THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE

**BODY**

COUNTRY: (U) LIBERIA (L)

SUBJ: (b)(3):10 USC 424 NPFL OPTIONS AND PROBLEMS (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 900609

REXS: (b)(3):10 USC 424

SUMMARY: (U) AS THE NPFL INSURGENTS APPROACH MONROVIA THEY WILL HAVE TO DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT TO FIGHT A PITCHED BATTLE FOR THE CITY, AND BY WHICH AXES TO MAKE THEIR PRIMARY ASSAULT. THE REBELS' DISCIPLINE WILL BREAKDOWN FURTHER AS THEY NEAR THE CITY.

TEXT: 1. (U) THE KEY ISSUE THAT THE NPFL MUST DECIDE IS WHETHER TO ASSAULT MONROVIA AND FIGHT A PITCHED BATTLE, OR WHETHER TO STRANGLE THE CAPITAL, APPLYING EVER INCREASING PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURE IN AN EFFORT TO BRING ABOUT EITHER THE FLIGHT OR TOPPLING OF PRESIDENT DOE. IN EITHER CASE, THE SECONDARY ISSUE THEN BECOMES BY WHICH AXES TO APPROACH THE CITY.

2. (U) STARTING FROM THEIR CURRENT GENERAL LOCATIONS NEAR KAKATA - 15 GATE, BONG MINE, AND OWENSGROVE/HARBEL, THE REBELS HAVE SEVERAL ROUTES BY WHICH TO MOVE ON MONROVIA.

- THE REBELS MAY CHOOSE, FOR MAXIMUM PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT, TO DRIVE THROUGH HARBEL, PAST THE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, AND ATTACK THE AFL AT CAMP SCHIEFFLIN. A ROUTE OF THE AFL DETACHMENT IN THE VICINITY OF THE AIRPORT WOULD GREATLY DEMORALIZE THE DEFENDERS OF CAMP SCHIEFFLIN, AND THEIR DEFEAT WOULD, IN TURN, CAUSE THE GREATEST FRIGHT POSSIBLE, WITH THE RESULTING MASSIVE DESERTIONS, AMONG THE MILITARY PERSONNEL IN MONROVIA.

AGAIN LEAVING AN AFL FORCE CUT-OFF (SOMETHOW AS THEY DID AT BUCHANAN AND GANTA). IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE, ALTHOUGH SOMETHOW MORE DIFFICULT, FOR THE REBELS TO MOVE FROM FIRESTONE DIVISION 10 CAMP //GEOCOORDS: (b)(3):10 USC 424 LONG A NETWORK OF PLANTATION TRAILS AND DIRT TRACKS AND Emerge ONTO THE MAIN HIGHWAY BY THE AMERICAN TransmitTING SITE NEAR SEYA TOWN //GEOCOORDS: (b)(3):10 USC 424 PUTTING THEM BETWEEN CAMP SCHIEFFLIN AND MONROVIA. IN EITHER CASE, WHEREAS THE REBELS HAVE SHOWN A WILLINGNESS TO MOVE THROUGH THE FOREST (AND THE BRUSH IS NOT PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT IN EITHER OF THE ABOVE CASES), THE AFL TENDS TO CONFINES ITSELF TO PAVED OR DIRT ROADS, PERMITTING SUCH MOVEMENTS BY THE INSURGENTS IN RELATIVE SAFETY.


- FROM BONG MINE, THE REBELS COULD, IF THEY SHOULD SO DESIRE, EITHER MOVE ALONG THE ST PAUL RIVER PAST THE MT. COFFEE DAM AND Emerge AT EITHER GARDNERSVILLE OR ON BUSHROD ISLAND, OR CROSS THE ST PAUL RIVER, STRIKE THE ROAD NETWORK ON THE FAR SIDE, AND BLOCK THE ROAD TO SIERRA LEONE AT BREWerville //GEOCOORDS: (b)(3):10 USC 424 CUTTING THE ROAD AT BREWerville WOULD TREMENDOUSLY INCREASE THE FEAR FACTOR WITHIN MONROVIA, BUT WOULD BE CONTRARY TO WHAT THE REBELS HAVE DONE TO DATE. IN EVERY CASE SO FAR, THE INSURGENTS HAVE LEFT A WAY OUT FOR THE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN OCCUPANTS OF THE TOWN OR CITY BEING ATTACKED. THIS MAY HAVE BEEN BY INTENT, SINCE BY LETTING THE AFL RUN THE REBELS WERE ABLE TO MINIMIZE THEIR OWN CASUALTIES, OR IT MAY SIMPLY REFLECT A LACK OF CAPABILITY TO FULLY ENCIRCLE THE TOWN/CITY UNDER ATTACK.)

3. AS THE NPFL FORCES CLOSE ON MONROVIA THERE WILL BE AN INCREASING NUMBER OF PROBLEMS/INCIDENTS THAT WILL HAMPER THEIR EFFORTS AND TARNISH THEIR IMAGE.

- SINCE THE "FRONT" COMPRISSES A NUMBER OF DISPARATE FACTIONS, THERE WILL BE INCREASED EFFORTS BY VARIOUS GROUPS TO POSITION THEMSELVES FOR THE BEST POSSIBLE POLITICAL ADVANTAGE/LEVERAGE, AND THERE IS INCREASED DANGER OF CONFLICTS BREAKING OUT BETWEEN THE FACTIONS (SUCH AS REPORTEDLY OCCURRED AT GBARNGA AND, POSSIBLY, AT BONG MINE).

- AS NPFL FORCES DRAW EVER CLOSER TO MONROVIA AND THE AFL RETREATS WITHIN THE CITY, THE REBELS WILL FACE A GREATER CONCENTRATION OF MILITARY FORCES THAN THEY HAVE TO DATE. LIKewise, SINCE THE CITY IS THE SEAT OF POWER, THE REBELS WILL NOT HAVE THE OPTION OF
BYPASSING THE CAPITAL AND GOING ELSEWHERE. THIS FACT MEANS THAT, IF THE REBELS ASSAULT THE CITY, THEY WILL PROBABLY SUFFER SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER CASUALTIES THAN THEY HAVE YET HAD TO ENDURE.

- AS THE INSURGENTS' RANKS SWELL WITH THE ADDITION OF NEW RECRUITS, THE LEVEL OF TRAINING AND DISCIPLINE WILL DECREASE ACCORDINGLY, AGAIN RESULTING IN GREATER NUMBERS OF NPFL CASUALTIES AND INCREASING THE POSSIBILITY OF UNDISCIPLINED PERSONNEL COMMITTING AN ATROCITY.

- AS THE LIKELIHOOD OF A REBEL VICTORY BECOMES MORE PROBABLE, THERE WILL BE A "BANDWAGON" EFFECT IN WHICH OTHER PERSONNEL/FACtIONS WILL COMMIT VARIOUS ACTS "IN THE NAME OF" THE NPFL. SUCH ACTS AREAPT TO BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE TO THE INSURGENTS' EFFORTS AND PUBLIC IMAGE.

- FINALLY, AS THE REBELS NEAR THE CITY, THEIR ADVANCE WILL TAKE ON A MOMENTUM OF ITS OWN. THE LACK OF AN EXTENSIVE TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM, AND THE LOWERED LEVELS OF TRAINING AND DETERIORATING DISCIPLINE OF THEIR FORCES WILL MAKE IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR THE NPFL LEADERSHIP TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OF THE COMPLEX BATTLE, TO COORDINATE SUCCESSIVE PHASES AND TO EFFECTIVELY EXPLOIT FOLLOW-ON OPERATIONS. DUE TO THE SAVAGRY OF THE FIGHTING AND INCREASED CASUALTY RATES, RETRIBUTIVE KILLINGS/ATROCITIES COULD BE EXPECTED TO OCCUR.

4. ANOTHER DECISION THAT MUST BE MADE BY THE NPFL LEADERSHIP PRIOR TO AN ATTACK ON MONROVIA IS WHETHER TO USE VARIOUS HEAVY WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT THAT THEY HAVE CAPTURED DURING THE CONFLICT. THE INSURGENTS REPORTEDLY HAVE THREE (3) 105MM HOWITZERS AND AN AMple SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION; THEY ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE TWO (2) OPERATIONAL MOWAG ARMORED CARS; AND IT MUST BE ASSUMED THAT THEY HAVE EXTENSIVE SUPPLIES OF INDUSTRIAL EXPLOSIVES CAPTURED FROM THE IRON MINING OPERATIONS AT YEKEPA (LIMCO) AND BONG.