and external security business. The Military Intelligence Directorate did, however, dispatch a counterterrorist officer and a military explosives expert to the Khartoum Airport after the plane had safely landed.

(b) ~~(S)~~ Ground Combat Units

Major Tactical Units	Strength per Unit	
	Authorized	Average/Actual
8 Corps HQ	Unk	Unk
11 Cmd HQ	Unk	Unk
1 Armor Div	6,500	5,400
3 Armored Bdes	Unk	Unk
1 Artillery Corps	Unk	2,900
10 Infantry Bdes	Unk	2,000-3,000
1 Border Guard Bde	2,200	1,470
1 Republican Guard Unit	670	670
1 Presidential Body Guard Unit	200	200
2 Armored Bdes	Unk	Unk
3 Air Def Bdes	Unk	Unk
1 Airborne Bde	Unk	2,500

(c) Deployment

~~(S)~~ Troops are stationed throughout the country. Approximately one-quarter of the SPAF is in the south to combat the SPLA. This percentage varies from time to time when the SPAF reinforces units in the south for relief operations, etc. Units are also concentrated in the east, to protect vital economic targets. Current basic combat unit deployment is as follows:

Regional Command	Infantry Brigade	Headquarters
Northern	10th	Shandi
Central	1st	Al Ubayyid
Roseires	14th	Ad Damazin
Eastern	4th	Khasm al Qirbah
	20th (Indep)	Wad Madani
Western	7th	Al Fashir
Upper Nile	13th	Malakal
Bahr al Ghazal	12th	Waw
Equatoria	11th	Torit
Khartoum Area	Khartoum Garrison	Khartoum
Red Sea	—	Port Sudan

(5) Weapons and Equipment

(a) General

~~(S/NF)~~ Major combat equipment still consists primarily of aging Soviet tanks, armored personnel carriers (APCs), reconnaissance vehicles, and artillery. The remaining equipment (approximately 50 percent) is made up of a mix of US scout cars, tanks, and armored personnel carriers (APCs); British, West German, US, and Italian artillery; British, French, and Czechoslovak APCs; and Chinese light tanks. Small arms sources are primarily the UK, the PRC, and West Germany. Equipment on hand is no longer sufficient to meet current requirements. Ground equipment is old or inoperable, with spare parts difficult to obtain. The last Soviet military equipment was received in 1974 and included T-54/55 tanks and BRDM-2 armored reconnaissance vehicles. No Soviet-provided spare parts for USSR equipment have been received since Soviet advisers departed in 1977. Under a foreign

military sales (FMS) agreement, the US has delivered since 1980 M-113A2 APCs, M-60A3 tanks, M-125A2 mortar carriers for 81-mm mortars, 155-mm howitzers, and AN/PPS-5B ground radars. The PRC has delivered Type 62 tanks, 60-mm and 82-mm mortars, and 122-mm howitzers. A military protocol was signed with Libya in 1985. Substantial quantities of small arms and ammunition have been provided by Libya to the SPAF. France has delivered armored cars and air defense artillery equipment. Military assistance is provided primarily by the PRC, with some additional aid provided by the US, Egypt, West Germany, and France.

b. ~~(S)~~ Ground Weapons and Equipment

		Country of Origin	Total Inventory	
Mortars:	2-inch, (51.2-mm)	UK	100+	
	60-mm, Type 63	CH	190	
	60-mm, NFI	SA	90	
	81-mm, Brandt M1927/31	FR	125	
	81-mm, NFI	JO	12	
	82-mm, NFI	JO	12	
	81-mm, M31-or-M68	YO	7	
	81-mm, M29	US	12	
	3-inch, (81.48-mm)	UK	Unk	
	81-mm, Type 53	CH	Unk	
	82-mm, M37	UR	Unk	
	120-mm, M43	UR	12	
	120-mm, Brandt AM49	FR	24	
	120-mm, NFI	SA	8	
	RCLR, ATGM, MRL	57-mm, RCLR, probable USM18A1	SA	100
106-mm, RCLR, M40		IR, US	72	
ATGM, Swingfire		EG	4	
MRL, BM-21		EG	4	
Field Artillery:		76-mm, (M1942) ZIS-3	UR	18
	85-mm gun D-44	UR	12	
	25-pdr field gun, (87.6-mm)	UK	12	
	100-mm field gun, M1944, BS-3	UR	12	
	105-mm pack how, OTO Melara Mod. 56	IT	6	
	105-mm how, M101/M101 GE Modified	GE	18	
	122-mm how, M1938, M30	UR	35	
	122-mm field gun, D-74	UR	4	
	122-mm field gun or how, Type 60 or Type 54	CH	36	
	130-mm field gun, Type 59 or 59-1	CH	18	
	152-mm gun-how, D-20	UR	4	
	155-mm how, M114A1	US	12	
	155-mm FA, how, SP, AMX-13	FR	6	
	Armor:	Mdm Tk, T-54/55	UR, EG	155
		Mdm Tk, Type 59	CH	10
Mdm Tk, M-47		SA	17	
Mdm Tk, M-60A3		US	20	
Lt Tk, Type-62		CH	70	

	Country of Origin	Total Inventory
Lt Tk, M-41	SA	53
APC, BTR-50	UR	20
APC, BTR-60	UR	6
APC, BTR-152	UR	20
APC, OT-62A	CZ	20
APC, OT-64B	CZ	10
APC, Panhard M3	FR	14
APC, M-113A2	US	36
APC, Walid	EG	124
APC, Commando V-150	US	49
APC, AMX-VCI	FR	6
AV, Commando V-100	US	40
ARC, Ferret	UK	50
ARC, BDRM-2	UR	30
ARC, Saladin	UK	15
ARC, Panhard AML-245	FR	6
Recovery Vehicle, M-88A1	US	2
Tank Transport, NFI	US	6
Tank Transport, NFI	UR	4
Tank Transport, NFI	GE	8
ARV, AMX-13, Supt	FR	3
Ground Surveillance Radar:		
AN/PPS-5B	US	8

(6) Logistics

~~(S)~~ The extreme diversity of equipment, paucity of spare parts, and limited technical and organizational capability combine to produce poor maintenance and logistic support. As much as 70 percent of all equipment is nonoperational due to age, mixed origin, and lack of spare parts. The logistic support capability, with few exceptions, has not kept pace with the introduction of new equipment. Even when viewed in the African context, the logistics system is relatively unsophisticated and inefficient.

~~(S/NF)~~ The Army is heavily dependent upon technical advisory personnel, maintenance and repair equipment, and spare parts from abroad. Western sources have been contacted to provide spare parts and maintenance training for Western equipment in the inventory. Although US assistance to Sudan has been reduced, Sudan retains limited military ties with other Western nations. However, adverse terrain, poorly developed lines of communication, an inadequate maintenance system, the lack of a central supply system, the paucity of logistic facilities, and the scarcity of funds will continue to preclude efficient logistics operations.

~~(C)~~ The logistics as currently constituted could not support short-lived hostile incursions into neighboring countries, and any sustained large-scale cross-border operation would require external support. The system would also not be able to provide support to SPAF units in the south facing increased insurgent operations.

(7) Personnel Procurement and Retention

~~(S)~~ The armed forces are composed of volunteers who serve a minimum of 3 years.

Service quotas generally are filled with little difficulty by such voluntary recruitment. Six reenlistments are allowed, each for a 3-year period. Specialists and technicians serve a minimum of 9 years. The Army has a difficult time retaining specialists and technicians after their initial 9-year enlistment because these personnel are highly sought after by private enterprise.

(S) A conscription law was passed in July 1971, but was never implemented. It contained a mandatory military service obligation for all males between the ages of 18 and 30, for a term of 2 years. Still another bill, this time providing for 6 months of active duty, was passed by the People's Assembly in December 1982. In 1985, the Sudanese News Agency (SUNA) reported that the SPAF General Command had established an administrative framework to manage compulsory military service. Regional governors were said to have been contacted about the establishment of recruitment centers in their capital cities. A draft now would be very unpopular in Sudan. Furthermore, budgetary constraints probably would prevent any significant expansion of the SPAF's manpower levels.

(8) Training

(S) Individual basic training is considered good by Arab standards. The greatest weakness is in the training of maintenance and supply technicians. The training received at the Military College and the Command and Staff School is efficient and practical in comparison with training elsewhere in the region. The majority of foreign training assistance is provided by advisory teams from Egypt, the UK, and the PRC. The US provided mobile training team programs for the M60A3 tank, M113A2 APC, and M114A1 howitzer in 1982. The attendance of Sudanese Army personnel has been noted at schools in Egypt and at least 20 other countries which, in the past, included the Soviet Union.

(9) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

(S) A reserve program was part of the 1 July 1971 mandatory military service obligation law, which required that personnel be transferred into the reserve for 8 years following completion of active service. Neither the reserve program nor the conscript law, however, was ever put into effect. The 1982 legislation pertaining to compulsory military service also included provisions for reserve service. In addition, there has been planning that envisioned the National Defense Force or National Guard as a cadre that could train a future reserve force. Nevertheless, while planning may continue, budgetary constraints are likely to prevent the implementation of any significant reserve program in the foreseeable future.

(b) Mobilization

(S) There is no known national mobilization plan. Rapid mobilization of a large and effective force would be hindered by the necessity to maintain a large part of the Army in the south, the poor transportation infrastructure, and periodic severe fuel shortages. Former army members could be recruited, but insufficient arms and equipment and a poor logistic system preclude any appreciable increase in combat capabilities.

b. Navy

(1) Mission

(U) To defend the 610-NM national coastline, prevent smuggling, guard territorial fishing waters, and perform search-and-rescue missions.

(2) Capabilities

(S) The naval fleet comprises aged, secondhand gifts, and purchases from other navies, resulting in a mixture of vessels that was not planned with specific Sudanese defense requirements in mind. The minimal, short-duration, coastal patrolling and search-and-rescue capabilities that exist could be significantly enhanced if more of the patrol vessels were operational. At present, coastal patrols are directed, with some success, exclusively against smuggling activities. Combat capabilities are nonexistent. The Navy lacks adequate funding and shipborne-trained personnel, and is dependent upon foreign assistance for future development.

(3) Personnel Strength

(S) 1,500

(4) Ship Strength

Type	Op	Nonop	In Reserve	Status Unknown
PC (patrol craft)		1		
PB (patrol boat)	3	4		
PBR (river/roadstead patrol boat)		4		
LCU (utility landing craft)		2		
AO (oiler)		1		
AGS (auxiliary)		1		
YFL (launch)		1		
YW (yard and service craft)		1		
Total: 18	3	15	0	0

(5) Organization and Deployment

(a) General Service

(S) The Sudanese Navy is organized into six squadrons of two to four ships each. The first, second, and fifth squadrons comprise patrol vessels of different sizes; the third squadron is composed of two landing craft; the auxiliary and service craft make up the fourth squadron; and the sixth squadron comprises harbor craft. A general service battalion, dockyard, and naval school are located at the Flamingo Bay Naval Base. Naval Headquarters is in Port Sudan. There are six permanent and two part-time coastal observation stations, which are manned by a coastal security battalion of about 330 men. A naval liaison office is maintained in Khartoum.

(b) Marine Corps

(U) The Sudanese News Agency has reported on the antismuggling operations of a small marine unit (possibly the coastal security battalion), but details are unavailable.

(6) Status of Equipment

(S) Except for a Sudanese-built launch, all naval craft have been acquired from Yugoslavia, Iran, and West Germany. Only the three German Abeking and Rasmussen 29-meter Class patrol boats are operational. Nonoperational vessels include two Yugoslav KRALJEVICA Class patrol craft, four Yugoslav TROGIR Class patrol boats, four US Sewart 40-foot Dolphin Class river patrol boats (awaiting engine refits), two Yugoslav DTK-221 Class landing craft, one Yugoslav PN-12 Class tanker, one Yugoslav PB-35 Class general

tender (used as a hydrographic survey ship), and one Yugoslav PV-6 Class water tender. Sudan is trying to locate spare parts for the West German patrol boats.

(7) Logistics

(S) A small marine machine shop (purchased from Yugoslavia) and a drydock facility, both located at the Flamingo Bay Naval Base, give the Navy a very limited ship repair capability. The drydock facility cannot be used, however, because of settling in the roadbed of the railway slip used to lift vessels out of the water. The only other drydock facility, a commercial venture located in Port Sudan, could be appropriated by the Navy in an emergency. However, the long waiting time for its use, as well as the expense involved, precludes routine scheduling of naval craft repairs at the commercial facility. The Navy logistics system provides only minimal support because of an acute shortage of funds for purchasing spare parts and training maintenance personnel.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

(U) Refer to paragraph 3.a.(7).

(9) Training

(S) The naval school at Flamingo Bay Naval Base maintains adequate classroom facilities to teach basic seamanship, navigation, gunnery, continuous wave communications, infantry skills, and electrical/electronic theory. Courses in mechanical and electrical engineering also are offered, but they suffer from a lack of training aids, lab equipment, and qualified instructors. Radar and radio technician schools are established, but they also suffer from the same deficiencies.

(S) All naval personnel are required to undergo 6 months of basic infantry training prior to receiving instruction in naval skills. Most personnel are required to serve a minimum of 1 year with the general forces prior to receiving special training in a particular skill (e.g., radio operation, gunnery, engineering).

(S) Advanced training for senior petty officers and commissioned officers is ordinarily conducted outside the country, with appropriate preparatory work taught at the naval school. Countries providing advanced training include the United Kingdom (UK), India, Greece, Egypt, Iraq, Yugoslavia, and Italy.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

(U) There are no reserve personnel or ships. In time of emergency, however, the Navy could recall the estimated 250 retired naval personnel who have been engaged, since 1981, in a commercial fishing venture on Lake Nuba.

(b) Mobilization

(U) The Navy has no mobilization plan or capability.

(c) Merchant Marine

(C) The Sudanese merchant marine fleet consists of 11 ships of at least 1,000 gross registered tons (GRT). Included in this number are nine breakbulk carriers and two roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ships with a total lift capacity of 93,000 deadweight tons (DWT). All but the smallest breakbulk ship have been built since 1973.

c. Air Force

(1) *Mission*

(U) To defend territorial airspace, provide close air support for ground forces, and conduct logistic and reconnaissance support for the regional commands.

(2) *Capabilities*

~~(S/NF)~~ The Air Force is unable to perform its air defense mission. While four MiG-23/FLOGGER aircraft delivered to Sudan in April 1987 are believed to be the interceptor version, the SPAF reportedly plans to utilize these aircraft in a ground support role for the short term. These are Sudan's most advanced fighter aircraft. However, the SPAF's marginal logistic and maintenance capabilities will be hard pressed to keep them functional without outside assistance. Ten PRC F-6 FARMER aircraft delivered in 1982 were never fully deployed. Five of these aircraft were sent back to the PRC for major repair and returned in mid-1986. Sudan received two US F-5F Tiger II trainer-fighter aircraft in 1982, followed by two F-5E fighters in 1984. Intended to be the nucleus of an F-5 squadron, the aircraft provided some close-air-support and intercept capability. All but one F-5F had crashed, however, by 1986. The remaining F-5F was transferred to Jordan in mid-1985, possibly in return for past Jordanian military assistance. At present, the Air Force relies on eight aging MiG-21/FISHBED-J aircraft, with an operational rate of about 20 percent, as its primary air defense aircraft. The Air Force's weapons inventory also includes advanced ATOLL radar-guided air-to-air missiles, but these are nonoperational due to limited technical support and maintenance capabilities. Still another air defense weakness is that of radar support. Some early warning radar is operational at Wadi Seidna Air Force Base (north of Khartoum) and sporadically at Port Sudan, but most of the inventory is nonoperational and even those units that work cannot be operated at full capacity. Air defense capabilities are further degraded by the lack of coordination between the Air Force and the Air Defense Force, in large part due to the absence of a communications system linking the two services.

~~(S)~~ The Air Force is only marginally more capable of performing its ground attack and reconnaissance missions for the regional commands. There are no specialized reconnaissance aircraft in the inventory. Limited logistic support can be provided by four operational C-130H Hercules aircraft, one operational DHC-5 Buffalo aircraft, and a variety of helicopters. One of the Sudanese C-130s was damaged during a resupply mission in southern Sudan in October 1986 by apparent anti-aircraft fire. The transport capability of the Air Force is small when the physical size of the country and its limited national road and rail networks are taken into consideration. The Air Force's ability to perform all of its missions is severely undermined by several other factors, including the small number of pilots and mechanics; fuel shortages; and inadequate logistic, maintenance, and communications systems.

(3) *Personnel Strength*

~~(S)~~ 3,000 estimated. The number of pilots is estimated to be less than 80.

(4) ~~(S)~~ *Aircraft*

Total: 125 (fixed-wing: 72 jets, 12 props; helicopters: 41)

In operational units: 101

(60 fighters: 32 day, 12 all-weather, 16 trainers;

10 transports: 8 medium-range, 2 VIP;

34 helicopters: 16 assault, 18 medium transport and utility)

(5) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

(S) The Air Force Headquarters is located in Khartoum. Aircraft are organized into 10 squadrons located at 2 principal bases in the Khartoum area. Most helicopters and transport aircraft are permanently based at Khartoum, fighter aircraft at Wadi Seidna. In early 1987, four F-6 FARMERs were deployed to Juba to support SPAF forces in the south. SPAF plans may also include the deployment of at least two MiG-23/FLOGGERS to Juba. In the past, aircraft also have been deployed as follows: MiG-17s to Kassala, Jet Provosts to Al Fashir and Malakal, Mi-8 helicopters to Al Fashir, and BO-105 helicopters to Port Sudan. A separate helicopter base is being built at Jabal Al Awilya near an Army installation where airborne units are stationed; however, the installation has not been completed because of lack of funds. Some construction continues, but Air Force personnel are resisting the move from Khartoum due to the lack of fuel, quarters, and other facilities at Jabal Al Awilya. The Strikemasters were to have been deployed to Juba to combat the SPLA; however, they are nonoperational and remain deployed at Wadi Seidna. One Boeing 707 was acquired from the United Arab Emirates in mid-1986. It will probably retain civilian (Sudan Airways) markings, however.

(S) When trainer aircraft are in the inventory, they are placed in the operational squadrons of the appropriate fighter aircraft, rather than being withheld to form a separate training squadron. Sudan's MiG-21 FISHBED/MONGOL and F-6/TF-6/FARMER aircraft are organized in this manner.

(b) Summary of Units

Units	Aircraft Type	Total	Principal Base
5 fighter squadrons	MiG-23/FLOGGER	4	Wadi Seidna
	MiG-21/FISHBED	8	Wadi Seidna
	F-6/FARMER, FARMER B	11	Wadi Seidna
	F-5/FRESCO	9	Wadi Seidna
	MiG-17/FRESCO	9	Wadi Seidna
	BAC 167/Strikemaster	3	Wadi Seidna
	MiG-21/MONGOL	4	Wadi Seidna
	T-55/Jet Provost	5	Wadi Seidna
	MiG-15/MIDGET	4	Wadi Seidna
	T-51/Jet Provost	4	Wadi Seidna
T-52/Jet Provost	8	Wadi Seidna	
1 transport brigade	DHC-5 Buffalo	3 ¹	Khartoum
	C-130 H Hercules	6	Khartoum
	Fan Jet Falcon	1	Khartoum
	Fan Jet Falcon 50	1	Khartoum
	C-55/Pembroke	3	Khartoum
1 helicopter brigade	SA-330 Puma	16	Khartoum
	BO-105 (MBB)	7	Khartoum
	Mi-8/HIP	14	Khartoum
	AB-212 Agusta Bell	4	Khartoum

(S) One additional Buffalo is on loan from Oman.

(6) Status of Equipment

~~(S/NF)~~ Aircraft are of Soviet, PRC, and Western origin. Only 20 percent of the aircraft in the squadrons are operational due to poor maintenance and insufficient funds to purchase needed spare parts. Even if there were sufficient spare parts, the Air Force remains dependent upon foreign technical assistance for aircraft maintenance and training. The Sudanese are having difficulty with the PRC F-5 aircraft due to environmentally associated maintenance problems. Some of these aircraft which had been sent to the PRC for major repair returned in mid-1986. Technicians from the PRC were continuing to reassemble the aircraft in late 1986. The PRC delivered five F-6 fighter and two TF-6 trainer-fighter aircraft in 1981. Five more F-6 aircraft were delivered in 1982, increasing the number of these aircraft to a full squadron of 12. By 1984 all the F-6 aircraft were grounded due to faulty fuel pumps and afterburners. The operational rate of the BO-105 helicopters is low due to a lack of spare parts and qualified maintenance personnel. Puma helicopters have been provided to Sudan by France and Romania (which assembles the aircraft under license). One is inoperable and one was lost in action in 1986 against SPLA insurgents. All 15 Mi-8/HIP helicopters are inoperable, although Sudan has requested PRC assistance to repair the aircraft. In early 1984, Sudan took receipt of the first 3 of 10 Strikemaster fighter aircraft from Great Britain. These aircraft are only armed with 7.62-mm machineguns. Reportedly, the Sudanese did not purchase bombs that the aircraft is capable of delivering. At the present time, there are only five pilots training to fly these aircraft. The seven additional Strikemasters will not be delivered unless Britain receives payment in advance. Sudan's remaining two US-built F-5E fighter aircraft were destroyed in 1985.

(7) Logistics

~~(S/NF)~~ The principal logistic problem confronting the Sudanese Air Force is the paucity of spare parts and the lack of necessary funds with which to purchase them. With the departure of the Soviet military advisory group in the spring of 1977, the spare parts pipeline from the USSR and East European countries (except for Yugoslavia) was closed. Extensive cannibalization of existing equipment has been necessary to keep aircraft operational. The PRC agreed, in 1983, to rebuild Sudan's Chinese-built F-5 aircraft. Five were returned to the PRC for repair and shipped back to Sudan in mid-1986. Yugoslavia periodically has sent maintenance teams to assist in the upkeep of Sudan's Mi-8 helicopters and MiG-21 aircraft. In addition a Western source or the PRC has agreed to reconditioning the Mi-8 helicopters.

~~(S)~~ All munitions are of Soviet, Chinese, Yugoslav, or Italian origin. A reserve is on hand, but it is inadequate. Delivery of 20-mm munitions for the US F-5F aircraft was concluded in April 1983. The Sudanese Air Force has both radar- and IR-guided air-to-air missiles for the MiG-21s, but these are believed to be nonoperational.

~~(S)~~ Workshops are clean and well organized, but they are limited by inadequate power and water supplies, and by a lack of maintenance equipment. Hangars at Wadi Seidna and Khartoum are large enough for most fighter and transport aircraft, but do not have sufficient height for C-130-type aircraft. Additional hangar facilities are under development.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

(U) Refer to paragraph 3.a.(7).

(9) Training

~~(S)~~ The Air Force has a pilot training requirement of approximately 15 pilots a year; however, with the expense of training abroad it usually is unable to fill this quota. Pilots and ground crews have attended schools in Egypt, the PRC, Greece, Yugoslavia, the US,

Saudi Arabia, West Germany, and probably other countries. Only about one-third of the Sudanese pilots normally complete the courses and graduate.

(S) Reports of a small number of pilots being trained in Libya in late 1986 to fly MiG-23s are unconfirmed. There are indications that a small number of MiG-23s might be provided to Sudan by Libya in 1987.

(S) A pilot training center was established at Wadi Seidna Air Force Base in 1974, but it conducts only pilot-refresher training. A national flight training school has been under study for several years, but budgetary limitations have prevented its establishment. In-country training assistance has been provided by Egyptian, PRC, Great Britain, and US (F-5) training missions. Most training flights are conducted by single aircraft, with few formation or joint air-ground exercises flown. A chronic lack of spare parts, fuel, ammunition, and operational funds seriously hampers the Air Force's training program.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

(U) None

(b) Mobilization

(S) Virtually all of Sudan's civil aircraft and indigenous civilian aviation personnel could be mobilized in the event of war or comparable national emergency. However, a lack of fully qualified, indigenous flight and maintenance personnel would prevent maximum effective use of the mobilized equipment without considerable foreign assistance.

(U) Approximately 10 civil transport aircraft with a gross takeoff weight of at least 9,000 kilograms currently are registered, owned, and operated in Sudan:

Long-Range Transport Aircraft

(greater than 3,500 NM or 6,500 km)

3 Boeing 707-320C

Owner/Operator

Sudan Airways

(One of these aircraft was in the FRG in late 1986 for repairs.)

Medium-Range Transport Aircraft

(1,200-3,500 NM or 2,200-6,500 km)

3 Boeing 737-200

Sudan Airways

1 Dassault-Breguet Falcon 50

Sudan Airways

1 McDonnell Douglas C-47/DC-3 Skytrain

Kenana Sugar Corp.

5 Total

Short-Range Transport Aircraft

(less than 1,200 NM or 2,000 km)

2 Fokker F-27 Friendship

Sudan Airways

(An additional F-27 was shot down by SPLA forces in August 1986.)

(U) Sudan Airways is wholly government owned. The Falcon 50 and one of the Boeing 707s are believed to be used for government VIP flights rather than scheduled services. Financial constraints have forced Sudan Airways to renegotiate some previous commitments to purchase additional aircraft.

(S) Sudan Airways was scheduled to receive one F-27 in April 1987. Two additional F-27s will reportedly arrive in June 1987 and a third later in the year under a leasing agreement. These three aircraft may be replaced with F-50 aircraft in 1988. Sudan Airways is also leasing an Alia L-1011 aircraft.

(U) Air Taxi is the name under which the National Agricultural Organization provides local, domestic air services; its fleet consists of two Piper and about seven Pilatus light aircraft. The Kenana Sugar Corporation may operate as many as four additional C-47/DC-3 Skytrains. All of the Skytrains are in questionable operating condition.

(U) In addition to the above equipment, certain Sudanese Air Force aircraft operate with civil registration markings. These include a medium-range Dassault-Breguet Falcon/Mystere 20F which is used for government VIP flights, a medium-range Lockheed C-130 Hercules which has operated for Sudan Airways on cargo flights, and a Boeing 707 acquired from the United Arab Emirates in mid-1986.

(U) The total number of licensed civilian pilots of major transport aircraft in Sudan is not known. Sudan Airways reportedly employs about 80 pilots, a significant number of whom are believed to be foreign nationals (past estimates range from 30 percent to over 40 percent).

~~(S)~~ Virtually all of Sudan's civil aircraft and indigenous civilian aviation personnel could be mobilized in the event of war or comparable national emergency. A lack of fully qualified indigenous flight and maintenance personnel would prevent maximum effective use of the mobilized equipment without considerable foreign assistance.

d. Air Defense Force

(1) Mission

~~(S)~~ To defend, in conjunction with the Air Force, Sudanese airspace and national territory against enemy air attack, and to provide warning of hostile air action.

(2) Capabilities

~~(S/NT)~~ The Air Defense Force is unable to satisfactorily perform its mission at the present time. Equipment deficiencies are far reaching, training is at a low level, and the lack of strategic and tactical communications results in a fragmented organization. There is also no central means of national command and control for air defense, and coordination with the Air Force is minimal. There is no communication between radar, missile firing sites, and command centers.

(3) Personnel Strength

~~(S)~~ 3,000 estimated

(4) Equipment Strength

~~(S)~~ All major air defense equipment was delivered to Sudan by the Soviet Union in the 1969-71 timeframe, except 37-mm antiaircraft guns delivered by the PRC in 1979 and 1982, 40-mm Bofors delivered in the 1960s, and French APC-mounted close-in air defense systems in 1986. Additional 37-mm antiaircraft guns may have been delivered by the PRC in 1986. The Soviet deliveries included SA-2 launchers and missiles, SA-7 launchers and missiles, antiaircraft guns ranging from 12.7-mm heavy machineguns to 100-mm artillery, and approximately 30 air defense and missile fire control radar systems. Additional Soviet radar units subsequently were received from Egypt.

(5) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

~~(S)~~ Air Defense Force Headquarters is located at Port Sudan. Sudan is divided into two sectors for air defense purposes: the Central Sector, which includes Khartoum, and the

Eastern Sector, which includes Port Sudan. The Central Sector commander is stationed at Wadi Seidna Air Base, about 15 kilometers north of Khartoum. The Central Sector commander also is the Wadi Seidna base commander. The commander of the Eastern Sector, who also is the Commander of the Air Defense Force, is stationed at Port Sudan. The air defense sector commanders at Khartoum and Port Sudan are responsible for defense of their respective critical target areas. At Khartoum, these consist of the Wadi Seidna Air Base, Khartoum International Airport, government buildings, the General Headquarters of the SPAF, and the bridges connecting the three towns that comprise Khartoum. At Port Sudan, critical targets include the naval installation, the seaport, the oil refinery, Port Sudan Airfield, bridges, and the railway center. Outside of these air defense sectors, the protection of important targets, such as dams, is handled by Air Defense Force units attached to, and under the operational control of, regional infantry commands.

(S) The Air Defense Force consists of three brigades. Two of the brigades are stationed in or near Port Sudan. They include the SA-2 brigade and one of two conventional anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) brigades (with 100-mm Soviet KS-19, 37-mm PRC Type-63, and 12.7-mm Soviet heavy machinegun weapons) that was redeployed from the Eastern Regional Command in 1981. The second conventional AAA brigade (with 100-mm Soviet KS-19, 57-mm Soviet S-60, 40-mm Swedish Bofors, 37-mm PRC Type-63 and possibly Type 55, and 12.7-mm Soviet heavy machinegun weapons) is stationed in the greater Khartoum area. Most air attack protection is of the point defense type, and most airfields have AAA weapons in place on a generally permanent basis. Most such weapons are of the types in the inventories of the air defense brigades, but defenses at Wadi Seidna Air Force Base, for example, also include 57-mm Soviet S-60 guns. Together with the three brigades, there are air defense battalions deployed in each of the regional commands, where they come under the operational command of local commanders. There are three such battalions in the Eastern Command region, and one each in the Northern, Southern, and Western Command Regions. A platoon equipped with SA-7s also is assigned to the Western Command.

(b) (S) *Air Defense Weapons*

		Country of Origin	Total Inventory
Missile:	SAM, SA-2/GUIDELINE	UR	18 launchers; 70+ missiles
	SAM, SA-7/GRAIL	UR	54+ launchers; 185+ missiles
Air Defense Guns and Artillery:	HMG, 12.7-mm Degtyarev	UR	40-50
	HMG, 14.5-mm single and twin (probable ZPU-1/2)	UR	Unk
	ADA, 23-mm twin (probable ZU-23)	UR	Unk
	ADA, 37-mm, M-1939	UR	36
	ADA, 37-mm, Type 55 (single)	CH	Unk
	ADA, 37-mm, Type 63 (twin)	CH	111+
	ADA, 40-mm, Bofors	SW	36+
	ADA, 57-mm, S-60	UR	30+
	ADA, 85-mm, KS-12	UR	37
	ADA, 100-mm, KS-19	UR	38
APC, AML-245, with TTB 120			
ADA, 20-mm, NFI	FR	12	

(6) Status of Equipment

~~(S/NF)~~ The general state of the air defense equipment is poor. Much of it is inoperative due to a lack of spare parts and trained maintenance technicians. There are no technicians in Sudan capable of troubleshooting the Soviet radar systems. Some spare parts for the radars are lacking, and most radar units are inoperative. The fuel shelf life of the SA-2 missiles has expired, and the missiles are considered nonoperational (although some Sudanese officers claim they still can be fired). US efforts to rehabilitate the SA-2s and associated radar have met with some success to date, although the operational rate is believed to be only 20 percent. Except for the newer PRC weapons, most of the conventional anti-aircraft artillery pieces suffer from low operational rates due to limited maintenance capabilities and the lack of spare parts.

(7) Logistics

~~(S/NF)~~ The SA-2 brigade's logistics, once considered adequate, have deteriorated. A good logistic and support facility is located in the Port Sudan area. There are facilities for all missile servicing, such as electrical checkout, propellant servicing, assembly, and repair, although limited resources hinder their effectiveness. Air defense artillery (ADA) equipment is not as well supported, but ADA assets in the Khartoum area have some minor repair shops to perform second-echelon maintenance. Any ADA assets outside the Khartoum area must depend on a few technicians who travel to the various locations to perform onsite servicing.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

~~(S)~~ The Air Defense Command is composed of volunteers who serve a minimum of 3 years. A total of six reenlistments are allowed, each lasting 3 years. Specialists serve a minimum of 7 years. The number of volunteers usually exceeds the recruiting quotas.

(9) Training

~~(S/NF)~~ Individuals coming into the command must first go through Army basic training. They are then sent to the Air Defense Force School at Port Sudan. The school teaches a full range of SA-2/SA-7, AAA, and radar techniques and tactics courses. Modern training aids are lacking, however, and technical support is weak. Live-fire practices are no longer undertaken due to ammunition and spare parts shortages. No training has been conducted against airborne towed targets for at least 8 years. Anti-aircraft gun crews are trained at the Air Defense Force School. They appear able to maintain the newer equipment, though to be effective they obviously need live-fire/towed target training. Repair of the equipment, especially the older Soviet guns that lack spare parts, is far more problematical.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

~~(S)~~ There are no known reserve units or mobilization plans.

e. Paramilitary Forces

~~(S)~~ There are no paramilitary forces in Sudan. However, in the event of hostilities, the national police force would have some potential for augmenting and supporting the regular ground forces. The Sudanese National Police (SNP) is responsible, along with the Army, for internal security, and has primary responsibility for criminal investigation. For the maintenance of internal security, the Sudanese Government relies on small SNP posts scattered throughout the country. Army units are used to intervene in security problems when the police are incapable of handling them. The strength of the police is estimated to be 65,000, of whom 35,000 are in the south. Included in this figure is a special police commando (or riot control) battalion, called the Police Reserve, which is stationed in Khartoum. This

unit's basic equipment is much like that of a motorized light infantry battalion. One company of special police is kept on 15-minute alert at all times in the capital. While the training and morale of the special unit is high, the overall morale of the SNP is said to be low when compared with the military services. This is because the police receive lower pay and have less authority than their counterparts in the Army, and because of the many hardship assignments the police receive in remote areas of Sudan.

f. ~~(S)~~ Total Military Personnel Strength

Army	51,000
Navy	1,500
Air Force	3,000
Air Defense	3,000
Total	58,500

g. ~~(S/NF)~~ Foreign Military Presence

Egypt: 5 (military advisers)

People's Republic of China: 30+ (primarily Air Force assistance personnel)

United Kingdom: 2 (instructors at Nimeiri High Academy)

West Germany: 5

h. ~~(S/NF)~~ Military Presence Abroad

Egypt:	Army in various staff colleges ¹ — Air Force ¹
India:	Unknown type of training ¹
Italy:	Unknown type of training (possibly helicopter pilot training) ¹
Saudi Arabia:	Air Force in various programs including senior staff courses ¹
United Kingdom:	10 (some Air Force) ¹
West Germany:	Army in senior service schools ¹ Army in senior service schools ¹
Libya:	Unidentified military training ¹

¹ (U) Program underway, number unknown.

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Appendix

Installation BE List (U)

Name	BE Number	Category	Latitude	Longitude
Abyei	0787-09983	70220	09-36-00N	028-24-30E
Ad Damazine Mil Fac/Rgnl Comd A Bde HQ	0788CA0002	90110	11-49-00N	034-21-20E
Al Fashir Airfield	0690-08001	80104	13-37-00N	025-14-00E
Al Fashir Mil Fac/Rgnl comd A Bde HQ	0690-00001	90110	13-37-50N	025-21-05E
Al Fashir Mil Fac West	0690CA0001	90110	13-37-10N	025-19-09E
Al Ubayyid Rgnl Comd A Bde HQ	0689-00380	91030	13-11-00N	030-12-30E
Bur Sudan SAM Site	0667-00118	87220	19-43-15N	037-13-45E
Bur Sudan SAM Site	0667-00119	87220	19-28-55N	037-14-15E
Bur Sudan SAM Site	0667-00111	87220	19-39-00N	037-08-20E
Bur Sudan SAM Training Area	0667-00120	87221	19-37-35N	037-10-50E
Flamingo Bay Naval Base/Port Facility	0667-00095	95100	19-39-10N	037-14-20E
Jabal Al Awilya Fac A Tng Cen/Sch	0689DA0001	90110	15-14-45N	032-29-50E
Juba Airfield	0811-08002	80106	04-52-20N	031-35-35E
Juba Rgnl Comd A Bde HQ A Bks SW	0811CA0001	90110	04-49-28N	031-35-05E
Kassala	0688-09997	70210	15-27-03N	036-22-58E
Kassala Airfield	0688-08019	80050	15-23-00N	036-19-25E
Kassala Mil Complex	0688-00435	90110	15-28-00N	036-24-00E
Khartoum Airfield	0689-08006	80081	15-35-30N	032-33-12E
Khartoum Air Force HQ SAF	0689-00032	89510	15-36-03N	032-32-42E
Khartoum Airborne Sch	0689-00383	90130	15-35-05N	032-33-25E
Khartoum Bks Area A/HQ Gordons Tree	0689-00023	90110	15-32-05N	032-30-30E
Khartoum Engr Corps Sch	0689-00390	90130	15-36-00N	032-32-00E
Khartoum Military Fac	0689-00371	90130	15-36-09N	032-32-35E
Khartoum Mil Instl A Area Comd HQ	0689-00024	90110	15-36-09N	032-32-35E
Khartoum North Army Bks	0689-00174	90110	15-38-30N	032-31-15E
Khasm Al Qirbah Fac/Rgnl Cmd/Bde HQ	0689CA0010	90110	14-56-11N	035-54-52E
Malakal Airfield	0788-08002	80091	09-33-20N	031-38-40E
Malakal Mil Fac/Rgnl Comd A Bde HQ	0788-00048	90110	09-30-35N	031-39-50E
Omdurman Mil Fac	0689-00027	90110	15-36-45N	032-28-55E
Port Sudan Coastal Def Site	0667-00029	98100	19-35-50N	037-13-50E
Port Sudan Mil Fac A Def HQ	0667-00073	92000	19-35-50N	037-13-50E
Port Sudan Airfield	0667-08001	80091	19-34-34N	037-13-00E
Port Sudan Mil Fac/Rgnl Comd A Bde HQ	0667-00110	90110	19-37-25N	037-10-50E
Port Sudan Naval Headquarters	0667-00141	96100	19-37-20N	037-13-20E
Sawaken Coastal Observation Post	0667-00096	98000	19-07-30N	037-21-10E
Shandi Mil Fac/Rgnl Comd A Bde HQ	0666-00009	90110	16-42-05N	033-26-20E

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Appendix (Continued)

Name	BE Number	Category	Latitude	Longitude
Wadi Seidna Infantry School	0689-00381	90130	15-49-00N	032-31-00E
Wadi Seidna Airfield	0689-08009	80052	15-49-00N	032-30-55E
Wadi Seidna Mil Fac	0689CA0003	90110	15-46-30N	032-31-50E
Wadi Seidna Mil Fac N	0689CA0007	90120	15-49-53N	032-31-30E
Wadi Seidna Mil Fac S	0689CA0011	90110	15-44-40N	032-30-50E
Waw Mil Fac/Rgnl Comd A Bde HQ	0812CA0001	90110	07-44-46N	027-59-00E

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TANZANIA

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1. GOVERNMENT

a. (U) Key Government Officials

President: Ali Hassan *Mwinyi*

Vice President and President of Zanzibar: Idris Abdul *Wakil*

Zanzibar Chief Minister: Seif Sharif *Hamad*

Prime Minister: Joseph S. *Warioba*

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense and National Service: Salim Ahmed *Salim*

Deputy Minister of Defense: Lt Col Abdulrahaman *Kinana*

Deputy Minister of Defense: Stephen *Kibona*

Minister for Foreign Affairs: Benjamin *Mkapa*

Director General, Tanzanian Intelligence and Security Service (TISS): Maj Gen I. H. *Kombe*

Inspector General, Police: Harun Guido *Mahundi*

b. Type and Stability of Government

(C) In November 1985, Ali Hassan Mwinyi became the second President of Tanzania. Mwinyi was former President Julius Nyerere's handpicked successor as well as the choice of the country's sole political party, the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). Mwinyi's main rival for President was Salim Ahmed Salim, who was the leading choice of senior military officers. The CCM feared Salim would not be as pliable as Mwinyi and applied pressure on Nyerere to pick Mwinyi. For the first time since the country's independence, leadership of the CCM and the state are not held by the same man. Nyerere retains substantial voice in government policies via his position as Chairman of the CCM. The CCM and the state bureaucracy continue to have power struggles which may stall attempts to streamline the Tanzanian Government ranks.

(S/NT) A potentially disastrous problem for Tanzania is a growing division in the population along religious lines — Muslim versus Christian. This division also renews the ethnic problems between Tanzanians of Arab and African descent. Divisions along religious and ethnic lines are rivaled only by the population's dissatisfaction over the country's economy, which has stagnated because of former President Nyerere's economic policies.

(C) The Tanzanian Government's stability is increasingly threatened by the continued decline in the country's economy and the eroding confidence in government's ability to improve this situation. Economic hardships, experienced at all levels, have generated rising levels of discontent among the general populace. The general mood within Tanzania, particularly in the urban areas, is that the government has failed to live up to either its responsibilities or the expectations of the Tanzanian people.

(S) Internal stability is further threatened by the survivability of the mainland's constitutional union with the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba. After 20 years of union, tensions between mainland Tanzania and the islands remain high. Zanzibaris are particularly

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dissatisfied with the meager benefits they have derived from their political union with the mainland. Tensions are likely to intensify as the economy declines and an internal Zanzibari power struggle offers opportunity for separatists to press their case. Acquiescence to separatist pressure could further tarnish the government's image both domestically and abroad and could even jeopardize the continuation of the constitutional union.

c. Internal Threat

~~(S/NF)~~ No well-organized civil group or faction has been identified that could pose a viable threat to the government. Nevertheless, growing discontent among elements of the Tanzanian People's Defense Force (TPDF) could pose a serious threat to internal stability. Internal dissatisfaction, particularly among junior and noncommissioned officers within the TPDF, has increased. Since early 1983, Tanzanian Government authorities have uncovered three separate coup plots against the regime. In one case, 24 civilians and military persons were arrested and charged with conspiracy.

~~(S/NF)~~ Although specific details of these security incidents are not available, these occurrences indicated a mounting dissatisfaction over continuing erosion of the national economy and the government's inability to resolve the situation. With each of these aborted coup attempts there has been a rise in grumbling among the rank and file of the TPDF. A major source of this discontent has been the rapid escalation of taxes levied on such items as beer, gasoline, and cigarettes. Dissent is also increasing over low salaries, food ration shortages, rapid inflation, and a perceived indifference of senior officers to the welfare of their subordinates.

~~(S/NF)~~ In an attempt to avert further antigovernment actions by the elements of the TPDF, all unit commanders were ordered to monitor rank-and-file military morale and to make periodic status reports. In further reaction to the aborted coup and widespread complaints by military personnel about basic commodity shortages, the government has allowed commodity parastatals to give priority allocations to the TPDF over the general domestic and export markets.

~~(S/NF/WW)~~ The government's difficulty in dealing with these domestic problems has had a profound impact on Zanzibari separatists. For example, the Zanzibaris regarded the coup plotting as further evidence of Nyerere's loss of political strength. As a result, Zanzibaris encouraged their leaders to press for constitutional amendments, key of which were those designed to guarantee Zanzibar's sovereignty and separate status within the union. In a move designed to end the threat of cessation, Tanzania deployed a 1,500-man TPDF task force to Zanzibar in January 1984. Although the situation has since become somewhat less tense, the issue is by no means resolved. In 1985, the government formed a new division (10th Division) on Zanzibar and placed subordinate brigades on Zanzibar and Pemba Islands. Plans were implemented to rotate Zanzibaris and mainland troops into the division to counter separatist sentiment.

~~(S/NF/WW/NO)~~ Nyerere, prior to leaving office, moved some senior officers to ineffectual positions in the TPDF and CCM to reduce the internal threat from the military.

~~(S/NF/WW/NO)~~ Many senior military officers owe their careers to Nyerere and many are from his home district. Political maneuvering has begun within the TPDF in the wake of Nyerere's departure. New political alliances are being formed in the military, many of them along tribal lines, which could ultimately threaten the regime.

d. External Threat

~~(S/NF)~~ The external threat to Tanzania has declined significantly since 1979. With the

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military ouster of former Ugandan president Idi Amin in that year, the era of Uganda's military threat to Tanzania came to an end. Tanzania remains concerned, however, over Ugandan political stability and relations with Libya. Uganda changed leadership in July 1985 and again in January 1986.

(S) Further improving Tanzania's regional relations was the successful arbitration for the disbursement of assets held by the defunct East African Community (EAC). The successful conclusion of these negotiations not only removed a potential stumbling block to improving Tanzania-Uganda relations, but also improved the diplomatic ties between Tanzania and Kenya. In fact, the EAC liquidation negotiations were in large part responsible for a bilateral reopening of the Tanzania-Kenya border in late 1983, ending its 6-year closure. Tanzania's relations with Kenya since 1983 can be described as correct, but not close.

(S/NF) As a result of its longtime basing and training support to South African dissident groups and the recent closure of other nearby refuges like Mozambique, Tanzanian fears of South African retaliation have heightened. Tanzania fears attacks not only upon dissident camps and training bases but also upon its own strategic facilities. Despite proven South African Defense Force regional intervention capabilities, strikes against potential Tanzanian targets pose support and logistic problems.

e. Communist Influence

(S/NF) Although Tanzania has no Communist party, former President Nyerere's continued dedication to national socialism was a key element in Tanzania's good relations with much of the Communist world. However, relations with specific Communist countries vary. For example, prior to the mid-1970s, the People's Republic of China (PRC) was the primary Communist supplier of military and economic assistance to Tanzania. China has since been surpassed in this role by the Soviet Union. From 1975 to 1981 Tanzania grew increasingly dependent upon Soviet military hardware and training assistance. This relationship began to wane in 1982 as President Nyerere began expressing interest in moving Tanzania away from its dependence on Soviet arms and training. By far the most significant move in this direction was the 1982 reduction of Soviet military personnel in Tanzania, from 186 to 122. Soviet personnel were further reduced to approximately 75 by late 1984. The Soviets, sensing Tanzanian dissatisfaction, negotiated an arms agreement in 1984 in order to retain influence with the Tanzanians and to keep them using Soviet Bloc equipment. Tanzania has diversified its Communist assistance contracts by purchasing military equipment and accepting technical assistance from various Communist countries such as Bulgaria, Romania, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, Cuba, and the PRC, but the Soviet Union remains its primary supplier. Since taking office, President Mwinyi has shown no clear signs of deviating radically from former President Nyerere's socialist policies or relations with Communist countries. Tanzania still has close relations with Communist countries and the Soviet Union in particular.

(S/NF) Since 1974, Tanzania has signed six separate military assistance agreements with the Soviet Union. Deliveries from the Soviet Union have included jet fighters, armored vehicles, rocket launchers, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), artillery, and trucks. In 1980, the PRC renewed its 1977 military agreement with Tanzania. PRC deliveries have included jet fighters, armored vehicles, rocket launchers, artillery, and naval craft. In mid-October 1981, Tanzania finalized a contract with the PRC for the repair of the TPDF naval maintenance facility in Dar es Salaam. Work on this project is continuing. Soviet Bloc countries have provided small arms, artillery, and naval patrol craft. In the past, Cuba has trained Tanzanian Internal Security Service (TISS) personnel, and North Korea has provided commando training for Tanzanian People's Defense Force (TPDF) personnel. The 1984

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Soviet-Tanzania agreement provided for an extensive repair and upgrade of Tanzania's air defense radar system and delivery of Soviet air defense artillery.

(S) Under President Nyerere, Tanzania was a long-time advocate of international nonalignment. For this reason it avoided wholesale identification with the Communist world. However, the military continues to be reliant on Communist-supplied equipment, and as a result Tanzania will most likely remain generally sympathetic to Communist positions on international issues.

f. Economic Factors

(U) The Tanzanian economy is heavily dependent on agriculture, which accounts for more than half of the total gross domestic product (GDP). Ninety-four percent of Tanzania's population is engaged in agriculture. More than two-thirds of all export earnings are derived from agriculture, with coffee, tea, cashews, pyrethrum, and cloves contributing significantly. Tanzania's economy is augmented by agricultural processing industries, diamond mining, and petroleum refining.

(S) Tanzania's economy is one of the poorest in the world. In 1979 and 1980, the country was hard hit by a combination of high import prices, including oil, and by falling agricultural output. Other factors which have contributed to Tanzania's poor economic state include floods in 1978, a drought in 1980-81, and problems in maintaining the country's rail, air, and sea transportation network.

(S/NF/WN/NC) Between 1977 and 1983 Tanzania's GDP fell drastically while inflation rose from 12.2 percent to 27 percent. Falling export prices and decreased productivity accounted for a severe decline in export earnings. During this 7-year period, Tanzania's oil importation costs were 150 to 160 percent of its export earnings. Severe shortages of foreign exchange have generated periodic gasoline shortages and prevented the purchase of industrial/agricultural machine parts needed to maintain an already faltering economy. Further, the Tanzanian Government's unwillingness to meet International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditions has prevented the negotiation of loans and donor aid necessary to revitalize the economy.

(S) Tanzania must import almost all of its military material. The scarcity of material resources and lack of skilled manpower have precluded the development of a significant defense industry. Tanzania does produce some small arms and ammunition, but not in sufficient numbers to supply its military.

g. Military and Political Alignment

(S/NF) Tanzania is a member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), a regular participant in Third World forums such as the Nonaligned Movement, and a major participant in African frontline state activities. Tanzania's relations with its neighbors are varied.

(S) Tanzania has pursued improving ties with Kenya, but the Kenyan response to these overtures has been limited since Kenya sees little advantage in closer economic, military, and political ties to Tanzania.

(S/NF/WN) After some initial hesitation, Tanzania covertly backed Uganda's main guerrilla group, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) led by Yoweri Museveni, while openly calling for a peaceful political settlement in Uganda. Since Museveni's overthrow of the Okello regime in January 1986, Uganda's foreign policy has been one of nonalignment, and relations with its neighbors have taken second place to its continuing internal problems. Tanzania's relations with the West are cordial, but could deteriorate if relations with

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Communist countries improve markedly. Currently, Tanzania receives military assistance from the USSR, the PRC, East Germany, Bulgaria, Romania, and North Korea.

~~(S)~~ Politically, Tanzanian relations continue to be close with fellow Nonaligned Movement member Yugoslavia and with mainland China, which has generally been seen by Tanzanians as responsive to Third World concerns. Soviet and other Eastern Bloc support for southern African liberation movements remains an important factor in the maintenance of cordial relations with Tanzania.

h. (U) Key US Officials

Ambassador: Donald K. Petterson

Military Attache: None

2. MILITARY, GENERAL

a. (U) Key Military Officials

Tanzania People's Defense Forces (TPDF):

Commander: Gen David B. *Musuguri*

Chief of Staff: Maj Gen Martin N. *Mwakalindile*

Air Wing:

Chief: Brig Robert P. *Mboma*

Deputy: Col Sylvester A. *Hemedi*

Naval Wing:

Chief: Col Ligate G. *Sande*

Deputy: Lt Col D. S. *Tindamanyire*

National Service:

Director: Maj Gen Nelson L. *Mikisi*

Deputy: Col A. M. *Msenga*

Military Intelligence:

Chief: Brig Sam T. *Laiser*

Militia:

Commander: Rowland Leslie *Makunda*

b. Position of the Armed Forces

~~(S)~~ The Tanzania People's Defense Force (TPDF) is composed of three services — Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Army, by virtue of its size, is the predominant force. Traditional factionalism in the armed forces temporarily declined during the late 1970s as a result of Tanzania's war with Uganda. However, with recent shakeups in the senior officer ranks, overtones of tribally based frictions within the military are beginning to surface again. Although the TPDF influence within the government has leveled, it remains a viable force in Tanzania's political arena and will continue to play an active, if somewhat moderate, role in influencing future Tanzania Government policies.

c. Military Trends and Capabilities

~~(S/NF/WN/NC)~~ The Tanzanian People's Defense Force is capable of countering an invasion by modern African forces of comparable size. The TPDF would at present be hard pressed to support a large task force beyond its borders, as it did in Uganda in 1979. The TPDF could quickly deploy a brigade-size force regionally, however, with foreign assistance. TPDF equipment has deteriorated because of neglect, theft, and lack of spare parts and tires. The transportation network presently is not capable of effectively supporting a large force beyond Tanzanian borders for any length of time. Rapid domestic deployments would also be hindered.

~~(S/NF/WN/NC)~~ Responding to Mozambique's plea for foreign assistance to combat growing insurgency, Tanzania began a limited deployment of troops into Mozambique in January 1987. Factions led by former President Nyerere had advocated a large Tanzania presence in Mozambique to bolster ongoing counterinsurgency operations. President Mwinyi and other government pragmatists instead argued for a measured response in Mozambique, with missions largely limited to rear area security. Economic constraints, however, forced Tanzania to approach numerous nations, including Mozambique, for materiel and other logistic support. Tanzania did receive some early support from East European nations, particularly Yugoslavia. Soviet AN-12 aircraft based in Mozambique are believed to have provided much of the required initial airlift of Tanzania personnel into Quelimane, the primary TPDF base in Mozambique. An estimated 3,000 TPDF troops have deployed to Quelimane, with a basic mission of providing rear area security for Mozambique forces. Despite early optimistic Tanzanian predictions, continuing logistic problems and limited international support will probably restrict the overall TPDF response.

~~(S)~~ The TPDF underwent a period of rapid expansion and reorganization during its 1978-79 war with Uganda. Until the latter half of 1981 TPDF Ugandan Task Force combat and advisory personnel, numbering between 10,000 and 11,000, were stationed in Uganda as a security force. This force was phased out at that time due to economic considerations in Tanzania.

~~(S)~~ The confidence and experience gained by the TPDF during the war temporarily improved the overall capability of the military. However, inadequate pay and limited chances for promotion have contributed to a decline in morale among regular military units.

~~(S/NF)~~ Military assistance to Tanzania is primarily from the Soviet Union and PRC, although Tanzania has sought to diversify aid through Western equipment. Sophisticated Soviet anti-aircraft equipment, including SA-3, SA-6, and SA-7 missiles, has been provided by the Soviets to defend Tanzania against air attacks. Tanzania hopes to expand its armored forces in the future by purchasing tanks and APCs from the USSR and the PRC. In 1980, military assistance agreements were concluded with both the Soviet Union and the PRC for additional equipment and spare parts deliveries. The initial arrival of some of this equipment in the fall of 1980 and spring of 1981 contributed to improving existing military capabilities and provided necessary replacement parts to return inoperable equipment to active service. In April 1984, a Soviet/Tanzanian military agreement was concluded for the delivery in 1985 of artillery, vehicles, communications equipment, radar, spare parts, and ammunition. The TPDF acquired small arms, trainer aircraft, and helicopters in the late 1970s from Western nations, particularly Canada, Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom in order to diversify its sources of military assistance. Although the TPDF is receiving new equipment there is increasing emphasis on repairing existing equipment, primarily of Soviet origin, in their inventory. This is due in large part to the severe foreign exchange shortage

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and the country's declining economic state. Tanzania will likely be forced to maintain its close military relationship with the Soviet Union for the foreseeable future.

(S) There are a variety of difficulties facing the TPDF. For example, the rapid expansion of the military in 1979 produced problems with training and organization as well as with absorbing the influx of complex weapon systems.

(S/NF/WN) Tanzania was largely successful in demobilizing its army from a 1979 high of 60,000 personnel to approximately 32,000 personnel in 1985. This action streamlined the military and aided command and control. The TPDF has been beset by economic shortages resulting in lower quality and quantity of provisions issued to the military; lack of spare parts and adequate maintenance; corruption and embezzlement at all rank levels; and junior officer and enlisted ranks' perceptions that senior officers care little about their troops or the troops' families. The government's inability to provide for the livelihood of the military may hamper Tanzania's ability to defend itself effectively against an army of comparable size. This is due to the military's preoccupation with developing its own "personal survival program."

d. Military Budget

(S/NF) For the fiscal year ending 30 June 1985, \$131.7 million, which was 9.4 percent of the central government budget. Dollar value is converted at the official exchange rate of 17.47 shillings equals \$1.00.

e. (U) Population

22,415,000 estimated as of 1 July 1986

Males (ages 15-49): 4,712,000; physically fit, 2,706,000

Ethnic divisions: 99 percent indigenous Africans consisting of well over 100 tribes; 1 percent Asian, European, and Arab

Literacy: 79 percent

3. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

a. Army

(1) Mission

(U) Defend national borders and assist in maintaining internal order.

(2) Capabilities

(S) The Tanzanian People's Defense Force (TPDF) is capable of countering an invasion by modern African forces of comparable size. Logistic problems have limited Tanzanian combat capability in the past; however, in the 1978-79 war with Uganda, the TPDF was able to operate despite these problems and mount a successful offensive operation outside its borders. However, had Uganda been able to mount a creditable defense against advancing Tanzanian forces, the latter would have bogged down due to logistic inefficiency. Since that time, military equipment maintenance has shown little sign of improvement. Economic problems plaguing Tanzania are also reflected in the Army's inability to project forces greater than regimental/battalion size beyond its borders for any length of time.

(3) Personnel Strength

(S) 32,000

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(4) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

~~(S)~~ As Commander in Chief of the TPDF, President Mwinyi has final authority over the Tanzanian Army. Military command is passed from the presidency, through the Ministry of Defense and National Service to TPDF Headquarters, and on to the Commander of the Army. Defense planning and policymaking generally originate in the various committees within the Ministry of Defense and National Service, and are subject to presidential approval prior to implementation. The headquarters for all military services is at Dar es Salaam.

~~(S)~~ The three divisions of the Tanzanian Army each have a regional responsibility in the overall territorial defense mission. The 10th Division headquartered on Zanzibar has responsibility for Zanzibar, Pemba, and Mafia Islands. The 20th Division, headquartered at Tabora, has the northern and central regions. The 30th Division with headquarters at Kibaha has the eastern and southern portions of the country.

~~(S)~~ The 20th and 30th Divisions each have three infantry brigades plus supporting units, while the 10th Division has two infantry brigades assigned. Tanzanian mainland brigades are normally deployed in Tabora, Biharamulo, Musoma, Arusha, Songea, and Dar es Salaam. Island-based units include 2 brigades from the 10th Division plus support units, and are deployed throughout the islands' 18 political jurisdictions.

~~(S)~~ The TPDF also has deployed approximately 3,000 TPDF troops to Quelimane, Mozambique. The basic mission of this force is to provide rear area security for the Mozambique Army. However, the Tanzanian deployment has been plagued by logistic problems and limited international support. This will probably restrict the overall effectiveness of this deployment.

(b) ~~(S)~~ Ground Combat Units

Major Tactical Units (Mainland)	Authorized Strength¹	Actual Strength²
2 division headquarters		400/division
6 brigade headquarters		250/brigade
19 infantry battalions		550/battalion
8 field artillery regiments		300/regiment
7 light antiaircraft regiments		300/regiment
2 tank regiments		400/regiment
1 tank battalion		200
2 field engineer regiments		500/regiment
1 communication regiment		200
8 service battalions		500/battalion
1 rocket artillery regiment		200
1 heavy mortar regiment		200
Major Tactical Units (Zanzibar and Pemba)		
1 division headquarters		400
2 brigade headquarters		250
4 infantry battalions		550/battalion
1 artillery regiment		300
2 service battalions		500/battalion

¹(S) Authorized strength levels for individual TPDF units are unknown.

²(U) Actual strength levels provided are estimates.

(5) Weapons and Equipment

(a) General

~~(S)~~ The TPDF's primary source of military equipment since 1974 has gradually changed from the PRC to the Soviet Union with additional equipment provided by other Communist Bloc nations. Tanzania has also received a small quantity of equipment from Western sources. Efforts to upgrade the Army's inventory have been limited because of the continuing deterioration in Tanzania's economy. However, deliveries of Soviet-supplied equipment, and the culmination of a Tanzanian-Soviet agreement signed in February 1980, helped to fill existing gaps in TPDF units. These deliveries included T-55 medium tanks and 122-mm field artillery pieces. In the past, the Soviet Union has supplied several different types of field artillery, antiaircraft guns, armored personnel carriers (APCs), surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), ammunition, small arms, and heavy-duty trucks. Additional equipment, munitions, and spare parts were delivered in 1985 as a result of a Tanzanian-Soviet arms agreement signed in April 1984.

(b) ~~(S/NF)~~ Ground Weapons and Equipment

		Country of Origin	Total Inventory
Tanks:	Medium tank, T-55	UR	32
	Medium tank, Type 59	CH	30
	Medium tank, T-34	EG	34
	Light tank, Type 62	CH	30
	Light tank, Scorpion	UK	40
Armored Vehicles:	APC, BTR-152	UR	30
	APC, BTR-40	UR	30
	APC, M1967	CH	45
	Armored car, BRDM-2	UR	25
	Armored car, Daimler Dingo	UK	10
AD Arty & SAM:	ADA, M1939, 37-mm	UR, CH	120
	ADA, ZU-23, 23-mm	UR	40
	ADA, ZPU-2/4	UR	285
	SAM, SA-3 (launchers)	UR	18
	SAM, SA-3 (missiles)	UR	150
	SAM, SA-6 (launchers)	UR	20
	SAM, SA-6 (missiles)	UR	150
	SAM, SA-7 (launchers)	UR	120+
	SAM, SA-7 (missiles)	UR	470+
Artillery:	Field gun, 130-mm, M-46	UR, CH	40
	Howitzer, 122-mm, D-30	UR	20
	Howitzer, 122-mm, M-30	UR, CH	100
	MRL, 122-mm, BM-21	UR	50
	Rkt lchr, 122-mm, Grad-P	UR	40
	Coastal gun, 85-mm	CH	18
	Field gun, 76-mm, ZIS-3	UR	45
	Field gun, 85-mm, Type 56	CH	80
	Field gun, 100-mm, M1944	EG	18

		Country of Origin	Total Inventory
RCLR & AT Weapons:	RCLR, 75-mm,	CH	540
	AT gun, 57-mm (ZIS-2), M1943	UR	15
	40-mm, RPG-7	UR, CH, BU	2,060
	Field gun, 85-mm, D-44	CH	80
Mortars:	160-mm, M160	CH	Unk
	120-mm, M1943	UR, CH, YO	135
	82-mm, M1937	UR, CH, YO	345
	60-mm, Type-63	CH, YO	465

(6) Logistics

~~(S)~~ The TPDF is virtually entirely dependent upon foreign sources for logistics equipment and spare parts. Most equipment has been furnished by Communist Bloc countries.

~~(S)~~ Notwithstanding substantial amounts of foreign assistance, the logistics system suffers from a lack of funds for purchases of equipment and spare parts, and a lack of training in organizational and preventive maintenance at lower echelons combined with a lack of administrative competence at upper levels. Lead-times for receipt of spare parts may be a year or more, particularly for Soviet-manufactured equipment. Sophisticated Soviet equipment must be returned to the Soviet Union for repair since the necessary facilities are not available in Tanzania.

~~(S)~~ During the 1978-79 war with Uganda, various weaknesses in the logistics system surfaced which hindered TPDF combat operations. Chief among these was the transportation system. Roads and railroads were inadequate to support large-scale military deployment to the border areas, and the TPDF advance into Uganda was slowed by the Army logistics system's inability to provide timely resupply to forward combat elements. These difficulties continue to limit the TPDF's operational capabilities due to the sparse transportation network and budgetary constraints.

~~(S/NF)~~ The domestic military production capability of Tanzania is now limited to the manufacture of ammunition, grenades, and landmines. Peak annual production rate is estimated to be as follows: ammunition — 5 million rounds; grenades — 15,000; landmines — 25,000. The major sources of military equipment and assistance are Communist countries with equipment deliveries valued at \$375 million in the past 5 years, or all but \$35 million of that acquired by Tanzania. Moscow accounts for more than 90 percent of the total from all sources. The major Free World supplier has been Canada with the delivery of transport aircraft and training assistance valued at \$24 million.

(7) Personnel Procurement and Retention

~~(S)~~ There is no conscription of military trainees. Tanzania's limited literacy rate contributes to serious problems in securing suitable recruits for technical training. Recruits are drawn from volunteers who have completed basic training in the paramilitary National Service (NS). The retention rate is unknown.

(8) Training

~~(S)~~ The National Service (NS) functions as a recruitment/training mechanism for the TPDF, as a reserve force, and as a civic action organization. All Tanzanians, male and female, who complete high school or its equivalent must serve in the NS for 2 years; others

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also may join. All personnel receive basic military training and are then assigned to either the military or civic action programs.

~~(S/NF)~~ Army training is accomplished in Tanzania as well as abroad. Major training centers include the Military Academy at Dar es Salaam; the National Leadership Academy at Monduli; the officer cadet school at Mgulani (Tanga Region), the Air Defense Training Institute at Tanga; the School of Artillery at Arusha; the School of Infantry Training at Nachingwea; and the military police school at Mpwapwa. The PRC has conducted a Battalion Command and Staff training course for TPDF officers in Tabora. In addition, the PRC has also conducted a TPDF Higher Command Studies course for TPDF officers in Monduli. In the TPDF, considerable emphasis is placed on party philosophy and political education. Thus, much of the training at the military training facilities is directed toward these areas.

~~(S/NF)~~ In the past, training courses overseas were conducted primarily in the PRC. However, training is taking place now in the USSR, North Korea, and Egypt. In late January 1983, Egypt offered 30 training slots in air defense equipment maintenance. Currently 25 of these billets are filled. In 1984 there were 120 Tanzanians undergoing military training in the USSR. Training continued in Egypt in 1984 and 1985 with 40 and 30 Tanzanian personnel, respectively.

(9) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves/Militia

~~(S)~~ The militia is a conglomeration of various paramilitary units, both standing and on call, or reserves, plus townsmen and villagers who meet under TPDF tutelage for regular drills, physical training, and ideological discussion sessions. At any one time upwards of 100,000 people may be considered to be "in the militia," but only about 14,000 are armed. The militia is called upon to assist the police in crowd-control operations and to support the TPDF in border regions.

(b) Mobilization

~~(S)~~ The 1978-79 Ugandan war demonstrated the capability of Tanzanian forces to mobilize. Drawing primarily from the NS and the militia, the TPDF was able to field a formidable force to combat the Ugandan threat and to maintain internal stability in Tanzania. Tanzanian Army units were able to expand from an estimated 29,500-man force to a 60,000-man Army during the course of the 6-month war.

b. Navy

(1) Mission

~~(S)~~ The primary mission of the Navy (called the Naval Wing), which is under the control of the TPDF, is surveillance and protection of territorial waters. It also is tasked to assist the Police Marine Unit (PMU) in preventing smuggling, in maintaining a sea link between the mainland and Zanzibar, and in providing port security.

(2) Capabilities

~~(S)~~ The capability of the Naval Wing does not extend beyond routine patrols for the protection of 1,424 km of coastal and territorial waters. The force has historically been hampered by low operational rates of its patrol craft because of antiquated equipment and lack of spare parts. Since 1981 this situation has been significantly improved with the assistance of the PRC, which has provided naval maintenance/repair teams to overhaul several Naval Wing vessels.

(3) Personnel Strength

~~(S)~~ 1,100

(4) ~~(S/NF/WN/NC)~~ Ship Strength

Type	Op	Nonop	In Reserve	Status Unknown
PTH, hydrofoils, Hu Chwan Class	4			
PGM, Type 62, Shanghai Class	1	5		
PGM, P-6 Class				4
PBR, Yulin River Class	1			3
PB, Bellatrix Class (modified) ¹				2
PB, Schwable II Class				2
PB, Vosper Thornycraft 75 ft ¹				4
PB, PC-16/I				1
PB, Poluchat				1
LCM, Yuchai Class ¹	1	1		
YGS, Survey Craft		1		
Total:	7	7		17

¹(U) Probably transferred to Police Marine Unit.

(5) Organization and Deployment

~~(S)~~ The Navy is headquartered at Dar es Salaam with detachments at Mtwara, Mwanza, and Zanzibar.

(6) Status of Equipment

~~(S)~~ The Navy has experienced severe maintenance problems with its Chinese-supplied naval craft, primarily because of a lack of spare parts and trained technicians. As a result, until early 1982, only a very limited number of vessels were operational at any one time. However, since the arrival of the PRC technicians and hardware in late 1981, there has been a major reversal in the combat readiness of TPDF naval vessels.

(7) Logistics

~~(S)~~ The Naval Wing is dependent on Chinese materiel, training, and support. As a result of the Chinese response to the Navy's needs, the overall capability of the force has improved substantially.

~~(S)~~ The Tanzanian Navy has the capability, with Chinese assistance, to maintain their six Shanghai Class patrol craft at the Navy base in Dar es Salaam. The repair facility, built by the Chinese specifically for the six ships, consists of a marine railway and covered roundhouse. Maintenance, originally accomplished by the Tanzanian Navy, is now supervised by the Chinese. All repairs, including hull, can be performed at this facility. There are no other important repair facilities in the country.

~~(S)~~ The Tanzanian Merchant Marine has a total of nine ships of over 1,000 GRT. Although two are almost 30 years old, they have military support potential. The various types include five breakbulk ships, two passenger/breakbulk cargo ships, one roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ship, and one POL tanker for a combined deadweight tonnage (lift capacity) of 61,500 tons of cargo. None were built in Tanzania since the country lacks a shipbuilding industry.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

(U) Tanzania has a literacy rate of 79 percent but it continues to have serious problems in securing suitable recruits for technical training. The retention rate for Naval Wing personnel is unknown.

(9) Training

~~(S)~~ The level of unit training and combat proficiency is not very high. The majority of personnel received their ship and technical training in China, and additional PRC training may be provided in communications, navigation, port services, and radar systems. The Chinese also offer courses at their Naval Staff College for TPDF naval personnel. Tanzanian naval personnel prefer to rely on basic training at their own facilities and, as a result, conduct most of their recruit training at facilities in Tanzania.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

~~(S)~~ No formal reserve unit exists, although the 130-man Police Marine Unit (PMU) would be available for augmentation as required.

(b) Mobilization

(U) None

c. Air Force

(1) Mission

~~(S)~~ Defend Tanzanian airspace, conduct close air support for the other armed forces, and provide logistic and airlift service for the Army.

(2) Capabilities

~~(S/NF)~~ The air wing is limited in its ability to meet its mission. Flying time has been restricted because of the lack of spare parts to maintain aircraft. Less than half of the aircraft are operational at any given time, and aircraft availability will not improve unless a satisfactory maintenance and logistic system is developed. Morale within the Air Force has declined over the last year, primarily because of poor economic conditions in the country and a lack of promotions within the service.

(3) Personnel Strength

~~(S)~~ 1,000

(4) ~~(S/NF)~~ Aircraft Strength

Total: 75 (fixed-wing: jet 32, turboprop 9, prop 23; helicopter 11)

In operational units: 75

(39 fighters: 18 day, 10 all-weather, 4 jet trainers, 7 prop trainers

17 transports: (9 medium-range, 8 short-range

8 utility

11 helicopters: 5 medium, 6 light)

(5) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

~~(S/NF)~~ The Tanzanian Air Force is headquartered at Dar es Salaam. Fighter units are based at Mwanza, Ngerengere, and Mtwara. Transport units are located at Dar es Salaam.

(b) ~~(S/NF)~~ Summary of Units

Units	Aircraft		Principal Base
	Type	Total	
3 fighter squadron	MONGOL	1	Mwanza
	FISHBED	10	Mwanza
	FRESCO	7	Mwanza, Ngerengere
	FARMER C	15	Ngerengere, Mtwara
	MIDGET	3	Ngerengere, Mtwara
1 transport battalion	HS 748	3	Dar es Salaam
	DHC-3 Otter	5	Dar es Salaam
	DHC-4 Caribou	2	Dar es Salaam
	Piaggio P-149	8	Dar es Salaam
	U-3A	2	Dar es Salaam
	Cessna 404 Titan	2	Dar es Salaam
	Piper Cherokee	6	Dar es Salaam
	DHC-5D Buffalo	6	Dar es Salaam
	COLT	1	Dar es Salaam
	Agusta Bell 205	5	Dar es Salaam
	Agusta Bell 206	6	Dar es Salaam

(6) Status of Equipment

~~(S/NF/WN/NC)~~ All aircraft are of foreign origin, and the Air Force is dependent on foreign suppliers for spare parts. In recent years, all TPDF aircraft have suffered from low operational readiness (OR) rates because of insufficient spare parts and limited maintenance capability; however, both the Chinese and the Soviets have attempted to improve this situation. The addition of five PRC-supplied MiG-19s, along with technical personnel to repair some of the existing ones, has improved the operational rate of these fighters. The Soviet Union has also provided additional spare parts and advisory personnel to improve the MiG-21 operational performance. Transport aircraft have a high nonoperational rate. In an effort to improve the OR rates of TPDF transport aircraft, the Tanzanian Government concluded an agreement with the Government of Madagascar to conduct maintenance on TPDF transport aircraft. However, this agreement has not been implemented. Helicopters are used jointly by the Tanzanian Air Force and the Police Air Wing. For the most part, aircraft that were captured during the Ugandan war were not incorporated into the Tanzanian inventory.

(7) Logistics

~~(S/NF)~~ During the 1978-79 Tanzanian-Ugandan war, the Air Force proved capable of providing only very limited support to Army units. Since that time there has been little change in this deficiency. Primary reasons are the large numbers of inoperable aircraft due to a shortage of spare parts, maintenance personnel, and qualified flight crew. Military budget projections indicate a continued shortfall of expenditures to alleviate these problems.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

(S) There is no conscription effort to obtain Air Force personnel. While there are sufficient numbers of volunteers to supply the service, difficulties arise in procuring qualified recruits who can meet the minimum educational standards for technical training.

(9) Training

(S/NF) Current training programs appear to be inadequate to maintain pilot proficiency. Pilots do not log enough flying hours to maintain proficiency, because of extensive aircraft downtime, lack of aircraft fuel, and the cost of flying in terms of maintenance and repair. There is an embryo internal flight training program; however, advanced training is conducted in the Soviet Union. Further, aircraft maintenance and engineering training has historically been conducted in the Soviet Union and Pakistan. During late 1982, a Chinese military survey team recommended that a basic flight training school be constructed at Tanga and that an aircraft technical school be built in Dar es Salaam or Ngerengere.

(10) Reserve

(U) There is a limited reserve capability for personnel and military aircraft from the civil air fleet.

(a) Aircraft

(U) Approximately seven civil transport aircraft with a gross takeoff weight of at least 9,000 kilograms currently are registered, owned, and operated in Tanzania:

**Medium-Range Transport Aircraft
(1,200-3,500 NM or 2,200-6,500 km)**

2 Boeing 737-200C
1 British Aerospace BAe HS-125-700B
1 BAe HS-748-2

Owner/Operator

Air Tanzania
Government
Private mining company

4 Total

**Short-Range Transport Aircraft
(less than 1,200 NM or 2,200 km)**

3 Fokker F-27-600

Air Tanzania

(U) Air Tanzania is government owned. International operations by the Boeing 737s have been curtailed since 1981 because of severe financial and maintenance problems experienced by the airline. Air Madagascar has flown some routes on behalf of Air Tanzania, using its own Boeing 737s. The HS-125-700 is operated by the Ministry of Communications and Transport for transporting VIPs. In addition to the above aircraft, the Tanzanian Air Force operates a HS-748-2 and a short-range Fokker F-28-4000 with civil registration markings.

(b) Pilots

(U) The number of licensed civilian pilots of major transport aircraft in Tanzania is not known.

(c) Mobilization Potential

(C) Most of Tanzania's civil aircraft and virtually all indigenous civilian aviation personnel could be mobilized in the event of war or comparable national emergency. Considerable foreign assistance would be required to achieve maximum effective use of the mobilized aircraft because of a lack of fully qualified indigenous flight and maintenance personnel.

d. Paramilitary Forces

(1) Police Field Force Units (FFU)

(a) Mission

(S) Reinforce conventional police posts as necessary to control serious civil disorders.

(b) Capabilities

(S) Each FFU is capable of brief independent operations as light infantry. They are more mobile than the army units and are capable of performing their missions near urban centers on short notice.

(c) Personnel Strength

(S) 1,400 (includes the 130-man Police Marine Unit and a 40-man Police Air Wing)

(d) Organization

(S) Eighteen FFUs are stationed throughout the country but are concentrated near the urban centers. Plans call for an eventual strength of 2,400.

(e) Status of Equipment

(S) Armament includes light automatic weapons, with maintenance being generally adequate. The Police Marine Unit (130 men) has the use of about eight patrol boats recently transferred from the Navy to perform its mission. These boats are in poor-to-fair condition and are located at Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar, Mwanza, and Bukoba. Five Bell helicopters are available for joint TPDF Air Force and Police Air Wing use.

(2) Other

(S) In addition to the FFUs, there may be about 10,000 Tanzanian police on the mainland and 1,000 on Zanzibar and Pemba.

e. (S) Total Military Personnel Strength

Army	32,000
Navy	1,100
Air Force	1,000
Militia	14,000
Police FFUs	1,400
Total	49,500

f. (S) Foreign Military Presence

(1) Foreign Military In-Country

USSR	5	Army and Air Force advisers/technicians
PRC	30+	Advisers to TPDF Navy and Air Force as well as instructing in military schools
East Germany	4	Assisting the Air Force
Yugoslavia	3	Assisting the police units
Mozambique	230	FPLM students attending infantry training.
Cuban	Unk	Intelligence advisers

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(2) (S) Presence Abroad

Egypt	30	Army TPDF ¹ NCOs attending maintenance, communication, and armor training
USSR	120(est)	Various military training programs
PRC	Unk	Air and naval training programs

¹ Approximately 3,000 TPDF troops currently deployed to Quelimane, Mozambique.

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TANZANIA

Appendix

Installation BE List (U)

Name	BE Number	Category	Latitude	Longitude
Arusha Artillery School	0932-00441	90130	03-22-00S	036-41-00E
Arusha Bde HQ	0932-00430	91140	03-22-00S	035-41-00E
Biharamulo Bde HQ	0932-00434	91140	02-38-00S	031-20-00E
Dar Es Salaam Afd	1031-08020	80081	06-52-31S	039-12-07E
Dar Es Salaam Army HQ	1031-00072	90110	06-44-24S	039-13-15E
Dar Es Salaam Mil Training Academy	1031-00152	90120	06-50-55S	039-17-10E
Dar Es Salaam Naval Base	1031-00361	95500	06-49-48S	039-17-58E
Kibaha Div HQ	1031-00393	91130	06-46-00S	038-55-00E
Mgulani Officer Cadet School	1031-00101	90110	06-51-00S	039-16-33E
Monduli Party Cadre Mil Academy	0932-00397	90130	03-18-00S	036-27-00E
Musoma Bde HQ	0932-00442	91140	01-30-00S	033-48-00E
Mwanza Afd	0932-09996	80092	02-26-38S	032-55-27E
Nachingwea Infantry School	0153CA0008	90130	10-25-18S	038-32-11E
Ngerengere Afd	1031-08808	80053	06-43-25S	038-09-10E
Tanga TISS Training Center	1031-00389	90110	05-04-28S	039-05-40E
Zanzibar Div/Bde HQ	1031-00394	91140	06-10-00S	039-11-00E

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UGANDA

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UGANDA

1. GOVERNMENT

a. (U) Key Government Officials

President: Yoweri Kaguta *Museveni*

Prime Minister: Dr. Samson B. M. *Kisekka*

Secretary of State in the Prime Minister's Office: *Eriya Kategaya*

Minister of Defense: Yoweri *Museveni*

Secretary of State for Defense: Dr. Ronald *Bata*

Deputy Minister of Defense and Political Commissar for the National Resistance Army: *Amanya Mushanga*

b. Type and Stability of Government

(U) The Republic of Uganda until recently had a democratic government structure, with executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Since receiving its independence from Great Britain in 1962, Uganda's government has undergone severe strains. In December 1980, Milton Obote was inaugurated President of Uganda. Obote had held national office in Uganda previously. In 1962 he was elected Prime Minister in the first national election, held shortly after the country received its independence from Great Britain. During his first term in office Obote assumed complete control of the Government, and became President with strong executive powers as stipulated in the interim constitution. In January 1971, Obote was ousted in a coup led by General Idi Amin, who ruled the country for 8 years with a regime based on terror, enforced by ethnically loyal security forces. Amin's years in power were characterized by economic decay, ethnic and religious persecution, and unpredictable relations with other states.

(U) The end of Amin's regime began in October 1978 when Ugandan troops crossed into the Kagera salient of northwestern Tanzania in pursuit of dissident Ugandan soldiers. They withdrew from Tanzania after 2 weeks of looting the countryside. Tanzanian security forces, deployed to repel the Ugandan troops, probed across the border and, encountering only light resistance, initiated more extensive operations into southern Uganda. In early 1979, the Tanzanian People's Defense Force (TPDF) launched a major military campaign to take Kampala and oust Idi Amin. The fall of Kampala occurred in April 1979 when a force of over 30,000 TPDF soldiers and Ugandan insurgents defeated a combined Ugandan, Libyan, and Palestinian force southeast of the capital. Amin evaded capture and escaped to Libya in June 1979; he currently resides in Saudi Arabia.

(C) Since Amin's fall, the leadership of the Ugandan Government has changed six times. The Ugandan Liberation Front, an ad hoc group of Ugandan exiles called together by Tanzanian President Nyerere in March 1979, elected an Executive Committee to govern Uganda until national elections could be held. Dr. Yusufu Lule, the head of this committee, exercised governmental control as President for 3 months until he was ousted by the quasi-legislative National Consultative Council (NCC), as the Executive Committee later came to be called. Lule was replaced by Godfrey Binaisa, who had been serving as the Minister of Interior. President Binaisa could not overcome differences with the NCC over

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the appointments to this executive cabinet, and he, in turn, was overthrown in May 1980 by Paulo Muwanga, Minister of Interior. Muwanga became Chairman of the Military Commission, an influential organization within the NCC, and this commission became the center of political control in Uganda until the December 1980 national election.

~~(S)~~ In the 1980 elections President-elect Milton Obote put together a coalition of northern tribes (primarily Acholi and Langi) to govern Uganda. Between his election in late 1980 and his overthrow in July 1985, Obote was beset by a wide variety of economic and ethnic problems. Obote's length of time in office was not an indication of public support as much as it was the lack of a viable political successor. The fragile Langi-Acholi coalition collapsed as the regime came under increasing pressure from an armed insurgency by the National Resistance Movement (NRM), and its military wing, the National Resistance Army (NRA) led by Yoweri Museveni, who eventually emerged as leader of both organizations. Perceptions by the Acholi that their people were bearing the brunt of the casualties in fighting against the NRA, and that they were shortchanged on military and political promotions, created conditions that resulted in a successful coup on 27 July 1985. Elements of the military, led by senior officers, primarily from the Acholi ethnic group, overthrew the Obote government. An Interim Military Government (IMG) headed by a Military Council was installed with General Tito Okello Lutwa, formerly Chief of the Defense Forces, as Head of State and Military Council Chairman.

~~(S)~~ Immediately after assuming power, the Military Council began appointing a broad-based civilian cabinet, comprising all major ethnic groups and representatives of the four political parties which had contested the disputed 1980 election. The council subsequently included members of four insurgent groups. They were the Former Ugandan National Army (FUNA), the Ugandan National Rescue Front (UNRF), the Ugandan Freedom Movement (UFM), and the Federal Democratic Movement of Uganda (FEDEMU). The UNRF and FUNA were composed of members recruited primarily from the West Nile region while the UFM and FEDEMU members were mostly from Bantu tribes in southern Uganda. Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Movement (NRM) and National Resistance Army (NRA), dominated by Bantus — in particular the Banyankole — refused to join the IMG. Museveni's NRA forces continued attacks against the IMG but did agree to participate in peace talks with the IMG in Nairobi, Kenya, under the chairmanship of Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi. The talks culminated in a peace accord signed on 17 December 1985 in Nairobi between Okello and Museveni, who agreed to join the government as vice chairman of the military council. By early 1986, the terms of the accord had not been implemented, and further fighting took place. In late January 1986, the NRA seized control of Kampala, the capital, and remnants of Okello's army retreated eastward to Mbale and then northward to their tribal homeland in the north around Gulu and Kitgum. The NRA seized the Acholi homeland region by April 1986.

~~(S)~~ Historically, Ugandan northern and southern ethnic groups have been in conflict. Although constituting 65 percent of the population, the southern Bantu tribes have been dominated by the northern tribes since 1966. The victory of the NRM, composed mostly of Bantu peoples, marks the end of almost 20 years of northern tribal dominance over the central government in Uganda. It remains to be seen if Museveni can bind all tribal and political factions to his new government.

c. Internal Threat

~~(S/NP)~~ The NRM, since assuming power in 1986, has more effectively assumed control throughout Uganda than any previous government. However, numerous armed groups, some politically motivated, are operating with greater frequency and intensity in the country,

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particularly in northern and eastern Uganda. The National Resistance Army (NRA), traditionally a guerrilla force, is slowly adjusting to its new role as a standing army with conventional internal security responsibilities.

(S/NF) The most serious threats to the government are remnants of the Ugandan National Liberation Army (UNLA), operating in northern Uganda. The UNLA was the Army ousted from Kampala by the NRA in 1986. Primarily Acholi, most are organized into small bands conducting hit-and-run raids against NRA units and garrisons. Approximately 3,000-4,000 rebels may be operating in the north. By late 1986, attacks against NRA positions were increasing in frequency and strength, forcing the government to respond by deploying large numbers of troops from southern Ugandan garrisons. Kitgum and Gulu have experienced several serious attacks by UNLA rebels, who for a time threatened to overrun these important NRA garrisons. Although attacks were repelled, both forces continue to suffer large numbers of casualties.

(S/NF) Since January 1986, UNLA rebels have largely operated as disunited, independent bands, with no known foreign support. Weaponry has consisted of a variety of small arms and vehicles, taken as the UNLA fled Kampala before advancing NRA forces. UNLA rebels are known to possess some field artillery, although probably not in large quantities. NRA forces had successfully recaptured much of the heavier equipment from the UNLA by March 1986.

(S/NF/WN/NC) Some UNLA rebels may have been organized under the newly created Uganda People's Democratic Movement (UPDM). Little is known about the UPDM's organization, although it is believed to be a coalition of military and political leaders from the Amin, Obote, and Okello regimes. UPDM officials possibly include Colonel Juma Oris, formerly Foreign Minister under Amin, and Dr. Henry Benjamin Obonyo, Minister of Health during the Okello regime. Other key UPDM officials probably include former UNLA officers Brigadier Justin Odong and Lt Col Eric Odwar Balmoi. President Museveni had charged in 1986 that the Sudanese supported the UNLA rebels and the UPDM. Sudanese assistance is considered unlikely, however, although individual southern Sudanese officials are probably assisting the rebels through provision of arms and sanctuary. The exact number of troops under UPDM/UPDA authority is unknown. Most rebel activity is still believed to be conducted by independent former UNLA units.

(S/NF) The NRA has largely been on the defensive in northern Uganda. Although able to conduct some sweep operations across the countryside, the NRA has suffered numerous casualties following effective UNLA hit-and-run raids. The arid terrain is unfamiliar to the predominantly Bantu NRA. NRA field communications are poor and vehicles often in disrepair. Rations and pay are infrequent, resulting in lowered morale. Initial local support for the NRA is deteriorating, in the face of rumors of NRA atrocities in the north. Ill-trained and undisciplined new NRA recruits have been deployed to the north in increasing numbers. Although the NRA has quickly punished troops responsible for brutality against Acholi and other northern tribes, the large numbers of northerners detained by the Army have heightened longstanding fears toward southern Ugandans.

(S/NF) Other violence throughout Uganda appears to be widespread banditry rather than politically motivated activity. The Karamojong tribe in northeastern Uganda is traditionally noted for cattle rustling. Possessing large numbers of automatic weapons, the Karamojong have increased their raids on villages throughout the region. Some Karamojong may have linked up with UNLA rebels operating in northern Uganda. Remnants of the Federal Democratic Movement (FEDEMU) and Ugandan Freedom Movement (UFM) have attacked numerous villages in the Kampala area, and are believed responsible for incidents in the

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capital. Some NRA soldiers have been implicated in murders and robberies in Kampala and throughout Uganda. Gunfire is often heard at night in Kampala, while the NRA has increased the number of roadblocks in the city in an attempt to stabilize the security situation.

~~(S/NF)~~ Intertribal tensions are central to current Ugandan instability. Rising expectations by the Baganda pose a serious threat to the government's long-term ability to control much of southern Uganda. Following the defeat of the Acholi-based Okello government, sentiment for increased regional autonomy, possibly including the return of the traditional Baganda monarch, the Kabaka, is increasing. The Baganda, which comprise a majority of the NRA rank and file, claim they are underrepresented in key government and top military positions, and are unfairly affected by state control of the economy. Baganda dissidents are increasingly affiliated with FEDEMU and UFM remnants operating in the Kampala area. The government's heavy-handed response to Baganda dissent has only heightened tensions, increasing the prospects for coup plotting and civil unrest.

d. External Threat

~~(C/NF)~~ Uganda currently faces no conventional external military threat to its national security from any of its neighbors or from other foreign sources. However, all of Uganda's neighbors — Zaire, Sudan, Kenya, Tanzania, and Rwanda — are concerned with the political turmoil within Uganda and fear the consequences of the overflow of violence and refugees across the border. Tanzania and Kenya could be expected to react vigorously to any border problems. The insurgency in southern Sudan poses a potential threat to Uganda's northern border, and border tensions have occurred recently with Zaire. Uganda charged in 1986 that UNLA remnants operating in the north had received Sudanese support and basing, increasing tensions between the two governments. Although Uganda has since acknowledged Sudanese claims of noninvolvement, it remains fearful of Sudan's inability to control its southern provinces. Formal Sudanese support has not been confirmed; assistance to UNLA rebels by individual southern Sudanese officials cannot be discounted, however.

~~(S/NF/WN/NC)~~ The government is concerned with the potential threat posed by the Force Obote Back Again (FOBA) movement. Reportedly based in western Kenya, the movement has threatened to conduct assassination and sabotage operations inside Uganda. FOBA is reportedly led by Peter Otai, former Minister of State for Defense in President Obote's government. Other key officials include Wilson Okwenje, former Minister of Cabinet Affairs, and John Luwuliza-Kirunda, former Minister of Internal Affairs. Although FOBA does not appear to have a popular political base in Uganda, the government remains very concerned over its potential to operate inside the country. Although FOBA probably is incapable of widespread sabotage or assassination inside Uganda, isolated attacks remain possible.

e. Communist Influence

~~(S/NF)~~ Although Uganda has diplomatic ties with a number of Communist countries, including Cuba, North Korea, and the Soviet Union, Communist activities in Uganda during the post-Okello era so far have been limited. Communist officials have visited Uganda since the overthrow of the Okello regime and efforts have been made to increase contacts and improve relations with members of the NRM/NRA. Museveni has received offers of economic and military assistance from Communist Bloc countries. Currently, Museveni has accepted some military and economic aid, but only for selected rehabilitation projects. Uganda continues to look to the West for the bulk of its economic aid. Derelict or nonoperational military equipment in Uganda of Communist origin, however, provides Communist countries with an opportunity to rehabilitate this equipment, resupply munitions, or supply new equipment to Museveni's forces.

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~~(S/NF/WN/NC)~~ Ugandan military officials traveled to the Soviet Union in 1986 to negotiate a possible military assistance agreement. The NRA has an urgent requirement for large amounts of major military equipment and training assistance on favorable terms. Uganda is particularly interested in purchasing helicopters which could be equipped as gunships to combat UNLA rebels. Although any actual agreement will probably be less extensive at first, opportunities for Soviet influence and possible presence would quickly increase. The Soviets were expected to provide four Mi-17 helicopters in early 1987, the first deliveries in a new military assistance program. President Museveni, however, has resented attempts by the Soviets to collect payment for military assistance debts incurred by previous Ugandan governments.

f. Economic Factors

~~(S/NF)~~ The Ugandan economy remains in chaos with high inflation, black marketeering, and low reserves of foreign exchange. The government has requested economic assistance to rebuild Uganda's war-torn economy and to resettle refugees. Museveni's government has succeeded in instituting law and order in the major urban areas. This has improved the overall economic outlook.

~~(C)~~ On 25 February 1986 the Government of Uganda (GOU) lifted the ban on foreign exchange transactions. The auction system which had been established as part of Uganda's 1981 IMF program has not been reinstated. Foreign exchange is allocated on a priority basis by the Foreign Exchange Committee composed of officials from the Bank of Uganda. First are priority imports: consumer goods (soap, sugar, salt, baby food), raw materials and industrial inputs, spare parts, petroleum products, human and animal drugs, agricultural inputs, and building materials. Second are payments for vital services: medical treatment of urgent cases, expatriates' allowances and remittances, freight and clearing charges under bilateral aid programs, funds for operations of oversea offices of marketing boards and Uganda Airlines, Uganda missions abroad, official government and parastatal travel, transit charges for courses and seminars abroad, and education for approved continuing students. Third is the public debt: official and private (guaranteed by government or parastatal organizations).

~~(C)~~ The current black market price of the shilling is 3,300-3,500 to the US dollar. The official rate is 1,470. This exchange rate is thought to be high because of the disruption of coffee shipments caused by civil war and the slow rate of clearance for payments for subsequent shipments of coffee. In the long term the exchange rate for the shilling should drop.

~~(C)~~ Uganda's controlled and obsolete money, no overnight deposits, and artificially low interest rates provide little or no incentive to save and much of the incoming foreign exchange is spent on consumer goods, which spurs inflation. Uganda also has inflation when its foreign exchange is in short supply. In turn inflation drives up the price of imported goods.

~~(S/NF/WN/NC)~~ A number of nations (Western, Communist, and Third World) have offered emergency aid to Uganda. The US has budgeted \$10.6 million for rehabilitation programs for returning refugees and displaced persons.

g. Military and Political Alignment

~~(S/NF)~~ Uganda has no formal military alliances with any other country and follows a nonaligned foreign policy. The international voting record of the new government was largely untested by mid-1986, although Museveni had voiced strong support for the Arab cause in the Middle East dispute. Museveni has expressed strong support for southern

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African insurgents, and has offered material assistance. Although generally apprehensive over Western intentions in Uganda, President Museveni has demonstrated some moderation and flexibility in foreign policy pronouncements, in part to ensure continued economic assistance.

~~(S/NF)~~ However, Uganda is actively seeking large quantities of small arms and ammunition from various nations. Museveni has repeatedly stated that he will accept military assistance from any nation, providing there are no preconditions. Foreign military training would be accepted, provided that foreign advisers only train key Ugandan personnel, who would in turn train NRA rank and file. To limit foreign contacts with the NRA, Museveni has indicated that most training should be conducted outside Uganda. By mid-1986, Uganda had engaged in discussions with the United Kingdom, Italy, Tanzania, Kenya, Libya, Finland, East Germany, the USSR, Yugoslavia, and the US on a variety of military assistance packages.

~~(S/NF)~~ Although there is no formal military alliance between Uganda and Libya at the present time, ties steadily improved throughout 1986. President Museveni has repeatedly stated that no alliance will be approved in the near future. However, negotiations were underway in 1986 for a \$70-million Libyan military assistance package.

~~(S/NF/WN/NO)~~ Libya has provided large quantities of small arms, ammunition, and uniforms to Uganda. Two SIAI-Marchetti SF-260 aircraft were provided by Libya in 1986; both have been equipped as ground attack aircraft. As many as 300 NRA personnel received advanced infantry, military intelligence, and political indoctrination training in Libya during 1986. Similar training for an additional NRA contingent was expected by year's end. Several Ugandan pilots were also believed to be receiving pilot training, for both fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. Several Libyan military advisers may be assigned to the Ugandan airwing. The two SF-260 aircraft are probably flown by Libyan pilots at the present time. President Museveni has looked to Tripoli as a source of heavier military equipment, including helicopter gunships and artillery.

~~(S/NF)~~ Responding to Western concerns over his improving ties with Libya, Museveni argues that his nonaligned status allows Uganda to seek assistance from all prospective donors. Museveni's ties with Libya appear, in part, to reflect his appreciation over Tripoli's timely assistance to the NRA during its war with the Obote and Okello regimes. Libya has a longstanding interest in Uganda, having established a military relationship with the Amin government prior to Tanzania's 1979 invasion. Although some strains had developed in relations with Libya by late 1986, in part due to Qadhafi's heavy-handed approach with Ugandan officials and fear of subversive support to Western Ugandan Muslims, ties continued due to Uganda's need for military assistance.

h. (U) Key US Officials

Chief of Mission (Kampala): Ambassador Robert G. Houdek

Defense Attache: None

2. (U) MILITARY, GENERAL

a. (U) Key Military Officials

Commander, National Resistance Army: Eli Tumwine

Deputy Commander: Fred Rwigyema

Deputy Commander: Salim Saleh

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Members of the High Command: Tom Kyaligonza
Tadeo Kanyankole
Lutaya Andrew

Senior Army Officers (NRA Department Heads): Jim Muhwezi Katugugu
Serwaga L. Lwanga
Dr. Kiiza Besigye
T. Kahinda Otafiire
Dr. Ronald Bata
Peter Kerim
Mugisha Muntu
Lutaya Andrew

The NRA does not use traditional military ranks.

~~(S/NP)~~ Museveni is the Commander in Chief of Uganda's Armed Forces. His authority flows uninterrupted as he is also Minister of Defense. Authority is directed from Museveni to the NRA Commander and on to the individual battalions. Senior Army officers handle NRA departments and do not appear to be in the direct operational chain of command. Known NRA departments include Operations and Training, Logistics and Engineering, Personnel and Administration, and Political Education. The NRA "High Command" serves as an advisory body only, and is subordinate to the governing NRM. The High Command is not in the direct operational chain of command, and does not have authority over any NRA forces.

~~(S/NP)~~ Museveni intends to politicize the armed forces while using them as role models for Uganda's citizens to follow. He wants the armed forces to be the nucleus and spirit for reshaping Uganda into a mold which will overcome tribalism and unify the country nationally.

b. Position of the Armed Forces

~~(S/NP)~~ Since independence the Ugandan military has had a mixed history of involvement in political affairs. Although typically apathetic toward domestic politics the military has, on occasion, made its influence known. The best example of this occurred in 1971 when General Idi Amin Dada overthrew President Obote in a military coup d'etat. The military's impact on the domestic political scene was again felt in December 1980 when the military was used to harass and intimidate opponents of Milton Obote (who was again seeking the country's highest office) attempting to cast their ballots in the national election. This heavy-handed military involvement cost President Obote a degree of support among the general populace. In July 1985, the elements within the military led by senior Acholi officers overthrew the Obote regime. The coup leaders set up an interim military government (IMG) and it, in turn, was overthrown by NRA forces in January 1986.

~~(S/NP)~~ Currently, the NRA is transitioning from a guerrilla force to a regular army. It is attempting to do this while trying to maintain stability and order in the country. It is clear that the NRA forms the basis of power for Museveni's government and the views of its leaders must be taken into account as government policy is formulated. Although the NRA leadership is highly loyal to President Museveni, disaffected elements within the military, particularly the Baganda, may ultimately challenge the government.

~~(S/NP)~~ Uganda issued a proclamation on 19 February 1986 designating the National Resistance Council (NRC) as the supreme council of the government with the powers of a legislature (as defined in the constitution) and the power to appoint the President. The NRC is composed primarily of NRM and NRA members. It was directed to seek the views of

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the National Resistance Army Council (NRAC) on all matters the NRC deemed important. NRAC is composed of members of the NRA High Command, Directors of NRA departments, senior Army officers, and battalion commanders.

(S) The NRC gives the military a great deal of political power, since it contains many senior NRA officers, but the NRAC must be consulted on all important issues. Museveni, as President, also functions as Minister of Defense. He believes that the Army needs to be more tightly controlled given its historic role in Ugandan politics since independence. If the NRC is expanded to include political and geographic representatives, in addition to NRM/NRA, it could ultimately become a challenge to Museveni's leadership.

c. Military Trends and Capabilities

(S/NF) The NRA is basically an infantry force with the capability to maintain order in major urban areas of the country, but cannot suppress banditry and dissident forces in rural areas in the north, northeast, and areas around Kampala.

(S/NF) Currently, Museveni is not seeking the trappings of modern forces in Africa (e.g., tanks and supersonic jets). Efforts are concentrated on repairing or replacing existing heavy equipment, small arms, and munitions. Efforts have been made to find light armored vehicles to provide mobility; helicopters equipped with rockets and machineguns have also been identified by the NRA as effective counterinsurgency weapons. The NRA and the NRA Airwing are unable to defend against foreign aggression or maintain internal security outside major urban areas. The NRA is at present transitioning from the role of an insurgent group to a conventional force capable of executing an effective counterinsurgency strategy. As the NRA becomes a more conventional force, it is expected to request more sophisticated equipment in order to increase its capabilities and effectiveness. Currently, NRA leaders regard the force as self sufficient, requiring little foreign training. This position could change should internal conditions further deteriorate, necessitating the training of large numbers of Ugandan personnel inside and outside of the country.

d. Military Budget

(S/NF) Estimated at \$114.3 million for fiscal year ending 30 June 1982, which was 25.7 percent of the central government budget. Dollar values are converted at the official exchange rate of 94.05 shillings equal \$1.00.

e. (U) Population

15,158,000 as of July 1986

Males (ages 15-49): about 3,316,000; physically fit, 1,785,000

Ethnic divisions: 99 percent African, 1 percent European, Asian, and Arab

Literacy: Approximately 52 percent

3. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

a. Army

(1) Mission

(U) To defend national borders and assist in maintaining internal order.

(2) Capabilities

(S) The NRA is not capable of successfully defending the nation against a major military incursion from Tanzania, Zaire, or Kenya. Rwanda and Sudan would not be able to sustain a

major military incursion into Uganda. Currently, the NRA controls major urban areas and a majority of Uganda's rural areas, although banditry is increasing and disorganized UNLA remnants remain unchecked. Continuing logistics problems, poor field communications, ration shortages, and spare parts shortages have limited the NRA's combat effectiveness in the north.

(3) Personnel Strength

~~(S/NF)~~ Estimated at 15,000-20,000 personnel. As many as 30,000 may be considered "members of the NRA," but this actually includes large numbers of dependents of NRA effectives who perform some support functions for the Army.

~~(S)~~ This figure includes seasoned combat fighters and recruits undergoing training, as well as FEDEMU, UFM, and former-UNLA troops incorporated into the NRA.

(4) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

~~(S/NF/WN/NC)~~ Yoweri Museveni as President and Minister of Defense exercises authority over the NRA through the Army Commander and battalion commanders. The complete disposition of NRA forces since the defeat of northern forces is unknown. The NRA remains organized essentially as a guerrilla force, lightly armed and highly mobile. Efforts are underway, however, to develop the NRA into a conventional army. The NRA remains divided into the Mobile Forces and Zonal Forces. The Mobile Forces operate in battalions, brigades, and divisions, organized apparently as necessary for specific missions. The Zonal Forces consist of independent battalions which defend and are based at specific locations. There are at least 15 known Zonal Forces battalions at the present time. Some of the UNLA's equipment (artillery, vehicles, helicopters, and small arms) which had been abandoned was recovered. The vast majority of UNLA equipment is now in the NRA's possession.

~~(S/NF/WN/NC)~~ The NRA does not utilize conventional rank structure. Senior battalion officers and NRA leadership are referred to as "Commanders" or "Senior Officers." Other ranks include Junior Officers Class One, Junior Officers Class Two, Provisional Junior Officers, and the Noncommissioned Officers (NCOs).

~~(S/NF)~~ Since taking over the country, the NRA has received military supplies and training from Libya, with offers of assistance from the Communist Bloc. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has established ties with Museveni's regime despite DPRK ties to previous regimes.

(b) ~~(S/NF/WN/NC)~~ Ground Combat Units

Major Tactical Units	Strength per Unit	
	Authorized	Actual
15+ infantry battalions (Zonal Forces) ¹	Unk	600-750

¹~~(S/NF/WN/NC)~~ Mobile forces include unknown number of tactical units designated as battalions, brigades, and divisions.

(5) Weapons and Equipment

(a) General

~~(S/NF)~~ During the NRA's successful campaign against the Okello government varying amounts of weapons, munitions, and equipment were supplied to the NRA by neighboring

countries and Libya. In the near term, the NRA needs ammunition, vehicles, and helicopters, in addition to help in refurbishing captured UNLA equipment and training in operating that equipment.

(b) ~~(S/NF)~~ *Ground Weapons and Equipment*

		Country of Origin	Total Inventory
Tanks:	Medium tank, T-34	UR	Unk
Armored Vehicles:	APC, OT-64B	CZ	5
AD Arty & SAM:	ADA, M1939 37-mm	CH/UR	53
	ADA, ZU-23 23-mm	UR	18
Artillery:	Field gun, 122-mm	KN	60
	Field gun, 100-mm	UR	29
	Field gun, M1942, 76-mm	UR	48
	MRL, 122-mm, SP, BM-21, 40 rd	UR	14
	MRL, 107, Towed, Type 63	UR	8
Recoilless (RCL) AT Weapons:	RCLR, 75-mm	CH	12
Mortars:	82-mm	KN	73
	120-mm	KN	61

(6) *Logistics*

~~(S)~~ Little is known of the present logistics system.

(7) *Personnel Procurement and Retention*

~~(S/NF)~~ The NRA does not utilize conscription to supply its manpower needs. Volunteer recruits are more than sufficient to fill its manpower needs. The NRA's retention rate is unknown. Presently, the majority of NRA forces are from the Bantu tribe. The NRA has made some effort toward broadening its ethnic base, and has incorporated large numbers of combatants from various armed groups, including the UNLA, FEDEMU, and UFM, into its ranks.

(8) *Training*

~~(S/NF/WN/NC)~~ Most army training is accomplished inside Uganda, primarily at Jinja and Nakasongola, although also at small regional centers. At least 38 NRA officers were training in Tanzania by late 1986. Great Britain during 1986 had 32 instructors at Jinja, conducting basic infantry training. Although they have since departed, future programs remain possible. Approximately 45 Tanzanian military advisers arrived at Jinja to conduct infantry training; as many as 100 Tanzanian advisers had been expected. Uganda has negotiated with Kenya and the DPRK for training, although any training underway cannot be confirmed.

(9) *Reserves and Mobilization*

(a) *Reserve/Militia*

~~(S)~~ The fate of militia/reserve forces after the NRA takeover is not clear but existing militia forces were probably disarmed and disbanded. The NRA's future plans for militia/reserve forces are unknown.

(b) Mobilization

~~(C)~~ Uganda could mobilize to some degree should the need arise. Its present ability to do so would be restricted by both a shortage of operational military transport vehicles and current NRA efforts to deactivate large numbers of former UNLA troops and guerrilla groups which had been coopted by the Okello regime.

b. Navy

~~(S/NF)~~ During the latter part of the Obote regime, Uganda may have had a small lake (Lake Victoria) navy of four 30-foot patrol boats (armament unknown) based at Fort Bell. These boats were not observed during the short-lived Okello regime and their status under Museveni's government is unknown.

c. Air Force

(1) Mission

~~(C)~~ The primary mission of the NRA Airwing is to provide transportation for NRM/NRA personnel and to conduct counterinsurgent ground attack missions. A possible secondary mission is to transport supplies and equipment.

(2) Capabilities

~~(S/NF)~~ The NRA Airwing is marginally capable of performing its assigned missions. It suffers from a lack of trained technicians and pilots, and poorly maintained equipment.

(3) Personnel Strength:

~~(S/NF/WN/NC)~~ The NRA Airwing total strength is estimated at 50 personnel, including pilots and technicians. Five Tanzanian Air Force personnel were assigned in 1986 to the NRM as helicopter pilots, although they are not expected to conduct combat operations against former UNLA rebels in the north.

(4) ~~(S/NF)~~ Aircraft Strength

Total: 26 (fixed-wing: 3 jets; 1 turboprop; 6 props; 16 helicopters)

In operational units: 26

(9 trainers;
1 transport;
16 helicopters)

(5) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

~~(S/NF)~~ The NRA Airwing, composed of one helicopter squadron, is directly subordinate to the Minister of Defense. Headquarters for the NRA Airwing and its one operational squadron is at Entebbe Airport, which is also its primary operating base and the location of its operational aircraft. Nakasongola and Gulu are the two other major airfields in Uganda; however, all aircraft at these locations have been nonoperational since 1979.

(b) ~~(S/NF/WN/NC)~~ Summary of Units

Maya	3 ¹	Gulu/Entebbe
AS-202 Bravo	3 ²	Entebbe
Saab-91 Safir	1 ²	Entebbe
Lockheed L-100-20	1 ³	Entebbe

SIAI-Marchetti SF-260	2	Entebbe
Agusta-Bell 412	7	Entebbe
Bell 412	1	Entebbe
Bell 212	1	Entebbe
Agusta-Bell 206	2	Entebbe
Bell 206	1	Entebbe
Mi-17 HIP	4	Entebbe
Total	26	

¹~~(S)~~ These aircraft are derelict.

²(U) These aircraft are nonoperational.

³~~(S/NF)~~ This aircraft has not been seen since December 1985.

⁴~~(S/NF)~~ Helicopters forward deployed in north as necessary to combat UNLA rebels.

(6) Status of Equipment

~~(S)~~ The NRA Airwing is wholly dependent upon foreign sources for its aircraft and spare parts, maintenance training, and other materiel. The Airwing's only two operational combat aircraft are the Libyan-provided SF-260s. The few MiG aircraft which survived the 1978-79 war with Tanzania are now derelict. The only transport aircraft (Lockheed L-100-20) is unaccounted for since the NRA takeover, and may be out of the country. Of the helicopters, 50 percent are considered operational although efforts are underway to improve operational readiness through aircraft acquisitions and improved maintenance. The rest require maintenance which cannot be wholly accomplished by Ugandan personnel.

(7) Logistics

~~(S)~~ The NRA Airwing has a limited air logistics capability. It has a medium airlift capability with the single Lockheed L-100-20 aircraft. Short-range light transport is performed by the Airwing's helicopters.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

~~(S)~~ There is no conscription. Unless the NRA rehabilitates the derelict fighter aircraft or expands its inventory, there is little need for additional personnel.

(9) Training

~~(S/NF)~~ Current training programs for the crews of fixed-wing or rotary-wing aircraft are largely inadequate to either meet or maintain pilot proficiency. However, Ugandan pilots are receiving training in Libya on fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. Foreign pilots will be necessary in the short term, however. Factors degrading pilot proficiency include maintenance downtime on the aircraft, shortage of fuel, and the prohibitive cost of flying, airframe maintenance, and repair. Uganda has no domestic flight training program.

(10) Reserves

~~(S)~~ There is a limited reserve capability for personnel and aircraft from the civil air fleet. Uganda's commercial aircraft and indigenous civil aviation personnel would be available for government use in the event of war or other national emergency. Aircraft utilization, however, would be restricted by the limited availability of qualified flight and maintenance personnel.

(11) Civil Aviation

(a) Aircraft

(U) Approximately three civil transport aircraft with a gross takeoff weight of at least 9,000 kilograms currently are registered, owned, or operated in Uganda:

Long-Range Transport Aircraft (greater than 3,500 NM or 6,500 km)	Owner/Operator
2 Boeing 707-320C	Uganda Airlines
Medium-Range Transport Aircraft	
Short-Range Transport Aircraft (less than 1,200 NM or 2,200 km)	
1 Fokker F-27-600 Friendship	Uganda Airlines

(U) Uganda Airlines is the country's national flag carrier and is entirely government owned. Carriers are based at Entebbe International Airport, about 38 kilometers from downtown Kampala. In the past, Uganda Airlines has provided scheduled passenger and cargo services connecting Entebbe/Kampala with London, Rome, and Cologne in Europe; Dubai in the Middle East; and various points in East Africa and in Uganda.

(b) Pilots

(U) The number of licensed civilian pilots of major transport aircraft in Uganda is not known. Uganda Airlines reportedly employs 39 pilots.

(c) Mobilization Potential

~~(S)~~ Virtually all of Uganda's civil aircraft and indigenous civilian aviation personnel could be mobilized in the event of war or comparable national emergency. The civil aircraft available to the NRA Airwing under such circumstances theoretically could provide an airlift capacity and range that are totally lacking at present. In actual practice, however, the ability of the NRA to make effective use of such mobilized resources probably would be impeded by inadequate mobilization planning and stockpiling, a lack of fully qualified indigenous civilian flight crews and maintenance personnel, and inadequate airline maintenance facilities. Considerable foreign assistance would be required if prolonged or intensive air transport operations were required.

d. Paramilitary Forces

~~(S/NF)~~ Paramilitary forces are being disbanded by the NRA at this time.

e. (U) Total Military Personnel Strength

Army	15,000 +
Air Force	50
Total	15,050 +

f. ~~(S/NF/WN/NC)~~ Foreign Military Presence

(1) Foreign Military In-Country

Tanzania	45 +	Advisers assigned to NRA training facility at Jinja. Helicopter pilots assigned to Airwing.
Libya	Unknown	Advisers and pilots assigned to Airwing.

(2) Presence Abroad

Libya	Unknown	Army — NRA personnel receiving advanced infantry training, domestic intelligence instruction, political education, and helicopter instruction. As many as 300 received Libyan training in 1986.
Tanzania	38	Army — NRA officer cadets in an officers' training course in 1986. Present status unknown.

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Appendix

Installation BE List (U)

Name	BE Number	Category	Latitude	Longitude
Bombo Army Barracks	0909-00349	90110	00-03-00N	032-28-00E
Entebbe Airfield	0909-08007	80053	00-02-30N	032-26-17E
Jinja Army Barracks	0909-00018	90110	00-27-10N	033-12-20E
Kampala Barracks Lubiri	0909-00188	90110	00-18-09N	032-33-58E
Kampala HQ Uganda Army	0909-00189	91011	00-19-48N	032-37-40E
Nakasongola Airfield	0909-08831	80053	01-24-10N	032-28-50E

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