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Africa South of the Sahara (U)

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AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA (U)

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### APPENDIX

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1. GOVERNMENT

a. (U) Key Government Officials

President, and President of the MPLA-Labor Party: Jose Eduardo dos Santos
Secretary-General, MPLA-Labor Party: Lucio Lara
Prime Minister: None
Minister of External Affairs: Paulo Teixeira Jorge
Minister of Defense: Col Pedro Maria Tonha ("Pedale")
Minister of Interior: Lt Col Manuel Alexandre Duarte Rodrigues ("Kito")
Minister of State Security: Col Juliao Mateus Paulo ("Dino Matrosse")

b. Type and Stability of Government

The People's Republic of Angola (RPA) is considered by its leaders to be a Marxist state; however, the Government is in only the earliest stages of development along Marxist lines. The RPA was established on 11 November 1975, at the end of Portuguese rule, by one of the contending Angolan insurgent groups, the Soviet- and Cuban-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). In December 1977, the MPLA's first party congress was held, transforming the MPLA into the MPLA-Labor Party and giving the party a stronger role in the Government and in the military and security forces. President dos Santos was elected by the MPLA in September 1979 to replace Agostinho Neto, who died in Moscow that month while under medical care. Dos Santos was confirmed in the position by a vote of the MPLA's Extraordinary Party Congress in December 1979.

The MPLA is the sole legal party in Angola; however, party leadership is severely factionalized and these divisions have undermined the stability of the regime. Even the late President Neto, who held a leadership role in MPLA affairs for more than a decade, was not always capable of maintaining complete control of his party. Neto balanced pressures—from both MPLA moderates and black militants. The former want to limit Communist influence in the country and the latter resent the influence of whites, mulattoes, and urban intellectuals in the top levels of the party and Government. Another faction contends for power is a hard-line pro-Soviet group. Because of their numbers, the militants and their supporters pose a serious threat to the stability of the regime; the pro-Soviets are also strong, deriving their support from the large Soviet Bloc presence in country. Other points of contention among the factions are reconciliation with rival nationalist groups and relations with the West. President dos Santos does not have the wide acceptance that Neto did, however, and his future will depend on the outcome of the continuing struggle for power among these and other factions. The relative influence of the various factions waxes and wanes. The MPLA's present power base includes the Kimbundu tribe, which has traditionally supported the MPLA; large segments of the urban population; and the substantial number of Cuban personnel in the country.

15 October 1984
c. Internal Threat

In the aftermath of the MPLA's 1975 seizure of control of the central government, the RPA has been seeking to consolidate its control over the country. In areas it controls, the RPA rules with dictatorial power; however, resistance in the form of guerrilla warfare is continuing in three areas—the southeast/central area, northwest, and Cabinda. Most serious is the insurgency being waged by Dr. Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in the southeast/central area. There, despite a series of government and Cuban military offensives, the insurgents control Cuando Cubango and Moxico provinces, have been able to prevent reopening of the Benguela Railroad and now operate routinely as far north as Uige and Lunda Norte. UNITA is the best-organized opposition movement and receives internal support from Angola's largest tribe, the 2 million Ovimbundu; past external support received through Zaire was all but eliminated following the late 1978 rapprochement between the two countries but may be on the increase again. Since at least 1975, UNITA has also received critical support, in unknown amounts, from South Africa. Most of UNITA's arms, however, are believed to come from captured stocks. The movement's military successes and its conciliatory policies are enabling it to move beyond the Ovimbundu's east-central highlands to areas with other ethnic bases. UNITA hopes to force the MPLA to share power by driving Cuba to withdraw its troops from Angola. The movement probably has about 20,000 troops; trainees and rear area personnel with various quasi-military capabilities may raise the total number currently or potentially under arms to over 35,000. The MPLA's other chief rival, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), collapsed militarily with the war's end and retreated to Zaire where its activities were restricted until mid-1976, when some constraints were removed and the movement was rejuvenated. Subsequently it waged low-level resistance in northwestern Angola, but the late 1978 rapprochement between Angola and Zaire resulted in increased restrictions once again placed on FNLA. In 1980, its absentee head, Holden Roberto, was forced out and leadership was taken over by the military wing, the Military Committee of the Resistance in Angola (COMIRA). This had little invigorating effect and the Front apparently has been reduced to low-level banditry. It is no longer a threat to the regime but, because it draws its support from a single tribe—the Bakongo—that does not fully support the MPLA, it continues to pose a regional security threat. Although the Front claims many more, it probably has less than 1,000 personnel under arms. The ability of UNITA to conduct routine operations in Bakongo areas beginning in 1984 indicates that the interests of a second major ethnic group may soon be represented by UNITA. The MPLA views this threat with alarm. In the oil-producing enclave of Cabinda, factions of the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) launch sporadic guerrilla attacks, necessitating the maintenance of a large government garrison. FLEC may have 1,000-2,000 guerrillas but suffers from recurrent leadership disputes. The 1978 Angolan-Zairian rapprochement resulted in restrictions being placed on FLEC by Zaire. Dissident guerrilla chief Daniel Chipenda, a former MPLA member who fought with UNITA during the civil war, still may have a small armed force loyal to him. Chipenda was with the FNLA in northern Angola in mid-1975 but is in exile now.
Aside from these dissident groups, the RPA's own large and poorly controlled Army poses an internal threat. Much of the Army is composed of poorly educated young blacks who resent the seemingly privileged position of the MPLA old guard, especially its mulattoes and whites. The Cuban military presence in Angola has as two of its major purposes assisting the MPLA in combating these insurgencies and defending the regime against internal factionalism.

d. External Threat

Neighboring Zaire for many years was the chief backer of the MPLA's oldest rival--the FNLA--and a supporter of UNITA and FLEC as well. Despite this, a reconciliation agreement normalizing relations between Angola and Zaire was concluded in late February 1976. It proved ineffective, however. Although a workable agreement would have benefited both parties, it was a more immediate necessity to Zaire. The Benguela Railroad, which is vital to both Zaire and Zambia, is controlled by Angola, which also is in position to control the mouth of the Zaire River which is Zaire's outlet to the sea. Angola's military potential is now much greater than that of Zaire because of Soviet weaponry received and the presence of Cuban troops. Moreover, several thousand ex-Katangan Gendarmes opposed to Zairian President Mobutu fought for the MPLA during the civil war and remain in Angola. In a March 1977 invasion sponsored by Angola and probably supported by Cuba and the Soviet Union, some 2,000 of the Katangans and followers secured a measure of control over the western portion of Zaire's vital Shaba Province until Zaire, with Morocco's assistance, was able to regain control of the area. A May 1978 invasion, also backed by Angola and Cuba, further antagonized Zaire. Since a second rapprochement with Zaire was effected in July 1978, some of the ex-Katangans (who now call themselves the National Front for the Liberation of the Congo--FLNC) have been dispersed away from the Zaire border while others are once again assisting the Angolan Armed Forces. Also as part of the rapprochement, Zaire placed restrictions on FNLA, UNITA, and FLEC. As a result, Zaire no longer poses an immediate threat to Angola. Another neighbor, Zambia, backed the rival UNITA faction during the civil war. Zambia now maintains good relations with the RPA, but may continue low-level contacts with UNITA.

The RPA correctly views South Africa as the major threat to Angolan sovereignty and depends on large numbers of Cuban military personnel in-country to help deter South Africa. In August 1975, a few hundred South African troops secured the Cunene River Dam and Power Station (a former joint Portuguese-South African project) located several miles inside Angola. Later, an expeditionary force of some 2,000 South African troops fought successfully against the MPLA in central Angola. These troops were pulled back to within 50 km of the southern border with Namibia (South-West Africa) in January 1976, but at the same time South African reinforcements were sent to this border area. South African forces in the vicinity of the border reached 10,000-15,000 troops, including up to 5,000 on the Angolan side. The last South African soldiers withdrew from southern Angola, including from the dam and power station, at the end of March 1976. South Africa continues to maintain troops...
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in the northern border area of Namibia as a counter to guerrilla activity from across the border. In May 1978, South African forces first struck three South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) camps in Angolan territory. Since then, South Africa has routinely made air and artillery strikes, reconnaissance flights, and limited ground attacks against SWAPO base areas and support facilities as well as six subsequent major cross-border raids. In 1979 South Africa struck what were apparently purely Angolan targets for the first time. South Africa is also the major external source of all manner of assistance to UNITA.

e. Communist Influence

Since the RPA owes its existence to Soviet and Cuban support, it is heavily influenced by those countries. The late President Neto himself joined the youth wing of the Portuguese Communist Party when he was a student in Lisbon and several years later joined the MPLA, which had been formed in 1956 by Angolan nationalists and members of the Angolan Communist Party. During the 1960s and 1970s, the MPLA followed the Moscow party line more closely than did any other African liberation movement. In October 1976, Angola signed both a friendship treaty, including a military agreement, and a separate party-to-party agreement with the Soviet Union. The treaty, even stronger than the 1974 USSR-Somalia treaty, puts the MPLA on record as rejecting African Socialism in favor of the scientific socialism of Marx and Lenin. Angola also has signed friendship agreements with Cuba, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, and Romania. Angola supports the Soviet Bloc and Cuba in international forums, and in 1980 was one of three Sub-Saharan states to vote against a UN condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. At the December 1977 party congress, the MPLA was transformed into the MPLA-Labor Party, officially described as a "vanguard working class party pursuing Marxist-Leninist ideology." The first task given to the party's central committee was directing an immediate purge of ideological dissidents. Nevertheless, the exact nature of Angolan Marxism is unclear; moreover, the cleavages pointed out in paragraph 1.b. contribute to some diversity among Angolan leaders on this issue. The Angolan Armed Forces are particularly susceptible to Communist influence because of the forces' poor capabilities on their own and the fact that most equipment in the inventory is of Soviet Bloc origin. Top leadership in the armed forces is disproportionately nonblack and therefore especially dependent on foreign backing to stay in power. Enlisted personnel, who are generally black, resent as excessive the influence of white foreign military advisers, who are seen partly as guarantors of white and mulatto dominance in Angola.

f. Economic Factors

(U) Angola's agriculturally based economy is augmented by extraction (oil, diamonds), food processing, cement production, and textiles. Angola imports at least 50 percent of its food needs. In 1981, GNP was $4.2 billion—$623 per capita. Major exports are oil, diamonds, coffee, and sisal. Leading imports are machinery, electrical equipment, iron, steel, metals, and vehicles. Major trading partners are Cuba, the USSR, Portugal, and the US.
Angola does not have the capability to produce military materiel except possibly the most basic quartermaster items. Since 1975, the USSR has been the major supplier of military equipment. The USSR has delivered fighter and transport aircraft, helicopters, landing ships, patrol boats, tanks, APCs, ADA, SAMs, ammunition, and support equipment valued at over $1.6 billion. Romania has been supplying trainer aircraft and helicopters, some of which are assembled in Angola. There have been no significant agreements, by dollar value, from the Free World since 1977, except a 1981 sale of Swiss trainer aircraft valued at $24 million.

g. Military and Political Alignment

The RPA's dependence on Moscow and Havana (particularly on over 30,000 Cuban military personnel and 6,000 Cuban civilians) and its current relations with neighboring states are an outgrowth of the MPLA's turbulent recent past. In January 1975, Portugal brought all three major Angolan nationalist factions (MPLA, UNITA, and FNLA) together in a transitional government under the terms of the Alvor Agreement, which established 11 November 1975 as the date of Angolan independence. Prior to independence day, scattered fighting broke out among the nationalist factions, and in March 1975, the Soviet Union and Cuba began their buildup of military aid for the MPLA. This buildup showed an unprecedented willingness on the part of the Soviets to support militarily a government takeover by a Marxist faction in Africa. Cuban advisers began to arrive in large numbers in September, the MPLA became more aggressive, and fighting escalated in the following months, technically becoming a civil war at independence on 11 November 1975. Thousands of Cuban troops were injected into the fighting for the MPLA, while smaller numbers of South African and Zairian troops supported the other two factions. The FNLA and UNITA, already in an alliance of convenience, formed a rival government to the Luanda-based RPA. International pressure and the weight of Soviet and Cuban assistance forced a South African pullback and the eventual collapse of the regular FNLA and UNITA forces. By the end of February 1976, the civil war was over, with UNITA, FNLA, and FLEC waging guerrilla warfare in the southeast, northwest, and Cabinda, respectively. Based on scanty evidence, it is estimated that Cuba has suffered over 3,500 casualties, including over 2,000 dead, since entering Angola.

During the civil war, the following additional states sent at least token military contingents to the aid of the MPLA: Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Algeria, Mozambique, Congo, and Somalia. The MPLA also received strong political support from Nigeria, Ghana, and Uganda. Although the OAU deadlocked in 1976 on recognition of the RPA, all member states now recognize it as the legitimate government of Angola.

As one of the Frontline States, Angola supported liberation movements aimed at white-ruled Rhodesia and provided training camps for the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). Angola supports even more vigorously
ANGOLA

SWAPO, which has both training and staging bases in Angola and seeks to take control of Namibia from the white-dominated government there. Nevertheless, Angola also backs a UN-supervised solution for the Namibia problem. Angola also supports the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, a liberation group opposed to white role there, and the anti-Mobutu FLNC, both of which also have training bases in Angola.

(U) Angola is a member of the UN, the OAU, the Nonaligned Movement, and other international organizations.

h. (U) Key US Officials

None. The US has not recognized the RPA.
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2. MILITARY, GENERAL

a. Key Military Officials

Armed Forces:
Commander in Chief, MPLA President Jose Eduardo dos Santos; Minister of Defense, Col Pedro Maria Tonha "Pedale"; Vice Minister of Defense and Chief of General Staff, Col Antonio dos Santos Franca "Ndalu"; Vice Minister of Defense and Political Commissar of the Armed Forces: Lt Col Francisco Magalhaes Paiva "Nvunda"; Vice Minister of Defense, Deputy Chief of Staff, and possibly Chief of Information and Intelligence Directorate: Lt Col Roberto Leal Ramos Monteiro "Ngongo"

Army: Commander, Probably same as Armed Forces Chief of General Staff

Navy: Commander (and Vice Minister of Defense), Lt Col Manuel Augusto Alfredo "Orlog"

Air Force and Air Defense: Commander (and Vice Minister of Defense), Col Henrique Alberto Teles Careira "Iko"

Militia: Commander (and Vice Minister of Defense), Lt Col Domingos Paiva da Silva "Mussuca"

b. Position of the Armed Forces

(...) The Armed Forces of the RPA are called the Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA). Both headquarters and general staff are in Luanda, where they are strongly advised by Cuban and Soviet military personnel. Military personnel often fill important civilian positions such as provincial governors, representatives at party congresses, diplomatic negotiators, and advisers to the President. The FAPLA consists of an army large by African standards, smaller naval and air forces, and a large militia force. The military has been generally respected in areas that have been traditionally pro-MPLA but this attitude seems to be declining in inverse proportion to UNITA successes. In other areas it is tolerated by the civilian populace. Many of the Army's troops are very young, poorly trained and disciplined, and uneducated. Reports of dissension over racial issues and of poor relations with Cubans are common. The country's poor economic situation has resulted in severe food and other supply shortages in at least some areas, with attendant morale and discipline problems in the FAPLA.

(...) Although overall command relationships are not well know, the constitution published in early 1978 states that the President of the MPLA-Labor Party (rather than the President of the RPA, although both positions currently are held by the same man) is the commander in chief of the FAPLA. He exercises control through the Minister of Defense. Informal means of control (tribal, regional, linguistic, generational, ideological, educational, and other ties) exist outside the formal structure and are very important. Control of Cuban troops in Angola is probably exercised outside the Angolan military structure with possible nominal subordination. A Soviet-led combined command of Angolans, Cubans, East Germans, and Soviets may exist.
c. Military Trends and Capabilities

Before independence on 11 November 1975, the FAPLA was essentially a guerrilla force fighting a conventional-style war. Since then, there has been an extensive training program designed to turn the FAPLA into a modern conventional armed force, although ironically it now finds itself waging a counterinsurgency effort. Apparently progress has been slow in the conventional training area, since most sophisticated equipment is still manned by Cubans. Acquisition of a counterinsurgency capability is a more distant prospect. It is likely that, in accord with the 1976 friendship treaty with the Soviet Union, modern equipment will continue to be delivered to Angola. Angola originally claimed that Cuban forces were in the country to defend against South Africa and that these forces would begin to leave if South African raids ceased. In fact, however, Cuban forces are also necessary to prop up the MPLA regime and to assist in combating insurgencies; it is likely, therefore, that Cuba will continue to station large numbers of troops in Angola for the foreseeable future, even if independence comes peacefully to Namibia and South African raids cease. Angola's more recent statements acknowledge this, insisting that Cuban troops will not withdraw until South African-backed destabilization ceases; since Angola attributes all UNITA success to South African support, Angola has a convenient justification for retaining Cuban troops indefinitely. Were Angola's Soviet Bloc and Cuban patrons to leave, the FAPLA's limited capabilities, dissension among its personnel, and the Government's narrow regional and ideological bases of support probably would cause the FAPLA to quickly lose control of all but a few areas.

The missions of the Armed Forces are inferred to be keeping the MPLA regime in power, defending the national territory, and combating the internal threat posed by insurgent groups.

d. Military Budget: $1,800,000,000 for fiscal year ending 31 December 1982. No service allocation is available.

e. Population

7,770,000 estimated as of July 1984 (includes Cabinda)
Males (ages 15-49): 1,722,000; physically fit, 867,000
Ethnic Divisions: Africans--93 percent; Europeans--5 percent; mestizos--1 percent
Literacy: 10-15 percent
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3. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

a. Army

(1) Mission

(U) To maintain the regime securely in power, defend the national territory, and combat insurgency.

(2) Capabilities

Without the assistance of Cuban forces currently in-country, the Army would be capable of blunting an attack launched by any of its neighbors except South Africa. It could not maintain the integrity of Angola's borders and could not prevent infiltration. Counterinsurgency capabilities would be poor; the Army would have little offensive capability despite its impressive list of equipment. Moreover, disunity in the Army probably would sap even these capabilities rapidly.

With the help of Cuban forces now in Angola, the picture changes considerably. In this case, the combined forces could repel an attack from any of Angola's black neighbors and blunt an attack from South African forces in Namibia. These forces still would not be capable of preventing infiltration or eliminating insurgency. Army capabilities are expected to continue to improve gradually as a result of the massive training program underway since independence.

(3) Personnel Strength

35,000 estimated indigenous regular Army troops. In addition, there are 25,000-30,000 Cuban military personnel and an estimated 4,000-6,000 former Katangan Gendarmes (who now call themselves National Front for the Liberation of the Congo--FLNC) exiled from Zaire, who assisted MPLA forces during the Angolan civil war, aiding the Angolan regime against UNITA. From time to time, SWAPO personnel, probably numbering in the hundreds, also assist the FAPLA in operations against UNITA.

(4) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

The Army is under the direct centralized command of the FAPLA General Staff in Luanda. There are 9 or 10 military regions (MRs) for the command and control of Army units. These are based upon the same MRs established by the MPLA during its years of insurgency against Portugal, although the boundaries seem to have changed somewhat from time to time and some have been split into two. When the civil war was in progress, the Army was organized into fronts rather than MRs, as some of the latter were wholly or
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partially occupied by the enemy. The first MR, in northwestern Angola, is headquartered in Uige; the second, in Cabinda; the third, in eastern Angola, is headquartered in Luena; the fourth (central Angola), in Huambo; and the fifth (southern Angola), in Lubango. The newer MRs and their headquarters are: 6 (Menongue), 7 (Benguela), 9 (Malange), and 10 (probably Saurimo). MR 8 HQ is probably in Luanda.

(b) Ground Combat Units

The Army has formed brigade-size infantry and air defense units. Their number and personnel strength are not known, but there may be 14-17 infantry brigades with perhaps 1,100 personnel each. Early reports indicated infantry battalions included about 500 men and that there were about 55 battalions, most of them infantry. Many units probably are considerably understrength due to recruitment difficulties and lack of competent personnel. Some battalions are known to have as few as 300 men. Armor, artillery, and support units of various sizes up to battalion also exist. Air defense units are part of the Air Force.

(c) Army Aviation Units

None. All aircraft are operated by the Air Force, including light spotter aircraft and helicopters that work with the Army.

(d) Deployment

All Army units except an apparent brigade deployed to Sao Tome are deployed in Angola, including the Cabinda enclave. Main concentrations are in the Luanda area, in Cabinda, and in the south where operations against UNITA are conducted. At any one time, perhaps as many as 1,200 Cubans from Angola may be in neighboring Congo, either in transit to or from Angola, on R and R in Congo, or deployed in Congo while assisting in maintaining security in Cabinda. These personnel are included in the 30,000 or more Cuban military personnel believed to in Angola; however, they are in addition to any Cubans in Congo who are assisting the Congolese Armed Forces. Moreover, the Cubans in Angola have served as a pool from which troops could have been drawn for the Rhodesian conflict, if necessary, and from which they were drawn for Ethiopian service.

(5) Weapons and Equipment

The Army is generally well equipped by African standards. There is a conglomeration of light weapons and equipment—some inherited from the Portuguese, some acquired during the years of insurgency, and some more recently obtained from the USSR and Eastern Europe. Heavy infantry weapons are in abundant supply and include 12.7-mm heavy machineguns, 60-mm and 82-mm mortars, and 82-mm and 107-mm recoilless rifles. Over the past 3 years the USSR has delivered an impressive list of armor, artillery, and ADA. The
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Following is a conservative estimate of the current equipment inventory:

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<th>Mortars:</th>
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<th>Total Inventory</th>
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<td>82-mm</td>
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<td>60-mm</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>122-mm gun and/or how</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>152-mm howitzer, (coastal arty)</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130-mm fld gun, M-46</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100-mm fld gun, M-1955</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100-mm assault gun, Su-100</td>
<td>CU, UR</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85-mm gun</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76-mm gun, ZIS-3, M-1942</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>12+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other fld arty under 100-mm</td>
<td></td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armor:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank, mdm, T-62</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>60</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tank, mdm, T-54/55, 100-mm</td>
<td>UR, PL, CU</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank, mdm, T-34, 85-mm</td>
<td>UR, YO, CU</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank, 1t amph, PT-76</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC, BTR-40, -50, -60, and -152</td>
<td>UR, CU</td>
<td>300+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARC, BRDM-2</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>200+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARC, U/I</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defense:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57-mm, 85-mm, and/or 100-mm ADA</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57-mm ADA, S-60</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>70+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37-mm ADA, M1939</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-mm ADA</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-mm ADA, ZSU-23-4</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-mm ADA, ZU-23-2</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.5-mm, ZPU-1, -2, and -4</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.7-mm hvy MG, quad</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAM, SA-7</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAM, SA-3 lchrs</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAM, SA-3 mls</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>110+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAM, SA-6 lchrs</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAM, SA-8 lchrs</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAM, SA-9 lchrs</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT Missiles:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT-3/SAGGER</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT-1/SNAPPER</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(6) Logistics

The Soviet- and Cuban-advised reorganization of the Army's logistic system that began after the Portuguese departure in 1975 and the accompanying infusion of large amounts of military material resulted in significantly enhanced support capabilities. The logistic system functions effectively; however, it is dependent upon foreign sources for virtually all military supplies and relies heavily on Cuban military personnel for its operation. Logistic facilities and equipment are adequate to support current levels of military operations. A wide and effective variety of support equipment, transport vehicles, and communications gear has been provided to Angola by the Soviet Union and its allies. Although loss of equipment during South African incursions has been substantial, available stock remains adequate and replacement of materiel continues at a steady rate.

Centralized control of supply and logistic functions has resulted in relatively efficient resource allocation. Most units are adequately supplied; breakdowns in the distribution cycle occur primarily in areas where adverse security conditions prevail and lines of communication are frequently interdicted. Food and noncombat materiel seems to be in shortest supply. Maintenance of equipment is fair to good, with most major service being performed by Cuban or Soviet Bloc technicians. Although technical training of indigenous personnel is conducted, maintenance of most equipment and sophisticated systems remains dependent on foreign assistance. Given the current level of internal security problems and threat from South Africa, large-scale foreign assistance is required to maintain adequate support capabilities.

(7) Personnel Procurement and Retention

Details about terms of service in the Angolan forces are not available. Volunteers come mainly from Kimbundu tribal and urban areas—longtime sources of MPLA support. Conscription also has been instituted to expand the forces, but has met with resistance; retention has been a problem as well. Eventually most of the military probably will be composed of draftees. Some former members of the Portuguese colonial forces also have been recruited for service.
(8) Training

The overall quality of training is poor to fair, but is improving. Most troops receive some basic training; the amount varies, with much of it very rudimentary. The low educational level of personnel has impeded successful training. Efforts are being made to improve the quality of training programs, and the Cubans and other foreign advisers are playing a prominent role. Training now is concentrated in three main areas: officer training (much of which is being conducted abroad), training in the employment of heavy weapons and other modern equipment, and technical training. Political indoctrination is also important.

(9) Reserves and Mobilization

Almost nothing is known about Army reserves. It is likely that the militia is considered a reserve force. The civil war showed that tens of thousands of Angolans can be mobilized in a relatively short time, but lack of training seriously affects their usefulness.

b. Navy

(1) Mission

(U) To patrol the coast, defend the ports from seaborne attack, and transport men and materiel.

(2) Capabilities and Limitations

The People's Navy of Angola (Marinha de Guerra Popular de Angola—MGPA) is an embryonic force. It has a minor patrol capability (mainly on the northern coast near Luanda), can conduct occasional escort operations in coastal waters, and is capable of providing some sealift support to the ground forces. During pre-independence fighting among Angola's insurgent groups, landing craft were used as mobile fire platforms for rockets and other Army weapons. Its limited capabilities to conduct operations and even to keep its ships operational are directly dependent on the presence of foreign seamen and advisers serving with the Navy and on materiel from abroad. Except for a small number of whites and mulattos who previously served in the Portuguese Navy, the Angolan Navy has no personnel with naval experience dating before 1975.

(3) Personnel Strength

Estimated at 1,500, not including foreign advisers. This total may include some former members of the Portuguese colonial forces who may or may not have Angolan citizenship.
(4)** Ship and Aircraft Strength**

(a) **Ships**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Op</th>
<th>Non Op</th>
<th>In Reserve</th>
<th>Status Unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LSM (mdm amph aslt landing ship)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTG (missile attack boat, OSA II Class)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT (torpedo boat, SHERSHEN Class)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC (patrol craft, Argos Class)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PB (patrol boat)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCU (util landing craft, Alfange Class)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCU (util landing craft)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCM (mdm landing craft)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCP (personnel landing craft)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK (cargo ship)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) **Aircraft**

None. MiG-21 aircraft of the Angolan Air Force based in Luanda fly occasional patrol missions over the coastal waters.

(5) **Organization and Deployment**

The commander of the Navy is collocated with and subordinate to the FAPLA headquarters in Luanda. The main base is located at the former Portuguese naval facilities in Luanda harbor. Several islands near Luanda are used for naval training, and some islands reportedly have coastal artillery batteries, which probably are under naval command. Marine units may have been organized, and Navy units are apparently deployed along some inland waterways.

(6) **Status of Equipment**

Ex-Portuguese Navy vessels are probably in fair-to-poor condition. Five coastal transport vessels (600 to 900 DWT) were acquired from local civilian shipping companies during the war; at least two of these were also former Portuguese Navy. The most modern patrol boats are a ZHUK Class PB and six OSA II PTGs, as well as five 137-ft Argos PCs, each armed with two 40-mm guns. Four of the later reportedly are being equipped with new electronic and communications systems by Soviet naval technicians. The other nine patrol boats are smaller, and some are believed to be in poor condition. Two are 69-ft Jupiter Class boats, each with two 20-mm guns, and five are 68-ft Bellatrix Class, each with a single 20-mm gun. Many of the 14 landing craft are
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inoperable. The two 187-ft Alfange Class LCUs are in heavy use, however. Three unidentified LCUs, a ZHUK Class PB, two POLUCHAT PBs, six OSA II PTGs, three SHERSHEN PTs, and three POLNOCNY LSMs have been supplied by the USSR.

(7) Logistics

The only important naval facility is a small base built by the Portuguese in the early 1960s on the Ilha de Luanda. This base provides shore support activities for navy combatants and billeting for personnel as well as minor missile maintenance for Angola's OSAs. Small yards at Luanda, Lobito, and Soyo routinely overhaul small combatants on end-haul marine railways. A 220-ton floating drydock is available for domestic use in Lobito. The maintenance of ships and facilities is largely dependent on Soviet and Cuban technicians. The Soviets have a floating drydock in Luanda along with a floating workshop and routinely repair Soviet 2,600-ton factory trawlers. The dock has a lifting capacity of 8,500 tons with the potential of supporting Soviet combatants as large as a KRESTA Class cruiser.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

There is a critical shortage of trained personnel; most of those recruited have come from the Luanda area. After independence in November 1975, when the Angolan Navy was formed, an effort was made to recruit former members of the Portuguese Navy. Little is known about terms of service.

(9) Training

It is difficult to judge the quality of training in the Navy, but it probably is improving. In 1976 a small Portuguese Navy team was in Luanda, probably advising the MGPA, but since its departure all foreign naval advisers, instructors, and technicians probably have been Soviet and Cubans. An unknown number of Angolans have been sent to the USSR and Cuba for naval officer training. In the Luanda area, training in naval gunnery and coastal artillery reportedly is being conducted under the direction of Soviets and Cubans. Political indoctrination is an important component of Angolan naval training.

Some members were trained during the period of transition to independence (January-November 1975) by the Portuguese Navy to be part of an integrated MPLA-UNITA-FNLA force. Because of the Portuguese Navy's clandestine support of the MPLA, however, most of those trained were members of that faction; any UNITA and FNLA members who were trained are probably no longer in the force.
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(10) Reserves and Mobilization

The existence of reserve and mobilization systems for personnel is unknown, but there are in Angola 14 merchant ships of 1,000 GRT or over which could be mobilized for military use. These include 12 general cargo ships, 1 bulk carrier, and 1 POL tanker.

c. Air Force

(1) Mission

(U) To provide logistic and tactical support to the ground forces and to protect Angolan airspace.

(2) Capabilities and Limitations

The Angolan People's Air Force and Air Defense (FAPA/DAA), with the assistance of Cuban forces in Angola, is capable of providing limited support to surface forces, including tactical air support. It is capable of defending Angola against air attack from any of its neighbors except South Africa. An integrated air defense system, including surface-to-air missiles, AAA, and radars, has been installed in the south and should improve Angolan capabilities against South Africa in the long term. The Air Force also could pose a threat of air attack to its black neighbors. Its combat capability is built around 127 jet combat aircraft, including 58 MiG-21/FISHBED fighters. In mid-1984 Angola received five Su-22/FITTERs, which should improve the Air Force's ground attack capability against insurgents. It is not known who will pilot them; neither Cubans nor Angolans are known to be in training on the Su-22. The Air Force is almost completely dependent on foreign sources for operational aircrews, training and maintenance personnel, aircraft, repair parts, and general supplies.

(3) Personnel Strength

Estimated at 2,000, not including foreign personnel. Almost all pilots are foreign nationals, mostly Cuban. There are also pilots from Portugal and perhaps other countries.

(4) Aircraft Strength

Total: 309 (134 jet, 35 turboprop, 46 prop, 94 turbine helicopter, 1 piston helicopter)

In operational units: 196

(86 fighters: 58 all-weather, 25 day, 1 fighter-trainer; 27 transports: 14 medium-range, 13 short-range; 71 helicopters: 35 medium, 29 light, 7 attack; 14 utility)
(5) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

The commander of the Air Force is responsible to the FAPLA general headquarters in Luanda. The main operating base is located at the former Portuguese Air Force (PAF) base adjacent to Luanda's international airport. The Air Force operates from two other former PAF bases (N'gage and Saurimo) and several other airfields (e.g., Bie, Huambo, Lubango, Lobito, Luena, Malange, and Menongue). Unit organization is unknown; a postulated organization is shown below. Some reports indicate there may be a separate Cuban Air Force contingent. Most of the Angolan aircraft are operated exclusively by the Cuban contingent, which seems to operate autonomously, with nominal FAPA/DAA subordination.

(b) Summary of Postulated Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Principal Bases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 FLOGGER Sqdn (future)</td>
<td>MiG-23</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Luanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 FISHBED Sqdns</td>
<td>MiG-21</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>Luanda/Lubango</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 FRESCO Sqdns</td>
<td>MiG-17/15</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Luanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Transport Sqdn</td>
<td>DC-3, Noratlas, Fan Jet Falcon</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Luanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 HIND Sqdn (forming)</td>
<td>Mi-24</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Luanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Transport/Util Sqdns</td>
<td>An-26, An-2</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Luanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 HIP Sqdns</td>
<td>Mi-8</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Luanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Alouette Sqdns</td>
<td>Alouette III</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Luanda</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) Status of Equipment

The equipment inventory includes many old ex-PAF aircraft, but also contains Soviet-provided MiG fighters, helicopters, and transports; transports acquired from the civil airline; and some light aircraft purchased in Western Europe and others taken away from private owners in Angola. Some old inoperable aircraft abandoned by the PAF in Angola have not been added to the Air Force inventory (e.g., PV-2 Harpoon bombers and F-84 fighters). Besides MiGs other aircraft that have been used in combat are Fiat G91 jet ground attack aircraft, Harvard T-6 armed trainers, and Alouette III helicopters—all but some of the Alouettes ex-PAF. There are also 6 C-47, 6 Noratlas, 13 An-26/CURL, and 14 An-2/COLT transports and some DO-27 utility aircraft. Ten Bn-2 Islanders, 11 Pilatus PC-7s, the remaining Alouettes, and 4 modern STOL utility aircraft (Porter Peacemaker) were purchased in Europe. Soviet-provided equipment is in good condition; other aircraft vary widely in material condition.
(7) Logistics

The Air Force logistics system is entirely dependent on foreign personnel to operate effectively. The Cubans are in charge of Luanda Airfield and are chiefly responsible for logistics support. Soviet technicians assemble MiG aircraft and, along with Cubans, work on airfield construction, facility improvements, and communications. Maintenance of MiG-21, MiG-17, An-26, and Yak-40 military aircraft at Luanda is performed by Soviet personnel. Soviet-made helicopters are maintained jointly by Soviet and Cuban personnel. About 25 percent of the MiGs at Luanda are grounded for maintenance. Western-made aircraft in the Angolan Air Force are maintained primarily by Angolan Airlines (TAAG). However, some major overhauls of C-130s have been done in Portugal. French-manufactured Alouette III helicopters have been maintained by former Portuguese Air Force personnel working for the Angolan Air Force. Twelve Soviet An-12 aircraft operate out of Luanda, providing logistic support to Soviet advisers and FAPLA units throughout Angola.

(8) Personnel Recruitment and Retention

Shortages of all types of personnel exist; nothing is known of recruitment practices or terms of service. During the colonial period the Portuguese Air Force (and Navy) recruited few if any black Angolans—unlike the Army, which recruited large numbers. As a result, it is difficult to find any blacks with air force experience dating before 1975. Thus, it is likely that some white former members of the PAF have been recruited for the Angolan Air Force.

(9) Training

Few details are available on training; however, there is considerable activity both in-country and abroad. Angolan pilots have been training in the Soviet Union since mid-1975, and some may be trained in Cuba. The Cubans are very active in training air force personnel in-country in a variety of skills. A pilot training school has been established at N'gage where Portuguese Communist mercenaries who are PAF reservists may have replaced the former Romanian instructors.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

No organized reserve is known, and the Air Force is small enough and new enough that, in any case, few former Air Force personnel would be available for mobilization or to form a reserve. Virtually all of the country's civil aircraft, facilities, and indigenous civil aviation personnel would be available to the Government in a national emergency. Without foreign assistance, however, use of the aircraft probably would be restricted by a shortage of qualified indigenous flight and maintenance personnel.
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(U) The total number of licensed pilots of major transport aircraft and other civil aviation personnel in Angola is not known. Approximately 22 civil transport aircraft with a gross takeoff weight of at least 9,000 kg currently are registered, owned, and operated in Angola: 5 707-320C, 3 An-26/CURL, 3 737-200, 1 737-200C, 2 L-100/L-382 Hercules, 3 F-27 Friendship, 2 F-27-500 Friendship, and 3 Yak-40/CODLING.

(U) With the exception of one F-27-500 Friendship, all of the above aircraft are in the fleet of Angola's national flag carrier, TAAG, which is wholly government owned. The F-27-500 is operated by Sonangol, Angola's state-owned oil company. An F-27 Maritime, not included in the above list, provides coastal surveillance and SAR duties rather than normal commercial service. This aircraft is reportedly operated by TAAG, but may be part of the Air Force inventory. Transport aircraft of the Angolan Air Force carry civil registration markings and some may operate for TAAG.

d. Paramilitary Forces

(1) Police

(S/NF) The People's Police Corps of Angola (CPPA) may number 8,000; some are former members of the Portuguese paramilitary services and were well trained in internal security functions. Under the Portuguese, the paramilitary police were organized into companies that could be employed quickly when the shift from normal police to military functions was required. In contrast to the Army, CPPA personnel are older, better educated, and experienced. The CPPA is subordinate to the Minister of Interior. In June 1981 the Minister of Interior fired the CPPA National Director and took the job himself, presumably temporarily. Whether a full-time replacement has been named is still not known. The Deputy Director appointed at the same time was Capt Fernando Torres Vaz de Conceicao. There is a Police Training School in Luanda; police have also received training in Cuba and Nigeria.

(2) Militia

(S/NF) The militia (People's Defense Organization--ODP) was formed during the civil war as an auxiliary to the FAPLA and was of some value during the 1975 streetfighting in Luanda. The bulk of its original members were youths between 12 and 20 years old with virtually no military training. That ragtag, undisciplined unit had little military capability. Since independence, the militia has been augmented with adults, has been organized apparently on a local basis, and has acquired rear area guard functions (including along the Benguela Railroad), thereby freeing FAPLA personnel for counterinsurgency operations. Militia personnel have suffered increasingly numerous casualties at the hands of UNITA insurgents. The militia may contain about 30,000 armed personnel, although some reports state the strength as over 100,000.
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(3) Border Guard

The Angolan Border Guard Service (Tropa Guarda Fronteria Angolana--TGFA) surveils Angola's border and would be expected to deter aggression until regular forces could arrive. In the early years after independence, Cubans may have had border patrol functions; the TGFA may have been established as late as 1977 or 1978. Some training is provided by Cubans in Angola; the TGFA has a technical specialists school at Ompanda and also conducts training at Saurimo. TGFA Chief of Staff is Capt Manuel Domingos. Personnel strength is estimated very roughly at 2,000. The organization and other details of the TGFA are unknown.

e. Total Military Personnel Strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force and Air Defense</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militia</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>76,500</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f. Foreign Military Presence

(1) Cuban Expeditionary Force

Cuban advisers began to arrive in Angola in sizable numbers in September 1975. By the end of the year, this force had increased considerably and was heavily involved in the fighting, both as advisers to the MPLA and as separate combat units. The Cubans appear to have been formed into units after their arrival in Angola. They function under a Cuban high command, which is probably controlled outside the FAPLA command structure with nominal subordination. Cuban troops number over 30,000; also present are 6,000 Cuban civilians. Combat units may be organized under 4 or more brigade headquarters, which control about 24 or more combat battalions. Cubans also are training air, naval, and security personnel.

(2) Former Katangan Gendarmes (National Front for the Liberation of the Congo--FLNC)

Gendarmes from Zaire's former Katanga province exiled themselves in eastern Angola more than 10 years ago after Katanga's abortive secession attempt. The Katangans were employed by the Portuguese during its counterinsurgency campaigns and later sided with the MPLA in the civil war. These troops are well trained, experienced, and in the civil war proved to be the best African troops under FAPLA command. They are equipped with infantry weapons. In March 1977, some 2,000 of these Katangans and their followers invaded Zaire's economically vital Shaba Province and secured a measure of control over the western portion of the province until Zaire, with Moroccan
assistance, was able to regain control of the area. In May 1978 they invaded Shaba once again and retreated to Angola only as French and Belgian forces arrived. After the late 1978 rapprochement with Zaire, Angola reportedly dispersed most of the FLNC away from the Zaire border. They now number 4,000-6,000 men; some of these have been organized as a separate force under the FAPLA headquarters and have assisted the FAPLA in operations against UNITA.

(3) South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)

The South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) has training and staging bases in Angola and participates, from time to time, in operations against UNITA. Elements of SWAPO are probably reluctant to do so, however, at least partly because of ethnic ties between the two groups, and continued SWAPO participation in these operations is uncertain. SWAPO combatants are collocated in many cases with FAPLA and Cuban units.

(4) African National Congress (ANC)

The African National Congress has several training bases in Angola. In return for Angolan support, an ANC unit has been required to aid FAPLA's counterinsurgency effort in the north in the last year.

(5) Others

Soviet Advisers: 700 (in advisory, training, and technical capacities supporting all the Armed Forces at all levels)

East German Advisers: approx. 500 (assisting Army and possibly police and intelligence services)

Romanian Advisers: 150 (assisting the Air Force)

Polish Technicians: 5 (processing Army materiel deliveries)

Many countries sent contingents, some only nominal in size or capability, to assist the MPLA during the civil war. None but those mentioned above remain. Perhaps three dozen Portuguese citizens, acting on their own behalf, are assisting the FAPLA. Others of Portuguese descent who are Angolan citizens are included in FAPLA strength totals. No official Portuguese military advisers are prevent.

Angolan officers and enlisted men numbering in the hundreds are receiving training in Communist countries—chiefly the Soviet Union and Cuba.
Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(3):10 USC 424

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
1. (U) Political-Military Situation: Benin has followed a Marxist-Leninist course since President Mathieu Kerekou (then Colonel) came to power in a 1972 military coup. The country is ruled by a military government. The ruling Council of Ministers receives guidance from the Central Committee of the People's Revolutionary Party, Benin's sole political party. President Kerekou, who was re-elected to a second 5-year term as President and Chief of Staff in July 1984, heads the 13-member Political Bureau of the Central Committee. This Bureau establishes policy guidance. A 196-member National Revolutionary Assembly was elected in June 1984. However, the real decisionmaking remains with the Central Committee. Close ties with the Soviet Union and its allies were established shortly after the 1972 coup; however, since mid-1982 closer ties have been formed with the West, particularly France. A positive sign of this tilt was French President Mitterand's 1983 visit to Benin, the first such visit in over a decade. In a further shift toward moderation, Kerekou removed several members of the extreme leftist faction from key government positions and appointed several moderate civilian ministers in his cabinet. For the first time since 1977, civilian ministers outnumbered military cabinet members. However, the size of the cabinet was reduced in mid-1984 and military cabinet members once again outnumbered civilians.

President Kerekou pursues a foreign policy of nonalignment, and remains pragmatic in his dealings with the USSR, the Bloc, and the West. Kerekou is appreciative of Egypt's role in helping to achieve peace in the Middle East with justice for the Palestinians. Benin has sought Egypt's help in resolving the POLISARIO issue in the Western Sahara and Morocco. Contrary to most African leaders, Kerekou supports Goukouni Weddeye as the legal leader of Chad, thus putting him on the side of Libya on this issue. This year, Kerekou established a technical agreement with Egypt to obtain Egyptian help in development projects and Egyptian loans to train Beninese students. Although Benin spouts Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, the country's need for improved trade relations, increased consumer goods, and additional foreign aid has prompted a drift toward the West in its approach to foreign relations.

As more moderate forces have emerged as the prevailing element in the government, President Kerekou, never known for his strong leadership, has learned to walk a cautious line. The radical leftist element, backed by the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Libya is resentful of its declining but latent influence. This element, with its corresponding arm in the military, could engineer a coup if it perceives that Kerekou is moving too fast toward more cordial relations with the West, especially the US. On the other hand, the more moderate element, which also has a military following, may become impatient with Kerekou for not moving fast enough.

In the past, the Kerekou regime relied heavily on the USSR and Soviet Bloc countries for its security. Recently, however, military ties with the Soviet Union have lessened. While there were 80 Soviet military advisers in Benin in 1982, now there are about 20. In addition, a Soviet naval captain and an air force lieutenant colonel serve as the Defense Attache and Assistant Attache to Benin. Four of the Soviet military advisers maintain key roles in the Kerekou government. A full colonel is assigned to the general staff; another colonel supervises overall financial matters and advises the Beninese Air Force. A Soviet naval captain is coordinator for the small Beninese Navy, and a Soviet
army captain is in charge of security matters and works with the Presidential Guard. Kerekou and his associates have never trusted Soviet motives and became disillusioned with the limited amount of economic aid from Moscow and the quality of military supplies and training. The Soviets, as well as the Cubans, have not mixed well with the Beninese, preferring to live apart in their own compounds. Even though there has been a perceptive change in Benin's political outlook, the Soviets are still showing interest in access to a proposed 3,000-meter airfield at Kana that they have funded; however, whether this airfield is ever built or if the Soviets will ever use it remains in question. The Soviets still pay regular port visits to Cotonou and are building a Beninese naval base there as previously promised in 1978, but Soviet access rights to this facility have not been determined.

In 1983, Benin became a member of the Islamic Conference Organization. Libya, in order to pursue its dream of a pan-Islamic Sahelian state, continues to use Benin as a transit point for flights carrying West Africans from a variety of countries to and from Tripoli for military and ideological training. Qadhafi has poured money into the country as outright gifts or for economic or military aid, which has given Libya leverage in the government. There are also some Libyan advisers with the military. However, some heavy-handed tactics and open boasting by the Libyans about their ability to "buy" the government, along with changes in Kerekou's cabinet that ousted Libyan allies, have dampened relations between these two countries. Although Libyan influence still remains, it has diminished somewhat in scale. In 1983, Libya gave Benin a Boeing 707 to replace the Mystere Falcon 50 it gave Benin in 1981. Libya also gave Benin a SPOON REST radar system, two T-55 tanks, three 106-mm recoilless rifles, 50 automatic rifles, and miscellaneous ammunition in 1983.

France is cautiously increasing its military ties with Benin. In 1982, France provided C-47 aircraft, and in 1983 it provided military personnel to support the aircraft. It also provided Benin troop transport vehicles, field radios, and military sedans. In 1984, France provided Benin a light utility helicopter and French pilots to train the Beninese pilots. The increase in French military aid is the result of Benin's lessening of military ties with the Soviets. A French Defense Attache resides in Benin.

Since the early 1970s, Benin's agriculturally based economy has stagnated from inefficient state-owned enterprises and recurrent droughts. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was $1,060,000,000 in 1982, a decline of almost 11 percent from 1981. Agricultural production, which generates 85 percent of exports and almost half of the GDP, has decreased constantly in recent years. While Benin will remain one of Sub-Saharan Africa's poorest nations—per capita income of $310—for the foreseeable future, there are some signs of economic improvement. Production of cash crops, particularly cotton, may increase and past investment in new industrial projects could reach fruition in the next few years. Moreover, limited amounts of oil are currently being pumped and test-marketed that could result in modest oil revenues.
Benin has no military equipment production capability. Army equipment in recent years has been acquired from the USSR, including tanks, APCs, small arms, trucks, and ammunition. Some aircraft have been provided by France, the Netherlands, Libya, and the USSR. Soviet deliveries since 1978 are valued at $148 million, while deliveries from the Free World for the same period total $21 million. Most of the value of Soviet assistance has been for military construction.

The 3,500-man Beninese Armed Forces are closely involved with the government. Deputy Chief of Staff of the People's Armed Forces (FAP) and Minister of Interior and Public Security Colonel Michel Alladaye is considered to be the real power in the Armed Forces. Since many military officials also hold ministerial positions, they divide their work schedule between two offices. The military has a complicated chain of command. The FAP is directly subordinate to the Ministry of Defense. The National Defense Forces Headquarters controls the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Public Security Forces (which consists of the National Gendarmerie, the National Police, the Customs Service, and Forestry and Water Inspection/Protection Service), the People's Militia, and the National Defense Forces are subordinate to the People's Armed Forces.

The mission of the Armed Forces of Benin is to defend the national borders and maintain internal security. The military forces of Benin are capable of handling most internal threats. There are no immediate external threats. Due to its small size and limited equipment, the Beninese military would not be able to defend itself against any aggression from its neighboring countries unless it received extensive foreign assistance. In an effort to keep Benin from completely moving into the Soviet camp, Nigeria has exchanged military students and has a Beninese Defense Attache resident in Nigeria. Additionally, a military cooperation agreement signed in 1983 between the two countries provides for combined military exercises. Benin fears Nigeria's superior military and is aware that Nigeria will tolerate only so much Soviet or Cuban activity in-country. A modest International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program is scheduled by the US for Benin in FY 85.

2. (U) Key Officials:
President of the National Executive Council, Head of Government, Minister of Defense: Brigadier General Mathieu Kerekou
People's Armed Forces (PAP) Chief of Staff: Brigadier General Barthelemy Ohouens
Deputy Chief of Staff (PAP): Colonel Michel Alladaye
Chief of Staff of the National Defense Forces (FDN): Vacant
Acting Chief of Staff (FDN): Lt Col Andre Atchade
Public Security Forces (FSP): Colonel Raimi Issa Lawani
People's Militia (MP): Brigadier General Mathieu Kerekou
Navy: Commander, Lieutenant Bere Prosper Kiando
Air Transport of Benin (TAB): Commander, Lt Col Leopold Ahoueya (Gendarmerie officer) Note: This is a joint Civil-Military Aviation Group
Chief of Escadrille Nationale (Air Force Component of TAB): Captain Mama Sika
Minister of Interior and Minister of Territorial Administration: Edouard Zodehougan (military officer, rank unknown)

Minister of Justice and Minister of Inspection of Public and Semi-Public Enterprises: Didier Dassi (military officer, rank unknown)

3. **Military Budget:** $24.7 million for fiscal year ending 31 December 1984; this is 19 percent of the central government budget. Service allocation is as follows: Common Defense Services (Army, Navy, Air Force), $18 million; Gendarmerie, $276,700; Public Security Forces $6.61 million; Custom Service, $100,000; Forestry Inspection Service, $48,800; Disaster and Safety Services, $14,000.

4. **Population:** 3,910,000 estimated as of June 1984
   Males (ages 15-49): 846,000; physically fit: 428,000 (est.) (Draft age 18)
   Ethnic Divisions: 99 percent African (42 ethnic groups, most important being Fon, Adja, Yoruba, and Bariba); 5,500 Europeans
   Literacy: about 20 percent

5. **Army:** (National Defense Forces-FDN):
   Personnel Strength: approx. 3,200 (70 officers, 350 NCOs, 2,780 EM)
   Reserve: None
   Major Units: Three infantry battalions located at Cotonou, Parakou, and Ouidah; one paracommando battalion with two companies at Ouassa; one service battalion; one engineer battalion with two companies; and an air defense battalion. The service, one engineer, and the air defense battalions are located at Cotonou. The second engineer battalion is at Cana (Kana). Each infantry battalion consists of a Headquarters Company and three motorized companies. Additionally, two armorer companies have been formed and are located with the battalions at Cotonou and Ouidah. The training center (Centre National D'Instruction) is located at Bembereke. Army National Headquarters and the Ministry of National Defense are located in Cotonou. The National Defense Forces Headquarters controls the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Commander of the Presidential Guard reports directly to Kerekou.
   Major Equipment: 2 T-55 tanks, 5 T-34 tanks, 20 PT-76 tanks, 16 Pahhard armored cars, 10 (US) M-8 light armored cars, 17 BRDM-2s, 5 (US) M2A1 halftracks, 5 57-mm ZIS-2 antitank guns, 5 76-mm ZIS-3 field guns, 3 106-mm and 13 57-mm recoilless rifles, and 3 ZPU-4 and 10 14.5-mm ZPU-2 antiaircraft machineguns.

6. **Navy:**
   Personnel Strength: 100 est (no breakdown available); includes trainees in the USSR and Nigeria. The Benin Navy was inaugurated in August 1978. Initial training occurred in North Korea, but recent training has taken place in both the USSR and France.
   Reserve: None
   Ships: Six (four ZHUK patrol boats, two Kim Jin patrol boats provided by North Korea).
   Merchant Ships: Three cargo ships (one cargo ship of 3,000 gross registered tons (GRT); one of 4,400 deadweight tons (DWT)).
7. **(C/NS) Air Force:**
Personnel Strength: 160 est (no breakdown available); includes trainees in Nigeria.
Reserve: None
Units: One composite squadron
Aircraft: Eight (one An-26, three C-47, one Fokker F-27 Friendship, one Fokker F-28 Fellowship, one B-707 (Presidential use piloted by an expatriate crew of one Iraqi, one Libyan, and one Englishman), and one Aerospatiale 335B light utility helicopter)

8. **(C/NS) Paramilitary:**
   a. **Public Security Forces (FSP):** Consists of the National Gendarmerie, National Police, Customs Service, and Forestry and Water Inspection/Protection Service. (No breakdown available except for the Gendarmerie.) The Gendarmerie consists of 2,000 troops organized into a National Gendarmerie Headquarters at Cotonou, a Gendarmerie Mobile Squadron, and a Gendarmerie Territorial Companies Command at Cotonou. A gendarmerie company is located in each of Benin's six provinces: Atlantic Province, Mono Province, Zou Province, Ouembe Province, Borgou Province, and Atacora Province. The Gendarmerie School is located at Porto Novo.
Reserve: None
Major Equipment: None
   b. **Militia (MP):** President Kerekou personally commands the People's Militia.
Personnel Strength: 1,500-2,000 (no breakdown available)
Units: At least one unit per province, but precise data are unknown. Serves primarily in a propaganda role.
Major Equipment: None

9. **(U) Key US Officials:**
Ambassador (Cotonou): George E. Moose

10. **(C/NS) Foreign Military Presence:**
(Some Soviets pilot the An-26)
Soviet Union: 20 advisers
Cuba: 8 advisers
E. Germany: 2 advisers
Libya: Unknown (Presidential Guard)
France: Unknown (one French military pilot and one mechanic in support of the C-47 aircraft; unknown number of French military pilots training Beninese helicopter pilots.)
### Installation BE List (U)

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1. (C) Political-Military Situation: An independent parliamentary republic and member of the Commonwealth, Botswana is one of the few African countries where democracy is more than an ideal. Formerly the British Protectorate of Bechuanaland, Botswana became an independent state in 1966. Sir Sereste Khama was President until his death in 1980, when he was succeeded by Vice President Quett K. J. Masire. Both Khama and Masire were founding members of the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), which has held a majority in the National Assembly since 1966. Botswana has followed policies emphasizing political stability, democracy, economic development, and nonmilitary involvement in the liberation of Southern Africa.

(U) Masire sees his political future threatened by the late President's son, Brigadier Ian Khama. Khama and his followers believe that he is the rightful successor to the Presidency. However, his positions as Deputy Defense Force Commander and Paramount Chief of the Bamangwato restrict his political career. By law he must resign the Paramountcy 5 years before running for office. The Defense Force Commander, Major General Merafhe, sees Khama as a destabilizing influence to the government, especially if he gains the support of the younger officers of the BDF. Merafhe hopes that by extending the retirement age for officers and postponing his own retirement he will make the Army a stabilizing factor in domestic affairs.

(U) Botswana is a sparsely populated, semiarid, landlocked country approximately the size of France surrounded by South Africa, Namibia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. It is heavily dependent upon transportation links with South Africa and the employment of its itinerant workers in the mines of that country, although the number of workers was reduced from a high of 40,000 in 1976 to about 20,000 in 1979. The economy is based on beef production but is diversifying with a copper/nickel matte mining operation and diamond mines. Botswana is a member of the United Nations; the Organization of African Unity; a Customs Union with South Africa, Lesotho, and Swaziland; and is associated with the European Economic Community through the Lome Convention. Botswana is also active with the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), an organization of southern African states seeking to lessen their economic dependence on the Republic of South Africa.

(U) Although Botswana is one of the Frontline States (the others are Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe), it maintains proper relations with South Africa. Officially, the Government of Botswana refuses to permit anti-South African insurgent groups, such as the ANC, to operate from bases in its territory. This complications relations with all of its neighbors as the black ruled states seek greater participation by Botswana in the liberation of South Africa from white rule, and South Africa seeks to deter such policies. South Africa would like to exchange the current informal security relationship with Botswana for a formal nonaggression pact that would obligate Botswana to cooperate with it in eliminating the dissidents. Even though Botswana is treading a fine line between South Africa and the other Frontline States, it may be pressured into signing a formal security agreement with South Africa in the near future. In neighboring Zimbabwe, the conflict between the military forces of the Mugabe government and the dissidents and bandits operating in the
provinces of Matabeleland North and South has often spilled over into Botswana. Most of these Zimbabwean dissidents are either ex-Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) soldiers and Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) members who oppose Prime Minister Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) government, or are deserters from the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA). Some of these insurgents, are, despite Botswana Government prohibitions, operating from bases inside Botswana territory. Some of them may be receiving military support from South Africa. The situation is further complicated by the close ethnic ties between many of the Zimbabwean dissidents and Botswana living near the border. As a result of the violence in southwest Zimbabwe, the number of Zimbabwean refugees and guerrillas disguised as refugees in Botswana has swelled to nearly 4,000. This problem has been a source of great tension between the two countries during the last year. Diplomatic solutions have repeatedly met with obstacles. ZNA counterinsurgency forces pursuing dissidents into Botswana have been confronted and engaged in actual firefights by Botswana Defense Force (BDF) units. As the dissident problems continue in southwest Zimbabwe, so will the potential for border confrontation between that country and Botswana.

Botswana is a sanctuary for refugees not only from Zimbabwe but also from Angola, South Africa, Namibia, and Lesotho. The majority of these people, nearly 4,000 are staying at the Dukwe Refugee Camp northwest of Francistown. Approximately another 1,000 plus are scattered throughout the country. As the domestic situations in these countries become more unstable, Botswana will have to contend with an influx of refugees as well as maintaining good relations with its neighbors.

By the mid-1970s, the Government of Botswana recognized that its 350-man Police Mobile Unit (PMU) was not capable of maintaining the integrity of its borders against insurgents, Rhodesian security forces, or the South African Defense Force (SADF). A decision was made to establish a defense force with greater capabilities to control refugees within Botswana and to prevent border incursions. In 1977 the Botswana Defense Force was established using the PMU as a nucleus. Both the commander and deputy commander were former members of the PMU, but only the deputy, Brigadier Ian Khama, had any military training. Since 1977, the BDF has grown rapidly from 500 men to approximately 3,200 and may reach a strength of 4,000 to 5,000 men by the late 1980s. This growth and the purchase of modern equipment from the United Kingdom, Israel, the United States, the Soviet Union, and a number of other Eastern and Western countries improves the capabilities of the BDF. However, it still has a very limited ability to defend against external threat and cannot wholly prevent insurgent operations in its territory. Defense matters are handled by the Cabinet; there is no defense ministry or department.

The BDF sees itself as a deterrent force to Zimbabwean or SADF cross-border operations against refugees or anti-South African Government groups, but recognizes its limitations against the much larger Zimbabwe military or the SADF.

2. (U) Key Officials:
President: Quett K.J. Masire
Minister of External Affairs: Archibald M. Mogwe
Minister of Public Service and Information and de facto Minister of Defense:
   Daniel K. Kweleboge
Botswana Defense Force Commander: Maj Gen Mompati Merafhe
Deputy Botswana Defense Force Commander: Brig Ian Khama
Air Wing Commander: A. S. Joshi (Indian Air Force Officer)
Commissioner of Police: Simon Hirschfeld

3. (U) Military Budget: $26.62 million for fiscal year ending 31 March 1983; this is 7 percent of the proposed central government budget. No service allocations are available. Dollar value converted at an exchange rate of 0.943 pula equals US $1.00.

4. (U) Population: 1,038,000 as of June 1984
Males (ages 15-49): 196,000; physically fit: 104,000; 12,000 reach military age (18) annually
Ethnic Divisions: 94 percent Tswana, 5 percent Bushmen, 1 percent European
Literacy: About 22 percent in English; about 32 percent in Tswana; less than 1 percent secondary school graduates

5. (U) Army:
Personnel Strength: 3,150
Reserve: None
Major Units: Five infantry company groups (strength per co grp is about 300) (2 at Gaborone, 2 at Francistown, and 1 at Selebi Phikwe; 1 special support unit (armored cars, mortar, antitank, air defense, engineer). The main base is located at Mogoditshane, 5 miles from Gaborone. Officer training abroad has been done mostly in the UK and Zambia, but the BDF has also established its own officer training program in-country. Some BDF members have received signals, supply, ordnance, and infantry training in India and the United States. Five Soviet advisers arrived in-country during late 1981 to assist with the delivery of Soviet armored vehicles. They departed in October 1982.
Major Equipment: Rifles (Belgian FN, British AR-18, Chinese AK-47); machineguns; 6 British 105-mm light artillery pieces; 60-mm and 81-mm mortars; RPG-2 and RPG-7 antitank weapons; 84-mm Carl Gustav recoilless guns; 20-mm antiaircraft guns; 36 Shorland armored cars; 11 V-150 Cadillac-Gage Commando APCs, equipped with 90-mm guns; militarized Land Rovers; 7-ton 4 x 4 Bedford trucks. In late August 1981 the BDF took delivery of a variety of equipment purchased from the Soviet Union. Included in the delivery were 30 BTR-60 armored personnel carriers, 3 BTR-40 armored reconnaissance vehicles, and 12 SA-7 launchers with 64 SA-7/GRAIL surface-to-air missiles.

6. (U) Navy: None.

7. (C) Air Force:
   The BDF Air Wing was formed in June 1977 and in the following month training began under the auspices of an ex-Royal Air Force pilot. The Air Wing has six BN2A-21 Defenders, two Short Skyvans, five Bulldog SA-3-120 armed trainers, and two Cessna 152A Aerobat aircraft. Botswana is planning to purchase utility helicopters of either US or French manufacture. The Bulldogs and Defenders are
configured to carry light rockets and machinegun pods. Cargo capacity is limited by long distances between operational airfields and troop garrisons as well as high temperatures throughout most of the year. Some 15 Botswana pilots, including Deputy Commander Khama, several British expatriates, and four Indian personnel are available. The British and Indian personnel also serve as instructors in flying and maintenance procedures but are not allowed to participate in actual combat. The Air Wing's primary missions are border patrolling and reconnaissance, with secondary missions of ground attack and resupply. Current air operations consist primarily of pilot qualification and local transportation flights. The main operating base is located at the International airport in Gaborone. Plans call for a forward base at Francistown with three squadrons, a maintenance unit, and a training unit. Basic training will be conducted at Francistown utilizing the Bulldogs.

8. **Paramilitary:**

Police: The paramilitary arm of the police, the 350-man Police Mobile Unit (PMU), was phased out in 1977; it became the basis for the new army. The police retained no paramilitary capability at that time but has since established a Special Support Group (SSG), which undertakes duties outside day-to-day police work. A paramilitary role is being planned for the police force which could then assist the BDF in controlling refugees and in patrolling the border areas. The police have a strength of about 1,000. They are not normally armed, except for those performing Presidential protection duties. A stock of .303 rifles and .45 cal pistols is kept for contingency purposes, and the Government of Botswana has recently sought Western assistance in obtaining rifles for the police. The force is well trained and administered and performs well its functions of insuring public safety and order. In the event of hostilities the police would serve as a reserve unit in support of BDF operations. Despite BDF origins in the Police Force, relations between the two are strained. Some British expatriates serve in the Police Force.

9. **(U) Key US Officials:**

Chief of Mission: (Gaborone) Ambassador Theodore C. Maino

10. **Foreign Military Presence:**

   India: 44 advisers to the BDF. Indians are on permanent assignment to the BDF and are incorporated into normal operations of the organization and occupy key maintenance and training positions.

   UK: The UK Military Assistance Officer of the Ministry of Defense prepared the basic planning document for the BDF. The BDF has continued to consult with the UK, but a British advisory team is not in-country. Some British expatriates assist the BDF.

   Soviet Union: Five Soviet advisers assisted the BDF with maintenance and training on the recently purchased Soviet equipment from 1981-82, but departed in October 1982.
BURKINA FASO

1. **Political-Military Situation:** The Republic of Upper Volta became Burkina Faso on 4 August 1984, the first anniversary of the country's latest coup that brought the current leftist military government to power. This coup, the second in a year occurred on 4 August 1983 when the moderate pro-Western government under Maj Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo—a medical doctor—was overthrown by his former Prime Minister, Captain Thomas Sankara. Ouedraogo himself came to power in a coup in November 1982, largely with the aid of Sankara. But the more radical Sankara was dropped from the post of Prime Minister and briefly imprisoned as his rhetoric and policies conflicted with those of Ouedraogo. This tense situation reached a head in August when Sankara overthrew Ouedraogo, forming the National Revolutionary Council (CNR). The council—which formulates government policy and makes decisions—is made up of both civilians and military officers of varying political persuasions. However, the more radical element is Marxist-oriented and commands considerable influence over Sankara. The new government's first year in power was marked by increasing tensions among radicals and more nationalist elements loyal to Captain Sankara. On 20 August Sankara dismissed most of his cabinet and purged it of members belonging to the Patriotic League for Development (LIPAD) whose far left members were unsure supporters of Sankara's military-dominated government. Another leftist group, the Union for Communist Struggle (ULC), emerged more powerful from the purge. There are no indications that Sankara plans to return the government to civilian rule.

Sankara has been preoccupied with consolidating his power and maintaining internal security. The Army—a critical actor in the political-military equation—supports his regime as do most youth, labor, and student organizations. While former government officials and many businessmen do not support the regime, they are not well organized and have not provided any united opposition. The June executions of seven military and civilians for coup plotting has effectively quieted the opposition. These deaths, in addition to the killing of two leading military men in the August coup mark a departure from the non-violent nature of previous coups. The Army has been responsible for providing internal security, and security around the capital, Ouagadougou, remains tight. As long as the Army remains loyal to Sankara, he will continue to maintain political control.

The Army has been expanded with the addition of two infantry regiments* and a new "combat" regiment at Po.** The interarms regiment has been disbanded and may assist in building up the new regiments. Under the Sankara regime, a determined effort is being made to politicize the soldiers. In late 1983 and early 1984, the government drew up plans for the formation and implementation of Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs). These committees are to be incorporated into the ranks to air grievances and improve morale. The CDRs will also provide political and ideological training to the military as Sankara attempts to inculcate his revolutionary ideas into the rank and file.

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* (5/11) The new infantry regiments at Fada N'Gourma and Gaoua currently have only company strength.

** (5/11) During the Ouedraogo regime, radical elements within the military often met at Po. Libyan military aid arrived at Po via Ghana during this time. The new regiment is a commando unit, that is receiving some training from North Koreans.

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In addition, a 20,000-man civilian militia, subordinate to the CDR, is to be established. Eventually, one Popular Vigilance Brigade (BPV) is to be located in each of the 25 provinces. They will be staffed by a cadre of regular military personnel, but manned mostly by local workers and students. BPV missions are to include local defense and possible curfew enforcement. Some officials see the units as a reserve for the Army. However, neither the expansion of the Army nor the creation of the BPVs will likely improve Burkina Faso's security, since inter-Service rivalries and imposed military training for civilians could lead to domestic discontent with the Sankara regime.

While Sankara has moved closer to the Soviet Union and Libya, he has tried to maintain his essential economic links with the West. Aid donations from Western sources far outweigh any assistance received from the more radical states; however, it is expected that Sankara will develop a closer relationship with radical anti-Western states as he further consolidates his power. Libya has already supplied some military equipment to Burkina and some of the recent Burkinan graduates of the military academy are expected to go to Cuba for officer training. Moreover, North Korea has 18 military advisers in-country providing training. Agreements providing for Cuban assistance in health, agriculture, and security have been announced. Close relations with Algeria have developed. Algeria has provided a large cash subsidy and has agreed to supply petroleum at low cost. In addition to economic assistance Algeria has provided military materiel and technicians and civilian technicians. Algeria's increasingly important role probably resulted from its attempts to counter Libyan influence, and it reflects a more cautious attitude by the Sankara government. While radical elements within the CNR have pushed for a closer relationship with Communist countries, Sankara will have to steer a careful course if he expects his Western donors to continue their economic support.

Relations with neighboring countries reflect Sankara's concern with security and the pursuit of the Burkinan revolution. Sankara believes external opposition resides in Abidjan and Paris; consequently relations with both Ivory Coast and France have eroded somewhat. Ivory Coast has expressed concern over what it perceives as the spread of Libyan involvement in the region and views Libyan activities in Burkina as a potential threat. While France maintains a small military advisory program in Burkina, it is not clear how much longer this program will continue. Sankara and Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings of Ghana maintain close ties as each leader mutually supports their revolutionary initiatives. The longstanding border conflict between Burkina and Mali has been quiet this past year and negotiations to end that dispute continue.

Burkina Faso ranks among the poorest countries in the world. The combination of few national resources, a prolonged drought, and a weak economic infrastructure contribute to the judgment that economic conditions will not improve in the foreseeable future. The majority of its 6.8 million people are engaged in subsistence agriculture. Per capita income was estimated at $148 in 1981. Agricultural exports account for a third of GDP and include livestock, peanuts, sheanut products, cotton, and sesame. Together with its Sahelian neighbors, Burkina suffers from widespread drought that further stifles agricultural production and animal husbandry. In late September, Algeria C-130s were sent to assist in disaster relief in the northeast. Manufacturing accounts
for less than 15 percent of GDP and is limited to food processing and basic consumer goods. Burkina will continue to remain heavily dependent on foreign donors for economic aid.

2. (U) Key Officials:
President of the National Revolutionary Council (CNR): Capt Thomas Sankara
Minister of Defense and Veteran Affairs: Maj Boukari Jean-Baptiste Lingani
Minister of Internal Affairs and Security: Nongma Ernest Ouedraogo
Armed Forces Commander and Army Chief of Staff: Maj Boukari Jean-Baptiste Lingani
Gendarmerie Commander: (Provisional) Lt Ouosseni Compaore
Air Force Commander: Capt Ali Traore
Republican Revolutionary Guard Commander: Lt Souley Mohamed

3. (U) Military Budget: $21,121,000 for fiscal year ending 31 December 1983; this is 18.0 percent of the central government budget. No service allocation nor percent of GNP are available. Dollar values converted from CFA francs at the official exchange rate of 290 francs equal $1.00.

4. (U) Population: 6,733,000 as of 1 July 1984
Males (ages 15-49): 1,504,000; physically fit, 758,000
Ethnic Divisions: More than 50 ethnic groups; principal group is Mossi (about 2.5 million); other important groups are Gurunsi, Senufo, Lobi, Bobo, and Fulani.
Literacy (1975): 5 to 10 percent

5. (U) Army:
Personnel Strength: 4,500 (no breakout available)
Reserve: No reserve units exist. However, politically reliable veterans could be called on to perform an important role in the development of the paramilitary CDRs.
Combat Units: Five infantry regiments; one parachute regiment; one headquarters and support regiment consisting of the command and combat service support units.
Major Equipment: 16 Panhard AML armored recon vehicles (4 with 90-mm guns), 10 Cascaval APC, 11 M-3 APCs, 8 Ferret Mk-II armored cars, 4 M-8 armored cars, 4 75-mm RCLR, 6 105-mm howitzers, and 12 20-mm AAA guns

6. (U) Navy: None

7. (U) Air Force:
Personnel Strength: 160 (no breakout available). No reserve
Units: One composite unit with four elements: operations, technical support, general support, and administration
Aircraft: Seven (four prop trnsp, two prop util, one util helicopter)*

* Unconfirmed reports indicate that several Algerian MiG-21s in crates as well as several helicopters have been given to Burkina. The crated aircraft, as well as antiaircraft cannon and 30 trucks and jeeps, were shipped to the Benin port of Cotonou for transshipment to Burkina. Earlier reports that Burkina would acquire five MiG-17s from North Korea may be false.
BURKINA FASO

8. (T) Paramilitary Forces:
   a. **Gendarmerie:**
      Personnel Strength: 1,000 (no breakout available)
      Units: Four cos and four mobile pltls. No major equipment
   b. **Republican Guard:**
      Personnel Strength: 1,400 (no breakout available)
      Units: Gd HQ, 3 mbl pltls, and 44 bdes (4 to 5 men each). No major equipment
   c. **National Police:**
      Personnel Strength: 1,255 (no breakout available). No major equipment

9. (U) Key US Officials:
   Chief of Mission (Ouagadougou): Ambassador Julius W. Walker, Jr.

10. (T) Foreign Military Presence:
    French Advisers: 20
        An additional 50 (approx) French military doctors serve in civilian capacities.
    FRC Advisers: Five (one officer, four NCOs)*
    Libyan: Unk
    North Korean advisers: 18 (approx)
    Algerian: Unk

* (S) FRC personnel are army engineers who are training Burkinans in road construction.
Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
BURUNDI

1. Political-Military Situation: Burundi received its independence as a traditional monarchy from Belgium on 1 July 1962. It became a republic on 28 November 1966 after a military coup led by then-Prime Minister Capt Michel Micombero. Ten years later, on 1 November 1976, a bloodless military coup ousted then-President Micombero; on 13 November of that year, the Second Republic, headed by President Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, was declared. The regime members are idealistic, youthful, relatively well-educated, reformist, and, though moderately influenced by socialist examples, pragmatic. The Tutsi ethnic group, making up only 14 percent of the total population, dominates a Hutu majority of 85 percent. The Army is the President's base of power. Reprisals following a Hutu uprising in April-May 1972 left it an entirely Tutsi force; reportedly Hutus slowly began reentering the Army in 1978, but the force is still overwhelmingly Tutsi.

Although the Hutus in Burundi no longer have significant access to military organization and equipment, their sheer numbers are perceived by the Tutsi as a threat. In addition, some in the Tutsi elite distrust President Bagaza's efforts at conciliation with the Hutu, particularly his abolition of feudal-like servitude of Hutu to Tutsi. Moreover, the Bagaza regime has encouraged Hutu refugees to return from Tanzania and Zaire. Large numbers have returned and are now seeking to reclaim their abandoned land from Tutsi who took it over. For these reasons, many Tutsis fear for their continued dominance and could support a coup attempt in favor of a regime willing once again to repress Hutus. The Tutsi themselves are divided by rival intratribal groupings that threaten regime stability. Bagaza is counting on the Army and the rural population to support his cautious social and economic reform. On the other hand, rivals, who are somewhat more radical or of different, less-conciliatory Tutsi groups, could appeal in traditional Burundi fashion to narrow ethnic loyalties in an effort to threaten Bagaza's consolidation of power or to replace him with a regime willing once again to repress the Hutu. Micombero, then more a focus for internal bickering than a direct threat to the current regime, was exiled in August 1977 to Somalia, where he presumably remains. He is no longer a significant factor in internal Burundian politics.

As a result of the 1972 ethnic conflict, tens of thousands of refugees fled to Tanzania, Zaire, and Rwanda. These refugees allegedly were responsible for attacks into Burundi during 1973 and again in late 1975. Although the 1975 invasion was dispersed easily by the Burundi Army, the refugee problem remains a source of concern for the Government. Possibly in response to a Bagaza regime campaign, large numbers of these refugees have been returning. External relations between Burundi and its three neighboring states are proper except for occasional tension over Hutu refugees and customs matters. Moreover, an unsettled border with Zaire was the subject of serious dispute in 1981, and the issue has not yet been resolved. Burundi's relatively warm relations with Communist states also worry Zaire and Rwanda. In the last 5 years, there has been a swing toward improving ties with Tanzania, partly at the expense of relations with Zaire. The Army is well trained and capable of maintaining domestic order or resisting an invasion from neighboring Rwanda. If invaded by one of its more powerful neighbors (Tanzania or Zaire), however, the Burundi Army probably would be overwhelmed. Burundi is partly dependent on transport routes through Kenya and Uganda for receipt of POL and other important supplies.

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Unstable conditions in these countries—for example, the early 1979 invasion of Uganda by Tanzania—have the potential for disrupting both the Burundian economy and the country's internal stability.

While there may be a few Communists in Burundi, there is no Communist Party. In April 1976, a Cuban ambassador was accredited; in early 1978, an embassy in Bujumbura was opened. Cuban advisers in Burundi are believed to be civilians. Relations with North Korea and the People's Republic of China (PRC) are warm. Relations with the Soviet Union and other Communist states are less close, but still good.

Burundi is a landlocked, resource-poor nation at an early stage of economic development. It is predominantly an agricultural society with only a few basic industries. All other consumer items are imported, mostly from Europe, and local prices are high due to transportation costs. Approximately 50 government agencies perform economic functions such as processing, sale, or distribution of goods, and in doing so contribute to economic inefficiency. Coffee exports account for about 90 percent of foreign exchange earnings each year, with cotton and tea accounting for another 8 percent. Burundi gross domestic product amounted to $1,211,289,000 in 1982, or $273 per capita.

Periodic summit meetings are held with Rwanda and Zaire to consider matters of common interest; in 1976 the three established the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL), which includes mutual security provisions, and have signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation. Moreover, Burundi joined Rwanda and Tanzania in 1977 to establish the Organization for the Management and Development of the Kagera River Basin, to which Uganda adhered in 1981. After Belgium's withdrawal of its military advisers in January 1974, Burundi turned to other Free World countries and to Communist states for military assistance and materiel. The USSR and Libya have been major suppliers of Army equipment including APCs, field artillery, trucks, radar, ammunition, and small arms. France has supplied armored cars and infantry weapons. Aerospace materiel is acquired mainly from the Free World and includes helicopters from France and utility aircraft from Italy. Military deliveries from the Free World and from Communist states over the last 7 years have been roughly equal in value.

2. (U) Key Officials (all Tutsi):

President of the Republic, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, and Minister of Defense: Col Jean-Baptiste Bagaza
Prime Minister: None
Minister of External Relations and International Cooperation: Laurent Nzeyimana
Minister of the Interior: LT Col Charles Kazatsa
Armed Forces Chief of Staff: Lt Col Hermenegilde Karenzo
Army Air Section Commander: Lt Col Libere Nahimana
Administrator-General of the Surete and Chief of Military Intelligence: Lt Col Laurent Ndabaneze
Inspector of Gendarmerie: Lt Col Augustin Bakana
Secretary General in the Ministry of Defense: Lt Col Paul Porota
3. **Military Budget**: $50,000,000 proposed for fiscal year ending 31 December 1983; this is 30 percent of the central government budget. No service allocation is available but this figure includes the Gendarmerie. Dollar values converted from Burundi francs at the exchange rate of 90 francs equal $1.00.

4. **Population**: 4,691,000 estimated as of June 1984
Males (ages 15-49): 1,070,000; physically fit, 556,000
Ethnic Divisions: Africans-85 percent Hutu (Bantu), 14 percent Tutsi (Hamitic), 1 percent Twa (Pygmy); other Africans include perhaps 70,000 refugees, mostly Zairians and Rwandans; non-Africans include about 3,000 Europeans and 2,000 South Asians
Literacy: About 25 percent, chiefly in Kirundi, but some in French and Kiswahili

5. **Army**:
Personnel Strength: over 7,000—most are Tutsi. Officer/enlisted breakdown not available, but all officers are believed to be Tutsi. Training in Somalia is believed to have ended; 200 received infantry training in Libya between 1978 and 1981 but few are being sent now due to dissatisfaction with the training received; about 30 officers and NCOs receive unspecified training in France annually; and another 20 are trained in the USSR yearly.
Reserve: After 1 year of active duty, veterans are subject for 20 years to emergency recall and annual training periods of 60-75 days.
Major Units: Six battalions (three infantry, one parachute, one commando, one training), six independent infantry companies, two armored squadrons, and various support units. Each infantry battalion probably has 750-900 men. An air defense battalion is being formed with Soviet assistance. The Army has major deficiencies in logistics.
Major Equipment: 23 BRDM amphibious armored reconnaissance vehicles, 15 AML-60 armored cars, 12 D-30 122-mm howitzers, 70-80 antiaircraft machineguns and guns (including 14.5-mm, 23-mm twin, and 14.5-mm quad), 15 75-mm rcl rifles, 120-mm mortars (number unknown), 18 82-mm mortars, 4 3-in mortars, 2-in mortars (unknown number). Soviet equipment is gradually replacing aging Belgian materiel.

6. **Navy**: None; however, the Army has a maritime company. Three high-speed Greek-built Lambro 44 patrol boats acquired from Greece in December 1974 give Burundi the potential of patrolling the northern end of Lake Tanganyika. It is unlikely that all three boats are operational at once. The maritime company also has a diesel barge used to transport military supplies along the Lake Tanganyika coast. In the early 1970s, 14 Burundians received naval training in Greece. One report indicates the patrol boats are operated by civilians.

7. **Air Force**: None; however, a tiny air section (70 men) is included in the Army and provides liaison services to the Armed Forces. French advisers contribute significantly to the maintenance and operation of Burundi’s four Alouette III helicopters, three Cessna 150s, three C-47s, three SIAI-Marchetti SF.260s, and one possible Do-27. Burundians are receiving flight, maintenance, and operations training in Greece and in Libya. In the past, 15 pilots were trained in the Soviet Union and 20 in Somalia. The Army air section reportedly has 50 qualified pilots (30 fixed wing, 20 rotary wing), but most are scattered as infantry officers throughout the Army.
8. **Gendarmerie Paramilitary**: The Gendarmerie is responsible for nearly all regular police duties, including traffic control and operation of Burundi's only firefighting unit, which is at Bujumbura airport. Following its subordination to the Armed Forces Chief of Staff in 1967, military incompetents and those of suspect loyalty were consigned increasingly to the Gendarmerie. In its early years the Gendarmerie was more heavily Hutu than the Army and, therefore, suffered greater losses in the purge of Hutu personnel, which followed the 1972 Hutu uprising. The current strength is probably about 1,000, although the authorized strength is 1,189 men. No breakdown by grade or ethnic group is available. The force is organized territorially, with six military districts (several of the provinces are combined in military districts). The military district commander controls all Gendarmerie units in the district. Districts, in turn, are divided into a countrywide total of 18 arrondissements, each presumably having at least one Gendarmerie "brigade" assigned. (A Gendarmerie brigade has about 30 men with 1 or 2 officers.) There are also a number of separate brigades responsible for frontier security, bringing the total number of brigades to 37. The Gendarmerie lacks mobility and is poorly trained. It therefore lacks a combat capability, but is adequate for the maintenance of internal security. The Gendarmerie has received communications equipment and considerable training from France.

9. **(U) Key US Officials:**
   **Chief of Mission (Bujumbura):** Ambassador James R. Bullington

10. **(S//N) Foreign Military Presence:**
   - **French military advisers:** 20 includes Army officers, Air Force personnel with the Burundi airline and Gendarmerie instructors.
   - **Soviet Army technicians:** 17 training Burundians to operate amphibious armored reconnaissance vehicles; air defense advisers. An additional 11 Soviet professors teach at the Burundi military academy.
   - **Egyptian military advisers:** 2 assisting the Army

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)
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1. GOVERNMENT

a. (U) Key Government Officials

President and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces: Paul Biya
Minister for Foreign Affairs: William Eteki Mboumoua
Minister of Defense: Gilbert Andze Tsoungui
Minister for the Civil Service: Rene Za Nguele
Minister of Territorial Administration: Jean-Marcel Mengueme
Minister of Transportation: Benjamin Itoe
Director of National Documentation Center: Samuel Missomba

b. Type and Stability of Government

The United Republic of Cameroon became independent in 1960, adopted a federal system in 1961, and formed a unitary state incorporating the Anglophone sector in May 1972. The name was officially changed to Republic of Cameroon in January 1984 to signify a greater cohesiveness within the country. The Cameroonian National Union Party (Union National Camerounaise—UNC), founded in 1966, is the country's only political party.

In November 1982, Paul Biya was appointed as President and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces after Ahmadou Ahidjo, who had held office since Cameroon achieved independence, resigned due to poor health. Initially Ahidjo retained his presidency of the UNC; however, Ahidjo resigned in August 1983 and Biya was appointed to this position as well.

President Biya initially emphasized the continuity between his presidency and that of former president Ahidjo. However, after running unopposed for the presidency, Biya was elected to a 5-year term in January 1984. Soon after taking the oath of office on 21 January, Biya eliminated the office of Prime Minister, renamed the country (Republic of Cameroon), and drastically reshuffled government and cabinet officials.

Biya is an active president who is already beginning to put his mark on the Cameroonian Government. During the latter days of Ahidjo and now under Biya, Cameroon has begun to exercise more confidence in taking a firm position in issues critical to Africa. These include the stance against seating the POLISARIO Front in the OAU and the rejection of Libya's attempt to seat former President Goukouni of Chad at the aborted conference in Tripoli. Cameroon has also firmly backed Equatorial Guinea's attempts to enter the UDEAC (Economic and Customs Union of Central Africa).

c. Internal Threat

(U) Cameroon is an ethnically diverse country. While there has been little friction among the over 200 ethnic groups, problems have erupted due to northern (Moslem) and southern (Christian) rivalries.
(U) In August 1983, former President Ahidjo, a northerner, reportedly spear-headed a coup attempt against President Biya, a southerner. In February 1984, subversion charges were brought against Ahidjo and two of his former military aides, Squadron Chief Ibrahim Oumarou and Captain Abamou Salatou. All three northerns were sentenced to death by firing squad, Ahidjo in absentia. However, Biya later commuted the sentences to life imprisonment. Biya also halted proceedings against other individuals implicated in this coup plot.

On 6 April 1984, northern members of the Cameroon Republican Guard staged an aborted coup attempt in the capital city of Yaounde. Ahidjo's trial and death sentence, although commuted, may have been the catalyst for this 36-hour uprising. Believed to have been planned for some time, Biya's announcement to transfer northern members out of the Republican Guard may have helped spark this attempt.

Although Cameroon has relied for many years on France for military protection from both internal and external threats, repression of the uprising was dealt with quickly and decisively by Cameroonian military troops. The loyalty of the military, coupled with its ability to quash the rebels and to preserve the presidency, has elevated its prestige immeasurably.

d. External Threat

Cameroon is relatively prosperous, politically stable, and currently at peace with its neighbors. Cameroon has set an example for the peaceful development of West Africa. Paul Biya's election as President has brought a greater concern for competence and efficiency in government administration. Biya has stressed that Cameroon's foreign policy will continue to be one of authentic nonalignment. With a reputation for political moderation, Cameroon exerts a stabilizing influence in the region. The successful repression of the April coup attempt has enhanced the political stability in Cameroon.

Recent oil discoveries along Cameroon's coastline have helped the country's economy. However, Nigeria has contested some of the Cameroonian claims to territorial boundaries. Many of Cameroon's oilfields lie in these disputed areas. As the Cameroonian Navy would be no match for the Nigerians, Cameroon will likely seek a diplomatic solution.

Past border conflicts with Nigeria combined with unrest along the Chadian border have made the need for a stronger, more centralized Cameroonian military a top priority with President Biya.

e. Communist Influence

The Communist party is proscribed in Cameroon. The Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC) has been dormant internally for the past two decades. This party, which staged a major uprising in the late 1950s, allegedly had Communist ties. The political philosophy of the current UPC is unknown although recent party positions papers contain no Marxist-Leninist doctrine and tend to espouse democratic principles. Based in Paris, the UPC has petitioned President Biya to reestablish the party; it is unlikely that the prohibition will be lifted in the near future.
Cameroun

No major groups or organizations that regularly serve Soviet or Cuban interests are based in Cameroon. No local affiliates of major international fronts are active in Cameroon. An ongoing program of cultural and sports exchange exists: various Cameroonian officials travel to the Soviet Union on Soviet-sponsored exchange programs; Soviet teams and cultural events are brought to Cameroon.

No Soviet-trained personnel are in high government positions in Cameroon, but a number of such personnel are in middle level positions. The Soviet Union appears to have little influence on Cameroonian affairs. The total in-country Soviet presence is estimated at 140, including diplomats and technicians.

In-country presence of other Communist countries is 50 from the PRC and 16 from North Korea; these are diplomats and technicians. Relations with other Communist countries are restricted and consist primarily of trade and technical assistance.

f. Economic Factors

Unlike many of its Central Africa neighbors, Cameroon's economic development reads like a Third World success story. The recent exploration of large oil reserves along the Cameroonian coastline has proved extremely fruitful for the economy, surpassing earlier calculations of oil reserves. Oil discoveries, combined with new natural gas strikes, have made this country very desirable for increased Western investment. Reportedly, the new oil discoveries will enable Cameroon to become an oil exporter within the next few years.

Although drought has affected crops and cattle grazing, most food production has not significantly declined. However, coffee, cocoa, and timber prices—the nonpetroleum mainstays of the economy—remain low; this adds to the ongoing mild recession. Cameroon's economy grew 40 percent between 1980 and 1982. Inflation accounts for a large part of this increase. The GDP equaled $7.5 billion in 1982 ($827 per capita). The current mild recession is perceived as a temporary situation, and the economy should soon regain its momentum.

g. Military and Political Alignment

Cameroon is friendly with the West and maintains correct relations with many non-Western nations. Cameroon does not like to antagonize either major Western or Eastern countries and usually abstains on West/East issues in the United Nations.

Cameroon's diplomatic ties with the Arab world have expanded through the establishment of relations at the ambassadorial level with Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Cuba and Cameroon have exchanged diplomatic missions, and the opening of the GDR embassy in Yaounde reflects increased trade relations between the two countries.

Cameroon has developed a policy of nonalignment in recent years to offset the risk of being overly identified with France and the US. However, its
outlook continues to be pro-Western on such regional issues as Soviet and Cuban activities in neighboring countries.

h. (U) Key US Officials

Chief of Mission (Yaounde): Ambassador Myles R. R. Frechette
2. MILITARY, GENERAL

a. (U) Key Military Officials

Inspector General of the Army and Chief of Coordinating Committee of Armed Forces (US Army Chief of Staff): Gen Pierre Semengue
Minister of Armed Forces: Gilbert Andze Tchoungui
Army Chief of Staff: Brig Gen James Tataw
Navy Chief of Staff: CDR Guillaume Ngouah-Ngally
Air Force Chief of Staff: Brig Gen Sunji Jean Nganso
Inspector General of the National Gendarmerie: Brig Gen Djam Yaya Oumarou
Delegate General of the National Gendarmerie: Ali Amadou
Director of Presidential Security: Pierre Minlo Medjo
Director of Military Intelligence: Col Hans Ako Anagho

b. Position of Armed Forces

Cameroon's General Staff of the Armed Forces, created in mid-1983, is responsible for organizing and uniting all aspects of the Cameroonian military. The General Staff provides cohesion, efficiency, and positive direction for the Cameroonian Armed Forces.

Under former President Ahidjo, the military was kept isolated from politics, splintered, and impotent. President Biya has changed its image and role, thus enhancing the prestige of the armed forces. Senior commanders now have direct operational control of the armed forces. As a result of Biya's demonstrated trust and confidence in the military, it is in a better position than ever before to exert its will in the politics and policies of Cameroon. However, members of the armed forces seem content in their postcoup roles as heroes of the nation and defenders of the Republic.

Cameroonian military officers are expected to be members of the government-controlled single party, the Cameroon National Union (CNU). However, they are forbidden to participate actively. Province governors often require military officers stationed within the province to attend political rallies. The armed forces are often tasked to provide men and equipment such as trucks and boats in support of political rallies.

c. Military Trends and Capabilities

The Cameroonian Army is the fifth largest ground force in West Africa; it is undergoing organization, equipment, and mission changes that could make it the most effective fighting force for its size in West Africa. In the past, creating a fully capable military force was a low priority item in Cameroon due to France's ability and willingness to provide for Cameroon's security; however, the increase of coup attempts in the early 1960s and 1970s and border conflicts with Nigeria and Chad forced Ahidjo to modify the military's mission. President Biya has also stressed the continued importance of developing the Cameroon's military capabilities. The Cameroonian Army has abandoned its purely ceremonial guard role. To acquire a more rapidly deployable defense force, to gain a greater autonomy in military policy, and to increase its domestic
peacekeeping ability, the military--particularly the Army--is developing a well-trained and well-equipped force under the control of the Minister of the Armed Forces.

d. Military Budget

(U) $70.7 million for fiscal year ending 30 June 1983; this is 6.8 percent of the central government budget. No service allocation is available. Dollar values are converted from francs at the official exchange rate of 392.4 francs equal $1.00.

e. (U) Population

9.5 million estimated as of June 1984
Males (ages 15-49): 2.1 million; physically fit, 1.1 million
Ethnic Divisions: About 200 ethnic groups of widely differing backgrounds: 31 percent Cameroon Highlanders, 19 percent Equatorial Bantu, 13 percent other African, 11 percent Kirdi, 10 percent Fulani, 8 percent Northwestern Bantu, 7 percent Eastern Nigritic, 1 percent non-African
Literacy: 40 percent for non-Muslim (South); 10 percent for Muslim (North)
3. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

a. Army

(1) Mission

The mission of the Cameroonian Army is to protect national integrity and maintain internal security. Formerly a ceremonial force, the Army is assuming greater responsibility for the defense of Cameroon territory with less reliance on French assistance. Except for Nigeria, Cameroon is the strongest military power among the six countries sharing its borders.

(2) Capabilities

Although relatively small, the Cameroonian Army is one of the more effective fighting forces in West Africa. It would be able to defend against external aggression by any of its neighbors, except Nigeria, and to maintain internal order. The most potent and well-trained force in Cameroon's Armed Forces is the 550-man intervention brigade.

The military is a loyal force. With the increased training and equipment the military is now receiving, the Army will most likely exert greater influence upon the government in the future. The influence of certain key senior personalities within the Armed Forces is currently sufficient to keep it loyal for the near-to-mid term as evidenced by the successful suppression of the April coup attempt.

(3) Personnel Strength

Personnel Strength: 6,500 (no further breakdown available)

(4) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

Cameroon is divided into three military regions and seven military sectors. The boundaries of the military regions divide the country into the Southern, Western, and Northern areas. Military Region One is headquartered at Yaounde. Military Region Two is headquartered at Douala. Military Region Three is headquartered at Maroua.

The seven military sector boundaries coincide with the provincial boundaries. Located within Military Region One, sectors one, two, and three are headquartered at Yaounde, Ebolowa, and Bertoua, respectively. Sectors four and five, located within Military Region Two, are headquartered at Douala.
and Bafoussam respectively. Headquartered at Ngaoundere and Maroua, respectively, sectors six and seven are located in Military Region Three.

The Army Chain of Command extends from the Commander in Chief through the Ministry of the Armed Forces to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. The Military Region Commanders report to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and are responsible for all military and paramilitary operations taking place within their operational region.

(b) **Ground Combat Units**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Tactical Units</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airborne Battalion (Intervention Force)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Battalion</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer Battalion</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery Battalion</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antiaircraft Battalion</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Battalion</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters and Service Battalion</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) **Army Aviation Units**

None. All aircraft are operated by the Air Force.

(d) **Deployment**

Each region has territorial responsibility for a specific area of the country. The 1st Military Region is responsible for the Central, South, and East provinces. The 2d Military Region is responsible for the West, Northwest, Southwest, and Littoral provinces. The 3d Military Region is responsible for the North province.

Each sector is composed of an artillery battery, engineer squadron, armored squadron, and infantry battalion or its equivalent.

(5) **Weapons and Equipment**

(a) **General**

The Cameroonian Army in the past received most of its military equipment from France; however, Cameroon started importing a variety of arms from other countries in 1975: infantry weapons, artillery, and ammunition from the FRC; Cadillac-Gage V-150 armored cars, jeeps, and transport vehicles from the US; and air defense artillery from Sweden. In addition, Cameroon recently completed a transaction with Italy for 12 35-mm Oerlikon air defense artillery weapons.
### Ground Weapons and Equipment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Mortars:**
- 81-mm, NFI: Unk (20)
- 60-mm, NFI: FR (25)
- 120-mm, M65: FR (6)

**Rkt Lctr (RL), Missiles, and Rcl Rfls (RCLR):**
- Rcls, 106-mm, NFI: US (40)
- Rcls, 75-mm, NFI: Unk (30)
- Rcls, 57-mm, NFI: Unk (13)
- Rcls, NFI: FR (4)
- AT, Milan: FR (6)
- HMG, 12.7-mm, Type 54: CH (6)
- Rfl, 7.62-mm, Lt Auto, FAL: BE (3)

**Artillery:**
- FA, 75-mm, NFI: Unk (3)
- FA, 85-mm, NFI: Unk (18)
- ADA, 40-mm, Bofors, NFI: SW (8)
- ADA, 37-mm, Type 65: CH (24)
- ADA, 14.5-mm, NFI: CH (24)
- ADA, 35-mm, Oerlikon, NFI: IT (12)

**Armored Vehicles:**
- APC, M-3 Half-track, NFI: Unk (7)
- ARC, M-8: Unk (41)
- ARC, M-20: Unk (1)
- ARC, Ferret, NFI: UK (21)
- ARC, Cadillac-Gage V-150: US (27)

**Transport:**
- Trk, VLRA 4x4: FR (6)
- Trk, M825: US (12)
- Trk, M151: US (12)

*Fourteen of the total 90 armored cars are with the Presidential Guard and 20 are with the Gendarmerie.*
(6) Logistics

The Army's logistics system is heavily oriented toward classroom instruction while other Western maintenance training stresses the hands-on philosophy. The Cameroonian Armed Forces, like many other African armed forces, has placed emphasis on repair with very little attention given to a comprehensive maintenance program. The military is now changing its training priorities to place increased emphasis on officer maintenance courses and decrease advanced NCO maintenance courses.

The Cameroonian Army has no equipment production capability. Most of the military's equipment needs were obtained from France; however, because of dissatisfaction with what was perceived as old, cast-off French equipment, Cameroon has turned to other suppliers. The army is currently equipped with some Chinese and Western arms.

In spite of maintenance training and the infusion of new equipment, the lack of an overall efficient maintenance system will continue to plague the Army.

(7) Personnel Procurement and Retention

With no conscription, the Cameroonian Army relies solely on recruiting. Positive acceptance of the Army by the public makes recruiting easy; annual advertisements on the radio and in newspapers usually result in more than sufficient applicants. However, technically trained people and university graduates are becoming more difficult to recruit due to the availability of better paying jobs in the commercial sector.

(8) Training

Basic training is conducted at the National Armed Forces Training Center in Ngaoundere and lasts 4 months. Most technical training is conducted in France, Morocco, the US, Greece, and the Federal Republic of Germany. In addition to normal unit training, the Cameroonian Army has instituted a special training program for infantry units in Koutaba.

Advanced training at the National Armed Forces Further Training Center in Ngaoundere offers a training program for junior and senior NCOs and warrant officers. After serving at least 2 years, a soldier may apply to attend one of the programs offered. His selection and the program he follows are based on the level of his civilian education. The NCO programs last 2 months; the warrant officer course is 5 months long.
CAMEROON

Officer training is conducted at the Military Academy in Yaounde. The instruction for active duty officers spans 2 years, while reservists train for only 6 months. Cameroon has eliminated cadet training in France, further emphasizing Cameroon's desire for greater independence from France.

(9) Reserves and Mobilization

Cameroon has 7,000 reservists and 1,500 veterans who can be called upon for wartime contingency support. The reservists, who are largely young boys 15 years of age and older, train without weapons and do not have uniforms or other military equipment.

The 1,600-man Civil Guard could augment the Cameroonian Army. Paramilitary forces could also be used to add personnel in the event of mobilization: 4,000 active duty and 14,000 reservists from the Gendarmerie; and 3,000 from the Police/Surete. This represents a total of 31,100 personnel available in the event of a wartime situation.

b. Navy

(1) Mission

(U) The Navy's mission during times of crisis or war is to defend maritime approaches, protect commercial trade and fishing, and protect economic and scientific installations.

(U) The peacetime mission of Cameroon's Navy is to police maritime traffic for contraband, survey and assist fishing activities, provide aid to sea, and give logistic advice to the other military branches.

(2) Capabilities

(c) The Navy has marginal combat capabilities and is considered to be inefficient, unorganized, and incompetent. Inadequate maintenance, lack of spare parts, and dependence on foreign assistance for repair of vessels are limiting factors.

(3) Personnel Strength

350 (no further breakdown available).
**SECRET**

**CAMEROON**

(4) **Ship and Aircraft**

(a) **Ships**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*Fast Patrol Craft</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol Craft</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol Boat</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Warfare Craft</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yard and Service Craft</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) **Aircraft**

None. All aircraft are operated by the Air Force.

(5) **Organization and Deployment**

(a) **General Service**

(U) The National Navy of Cameroon was formed from a detachment of the maritime gendarmerie just after the 1960 independence. Cameroon's Navy became the Naval Forces in late 1976 after upgrading its fleet with acquisitions from France and China. This force was renamed the Naval General Staff in late 1983.

(U) The Navy's headquarters and only operating base is at the Douala Port facility, recently upgraded with funds provided by the French. The Cameroon Chief of Staff of the Naval General Staff is directly subordinate to the Minister of Armed Forces. He is assisted by the Deputy Chief of Staff and the Director of Naval Intelligence.

(b) **Marine Corps**

(E) Established in 1982, the naval infantry is composed of 200 paracommando marines and located at Man-of-War Bay. Its mission is protecting oil fields and refineries. Equipped with several zodiac inflatable boats, this unit could be rapidly deployed in response to a Nigerian border conflict.

(E) Cameroon plans to expand this force to 2,500 men with four companies located at Douala, Limbe, Lombe, and Man-of-War Bay.

**Naval Air Arm**

(U) None.

* (E) One is armed with French Exocet missiles, the other with conventional cannons.
(6) **Status of Equipment**

All of the ships in the Cameroonian Navy are believed to be operational. Most of the ships were purchased and received as gifts from the French. The PRC gave two patrol craft to Cameroon in 1976, believed to be part of an arms agreement reached between the two countries in early 1974. The ships and weaponry in the Cameroonian Navy reportedly receive minimal maintenance, usually under supervision from French military advisers.

(7) **Logistics**

A navy base was recently completed as part of the new extension at the Douala Port Facility. The base probably houses most of the logistics and repair capability. Major repairs can be conducted from commercial quay-side facilities and floating drydocks of 500 and 1,000 ton capacity in Douala.

(8) **Personnel Procurement and Retention**

(U) See paragraph 3.a.(7)

(9) **Training**

(U) Officers and some NCOs are trained at the Naval School in France and at the Greek Naval Academy. Some specialists are trained in Cameroon by the Ground Forces, in such areas as administration, marine activities, and radio operation. The Naval Forces train mechanics up to the grade of quartermaster.

(10) **Reserves and Mobilization**

(a) **Reserves**

(U) No information available.

(b) **Mobilization**

Cameroon has five merchant ships of 1,000 gross registered tons or greater. These four general cargo ships and one tanker could be used to augment the naval force.

c. **Air Force**

(1) **Mission**

(U) The mission of the Cameroonian Air Force during time of war is ground support, air transport, air drop reconnaissance, medical evacuations, and air cover.
CAMEROON

(U) In peacetime, the liaison and transport squadron and the helicopter squadron are responsible for civilian and military personnel transport, medical evacuations, logistic missions, paradropping, and instructional fights. The combat squadron is devoted to aerial combat training.

(2) Capabilities

The Cameroonian Air Force has limited air-to-ground capability and no air-to-air capability. All the helicopters are operated by French air crews or by contract air crews.

(3) Personnel Strength

350 (12 officers, 126 NCOs, 212 EM est; includes 33 qualified pilots).

(4) Aircraft Strength

Total: 29 (5 attack, 13 transport, 5 fighter trainers, 6 helicopters).

(5) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

The Cameroon's Air Force Chief of Staff is directly subordinate to the Minister of Armed Forces. Operating elements consist of three squadrons and a Presidential Flight. The combat squadron and Presidential Flight are located at Yaounde Airfield. The liaison and combat squadron and the helicopter squadron are located at Douala Airfield.

(b) Summary of Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combat Squadron</td>
<td>Alpha Jet</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaison and Transport Squadron</td>
<td>C-130H Hercules</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DHC-5D Buffalo</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dornier Do-28</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DHC-4 Caribou</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CM-170 Magister</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopter Squadron</td>
<td>Mi-4/HOUND</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SA-341 Gazelle</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SA-330 Puma</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECRE-T
CAMEROON

Presidential Flight Boeing 727-200 1
Grumman Gulfstream 1
Alouette III 2

(c) Status of Equipment

Twenty-seven of the 29 aircraft are operational, including all alpha jets and fighter trainers, 12 of the 13 transports, 5 of the 6 helicopters.

(7) Logistics

The Government is interested in obtaining additional aircraft from Western sources other than the French; however, a large French military advisory presence may affect the Government's decision. The number of French advisers including officers holding command positions is expected to increase in the future with an increased emphasis on aircraft maintenance courses. The mobile force plan will utilize the three C-130s for the rapid transport of men and equipment. This concept can only be successful if the Air Force has the capability to perform all levels of maintenance on the aircraft.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

(U) See paragraph 3.a.(7)

(9) Training

Basic and pilot training facilities are located at Douala Airfield. In addition, 30 pilots have been sent to West Germany to be trained for fighters and transports; 12 candidates were sent to France for helicopter training.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

(U) No information available.

(b) Mobilization

(U) Cameroon Airlines, the country's civil airline, is 75 percent owned by Cameroon's Government and 25 percent owned by Air France. At least seven civil transport aircraft with a gross takeoff weight of 9,000 kilograms are currently registered, owned, and operated in Cameroon: two long-range transport aircraft (one Boeing 707-320C and one Boeing 747-200B COMBI), and five medium-range transport aircraft (three Boeing 737-200C and two British Aerospace HS-748).
CAMEROON

(U) Cameroon Airlines reportedly employs about 60 flight crew personnel; over 30 are Cameroonian. The total number of licensed civilian pilots of major transport aircraft in Cameroon is unknown.

Virtually all of Cameroon's civil aircraft and indigenous civil aviation personnel could be mobilized in the event of war or comparable national emergency. Because of a shortage of fully qualified, indigenous flight and maintenance personnel, foreign assistance would be required to achieve maximum use of the mobilized equipment.

d. Paramilitary Forces

(1) Gendarmerie

(a) Mission

During periods of hostilities, the Gendarmerie operates traffic control points, controls prisoners-of-war, escort convoys, secures strategic and headquarter locations, and operates as a forward combat unit when required.

Used during peacetime to extend government control efforts, the Gendarmerie is used as an organized vigilance against disruption of the government when there is no clearly identified external military threat.

(b) Capabilities

The Gendarmerie is a well-trained force capable of performing its mission. This force was used to seal off urban neighborhoods while police searched dissidents and criminals prior to the 1982 National Day celebrations. Border crossing points in the Lake Chad region were fortified using the Gendarmerie during past Chad/Nigeria disputes in that area. In addition, the Gendarmerie was effectively used to help abort the 1984 coup attempt by Northern members of the Republican Guard.

(c) Personnel Strength

(U) Personnel strength of the Gendarmerie is 4,000. Authorized reserve strength is 14,000; about 7,000 youths have received reserve military training.

(d) Organization

Modeled after the French gendarmerie, the Cameroonian Gendarmerie is headquartered in Yaounde and is commanded by a civilian presidential appointee with the title of General Delegate. Responsible to the Minister of Armed Forces, he reports directly to the President on sensitive matters. He is assisted by a uniformed Chief of Staff.
CAMEROON

(1) Designed as a countervailing force for the army, the Gendarmerie's two major subdivisions are the school and the legions. Following basic training at the National Military Training Center, all Gendarmerie candidates report to the Yaounde school to begin a 9-month course. They receive training in tactics, weapons, and rear area control techniques, along with instruction in their peacetime and wartime duties. A typical class consists of 250 to 300 students.

(2) The Gendarmerie's seven legions are headquartered in Yaounde, Douala, Bafoussam, Bertoua, Garoua, Buea, and Bamenda. A legion ranges from 400 to 500 men.

(3) The Republican Guard was formerly a subdivision of the Gendarmerie. It had the sole and unique responsibility of providing protection for the president. The Republic Guard was dissolved following the aborted coup attempt in April 1984. It consisted of ceremonial support including mounted guards, motorcycle escorts, a band, and dismounted guards. Organized and trained to fight as a combat unit, it represented a rather potent military force at the president's disposal. Elements of this force were placed at the disposal of the Commander of the National Gendarmerie, and its equipment was given to the Army Headquarters in Yaounde.

(e) Status of Equipment

(4) Equipment includes 106-mm recoilless rifles, mortars, Milans, and V-150 armored cars. All equipment is believed to be in good condition.

(2) Other

(5) Though not a viable military force, the 3,000-man National Police/Surete could contribute to the country's combat strength. Armed with individual weapons and light machineguns, this force would probably serve as a local defense and rear area security force in the event of mobilization. This force includes one mobile company that acts as an intervention force.

e. Total Military Personnel Strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>6,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gendarmerie</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police/Surete</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 14,300
f. Foreign Military Presence

At least 82 French military advisers are in Cameroon. The following assignments are known:

- Army: 52 (14 officers, 38 NCOs est)
- Navy: 4 (1 officer, 3 NCOs est)
- Air Force: 14 (2 officers, 12 NCOs est, including 9 pilots)
- Gendarmerie: 12 (3 officers, 9 NCOs est)

Seven Chinese military technicians are assigned to Cameroon's Navy.
Withheld pursuant to exemption
(b)(3) 10 USC 424
of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
1. (C) **Political-Military Situation:** The Government of Cape Verde, nominally a republic, is officially run by the African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV), the successor to the African Party for the Independence of Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC). The PAIGC, founded by Amilcar Cabral in 1956 was the party in power in both Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau until 14 November 1980 when a coup occurred in Guinea-Bissau. One of the PAIGC's chief aims had been the unification of both nations; however, differences in political history, orientation, ethnic makeup, and ideological views in both countries nullified hopes for unity. In 1981, Cape Verde changed the name of its ruling party from the PAIGC to the PAICV. Total party membership runs between 3,500 and 4,000, or roughly 1.2 percent of Cape Verde's total population.

In reality, the Government is run by a small group of men who proclaimed independence from Portugal in 1975 after 500 years of Portuguese control. President Pereira and Prime Minister Pires operate as a benign consultative dictatorship and establish policy with the advice of the 9-member Central Committee (Comissao Politica) and the 22 other members who together with the Central Committee comprise the National Council of the PAICV. Although Marxist-oriented, the PAICV is pragmatic in its decision-making. The membership recognizes that even though Cape Verde relied on the Soviets and their allies for military and ideological support in their past struggle for independence, its economic needs require that it associate itself with Western donors. In the early 1980s, Cape Verde publicly announced that it was diversifying its sources of military assistance to include Western donors. Pereira may have made this decision in part to limit Soviet influence among his subordinates. There are groups within the PAICV who would like to see the Government become more democratic, and indications are President Pereira is one of them. He is fostering an exchange with the non-Communist, leftist Portuguese Socialist Party (PS) in Portugal. On the other hand, others within the PAICV still harbor anti-Portuguese sentiments and resent the liaison with such democratic forces as the PS.

Cape Verde's gradual orientation toward the West is highly dependent upon Pereira remaining in power. Under him, the PAICV will likely become more moderate as the country is exposed to democratic political processes, growing Western economic assistance, and possibly some economic ventures involving the private sector. A unique relationship exists between Cape Verde and the West—there are about 40,000 Cape Verdeans living in Portugal and over 200,000 living in the Northeast United States who send remittances to their relatives in Cape Verde. In 1983, Pereira met with US President Reagan and Vice-President Bush during a visit to the United States. The first US Ambassador to Cape Verde arrived in April 1983.

Cape Verde pursues a foreign policy of nonalignment. It is a member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Nonaligned Movement (NAM). Cape Verde tends to vote in international fora with the more "progressive" members of the nonaligned movement, and regionally with its colleagues in the OAU. During 1983, Pereira was Chairman of the Interstate Commission of the fight against drought in the Sahel (CILSS) and of the informal group of the five ex-Portuguese colonies known as the Lusophone states.
CAPE VERDE ISLANDS

Located about 300 miles off the coast of West Africa, Cape Verde is of strategic importance to the West. Much of the West's oil, minerals, and other commodities are transported over the central-south Atlantic sealine of communication in which Cape Verde is situated. Any Soviet anti-SLOC operations in the area could create an economic chokepoint. Cape Verde's Sal Island Airport is also a major transportation center for transatlantic flights originating or terminating in Africa.

In 1983, Cape Verde continued to play an intermediary role in a dialogue between South Africa and Angola by serving as the host country for meetings between the two southern Africa states. In September 1982, Cape Verde hosted the third summit meeting of the five former Portuguese colonies—Cape Verde, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and Sao Tome and Principe.

There is no external threat to Cape Verde. In 1982, a group of Cape Verdean exiles in Portugal founded the Cape Verde League of Human Rights and continue to oppose the PAICV. In 1981, a group of about 100 Cape Verdean workers in the Netherlands attempted to occupy the Embassy of the Republic of Cape Verde in the Netherlands. The workers protested what they termed the undemocratic government in Cape Verde and demanded an elected parliament, an end to corruption and to the pro-Soviet policy of their government. A group of fellow workers in Rotterdam denounced the demonstrators and opined that landowners in Cape Verde were setting up antigovernment political groups abroad to try and usurp the Pereira government. None of the groups abroad are well organized or funded.

Cape Verde has suffered from 16 years of drought, an absence of raw materials, overpopulation, and substantial unemployment. It produces only 10 percent of its food needs yet 80 percent of its population is agriculturally involved. In 1982, the value of imports exceeded exports (tuna, lobsters, bananas, and salt) by a ratio of 40 to 1. Cape Verde relies on remittances from emigrants ($20 million annually from those in the US alone) and international aid to keep its economy afloat. In 1980, its gross National Product was $142 million, or $473 per capita.

The PAICV is ideologically, and to some extent in practice, influenced by ties with the Soviet Union and Cuba. These ties were forged during the extended independence struggle. The Soviet Union now has a resident ambassador in Praia. About 30 Soviet and 20 Cuban military technicians are assisting Cape Verde in developing its small Air Force and Navy. The Soviets have periodically pressed the Government of Cape Verde for formalized access to Cape Verde's main port and airfields to conduct maritime reconnaissance and surveillance in the South Atlantic. So far the Government of Cape Verde has denied the Soviet's request on grounds that such action would conflict with the Government's nonalignment policy. In addition to the Soviets, several Chinese civilian technicians are working on a chancery building and a new national assembly building. The Cubans normally deploy three flights a week through Cape Verde's Amilcar Cabral International Airport on Sal Island en route to Luanda, Angola, and Havana, Cuba. There are also about 15 Cuban medical personnel in Praia and Mindelo. Additionally, a small number of Cuban technical advisers assist in developing Cape Verde's military and security units. There are a few East German technicians working on economic development projects.
CAPE VERDE ISLANDS

(O/NF) In 1981, President Eanes of Portugal and President Pereira met in Cape Verde to further Portugal's relationship with Cape Verde. In the same year, Colonel Honorio Chantre, Cape Verde's Minister of Defense, visited Belgrade, Yugoslavia. Chantre was interested in Yugoslavia's popular defense system. In 1981, France's first resident diplomatic officer arrived in Cape Verde. Portugal provided military uniforms to the Cape Verde military in 1981 and is continuing its efforts to reestablish working relationships with Cape Verde's Forces.

(U) In 1982, Cape Verde agreed to send military personnel to the US for training under the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET). The first Cape Verdean military students are expected to arrive in the US during FY 83. The FY 84 IMET program involves training three officers and eight enlisted men.

(O/NF) Cape Verde has no military equipment production capability. The main supplier of military equipment has been the USSR. Equipment supplied includes patrol boats, APCs, mortars, small arms, trucks, and ammunition. In 1981, the USSR supplied the islands' first aircraft in the form of two An-26 transports. Free World assistance is limited primarily to training of personnel. The value of military assistance by Communist suppliers in the last 6 years totals $65 million.

(O/NF) The People's Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARE) have a threefold mission: to maintain external and internal security; to politicize the population; and to participate in civil and economic development. The Armed Forces are relatively capable of performing their mission.

(O/NF) In 1980, the Government of Cape Verde formalized a rank structure so that former veterans who were government officials could retain nominal control over the Armed Forces. The military is under the direct control of the PAICV. The Chain of Command extends from the President, to the service heads, to the unit commanders.

(O/NF) Armed forces capabilities are hindered by poor logistic systems, inefficient command and control, little combat experience (except for the high military officials who were guerrilla fighters during the independence struggle), the lack of a developed military doctrine and the geographical dispersion of the islands. The Government has no plans to expand its armed forces. It is concentrating on improving the capabilities of its present forces. The acquisition of two An-26 cure transport aircraft has helped maintain links with the ten main islands and five islets that make up the Republic of Cape Verde.

2. (U) Key Officials:
President and Secretary General PAICV: Aristides Pereira
Prime Minister: Pedro Pires
Minister of Defense: Col Honorio Chantre
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Silvino Manuel da Luz
Minister of the Interior: Col Julio de Carvalho
Director of National Security: Eduardo Alinho
Armed Forces Chief of Staff: Agnelo Dantas
Head of Air Force: 1Lt (Position equates to US Air Force Cpt) Jorge Pinto
Head of Navy: Maj Alvara Dantas Tavares
CAPE VERDE ISLANDS

3. (U) **Military Budget:** Total defense expenditures are not released by the Government. However, the 1980 budget showed an estimated expenditure of $15 million US dollars for the Armed Forces. Almost all of Cape Verde's military imports are on a grant basis.

4. (U) **Population:** 300,000 estimated as of 1 July 1984
   Males (ages 15-49): 82,000; physically fit, 48,000; fit for military service
   Ethnic Divisions: About 28 percent African, 70 percent Mulatto, 2 percent European
   Literacy: 14 percent

5. (S/N) **Army:**
   Personnel Strength: 1,800 (estimated 84 officers and 1,716 enlisted men).
   Reserve: Unknown
   Organization and Deployment: The Army is organized into three brigades, which correspond to three military regions, responsible for protecting the islands. Regional headquarters are located at Mindelo, Sal, and Praia. Troops are deployed throughout the islands; however, principal troop locations are at Praia, Mindelo, Tarrafal, and at Sal Airfield.
   Capabilities: The Army is able to maintain internal security. Its capabilities are limited by the same problems confronting the Armed Forces in general.
   Major Equipment: Mortars—unknown, about 24 antiaircraft guns (USSR), SA-7 SAM missiles, 6 BTR-40 (USSR), 17 BRDM-2 (USSR), 10 light tanks.

6. (S/N) **Navy:**
   Personnel Strength: Probably about 100 officer and enlisted personnel.
   Reserve: Unknown
   Ships: Two SHERSHEN patrol craft (PCF) (without torpedo tubes), one BIYA utility craft (AGS).

7. (S/N) **Air Force:**
   Personnel Strength: 10 pilots, only 1 qualified to fly solo.
   Reserve: None
   Aircraft: Two Soviet An-26 used to deploy the FARP to various islands of Cape Verde

8. (C) **Paramilitary:**
   **Militia**
   Personnel Strength: 2,000 (no information available on the number of officers and enlisted men). Members are recruited primarily from among PAICV party adherents. The militia is to be primarily used in the rural areas.
   Reserve: None
   Units: No information available.
   Major Equipment: No information available.

9. (U) **Key US Officials:**
   **Ambassador:** John Yates

(b)(3):50 USC 302a(e)
10. (S/HB) Foreign Military Presence:
Soviet Union: There are 20 Soviet advisers training the Air Force; about 30 are training the Army and Navy.
Cuba: There are 6 to 12 Cuban military and security advisers in Cape Verde.
Cape Verde: There may be 13 Portuguese military advisers in Cape Verde.
Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

1. (U) Political-Military Situation: General of the Army and Chief of the Central African Republic (CAR) Military General Staff, Andre-Dieudonne Kolingba, took power on 1 September 1981, ousting President David Dacko in a bloodless military coup. Upon installing himself as President of the Military Committee for National Recovery, Kolingba suspended the CAR Constitution of 5 February 1981 and banned all political party activities, thus inheriting the results of 15 years of political and economic deterioration.

Since taking over the Government, Kolingba has faced a number of problems. The Cabinet has not developed any kind of internal cohesion, and factionalism based on tribal, regional, and political affiliations appears to be rife. Though the lines of division are not always clearcut, pro-Kolingba and anti-Kolingba groups of Cabinet ministers are evident.

President Kolingba is determined to retain power for the foreseeable future. A return to democratic rule is unlikely in the near term. He appears to have been accepted by the French, who maintain military forces in the CAR. However, there has been opposition to his rule. The degree of loyalty he had retained within the Army is questionable. Public support is fragile, and numerous rumors of general unrest within the Government abound. Any number of Kolingba's military cabinet members or senior Army officers could be considered candidates as contenders for power. This list includes: Justice Minister Yongongo, who may have been involved in a mid-1982 coup attempt and could conceivably try again; Secretary of State for National Defense Lt Col Francois Diallo, who still commands support from his former Gendarmerie charges; and Foreign Minister Gervil-Yombala, who has reportedly offered his services to the Libyans in return for various favors.

In late 1982, the Libyans set up Camp KM 22 with 75 Libyan troops and a variety of small arms and shoulder-fired rocket launchers. Established to train CAR troops in maintenance and deployment of armored equipment, President Kolingba ordered all Libyans to leave the country 6 months after this camp was formed due to a disagreement between the CAR President and Libyan's Col Qadhafi. In June 1983, the Libyan troops left the CAR, after destroying much of the equipment they had brought. Although Libya no longer maintains an official military presence in CAR, the weakness of the CAR Armed Forces allows Qadhafi to use the country as a staging base for operations into Southern Chad.

The French maintain approximately 1,150 troops in the CAR, 800 at Bouar and 350 in Bangui. Since the French provide the vast majority of military aid to the CAR, they are genuinely concerned about the implicit threat to their interests that the Libyan efforts in the CAR represent. The French would intervene if their interests appear to be seriously threatened because Kolingba is unable or unwilling to constrain Libyan activities and influence in the CAR.

Following the successful takeover by President Hussein Habre in Chad, a large number of exiles/refugees fled to the CAR to escape potential reprisals. Currently, 5,000 Chadian refugees and established in various places in the CAR. Most are located along the northern CAR/southern Chadian border, and some live in the capital city, Bangui. An additional 25,000 refugees recently fled to CAR.
after the 17 September Franco-Libyan agreement to withdraw all troop and equipment from Chad. These Chadian refugees are causing no trouble and are observing all local laws and customs. They have no central leader and are nominally armed. In this condition, they present no serious threat to the CAR.

(U) After a decade of political and economic difficulties, the CAR economy appears to be close to reversing a 5-year decline. Following modest economic progress in 1982, a harsh drought in the first half of 1983 damaged crops, upset growing seasons, impeded essential river transportation, and crippled industrial performance. Government estimates indicate a 30-percent loss in light industrial output and a 7-percent decrease in much needed Government revenues. With the return of seasonal rains in May 1983, economic activity rebounded, although overall performance in 1983 fell below pre-drought expectations. Agriculture, animal husbandry, and forestry employ 37 percent of the gross domestic product. The estimated GDP for 1982 was $57.8 million ($269 per capita). Timber, coffee, diamonds, cotton, and tobacco are the CAR's primary products and export earners.

The Army and Gendarmerie continue to be poorly equipped, badly trained, and undermanned. The military agreement with France prohibits French intervention in civil disturbances where the safety of French citizens is not immediately involved. CAR security forces could probably contain a single, localized outbreak in Bangui if they moved quickly enough. They could not handle any degree of generalized or prolonged unrest, particularly if it occurred in outlying areas of the country.

On 9 February 1983, President Kolingba signed a decree dividing the country into military regions; two are operational. Region One, the north-central area, includes the prefectures of Ouham, Ouham-Pende, and Gribingui Economique with headquarters at Bossongoa. Region Two, the northeastern area, includes the prefectures of Vakaga and Bamingui-Bangoran with headquarters in Birao. These regions were created primarily to handle the influx of refugees from Chad. Although created on paper, the trained men and equipment have not yet been supplied. It may be some time before these two military regions are fully operational. President Kolingba has also established an armored squadron under the direct authority of the Chief of State. Troops assigned to this squadron may include some of the personnel that were trained at Camp KM 22.

2. (U) Key Officials:
President, Prime Minister, Minister of Defense and Veterans Affairs, and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces: Gen Andre Kolingba
Secretary of State for Defense and Veteran Affairs: Col Francois Diallo
Minister of Interior: Lt Col Christopher Grelombe
Minister of Foreign Affairs: 2d Lt Clement Michel Nga Gnii-Voueto
Minister of Justice: Maj Gaspard Kalene
Armed Forces: Chief of Staff and Commander of the Army: Gen Andre-Dieudonne Kolingba
Commander of the Air Force: Maj Marcel Ngoudou
Commander of the Gendarmerie: Maj Philippe Blambe
Commander of the Republican Guard: Maj Martin Namennemokokoa
Director General of the Police: Jean Willybiro-Saka
3. (U) Military Budget: (U) $12,180,027 (Army, $7,359,467; National Guard $1,296,814; Air Force, $429,274; unallocated $2,212,282; Paramilitary; $882,196) for fiscal year ending 31 December 1983; this is 14.5 percent of the central government budget. Dollar values converted from Central African Republic francs at an exchange rate of 392.94 francs equal $1.00.*

4. (U) Population: 2,585,000 estimated as of June 1984
Males (ages 15-49): 570,000; physically fit, 295,000
Ethnic Divisions: Approximately 80 ethnic groups, the majority of which have related ethnic and linguistic characteristics: Banda (32 percent) and Baya-Mandjia (29 percent) are the largest single groups; 6,500 Europeans of whom 6,000 are French and the majority of the rest are Portuguese.
Literacy: Estimated at 20 percent

5. (U) Army:
Personnel Strength: 3,200 (no breakout available)
Reserve: The Army has no effective reserve system; however, personnel released from the Armed Forces are required to serve a period in the reserve equal to 15 years (less the time served on active duty).
Combat Units: one parachute intervention regiment with three companies, one territorial defense regiment with four companies**
Major Equipment: 4 BRDM-2 armored cars, a 75-mm gun, 50 Soviet AT grenade launchers, 10 106-mm recoilless rifles, 16 60-mm and 81-mm mortars, and 4 120-mm mortars.***
Ships: Nine river patrol craft (most inoperable), which were formerly part of the now defunct Navy. They currently belong to the riverine company.

6. (U) Navy: Disbanded in 1981, its nine river patrol craft were transferred to the Army.

7. (U/MA) Air Force:
Personnel Strength: 230 (no breakout available; 17 qualified pilots)
Reserve: None
Unit: An air transport/reconnaissance group located in Bangui
Aircraft: 12 total; 7 transport, 2 trainer, and 3 utility craft

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* (U) Latest available information.
** (U) One company each is planned for deployment to Bambarti, Bangassou, Bossangoa, and Berberati, with the regimental HQ to be located at Bambari.
*** (O/MA) The CAR has no military production capability. France is the main supplier of arms to this country. During the past 5 years, France had sold $12.5 million worth of equipment, mostly trucks and armored personnel carriers.
8.  (G)  Paramilitary:
   a. Central African Gendarmerie
   Personnel Strength: 1,600 (no breakout available)
   Reserve: None
   Units: three airfield security companies (130 men each); and two legions, (one
   ground force and one mobile). The ground force legion consists of four
   regional headquarters and a military intelligence unit; each regional
   headquarters has from two to five subordinate units. The mobile legion is
   organized into four squadrons: three are operational, the fourth is an
   augmentation/holding company.
   Major Equipment: None
   b. Central African Republican Guard
   Personnel Strength: 700 (no breakout available)
   Reserve: None
   Units: 60 detachments (5 to 20 men each)*
   Major Equipment: None
   c. Other (National Police)
   Personnel Strength: 1,350 (This organization does not contribute to the
   current combat strength but could serve as a manpower pool or provide local
   security in the event of mobilization.)

9. (U) Key US Officials:
   Chief of Mission: Ambassador Edmund DeJarnette

10. (G)  Foreign Military Presence:
    France: Approximately 1,150 combat troops, and 83 advisers from the 3d Overseas
    Infantry Parachute Regiment (RPIMA) to assist the Armed Forces and Gendarmerie.

    * (G)  Two battalions are planned, one for Bangui and another for pro-
    vincial duty, and will operate under the control of the Gendarmerie.
Withheld pursuant to exemption
(b)(3):10 USC 424
of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
CHAD

1. (S) Political-Military Situation: The political-military crisis in Chad reached international dimensions by the middle of 1983. The Chadian President, Hissène Habré, and his National Armed Forces of Chad (PANT) faced a direct threat from dissident forces of the Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT) headed by former Chadian President, Goukouni Oueddei. At the beginning of June, the GUNT, together with direct Libyan combat support, began their assault by attacking the northern town of Faya Largeau. By July, they advanced south and east to take the town of Abeche and posed a potential threat to the capital, N'Djamena. The PANT counterattacked northward, eventually recapturing Faya Largeau. The loss of Faya by the dissidents precipitated a massive Libyan involvement, which included heavy artillery barrages and airstrikes against the PANT. By mid-August, approximately 1,500 Libyan troops entered Northern Chad and recaptured Faya Largeau, forcing the PANT to retreat southward. At that point, France intervened with 2,000 troops to support Habré and prevent further Libyan and GUNT advances. In essence, a military stalemate has existed since late 1983 with some 6,000 Libyan forces and over 4,000 dissident GUNT forces occupying the northern third of Chad. The current "Redline" of partition is roughly the 16th parallel.

(C) France has officially favored a negotiated settlement between Habré and GUNT elements.* However, Habré has stated that he is opposed to negotiation and the status quo that amounts to a divided Chad, and that he finds a possible sharing of power with Goukouni or a "third man" unacceptable. Therefore, Habré refused to attend an OAU sponsored reconciliation meeting with dissident Chad factions in Addis Ababa in early January. It is uncertain what terms would be acceptable to all the various parties involved in the conflict. A reconciliation conference is being planned at Brazzaville that will provide a forum for all Chadians to resolve their differences. No date has been set for this meeting that will attempt to reunify the country, remove all foreign powers, and regain territorial sovereignty.

(C) Chad continues to be faced with a disrupted economy because of the combat situation. Drought conditions in the north and east continued through 1983 requiring large outlays of food assistance. Southern Chad, the "useful Chad," had a good growing season, however. Economic recovery has been hampered by lack of transportation infrastructure and vehicles, and sporadic border closings by Nigeria has caused often long delays in fuel and relief supplies. Large military expenditures by France and other Western powers has assisted the Chad economy. However, Habré's government still does not regularly meet its payroll on time, and reconstruction taxes imposed on civil servants and businessmen have created considerable discontent.

*(U) On 17 Sep 84, press releases from Paris and Tripoli announced that France and Libya agreed to the "total and concomitant evacuation from Chad of the French Armed Forces and Libyan support elements of the GUNT (Transitional National Union Government) as well as the totality of their respective armaments and equipment." Compliance to terms of this agreement remain to be seen.

15 October 1984
CHAD

Northern Chad, above the 16th parallel, is economically within the Libyan sphere. The area is supplied from Libya and Libyan currency is the only acceptable exchange. The Aozou Strip appears to be firmly in Libyan hands as the Libyans steadily improve their military capabilities. Libyan aircraft, tanks, and mechanized forces are now permanently stationed at a variety of Northern Chad locations, including Faya Largeau, Fada, Gouro, and Ounianga Kebir.

The movement and rotation of men and materiel to occupied areas from southern Libya is continuous. While the Libyans and GUNT dissidents occupy the northern one-third of Chad, their effective control of the region is open to question. The Libyans are attempting to set up local and regional political organizations, and while they have some support from the local Chadian population, it is by no means complete and their degree of control varies from region to region. However, the longer they occupy Northern Chad, the more ensconced they are likely to become.

In addition to their occupation of Northern Chad, the Libyans and GUNT are also encouraging internal conflict in other regions of Chad. They are encouraging several political factions in the ethnically different and more economically viable south not to support Habre's government. Moreover, Goukouni's forces, with Libyan backing, have infiltrated the south with some measure of success, to try and disrupt the government's political and economic reconstruction efforts. As the military stalemate continues along the 16th parallel, Libyan-sponsored dissidents in southern prefectures continue to pose a threat to Habre.

But there is evidence that the security situation in Southern Chad is better than it was in September-October 1983. While Government and dissident troops still intimidate area residents, the number of incidents is fewer than in late 1983. Habre's negotiations with former dissidents in the south has been ongoing for months and agreements with several local commando groups have been reached. One tangible indication of the calmer situation is the marked increase in cotton production during 1983-84 season to levels above what was expected, and to the highest levels since the mid-1970s. The increase in cotton production can be attributed in part, to improved security in the southern countryside. Nevertheless, DIA can expect the Libyans to continue and perhaps increase their support to dissident elements in the south as they seek to undermine the stability and effectiveness of Habre's government.

France intervened in Chad on 10 August 1983 in Operation Manta, a major airlift of men and materiel into N'Djamena. French forces under General Jean Poli established themselves at the 15th parallel, the designated "Redline," acting as a buffer between combatants and a barrier to further Libyan incursions. Since August, the French have brought in large quantities of materiel and provided training to the Chadian Armed Forces. French military assets and men are rotated. French air force assets in Chad include Mirage F-1s and Jaguar fighters based at N'Djamena. The Mirages and Jaguars carry Magic infrared homing missiles. French air defense operates a Crotale Point defense SAM system and has an early warning radar in N'Djamena. Puma helicopters are available at several sites for deployment. Breguet Atlantics maintain
surveillance along the Redline. Boeing C-135 tankers are also employed for aircraft refueling. Following an attack on a FANT outpost on 25 January 1984, French deployed support aircraft encountered rebel fire which resulted in the destruction of one Jaguar and killing of the French pilot. France responded by moving the Redline northward to the 16th parallel. French ground forces' equipment includes Milan AT missiles, vehicle-mounted 20-mm cannons, light armored cars with 90-mm guns and 60-mm mortars. The French forces also have Redeye and Stinger missiles.

Although Libya has provided small arms materiel to GUNT forces, major heavy assets are in the hands of the Libyans themselves. Libya deployed F-1 and Su-22 fighter bombers to Aozou Airport, and in their air attacks against Faya Largeau that took place after 21 July 1983, the Libyans used Mirage F-1, Su-22, Tu-22, and SF-260 aircraft and Mi-24 helicopters. Maintenance problems have resulted in an operational readiness rate of 50 percent or less.

Since the dissolution of the national military force structure in the late 1970s, the armed forces in Chad have been private armies following particular leaders rather than units owing allegiance to the state. President Habre used his private army as the foundation for the current national army. He has had some success in rallying other groups to his units. The Chad Government believes that Army personnel are acquiring a reasonable military foundation and are becoming an asset for national defense. The primary problems facing the Habre forces are shortages of equipment—particularly air defense equipment, antitank weapons, and light motor transportation—severe limitations on maintenance and support functions, and their limited education and military training. The Chadian army—currently estimated at about 7,500—will not be able to defend itself alone against Libyan aggression for the foreseeable future since they are no match for Libyan firepower. However, Habre's forces have demonstrated their ability to defeat GUNT forces when these forces are not supported by the Libyans.

On 24 June 1984, a new political party was formed by President Habre that united several separate political factions. The National Movement for Independence and Revolution (UNIR) is headed by a 80 member Central Committee with real power resting in the hands of the Executive Bureau. Habre was elected President of the Committee and the Bureau.

2. (U) Key Officials:
President Hissein Habre
Foreign Minister: Gouaro Lassou
Minister of Defense: Captain N'Dilinodji Guelhor
Minister of State for Interior and Security: Ibrahim Mahamat Etno
Armed Forces Commander in Chief: Idriss Deby
Army: CPT Gopina Hassan
Air Force: LT Mbaissanbe Morejdi

3. (U) Military Budget: Information not available
4. Population: (estimated) 5,116,000 as of 1 July 1984
Males (ages 15-49): 1,167,000; physically fit, 603,000
Ethnic Divisions: Chad contains over 240 ethnic groups or factions. In addition, it is divided along religious lines. The largely Muslim north and central region contains Arab, Toubou, Fulani, Kotoko, Hausa, Kanembou, and Boulala groups. The South is dominated by Christian and animist Sara factions.
Literacy is estimated at 20 percent.

5. Ground Forces:

Army

The National Armed Forces of Chad (FANT) troop strength is estimated at 7,500. Due to lack of reporting on casualty figures and the rate of assimilation of rallying factions, an accurate assessment is not possible. The arms inventory is likely to be a conglomeration of Soviet (often captured from Libyans and dissidents) and mostly Western-manufactured infantry weapons and small vehicles. France is currently supplying the major portion of training and arms to the FANT. Chad is organized into 10 military zones with sector defense responsibilities. The structure of the Chadian Ground Forces frequently change as dissidents rally to the government and are formed into new units.

Major Units (estimated): 15 Mtz Inf Cos (Separate), 1 105-mm How Btys, 1 Commando Bn, and 2 Armored Recons Sqdns.
Major Equipment (estimated): 10 AML-90, 10 Ferret, 34 VLRA 4x4, 4 105-mm Howitzers, 22 Redeye missiles, 50 106-mm RCLS, 40 89-mm ATRKTL, 10 ATGMs (MILAN), 50 60-mm Mortars, 24 81-mm mortars and over 250 Toyota Land Rovers.

Approximately half the ground forces are located along the 16th parallel maintaining the buffer zone between Libyan/Dissident and Government forces. Specialized forces such as airborne, infantry, and air defense are located in N'djamena for contingency employment anywhere in Chad. The rest of the ground troops are located in the Southern military zones for internal security operations against resident insurgent groups.

6. Air Force:

Personnel Strength: Current reliable information is not available. As of 1 January 1980 there were 280 (30 officers, 80 NCos, 170 EMs). The estimated 13 pilots at that time is the current figure also. Chad's small Air Force can provide only very limited logistic support to the Army. The aircraft are old, and the backbone of the air transport capability is the two C-130As. They do have an air combat capability with 5 Skyraider (AID) Bombers but all aircraft are believed to be grounded at the present time. Flight crew training will likely be the Air Forces priority need.

Reserve: None
Aircraft (estimated): 44 total—5 attack, 14 transport, 8 utility/light observation fixed-wing aircraft (Jet, Turboprop, or Prop), 15 lift support, and 2 utility helicopters. All aircraft are maintained by contract and for the most part remain under French control at N'Djamena Airfield.
7. **Paramilitary:**
While some paramilitary forces may have existed in the past, it is likely that they have been absorbed into the FANT.

8. **Key US Officials:**
Chief of Mission: Ambassador Peter Moffat

9. **Foreign Military Presence:**
- 6,000+ Libyan troops in the North
- 3,000 French forces south of the 16th parallel
- 2,000 Zairian troops in and around the capital
VIIIth held pursuant to exemption

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
1. **Political-Military Situation:** The Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros is comprised of three of the four main islands of the Comoran Archipelago. The fourth island, Mayotte, at the time of independence voted to remain a French Territory. However, the Republic still lays claim to Mayotte. The Constitution adopted by popular referendum in 1978 set up a federal system that elected governors for each island and the President. Constitutional revisions in late 1983, however, gave the President power to appoint governors for each island at the end of their current term. The islands do retain autonomy in matters not assigned by the Constitution to the federal institutions of the presidency and Council of Government, the Federal Assembly and the Supreme Court. The Federal Assembly, directly elected, is the legislative branch of the government. Another constitutional revision lifted the ban on political parties and established a single legal party, the Comoran Union for Progress (UCP). Recent constitutional amendments significantly strengthened the President's position. His decision to stand for re-election in September 1984 for another 6-year term (which he won) may have in part been influenced by what he perceives as power to hold the country together. President Abdallah is reported in bad health and may not be able to serve out his second 6-year term. To date Abdallah has not chosen a successor and any constitutional solution would very likely be contested. If Abdallah leaves office, the Comoros would immediately dissolve into political chaos. The country would divide and political pressure would increase from both domestic leftist elements and extreme Islamic and Communist groups formed among Comoran exiles in Mozambique, Tanzania, Kenya, and France.

The Republic of the Comoros has in the past been the scene of much political rivalry. On 6 July 1975, the Comoran Chamber of Deputies voted unilaterally to declare independence from France for three of the four Comoran islands. Two days later, Ahmed Abdallah Abderamane, a wealthy landowner and politician from Anjouan island, was elected the country's first president. In August 1975, less than 1 month after independence, a coalition of island opposition parties staged a coup against Abdallah, who was exiled to Paris, and handed power to a National Executive Council headed by a new strongman, Ali Soilih. On 13 May 1978, this government was ousted in a coup by a group of foreign mercenaries (whose most notorious member was the Frenchman Bob Denard) that put Ahmed Abdallah in power with his close associate Mohammed Ahmed as a dual presidency in a Political-Military Directorate. This Directorate was disbanded in 1978 because the French mercenaries associated with the Presidency undermined its legitimacy, however, Abdallah retained control as the only candidate in a national referendum and was elected president for 6-six year term. By early 1982, most French mercenaries were forced to leave the country under pressure from the Organization of African Unity, and only a few remain to advise local security forces.

In the 1974 independence referendum and again in 1976, the inhabitants of the island of Mayotte, the fourth island in the Comoros cluster, voted in favor of retaining ties with France. The inhabitants of Mayotte not only wanted to retain French ties but wanted full departmental status. France subsequently granted Mayotte the status of "special territorial collective," which is between that of a department and an overseas territory. France currently maintains approximately 100 policemen on Mayotte and 250 Foreign Legionnaires. The French
COMOROS ISLANDS

Parliament passed a bill on 6 December 1979 extending the special status of Mayotte. The islanders will continue to vote every 5 years on maintaining their present status. The United Nations, however, has passed a resolution to reaffirm the Comoros' sovereignty over the island and has called on France to continue negotiations between the two countries over the status of Mayotte. France refuses to be bound by the UN resolution. The Government of the Comoros continues to demand Mayotte's inclusion in the Republic of the Comoros, to the discomfort of the French. The Mayorais populace, however, has made no attempt to change its situation. While the islands have suffered economic stagnation and depression, the economy of Mayotte has continued to prosper under the French. A referendum on the island's future status is scheduled for 1985.

The return of Mayotte to the Comoros is an obsession with President Abdallah. In August 1984 when he announced his plans to stand for another Presidential term, he pledged that the island of Mayotte would be brought back into the fold of the Comorran nation. However the prospect for the speedy return of Mayotte to the Comoros Government is dim. The Comoran President has offered the French Navy the use of Anjouan and a long-term defense agreement that would insure a French presence in the region in return for Mayotte. Abdallah apparently realizes that a lengthy period of negotiation prior to a final agreement with France can be anticipated. The President hopes that France does not hold a referendum on Mayotte in 1985 because it will be binding until 1990. One sore point remains as a serious stumbling block—the Mayorais believe that their economic well being and high standard of living will be jeopardized by incorporation into the Republic.

Aside from the Mayotte issue, the present government has had an amicable relationship with France, and their relations have continued to improve through 1983. As head of a European consortium, the French began construction in mid-1983 of Comoros' first deepwater port. The 210-meter wharf at Mutsamudu, on Anjouan Island, when completed, will accommodate ships with 9-meter drafts. Work is scheduled for completion in early 1985. Monies are being provided by various Arab and African development funds. In November 1983, in a related development, the two governments established a joint Franco-Comoro Commission to deal with bilateral issues. Following the Commission's first meeting the same month, France announced plans to double its bilateral aid to the Comoros and assume exclusive responsibility for Comoran defense. The French participation in the port construction is viewed as a prelude to this decision. Since the Comoros has no inherent capability to produce military equipment, France, as the country's sole military supplier, has given the country $2.5 million worth of trucks and armored vehicles since 1978. The Comoros has maintained a security agreement and a technical assistance accord with France since Abdallah regained power in 1978. The agreements provide for French military intervention, if requested by the Comoran Government and approved by French authorities, and for French advisers to train the national armed forces.

Apart from his relations with France, President Abdallah continues to seek international support. He has encouraged increased relations with the West, and has made repeated appeals for American presence and assistance to the Comoros. Abdallah has tried to promote US interest in the Comoros with offers of
military access. He also expects his relations with other foreign governments, and, in particular, African nations, to continue to improve. Although President Abdallah denies any diplomatic accords exist with South Africa, privately he has admitted to an excellent working relationship with South Africans. This relationship includes financial and arms assistance for his presidential guard, as well as landing rights at Moroni airfield for South African Airways 747s. The South Africans gained landing rights in July 1983 in exchange for paying all costs to extend the runway at Moroni.

The Comoros was not allowed to have representation at the OAU conference in Khartoum in 1978 but was readmitted to the organization in February 1979 after the departure of some of the foreign mercenaries. The government fosters close relationships with the more conservative (and oil-rich) Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, and Oman, and has been on friendly terms with China. The Chinese have provided consistent aid over the years and apparently wish to maintain contact with the Comoros to counterbalance growing Indian and Soviet influence in the Indian Ocean.

The Comorans consider themselves nonaligned, having attended the Non-Aligned Summit in Havana in August-September 1979. The country has been less than enthusiastic, however, over Seychelles President France Albert Rene's proposal to unify the "progressive" forces of the Indian Ocean.

Since the Soviet military ouster from Somalia in November 1977, Moscow has made continuous overtures to the Comoros for improved military relations, and, more specifically, for anchoring privileges. A nonresident Soviet ambassador was accredited to the Comoros in 1978. Since early 1983, the Soviets offered over 315 scholarships and TASS offered its wire service to Radio Comoros.

In addition, the Soviets have recently offered to fill all Comoran POL storage tanks twice and to construct a fish processing plant. Since mid-July the Soviet Ambassador has visited Abdallah at least four times. Although Abdallah has repeatedly refused Soviet aid he could possibly accept a few of the proffered scholarships. US Embassy reports that the President wants to assuage the fears of those ministers who feel he is antagonizing the Soviets by not accepting at least some of their gifts.

Comoran security forces are tasked with maintaining internal security and defending national borders. They include the Comoran Armed Forces (FAC) (an army), the Federal Gendarmerie and the Presidential Guard. The military balance that currently exists between these forces has not altered in the past year. There is no national service or draft, nor is there a shortage of recruits due to the poor economic conditions of the country. The Presidential Guard, a mercenary-led unit under direct presidential control, is considered more than a match for the other two armed forces. It remains the best trained and best equipped of local security forces. It has the only heavy weapons, with the exception of two 81-mm mortar assigned to the FAC. Without the Presidential Guard, the country would be in a continuous state of factionalized fighting between cliques vying for power. The Presidential Guard could be expected to
handle any internal uprising against the central government. The Presidential
Guard is in the process of being expanded by 50 men (Comoran) and 5 white
mercenaries. They will form a company to be stationed permanently on the island
of Anjouan providing a security guard detachment at Anjouan/Ouani Airport, the
President's hometown of Domoni, and the radio station that provides interisland
communications. This unit may also be expanded to provide post security when the
new port at Mutsamudu is completed in December 1984. However, the Comoros faces
no significant internal or external threat at this time. The Comoros has no
military equipment production capability; the majority of its weapons are
supplied by France.

(U) The Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros is among the poorest
countries in the world (per capita income was estimated at US dollars 310 in
1981), and is considered by the United Nations to be one of the least developed
countries. The Comoros is predominantly a rural economy. Agriculture occupies
the majority of the people (over 80 percent of the population lives in rural
areas) and accounts for about 42 percent of the gross domestic product. They are
the world's largest producers of ylang-ylang perfume essence and the second
largest producer of vanilla. Ylang-ylang, vanilla, cloves, and copra account for
99 percent of the Comoros export earnings. The industrial sector centers largely
on crop processing and handicrafts, and accounts for only 5 percent of GDP. Total GDP amounted to $90 million in 1981 or $230 per capita.

2. (U) Key Officials:
President: Ahmed Abdallah
Prime Minister: Ali Mroudjae
Chief of Staff and Commander of the Forces Armees Comoriennies (FAC): Commandant
Ahmed Mohamed
Commander of the National Gendarmerie: Captain Abdoulhamid Abourazakou

3. (U) Military Budget: (most current information available) $2,920,000 for
fiscal year ending 31 December 1981; 16 percent of the central government budget,
and 3 percent of GNP. Dollar value converted from Comoran francs at the exchange
rate of 225 francs equal $1.00.

4. (U) Population: 455,000 estimated as of July 1984
Males (age 15-49): 102,000; physically fit, 60,000
Ethnic Divisions: Mixture of Arab, Malay, and Negroid

5. (C) Army:
Personnel Strength: 450
Combat Units: The headquarters for the FAC is on Grande Comore. The combat
units consist of three companies located on Grande Comore, Anjouan, and Moheli.
The mobility of the FAC is severely hampered due to lack of interisland
transportation and poor vehicle maintenance. Only 30 percent of assigned
transport is operational due to lack of parts.
COMOROS ISLANDS

Equipment: Four ACMAT VLRA reconnaissance/liaison vehicles, 15 land rovers, 2 81-mm mortars, 500-600 small arms (including 30 caliber rifles, 400 Chinese types SKS rifles, 9 AA-52 30 caliber light machineguns, 2 AA-52 ground mounted 50 caliber heavy machineguns, and 100 M.A.B. P15 pistols), 40 Cournil SAMO trucks, 20 Peugeot 404 light trucks, 4 Saviem SM-8 heavy trucks. The SKSs are in reserve in an armory on Grande Comore and used for the training of recruits. The pistols are issued to the headquarters staff and officers.


7. (G) Air Force: Comoros has no Air Force. A nominal Army Air Arm was established in 1977 with supposed delivery of three Siai-Marchetti SF 260W Warriors (ground attack) from Italy for the light strike role, followed by an order for five SF S-Marchetti 260C (fighter trainers) in 1978. These aircraft, however, reportedly were stopped short in Djibouti by the French and never arrived. No record is available for alleged presence of C-47 Dakota and Emb-110 Bandeirante given by Brazil to the Comoros in 1979. At present the Comoran Air Arm maintains an Air Comoros F-27 Friendship (piloted by French pilots on contract) and the presidential aircraft, a Cessna 402B (piloted by a retired French Air Force major).
Aircraft: One F-27 Friendship short range transport, and one Cessna 402B utility aircraft.

8. (G) Paramilitary:
   a. Gendarmerie
   Personnel Strength: 325. Performs police duties such as guarding government buildings and assisting the Army in controlling civil disorders.
   Equipment: The Gendarmerie is armed with various types of small arms, including Chinese SKS rifles and M.A.B. P15 pistols.
   b. Presidential Guard:
   Personnel Strength: 450 troops and 25-35 mercenaries. The number of foreign mercenaries fluctuates depending on the number on leave or in South Africa on training courses. The Presidential Guard performs guard duty at the Presidential residence, airport, radio station, and other key points. They are stationed only on Grande Comore.
   Equipment: 20-30 land rovers (10 with Chinese 51 caliber heavy machineguns), 6 106-mm recoilless rifles, SIG 7.62-mm rifles, AK-47 assault rifles, RPG-2/7 rocket launchers, various types of small arms, and numerous Renault IV trucks.

9. (U) Key US Officials:

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)
10. **Foreign Military Presence:**

* a. **Foreign Military In-Country**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6 Army to train infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14 Gendarmerie to train/assist Gendarmerie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 retired Air Force major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>civilian contracted to fly/maintain Cessna 402B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>25-35</td>
<td>Mercenaries command the Presidential Guard (French, Belgium, South Africa, British, and Swiss)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* b. **Presence Abroad**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>armed forces officers were receiving training at French military schools as of February 1982.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>NCO air trainees</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. GOVERNMENT
   a. Key Government Officials ........................................... 1
   b. Type and Stability of Government .................................. 1
   c. Internal Threat ........................................................ 2
   d. External Threat ........................................................ 2
   e. Communist Threat ....................................................... 3
   f. Economic Factors ....................................................... 3
   g. Military and Political Alignment .................................... 4
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   a. Key Military Officials .................................................. 5
   b. Position of the Armed Forces ........................................ 5
   c. Military Trends and Capabilities .................................... 5
   d. Military Budget .......................................................... 5
   e. Population ............................................................... 5

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   b. Navy ......................................................................... 9
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   e. Total Military Personnel Strength ................................... 14
   f. Foreign Military Presence ............................................. 14

APPENDIX

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1. GOVERNMENT

a. (U) Key Government Officials

President of the Republic, Chief of State, Minister of Defense, President of the Council of Ministers, and President of the Congolese Labor Party Central Committee: Colonel Denis Sassou-Nguesso
Prime Minister: Ange-Edouard Poungui
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation: Antoine Ndinga Oba
Secretary General of the Political Bureau: Camille Bongou

b. Type and Stability of Government

The People's Republic of the Congo became independent in August 1960 under a French-oriented government headed by President Abbe Youlou. This regime, riddled with nepotism and corruption, was overthrown in 1963 by Alphonse Massamba-Debat. Under the new National Movement of the Revolution (MNR) and Prime Ministers Noumazalaye and Lissouba, the Government pursued an official, but ineffective, policy of "scientific socialism." Massamba-Debat's regime was plagued with uncontrollable youth militia groups that were given to harassment of citizens and foreigners. During this time, the US closed its embassy. In effect, the US suspended relations with the Congo for 13 years because of violations of American rights of legation.

Captain Marien Ngouabi staged a military coup d'etat in August 1968. Named as Chief of State on 31 December 1968, Ngouabi maintained firm control over the country for 9 years. Well liked and respected by his people, he became the Congo's preeminent national hero. He proclaimed Africa's first People's Republic and created the Congolese Labor Party (Parti Congolais Du Travail--PCT). Ngouabi's rise to power signaled the ascendancy in Congolese politics of northern military elements over the more numerous, traditionally favored, ethnic groups of the South. This dominance continues today under the guise of consolidation of the socialist revolution.

Under Ngouabi, the Congo followed a leftist course on domestic and foreign policy issues. Greater Soviet influence developed during this time, and both the Soviets and Cubans used the facilities of the country in support of their activities in Angola during the mid-1970s. Ngouabi was assassinated in March 1977 under circumstances never fully explained. He was succeeded by Colonel (later General) Joachim Yhomby-Opango. Suspected of corruption, Yhomby-Opango was accused by the left of insincerity as a Marxist. Moreover, he incurred Soviet displeasure by courting the West and by not permitting the USSR to establish a naval base at Pointe Noire. Yhomby-Opango was removed from office by the PCT central committee in February 1979 and replaced by the present Head of State, Colonel Denis Sassou-Nguesso.
Under President Sassou-Nguesso, the Congo continues to pursue a socialist doctrine. Nevertheless, the President is pragmatic, leaving much of the economy in private hands, particularly French firms. In addition, the Congo has remained in the Franc Economic Zone. Domestically, his position is reasonably solid despite the country's political fragmentation, caused by the traditional north/south hostilities. Moreover, he must keep an eye on leftist hardliners.

The PCT Congress, which meets every 5 years, convened 27-31 July 1984. During this Congress, Sassou-Nguesso pushed through structural reforms that gave him a great deal more decision autonomy. The Party Congress expanded the number of positions in the government's decisionmaking bodies: the Chamber of Ministers has 27 ministers, the Political Bureau has 13 members, and the Central Committee has 75 members. The Congress also selected new members to the Central Committee and to the Political Bureau, ousting several who were opposed to Sassou-Nguesso's leadership. Sassou-Nguesso retained his positions as Chief of State and President of the Central Committee, of the Political Bureau, and of the Council of Ministers. For the first time the Congress elected Sassou-Nguesso as Head of Government. This position gives him control of the cabinet and leaves the Prime Minister with little power. Decisionmaking is more solidly consolidated in the hands of a small group of northerners, most from Sassou-Nguesso's M'Bochi ethnic group.

c. Internal Threat

The prominence of north-south rivalries in internal Congolese politics is a recurring theme. Subversive activities by dissidents from these regions include bombings at the Brazzaville airport, attempted kidnapings, arson, and destruction of public property. These groups do not currently pose a serious threat to the Sassou-Nguesso government.

d. External Threat

Prior to 1980, the Congo had been virtually isolated from the other Central African countries, except Angola, because of the Congo's socialist stand. Economic necessities, however, dictated that the Congo develop a rapport with other countries in the region and with the West. In this regard, the Congo stressed prior to and at the 1983 UDEAC (Economic and Customs Union of Central Africa) meeting held in Bangui the necessity for the Central African states to increase cooperation in all areas and to demonstrate solidarity on political issues of concern to the region.

Congo's relations with its neighbors have steadily improved due to Sassou-Nguesso's efforts to put his neighbors at ease over a "progressive state" in their midst. Cameroon and Congo have mutually upgraded their diplomatic missions to the level of Ambassador, and a continued atmosphere of good will exists between the two countries. Congolese-Nigerian relations have improved, as evidenced by the assignment of the first Nigerian Ambassador to Brazzaville. Relations with Gabon and the Central Africa Republic have also been strengthened.
Relations between Zaire and the Congo have historically been strained primarily due to the personal contempt Congolese leaders have had for Zairian President Mobutu's corruption and dictatorial ruling style. The increased relations between Zaire and Israel have further strained these relations.

e. Communist Influence

The Sassou-Nguesso regime considers itself nonaligned. Certain actions now make this a more realistic assessment than in the past. The Congo no longer feels constrained to side with the Soviets on every international issue or obligated to meet every request made for use of Congolese territory. Although Sassou-Nguesso visited Moscow in 1981, he did so only after repeated postponements caused by disagreements over how the Soviet-Congolese relationship would evolve. Once there, he signed a friendship treaty that is the softest the Soviets have negotiated in the Third World. The Congolese have resisted Soviet pressures for base rights at the Pointe Noire port facility, and for use of Maya Maya Airfield at Brazzaville. The Soviets are permitted access to these facilities on an extremely limited basis. The Congolese also declined a provision in the treaty that would have allowed the two countries to come to each other's defense in times of emergency. During the 1981 visit, the Congolese were apparently successful in securing a Soviet pledge for $50 million in low interest economic and military assistance over the next 5 years.

In the international arena, Sassou-Nguesso has refused to follow unquestioningly the Moscow-requested line in voting on Soviet-related issues in international organizations. To avoid a direct confrontation, the Congo abstained on the two United Nations General Assembly resolutions condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. For the most part, however, the Congo can be expected to maintain "socialist solidarity" on votes in such fora. Although the Soviets are occasionally nervous about Congolese economic ties with the West, they accept and perhaps even encourage these ties, as long as the Congo maintains its Marxist orientation and looks predominantly to Moscow for its defense needs.

In addition, Cuba deploys about 2,000 troops in the Congo. While 1,200 are on leave from Angola, the remaining 800 troops are utilized within the military structure as advisers and technicians.

f. Economic Factors

Oil production is the basis of economic development in the Congo and accounts for 70 percent of the export earnings. A major portion of the government's development plans is directed toward increasing the Congo's transportation network and building an economic infrastructure. The mining sector remains in a somewhat depressed state as a result of mismanagement of its lead, zinc, copper, gold, and potash deposits. Currently Congolese industries produce soap, beer, soft drinks, cigarettes, textiles, cement, wood products, refined petroleum products, and boots. The Congolese agricultural sector is still rudimentary, producing perfume oils, vanilla, copra, and cloves for export. Congolese gross domestic product was estimated at $1.8 billion in 1981 ($1,140 per capita).
g. Military and Political Alignment

The former M-22 movement may be a key factor in present Congolese politics. Many of this group's former members, some of whom were imprisoned or fled into exile under Ngouabi, currently occupy key positions in the president's cabinet and in Congolese politics. The original nucleus of this group was pro-Chinese and elitist. In fact, after taking office, Sassou-Nguesso visited China and has since gained significant economic and military assistance from the PRC.

The Congo has also increased its contacts with members of the European Economic Community (EEC), notably France, West Germany, and the US. The result is an increase in aid and private sector ties with the West. Western business interests and activities in the Congo have increased markedly, reflecting the Congo's oil revenues and desire to develop its economy.

The denial of access rights, the votes on Afghanistan, and increased relations with China and the West have occasionally put strains on the Congo's relationship with the Soviets. The Congo's posture, however, is consistent with its desire to become more truly nonaligned and not be seen as political puppets of the Soviet Union or an economic extension of France.

h. (U) Key US Officials

Chief of Mission (Brazzaville): Ambassador Alan W. Lukens

* (U) The first appointed resident took permanent residence in February 1983.
2. MILITARY, GENERAL

a. (U) Key Military Officials

Armed Forces: Chief of Staff: Col Emmanuel Elenga
Army: Commander, Col Emmanuel Elenga
Army: Chief of Operations, Henri Eboundi
Navy: Commander, CDR Jean-Felix Ongouya
Air Force: Chief of Staff, Maj Leon-Charles Kouta-Bongo
People’s Militia: Director, Lt Michel Ngakala
Military Intelligence: Director, Capt Gilbert Mokoki

b. Position of the Armed Forces

The Congolese military is the largest and best organized government entity within the Government of the Congo. Military officers hold top government positions and are represented at all levels of the Congolese Labor Party (PCT). As the party’s right arm, the military insures its survival. The military maintains a good relationship with the populace and is the basis for Government stability.

c. Military Trends and Capabilities

The military has improved its capabilities over the past few years by procuring new artillery and armored vehicles from Communist sources and by sending personnel for technical training to East Germany, China, the USSR, and Cuba. Military deliveries from communist suppliers over the past 6 years are valued at $170 million.

d. Military Budget

The military budget was $69 million for fiscal year ending 31 December 1983; this is 10.7 percent of the central government budget. No service allocations are available. Dollar value converted at an exchange rate of 393 francs equal $1.00.

e. (U) Population

1,745,000 estimated as of 1 June 1984
Males (ages 15-49): 386,000; physically fit, 194,000
Ethnic Divisions: About 15 ethnic groups divided into some 75 subgroups, almost all are Bantu-speaking; most important ethnic groups are Kongo (48 percent) in the south, Teke (7 percent) in the center, M’Bochi (12 percent) and Sangha (20 percent) in the north; about 8,500 Europeans, mostly French.
Literacy: More than 50 percent
3. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

a. Army

(1) Mission

The mission of the Congolese Army is to defend the national territory and maintain internal security.

(2) Capabilities

While the Army is the key actor within the governmental structure and exerts strong influence over all facets of Congolese life, its combat capability is severely limited. This restricted capability is due to poor maintenance of equipment and lack of military training for the average soldier. Though it would not be an effective fighting force against determined external aggression, the Army is the most cohesive organization in the country.

(3) Personnel Strength

Estimated at 7,000 (no further breakdown available)

(4) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

The Army chain of command extends from the Minister of Defense through the Armed Forces Chief of Staff and the Chief of Staff of the Ground Army to the Autonomous Zone commander and the six military region commanders. Headquarters for the six military regions are located in the following cities: Pointe Noire, Loubomo, Gamboma, Owando, Ouesso, and Impfondo. Brazzaville is headquarters for the Autonomous Zone. Most ground troops are based in Brazzaville and Pointe Noire.

(b) Ground Combat Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Tactical Units</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mechanized Infantry Battalion</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Artillery Battalion</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defense Artillery Battalion</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armor Battalion</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer Battalion</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parachute Battalion</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Battalion</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Battalion</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signals Company</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONGO

(c) Army Aviation Units

None. All aircraft are operated by the Air Force.

(d) Deployment

The most significant troop concentration, located at Brazzaville, includes four regiments and one battalion. The Third Regiment includes two mechanized infantry battalions with three companies each. It also includes a support battalion, a security battalion, and a signals company; these are detached throughout Brazzaville and the six military regions. The Support Battalion is divided into the barracks, workshop, financial, and quartermaster sections. Together, these four sections are called Garrison Services. The Artillery Regiment includes the air defense artillery battalion and the field artillery battalion. The Airborne Regiment has at least one parachute company. Brazzaville also has an armored regiment and an engineer battalion.

Pointe Noire also has a high troop concentration. It has two regiments, the Armor Regiment and the Artillery Regiment. Its mechanized infantry battalion has two companies. It also has an airborne infantry company, a signals group and a support group.

The remaining five military regions are sparsely manned with an infantry company, a signal group, and a support group.

(5) Weapons and Equipment

(a) General

The Congolese Army receives most of its military equipment from the Soviet Union. The Soviets and Congolese signed their most current military arms agreement in mid-1982. The Congolese Government has not been pleased with the old, obsolete, and rebuilt equipment the Soviets have offered; it has begun seeking out new sources of military assistance, including France, China, and the US. The Congo has no indigenous capability for producing arms or equipment.

(b) Ground Weapons and Equipment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mortars: Mortars, various calibers</td>
<td>UR, CH</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONGO

Rkt Lchrs (RL) Country of Origin Total Inventory
and Rcl Rifles:
MRL, 140 mm, BM-14 UR 69
MRL, 122-mm, BM-21 UR 10

Artillery:
FA, hows, 122-mm, NFI UR 8
FA, hows, 105-mm, NFI UR 2
FA, 100-mm, NFI CH 10
ADA, 57-mm, S-60 UR 6
ADA, 37-mm, M1939 UR 28
AA, towed twin 40-mm, NFI UR 4
AA, towed quad 14.7-mm, NFI UR 4
AA, towed 85-mm, NFI UR 6
AA, 100-mm, KS-19 UR 2
AT, 100-mm, towed, NFI UR 13
AT, 57-mm, NFI UR 4

Armor:
Tank, T-54 UR 17
Tank, PT-76 UR 4
APC, BTR-152 UR 38
APC, BTR-60 UR 8
ARV, BRDM-2 UR 24+

(U) Aircraft: None

(6) Logistics

(U) No information available.

(7) Personnel Procurement and Retention

(U) In 1982 the National Assembly of Congo adopted a law requiring national service of every male reaching the age of majority, considered to be 18 years of age. President Sassou-Nguesso stated "the law requires every citizen of legal age to set aside a period of his life to the defense and development of his country." The law did not clarify whether a young Congolese will have the option to choose military or nonmilitary national service.

(U) The Congolese military is currently an all-volunteer service. The military volunteers have a 4-year obligation; the gross majority remain after completing their obligation as military pay is much better than civilian pay.

(8) Training

(U) A large Congolese Army base at Makola, 30 km east of Pointe Noire, is set aside for the training of Congolese recruits. Basic and some specialized training is conducted at this base. Approximately 1,500 troops
CONGO

undergo training at one time. Though several Cuban advisers are stationed here, the Congolese conduct most of the training.

The Congo has been trying to upgrade the professional capabilities of its troops by sending them to various countries for specialized training. Since December 1981, 500 Congolese military personnel have received unspecified training in France, approximately 300 in Moscow, and smaller numbers in East Germany, Romania, Algeria, and Cuba. After offering a number of scholarships to the Congolese, China began training Congolese military personnel in Beijing in 1982.

(9) Reserves and Mobilization

(b) Reserves

(U) No information available.

(b) Mobilization

Specific mobilization plans are unknown. Mobilization capacity is limited by both a shortage of trained personnel and basic military equipment.

b. Navy

(1) Mission

The mission of the Congolese Navy is to defend the national territory and maintain internal security.

(2) Capabilities

The Congolese Navy has marginal combat capabilities. It is limited by inadequate maintenance, lack of spare parts, and dependence on foreign assistance for repair of vessels.

The Coastal Patrol Squadron maintains security of the offshore drilling operations and projects a Congolese presence vis-a-vis the Cabinda enclave. The River patrol Squadron is responsible for interdiction of smugglers and projects a Congolese presence on the Congo-Zaïre frontier.

(3) Personnel Strength

Approximately 385 (85 officers, 300 enlisted).
(4) **Ship and Aircraft Strength**

(a) **Ships**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Operational</th>
<th>Nonoperational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fast Patrol Craft</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol Craft</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol Boat</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>River Patrol Boat</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Warfare Craft</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yard and Service Craft</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) **Aircraft**

(U) None. All aircraft are assigned to the Air Force.

(5) **Organization and Deployment**

(a) **General Service**

(U) The Congolese Navy is organized into two squadrons. The coastal patrol squadron is located at Pointe Noire; the river patrol squadron is located at Brazzaville. Authority extends from the Minister of Defense through the Commander of the Congolese Navy to the two naval base commanders.

(b) **Marine Corps**

(U) None.

(c) **Naval Air Arm**

(U) None.

(6) **Status of Equipment**

(U) Of the 26 craft, 19 are reportedly operational. The three SHERSHENs are believed to be in extended drydock due to powerplant problems and propeller unit damage; one PIRANA and the three POLUCHAT-1 patrol boats are non-operational.

(7) **Logistics**

(U) Congolese POLUCHAT and SHERSHEN patrol boats are being overhauled on the end-haul marine railway at Pointe Noire's small shipyard. Several shipyards in Brazzaville can service the riverine fleet. Maritime units seldom operate outside of port and suffer from spare parts shortages and poorly trained maintenance personnel.
(8) **Personnel Procurement and Retention**

(U) See paragraph 3.a.(7).

(9) **Training**

(PR) Most Congolese naval officers are Soviet trained, and some receive training in France. Selected enlisted personnel have been trained in France, Spain, and the PRC.

(10) **Reserves and Mobilization**

(a) **Reserves**

(U) No information available.

(b) **Mobilization**

(U) No information available.

c. **Air Force**

(1) **Mission**

(PR) The mission of the Air Force is to defend the national territory and maintain internal security.

(2) **Capabilities**

(PR) The Congolese Air Force is capable of providing some aerial surveillance and troop transport. While capable of maintaining internal security, the Air Force probably could not defend the national territory from external aggression.

(3) **Personnel Strength**

(PR) 325 (25 officers, 150 NCOs, and 150 EM)

(4) **Aircraft Strength**

(PR) 38 (12 MiG 21s, 5 MiG 17s, 2 MiG 15s, 3 intermediate-range transports, 8 short-range transports, 1 utility aircraft, and 7 helicopters)

(5) **Organization and Deployment**

(a) **General**

(PR) The Congolese Air Force is organized into two mixed units. Most aircraft are assigned to the Maya Maya Airfield in Brazzaville, and a few are assigned to Pointe Noire Airfield. Aircraft periodically deploy to airfields at Djambala, Impfondo, Loubomo, Ouesso, and Owando.
(b) **Summary of Units**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazzaville</td>
<td>MiG-21/FISHBED</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MiG 21/MONGOL</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>An-26</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>An-24 V/RV COKE</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>An-24RT/COKE</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Il-14T/CRATE</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nord 262C</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nord 2501 Noratlas</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cessna 310 ROMEO</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mi-8P/HIP</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mi-8T/HIP</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alouette III</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pointe Noire</td>
<td>MiG-21/FISHBED</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MiG-17/FRESCO C</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MiG-15/FAGOT</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alouette II</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) **Status of Equipment**

Of the 43 aircraft in the Congolese Air Force, 15 units are operational. Of the 12 MiG-21s at Brazzaville, 7 units are flown occasionally; the rest are kept in hangars. The four MiG-21s at Pointe Noire were delivered in January 1984; all are fully assembled and undergoing ground testing. The An-26, one An-24 V/RV, one Nord 2501, the Norad 262C, one Mi-8T, and the Alouette III are the sole operational units. Most aircraft have gone well beyond their normal service life, and attempts to maintain operability are further frustrated by spare part shortages and poorly trained maintenance personnel.

(7) **Logistics**

(U) No information available.

(8) **Personnel Procurement and Retention**

(U) See paragraph 3.a.(7)

(9) **Training**

(U) No information available.
CONGO

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

(U) No information available.

(b) Mobilization

(U) Approximately six civil transport aircraft with a gross takeoff weight of 9,000 kg are currently registered, owned, and operated by two civil air companies in the Congo. These include four medium-range transports (one ATL-98 CARVIR, one Boeing 727-200, one Boeing 737-200C, and one C-54/DC-4 SKYMASTER) and two short-range transports (one F-27-600 FRIENDSHIP and one F-28-1000 FELLOWSHIP)

(U) The number of licensed civilian pilots of major transport aircraft in the Congo is unknown.

Virtually all of the Congo's civil aircraft and indigenous civilian aviation personnel could be mobilized in the event of war or comparable national emergency. Without considerable foreign assistance, the lack of fully qualified, indigenous flight and maintenance personnel would prevent maximum effective use of the mobilized aircraft.

d. Paramilitary Forces—National People's Militia

(1) Mission

(C/TA) The mission of the National People's Militia is to perform light internal security duties to include combating counter-revolutionaries, saboteurs, rumor-mongers, detractors, and reactionaries. The Militia provides manning for roadblocks and checkpoints, checks identification papers, and guards work sites.

(2) Capabilities

(3/TA) Although the militia in theory provides certain members of the Congolese political elite with a personal armed force to intervene in a political crisis, in practice the militia could not hope to stand against the regular army troops of the APN in any sort of military confrontation.

(3) Strength

(U) 4,700 (no further breakdown)

(4) Organization

(3/TA) The militia is subject to supervision of various party members. The militia is essentially a decentralized organization composed of four separate corps: the workers militia corp reports to the Congolese Labor Union; the youth militia corp reports to the Union of Socialist Congolese Youth; the Urban militia corp reports to the appropriate city and borough mayor; and
the rural militia corp reports to the appropriate regional and district political commissar.

Each corp commander reports to the National Militia Commander who is attached directly to the Ministry of Defense.

(5) Equipment

The militia is equipped with small arms, mostly AK-47 assault rifles and Soviet SKS carbines; they have no heavy weapons or machine-guns at their disposal. Equipment status is unknown.

e. (C) Total Military Personnel Strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paramilitary</td>
<td>4,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 12,410

f. (G/MI) Foreign Military Presence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Military Advisers</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuban Military Advisers and Personnel</td>
<td>400*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People's Republic of China</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* (G) An additional 1,200 Cuban military personnel from Angola may at any given time be deployed temporarily to the Congo from Cabinda, either on leave or for other reasons.
1. Political-Military Situation: The former French Territory of the Afars and Issas received its independence from France on 27 June 1977, becoming the Republic of Djibouti. Since that time, the government of President Hassan Gouled Aptidon has achieved a degree of political stability amidst serious internal divisions, regional tensions, and economic difficulties. Internal divisions center around the deep-rooted antagonisms and suspicions between the nation's two main tribal groups, the Afars and Issas. The politically dominant Issa tribe is somewhat larger and ethnically related to the people of Somalia while the Afars have ties with Ethiopia and feel they do not have an equal share of the power structure in the government. Although the Afars are numerically well represented in the government, few Afars hold significant ministerial positions. The slow pace of economic development also contributes to the traditional rivalry between Afars and Issas. Dissatisfaction with President Gouled's apparent inability to solve Djibouti's economic and political problems was evidenced by the formation in 1981 of an opposition political party whose members were old-line politicians drawn from both Afars and Issas. This opposition party hoped to challenge President Gouled in the National Assembly elections held in May 1982. The opposition party, however, was refused legal recognition, its leaders were arrested, and the party disbanded. Afar dissident activity surfaced after the banning of the opposition party. This activity included an Afar partial boycott of the national assembly elections in an attempt to show Afar dissatisfaction with Issas dominance of the Djibouti political scene. Partially as a result of the boycott, the number of Afar seats in the 65-man national assembly decreased from 30 to 28, thus exacerbating the political balance of power problem in Djibouti. President Gouled's efforts to contain opposition and dissidence, while navigating a course between the country's two far more powerful neighbors, Ethiopia and Somalia, have been fairly successful. Nevertheless, the task of maintaining stability within Djibouti will be a difficult one, and for the long term, only feasible if there is cooperation between the Afars and Issas.

The Djibouti Government not only must contend with a potentially disruptive internal problem, it must also deal with a number of competing external powers, including Somalia, Ethiopia, radical Arabs, and the Soviets, all of whom have interests in the country. Somalia harbors irredentist claims against Djibouti and is concerned over any erosion of Issa dominance under Ethiopian pressure or overt Ethiopian intervention. On the other hand, the Ethiopians fear ascendant Somali influence which could interfere with their rail link to the port of Djibouti. The radical Arabs, principally Libya, seek influence for political purposes. In 1980 Libya made unsolicited deliveries of military equipment. However, relations between the two countries are poor despite Libyan military and economic aid efforts. The political gains Libya hoped to obtain through its aid programs have not been realized, due to the heavy French influence in Djibouti and ideological differences. The Soviets are interested in denying the country's air and naval facilities to the West. Typically, President Gouled has kept a low profile on most external political matters except Afghanistan, for which he condemned the Soviets.

In March 1984, Ethiopia Chairman Mengistu made a State visit to Djibouti, that has at least for the time being moved Djibouti visibly closer to Ethiopia particularly in light of Djiboutian displeasure over the Western Somali
Liberal Front's February 1984 attack on the Ethiopian-Djibouti rail line. The joint communique indicated agreement to "coordinate . . . activities and efforts in a struggle against all hostile forces . . ."; possible exchanges of views and consultation; stepped up border surveillance; refugee repatriation and increased Ethiopia use of the Djibouti port. At the same time, Djibouti does not intend to jeopardize relations with Somalia. Djibouti hopes that by improving relations with Ethiopia, Somalia will become more accommodating.

Since its independence, Djibouti has relied primarily on France for economic support and military security. Under a 1977 military cooperation agreement, France maintains naval, land, and air forces in the country and is providing training for Djibouti's armed forces. In spite of recent French force reductions in Djibouti, the Government considers the presence of French troops a sufficient guarantee against foreign intervention.

Lacking natural resources and having virtually no industrial establishment, Djibouti has been economically dependent on the activity of its deepwater port, the rail link to Addis Ababa, and foreign assistance. The Djibouti-Addis Ababa Railway, closed in 1977 because of the Ogaden War, reopened in June 1978, and carries a significant proportion of Ethiopian imported and exported products. However, Ethiopia's increased utilization of its own Assab port facilities has lessened its dependence on Djibouti's railway and deepwater harbor. As a result, Djibouti has not yet regained its former status as the primary carrier of Ethiopian trade. The port of Djibouti suffers some deficiencies, primarily old equipment, but government officials hope to improve the facilities in an effort to generate increased revenue through greater use of the port. Apart from the support provided by France, Djibouti receives economic assistance from some Arab countries, notably Saudi Arabia and Iraq.

Djibouti does not possess a military equipment production capability. Since 1978, France and Saudi Arabia have supplied over $6 million in arms, predominantly armored vehicles.

Djibouti is using IMET and MAP funds to assist in creating an Engineer Company with the Djiboutian military. This program began in 1982 and is dedicated almost entirely to civilian construction projects, including roads, communications, and building construction. The Djibouti military is composed of an army, an air force, and a naval force. There are no signs of dissent or unhappiness within the military. The individual soldier is well motivated and aggressive. The forces are still in an embryonic stage.

Key Officials:
President: Hassan Gouled Aptidon
Director of the Cabinet: Ismail Guedi Hared
Prime Minister: Barkat Gourad Hamadou
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Moumin Bahdon Farah
Minister of Defense: Habib Mohamad Loita
Minister of Interior: Youssouf Ali Chirdon
Commander of French Forces: Maj Gen Jean-Marie Failler
National Army Commander: Brig Gen Ali Mehidel Wais
Military Intelligence Chief: Capt Moussa Djama Dembil
3. Military Budget:

(U) $27.8 million (proposed) for the fiscal year ending 31 December 1984; this is 22 percent of the proposed central government budget. No service allocations are available. Dollar value converted at an exchange rate of 176 francs equal $1.00 (most current information available).

4. (U) Population: 289,000 (1 July 1984), average annual growth 4.1 percent
Males (ages 15-49): about 63,000; about 37,000 fit for military service
Ethnic Divisions: (approximate figure) 96,300 Issas; 90,500 Afars; 6,000 Arabs; 7,000 French (including French military forces)
Literacy: About 5 percent

5. (C/O) Army:
Personnel Strength: Estimated 2,600
Major Units: one general headquarters and staff, with a parachute company and an armored squadron assigned; one commando intervention company; one frontier gendarmerie group.
Major Equipment: 20 Panhard AML armored cars (4 AML 60s and 16 AML 90s), 10 BTR 60 APCs and 10 BRDM-2 armored recon vehicles, 6 106-mm recoilless rifles, 4 120-mm mortars.

6. (C) Navy:
Personnel Strength: 20
Ships: four patrol boats.

7. (C) Air Force:
Personnel Strength: 80
Aircraft: two Noratlas 2501 transport, one Rallye Socata transport, one Cessna 206G transport, one Alouette II helicopter, one Fan Jet Falcon 20.

8. (C) Paramilitary: National Security Force
Personnel Strength: 1,200

Defense Attache: None

10. (C) Foreign Military Presence:
French Ground Forces: Personnel Strength: 3,800
Major Units: three infantry companies, two armored squadrons, and two artillery batteries.
Major Equipment: 33 AMX-13 light tanks (10 with SS-11 ATGMs), 11 armored reconnaissance vehicles, 16 howitzers, 8 ADA weapons, 12 81-mm mortars.

French Navy:
Personnel Strength: 200. The naval component based in Djibouti is a permanent shore contingent that coordinates maintenance of French Indian Ocean Fleet vessels as well as maritime surveillance in the local zone. No French ships are based in Djibouti but French vessels operating in the Indian Ocean call regularly for repairs, rest and relaxation, and provisioning.
French Air Force:
Personnel Strength: 850
Aircraft: 10 Mirage III fighters, 3 Nord 2501 Noratlas transports, 4 SA-330 Puma helicopters, 6 Alouette II helicopters
1. Political-Military Situation: On 3 August 1979, a coup toppled the Government of Equatorial Guinea terminating the 11-year dictatorial rule of Macias Nguema, whose regime was characterized by genocide, religious repression, hostility to neighboring states, and economic collapse. Colonel Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo ousted Macias and became President of the country.

The current form of government is a constitutional republic. Formerly a military regime, the new government follows a democratically elected presidential system with an elected parliament/assembly. Col Obiang promised a constitutional referendum within 3 years and, despite some opposition, he maintained this schedule. In August 1982, the constitutional referendum was approved and subsequently adopted with Obiang becoming the new civilian President for a fixed 7-year term. Elections for Parliament's representational assembly, held in August 1983, were carried out democratically and without incident. The assembly held its first week-long session in November 1983, establishing ground rules and various committees. These elections were a boost for both human rights and the democratic process in Equatorial Guinea. At the same time, the powers of the assembly are carefully circumscribed by the country's constitution; in the first years of its existence, the assembly may function largely as a consultative body to the President.

The new constitution provides for the rights of free association and assembly; it dismantled and replaced local military rule with civilian control. It has decreased the number of ministerial level officials and provides for a more equitable balance of ethnic groups and tribal factions within the government.

President Obiang has sought to increase the Government's efficiency while decreasing its size. He continues to weed out corrupt individuals and shunt aside officials he regards as politically unreliable. The changes have brought about a government in which real influence corresponds very nearly to the position held.

The Government of Equatorial Guinea is strongly pro-Western. Power remains very much in the hands of President Obiang, with a high concentration of political influence within the Esangui clan of the Fang tribe. Although the Government is in the process of reorganization so that the people will have a greater say in their leadership, some dissonance still exists among the older local civilians, military, and tribal functionaries. There is concern that the Soviet Union is trying to increase its influence by exploiting internal dissatisfaction and generating confusion and disorder.

The presence of Soviets and Cubans in Equatorial Guinea has been a source of great consternation to President Obiang. President Obiang clearly wishes to align Equatorial Guinea more closely with the Free World including the US and to reduce its ties to the Soviet Bloc. In late 1983 all formal treaties between the Soviet Union and Equatorial Guinea were scheduled for renewal. The Equatorial Guinean Government chose not to renew these treaties and ordered all Soviet military advisers to leave the country. The Libyan Embassy in Malabo was closed in January 1981, and the Soviet Embassy was directed to reduce its staff from 100 to 15. Conversely, an American Embassy was opened in Malabo in June 1981, and for the past 3 years Equatorial Guinea has been included in the scheduled annual port visits of the US Navy's West African Training Cruise.

15 October 1984
(U) Major cash crops are timber and coffee on the mainland, Rio Muni, and cocoa on the island of Bioko. The limited industrial sector centers largely on fishing and sawmilling. Economically, the Government wants to increase agricultural production, particularly cocoa, and encourage Western aid for food purchases and development projects. This is a clear departure from the policy of the previous government, which relied primarily on the USSR, Cuba, and the PRC for assistance. Equatorial Guinea's GNP amounted to $100 million in 1981 ($552 per capita). Socially, the Government is placing strong emphasis on improved health and education systems. Equatorial Guinea was admitted as a full member of UDEAC (Economic and Customs Union of Central Africa) in December 1983. This is the first non-Francophone country permitted to join.

Following an alleged coup attempt in May 1983, 33 persons were implicated in an attempt to assassinate Obiang. A military tribunal was convened in July to try the cases. However, this coup attempt appears to be an isolated incident. The stability of Equatorial Guinea will probably continue to depend more on economic success and political development of institutions than on remote disturbances in its small and ineffectual military.

The military forces within the country are still in a period of adjustment and flux. The actual size and extent of the Armed Forces throughout Equatorial Guinea can only be estimated. The primary military aid prior to the coup came from the USSR, Libya, and Cuba. Following the 1979 coup, large numbers of Soviet and Cuban military advisers were asked to leave. Since the Government still required military assistance, Morocco and Spain were tapped to fill the vacuum left by the USSR and Cuba. Morocco currently has 300-400 security personnel in Equatorial Guinea assisting the Government in reorganizing the Armed Forces. Most of the military equipment is of Soviet origin, so maintenance and availability of spare parts could be difficult in the future. In the last 6 years, the USSR delivered $11 million worth of military equipment—most of it prior to the coup—including patrol craft and transports. The Government will probably seek additional arms from the West.

Internally, Obiang is attempting to defuse those problems that led to the demise of his predecessor. Activity in the capital, Malabo, is vigorous: buildings are undergoing modernization; new roads and facilities are being constructed. These are the first signs of economic progress in the country since the 1970s and will work to help solidify control by the Obiang government. In his plans for the future, President Obiang has stressed agriculture and self-sufficiency in food production. The possibility of exploitable oil deposits located in Equatorial Guinea could result in an improved investment climate and potential economic development.

Although the Government is in control on the island, the mainland is still in political disarray. Competing factions are vying for control, and it may be sometime before the mainland and island can be politically and economically integrated. However, the recent Spanish discovery of uranium on the mainland may help speed up this process.

An external threat to the military regime appears minimal. Relations with Nigeria are strained, since the August 1981 agreement that allowed Nigerian
farm laborers to work in Equatorial Guinea was not publicly supported by the then Nigerian President Shagari. Nigeria, Cameroon, and Gabon are endeavoring to settle their territorial differences with Equatorial Guinea over contested border areas containing important petroleum and mineral deposits.

2. (U) Key Officials
President, Chief of Staff, Commander of the Armed Forces, President of the Supreme Military Council: Col Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo
Prime Minister: Capt Cristino Seriche Bioko
Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Defense: Lt Col Fructuoso Mba Onana Nchama
Vice Minister of Defense: Major Melchor Ndong Mba
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Marcelino Nguema Onguena
Armed Forces: Inspector General, Antonio Mba Nguema
Armed Forces: Chief of Staff, Capt Melanio Ebendeng Nsomo
Army: Commander, Major Melchor Ndong Mba
Director General of Security: Isidoro Eyi Monsuy Andeme
Director of Presidential Security Service: Armengol Ono Nguema Mbasogo

3. (U) Military Budget: $6.2 million for fiscal year ending 31 March 1981; 21 percent of the central government budget. Dollar values are converted from ekuele at the exchange rate of 68.85 ekuele equal $1.00.

4. (U) Population: 275,000 estimated as of June 1984. In addition, a considerable number of exiles and refugees, numbering in the thousands, are continuing to return.
Males (ages 15-49): 62,000; physically fit: 31,000
Ethnic Divisions: Indigenous population of Bioko Island Province is primarily Bubi with some Crio (including Fernandinos); Rio Muni Province is 75 percent Fang with a few hundred Europeans, primarily Spanish.
Literacy: 20 percent

5. (C) Army: (Land Forces)
Personnel Strength: 2,000 est (personnel breakdown not available)
Reserve: None
Combat Units: Five infantry companies deployed throughout the country, with the largest troop concentrations in Bata, Mongomo, and Akurenam.
Major Equipment: The status and inventory figures of equipment is unknown. However, general equipment items by country have been identified. Due to the presence of Soviet military advisers prior to 1983, Equatorial Guinea has a substantial inventory of Soviet arms and equipment. Soviet: Armored vehicles including ten BRDMs and four BTR-60Ps, air defense weapons, and various quantities of mortars, machineguns, rifles, and other small arms.
Libya: APCs, field artillery, mortars, and air defense weaponry.

6. (C) Navy:
Personnel Strength: 150 est (breakdown unavailable)
Reserve: None
Ships: Three ZHUK patrol craft; none are operational.
7. **Air Force (Air Forces):** According to government decree, an air force will be created in the future.
   Personnel: None
   Equipment: None, but the Government has used Spanish-owned Lockheed Hercules C-130 and three USSR Yak-40s for transport.

8. **Police: (Police for Public Order)**
   Personnel Strength: 700 est. Police could provide manpower for mobilization. Capability is negligible.

9. (U) **Key US Officials:**
   Chief of Mission Malabo accredited: Ambassador Alan M. Hardy

10. **Foreign Military Presence:**
    Morocco: 300-400 security specialists plus special communications equipment.
    Spain: 40 specialists to train Army, Navy, and security personnel.
    Security assistance materiel in the form of riot control equipment. Air transport and communications materiel.
    Cuba: Six doctors, military status unknown.
    PRC: 200 civilian technicians, with unknown number of military personnel.
Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act.
ETHIOPIA

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APPENDIX

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1. GOVERNMENT

a. (U) Key Government Officials

Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Worker's Party of Ethiopia (WPE), Chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), and Commander in Chief of the Revolutionary Armed Forces: Mengistu Haile Mariam

Secretary General of the PMAC and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers:
Capt Fikre Selassie Wodgeress

Assistant Secretary General, PMAC: Lt Col Fisseha Desta

Minister of Foreign Affairs: H.E. Goshu Wolde

Minister of National Defense: Lt Gen Tesfaye Gebre-Kidan

Vice Minister of Defense: Brig Gen Abebe Wold-Mariam

Vice Minister of Defense: Maj Gen Haile Ghiorgis Habte-Mariam

Minister of the Interior: Brig Gen Taye Tlahun

b. Type and Stability of Government

(U) Ethiopia is a state in transition. September 1984 marked the tenth anniversary of the fall of Emperor Haile Selassie and the effective end of the nation's 3,000-year monarchy. On the surface, Ethiopia is currently ruled by a military oligarchy the members of which belong to two organizations: the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), and the Central Committee of the Worker's Party of Ethiopia (WPE). Known locally as "The Dergue" (Committee of Equals), this originally anonymous group of 140 officers and enlisted men from all ranks and backgrounds replaced the royal family and various government ministries. Ethiopia, in fact, is an autocracy, in the form of Mengistu Haile Mariam.

(U) Postimperial Ethiopia has moved through three phases as it began its uncertain future. A fourth stage that may confer a greater degree of stability than it has enjoyed in the past may be about to begin. Although the military rulers have had control of the instruments of coercion throughout the phases, they have faced numerous challenges from several directions, including the military. Thus, stability of government has not been assured. The three completed stages include: the transition to and legitimization of military rule (8 July 1974-21 March 1975); survival of the Dergue (April 1975-December 1979), and Mengistu's rise to dominance (September 1974-December 1979).

(U) Ethiopia's transition to and legitimization of military rule, the first phase of the transitional decade began on 8 July 1974 and ended on 21 March 1975. The initial date was the publication of "Ethiopia Tikdem" (Ethiopia First) which became the basis for rule by the military. This document, written while the Dergue was secretly forming itself, was a set of 13 philosophical statements that gave the military movement a doctrine for the nation's future. "Ethiopia Tikdem" and a second 12 September document announcing a 15-point program to overhaul legal, economic and political institutions as well as the society itself were written in the Western liberal democratic mold; however, subsequent interpretations used both documents as the justification for transforming Ethiopia into a classless society where the state owns the means of production.
(U) The second element in this phase was the most stunning in that it sent a message to the population that the Dergue would not be challenged. This event, "Bloody Saturday," occurred on 23 November 1975 when 59 former civilian, military, and police officials from the imperial government as well as some PMAC dissidents supporting civilian rule were executed. Additionally, Lieutenant General Aman Andom, the first PMAC spokesman and de facto head of state, was killed the same day resisting arrest by the Dergue in the climax of an internal power struggle which, in part, included a debate over the formation of an Ethiopian republic governed by civilians and a political settlement to the Eritrean issue.

(U) The final event of the first phase occurred on 21 March 1975 when the Dergue formally abolished the monarchy in a proclamation stating that the people would determine their future government in socialist Ethiopia.

(U) Despite its announcements and draconian measures to eliminate dissent, the Dergue faced numerous constraints on its freedom to act. These constraints emerged from two major sources including: the unwieldy size of the Dergue itself, and the problems inherited from the imperial regime. Decisionmaking within the Dergue was difficult given the various backgrounds, educational levels, abilities, and priorities of its many members. Thus, the conditions existed for the emergence of a strong if not charismatic leader. Additionally the conditions of famine, rising prices, the Eritrean separatist movement and poor relations with Sudan and Somalia which contributed to the emperor's fall still existed resulting in continued unrest among groups within the Ethiopian population.

(U) Survival of the Dergue is the theme of the second phase in the transition of the Ethiopian political system. The challenges came from students, the civilian Left, labor, the military, and Somalia. The Dergue dealt with the students by sending them into the countryside to educate peasants about the revolution, "Ethiopia Tikdem" and to form peasant associations. The Dergue disbanded the existing Confederation of Ethiopian Labor Unions and replaced it with the All-Ethiopia Trade Union. Labor leaders were coopted into the new union or arrested. Some were also executed. Military discontent came in the form of an April 1975 ultimatum from the Second and Third Infantry Divisions to the Dergue. They responded by arresting and executing known and suspected ring-leaders. When the civilian Left formed the underground Marxist Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Party (EPRP), the Dergue countered by forming the All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement (MEISON). MEISON with PMAC's support searched out and summarily executed EPRP members and sympathizers. In 1977, PMAC authorized the formation of "The Revolutionary Flame" to counter the growing influence of MEISON. Within 2 years, no national political movement existed except the Revolutionary Flame. Thus, in order to build a bridge to the civilian population and create some form of coalition that would further legitimize military rule, the Dergue created the Congress of Organizing the Party of the Workers of Ethiopia (COPWE) in December 1979. Membership of COPWE included some civilians, however, most members were military and also belonged to PMAC. COPWE's highest leadership levels were all filled by military men. The Workers' Party of Ethiopia (WPE) inaugurated in September 1984 is the successor to COPWE. The distribution of civilian and military membership has not changed.
The final challenge to the Dergue's survival came from the 1977 Somali invasion of the Ogaden. The Soviet Union initiated a significant military advisory and equipment assistance effort and Cuba provided more than 17,000 combat troops in response to the invasion. The externally provided assistance enabled Ethiopia to defeat the Somalis. The continuing Soviet advisory and Cuban troop presence are a signal of Soviet-Bloc interest in maintaining their influence in Ethiopia and their support for the Dergue which invited them.

The third phase, the rise to political dominance by Mengistu Haile Mariam progressed concurrently with the first two. Mengistu joined the Dergue as an Army major at some point after it was originally formed in June 1974. His presence on the Dergue was announced in November 1974 (Mengistu has claimed credit for the philosophy of "Ethiopia Tikdem," and the deposition of Haile Selassie). Mengistu moved into predominance on the Dergue by first engineering the fall of Andom. He became dominant when he was elected Chairman of the Dergue on 12 February 1977 following the executions of his last seven competitors. Mengistu's consolidation of power continued when he was named Chairman of COPWE upon its formation in 1979.

As the undisputed leader of Ethiopia, Mengistu has been the principal force behind Ethiopia's foreign policy shift from pro-West to pro-Soviet. He makes all major decisions and mid- to high-level personnel appointments within political, administrative, and military institutions. There is considerable evidence indicating that the most important criterion for individual advancement is demonstrated loyalty to Mengistu rather than to ideology or a concept of the nation.

A fourth phase in Ethiopia's transition from a monarchy may occur as the WPE evolves in the future. Whether it will be a distinct phase or merely a tool used by Mengistu to continue his rule remains to be seen. The party's formation has long been a goal of Soviet diplomacy; however, it is not certain whether the new party will be in the Soviet tradition beyond its outward symbols and public pronouncements. DIA currently believes that party membership will be limited to 35,000 out of a population of 40 million. The military comprises the greatest percentage of its membership (67 percent). However, the government has expended great efforts to organize the population into neighborhood and regional party associations in order to gain civilian support. Therefore, it cannot be discounted that a civilian-military coalition similar to that in the Soviet Union is a long-term Ethiopian goal.

The issue that the new party must address if it is to contribute to government stability and become an evolutionary phase in Ethiopian political history is the institutionalization of programs and procedures to execute the many functions of government that will survive Mengistu.

The postimperial decade in Ethiopia follows the pattern of military rule in many African countries where a predominant, if not dominant figure arises from the ruling group and attempts to build an alliance of various social forces that is balanced by the military for the purpose of regenerating society. As
long as the leader lives or is able to sustain that alliance, there will be some degree of stability or at least continuity. If the leader is unsuccessful or dies, the usual pattern is that he is replaced by either another military regime or by a civilian government subject to the same conditions that caused the original coup or revolution. Currently there are two major unknowns in Ethiopian politics. The first is Mengistu's ability to solve the nation's problems to the satisfaction of military and civilian leaders outside of his immediate inner circle. The second unknown is the degree of Soviet penetration of Ethiopian politics. The Soviets may have to sustain Mengistu against determined Ethiopian opposition or replace him with another pro-Soviet official. Soviet success or failure will be determined by how thoroughly influential Ethiopians have embraced them.

c. Internal Threat

Ethiopia's greatest internal threat is the disintegration of central government authority in the territories over which the monarchy gained control during the late 19th Century. It is currently possible to identify 20 separatist organizations throughout the nation. Although many of these groups became active after Haile Selassie was deposed, the origins of their claims can be found deep in Ethiopian history. The attempt to integrate diverse provinces and assimilate heterogenous populations into the Ethiopian core is a major and historically consistent national policy goal.

There are three separatist movements currently posing the greatest challenges to Ethiopian territorial integrity. They are located in Eritrea, Tigray, and the eastern provinces, including the Ogaden region. The Eritrean insurgency is the most serious of the three.

Armed rebellion in Eritrea began in 1962 when Haile Selassie annexed Eritrea disregarding a UN resolution recommending a federal relationship between the Province and the central Ethiopian Government. The Emperor's consistent position from the end of Italian occupation in 1941 until his overthrow was that complete union was the only acceptable solution. The Eritreans demanded complete independence. Except for a brief period during the first 60-days of rule by the PMAC when a political solution to the fighting was thought possible, neither the position of the central government nor that of the separatists have changed. Both the United States and the Soviets have argued in Addis Ababa that a military solution will not be possible to achieve; nevertheless, all protagonists remain in intransigent in their demands.

Key Eritrean separatist groups include the following: The Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) estimated at approximately 20-25,000; the Eritrean Liberation Front estimated at 10-12,000; and the Eritrean Liberation Front/Popular Liberation Front (ELF/PLF) estimated to have few armed members, but which plays a diplomatic role abroad soliciting support. These three groups are not united although there have been attempts to develop an alliance to facilitate coordinated operations. When these groups have not been fighting the Ethiopians, there has been serious fighting among them in which the EPLF emerged as the most powerful. Nevertheless, they do have a common purpose: Eritrean independence. Control of Ethiopia is not a goal of these groups.
The Eritreans scored major gains against Ethiopia authority early during PMAC's rule when Eritrean troops conquered nearly all of the province; however, internecine fighting compounded by multidivisional Ethiopian Army operations planned and supported by Soviet advisers pushed the rebels back during the late-1970s. Ethiopian Army campaigns have occurred almost annually between 1978 and 1983. However, large-scale operations ceased after 1983 probably at the insistence of the Soviets.

During 1984, the civil war continued with the insurgents scoring some significant victories when they seized important towns. The Army reacted locally but no serious counteroffensives have been conducted. Given Mengistu's refusal to negotiate a settlement and Soviet reluctance to support a futile cause, it is probable that the Army has been using the time to recover from its hard fighting and to regroup, refit, and absorb replacements. Additionally, the tenth anniversary of the Ethiopian revolution has consumed much government attention and resources. Therefore, no offensive is expected prior to 1985.

The separatist movement in Tigray has its roots in Ethiopian history. Armed resistance to central government authority began during the early 1940s following the expulsion of the Italians by the British. However, the current insurgency is 9 years old and the major group is the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). Its goal is the overthrow of Mengistu. The TPLF's estimated strength is currently 8-10,000 and the movement has coordinated some of its military operations with the EPLF. The Eritreans have been training TPLF forces in guerrilla tactics for at least 3 years.

The TPLF has been successful during 1984 in cutting lines of communications, controlling the countryside, and extending its operations into the neighboring provinces of Welo and Gondar. The Ethiopian Army controls the major towns in Tigray and must escort convoys between them. Nevertheless, the TPLF overran the religious center of Lalibella in October 1984 capturing 10 foreign nationals. This attack was the TPLF's first major operation in 1984. The TPLF's tactics do not include retention of towns they conquer. They withdraw after a few days preferring to reap the political benefits of embarrassing the central government. The Ethiopian Army has not launched a major campaign against the TPLF in 1984. It has been using the time to refit and regroup after taking heavy losses in the 1982-83 offensive.

The third major separatist movement is in the eastern provinces of Harerge, Bale, and Sidamo and is uncoordinated among the numerous tribes and ethnic groups. The movement originates from the following: the inability of the Ethiopian Government to fully consolidate its control over these individuals since the 16th Century migrations; conflicts arising out of Italian and British decolonization of their Somali territories, and the stated interests of Ethiopia and Somalia.
The most significant armed rebel group is the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF), which was formed in 1960. The Ethiopian Army was committed against the WSLF in 1966 when local police and militia forces could no longer cope with the threat to Ethiopian control of the territory. The WSLF is currently estimated to have 3,000 members and it relies on external support from Somalia. It traditionally employs hit and run guerrilla attacks on lines of communications and isolated Army units and in January 1984, it attacked a train on the Ethiopia-Djibouti rail line causing numerous casualties.

Other separatist movements in this eastern region include the Oromo and Sidamo Liberation Fronts; however, neither of these groups has the organization or assets to pose a threat to government control. The best that can be achieved is harassment of Ethiopian forces.

The seemingly unending involvement of Ethiopian forces in military operations has placed a serious strain on the morale of Ethiopian forces in combat zones. Mengistu has responded severely to acts of mutiny within the Armed Forces and military dissatisfaction presents an additional potentially dangerous but for now controllable internal threat. It is very likely that there is a cleavage between those military leaders serving in the field and those in political power over the viability of military solutions especially in the case of Eritrea; however, there is also a reluctance to agree to a political solution that would dismember the nation. Since the separatists are adamant in their demands, no end to the fighting is foreseen even in the event of Mengistu's departure from the scene.

d. External Threat

Ethiopia perceives Somalia as its major external threat. In July 1977, the Somali Government sent regular forces into the disputed Ogaden to join Somali-supported guerrillas in joint operations that pushed Ethiopian defenders from most of their garrisons in the region. The Somali regular forces were pushed out of the Ogaden in late March by Cuban armored units backed by Ethiopian troops. Heavy fighting continued in the region until Ethiopian forces were able to crush guerrilla and Somali Regular Army units operating in the area in the fall of 1980. Following renewed Ogaden fighting in late 1980, Ethiopian forces were able to consolidate their gains and military control along the disputed border. In July 1982, Ethiopian forces, fearing closer cooperation between Somali regular forces and the WSLF and sensing an opportunity to topple the Siad regime in Somalia, launched an attack on two Somali administered border towns. Mechanized units overran the lightly defended Somali positions and occupied Somali territory. Sporadic and isolated incidents of violence have continued to occur and Ethiopian forces remain deployed in strategic operating bases throughout the Ogaden. These deployments reinforced by the Cuban military presence reduce the actual threat presented by Somalia.

Sudan represents a threat to Ethiopia's security only in the sense that it supports the major Eritrean insurgents with sanctuary and some limited funds, medical aid, and weapons. Neither Sudan nor Ethiopia desires open conflict. However, Ethiopia continues to allow Ethiopian-supported Libyan
training camps for Sudanese dissidents intent on overthrowing the Nimeiri regime in Sudan, to operate within its borders. These camps are scattered throughout the western border area and present a focus for conflict between these two countries. The largest camp is at Gambella in Ethiopia's Illubabor Province. Sudanese forces intent on attacking these camps or in hot pursuit of dissidents or bandits could cross into Ethiopian territory with the possibility of hostile action occurring between Ethiopian and Sudanese forces. Sudan, however, does not pose a serious conventional military threat to Ethiopia.

Ethiopia perceives the US as an increasing threat to its security. Activities of the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) are of utmost interest to Ethiopia. Ethiopia fears that US military involvement with its neighbors is directed at undermining the Ethiopian regime. Increased US military assistance to Kenya, Sudan, and especially Somalia, particularly in light of the present Ethiopia-Somali border situation, is viewed by the Ethiopians as US support for some form of action Ethiopia.

e. Communist Influence

The Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, Cuba and East Germany are seen by the PMAC and much of the Ethiopian population as the nations which came to Ethiopia's aid during 1976 and 1977, when the country was in real danger of being dismembered by large-scale conflicts in Eritrea and the Ogaden. Since 1976, Ethiopia and the Soviet Union have signed agreements for military equipment totaling $4 billion, and the Soviets have provided over $3 billion worth of military equipment including jet fighters, advanced attack helicopters, armored vehicles, tanks, rocket launchers, artillery, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and naval combatants. In addition, the USSR continues to provide 1,700 Soviet advisers to Ethiopia and also supports the stationing of 5,000-6,000 Cuban combat troops and advisers in the country.

In early November 1983, reports began to surface that indicated a substantial portion of the then estimated 6,000-7,000 Cuban combat troops in Ethiopia were departing. The total Cuban military presence in Ethiopia was estimated at the time to be 9,000 personnel (6,000-7,000 combat troops and 2,000-3,000 military advisers). DIA now believes that the Cuban strength is 5,000-6,000 (2,000-3,000) advisers and 3,000 combat troops). Personnel reductions are the result of drawdowns in the four brigades (two armor, one artillery and one mechanized infantry) that were in Ethiopia as of late-1983. The mechanized brigade has been withdrawn and the remaining brigades consolidated into one. Strength assessments are complicated because the Cuban equipment remains in Ethiopia and is turned over to the Ethiopians instead of redeployed to Cuba.

Explanations for a drawdown of Cuban forces in Ethiopia vary; however, most likely the cost of supporting a large number of troops is a significant factor. The cost of maintaining Cuban forces is reportedly in excess of $175 million per year. This includes food, housing, medical expenses, transportation to and from Cuba, and salaries. The Soviets apparently pay most of this cost, at least indirectly. The Ethiopians probably pay only a small portion of the total. Cuba apparently bears none of the expense for its forces.
in Ethiopia. As a result neither the Ethiopians nor the Soviets want to continue picking up the tab, particularly when Ethiopia is capable of maintaining control of the Ogaden using indigenous forces and Moscow also gains collateral political benefits. Cuban forces have remained in Ethiopia since the Ogaden War both as a strategic reserve ready to respond to any military contingency and as support for the Mengistu regime.

In partial return for Soviet military aid and backing, Chairman Mengistu has allowed the Soviets to establish military access to naval and air facilities. On Dehalak Island, 50 km off the northern Ethiopian port of Mitsiwa, the Soviets have constructed an installation that provides their Indian Ocean squadron with logistic support, light repair, and replenishment services. The Soviets have also stationed two Il-38 naval reconnaissance aircraft at Asmara. These aircraft, along with four Il-38s stationed at Aden, conduct flights over the Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean observing US ships operating in the region.

The stationing of the Il-38s at Asmara was temporarily, at least, halted after 21 May 1984 because of an Eritrean insurgent raid on the airfield which destroyed one and damaged the second aircraft, among other Ethiopian planes and helicopters. The Soviets may resume their Asmara-based air operations when an improved security construction project is completed.

Even though the Soviet Bloc is the primary source of military supplies for Ethiopia, the latter has not been a fully cooperative client. Chairman Mengistu continues to put off issues which the Soviets feel are key to maintaining their control in the country, such as the establishment of a civilian-based Marxist Party. The Ethiopian Workers Party may have the form of a Communist party but not the substance. Mengistu also refuses to grant the USSR large-scale access to Ethiopian military facilities. In the past Moscow's minimal economic assistance to Addis has been a personal source of friction in Ethiopian-Soviet relations, and as a result Ethiopia has maintained negotiations with the West in an attempt to obtain badly needed economic aid. Because of its deteriorating economic situation, declining hard currency reserves, and continued need for military and petroleum supplies, Ethiopia will probably continue to seek closer relations with the USSR and its Bloc allies. It is noteworthy that in the past 2 years several high-level Soviet economic delegations have visited Ethiopia. At present, there are five Soviet economic planners serving with the Ethiopian National Revolutionary Development Campaign indicating that the Soviets may be willing to offer more development assistance in order to maintain their considerable degree of leverage in the Ethiopian Government. However, most likely any economic funding for regional development will be overshadowed by Ethiopia's continued need for large amounts of Soviet military equipment.

Ethiopia's need for military aid, generally coinciding with foreign policies and ideological kinships between the Mengistu regime and the Soviet Bloc, makes the prospects for continued close cooperation good. In an attempt to insure this relationship, the Soviets, their East European allies, and the Cubans
are continually pursuing activities such as establishing Friendship Treaties, and signing economic, scientific, and cultural accords to forge stronger bonds between themselves and Ethiopia.

Ethiopia also has relations with China. Relations between Ethiopia and the PRC have been strained in past years, although recent remarks by Ethiopia's Chairman Mengistu have indicated the possibility of a gradual improvement in their relationship. At the present time the only known PRC project in Ethiopia involves road construction in the Gondar region. The importance of Ethiopia's ties to the Soviet Union will continue to hamper any improvement in its present relationship with the PRC. However, the PRC will be prepared to exploit any opportunity which would hinder Soviet attempts to expand their strategic position.

In January 1984, Ethiopia and North Korea signed an economic assistance agreement, however, all the terms are unclear. Reportedly, North Korea initiate a series of projects over the next 7 years that will have a combined value of $250 million. All but one of the projects involve the civilian sphere. The agreement also calls for a small arms munitions factory to be built. Some military advisers were sent to Ethiopia; but they were sent home a few weeks after they arrived.

f. Economic Factors

Ethiopia, the world's sixth poorest country on a per capita basis, relies on its agricultural sector for nearly half of its GNP and 85 percent of its employment. Nevertheless, Ethiopia has been unable to feed itself since prior to the 1974 revolution. The country is currently suffering its worst famine since 1972-74 and perhaps in this century. In 1982, the GNP was $4.9 billion, $144 per capita. Foreign trade provides Ethiopia with most of its government operating revenues. Ethiopia relies on coffee exports as a major source of foreign exchange earnings. Other major exports are hides and skins, and refined petroleum products. Leading imports are petroleum and foodstuffs. Major sources of imports are Saudi Arabia, Japan, Italy, and West Germany. Most of Ethiopia's exports go to the US, Djibouti, Saudi Arabia, and Japan.

Ethiopia has the capability to domestically produce support materiel to include small arms of 7.62-mm and .30 caliber at the Addis Ababa Ammunition Plant. It has an annual ammunition production capacity of 5 million rounds and a current annual production rate of 1.5 million rounds. The primary supplier of major weapons is the USSR and to a lesser degree other Communist countries. Soviet supplies include aircraft, helicopters, tanks, APCs, field artillery, mortars, ADA, small arms, frigates, and patrol boats. Agreements for Communist-supplied military equipment are valued at over $4 billion with equipment deliveries in excess of $3 billion. To date Free World agreements and deliveries have totaled only $233 million for the same period.

g. Military and Political Alignment

Despite Ethiopia's dramatic shift away from the US and the West, there remain a number of factors that complicate and qualify its relationship...
with Moscow. First, Chairman Mengistu and the PMAC are highly nationalistic and do not consider themselves Soviet puppets. Moreover, there are many indications that the military, as an institution separate from the PMAC, is not satisfied with the Soviets, their equipment, and their training. Second, there is tension over Soviet efforts to influence internal events within Ethiopia. The USSR desires to negotiate a peaceful solution to the Eritrean conflict against the PMAC's desires and may have threatened to reduce or halt military aid to Mengistu if orders more large-scale offensives.

Third, Ethiopia is heavily dependent on the West for economic assistance. Mengistu's strong anti-Western rhetoric stops short of completely antagonizing the West in order to prevent the flow of aid from being stopped; however, he consistently supports the Soviet Union on most international issues. Soviet operations of Afghanistan and the Soviet boycott of the 1984 Olympics are two examples. Current US policy is attempting to convince Mengistu that he cannot insult the West and favor the East if he wants economic aid to continue.

Regionally, Ethiopia is closely aligned with other nations in the area with which it shares a common interest. These include Kenya, with which Ethiopia has a defense treaty directed against Somali irredentist claims; South Yemen, another Marxist-Leninist revolutionary state; and Libya. The major political alignment in the region which Chairman Mengistu sees as a threat to Ethiopia is that of the Arab nations. This threat is a recurring theme in Ethiopian history. The country perceives itself as a Christian island in an Islamic sea. Nevertheless, Mengistu's fear is justified. Arab States have been heavily involved in supporting Islamic Eritrean insurgent groups in northern Ethiopia. One example is Saudi Arabia. It has been a major supplier of aid to Ethiopian insurgent groups and has attempted to unify various Eritrea opposition groups to increase their effectiveness.

One of the most important events in Ethiopian foreign relations was the 1981 signing of the Tripartite Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation with Libya and South Yemen. The pact serves the varied interests of these three countries and has an adverse impact on Somalia and Sudan. The signatories have fulfilled many of the various political, military, and economic commitments. However, strains between Libya and Ethiopia began to develop in 1984 leaving the future of the pact in doubt.

h. (U) Key US Officials

Charge d'Affaires (Addis Ababa): David A. Korn
Defense Attache: None
2. MILITARY, GENERAL

a. (U) Key Military Officials

Armed Forces:
   Commander in Chief, Mengistu Haile-Mariam
   Chief of Staff, Maj Gen Haile-Ghiorgis Habte-Mariam
   Army: Ground Forces Commander, Brig Gen Hailu Gebre Mikael
   Air Force: Commander, Brig Gen Fanta Belay
   Deputy Air Commander, Brig Gen Amha Desta
   Navy: Commander, Capt Tesfaye Berhanu
   Police: Chief Commissioner, Brig Gen Worku Zewede
   Chief, Military Intelligence: Brig Gen Alemu Tibebe

b. Position of the Armed Forces

   Mengistu with the assistance of his immediate military subordinates control Ethiopia. In their roles as Chairman and the top leadership of the WPE, they are in charge of the civilian functions of government. As the leaders of the PMAC, they command the armed forces. Mengistu is Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces since he is the PMAC Chairman. The PMAC Defense Affairs Committee controls the National Revolutionary Operations Command (NROC), which administers the regular armed forces as well as the nation's paramilitary forces. Chairman Mengistu, has stayed in power by shrewdly maneuvering elements in the Armed Forces, consulting with the officer corps before setting major policies, and ruthlessly using force when necessary; however, the loyalty of all military units is not assured. Continuing morale problems stemming from harsh field conditions, significant military setbacks in the North, and divisions within the Armed Forces along ethnic, religious, or ideological lines, may have undermined the PMAC's position by creating a cleavage between those leaders in the field and those in the capital over the issue of national strategy and the Soviet alliance. If such a gap exists, Mengistu's future may well rest on how he attempts to solve the problem of the separatist movements.

c. Military Trends and Capabilities

   The Ethiopian armed forces are large, experienced, and capable in comparison with other Sub-Saharan nations. The Army is the largest on the subcontinent and the Navy and Air Force rank second only to South Africa in personnel strengths.

   The most significant military trend has been its expansion as a direct result of the Ethiopian Revolution, Soviet aid, the insurgencies and the 1977-78 Ogaden War against Somalia. The most significant increases occurred in the Army and Air Force. The Army expanded from 35,000 to 240,000 men between 1976 and 1981. The Air Force has increased since 1973 from 53 assorted aircraft and 2,100 men to over 350 aircraft and 4,000 men. The Air Force expansion appears to be continuing.
The Services are capable of integrating their efforts to execute a national military strategy while the ground forces have additionally demonstrated their capability to fight on two fronts simultaneously. The most recent example of a major combined-Service offensive operation occurred during the 1982-83 "Red Star" campaign in Eritrea when the ground forces supported by air and naval units attempted to defeat the Eritrean and Tigrayan insurgents. Operations during 1984 have been primarily defensive in nature; nevertheless, air and ground cooperation with naval support as necessary are characteristic.

Unfortunately for the PMAC, major deficiencies within the armed forces as well as the tenacity of the opposition have not permitted the Ethiopians to achieve victory in spite of the large quantities of equipment, supplies, and advisers from Cuba, the Soviet Union, and other East European nations, as well as combat troop units from Cuba. Even with Soviet-directed improvements, four general deficiencies can be identified. First, morale is a serious problem, with numerous desertions to include cross-border unit defections in battalion size as a manifestation of the problem. Second, rapid expansion has produced large numbers of personnel, but many lack proper training. Nevertheless, the Ethiopian soldier compares favorably in quality with the personnel of other East African armies although he may be marginal by Western standards. Third, the military lacks sufficient numbers of personnel with the ability to master the complex weapons that have been supplied by the USSR, creating dependence on the Cubans and Soviets to man and maintain many of the more sophisticated weapon systems. Likewise, leadership has been impaired by a shortage of properly trained and motivated officers. A fourth problem is the politicalization of the Armed Forces. Following the revolution that ushered in the present military regime, the officer corps was beset with executions, defections, arrests, and involuntary retirements. In this highly charged political atmosphere, less-capable officers were able to assume command positions. Officers also were required to "consult" with troops before conducting military operations. Heavy losses in the Ogaden and Eritrea during 1976 and 1977, plus severe discipline problems, caused the PMAC to reevaluate its criteria for leadership and to reinstate some of the experienced officers in command positions. To assure complete PMAC control of all units, a parallel chain of command based on the Soviet model has been established in all units. These "political cadre" trained in Soviet doctrine and propaganda techniques, make sure that all actions taken by unit commanders are in the best interest of the revolution and the PMAC. While the political cadre perhaps enhances the political reliability of the armed forces it also suppresses tactical initiative.

d. Military Budget

$420,120,000 for fiscal year ending 4 July 1984; this is 25 percent of the central government budget. No service allocations are available. Dollar value converted at an exchange rate of 2.07 birr equal $1.00.
e. (U) Population

31,998,000 as of 1 June 1984
Males (ages 15-49): 7,256,000 physically fit, 3,898,000
Ethnic Divisions: 40 percent Galla, 32 percent Amhara and Tigray, 9 percent
Sidamo, 6 percent Shankella, 6 percent Somali, 4 percent Afar, 2 percent
Gurage, 1 percent other
Literacy: About 5 percent
ETHIOPIA

3. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

a. Army

(1) Mission

(U) To protect the territorial integrity of the country, by conducting operations across national borders if necessary as directed by national command authorities, and to aid the police and other paramilitary organizations in maintaining internal security by conducting counterinsurgency operations.

(2) Capabilities

The Ethiopian Army is the largest ground force in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is capable of securing large populated areas and contesting other areas where insurgents operate within the country, such as the Ogaden, Eritrea, and Tigray. It is capable of conducting multidivisional operations involving up to 100,000 troops, as it has in Eritrea. The Army is also capable of defending against a conventional invasion from any one of the neighboring states, and of conducting cross-border military operations against them. In the case of Somalia, the Ethiopian Army is capable of making significantly penetrations across the border in force.

The capabilities of the Ethiopian ground forces can be attributed directly to expanding force levels and the large amounts of Soviet military equipment and advisory aid that has been provided to the country over the last 7 years. Ethiopia has formed and equipped 19 new infantry divisions since 1977, in addition to the 5 original divisions, with sufficient firepower and mobility to field deploy for counterinsurgency in both the Ogaden and Eritrea. Improvements in command, control, and communications have resulted in the more effective employment of units. This in part has allowed Ethiopian forces to remain in control of the Ogaden, includes the possession of Somali territory along the border, with simultaneous focus on military operations in the north. A third factor that has helped improve the effectiveness of the ground forces has been the expansion of the Ethiopian Air Force (EAF), which has allowed the Army to receive increased levels of close air and logistic support. Additionally, the acquisition of utility and advanced attack helicopters has allowed isolated units to be resupplied, wounded air-evacuated, artillery fire directed, and accurate airstrikes delivered.

The ground forces are almost totally dependent upon the USSR for materiel support. As long as the Soviets continue to supply the Army with equipment, spare parts, and training, the country's plentiful manpower resources will enable the Ethiopian ground forces to remain superior to those of neighboring countries. Ethiopian forces are capable of conducting extensive military operations within their borders. However, in most cases sustained cross-border operations will only be accomplished with external, primarily logistic support, by the Soviet Union.
ETHIOPIA

(3) Personnel Strength

180,000+

(4) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

Headquartered at Addis Ababa, the Army consists of 23 infantry divisions and 1 support division. Deployment and tactical operations of military forces are controlled by the NROC through four regional command headquarters. (It is anticipated that in the near term a fifth regional command will be established using manpower derived from the expanded conscription program.) Although the regional command headquarters control military operations in their regions, during special operations the NROC establishes campaign headquarters to assume operational command. Additionally, subcommands in the form of multibrigade or multidivision task force headquarters are established to react to serious military threats. Task force headquarters during operations, bypass regional command headquarters and report directly to the NROC campaign headquarters.

(b) Ground Combat Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Tactical Units</th>
<th>Strength Per Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23 inf division HQ</td>
<td>Unk 800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130 inf brigade HQ</td>
<td>Unk 1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>541 inf bns</td>
<td>500 250-450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 inf bns (mech)</td>
<td>500 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 paracommando bns</td>
<td>500 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48 artillery bns</td>
<td>200 180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43 armor bns</td>
<td>150 150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 air defense bns</td>
<td>100 100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Deployment

Most of the Ethiopian Army's 23 infantry divisions are deployed to combat major insurgent movements in the north and east, and to control the borders with Somalia and Sudan. The majority of Ethiopian forces are deployed in the north (14 divisions consisting of about 155,000 men) against insurgent threats in Eritrea and Tigray. A second major concentration of Ethiopian combat personnel (6 divisions numbering 60,000 men) is in the Ogaden to defend against a perceived threat from Somalia and combat Somali-backed insurgents. The remaining four divisions, with 25,000 personnel, are deployed to combat smaller insurgent groups. Two of these divisions are deployed in southern Ethiopia, while one division is stationed in central Ethiopia to protect the regime and guard the road from Addis Ababa to the port of Aseb. A support division also exists, which functions as a strategic reserve by detaching its
subordinate units to territorial commands as needed. Each regular infantry division normally has four brigades plus support units. In actual practice, Ethiopian combat divisions vary greatly in size; some have a strength of approximately 4,000 while others may contain more than 10,000 men. Within the next few years Ethiopia hopes to establish a restructured/standardized Army that would field the infantry division with four infantry brigades plus support elements and a battalion each of field artillery, armor, air defense artillery, transportation, engineers, communications, and medical personnel.

(5) Weapons and Equipment

(a) General

Older equipment is principally of US origin. The Soviet Union and its allies commenced delivery in 1977 of a wide variety of modern equipment, ranging from T-55 medium tanks to small arms and ammunition. In addition to standard weapons and support equipment, the USSR has supplied the Ethiopian Army with large amounts of electronic warfare (EW) equipment. Effective use of EW has been noted in Ethiopian military operations, both in the Ogaden and Eritrea. Despite the support of Soviet and other foreign advisers, trucks, armored vehicles, and artillery pieces frequently have fairly high deadline rates. The Army is currently increasing the size of its logistic support to correct this problem and most units are now able to keep enough of their equipment operational to perform their missions. In addition, foreign military advisory support continues to be concentrated in this area in an attempt to obtain higher overall equipment readiness rates.

(b) Ground Weapons and Equipment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mortars:</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*60-mm, M19</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81-mm, M1/M29</td>
<td>US, UK, IS</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82-mm, M1937</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2-in, M24A1</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120-mm, M1938</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Antitank Rkt Lchrs (RL) and Rcl Rifles (RCLR):</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*57-mm RCLR, M18A1</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*75-mm RCLR, M1A1/M20</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82-mm RCLR, B-10</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*106-mm RCLR, M40A1</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>107-mm RCLR, B-11</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>*3.5-in rkt launcher, M20</td>
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<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT-3/SAGGER launcher</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPG-7</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Pre-Ogaden war or captured Somali equipment whose status is unknown.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>country of origin</strong></th>
<th><strong>Inventory</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ETHIOPIA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**AD Artillery/Missiles:**
- 14.5-mm, ZPU-1/2/4  
  Country: UR  
  Inventory: 100
- **23-mm, ZU-23**  
  Country: UR  
  Inventory: 440
- 23-mm, ZSU-23/4  
  Country: UR  
  Inventory: 103
- 37-mm, M1939  
  Country: UR  
  Inventory: 217
- 37-mm, M1939 (twin)  
  Country: UR  
  Inventory: 25
- 57-mm, S-60  
  Country: UR  
  Inventory: 58
- 100-mm, KS-19  
  Country: UR  
  Inventory: 40
- SA-7/GRAIL SAM launcher  
  Country: UR  
  Inventory: 300
- SA-9/GASKIN SAM  
  Country: UR  
  Inventory: 6

**Artillery:**
- 76-mm, ZIS-3, M1942  
  Country: UR  
  Inventory: 304
- 85-mm, gun, D-44  
  Country: UR  
  Inventory: 89
- **105-mm, howitzer, M2A1**  
  Country: US  
  Inventory: 36
- 122-mm, howitzer, D-30  
  Country: UR  
  Inventory: 400
- 122-mm, rkt launcher,  
  GRAD P  
  Country: UR  
  Inventory: 45
- 122-mm, MRL, BM-21  
  Country: UR  
  Inventory: 90
- 130-mm, gun, M-46  
  Country: UR  
  Inventory: 79
- **155-mm, howitzer, M14A1**  
  Country: US  
  Inventory: 10
- **155-mm, SP howitzer, M109**  
  Country: US  
  Inventory: 5

**Armored Vehicles:**
- APC, BTR-60PB  
  Country: UR  
  Inventory: 497
- APC, BTR-152  
  Country: UR  
  Inventory: 150
- **APC, M113**  
  Country: US  
  Inventory: 20
- **ARC, M-20**  
  Country: US  
  Inventory: 5
- **ARC, M-8**  
  Country: US  
  Inventory: 5
- ARC, Panhard  
  Country: FR  
  Inventory: 56
- ARC, BRDM-2  
  Country: UR  
  Inventory: 160
- ARC, BRDM-2W/AT-3  
  Country: UR  
  Inventory: 35
- IFV, BMP-1  
  Country: UR  
  Inventory: 41

**Tanks:**
- **Lt tank, M-41**  
  Country: US  
  Inventory: 15
- Med tank, T-34  
  Country: UR  
  Inventory: 30
- Med tank, M-47  
  Country: YO  
  Inventory: 70
- Med tank, T-54/55  
  Country: UR/LY  
  Inventory: 800
- **Med tank, M-60**  
  Country: US  
  Inventory: 20

* (**) Pre-Ogaden war or captured Somali equipment whose status is unknown.
** (**) The ZU-23s have a dual role of air defense and direct fire support.
The large amount of Soviet military equipment and advisory aid provided to Ethiopia over the past 7 years has significantly enhanced the firepower, mobility, and support capability of the Ethiopian Army. Although marginal by Western standards, the Ethiopian logistic system is advanced and efficient in comparison with most other African countries. Distinct changes in support procedures, reflecting Soviet/Warsaw Pact logistic principles, have been introduced since 1977. Centralized control of logistic functions has resulted in relatively efficient resource accounting and allocation. Institution of principles of automatic resupply and strict prioritization of deliveries are indicative of an increasing level of logistic sophistication. Although overall support capability has increased, the serious defects are the country's meager military production capability and lack of indigenous petroleum resources. Consequently, Ethiopia's nearly total dependence on external sources for military supplies limits its flexibility both militarily and politically. Ethiopia's near total dependence on the Soviet Union for military equipment has permitted a high degree of standardization.

Support facilities and lines of communication are favorably located for operations against Somalia, Djibouti, and northeast Sudan. Materiel precedence afforded by well-stocked regional depots allows repositioning of additional assets concurrently with combat operations in these sectors.

The central supply depot in Addis Ababa distributes military supplies and equipment to regional command headquarters depots as directed by national-level logistic plans. The regional depots, located at Asmara and Dire Dawa, normally maintain inventory levels for 3 months of projected operations. Forward supply depots at task force headquarters are established when needed, which enable priority supplies to be stocked as close as possible to the rear of supported units.

Maintenance organizations exist at regional command headquarters level only. The Command Repair Battalion controls distribution of spare parts, allocation of mobile repair teams, and administration of regional repair facilities. For capital repairs, equipment must be transported to one of three major repair facilities. Major depots located at Adis Abeba, Dire Dawa, and Kagnw Station (Asmara) are capable of complete rebuild of ground equipment.

Despite its inadequacies, the logistic infrastructure is capable of supporting combat forces engaged in military operations necessary to maintain internal security and deter external aggression. Administration of the logistics system is competent; and, experience with automatic resupply operations, movement of material in a hostile environment, and centralization of logistic command functions has resulted in a support capability superior to that of any neighboring country. Strategic or tactical operation plans are limited not by capability of support services but by availability of material from external sources. Sustained combat operations on a large scale and dependent solely on indigenous Ethiopian resources are not feasible. With the influx of
material at the current rate, Ethiopia is capable of countering an attack by conventional forces from neighboring countries; however, prolonged large-scale offensive actions outside its borders would require a significant increase in military deliveries.

(7) Personnel Procurement and Retention

The Ethiopian Army has undergone three major expansions since 1975. In July 1973, a compulsory military service law was enacted but not implemented until 1975 when the Eritrean insurgency, the threat of a Somali attack and outbreaks of violence in other provinces demanded a larger ground force. Additionally, reservists were activated, and students were recruited. These measures increased the Regular Army from 35,000 to 40,000. By the time of the 1977 Somali invasion, tens of thousands of militia were also in training. The second expansion occurred between 1977 and 1981 when recruits were drafted again and volunteers were required to serve an initial term of 7 years. The product of these first two Army expansions was a ground force increase from 35,000 to 240,000. The third expansion was directed by a 1 January 1984 conscription law designed to replace losses due to combat and desertions which reduced the force size to 180,000, to its high end-strength of the 1980-83 period. Under the terms all citizens both male and female, in the 18-to 30-year age group are required to register for military service. DIA believes that the current strength is again at 240,000.

(M/M) Morale is the most serious and growing problem for the Ethiopian Army. Officer morale is frequently low, mainly because of low pay, slow promotions, and the inability to resign one's commission. Purges and arrests also have had a negative impact on morale. Rapid expansion has produced large numbers of personnel, but there is a shortage of qualified officers and noncommissioned officers. In some infantry brigades, the ratio of enlisted men to officers is as high as 75 to 1. An additional problem is the emphasis on political reliability as a factor in determining promotions and command assignments. The most significant morale determinant, however, is the high number of casualties that have been suffered in northern campaigns. It is not likely that morale will improve until such time as the military builds a record of undisputed success in the field, and the Government can establish a higher degree of economic and political stability than currently exists.

(8) Training

(3/IR) Training at all levels had been disrupted by the turmoil that arose in the wake of the 1974 coup, but the regime is now attempting to build a competent and loyal cadre. Basic training for enlisted personnel is conducted in four large camps, while advanced training is under the control of division commanders at centers located throughout the country and is not standardized. In the past, newly formed divisions generally were created by combining newly trained officers and enlisted men, who then conducted division-size training training exercises for about 3 months to make the unit a cohesive organization. However, the two most recently formed divisions differed from this procedure, in that they formed primarily from already existing units. Officer
training is conducted at three different military academies; Holeta, Guenet, and Harer. These institutions are thought to produce about 1,000 officer graduates a year. The academic curriculum of all three schools is based heavily on basic fundamentals of soldiering and the physical sciences. Emphasis on political indoctrination is highly important in Ethiopian military units. Officers are being trained to fill political commissar positions within the armed forces. These officers are normally graduates of the Holeta Academy and receive additional training in the Soviet Union before being placed in operational units. Political indoctrination will help to prepare Ethiopian forces for the projected establishment of the Communist Party scheduled for 1984.

Foreign military advisory programs continue to be integral parts of the ground forces training effort. Officers and technical personnel received training at US service and technical schools prior to 1977. The Soviet Union and Cuba currently are involved in instructional programs to train Ethiopians in the use of Soviet-manufactured equipment that has been delivered. Ethiopians also have been sent to the Soviet Union for training in tactics and maintenance. East Germany (GDR) is assisting in establishing the country's intelligence and security operations. Other East European countries are providing specialized short-term training courses as needed.

It is noteworthy when comparing the Ethiopian Army against other African ground forces that the Soviets found, on their arrival, the quality of Ethiopian basic training programs to be of high enough as not to require the establishment of a program at this level. While Ethiopia is not unique in this category of efficient entry level training, it is in a distinct minority of African armies that can make such a claim.

Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

All known reserves have been activated at this time in response to the conflicts being fought in the Ogaden, Eritrea, and Tigray. Reserves in the past have consisted only of a 1,400-man Territorial Army (TA) and a pool of retired servicemen who could be mobilized into "Father Fighter" battalions. However, in recent years the regime has relied on paramilitary forces, particularly the People's Militia, People's Defense Squads, and the People's Protection of the Revolution Brigades for massive supplements to its regular forces. The Territorial Army (TA) has a small permanent cadre of officers and NCOs, but most members are retired servicemen who perform 2 months of active duty each year. The original 10 battalions of Father Fighters have been supplemented by additional units formed by the call-up of retired servicemen. TA and Father Fighter units generally perform garrison and guard duties, freeing other troops for active combat roles. Militia personnel have been integrated with regular troops and have assumed major combat duties.
ETHIOPIA

(b) Mobilization

Ethiopia has demonstrated its ability to rapidly expand a small ground force to nearly ten times its size in a short period of time. Mobilization is a continuing requirement given operational requirements.

b. Navy

(1) Mission

(U) Defend the sea approaches to the nation, protect territorial waters, coastal shipping, and maritime activities, and provide logistic and fire support for the Army.

(2) Capabilities

The Navy is unable to patrol the entire 630-mile coastline; however, it is capable of short patrols in coastal waters. These patrols are conducted mainly in the vicinity of the country's two major ports, Aesab and Mitsiwa, and along the northern coastal area. Patrols along the northern coast are aimed at stopping arms smuggling to Eritrean rebels in this region. The Navy has proved itself capable of moving materiel and supplies along the Eritrean coast to resupply Ethiopian Army units. When performing this logistic support role, the squadron is under the operational control of the Ethiopian Army. The Navy suffers from three major weaknesses: a lack of technically trained personnel to maintain complex equipment, morale, and dependence on foreign military assistance for both sustainment of the current force and future expansion.

(3) Personnel Strength

2,500 (estimated 400 officers, 1,900 enlisted, and 200 civilians). Total includes a 200-man Marine force that may be expanded to about 500.

(4) Ships and Aircraft Strength

(a) Ships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Op</th>
<th>Nonop</th>
<th>In Reserve</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FFL (Corvette)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSM (Medium amphibious assault landing ship)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTG (Missile attack boat)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PB (Patrol boat)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ETHIOPIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Op</th>
<th>Nonop</th>
<th>In Reserve</th>
<th>Status Unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PBR (River/roadstead patrol boat)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCU (Utility landing craft)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCM (Medium landing craft)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AG (Miscellaneous auxiliary)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) Organization and Development

The Navy is headquartered at Addis Ababa, with primary training facilities located at Asmera, and operational bases at the country's two major ports, Mitsiwa and Aseb, which are the locations of the Navy's Northern and Southern Commands, respectively. The Northern Command is responsible for all naval operational missions and the Southern Command acts as a port authority at Aseb. Most ships are now based at Mitsiwa. However, the newer Soviet-provided missile attack boats are homebased at Aseb, where a missile handling facility has been built to support them. Surface-search radar sites have been built at both Mitsiwa and Aseb to support naval operations in these areas.

(6) Status of Equipment

Usually several ships are inoperable at any given time. The Navy itself has no capability for major overhaul of its primary ships, but the Soviet drydock stationed off Mitsiwa at Dehalak Island has been noted performing maintenance on Ethiopian naval combatants. The bulk of the Navy's fleet will have to be replaced soon because of the age of the craft and the inability to obtain spare parts. In November 1975, the Navy acquired a used patrol craft from Yugoslavia, and four 105-ft "Swiftships" (PGMs) were delivered by the US in 1977, although radar-controlled guns were not installed. In January 1978, the first combatants from the Soviet Union, consisting of one missile attack boat and two torpedo boats, were delivered. Since that time, the USSR also has supplied Ethiopia with four landing craft. Two additional landing craft have been delivered from France, the first ships in the Ethiopian inventory from this source. The POLNOCNY LSM was delivered to Ethiopia in November 1981. In 1982 a POLUCHAT I torpedo retriever and a Zhuk patrol boat were delivered. The most recent additions to the Ethiopian Navy are two ASW frigates delivered in 1983 and 1984.

(7) Logistics

The Navy is totally dependent upon foreign sources for ships and all naval equipment. Ethiopian naval personnel have criticized the Soviet Union for the poor condition of ships provided, and the lack of maintenance training. Additionally, engines must be sent back to the USSR for rebuilding and major repair, placing these ships in a nonoperational status. Inadequate operating funds and the poor use of available resources, have also eroded the Navy's overall capabilities. Small ships can put in for minor repairs at the
small shipyard in Mitsiwa, which has a marine railway with a handling capacity of 300 tons. This facility can also perform minor engine repair in shops and minor repairs afloat. Ethiopia's naval craft also have limited use of the 8,500-ton Soviet floating drydock located at the Soviet Naval Facility on Dehalak Island. Marine engines in need of major repair or rebuilding are sent back to the Soviet Union.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

Poor morale is a continuing problem, and a number of naval personnel have defected aboard while undergoing training programs; defections to the Eritrean insurgents have also occurred, and in the fall of 1983 the crew of one of the 105-ft Swiftships defected with the ship to Somalia. The government response to the latest defection has resulted in even more disgruntlement among Naval personnel. Now Ethiopian naval ships, except for the smallest boats, carry either a political commissar or a Soviet naval officer. In addition, ships have their fuel requirements strictly computed before departure on missions in order to make crew defections more difficult.

(9) Training

The Ethiopian Naval Training Center was moved from Mitsiwa in late 1978 and early 1979 to a more secure location in Asmara. It consists of two facilities, one for naval officer cadets and one for enlisted personnel. The officer school, since returned to Mitsiwa and known as the "Naval College," has a course of instruction 3 years long, including classes in military science, navigation, maintenance repairs, nursing, and other fields. Total number of cadets in the college is approximately 80. These students are divided into 3 classes of 25 to 30 each. Classes of instruction include navigation, gunnery, mathematics, and communications. After completion of the naval college, many officers go to the USSR for additional training. The enlisted training center conducts a course of instruction which is 6 months long and the school has 220 students at the center at any one time. Classes of instruction include mathematics, navigation, seamanship, engineering, and gunnery. An unknown number of enlisted personnel have also been sent to the USSR for additional training after graduation from this school.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

Ethiopia has no formal reserve or mobilization organization for the naval force. The Ethiopian Merchant Marine has nine ships of over 1,000 GRT. Although two are aged, they are considered to have military support potential. Types include five breakbulk ships one refrigerated cargo ship, one small RO/RO ship, and two POL tankers, with a total deadweight tonnage of 38,300 tons of cargo. It is likely that all of these ships would be made available to the military in the event of a national emergency. None of the ships were build in Ethiopia since the country has no commercial shipbuilding industry.
c. **Air Force**

1. **Mission**

   Provide the first line of defense against air attack, conduct close air support and reconnaissance for the ground forces and Navy, project power to foreign soil in support of national objectives, and perform logistic and airlift missions.

2. **Capabilities**

   The Ethiopian Air Force (EAF) is capable of performing close air support and reconnaissance missions effectively, and has a limited night attack capability. A ground-based radar network gives the Air Force the ability to conduct all-weather intercepts over most areas of the country. Pilot proficiency is generally high, and jet fighters have performed impressively against Somali ground and air units and against insurgent groups both in Eritrea and the Ogaden. The delivery of Soviet MiG-21 and MiG-23 fighters has added considerably to EAF effectiveness. Also the EAF has been able to augment its Soviet-supplied equipment by repairing some US-supplied aircraft. Transport capability, which had been inadequate, has been supplemented by 12 An-12 aircraft provided by the USSR and two DHC-5 Buffalo delivered in 1981 from Canada. Even with these additional assets, Ethiopian Airlines (EAL) aircraft often are called into service for troop transport.

3. **Personnel Strength**

   Est 4,000 (600 officers, including 221 pilots; 3,200 enlisted; and 200 civilians).

4. **Aircraft Strength**

   Total: 359 (fixed wing: 242 jet, 12 turbo prop; 56 prop; helicopters: 49 turbine).

   In operational units: 235
   
   (117 fighters: 76 all-weather, 41 day; 12 photo recon
   24 trainers: 20 combat capable;
   19 transports: 9 medium-range, 10 short-range;
   14 utility: staff transport, communication;
   49 helicopters: 16 attack, 33 utility)
(5) **Organization and Deployment**

(a) **General**

The EAF Commander is directly subordinate to the National Revolutionary Operations Command. The Commander is assisted by a Deputy Commander and a Chief of Staff. Each airfield has one or more squadrons which are subordinate to an air group. The air group controls all assets at the airfield and the air group commanders report directly to the Commander of the Air Force at Harar Meda Air Base, EAF Headquarters. Operating elements consist of fighter, transport, trainer, reconnaissance, and air rescue units at Harar Meda, and fighter units at Aba Tenna Dejazmatch Yilma, Gode, and Yohannes IV Airfields.

(b) **Summary of Units**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Principal Base</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 Ftr Sqdns</td>
<td></td>
<td>FLOGGER C</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Harar Meda Afd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FLOGGER F</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Harar Meda Afd</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FISHBED L</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>Harar Meda Afd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FISHBED U/I</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Yohannes IV Intl Afd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>F-5E Tiger II</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Harar Meda Afd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MONGOL</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Harar Meda Afd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MIDGET</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Aba Tenna Dejazmatch Yilma Afd</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FRESCO C</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Aba Tenna Dejazmatch Yilma Afd</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DHC-6 Twin Otter</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Yohannes IV Intl Afd</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 **Aviation Sqdn</td>
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<td>HIND</td>
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<td>HIP</td>
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<td></td>
<td>U-1A Otter</td>
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<td>Harar Meda Afd</td>
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<td>U-17A Cessna</td>
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<td>UH-1H Iroquois</td>
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<td>Harar Meda Afd</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>T-41A Mescalero</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Harar Meda Afd</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* **(S/NF/AM/AF)** On 20 May 1984, Eritrean insurgents staged an attack on Yohannes IV International Airfield inflicting serious damage to aircraft deployed there. Aircraft losses included 3 HIPs and 8 FLOGGERS, and 1 FISHBED. In addition, 1 Soviet Il-38 May was destroyed and the other Il-38 was seriously damaged.

** *(S/NF)* Formerly Army aviation. In early 1983, the Army air assets were reassigned to the Air Force.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Principal Base</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Transport Sqdn</td>
<td>CUB</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Harar Meda Afld</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHC-5 Buffalo</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Harar Meda Afld</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Douglas Skytrain</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>Harar Meda Afld</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODLING</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Harar Meda Afld</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS Dove</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Harar Meda Afld</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Reconnaissance Sqdn</td>
<td>FISHBED H</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Harar Meda Afld</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Trng Sqdn</td>
<td>F-86 SABRE</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Yohannes IV Intl Afld</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) **Status of Equipment**

(31/31) The large quantities of late-model MiG-21 and MiG-23 fighter aircraft plus An-12 transports are thought to be in good operating condition, with Soviets advising assisting in maintenance functions. The US-supplied fighters, reconnaissance aircraft, and trainers are suffering from a severe parts shortage, and most of these aircraft are being flown only occasionally. Transports obtained from US and other Western sources are maintained in fairly good order because spare parts for these aircraft are more easily purchased on the world market. However, many of these planes will have to be replaced because of the excessive number of flying hours that have been put on the airframes. In addition, the Ethiopians have in the past experienced serious difficulties with their HIND helicopters in Eritrea, principally because of operating conditions. Because of the altitude, the lift capability of the HIND is limited, and combat missions are flown with limited ordnance. Besides the altitude problems, terrain difficulties affect the operation of the helicopters; the steep mountainous areas deny the Ethiopians close-in air-ground support.

(7) **Logistics**

(60) The EAF relies heavily on foreign sources, especially the Soviet Bloc, for aircraft and related equipment, ammunition, POL, and advisory support. Although the logistic system is hampered by limited availability of parts for the Western-produced aircraft, shipments of Soviet aircraft to Ethiopia may permit them to be phased out and sold to other Third World nations who can obtain needed parts.

(60) Aircraft maintenance capability is an untapped strength of the Ethiopian Air Force. Owing to Soviet policy, it is an asset not fully utilized. In the past, the Air Force's record of successful maintenance on US-supplied aircraft was impressive. Additionally, Ethiopian Airlines (EAL), whose services are available to the military, operates a maintenance service and training program with an excellent international reputation. EAL has contracts with other African airlines, e.g., Zambian Airways, to service their jet fleets.
When the Air Force changed to Soviet fighter and transport aircraft it did not receive maintenance training on the new equipment. Soviet technicians perform all major maintenance and troubleshooting. Major overhaul of most aircraft components is accomplished only after shipment to facilities within the Soviet Union. Ethiopian mechanics are allowed to perform only routine, relatively simple maintenance tasks. This policy is a reflection of the Soviet desire to protect its technology and promote client dependence rather than inability of Ethiopian mechanics to successfully perform sophisticated maintenance tasks. In fact, such friction has developed between Ethiopia and the Soviet Union that the Soviets have conceded to Ethiopian desires and will build a repair facility in Ethiopia to service some military aircraft.

The level of stockage of all types of spare parts for Air Force equipment is critically low. Lack of success in obtaining parts of US-supplied aircraft has led to extensive cannibalization and drastic reduction in the number of operational US-manufactured planes. Supply of parts for Soviet-supplied aircraft has been inadequate both in terms of amount and timeliness. Chronic shortages of even routine replacement items such as tires and wheels have periodically resulted in temporary cannibalization, operation of unsafe aircraft, and degraded operational readiness rates. The Air Force has been the most vocal of the services in its dissatisfaction with the Soviet supply relationship.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

All enlisted personnel volunteer for a 10-year period of continuous service. The retention rate is about 90 percent, and promotions compare favorably with those in the Army and Navy. Volunteers consistently exceed the number of available spaces (which usually average about 300 annually). The bulk of officer procurement is from selective recruitment of high school and university graduates, with higher academic levels preferred. The overall quality of manpower in the EAF officers' corps suffered during and shortly after the revolution. Many top administrative personnel and pilots were identified as antiregime and were jailed or purged from the service. Since that time, morale problems have continued in the Air Force; many officers and enlisted personnel are unhappy with the large-scale Soviet adviser presence and the Soviet requirement that Ethiopian jet engines be sent back to the USSR for rebuild. Although most EAF personnel recognize that their living and working environments are much better than their Army counterparts, there continue to be shortages of food and clothing for enlisted personnel, which has an adverse impact on morale. As in the other Services, the introduction of political commissars into the Air Force has contributed to increased negativism in the Ethiopian Air Force officer corps. Despite these troubles, the present personnel in the EAF and the EAL as a whole should be rated as the best in black Africa, mostly as a result of established, high-quality training programs.
(9) **Training**

Recruits receive 4 months of basic training followed by a basic course in elementary mechanics for those personnel assigned to technical fields. Cadets, both flying and nonflying, are enrolled in the officer candidate school, which has an output of about 20 second lieutenants annually. Pilots receive their advanced training in the units to which they are attached. The number of hours each pilot flies while with operational units is more than sufficient to maintain a high level of pilot proficiency. In the past, the EAF flight training program was closely patterned after that of the USAF, and pilot graduates were well qualified upon graduation. However, the nature of training is now rapidly being shaped by the Soviet Union and the skill level of new pilots is unknown. At least 50 pilots, who in the past flew US fighters, have now completed MiG-21 and MiG-23 training in the Soviet Union and large numbers of transport pilots and maintenance personnel have also taken short courses in the USSR. At the present time, an unknown number of additional pilots and technical personnel are in the Soviet Union for longer-term training programs that run 3 to 5 years. The Air Force Academy is located at Mitsiwa and presents a 3-year course in military science, navigation, maintenance and repair, nursing, and other fields.

(10) **Reserves and Mobilization**

(a) **Reserves**

There is no known reserve system. There are some former EAF member (both pilots and ground crew) serving with Ethiopia Airlines (EAL).

(b) **Mobilization**

All of the country's civil aircraft and indigenous civilian aviation assets could be mobilized for military or other government use in the event of war or comparable national emergency. Ethiopian Airlines provided valuable cargo and troop airlift support to the Government during the 1977-78 Ogaden war.

(U) Approximately 22 civil transport aircraft with a gross takeoff weight of at least 9,000 kilograms currently are registered, owned, and operated by Ethiopia. These aircraft include: 1 Boeing 707-320C and 5 Boeing 720B, long-range transport aircraft; 3 Boeing 727-200, 2 DHC-5 Buffalo, and 11 McDonnell Douglas C-47/DC-3 Dakotas, medium-range transport aircraft. All of these aircraft are in the fleet of Ethiopian Airlines (EAL), which is wholly government owned. Some of the Douglas C-47/DC-3s may not be operational. EAL has ordered two medium-range Boeing 767-200ER (extended range) aircraft, and placed options on two more; delivery of the first two is expected in May or June 1984.
ETHIOPIA

(U) In addition to the above aircraft, approximately 30 light, fixed-wing aircraft of various types are operated by Admas Air Service, which is also wholly government owned. It performs a wide variety of general aviation operations, including aerial photography, disaster relief, and air ambulance services.

(U) According to Ethiopian Government figures, approximately 260 civilian pilots of all types hold valid licenses in Ethiopia. Ethiopian Airlines reportedly employs about 100 pilots.

d. Air Defense Command

(1) Mission

To defend, in conjunction with the Air Force, vital installations of military importance and provide warning of hostile air action.

(2) Capabilities

The Air Defense Command, because of heavy Cuban and Soviet adviser involvement, is able to provide a good level of low- and medium-altitude air defense coverage in the port area of Aseb. The number of SAM sites currently located near the airfields at Debre Zeit, and Jijiga allow for only limited air defense coverage at these locations. Because of an increase in SAM sites in Dire Dawa, protection has recently improved at this airfield. The limited number of sites at most locations allow the system to serve only a tripwire function against foreign air attacks. The Ethiopian Air Force remains the nation's first line of defense against hostile air action.

(3) Personnel Strength

The strength of the Air Defense Command is estimated at 3,000 personnel, but because it is not clear which air defense systems belong to the Air Defense Command and which AD weapons are organic to Army units the exact strength remains undetermined. In addition, many positions currently are being manned by Cuban/Soviet advisers and technicians who are manning the systems and providing on-the-job training for Ethiopian personnel.

(4) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

Little is known about the Air Defense Command organization. The headquarters is located in or around Addis Ababa. This facility is believed to coordinate operations between air defense and air force assets.
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Operations SAM sites and early warning/air surveillance sites are located at Asseb and around military airbases at Debre Zeyt (Ethiopian Air Force HQ), Dire Dawa, and Jijiga.*

(b) Summary of Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Type</th>
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<td>SA-3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Asseb</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 support battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 SAM battalions</td>
<td>SA-2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Debre Zeyt</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 radar battalion</td>
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</table>

(5) Equipment

SA-2: 24 launchers and 150 missiles; SA-3: 21 launchers and 150 missiles. SA-7 missiles are organic to ground units and strength figures for the system can be found in the ground forces inventory table. Radars (including target tracking at SAM sites): about 35.

(6) Status of Equipment

The general state of the air defense equipment is thought to be good. Cuban and Soviet personnel operate and maintain most of these complex weapon systems. Ethiopian technicians are in the process of being trained on them.

(7) Logistics

The logistic system for the air defense equipment appears to be well planned, with major maintenance and logistic support facilities located near deployed equipment. The facilities are thought to be heavily manned by Cuban and Soviet personnel.

* Six SA-9 GASKIN SAM transporter-erector-launchers were first located at Addis Ababa/Lidetta Airfield in June 1984. This is the first known deployment of the weapon system to Ethiopia. These SAMs may be assigned elsewhere after the September 1984 anniversary celebrations.
(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

Little information is available on the procurement of personnel. When the organization was established, some personnel probably were obtained from both Air Force and Army units to provide a basic core upon which to build the organization.

(9) Training

Training probably consists of special instruction in air defense systems, after a period of basic training. An unknown number of Ethiopians also have gone to the USSR for advanced training on SAMs and radar systems. Cuban and Soviet advisers also provide onsite training in Ethiopia as well.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

There are no known reserve units or mobilization plans.

e. Paramilitary Forces

(1) Emergency Strike Force Police

(a) Mission

Border patrol and counterinsurgency operations; it also serves as a highly mobile reserve to reinforce regular police as well as military units.

(b) Capabilities

Emergency Strike Force Police members are trained and equipped as a light infantry force. Its primary limitation has been the slow adoption of coordinated intelligence functions and operations with the Army. It has excellent communications and good mobility and is capable of contributing to the country's combat strength.

(c) Strength

9,000

(d) Organization

The force consists of a headquarters, at least 2 training centers, approximately 14 battalion headquarters, and 50 companies of 150 men each. The largest segments are stationed in Eritrea and the Ethiopian-Somali border area.
(e) Status of Equipment

Arms include rifles, submachineguns, light mortars. Mobility since 1978 has been enhanced through acquisition of trucks, Land Rovers, and motorcycles, most of which appear to be in adequate supply and in good condition.

(2) National Police

In addition to the Emergency Strike Force Police, there is a 30,000-man National Ethiopian Police Force. This force has traditionally served as a ready reserve for Army units and all police inductees routinely receive basic military training.

(3) Other

Ethiopian forces are augmented along the Ethiopian/Somali border by Somali insurgent forces under its de facto control. These include two primary groups—the Somali Democratic Salvation Front (SDSF) and the Somali National Movement (SNM). Although they are not part of the Ethiopian Government's military structure officially, they are listed here because they are an important force controlled by Addis Ababa.

The SDSF was formed in October 1981 when the Somali Salvation Front (SSF) aligned itself with two minor ideologically oriented, anti-Somali president Siad organizations. The insurgents have received training and assistance from Ethiopia and Libya; material from South Yemen; and limited support from the Soviet Union. The SDSF can operate as independent units but also in joint military operations with Ethiopian forces in the Ogaden and along the disputed border in attempts to consolidate Ethiopian military control of the region. Weapons for the SDSF are primarily supplied by the Ethiopian Army and Libya. Most weapons are Soviet arms with a mix of older US equipment. In addition, the Ethiopians have given the SDSF captured Somali equipment, which includes Italian APCs/armored cars and some West German and French-manufactured small arms. Present combat strength is estimated at 2,500-3,000.

The SNM originated in the mid-1970s when thousands of Somali workers emigrated to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other Persian Gulf countries. They soon began to organize themselves under the leadership of political dissidents, mainly on a tribal basis. During its first month of existence, the SNM, primarily based in London, confined its activities to publishing a newsletter and placing anti-Siad propaganda in the media and newspaper. It was not until 1982 that the SNM developed a military arm and began receiving assistance and training from Ethiopia. In March 1982, SNM headquarters was moved from London to Addis Ababa. At present, SNM military personnel strength is estimated at over 1,000 armed personnel receiving training at major, Ethiopian training bases. The SNM has demonstrated its capability to conduct small raids into Somali territory and to attack government facilities. Efforts continue to unite the SDSF and the SNM.
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### f. Total Military Personnel Strength

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<tr>
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<td>Air Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>Emergency Strike Force Police</td>
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<td>National Police</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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### g. Foreign Military Presence

#### (1) Foreign Military In-Country

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<td>GDR (East Germany)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDSF and SMN</td>
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#### (2) Military Presence Abroad

- (U) None
Withheld pursuant to exemption
(b)(3) 10 USC 424
of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
## ETHIOPIA

### APPENDIX (Continued)

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1. Political-Military Situation: The Republic of Gabon was established in August 1960 and has operated under a one-party presidential regime since 1968. Although Gabon is a republic and elects an 84-member National Assembly to 5-year terms, the majority of the power is centralized in the President, El Hadj Omar Bongo. President Bongo was reelected to a 7-year term in January 1980. His firm control over the government apparatus has never been challenged.

In contrast to the close personal relationship that President Bongo enjoyed with former French President Giscard d'Estaing, Gabon's initial relations with the French Socialist government were cool. Following the French socialist electoral victory in 1981, Bongo felt forced to reconsider his assumption that he could rely on the French military presence to rush to his defense in the event of any political crisis. However, the French military presence, including a contingent of Jaguar fighters and a refueling tanker, remains constant in Gabon. Although Bongo continues to seek and strengthen relations with other countries, both he and Mitterand appear to have arrived at a correct relationship. France recognizes that Gabon is a significant economic partner and an essential actor in the strategic disposition of France in Central Africa. Similarly, Bongo realizes that French military and economic support to Gabon would be unequalled by any other power.

The security forces of the Republic are subordinate to President Bongo. He maintains close control over them with the assistance of French advisers. The President has distributed military power among the Army, Navy, Air Force, Gendarmerie, Presidential Guard, and the National Police Forces. Gabon's small army is deployed in company size or smaller units in seven of the country's nine military regions. These are Libreville, Franceville, Makakou, Koula-Moutou, Mouila, Tchibanga, and Oyem. This reflects the President's mistrust of troops concentrated too near the capital or in large numbers within one sector. His distrust inhibits efforts to improve the combat capability of the Army. This force is in a poor state of readiness, with limited weapons and field training. The Army, with the aid of the Gendarmerie, could maintain internal security; however, any attack from neighboring states would probably require French assistance.

The Navy is based at Port Gentil. With no reserve force and no offense capability, the Navy does have limited ability to perform its assigned missions: to prevent water smuggling, and to provide transportation for security forces deployed along the coast and accessible inland waterways.

Stationed at Libreville airfield, the Air Force is capable of executing its mission of providing transport for parachutists, liaison for the Army, and logistic support to outlying areas.

Under the President's direct control, the Presidential Guard is the best armed, equipped, and trained Gabonese military force in the country. No other Gabonese military force is as powerful or receives as much modern equipment as the Presidential Guard. Much of the equipment purchased for the Air Force is also utilized and maintained by the Guard. The Guard's primary mission, to maintain the regime in power, reflects Bongo's concern with internal security.

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security. Commanded by a French national, the Guard is composed of Gabonese, French, and Moroccans. Its troops are based at the Presidential Palace and at the Libreville airfield.

Gabon has no military equipment production capability. Gabon's major military suppliers have been France, the US, and the PRC. Recent materiel delivered from France is valued at almost $45 million and includes fighter aircraft, a missile attack boat, and armored reconnaissance vehicles. The US has provided C-130s and T-34s used by the Presidential Guard. Deliveries from the PRC were made as grant aid and include infantry weapons and artillery valued at $7 million.

President Bongo has had little internal or external challenge to his authority. Gabon has remained stable since Bongo assumed the Presidency in 1967. There have been occasional signs of opposition, most recently by students and by the dissident group MORENA (Movement pour le Redressment National). A Fang organization, this group is composed primarily of intellectuals and professors from the university. Members of this group claim MORENA is an intellectual, nonviolent, political movement aimed at seeking redress for grievances. To date, neither of these groups has posed a threat to the Government. A long-term problem—and one that has contributed to these overt signs of opposition—is the ethnic diversity of the country and the slow progress toward the development of a national rather than a tribal identity.

Gabon is an economically viable state with a small population and an adequate resource endowment. Because of oil and other mineral deposits, Gabon's 1982 GDP amounted to $3,375 billion ($3,835 per capita). Expressed in dollar terms, the per capita GDP has been declining due to the appreciation of the dollar. Besides its petroleum deposits, Gabon is one of the world's largest exporters of manganese. Its important uranium deposits, timber reserves, and vast iron ore deposits have not been fully exploited.

When the economy suffered substantial foreign exchange deficits in the mid-1970s, the Government imposed a series of strict austerity measures, backed by an IMF stabilization program. These have been successfully completed but are being continued with technical assistance to insure that the recovery, which is well underway, will not be disrupted by a renewed surge of unprogrammed spending.

As a result of weak world markets for Gabon's four export commodities (petroleum, manganese, uranium, and timber), Gabon's economic performance has recently declined. However, Gabon continues to be one of the financially strongest nations in Black Africa due to its substantial oil revenue and small population. The economy is export-oriented with these exports accounting for 61 percent of the GNP in 1982.

Officially nonaligned, Gabon leans toward the West on foreign policy issues and clearly has a close relationship with France in terms of economic aid. Gabon has improved its relations with several regional countries and has expressed a desire to initiate talks aimed at the development of a Central African Economic Community.
(C) Externally, the Gabonese Government is concerned with Soviet and Cuban military involvement in neighboring states, particularly the Congo and Sao Tome and Principe. The Government is also concerned with instability promoted by outside elements such as the Libyan element causing the turmoil in Chad. In addition, Gabon is concerned about stability in Cameroon. In fact, the Cameroonian-Gabonese border, closed by Gabon during Cameroon's 6 April coup attempt, has reportedly remained closed. For the past several years, Bongo has requested substantial military assistance from Western sources to help Gabon develop a credible deterrent to potential subversion across its largely unmarked frontiers.

(UN) Gabon-US relations currently are excellent. Gabon has purchased some military equipment from the US and has expressed the desire for more. However, the French have tried to convince Bongo that US equipment would be far inferior to French equipment.

2. (U) Key Officials:
President: El Hadj Omar Bongo
Prime Minister: Leon Mbeame
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation: Martin Bongo (the President's nephew)
Minister of National Defense, Veterans Affairs and Public Security: Julien Mpouho-Epigat
Secretary General in the Ministry of Defense: Gen Jean-Fernand Roux (French National)
Armed Forces: Commander in Chief, Maj Gen Daniel Ba Oumar
Armed Forces Chief of Staff: Brig Gen Idriss Ngari
Army Chief of Staff: Col Claude Gadault
Naval Forces Chief of Staff: Capt Jean-Leonard Mbini
Air Force Chief of Staff: Lt Col Jacques Mve-Nkwele
Gendarmerie: Commander in Chief, Gen Andre Nzong
Gendarmerie: Chief of Staff, Col Henri Poumah-Ntogolo
Gabonese Presidential Guard: Chief of Staff, Gen Louis Martin (French National)
National Police: Commander in Chief, Lt Gen Jean-Boniface Assele (the President's brother-in-law)

3. (U) Military Budget: The total national defense budget for fiscal year ending 1983 is $108 million. Dollar values are converted from CFA at the official exchange rate of 283 CFA equal $1.00. This figure is 8 percent of the total budget.

4. (U) Population: 958,000 estimated as of June 1984
Males (ages 15-49): 227,000; physically fit, 117,000
Ethnic Divisions: About 40 ethnic groups, including 5 major ones (Fang, Bapouna, Eshira, Mbene, and Okande); about 178,000 expatriate Africans and Europeans, including 28,000 French
Literacy: About 65 percent

5. (UN) Army-Gabonese Armed Forces (FAG):
Personnel Strength: 1,700
Reserve: None
Combat Units: Seven infantry companies, one parachute battalion, one engineer battalion, one command and support battalion and one 81-mm mortar battery.

Major Equipment: 11 EE-11 URUTU APCs, 1 APC NFI, 12 EE-9 Cascavel ARV, 68 armored reconnaissance vehicles, 1 75-mm M97 gun, 45 PRC Type 69 AT rocket launchers, 15 75-mm recoiless rifles, 4 160-mm mortars, 3 81-mm mortars, 16 82-mm mortars, 14 120-mm mortars, 2 40-mm AD guns, 12 37-mm AD guns, 8 Milan systems, and 7 EE-25 (25-t trucks).

6. **Navy:**
Personnel Strength: 200 (2 officers, 5 petty officers, and 193 EM) plus 14 French advisers
Reserve: None
Ships: Four (three patrol craft and one landing craft)

7. **Air Force—Gabonese Air Force (GAF):**
Personnel Strength: 500 (including 10 Gabonese and nine French pilots)
Reserve: None
Units: Transport Group and Presidential Air Group
Aircraft: 42; 27 transports, 6 utility, 1 trainer, and 8 helicopters

8. **Paramilitary:**
   a. **Gendarmerie**
   Personnel Strength: approximately 2,300
   Reserve: None
   Units: Three groups (assigned to North, South, and East Security Zones) and a mobile squadron
   Major Equipment: five Panhard AML armored cars, six armored cars, an unknown number of 81-mm mortars, one Alouette III helicopter, and 16 small coastal craft.
   b. **Gabonese Presidential Guard**
   Personnel Strength: 1,400, including 70 French nationals
   Reserve: None
   Units: One air squadron, one infantry battalion, one armored battalion, and one artillery battalion.
   Major Equipment: The air squadron has 28 aircraft: 13 fighters, 13 trainers, and 2 helicopters. The infantry battalion is made up of three infantry companies equipped with Uzi machineguns. The armored battalion has two companies, one equipped with six Cadillac-Gage V150 armored cars and six VXB APCs, and the other equipped with 18 AML armored cars. An artillery battalion is being formed and has 12 antiaircraft guns and 26 PRC Type 69 AT rocket launchers.
   c. **National Police Forces**
   Personnel Strength: 1,200. Total includes a 150-man intervention company and a 72-man Public Security Brigade designed to provide a rapid response capability for reports of crimes by gangs.

* The Presidential Guard has its own aircraft.
9. (U) Key US Officials:
   Chief of Mission (Libreville): Ambassador Francis Terry McNamara
   Defense Attache (Kinshasa, Zaire): Col Frank K. Williams, USA

10. (S/N) Foreign Military Presence:
    French Military Forces:* 550
    French Military Advisers: 145
    Moroccan Security Forces: 30

* (S/N) Personnel are assigned to the French 6th Overseas Infantry Battalion, which is permanently stationed in Libreville. This battalion includes two rotating companies whose parent units are the 9th and 11th Divisions stationed in France.
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</tbody>
</table>
Political-Military Situation: The Republic of the Gambia has been led by Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara since receiving its independence from the United Kingdom (UK) in 1965. Residual British influence is strongly reflected in the Gambia's unicameral, multiparty system. The National Convention Party, headed by Sheriff Dibba, is the only opposition party. The Gambia's foreign policy is Western oriented and generally moderate. This is a result of Jawara's personal philosophy; the country's diplomatic and security association with Senegal; its fairly open, democratic government; and strong village/tribal traditions of compromise and consensus. The Gambia's location, a small country surrounded on the north, east, and south by Senegal, requires a close relationship with Senegal.

Since gaining its independence in 1965, the Gambia's political history had been marked by a relatively high degree of stability. However, over the years Gambians became disgruntled over the country's failing economy, decreased agricultural production, and government corruption. During 1983, the availability of food became especially serious as crop failure and below-normal rainfall caused large shortfalls. The aftermath of the July 1981 attempted coup continued in investigations, trials, and rumors of high-level involvement in dissident activity. A possible future source of internal turmoil could result from the large number of weapons used in the coup attempt that remain unaccounted. Although several participants in the coup plot were sentenced to death, coup leader Sanyang and some of his followers who fled to Guinea-Bissau were eventually sent to Cuba by the Bissau officials.

As a result of the July 1981 coup attempt, President Jawara and Senegal's president Abdou Diouf signed an agreement establishing the Senegambia Confederation, effective 1 February 1982. Both Senegal and the Gambia retain their independence and sovereignty. Under the terms of the confederation, the Gambia's armed forces and security forces are integrated with Senegalese forces in the Gambia, an economic and monetary union is to be developed, and policy in the field of foreign relations and in matters of communications are coordinated. Senegal's President Diouf is President of the confederation; the Gambia's President Jawara is Vice-President. The Confederation Assembly consists of two-thirds Senegalese representatives and one-third Gambians.

President Jawara claimed to have most of the Gambian people's support for the confederation. Although the majority of the Gambian parliament approved of the confederation, there are some elements within the Gambia that oppose it. The confederation may be the salvation for the Gambia; but Gambians also fear subordination to the French-speaking Senegalese.

Under the Confederation, the Gambia is a military zone of operation. A Senegalese officer is the military adviser to President Jawara and is in command of the Gambia Military Zone. Approximately 600 Senegalese troops have been integrated with the Gambian Gendarmerie (formerly called the Gambian Field Force). The Senegalese military headquarters in the Gambia is located at Bakau. The Senegalese troops perform security duty at the presidency, at Yundum Airfield in Banjul, the Banjul-Barra ferry crossings, at the radio station at Banjul, at the Oyster-Creek Bridge, and at the Farafenni Ferry Crossing.
The Gambians are developing their own army, which is to consist of 750 men comprised of 2 companies of infantry, 1 engineer company, 1 armored car squadron, and the appropriate headquarters and support elements. Four gendarme cadets will become Army officers and will receive training in the US and Great Britain. Other countries providing assistance include France and Morocco. The first group of 100 recruits completed basic training in December 1983 and will train additional groups of 100 in 6-month cycles.

The Gambia has no military materiel production capability. In 1975 and 1976, the PRC and the USSR donated infantry weapons valued at about $3 million. The UK has provided two naval vessels, as well as construction equipment and technical training. Britain has agreed to provide technical assistance and training toward the development of The Gambian Army. The US began plans to initiate an International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) in 1983.

2. (U) Key Officials:
President: Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara
Minister of Interior: Alieu Badji
Minister of External Affairs: Lamin Kiti Jabang
Commander, Gambia Gendarmerie: Cdr N'Dow N'Jie (Once The Gambian Army is formed, he will become its commander.)
Inspector General, Gambian National Police: Sulayman Jarra
Commander, Gambia Military Zone: Commandant (Maj), Ibrahima Nouhou Sylla (a Senegalese)

3. (U) Paramilitary Budget: $3.06 million for fiscal year ending 30 June 1981. This figure is 6.2 percent of the central government budget. No service allocations are available. Dollar value converted at an exchange rate of 1.7 dalasi equal $1.00.

4. (U) Population: 725,000 estimated as of 1 July 1984
Males (ages 15-49): 162,000; physically fit: 82,000
Ethnic Divisions: Over 99 percent Africans (Mandinka 40.8 percent, Fulani 13.5 percent, Wolof, 12.9 percent, remainder made up of several smaller groups), fewer than 1 percent Europeans and Lebanese.
Literacy: about 10 percent

5. (U) Army: Under development (see para 1, Political-Military Situation)

6. (U) Navy: None

7. (U) Air Force: None

8. (C) Paramilitary:
   a. Gendarmerie: Personnel strength of the Gendarmerie is 280 men (3 officers, 277 enlisted). In addition to N'Dow N'Jie, its commander, the Gendarmerie has two other officers. One is the training officer at Bakau Camp; the other is the operations officer. Unit leaders are called inspectors—a police rank equivalent to a grade just below warrant officer. Enlisted men are all
volunteers who serve for 5-year renewable terms. Recruits receive basic training consisting of military and police subjects for 6 months. Gendarmerie forces use the British 7.62-mm L1A1 rifle; recruits appear to use the 7.62-mm Simonov SL rifle (SRS). Reportedly, the Gendarmerie holds weekly parades to instill discipline, teamwork, and esprit. Movements, commands, and manual of arms are performed in the British style. There are a few battered Land Rovers and one or two light trucks in the inventory. Although the Gendarmerie has a communications center, it is not secure. The Gendarmerie has two armories that are well guarded. One contains 250 British 7.62-mm L1A1 rifles, 10 machineguns, about 15 shotguns; the second armory contains 150 Chinese AK 47 rifles (Type 56), approximately 150 Chinese SKS rifles, and some 20-mm Oerlikon guns without mounts. The Oerlikon guns may belong to The Gambian Harbor Patrol Division. The Gendarmerie would only be capable of a brief, limited defensive action against even an unsophisticated force. It lacks qualified NCOs, strength, firepower, logistic capability, and command structure to make it an effective force.


c. Harbor Police Division: Personnel strength unknown.

Ships: Five patrol craft are subordinate to the Harbor Police Division. These boats are used to apprehend fishing poachers; one is also used as the Presidential yacht.

9. (U) Key US Officials:
Chief of Mission (Banjul): Ambassador Larry Gordon Piper

10. (U) Foreign Military Presence: 450-man Senegalese force
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(SECRET)
GHANA

1. GOVERNMENT

a. (U) Key Government Officials

Head of State: Flight Lieutenant (Rank equates to USAF Capt) Jerry John Rawlings
Secretary of Foreign Affairs: Dr. Obed Yao Asamoah
Minister of Defense: Defense is the direct responsibility of the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC).
Secretary of Defense: Rear Admiral (Ret) Chemago K. Dzang
Director, MOD Operations and Plans: Col Victor Doegah
Director, MOD Logistics: Col Peter Awuku
Director, MOD Personnel/Administration: Col R.B. Commey
Secretary of Interior: Mr. Kofi Djin
Special Adviser to the PNDC: Capt (Ret) Kojo Tsikata

b. Type and Stability of Government

A coup led by retired Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings on 31 December 1981 resulted in Ghana's fifth military coup and eighth military regime since it received its independence from Great Britain in 1957. The military has played a pivotal role in Ghana's political equation primarily in reaction to unacceptable levels of corruption, worsening economic conditions, and political indecision and repression. However, Rawlings has been unable to improve the political and economic conditions that have existed in Ghana over the past two decades. The Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) was established by Rawlings soon after the coup as the instrument of the revolution to transform the social and economic order of the country. The PNDC originally consisted of six members and Rawlings who headed the council. It now consists of Chairman Rawlings and four members—only one of whom is an original member of the PNDC. Five original members either resigned or were fired. Largely ineffective, the PNDC does not meet regularly; rather, decisions are made by Rawlings and his advisers within and outside of the PNDC. His most influential adviser is retired army Captain Kojo Tsikata who is not a member of the PNDC and who has close ties to Libya, the Soviet Union, and Cuba.

People's Defense Committees (PDCs), and Workers Defense Committees (WDCs) were established theoretically to allow all Ghanaians to participate in government. The committees come under the authority of the National Defense Committee. In December 1982, Rawlings established subordinate defense committees at regional, district, and local (area, town, village) levels to further decentralize the government. The role of the defense committees is in many ways similar to a party in a one-party state. Although secret ballots and universal adult suffrage will be preserved at the local level, the PDCs will have a key role in nominating candidates. At the national level, Rawlings has no plans to return the government to civilian rule.

The Government of Ghana, like many Third World governments, is inherently unstable. It lacks experience, cohesion, direction, and decisiveness. Moreover, it has been unable to successfully deal with the central obstacle to stability in the country—the severe economic problems. Neither the civilian nor...
the military sectors of society fully support the Government. As evidence of this discontent with the regime, no less than five separate unsuccessful coups have been attempted to oust Rawlings since he came to power. The continued prospects for a change in the Government are high since economic conditions have worsened and are expected to continue to worsen at least through mid-1984. It should be noted, however, the PNDC beat back and survived the coup attempts, has undertaken an IMF/IBRD (World Bank) and Western supported economic reform program courageous in its severity and scope, and been pragmatic in shifting to new policies when ideological approaches failed.

c. Internal Threat

The major internal threat to Ghana is the military. Due to its historic penchant to change a government that is not moving fast enough or in the right direction to improve economic conditions, the status of any regime depends upon the tolerance of the military. Further complicating the internal scene is the acquisition last year of tanks from Libya reportedly to scare those Ghanaians who might seek to overthrow the government.

Longstanding ethnic rivalries also pose a threat to Ghana. Although Rawlings' coup was not conducted by members of the same tribe and the PNDC originally had representatives from several ethnic groups, ethnic tensions have intensified since he came to power. There have been several reported coup plots by either Ghanaians who opposed the regime from the beginning or from radicals who initially supported Rawlings. On 1 July 1982, three judges and a retired army officer were slain. All the victims were northerners. Both Rawlings and Tsikata are members of the Ewe, a southern tribe. Some northerners felt that the leadership was favoring the Ewes. A key northerner in the PNDC was Sergeant Daniel Aolga Akata-Pore. In November 1982, two coup plots surfaced, one of which was reportedly led by Akata-Pore and several enlisted personnel from northern tribes, and another led by officers from northern tribes. Rawlings, who was initially regarded as the champion of the lower military ranks, was accused by some enlisted members of ethnic favoritism. Akata-Pore was detained and lost his position on the PNDC. The most recent attempted coup occurred on 19 June 1983 when Ghanaian dissidents briefly occupied the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation facilities and announced the overthrow of the Rawlings' regime. Some moderates and some radical elements in society continue to be perceived by Rawlings as a threat to his regime and coup attempts will likely continue in 1984.

To counter the threat, Rawlings is trying to give the impression that he is involving all Ghanaians in the decisionmaking process through his decentralization program. To restore professionalism and loyalty in the military, his Army Commander is conducting field exercises.

Poor economic conditions and a society divided over its support for the regime are other internal threats facing the Government of Ghana. The military will likely decide the longevity of the present Government.

d. External Threat

Rawlings perceives a threat from Ghanaians in exile in the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, and Togo, and he believes that the Government of Togo would
GHANA

support the opponents of his regime. In September 1982, Ghana closed all its borders on the grounds that smuggling between borders had to be stopped. In reality, Rawlings took the action to preclude Ghanaian exiles from building up support in neighboring countries to return to Ghana and conduct a coup. The borders have been opened periodically. However, with the flood of illegal aliens leaving Nigeria and returning to Ghana, the closed borders present a problem for the regime in that there is the possibility that antiregime exiles in Ghana's neighboring countries may also enter Ghana and attempt a coup with the support of some elements of the military. Rawlings also perceives Ghanaian exiles in London as a threat. Actually, the exiles could only become a threat if they were well organized and financed. Although relations with Ghana's neighbors are tense, there are no substantive reports of any foreign-backed coup plots by Ghanaian exiles.

e. Communist Influence

The Government of Ghana is influenced by Marxist-oriented radicals who regard aspects of Libyan, Soviet, Cuban, Ethiopian, and to some extent North Korean societies as revolutionary models for development. Although there is no Communist party in Ghana (Rawlings proscribed all political parties upon taking over the Government), many of the leaders of the PDCs are members of radical groups, and key advisers to Rawlings are Marxist-Leninist. However, the ideology of political operatives in Ghana has not caused a massive rush of Communist assistance but rather a cautious, steady increase of aid to the lynchpin of Ghana's security, the military.

Immediately after the coup, Libya supplied Ghana with some small arms and ammunition. Later, Libya provided Ghana several Cascavel armored reconnaissance vehicles and then T-55 tanks. Reportedly, 12 Libyan military personnel were sent to Ghana to train tank crews and several Ghanaian students received military training in Libya. Current Ghana-Libya relations are strained due to Libya's heavy-handed attempt to force the Rawlings' regime to accept a Libyan military presence and allow Libya access to Ghanaian bases in return for oil.

The Ghanaians maintain bilateral trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Most of the Communist aid is attached to projects, many of which were not completed during the Nkrumah regime of the 1960s. Five Soviet statisticians work in Ghana's statistical department. The People's Republic of China has the most technicians in Ghana; however, there are also civilian technicians from Cuba, East Europe, and North Korea. The Soviet Union, East European countries, the PRC, North Korea, and Cuba all maintain diplomatic missions with resident ambassadors and commercial or economic counselors in Ghana. The Soviet Union has resident representatives from NOVOSTI Press, TASS, and Aeroflot in addition to a separate trade representative and cultural center. On 10 January 1982, Rawlings reopened the Libyan People's Bureau, which was closed in 1980 under the Limann regime. Rawlings has been dissatisfied with the amount and terms of Communist assistance. Immediately after the coup, Libya gave Ghana 500,000 barrels of crude oil; however, additional acquisitions of Libyan oil were to have been on commercial terms. In March 1983, the Libyans gave Ghana a $350-million credit for 1 year to finance oil imports beginning in May 1983.
Libya has delivered only two shipments of oil under this credit, apparently because of Ghana's rejection of a defense agreement with Libya. Ghana signed a $10-million credit agreement with the Soviet Union for the completion of projects, but the loan carries a high interest rate and no grace period. The Soviets appear to be cautious about increasing their economic assistance to Ghana because they are unsure of the PNDC's orientation and prospects, and they recall the abrupt termination of their high influence in 1966 with the ousting of Kwame Nkrumah as President of Ghana. Ghana turned down a Soviet request to have Ghanaian naval personnel receive training in the Soviet Union claiming that Soviet naval equipment is not compatible with Ghana's ships and naval systems. However, the Soviets have made one important inroad into Ghana with the arrival in August 1982 of the Soviet Defense Attache to Accra.

f. Economic Factors

Ghana's economy is almost totally dependent on agriculture, with some augmentation from mining, lumbering, and light manufacturing. In 1981, GDP was $3.75 billion, $290 per capita. Major exports are cocoa, gold, wood, diamonds, manganese, and bauxite. Leading imports are fuels, textiles, manufactures, food, and transport equipment. Major trading partners are the United Kingdom, the European Economic Community, and the US. Ghana does not grow (or at least retain because of smuggling) enough food to meet domestic requirements.

g. Military and Political Alignment

The Rawlings regime is guided by the policies of nonalignment, Pan Africanism, and a desire to downplay the previous regime's close ties with the West. The Ghanaian Government has been slow in acknowledging that large-scale economic aid needed by the country can only be received from the West. Ghana is a member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). A battalion of Ghanaian soldiers serves with the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and Ghana has agreed to provide forces for the UN transitional assistance group in Namibia if and when such a force is approved. Brigadier A. K. Twumasi was appointed Chief of Staff of the UNIFIL in February 1983. All that remains of the Commonwealth Military Advisory Team (CMAT) at the Ghana Armed Forces Staff College (GAFSC) are two British officers. The senior British officer, a Colonel, however, is the defacto head of the staff college. The one Canadian military adviser who was part of the CMAT departed in July 1983 and will not be replaced. There is also one Nigerian field grade officer assigned to the directing staff at the college. In addition to the British officers at GAFSC, the UK also has had a four-man military training team at the Military Academy and Training School (MATS). During their 7-month tour, which ended in December 1983, the team developed programs of instruction and conducted infantry and leadership training for section, squad, and platoon leaders. This four-man team is supposed to be replaced by two British majors who will be assigned as instructors at MATS and GAFSC on a TDY basis. Ghanaian students are receiving military training in the UK, the US, Pakistan, and India. Although the Ghanaian Armed Forces Staff College welcomes
other African military students, none have attended since the coup. The UK has provided military uniforms and field gear to the Ghanaians since the coup. In 1982, Japan donated 35 trucks and spare parts to the Government, and France lifted its temporary embargo placed on Ghana immediately after the coup that restricted Ghana from the credit facilities of French financial institutions. French companies will assist in the development of Ghana's agricultural and mining sectors, and help train middle level managers to control Ghana's natural resources. Italy is also assisting Ghana in agricultural activities. The Canadians have a loan agreement with Ghana. The West is also involved in oil drilling in Ghana. After the coup, Ghana approached Nigeria for oil; however, arrears in oil payments by the previous Ghanaian regime have hindered Ghana's attempts to obtain oil from Nigeria. In FY 83, the US provided approximately $4.16 million in food aid; in FY 84 approximately $5.3 million in regular food aid and $13.8 in emergency food aid is expected to be disbursed.

Following the coup, the Ghanaian press launched a press campaign accusing the US, the UK, and Nigeria of planning to invade Ghana and overthrow the Rawlings regime. On the first anniversary of the coup, the press attacked US assistance efforts for allegedly planning to overthrow the Ghanaian Government. In each instance, the Government of Ghana denied responsibility for the newspaper articles; however, the PNDC suspended the constitution of the Third Republic, which provided for freedom of the press and the press was instructed to support the revolution. The periodic attacks on Western aid parallels the beliefs of the radical elements in the Government who argue that Ghana's problems stem from its neocolonial relationship with the West. It appears that anti-West press attacks periodically occur to distract Ghanaians from the inability of the country's radical politicians to improve economic conditions. The Government, forced by dire economic conditions, cannot afford to actively disassociate itself with the West.

h. (U) **Key US Officials**

Chief of Mission (Accra): Ambassador Robert E. Fritts
GHANA

2. MILITARY, GENERAL

a. Key Military Officials:
   Armed Forces and Army: Commander, Major General Arnold Quainoo
   Navy: Commander, Commodore Joseph Opong
   Air Force: Commander, Air Commodore James Kotei
   Border Guard: Commander, Colonel Godfrey Naapie Goumil
   Police: Inspector General of Police: Mr. S. S. Omane
   Intelligence: Commander, Ministry of Defense Intelligence Branch: Lt Col F.E.A. Quayson

b. Position of the Armed Forces

   The relationship between the ruling PNDC and the military is mixed. Northerners, who comprise 60 percent of the military, are suspicious of the Government, many officers want a return to civilian rule, and some units dislike the apparent favoritism given to Ghanaian units in the Accra area who were given new Libyan arms and equipment. The units in Accra appear to support Rawlings. In any event, the loyalty of the military to the Rawlings' regime is questionable. The loyalty of the units with the tanks and armored cars is most critical as they are the units that can either precipitate or prevent a coup.

c. Military Trends and Capabilities

   Over the last 10 years, Ghana's military personnel losses have consistently exceeded accessions. Key factors contributing to this decline include economic decline, low military operating budget, highly selective and restrictive recruiting practices, large-scale desertions, and voluntary and forced retirements. Most desertions and retirements occurred during the aftermath of four military coups—January 1972, July 1978, June 1979, and December 1981. Present total Armed Forces personnel strength is estimated at 42.6 percent (8,100 of its authorized strength of 19,000). Reportedly the Government is no longer allowing voluntary retirements.

   Since the 31 December 1981 coup, the Ghanaian military has faced the formidable tasks of addressing supply and maintenance problems, refining and improving administrative procedures, and restoring the image of the armed forces. Shortly after the coup, the military was faced with undisciplined troops harassing civilians, and a lack of respect between officers and enlisted personnel. To counter this, Rawlings has enforced stiff penalties for disobedience to orders and the harassment of civilians and has implemented widespread field training exercises to instill discipline and mutual respect. In addition, to further improve the image of the army, Ghanaian soldiers have been directed to involve themselves in farming and farm-related operations. The program is an attempt to attain self-sufficiency in food in both the military and civilian sectors, keep soldiers occupied, and utilize farming as a vehicle to exercise military organization, and chain of command.

   Ghana has no plans to significantly increase troop strength; instead, it would like to consolidate and flesh out its severely understrength
GHANA

units and to concentrate on improving the professionalism of the present forces while modernizing equipment. Previous plans to strengthen the reconnaissance regiment with additional armored vehicles and a tank squadron of 18 T-55 tanks are not expected to materialize in the near future.

There have been no reported coup attempts by units of the Army, Navy, and Air Force in the last year. Although in the summer of 1983, sailors at Tema Port briefly mutinied when a navy enlisted man was shot and killed for stealing rice. Restoring discipline has become the top priority for Ghanaian military leaders. In its present state, the armed forces can barely maintain internal order, much less project a credible force to defend Ghana's borders; however, training and modernization plans are attempts to change both assessments.

In early 1983, the Ministry of Defense Intelligence Branch was established. It is responsible for combat intelligence and security control. The Combat Intelligence Wing is responsible for: collection of information on enemy activities; information on weather and geographic features; examination and interpretation of air photography; the study of intercepted signals, electronics emissions, and satellite communications; translation and interpretation of foreign languages--telephonic, telegraphic, or written; coordination of intelligence from the headquarters of all services; analysis of intelligence reports received from other services headquarters in conjunction with national security planning; obtaining information on the armed forces of neighboring countries; liaison with the National Bureau of Investigation, liaison with the Bureau of Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and current knowledge of equipment and armament of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. The Security Wing is responsible for: issuance of instructions on all classified materials, areas; investigation of all breaches of military security and instituting measures for prevention; disposal of classified materials and maintenance of safes and other classified equipment; the vetting of personnel of the armed forces, both military and civilian; immigration affairs of military personnel; the processing of passports and visas; and the documentation and issuance of ID cards and passes of all kinds for military personnel.

Ghana has no military equipment production capability. In recent years, major suppliers have been West Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and Libya. Bonn delivered four patrol boats valued at $44 million. Italy has provided six fighter/trainer aircraft for $17 million. Deliveries from Libya total about $17 million and deliveries from Switzerland total $20 million.

d. Military Budget

The military budget was $13.59 million in operating expenditures for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1982; this is 3.3 percent of the central government budget. (Army, $4 million; Navy, $8.90 million; Air Force, $1.10 million; Border Guards, $9.93 million; other $6.36 million.) Dollar values converted from Ghanaian cedis at an exchange rate of 25 cedis to $1.00.
e. (U) Population

13,804,000 estimated as of June 1984
Males (ages 15-49): 2,972,000; physically fit, 1,654,000 (draft age 18)
Ethnic Divisions: 99.8 percent indigenous African; 0.2 percent European
(Three major ethnic groups: Ashanti, Fante, and Ewe)
Literacy: Approximately 25 percent (in English)
3. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

a. Army

(1) Mission
To defend the national borders, maintain internal security, participate in international peacekeeping efforts, and assist in civic action.

(2) Capabilities
The Ghanaian Army's traditions, organization, and professional orientation are British with battle honors dating back more than 60 years. However, the Army is ill equipped, undertrained, and though improving, is still lacking in discipline. Although it has quelled small-scale disorders within Ghana since the 31 December coup, it would not be able to maintain sustained operations of any type. Until it obtained parachutes from Libya recently, the Airborne Force at Tamale had not had a parachute exercise since 1977, primarily due to the poor condition of the unit's T-10 parachutes that had deteriorated because of age and lack of proper maintenance and storage facilities. Training for the Army primarily consists of close-order drill, occasional field training exercises, and annual marksmanship training. Live fire exercises are constrained due to limited supplies of ammunition. Because of severe economic constraints, major acquisitions of additional military material or equipment will only be achieved through foreign assistance on a grant aid basis.

(3) Personnel Strength
Approximately 5,450

(4) Organization and Deployment

(a) General
At present, Army Commander Major General Arnold Quainoo has no plans to reorganize the Army; however, he has made a major change in the command and control structure that affects the entire Armed Forces. In December 1982, following the resignation of the Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) Brigadier Nunoo-Mensah, Quainoo (then Brigadier) with apparent PNDC approval, created and assumed the title and role of Force (Armed Forces) Commander in addition to his role as Army Commander. (Force Commander is equivalent to the position of Chairman, JCS.) Since his elevation to this new position, the Force Commander has usurped most of the responsibilities of the former Chief of Staff, Ministry of Defense, Brigadier Baafi, and has transferred all Armed Forces operational matters to Force Headquarters collocated with Army Headquarters at Flagstaff House. Since that time, the position of Chief of Staff, MOD has been changed to Chief Staff Officer, MOD, and Brigadier Baafi has been forced into defacto retirement. As Force Commander, Major General Quainoo not only commands the Army but has operational control of the other Services as well.
The basic operational unit in the Ghanaian Army is the battalion; the highest field headquarters is the brigade. The Army Commander exercises control of the two infantry brigade groups; a Support Services Brigade; and the separate reconnaissance, engineer, mortar, and signal regiments (battalions). The 1st infantry brigade group (Accra) controls the 1st, 2d, and 5th infantry battalions located in Tema, Takoradi, and Accra (Burma Camp), respectively. The 2d infantry brigade group (Kumasi) controls the 3d (Sunyani), 4th (Kumasi), and 6th infantry (Tamale) battalions, and the provisional airborne force (Tamale). The Support Service Brigade is located at the Ministry of Defense Headquarters, Burma Camp. Operational control of the signal regiment is retained at Force/Army Headquarters, while the field engineer regiment and the reconnaissance regiments are OPCON to the 1st Brigade with elements on order to support the 2d Brigade. A 750-man composite battalion of Ghanaian military personnel from all units is rotated to the Middle East United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) on a semiannual basis. The mortar regiment is located at Ho.

The Army command structure is geographically oriented, with the 1st Brigade constituting the Southern Command and controlling all remaining administrative regions bordering the Gulf of Guinea. The 2d Brigade includes all remaining administrative regions: Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo, Northern, and Upper Regions. Area/brigade commanders and their subordinate battalion commanders are responsible for security in areas surrounding their unit location. A battalion commander assumes operational control of all units of the Armed Forces in his area during emergency situations.

(b) `<c>` Ground Combat Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Units</th>
<th>Authorized Off / EM</th>
<th>Average Actual Off / EM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Headquarters</td>
<td>26 200</td>
<td>14 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Brigade Headquarters (2)</td>
<td>28 600</td>
<td>18 250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Battalion (6) (Excluding UNIFIL Bn)</td>
<td>149 3,142</td>
<td>50 1,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airborne Force</td>
<td>20 352</td>
<td>8 250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance Regiment</td>
<td>23 399</td>
<td>13 250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer Regiment</td>
<td>38 1,142</td>
<td>10 450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar Regiment</td>
<td>14 260</td>
<td>9 140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal Regiment</td>
<td>26 800</td>
<td>12 350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Services Brigade</td>
<td>200 2,500</td>
<td>80 750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) `<c>` Deployment

In-country: 4,700
Overseas: 750 (1 battalion minus, deployed for duties with the UN forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL)).
(5) Weapons and Equipment

(a) General

The Army has been attempting to standardize and modernize its equipment. Swiss Mowag and Brazilian Cascavel armored cars are replacing British Saladins and Ferrets although some of the latter still exist in the inventory. The standard infantry weapons remain the German-manufactured G3 rifle and MG3 machinegun. As discussed earlier, modernization of equipment and weapons will likely be accomplished through any foreign assistance willing to deal with Ghana on a grant basis.

(b) Ground Weapons and Equipment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mortars:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81-mm mortar</td>
<td>UK 74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82-mm mortar</td>
<td>IS 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120-mm mortar</td>
<td>IS 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rkt Lchrs (RL) and Rcl Rifles (RCLR):</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5-in rocket launcher</td>
<td>UK 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57-mm recoiless rifle</td>
<td>UK 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPG-7 grenade launchers</td>
<td>LY 81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106-mm recoiless rifle</td>
<td>LY 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Armor:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scout car, Ferret</td>
<td>UK 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scout car, Saladin</td>
<td>UK 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored car, Mowag Piranha</td>
<td>SZ 57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored car, Cascavel</td>
<td>LY 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-55 tanks</td>
<td>LY 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Motor Transport:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-to 5-ton Fiat truck</td>
<td>IT 177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1- to 5-ton Bedford Truck</td>
<td>UK 156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton Fiat jeep</td>
<td>IT 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/4-ton M-151 jeep</td>
<td>US 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2-ton Land Rover</td>
<td>UK 173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton Pinzgauer truck</td>
<td>AU 432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 1/2-ton Pinzgauer truck</td>
<td>AU 226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Defense:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.5-mm, ZPU-4, Soviet</td>
<td>LY 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) Logistics

The Army's extremely weak logistics system is unable to satisfy basic military requirements. The Army has an inadequate service and supply organization, and the lack of spare parts and maintenance facilities is a critical problem. Most logistic services are concentrated around the capital city and provide minimal support to deployed units. The logistics system is completely dependent on foreign sources for spare parts and replacement items. Only minimal attempts have been made to improve logistics capabilities. Officers receive overseas training in logistics, but the principles learned are not practiced. Shortages of spare parts, technically qualified personnel, and the
lack of maintenance of equipment, combined with the lack of financial fluidity, continue to dilute Army efforts.

(7) Personnel Procurement and Retention

The Army is understrength with an authorized strength of 12,000 and an assigned strength of 5,450. The Army is at 45 percent of its assigned strength.

Some officers advance from the enlisted ranks, and direct commissions are offered to civilian professional personnel for a period of 5 years. Most officers are graduates of the 18-month cadet training course, which is conducted at the Ghana Military Academy.

(8) Training

The Armed Forces Recruit Training Center (AFRTC) at Tamale, which conducted training for all Services, is being phased out. Its mission will be picked up by the 6th Infantry Battalion, also located at Tamale, which will become a training battalion. Although each battalion and combat support command formerly conducted a unit refresher training school for junior leaders, since the 1981 coup, few of the unit schools have been operational. The Military Academy and Training School (MATS) at Teshi provides formal military training for young officers and NCOs. The Ghana Armed Forces Staff College (GAFSC) at Teshi conducts classes for senior and junior officers. The GAFSC has the best equipment and facilities of all the military schools. A Jungle Warfare School is located at Achiasi. The Border Guard School at Kpeto is used for training peacekeeping forces. With the acquisition of Libyan tanks and armored cars, Camp Michel at Afianya appears to be used as a training area for armored vehicles. Field exercises are conducted at the Bundase training area near the Shai Hills.

Training objectives focus on command and leadership training, discipline, and technical proficiency. Budgetary constraints, a shortage of qualified personnel, and inadequate logistic systems hinder the quality of training. Joint field exercises held in the fall of 1982 and spring of 1983 were considered a success by the Army Commander, in establishing respect between officers and enlisted personnel, improving discipline, and reestablishing control. An unprecedented combined field training exercise with units from Upper Volta, codenamed "Operation Bold Union," was held in the fall of 1983. The exercise involved joint military maneuvers along the common boundary of the two countries in the Navrongo-Po area.

(9) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

The 2,500-man Border Guard Service could be integrated into the Army command structure during emergencies. Personnel who leave the Army before completing their service obligation are placed on a roster and can be called up as reserves. In addition, a new program of national service is in the process of being implemented. The program calls for a 2-year national service commitment prior to attending university. The first 6 months and the last 3 months
of the program would involve military-related service, while the remaining 15 months would be devoted to support of governmental rural development programs.

(b) Mobilization

Without foreign administrative, training, and logistic support, coupled with an increased budget, the size of the Army could not be increased substantially beyond the integration of the Border Guard.

b. Navy

(1) Mission

To protect territorial waters, conduct sea search and rescue missions, and conduct antismuggling operations.

(2) Capabilities

The small coastal defense force has limited combat capability. Lack of funds, deteriorating facilities, inadequate management, and shortages of spare parts and basic commodities, hinder the capabilities of the Navy. The Navy is able to patrol territorial waters to a limited degree; however, sea search and antismuggling operations are rarely carried out. The Navy, traditionally considered the best disciplined force of the armed forces, fell into a serious state of disarray following the enlisted mutiny and murder of three base officers, including the base commander, at Sekondi Naval Base in February 1982. As a result of this incident and the failure to punish those seamen responsible, large numbers of senior enlisted and naval officers retired. This has created a major manpower and leadership problem since many of the best trained and most experienced personnel in the Navy left the service well before they normally would have done so. Because of the long training lead time required, and lack of adequate training facilities, the great majority of these personnel losses have not been replaced.

(3) Personnel Strength

Authorized 1,195; assigned 508 (59 officers, 449 enlisted).

(4) Ship Strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Op</th>
<th>Nonop</th>
<th>In Reserve</th>
<th>Status Unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PG (patrol escort)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPCF (fast patrol craft)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC (patrol craft)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(5) **Organization and Deployment**

Overall command is exercised by the Navy Commander in the Ministry of Defense, Burma Camp, Accra. The Western Command is at Sekondi, the principal operating base; the Eastern Command is at Tema, a major training facility. Duty ships (the patrol craft and patrol boats) are assigned to Tema on 2-week rotational tours from their home port at Sekondi. The two fast patrol craft are deployed in support of border guard operations on the Tuno River. The duty ships' operational areas are normally limited to the immediate coastal waters.

(6) **Status of Equipment**

At one time, most ships were of British design, but the newer ships and those on order are West German. Two 45-meter Jaguar II patrol craft were delivered in January 1980 and one 57-meter Jaguar III model was delivered in late 1980. The second Jaguar III was delivered in early 1981.

(7) **Logistics**

One of the largest shipyards in West Africa is owned and operated by the Tema Shipyard and Drydock Company. Its largest drydock is 277 meters long and 47 meters wide. A second drydock is 106 meters long and 13 meters wide and has recently been engaged in the overhaul of Ghanaian Navy units. The main drydock is serviced by a 6-ton and a 20-ton traveling crane and the smaller drydock has a 45-ton and a 25-ton traveling crane. A variety of services are provided by a plate shop, production shop, assembly shop, and two general engineering shops. The Navy base at Sekondi possesses limited facilities only for alongside repairs. Small utility boats can be hoisted onto the quay for hull repair. Divers are available for underwater repair at Tema and Sekondi.

(8) **Personnel Procurement and Retention**

Enlisted personnel must have the equivalent of a grammar school education. Procurement and retention pose a serious problem. Higher-caliber personnel are needed to upgrade Navy capabilities and to replace skilled technical personnel who are completing their 12-year enlistment. The Navy has lost many of its officers through voluntary retirements and is at 42 percent of its authorized strength (1,195 authorized, 508 assigned).

(9) **Training**

Initial training of officers is accomplished at triservice establishments with additional training at Tema and in the UK, Canada, and India. Navy recruit training is conducted at the Armed Forces Recruit Training Center, Tamale. After 8 to 12 weeks' training, recruits are given 8 to 12 additional weeks of basic seamanship training at the Naval Training School, Tema Naval Base. Communication courses and all enlisted promotion examinations are conducted in Tema; other courses and limited basic seamanship training are provided in Sekondi. Fuel shortages and inadequate facilities hinder training.
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(10) Reserves and Mobilization

Allegedly, there is a small volunteer reserve force of approximately 200 personnel; no information is available on mobilization plans, skill levels, or equipment.

(11) Merchant Ships

Ghana has 28 merchant ships of 1,000 gross registered tons or greater including 25 general cargo, 2 refrigerated cargo, and 1 bulk cargo ship. Many of these, however, are inactive because of the financial situation of the national shipping line and several ships that are laid up in foreign ports. These nonoperational ships are poorly maintained and would be of little value in case of mobilization.

c. Air Force

(1) Mission

Defend territorial airspace, provide air transport and liaison for the Armed Forces, and conduct search and rescue operations.

(2) Capabilities

The Air Force has limited transport, liaison, and reconnaissance capabilities, but its inventory of air defense and tactical air support aircraft currently contains only one operational jet fighter. Sea search and rescue capabilities are nonexistent; Air Force and Navy communications equipment is not compatible.

Shortages of highly qualified pilots are aggravated by Ghana's deteriorating economic situation. Limited fuel supplies are diverted for non-operational missions. Consequently, only minimal fuel stocks are available for training and maintaining the flying proficiency of qualified pilots. Due to the nonoperational status of military training aircraft, no in-country new pilot training is being conducted.

Veteran air and ground crews are generally well qualified; however, the shortage of suitable trainees and an inadequate supply and maintenance system severely restrict combat capabilities. The mixed inventory of preponderantly nonessential aircraft negates the development of a modern and efficient Air Force.

(3) Personnel Strength

Authorized: 1,300; assigned: 400

(4) Aircraft Strength

Total: 47 (fixed wing: 11 jet, 11 turboprop, 20 prop; helicopters: 5 turbine)
In operational units: 47
(fixed wing: 11 jet—one jet is the Chairman PNDC/
President Support Aircraft, 11 turboprop, 20 prop;
helicopters: 5 turbine)

(5) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

Overall operational control is exercised by the Air Force Commander. The Air Force is organized into three transport squadrons and one squadron each of fighters, helicopters, and trainers.

(b) Summary of Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
<th>Principal Bases</th>
<th>Operational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Squadron</td>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>Takoradi</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Britten Norman</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Islander)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Squadron</td>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>Takoradi</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Skyvan)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Squadron</td>
<td>Helicopter</td>
<td>Accra</td>
<td>2 Alouette</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3 Alouette III,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Bell 212)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3 Fokker F-27,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Fokker F-28)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Squadron</td>
<td>Day fighter</td>
<td>Accra</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6 Aermacchi 326-F</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and 4 Aermacchi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>326-K)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Squadron</td>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>Tamale</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Fokker F-27)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Squadron</td>
<td>Trainer</td>
<td>Takoradi</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Bulldog)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trainer</td>
<td>Takoradi</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Italian SF 260)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) Status of Equipment

Aircraft are mainly British, Dutch, and Italian. Maintenance is performed by indigenous personnel. The Aermacchi jets are poorly maintained. Most of the other nonoperational aircraft are awaiting repair parts, while some
GHANA

are stripped for spare parts. The Aermacchis are armed with 20-mm cannons and fitted with bombs and/or rockets. The deadline rate for all aircraft is extremely high due to poor maintenance procedures and nonavailability of repair parts.

(7) Logistics

(©) Ghana produces no aircraft or related equipment and is entirely dependent upon foreign sources for replacement aircraft and repair parts. Two of an original inventory of 12 Aermacchis crashed in 1982. In 1981 Ghana reportedly ordered eight light SF-260TPs from SIAI Marchetti of Italy. No deliveries have been received yet. Ghana’s air maintenance facilities are unable to support their current inventory.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

(©) The Air Force is understrength. It has an authorized strength of 1,300 and an assigned strength of 400.

(9) Training

(©) Since its formation in 1959, the Ghana Air Force has received various kinds of training assistance from several countries, including Israel, India, the USSR, Canada, the UK, the Netherlands, Italy, and the US. All personnel are volunteers, and enlisted personnel receive basic, technical, and advanced training courses. Candidates selected for flight training receive preflight military and general education courses prior to entering the Flight Training School at Takoradi. Because of nonavailability of training aircraft, however, no in-country pilot training is presently being conducted. Complete training at Takoradi normally lasts about 2 years.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

(U) The Air Force has no reserves.

(b) Mobilization

(U) The Air Force has the potential for expansion only if foreign sources provide total support. Approximately seven civil transport aircraft with a gross takeoff weight of at least 9,000 kilograms currently are registered, owned, and operated in Ghana. Aircraft in the civil air inventory include: one Boeing 707-320B and two Boeing 707-320C operated by West Coast Airlines; one McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30 and one DC-9-50 operated by Ghana Airways; and one Fokker F-28-2000 Fellowship and one Fokker F-28-4000 Fellowship operated by Ghana Airways.

(©) Ghana Airways, the country’s domestic and international flag carrier, is wholly government owned. West Coast Airlines is a private passenger and cargo carrier. The Ghanaian Air Force (GAF) has been assisting
GHANA Airways on its domestic routes with a Shorts SC-7 SKYVAN light aircraft and two short-range Fokker F-27 Friendships, along with GAF flight crews.

The number of licensed civilian pilots of major transport aircraft in Ghana is not known. Ghana Airways reportedly employs over 30 pilots.

Virtually all of Ghana's civil aircraft and indigenous civilian aviation personnel could be mobilized in the event of war or comparable national emergency. Without foreign assistance, a shortage of fully qualified, indigenous flight and maintenance personnel would prevent maximum effective use of the mobilized equipment.

d. Border Guard Service

(1) Mission

To insure border security, conduct antismuggling operations, and maintain internal security.

(2) Capabilities

The 2,500-man force is a branch of the Armed Forces. Some Army officers, men, and equipment have been transferred to the Border Guard Service. Antismuggling operations are ineffective when compared to the level of activity. Since the coup, the Army has supplemented this capability.

(3) Personnel Strength

2,500

(4) Organization and Deployment

The Border Guard Service could be more effective if placed under the Minister of Interior; however, the Army has operational control. The Border Guard Commander at Accra commands three battalions and three separate companies. The 1st, 2d, and 3d Border Guard Battalions are at Dormaa-Ahenkro (Brong-Ahafo Region), Bolgatanga (Upper Region), and Ho (Volta Region), respectively. The separate companies, and subordinate units of the three battalions, are located at critical border points. Personnel are assigned randomly throughout the country rather than to locations in their respective home areas. The Border Guards can be assigned or attached to the Army. One element is deployed at Sekondi to support border operations. Plans are being implemented to regionalize the force.

(5) Weapons and Equipment

Border Guard troops are armed with small arms and equipped as light infantry. A limited number of Land Rovers and miscellaneous types of trucks support their operations. Equipment replacement, poor maintenance, and the lack of spare parts minimize troop effectiveness. Additionally, two fast patrol craft are assigned from the Navy to prevent smuggling along inland waterways and coastal waters; however, they are inoperable.
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(6) Logistics

The Border Guard Service is deficient in the same areas of logistics as the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and for the same reasons. These problems are accentuated because substandard equipment is normally transferred to Border Guard units after being utilized by the other Services.

(7) Personnel Procurement and Retention

Border Guard officers and recruits must meet the same standards and terms of service as those established for the Army. Although there is a waiting list for enlistment, the Border Guard is not considered as prestigious a branch as the other services. Retention is no longer a problem now that Border Guard service pay is comparable to that of the other Services. Some non-promotable officers have been transferred to this Service.

(8) Training

Border Guard recruits receive basic training at the Border Guard Training Center (Kpeto). Some specialized courses of varying duration are conducted by the Ministry of Defense.

(9) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

(U) Unknown

(b) Mobilization

(U) Unknown

e. Paramilitary Forces

(1) National Police Force

The 17,000-man National Police Force assists in maintaining internal security and protecting vital installations. Deployed to 250 police stations, most police units are equipped with small arms, motor transport, and communications equipment. The 900-man reserve unit, armed with Sten guns, could be employed in a support role.

(2) Army Volunteer Force

There is an estimated 150-man Army Volunteer Force, that receives sporadic training and has the mission of guarding fixed installations in an emergency. The force is organized at squad and platoon levels and receives training and supervision from the First Brigade Headquarters.
(3) Militia

Since the 19 June 1983 attempted coup, some militia (approx 400) and PDC Cadre (approx 1,000) training has taken place. Militia training so far has been provided primarily to government associated workers, service wives, and coastal fishermen and consists of two weeks of basic military subjects to include weapons familiarization. The cadre training, conducted at the University of Ghana, Legon for PDC cadre from all over Ghana, was primarily political but included some weapons familiarization. There have been some reports that the Government intends to regularize militia training to support the regular forces in a crisis and to establish a militia secretariat to coordinate militia activities. So far, however, little has been accomplished. Until this happens, the role of the militia will not be significant.

f. Total Military Personnel Strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>5,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Guard Service</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,850</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

g. Foreign Military Presence

UK Advisers: 3 (1 Defense adviser/attache, 2 officers at GAFSC)

Soviet Defense Attache: 1

Nigerian: 1 (Instructor at GAFSC)


Indian Attache: Resides in Lagos, Nigeria, accredited to Ghana. Made one visit in 1981.

Egyptian Attache: 2

Libyan Advisers: Unknown

Students Abroad: Libya - unknown, India - 19, UK and Canada - unknown, Soviet Union - 4.
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Withheld pursuant to exemption
(b)(3): 10 USC 424

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act.
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1. GOVERNMENT

a. (U) Key Government Officials

President: Col Lansana Conte
Prime Minister: Col Diarra Traore
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Capt Facine Toure
Minister of Interior: Herve Vincent
Minister of National Defense: Capt Lancine Keita

b. Type and Stability of Government

In late March 1984, Ahmed Sekou Toure, who had ruled Guinea since its independence from France in 1958, died of heart failure in hospital at Cleveland, Ohio. On 3 April the Army executed a successful coup, removing Louis Lansana Beavogui, the interim head of state. The new government, which is known as the Military Committee for National Redress (CMRN), is currently in the process of managing the country. Upon taking control of the government it dissolved the National Assembly, the Democratic Party of Guinea, and all other state institutions.

Domestically, policies are already in the process of change as the CMRN begins to remove the harsh restrictions of Sekou Toure's regime. Trade unions have been legalized, political prisoners have been released, and freedom of travel throughout the country has been restored. A key problem for the new government, however, is the lack of capital resources needed for rebuilding the country after 26 years of near economic isolation. A further problem that could affect stability is that of the exiles. The CMRN has encouraged those Guineans who fled Guinea under Sekou Toure to return, but has stated that political power should be reserved for those who remained and suffered in Guinea under Sekou Toure's rule.

The stability of the military government is uncertain. Members of the CMRN lack experience in government, politics, and foreign relations. Neither the President nor the Prime Minister enjoy Sekou Toure's standing among African leaders or his charismatic personality. As the 'honeymoon' period draws to a close, there is some doubt that the CMRN can manage the country effectively.

c. External Threat and Government Counterstrategies

Libyans are a potential threat to Guinea. Libyan attempts to undermine legitimate governments of West Africa by fomenting subversive activities through disgruntled groups are a concern. Although there have been no significant Libyan inroads in Guinea, Libyan activities in other West African countries and Libyan-supported internal unrest in the region could spread to Guinea. In 1983, President Sekou Toure and Malian President Moussa Traore signed a protocol of an agreement leading to progressive unification of their countries' political systems, national structures, a new organization common to both countries' military structures, and eventually to a union. Under the protocol, any act of aggression against either country will be considered as aggression against the other. However, both countries will remain sovereign states.

15 October 1984
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Another area of potential external threat is that of border incidents. Early this year (1984) a shooting occurred on the Sierra Leone border in which two Sierra Leoneans were wounded by Guinean border guards. The guards apparently believed that the Sierra Leoneans were involved in a plan to invade Guinea. Incidents such as this can provoke governments into larger, more serious military actions. Several weeks following the shooting, 26 persons were arrested in Senegal for planning to invade Guinea and overthrow Sekou Toure. Now that a new government is in power in Guinea there may be less tension along the border areas. Guinea has not experienced serious border conflicts caused by ethnic differences as have some other West African states.

d. Internal Threat

The attempt of a military government lacking administrative experience to manage a country with serious economic problems is in itself the greatest internal threat to stability. Yet this situation may be aggravated by the attitude of the CMRN toward the exiles. By taking the attitude that only those who remained in Guinea during Sekou Toure's rule should have political power the CMRN cuts itself off from a source of skills and experience which it badly needs if modernization is to be achieved. The return of the exiles, of which there are an estimated one million, (many of whom are educated), could certainly have an impact on the country. If shut out of government, their frustrations could lead to violence, but also to the formation of opposition political parties.

e. Terrorism and Counterterrorism

Guinea formed a counter terrorist organization in 1982. It contains 17 individuals under the operational command of the Minister of the People's Army; however, only the President can order the group into action. Weapons and training are of Soviet origin and the unit has not yet been operationally used.

f. Communist Influence

No Communist parties or organizations are allowed to exist in Guinea and there is no evidence that any Communist group exists illegally. Communist countries were the first to offer aid and recognition when Guinea became independent from France. Since then, the Soviet Union, East Germany, Yugoslavia, North Korea, Cuba, and the People's Republic of China have initiated aid projects, and provided either military, economic, or technical assistance. The Soviets press for permanent access rights to Guinean military installations; the East Germans play a minor role in supplying assistance; the North Koreans expect and receive Guinea's support in not recognizing or establishing diplomatic relations with South Korea; and the Cubans attempt to receive Guinean support in the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) and in international fora against US positions. However, Guinea is displeased with Castro's attempts at manipulating the NAM and does not always side with Cuba against US positions in international fora. China has very cordial relations with Guinea. Prime Minister Zhao Chose Guinea for the first stop of his African tour that was probably designed to exploit Guinea's cooling relations with the Soviets.
g. Economic Factors

(U) Guinea's agricultural sector, employing 80 percent of the labor force and contributing 40 percent of GNP, is inadequate to feed the country. Dominating Guinea's economy is its mineral sector, generating 95 percent of export earnings and 20 percent of GNP. In 1981, Guinea's GNP was $1.5 billion, or $264 per capita. Leading exports are bauxite, alumina, and diamonds. Major imports are petroleum products, metals, machinery, foodstuffs, and textiles. Leading trading partners are the Communist countries, Western Europe, and the US.

(O) Guinea began a program of economic liberalization in the late 70s to reverse economic decline and stagnation resulting from its tightly controlled socialistic economy. Measures include the following: liquidation of public enterprises; permission for private traders to supply local markets with food, small appliances, and personal articles; state retail firms abolished in Conakry; export of some agricultural products; encouragement of foreign investment; and reform of agricultural subsidies.

(O) Guinea has no military equipment production capability, and the USSR has been the major supplier of military equipment. To a lesser extent, the PRC has provided military equipment. In 1982, the Government of Guinea received a high-level military delegation from China and an agreement was made whereby the PRC will provide Guinea some military assistance. The value of Soviet deliveries in the last 6 years is over $37 million, while the PRC's deliveries for the same period total about $5 million. In 1982, Guinea programmed a US International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) to allow a few members of its Army to receive training in the US.

h. Military and Political Alignment

(O) Guinea is a member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Mano River Union (MRU), and the Islamic Conference. President Toure was Chairman of the Islamic Peace Committee and was involved in negotiating a peaceful settlement to end the Iran-Iraq War. Guinea was expected to host the 1983 OAU Summit, but Sekou Toure's death has made this uncertain. Sekou Toure headed up the boycott of the 1982 OAU Summit to protest OAU Chairman Mu'ammar Qadhafi's handling of the admission of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SDAR) to the OAU. In September 1982, Toure made his first visit to France and met with President Mitterand to improve relations between the two countries. In the same year, he also made official visits to Canada, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, West Germany, and the United States. Guinea's gradual movement away from the East and toward the West is a moderating force in the region because Sekou Toure is a respected African figure.

(O) From mid-1973 to June 1977, Guinea allowed the USSR to deploy long-range reconnaissance aircraft to Guinea on more than 20 occasions for maritime reconnaissance. In June 1977, the President announced that Guinea would not allow additional Tu-95/BEAR D aircraft to land at Conakry. Since then, only the unauthorized landing of two Tu-95s has taken place, but the Soviets continue to pressure Guinea for resumption of landing rights. In addition, Guinea refused the Soviets' request to construct new installations around Conakry and did not
allow An-22s to transit en route to Ethiopia in November-December 1977. The latter decision is of particular significance since the Soviets made heavy use of Conakry for refueling An-22 and An-12 transport aircraft involved in the 1975 Angolan airlift. Events of the past 5 years have widened the gap between Guinea and the Soviets. During the latter part of 1978 Guinea requested the withdrawal of more than 200 Soviet and 100 Cuban military/civilian advisers, substantially reducing Communist representation in-country. The Government's anti-Soviet sentiments are based on: the ineffectiveness of many Soviet-Cuban economic, educational, and military programs; the failure of these nations to implement previously agreed upon projects; and the fear that they would politicize the Guinean military. In addition, Guinea advocates a foreign policy of nonalignment, wants no permanent Soviet presence in the country, and feels its position on nonalignment will be enhanced by diversifying its sources of military assistance.

i. (U) Key US Officials

Chief of Mission (Conakry): Ambassador James Rosenthal
US Defense Attache: None has reporting responsibility).

(b)(3): 50 USC 3024(1)
GUINEA

2. MILITARY, GENERAL

a. (U) Key Military Officials

Armed Forces: Chairman, Defense High Command, President Col Lansana Conte
Chief of Staff, Combined Forces: Maj Ousmane Sow
Army: Chief of Staff, Cmdt Kekoura Camara
Navy: Chief of Staff, (Position equates to US Chief of Naval Operations). Capt Amara Bangoura
Air Force: Chief of Staff, Capt Raymond Bangoura
Gendarmerie: Chief of Staff, Capt Haba Ou Ou Ou Gaspard
Police: Director General Fode Diaby

b. Position of the Armed Forces

(OU) Under Sekou Toure the Armed Forces suffered from poor living conditions, poor equipment, and low morale. With the CMRN now in power the lot of the Armed Forces is likely to improve. One example of this is the appointment of many military officers to Ministerial positions. There are only eight civilians in the new administration.

c. Military Mission

The mission of the Army is to provide National defense, internal security, and civic action. The Navy’s mission is to protect the nation’s fisheries, provide for maritime safety, and conduct antismuggling operations. The mission of the Air Force is to defend Guinean airspace. Generally, only the Army is capable of performing its mission. The Air Force and Navy are hampered by poor maintenance and a lack of space parts.

d. Military Command and Control

The President of Guinea is chairman of the Defense High Command. The chain of command extends from the Chairman through the minister of the People’s Army, through the Chief of Staff of the Combined Forces, through the service Chiefs, to line and staff units of the respective services.

e. Military Trends and Capabilities

The Government of Guinea would like to upgrade the armed force’s level of training and improve the quality of weapons and equipment. It is contemplating acquiring two French patrol boats equipped with surface-to-surface missiles and has turned to the Soviet Union to modernize its military aircraft. The Guineans have also turned to the US to upgrade its patrol craft. The Armed Forces of Guinea compares favorably with the forces of neighboring states. It is capable of defending the country against external threats from surrounding African countries, and is able to maintain internal security.
Guinea has no military equipment production capability. The USSR has been the major supplier of military equipment to include torpedo boats, fighter and trainer aircraft, tanks, APCs, field artillery, BM-21 rocket launchers, ADA, trucks, radar, ammunition, and small arms. The value of Soviet deliveries in the last 6 years is over $48 million. A seven million dollar arms sale was negotiated with Brazil in January 1984 involving small arms, trucks, and 20 Cascavel armored vehicles. This sale combined with requests to US and an agreement with Egypt are signals that Guinea is attempting to break away from its reliance on the Soviets.

f. Military Budget

The military budget is $6,072,874 for fiscal year ending 30 September 1970 (latest available); this is 8 percent of total budget and 2 percent of the estimated GNP. No service allocation is available. Dollar values converted from Guinea francs at the official rate of 247 francs equal $1.00.

g. (U) Population

5,579,000 estimated as of 1 July 1984
Males (ages 15-49): 1,249,000 physically fit, 628,000
Ethnic Divisions: 99 percent African (3 major groups--Fulani, Malinke, Susu--and 15 smaller groups)
Literacy: 5 to 10 percent; French is the only significant written language
GUINEA

3. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

a. Army

(1) Mission

The mission of the People's Revolutionary Army is to provide national defense, internal security, and civic action.

(2) Capabilities

The People's Revolutionary Army on paper is one of the largest and best equipped ground forces in West Africa. It should be able to mount a credible defense against the forces of neighboring African states because of its superiority in manpower, weapons, and ground support equipment. However, weaknesses such as a poor logistics system, a lack of maintenance programs, illiteracy, language problems, considerable personnel turnover (especially in the officer corps), and the tight political control of the military establishment by Sekou Toure's government have limited the Army's capability for sustained action. Furthermore, a reemphasis on the Army's socioeconomic development role--food production, road construction, public building projects--while part of the mission, undoubtedly will detract from refinement of military skills. Nevertheless, at the same time efforts are being made to upgrade capabilities with increased outside training programs and new and more sophisticated equipment. Together with the internal security forces, the Army could contain civil disorders.

The Army also has a limited force projection capability and, over the years, Guinea has contributed toward maintaining regional stability in Africa. Guinean forces have been deployed out of country on four occasions: with UN forces in the Congo in 1960-61; in support of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in the 1975-76 Angolan Civil War; to Benin to aid in the prevention of a coup in 1977; and to help quell civil unrest in Liberia in April 1979. The latter episode indicated an ability to deploy up to 2 companies of airborne troops within the region on short notice.

(3) Personnel Strength

Estimated 11,000 (1,000 officers, 10,000 enlisted)

(4) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

There are six military zones in Guinea plus a special zone located at Conakry. There are 6 battalion headquarters that serve as parent organizations for 6 infantry battalions and 19 other tactical battalions. The Army's organization and control are designed to reduce its potential for acting against the Government and, at the same time, increase its military-political presence throughout the country. The engineer, armor, artillery, paracommando, and special battalions, located in Conakry, are controlled by Army Headquarters.
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(b) Ground Combat Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Units</th>
<th>Strength Per Unit</th>
<th>Actual*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 Infantry Battalions</td>
<td>400-600</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Armored Battalion</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Engineer Battalion</td>
<td>815</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Special Battalion</td>
<td>650-850</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Paracommando Battalion</td>
<td>450</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Artillery Battalion</td>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Unidentified Tactical Battalions</td>
<td>200-400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) (U) Army Aviation Units

None

(d) Deployment

Infantry battalions and unidentified tactical battalions are located throughout the country. Zone I headquarters is at Kindia, Zone II headquarters is at Labe, Zone III, Kankan; Zone IV, Nzerekore; Zone V, Boke; Zone VI, Faranah.

(5) Weapons and Equipment

(a) General

Military materiel consists largely of World War II era equipment procured from Communist countries. The condition of arms and of motorized equipment delivered prior to 1970 is probably poor. Equipment consists mainly of light infantry weapons. From 1970 to 1982, new shipments of Chinese T-62 light tanks, Soviet T-54 and T-34 medium and PT-76 light tanks, field guns, armored cars, air defense guns and associated radars, and large amounts of small arms and ammunition were received. These items are considered to be in fair condition, and many probably are replacements for older equipment. Maintenance of vehicles and equipment is poor.

* (U) Estimated.
GUINEA

(b) **(C/AF) Ground Weapons and Equipment***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mortars:</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>82-mm Mortar</td>
<td>CU</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82-mm Mortar</td>
<td>CH</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82-mm Mortar</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120-mm Mortar</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rkt Lchrs (RL) and Rel, Rifles (RCLR):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-mm, RPG2</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82-mm, SPG-82</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75-mm, RCLR</td>
<td>CH</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82-mm, RCLR, B-10</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U/I gun</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-mm AD, ZU-23</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37-mm AD, M1939</td>
<td>CH</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37-mm AD, M1939</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57-mm AD, Type 59</td>
<td>CH</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57-mm gun</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75-mm assault gun, SP</td>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76-mm gun</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85-mm gun, D44</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85-mm AD, KS-18</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100-mm AD, KS-19</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122-mm, MRL, BM-21</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155-mm howitzer, M18/M19</td>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armor:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRDM-2 armored car</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTR-40 APC</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTR-152 APC</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT-76, LT amph, tank, 76-mm</td>
<td>CU, UR</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-62 lgt tank</td>
<td>CH</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-34 mdm tank, 85-mm</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-54 mdm tank, 100-mm</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-59 mdm tank, 100-mm</td>
<td>CH</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt tank</td>
<td>CH</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Transport:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck, 1/4- to 3/4-ton</td>
<td>CH, UR</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck, 7/8- to 3.5-ton</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck, 3.5- to 7.5-ton</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck, over 7.5-ton</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck, tank, liquid</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van, shop</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeep</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferry, amph, GSP</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* (U) There is no information available on the operational status of ground weapons and equipment.
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(6) Logistics

The Army's service and supply system is generally ineffective, and relies completely upon foreign sources for equipment. Available logistic services are concentrated in the Conakry area, but the Army has plans to establish decentralized arms and munitions storage facilities. However, overall the Army logistics system must be considered poor, the maintenance of vehicles and equipment.

(7) Personnel Procurement and Retention

A conscription law provides that all able-bodied male citizens between 18 and 49 are eligible for military service. Manpower requirements had been satisfied by volunteers until 1970, when members of the militia were called up for duty. In a March 1974 speech, then President Sekou Toure announced that armed forces personnel would be recruited only from the ranks of the trained militia; no longer would inexperienced men be recruited.

(8) Training

Before independence, Guinean forces were trained by the French. Since then, however, Communist training and advisory assistance have predominated, with the Soviet Union and China providing officer and specialist training. Military engineers and paratroopers have received training in East Germany and Cuba. In addition, Soviet, Chinese, and Cuban personnel have trained Guineans in-country. As many as 200 Guinean troops received basic military training in Libya in 1980; however, no Guineans currently receive training in Libya.

(9) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

An effort is being made to give militia training to industrial workers, and high school and university students. The planned size of the reserve is unknown.

(b) Mobilization

Mobilization plans are not known. Mobilization capacity is limited by a shortage of trained manpower as well as basic military equipment. The Army, however, probably could be expanded to about 15,000 within a year, with foreign administrative and technical assistance. Such an expansion probably would require the incorporation of the estimated 35,000-man militia and the conscription of additional personnel from elements of the civil service tactical groups—groups charged with civic, economic, and agricultural tasks that come under the military zone commanders. If stores of arms and munitions have been placed in each village and town, and militia
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training and organization are proceeding as proclaimed, then mobilization of the militia could be accomplished within days. However, such a force would have limited field combat capability.

b. Navy

(1) Mission

The mission of the Navy is fisheries protection, interdiction of contraband, and maritime safety/regulation.

(2) Capabilities

The Navy has marginal combat capabilities; it is limited by inadequate maintenance, lack of spare parts, and dependence on foreign assistance for repair of vessels.

(3) Personnel Strength

Estimated at 900 (100 officers, 800 enlisted)

(4) Ship and Aircraft Strength

(a) Ships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Op</th>
<th>Nonop</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PCS (submarine chaser)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCF (fast patrol craft)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT (torpedo boat)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTL (small torpedo boat)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PB (patrol boat)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCM (medium landing craft)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSF (fleet minesweeper)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) (U) Aircraft

None

(5) Organization and Deployment

(a) General Service

The Navy headquarters and operating base is at Conakry.
GUINEA

(b) Marine Corps (or Naval Infantry)

(U) None

(c) Naval Air Arm

(U) None

(6) Status of Equipment

Of the 20 coastal patrol-river/roadstead craft and mine warfare ships, 1 is known to be operational. Although the specific readiness ratings for the operational craft are unknown, their status probably ranges between substantially and marginally ready. All Guinean naval craft are of Soviet origin, except for the de l'Esterel patrol boat, which was purchased from France.

(7) Logistics

The Navy's limited logistic system requires foreign support to function. Guinea has no shipbuilding capabilities and its repair capability is limited to the port of Conakry for only smaller vessels. The ship-repair facility at the northeast end of Tombo Island makes repairs to minor combatants on a marine railway with a capacity of 1,000 tons. A small 800-ton floating drydock also provides hull repair to Navy units in the basin at Conakry. All Navy units at present require some repair. Only one combatant is operationally available. All others are inoperable because of a lack of maintenance and a lack of fuel and lubricants. Guinea's T-58 Gunboat is in the Soviet drydock at Luanda (Augola) for a major overhaul.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

(U) See paragraph 3.a.(7)

(9) Training

Naval personnel are moderately well trained. Specialized training is given in Conakry by a Soviet training team and by Guinean crews trained in the USSR.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

(U) No information available

(b) Mobilization

(U) Guinea has no registered merchant ships that could be mobilized.
Air Force

(1) Mission

The mission of the Air Force is to defend Guinean airspace and assist the ground forces by providing close air support, light bombing, reconnaissance, border surveillance, and general transport and utility services.

(2) Capabilities

The Guinean Air Force (GAF) is only partially capable of fulfilling its mission. The Air Force flew several reconnaissance flights over Freetown during the 1971 attempted coup in Sierra Leone. In April 1979, two MiG-21s successfully flew air cover support for an An-12 carrying Guinean troops to Liberia. The Air Force conducts MiG reconnaissance flights around Conakry. Guinean pilots have been trained both in the USSR and by Soviet and Cuban advisers in-country.

(3) Personnel Strength

Estimated at 750 (100 officers, 650 enlisted). This figure excludes Soviet/Cuban advisers and pilots.

(4) Aircraft

Total: 21 (fixed wing: 12 jet, 2 turboprop; helicopters: 3 turbine, 4 piston. All helicopters are non-operational.)

In operational units: 5
(4 day fighters; 1 transport: short-range)

(5) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

Air Force headquarters, as well as Guinea's only operating airbase and all training facilities, are located at Conakry. Detachments are located at Labe and Kankan Airfields to provide greater countrywide coverage.
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(b) Summary of Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Principal Bases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Composite Unit:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detachment</td>
<td>MiG-21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Conakry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MiG-17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Conakry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MiG-15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Conakry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>An-12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Conakry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mi-8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Conakry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mi-4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Conakry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MiG-17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Labe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) Status of Equipment

All of Guinea's military aircraft are of Soviet origin, and the Soviets are the primary source of ancillary equipment and repair parts. Despite the presence of Soviet military technicians, the quality of aircraft maintenance is poor. Only about five aircraft are believed to be operational at any given time.

(7) Logistics

Guinea has no aircraft production industry. The GAF suffers from a shortage of maintenance specialists and spare parts and insufficient fuel.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

See paragraph 3.a.(7)

(9) Training

Of the seven jet pilots, only two are capable of flying combat missions. Insufficient flying time limits pilot proficiency. Some MiG flights may be piloted by Cuban or Soviet personnel.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

(U) No information available

(b) Mobilization

(U) The Air Force could be augmented by pilots and aircraft from Air Guinea, which is government owned and controlled. Approximately 10 civil transport aircraft with a gross takeoff weight of at least 9,000 kilograms currently are registered, owned, and operated in Guinea. Aircraft in
the inventory include two Boeing 707-320B and two 720B long-range transports; one An-12, two An-24, one Boeing 727, one Boeing 737, and one Ilyushin Il-18. The current operating condition of the Boeing 727 is uncertain; its engines reportedly were removed in early 1982, presumably for major overhaul. The Il-18 is believed to be a Force Aérienne de Guinée (FAG) aircraft operated by Air Guinée on VIP government flights. The Guinean Government does not permit the ownership and operation of private aircraft.

(U) The total number of licensed civilian pilots of major transport aircraft in Guinea is not known. Most of Air Guinée's pilots are believed to be Guinean nationals.

Virtually all of Guinea's civil aircraft and indigenous civilian aviation personnel could be mobilized for military or other government use in the event of war or comparable national emergency.
d. Paramilitary Forces

(1) National Gendarmerie

(a) Mission

The mission of the Gendarmerie is to maintain order in rural areas and patrol the country's borders. It is especially concerned with customs, duties, smuggling, and controlling subversion. The Gendarmerie also has responsibility for national communications.

(b) Capabilities and Limitations

The Gendarmerie is poorly trained, lacks equipment, and is underpaid. Desertion from units stationed in remote areas is common. It is capable of performing its mission, and could provide some combat potential to augment that of the Army.

(c) Strength

Estimated at 1,500

(d) Organization

This force is organized into seven squadrons, one special squadron, and the Gendarmerie School at Kankan. The squadrons are located in Kindia, Labe, Kankan, Faranah, Boke, N'Zerekore, and Conakry. The Gendarmerie is further divided into city brigades, border brigades, and special brigades.

(e) Status of Arms and Equipment

It is equipped with an insufficient number of Soviet small arms. These weapons are in poor condition, and spare parts are not readily available.

(2) People's Militia

(a) Mission

The Militia has the mission of guarding the government, providing security services, (e.g., manning checkpoints), and performing police functions.

(b) Capabilities and Limitations

The People's Militia probably is moderately well trained. It probably has the combat potential to augment the Army.
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(c) **Strength**

Estimated at 35,000

(d) **Organization**

The permanent force of the People's Militia is believed to be organized into a National and Popular Militia. The National Militia is directly responsible to the President; the Popular Militia comes under the control of the provincial governors.

(e) **Status of Equipment**

The Militia is equipped with Soviet and PRC small arms and equipment. The condition of the equipment is unknown.

(3) **Other**

In addition to the foregoing paramilitary forces that are capable of a substantial contribution to the country's combat strength, the following forces have some potential for augmentation of the regular forces in the event of hostilities.

(a) **Republican Guard**

The 1,200-man Republican Guard has the mission of civil security. The lightly armed force would serve as a rear-area security force in the event of hostilities.

(b) **Surete Nationale (Police Force)**

The 1,500-man Surete Nationale is charged with traffic control and routine police functions and would serve as a rear-area security force in the event of hostilities.

(e) **Total Military Personnel Strength**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gendarmerie</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People's Militia</td>
<td>35,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Republican Guard</td>
<td>1,200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Surete Nationale</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>51,850</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
f. **Foreign Military Presence**

Soviet Military Advisers: Estimated 50 (15 serve as advisers to the Guinean Air Force). The Soviet Union has a military assistance advisory group assigned in Guinea.

Cuban Military Advisers: Estimated 40 (includes 20 Cuban military personnel on temporary deployment to work on road building projects).

North Korean Military Advisers: Number unknown
Withheld pursuant to exemption
(b)(3) 10 USC 424
of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
Withheld pursuant to exemption
(b)(3) 10 USC 424
of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
Guinea-Bissau

1. Political-Military Situation: After 14 years of insurgent activity, Guinea-Bissau declared its independence from Portugal on 24 September 1973, and Portugal granted de jure independence on 10 September 1974. The African Party for Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC) was the political wing of the insurgent movement, and it since has been embodied in the Constitution as the only legal party. Prior to 1980, the PAIGC was the ruling party of both Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. In November 1981, the Government of Cape Verde made the formal break with the Government of Guinea-Bissau by changing its party name to the Party for Independence of Cape Verde (PAIC). Although Cape Verde has requested that Guinea-Bissau change its party name to the PAIG, the Government of Guinea-Bissau has retained the PAIGC title. The regime continues to concentrate on the organization of government down to the local level, expansion of foreign relations, and acquisition of economic and military assistance from abroad. However, a paucity of public administration expertise among Guinea-Bissau's officials has contributed to the country's slow implementation of national reconstruction. The PAIGC is the only authorized political party. Throughout 1983, a series of commissions met to prepare for legislative and presidential elections and to revise the 1973 constitution. The commission will update the electoral process and call for elections of a national popular assembly. A National Security Council was created in August 1983, which will replace the current Revolutionary Council following election of a national assembly.

A coup d'état led by former Prime Minister and guerrilla commander Joao Bernardo "Nino" Vieira overthrew the government of Louis Almeida Cabral on 14 November 1980. In 1981, Cabral was exiled to Cuba. The underlying causes of the coup included: resentment on the part of the indigenous Guineans of the continued domination of their country by a Cape Verdean political elite, and a reaction against Cabral's statist approach to economic planning. Currently, unpaid salaries in the civilian and military sectors, a lack of rice, electricity outages, and dissension within the military could threaten the stability of the present regime.

In February 1980, the Government of Guinea-Bissau established a military rank structure for its Armed Forces. Top government officials, veterans of the guerrilla war, were also given positions of military importance. This was done so that the old line soldiers could retain control of the Armed Forces. The military is President Vieira's political base.

In the past, the Armed Forces have relied on Communist countries for training and aid. Military hardware has come almost exclusively from the USSR and includes MIG-15 and MIG-17 aircraft, Mi-8 helicopters, PT 76 and T-34 tanks, armored cars, and infantry weapons. There are 50 Soviet and 50 Cuban military advisers in Guinea-Bissau. Both the Soviets and Cubans are regarded highly in open rhetoric because Soviet and Cuban military advisers to Guinea-Bissau contributed greatly to the success of their struggle for independence. However, the Soviets have lost some of their popularity because of their aggressive traits, inability to speak Portuguese, and lack of understanding of local culture and customs. Specifically, Guinea-Bissau is dissatisfied with the performance of

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Soviet military advisers. Due to the difficulty in obtaining spare parts, vehicles, and equipment remain at low readiness levels.

**SYN** The mission of the People's Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARE') is threefold: (1) maintenance of frontier and internal security; (2) politicization of the masses; and (3) participation in civilian economic development. The Army is the backbone of the military while the Air Force and Navy play secondary roles. Emphasis on training has been primarily as a defensive force; the Army is not capable of conducting conventional offensive operations. Compared to the armies of Senegal and Guinea, Guinea-Bissau fares poorly. The Guinea-Bissauans would succeed in guerrilla warfare operations in-country but not in conventional warfare against their neighbors. The Army, however, is capable of quelling internal disturbances. Air Force pilots fly with Soviet pilots in the cockpits, but the Soviets take off and land the aircraft. Only Guinea-Bissauans were at the controls of the two MiG-17s that crashed in January 1984. These planes had been sent on a mission in an offshore area where two oil prospecting ships sent by Senegal discovered oil in waters claimed by Guinea-Bissau. It is unclear whether they were sent to observe or disrupt the exploration. If the latter, the episode is an example of the government using military resources to support its position in the dispute. The Navy is hindered in its mission of conducting coastal patrols and protecting the fishing industry for its vessels. Both Air Force and Naval officers are primarily trained in the Soviet Union or Cuba.

In 1979, 17 percent of the national budget went to the military. At present, the Army consists of about 7,000 personnel. A reduced strength posture is more in line with Guinea-Bissau's economy and with the security needs of the country.

Guinea-Bissau follows a foreign policy based on nonalignment. It is a member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and of the Lusophone Conference of former Portuguese colonies. Over the past 6 years, it has improved its relations with Portugal, Sweden, France, the US, and West Germany, and it established diplomatic relations with South Korea in December 1983. This turn to the West coincides with the rise to high political office by moderates. These moderates have also sought and received aid from moderate Arab states including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Egypt. The goal of these efforts is to broaden the base of economic dependence from its almost sole orientation on Warsaw Pact nations prior to 1980. In 1982, the US initiated an International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) to train a few Guinea-Bissauan military personnel. Relations with West Germany improved last year with the signing of an economic aid agreement.

Guinea-Bissau continues to maintain economic and diplomatic relations with Communist countries. The close ties with the Soviet Union and Cuba stem from both countries' help in Guinea-Bissau's struggle for independence. About 150 civilian Soviet advisers are involved in developing energy, infrastructures, mining, fisheries, hydrology, education, and health. About 100 civilian Cuban advisers work in education, health, agriculture, fishing, planning, civil construction, and telecommunications. About 50 civilian East German advisers
GUINEA-BISSAU

provide assistance in internal security, telecommunications, education, agriculture, some industrial projects, and fill mid-level managerial positions in some government offices.

A major foreign policy issue is a running dispute with the Republic of Guinea (Conakry) and Senegal over the maritime borders between the three countries. The dispute was focused on offshore oil exploration in the contested area. Guinea-Bissau and Senegal agreed to submit their dispute to arbitration in 1982 while Guinea-Bissau and Guinea agreed to arbitration in 1983. However, the dispute with Senegal rapidly escalated in January 1984 when a Canadian oil exploration vessel under contract to Senegal was in the disputed zone. Although hostilities did not break out, tensions were high until the vessel departed.

Guinea-Bissau has no military equipment production capability. The USSR is the major supplier of military equipment to include fighter aircraft, helicopters, armored reconnaissance vehicles, trucks, small arms, radar, and two SHERSHEN Class motor-torpedo boats. Guinea-Bissau has also purchased 8-ton military trucks and an Alouette II helicopter in 1983 from France. The value of total military equipment shipments, mostly Soviet, is $37 million.

2. (U) Key Officials:
President: Brigadier General Joao Bernardo Vieira
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Fidelis Cabral D'Almada
Minister of Defense: Iafai Camara
Navy: Commander, Lt Col Mario Delegado
Air Force: Commander, Col Lamine Cisse
Army: Col Joao Lopes Da Silva
Chief of Staff, Land Force: Col Benghate Na Beate

3. (U) Military Budget: No information available

4. (U) Population: 842,000 estimated as of July 1984
Males (ages 15-49): 197,000; physically fit, 115,000
Ethnic Divisions: About 99 percent African (Balanta 30 percent, Fulani 20 percent, Mandyako 14 percent, Malinke 13 percent, and 23 percent other tribes); less than 1 percent Europeans and mulatto.
Literacy: 3-5 percent

5. (S/NF) Army:
Personnel Strength: Estimated 7,000 (no breakdown available on the number of officers, NCOs, and enlisted men).
Combat Units: Four infantry battalions, one mechanized brigade, one artillery group, one antiaircraft unit, one transportation group, one signal company, and a Presidential Guard.
Major Equipment: 8 T-34 and 7 PT-76 tanks; 15 BTR-40 APCs; 10 BRDM ARCs; an unknown number of SA-7/GRAIL SAMs; 57-mm AT guns; 37-mm AD guns; 82-mm recoilless rifles; 122-mm rocket launchers; 60-mm, 82-mm, and 120-mm mortars.
6. **Navy:**
Personnel Strength: 450
Ships: No combat ships. Two SHERSHEN patrol boats (PT), two P-6 patrol boats (PTL), two POLUCHAT torpedo retrievers (YPT), six T-4 medium landing craft (LCM), two Plascha patrol boats (PB), and one hydrographic survey ship (AGS). The SHERSHENs were delivered in December 1978 by the Soviet Union. In 1982, Guinea-Bissau signed a technical and naval assistance agreement with Portugal. All naval craft are based at the Bissau Port Facility (BE 0780-00007, CAT 47400, CORD 11-51-28N 015-34-52W).

7. **Air Force:**
Personnel Strength: 150
Aircraft: 16 (3 jet fighters, 5 prop light transports, 2 prop light trainers, 4 helicopters)

8. **Paramilitary (Militia):**
Personnel Strength: Estimated about 2,000 men (no breakdown available of officers, NCOs, and enlisted men).
Units: No information available on composition of units. No major equipment. The Militia consists of demobilized troops who have retained their weapons and have formed into agricultural and industrial cooperatives. Cuban advisers are stationed with these troops, assisting in agricultural, economic, and paramilitary/political training. Reportedly, other paramilitary forces are the Frontier Guard, the Customs Service, and the Public Safety and Transit Police.

9. **Key US Officials:**
Chief of Mission (Bissau): Ambassador Wesley W. Egan, Jr.

10. **Foreign Military Presence:**
Soviet Military Advisers: 50 advisers working with the Army and the Air Force. Cuban Military Advisers: less than 50 military advisers working with the Army and the Militia.
Withheld pursuant to exemption
(b)(3): 10 USC 424
of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
IVORY COAST

1. Political-Military Situation: Since achieving independence in August 1960, the Republic of the Ivory Coast has been led by one man, President Felix Houphouët-Boigny an Octogenarian. Operating through the Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast (PDCI), the country's only legal political party, Houphouët's rule is characterized by tight control of government operations and national politics. In this highly centralized system, very little is accomplished without the President's approval. Houphouët's leadership of the pre-independence movement made him a revered and popular figure. The country's overall postcolonial success has further strengthened his position. Ivorian political stability has been enhanced by a relatively prosperous economy based upon three major factors: rapidly expanding agricultural production; encouragement of foreign, primarily French, private investment; and extensive use of foreign, again primarily French, professional expertise.

To insure that his system will endure, the President has taken several measures to diminish the chances of a military or civilian coup. He has created and continues to maintain a power balance within the armed forces by establishing several different services: the military, gendarmerie, police, and the presidential guard. He has also assured that these services and their individual units are not dominated by one ethnic group. Houphouët incorporates highly rated young military officers into his administration so as to benefit from their talents, give them first-hand experience in the difficulties of running a developing country, and to monitor their political ambitions. Additionally, the one party system as it functions under Houphouët's tutelage has been able to co-opt and absorb ambitious individuals who might otherwise have become opponents. Finally, the Ivory Coast and France have mutual defense accords that call for the French to intervene in the event of an external attack upon the country. There is a French Marine Battalion stationed under terms of this agreement near Abidjan's international airport. In addition to resisting external aggression, additional missions include protecting French nationals and interests, and supporting the Houphouët regime. The possibility of French intervention is itself a deterrent to coup plotting.

On the economic front, the Government is currently faced with a financial crisis unparalleled in the independence era. Rising unemployment among Ivorian elites and persistent inflation is eroding real incomes. The current decline in coffee and cocoa prices has trimmed foreign exchange earnings. This in addition to high interest rates and an appreciating dollar has caused debt service expenses to rise sharply, put the balance of payments severely into deficit, and depleted foreign exchange reserves. Private firms find it virtually impossible to raise funds in local financial markets. Their problems are further exacerbated by arrearages on many government accounts. Unemployment so far is most acute among recent graduates of secondary and postsecondary institutions who are having increasing difficulty finding positions compatible with their education.* Unemployment could become even more serious if business failures mount due to the financial crisis. Minimum wages, which are the effective wage for many workers, have not been increased since January 1980. In

* Many of these graduates blame this problem on the French and other expatriates living in-country who hold jobs that should, in the view of these graduates, be given to Ivorians.

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addition, many better paid government workers have been threatened with substantial salary reductions at the same time as inflation continues at a 10-15 percent annual rate.

The key question on the political front remains the succession to President Houphouet-Boigny. A constitutional amendment in 1980 created the position of Vice-President, but Houphouet has not yet filled it. Thus, the question of who would succeed the President if he should die suddenly remains unresolved. Since power in the Ivory Coast remains heavily concentrated in Houphouet's hands, his death with the succession matter unsettled would cause a period of uncertainty which could be destabilizing. However, other changes over recent years should reduce the prospects of instability after Houphouet. During 1980, the Ivory Coast successfully held its first democratic elections for party, legislative, and municipal posts. As a result of the major changes brought about by the elections, each of these institutions is composed of people who on the average are younger, better educated, and more popular than their predecessors. A younger generation is gaining increasing experience in the executive branch as well. Only 6 of the 37 ministers named in the February 1981 cabinet reshuffle are over 55 and a substantial number are in their late 30s and early 40s. These changes will tend to avoid generational conflict, contribute to the flexibility of the political system, and should help to keep domestic conflicts manageable.

At present, there does not appear to be a major external threat to the Ivory Coast although the Ivorians perceive one emanating from Burkina Faso as a result of the August 1983 coup. During 1984, there are plans to form a fourth infantry battalion and station it near the border with Burkina Faso. Relations with Liberia are correct but not cordial.

There are no bilateral aid agreements or military assistance programs with any Communist state, and Ivorian relations with Communist countries are very limited. Houphouet's officially espoused policy is based on the Ivorian belief that Communist intentions in Africa are to foment conflict and to deny the continent's natural resources to the West. However, Ivory Coast established relations with China during 1983.

The small defense organization of the Ivory Coast, composed of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Gendarmerie, totals about 10,000 personnel. The President, as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, exercises ultimate control. Very little is decided without his approval, including all senior military appointments. The President has designed the command and control structure to assure strict civilian control over the military. Furthermore, he has been careful to create an ethnic/regional balance within both the command structure and individual military units. The Army, the largest branch of the Armed Services, has the mission of defending the country against external aggression and in maintaining internal order. However, it is poorly equipped and without direct French assistance would have difficulty fulfilling its mission. Major deficiencies include an ineffective logistics system, a paucity of qualified personnel, a weak command and control system, and a lack of effective combat service support elements. There are four military regions in Ivory Coast: Abidjan, to which the 1st Infantry Battalion is assigned; Daloa, to which the 2d Infantry Battalion is assigned; Bouake, to which the 3d Infantry Battalion is assigned; and Korhogo, to which the 3d Legion of the Gendarmerie is assigned.
In the event of an invasion, the Ivory Coast would call on France, with which it has a defense accord. Joint French-Ivorian military maneuvers specified under terms of the accord between the two nations were held along the frontier with Ghana in October 1983. Participants in these maneuvers included the 43d French Marine Infantry Battalion located in Abidjan, and the three Ivorian infantry battalions. The maneuvers were successful in that they demonstrated good French-Ivorian military cooperation and involved elements from all Ivorian military services.

The Ivory Coast has joined other members of the Economic Community of West African states (ECOWAS) in initiatives to create a defense agreement among the other 16 members. There are no defense pacts with individual African states.

The Ivory Coast has no military materiel production capability. France is the major supplier of military equipment to include tanks, APCs, field artillery, mortars, trucks, communications equipment, jet fighters, air transports, utility aircraft, and helicopters. The Netherlands has supplied transport aircraft. The value of military deliveries in the last 6 years is over $380 million.

2. (U) Key Officials:
President: Felix Houphouet-Boigny
Minister of Defense: Jean Konan Banny
Minister of State Charged with Interior: Leon Konan Koffi
Minister of Internal Security: Maj Gen Oumar N'Daw
Minister of Marine Affairs: Capt (Navy) Lamine Fadika
Armed Forces: Inspector General, Lt Gen Ibrahima Coulibaly
Armed Forces: Chief of Staff, Maj Gen Zeze Baroan Bertin
Army: Coincides with Chief of Staff of Armed Forces
Navy: Commander, Lt Cdr Fako Kone
Air Force: Commander, Lt Col Abdoulaye Coulibaly
Gendarmerie: Commander, Col Botty Koffi
Presidential Guard: Commander, Col Kouassi Ouffane
Military Fire Group: Commander, Col Robert Guie

3. (U) Military Budget: $75.4 million for fiscal year ending 31 December 1982; this is 4.5 percent of the central government budget. No service allocation is available. Dollar value converted from CFA francs at the exchange rate of 335 francs equal $1.00.

4. (U) Population: 9,178,000 as of 1 July 1984
Males (ages 15-49): 2,228,000, physically fit, 1,144,000

5. (U) Army:
Personnel Strength: Auth: 4,039; Assigned: 4,250 (figures include Admin staffs in MOD and Civil Service)
Combat Units: Three inf bns; one armd group; one artillery group with US-manufactured 105-mm howitzers and 120-mm mortars, one ADA btry with 40-mm AD guns and Panhard twin 20-mm AA systems.
Reserve: There is a formal reserve system from which several thousand could be mobilized.
Major Equipment: 39 armored cars and troop carriers (Panhard M-3/VTT; AML-60/20; AML-90); 5 AMX-13 light tanks; 7 ERC-90; 4 105-mm howitzers; 6 120-mm mortars; 6 Panhard M-3/VDA 20-mm ADA; 6 20-mm/VLRA-mounted ADA; and 4 40-mm BOFORS ADA

6. Navy:
Personnel Strength: Auth: 666; Assigned (as of 1 Jan 1984): 620
Reserve: None
Ships: One amphibious assault ship (LPH), four motor gunboats (PGM), and several small utility craft for liaison and lagoon patrol
Merchant Shipping: 12 cargo ships (1,000 GRT or over) totaling 125,392 GRT, 158,624 DWT

7. Air Force
Personnel Strength: Auth: 780; Assigned (as of 1 Jan 1984): 790
Reserve: None
Aircraft: 37 (22 fixed wing, 10 helicopter—all transport/utility types, 5 Alpha jets)

8. Paramilitary:
   a. Gendarmerie:
Personnel Strength: Auth: 4,312; Assigned (as of 1 Jan 1984): 3,800
Reserve: None
Units: 4 legions (consisting of 10 department/specialized cos and 7 mobile sqdns), and a new commando-intervention group.
Major Equipment: 81-mm mortars, 13-Saviem VAB armored cars, 34 SAMO 4x4 vehicles, and 180 Peugeot Camionette vans.

   b. Presidential Guard and Militia
Personnel Strength: Auth: 1,067; Assigned (as of 1 Jan 1984): 1,610
Reserve: None
Units: Presidential Guard—4 cos (600 men); Militia—several groups for protection of other government officials (500 men).
Major Equipment: None

   c. Other: The Military Fire Group (GSPM)

9. Key US Officials:
Chief of Mission (Abidjan): Ambassador Robert Miller

10. Foreign Military Presence:
French Army Forces: The 43d Marine Infantry Battalion (BIMA), with 450 men, with 6 AMX-13 tanks, AML-90/AML-60/20 armored cars and 81-mm mortars located near Port Bouet International Airport, Abidjan.
French Advisory Personnel: 90 plus.
In addition, there are 80-90 French military doctors with most serving in medical facilities in Abidjan.
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1. **GOVERNMENT**

   a. **(U) Key Government Officials**

   President and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces: Daniel T. arap Moi
   Vice President and Minister of Home Affairs: Mwai Kibaki
   Minister of State in the Office of the President: Justice Ole Tipis
   Chief Secretary, Permanent Secretary in the Office of the President, Head of the Civil Service and Secretary to the President's Cabinet: Simeon Nychae

   b. **Type and Stability of Government**

   (U) The people of Kenya were granted self-government by Great Britain on 1 June 1963 followed by full independence on 12 December 1963. One year later Kenya became a Republic within the Commonwealth, and continues to be a functioning democracy. Jomo Kenyatta, a member of the Kikuyu tribe, was the country's first President and national leader for 14 years. Kenya's record of domestic stability and economic growth during his years as head of state can be ascribed in large part to his charismatic leadership and the respect he had throughout the country. Following Kenyatta's death in 1978, Vice President Daniel arap Moi, a member of the Kalenjin tribe, was installed as the interim President in a peaceful, constitutional transition of power. He was subsequently elected to a full 5-year term of office in November 1978, and again in September 1983.

   (U) Matching the executive term of office is Kenya's 158-man unicameral National Assembly. In addition to this elected representation, there are also 12 members appointed by the President, plus the Attorney General and the Speaker who are ex officio members. The judiciary is headed by a Supreme Court of at least 11 presidentially appointed judges. Regional government is organized into 40 rural administrative districts, each headed by a District Commissioner appointed by the President. These districts combine to form seven rural provinces, similarly administered by an appointee of Kenya’s chief executive.

   (U) Since coming to office President Moi has suffered a gradual decline in the high degree of credibility and respect that he inherited as the late Jomo Kenyatta's successor. One of the key factors in this decline has been the intense tribal factionalism that plagues Kenyan politics.

   As a member of a minority tribe, President Moi is in a difficult position. He has been heavily dependent on a council of close advisers from the politically and demographically important Kikuyu ethnic group. However, as a result of suspected behind-the-scenes Kikuyu involvement in the 1 August 1982 Kenyan Air Force coup attempt, Moi has taken action to reduce the degree of Kikuyu influence in Kenyan politics.

   During the past year President Moi has carried out a series of sudden moves to eliminate a number of his political enemies while filling vacated positions with his supporters. Following the suspension and subsequent inquiry of Charles Njonjo, the former constitutional affairs minister, the sole political party, KANU, in an unprecedented move, expelled 15 members from the party,

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including Njonjo. Other moves such as the sudden removal of Major General Musomba, the former Chief of Staff, and the replacing of Jerry Kiereini, Chief Secretary to the Presidency and a long-time Njonjo protege, seem to have stripped the majority tribe—the Kikuyu—of many of their privileges in the power structure. Morale among the Kikuyu in the military, particularly mid-level officers, has been adversely affected. Dissatisfaction among the Kikuyu in general has risen, particularly since the drought situation has affected Kikuyu tribal areas and the government has been slow to respond with aid.

As a result of these actions Moi is forced to rely on less experienced civilian advisers; centralize more power in the Presidency; and has become increasingly restrictive in governmental matters. Such actions further erode Moi's base of support and reduce the likelihood of his continuation in office. While Moi currently faces no clear political or military threat, his efforts to enhance personal power has served to demoralize several key traditional institutions, and added to his own insecurity and isolation.

c. Internal Threat

The primary internal threat to Kenya comes from ethnic rivalries and political infighting as national economic and social problems increase. Inflation, unemployment, periodic food and fuel shortages, a very high population growth rate, increasing rural competition for scarce productive land, and a growing crime rate have resulted in more public discontent and increased levels of disaffection in the military. Such circumstances could lead to either a threat from a group within the military, as the August 1982 coup attempt illustrates, or a situation where the military leadership would feel compelled to intervene collectively to restore order and preserve national security.

d. External Threat

There is currently no significant external threat to Kenya despite the fact that most of its neighbors possess larger military forces. In spite of warming bilateral relations, Kenya continues to perceive an external threat from Somalia. This perception stems from Somalia's historic claims to northeastern Kenya, a region inhabited by ethnic Somalis. However, irredentist Somali actions in this region have been forestalled by Mogadishu's preoccupation over the continuing border conflict with Ethiopia.

Ethiopia is a signatory ally of Kenya, retaining its bilateral Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, and participates in joint border patrols. Nevertheless, Ethiopia is now perceived by Kenya as a growing potential threat because of its radical Marxist orientation. More specific factors that bode ill for future bilateral relations are: the large Communist military presence in Ethiopia; the Aden Pact between Ethiopia, Libya, and South Yemen; improved relations between Kenya and Somalia; US access to Kenyan military bases; and Kenya's dependence upon Western military and economic assistance.

Kenyan concerns over Tanzania abated considerably with the departure of Tanzanian occupation forces from Uganda in early 1982. However, relations again were strained in August 1982 following the Kenyan Air Force coup attempt
KENYA

when two coup participants were granted asylum in Tanzania. Their extradition in November 1983, in exchange for Tanzanian dissidents living in Nairobi, was largely responsible for warming relations between the two nations. This event, coupled with the successful conclusion of negotiations for distribution of assets held by the defunct East African Community were primarily responsible for the opening of the long-closed Kenya-Tanzania border in late 1983. In spite of these improvements in Kenya-Tanzania relations, further significant advances will be limited by the widely divergent ideological views espoused by the two heads of state.

e. Communist Influence

There is no Communist party in Kenya. Communist nations generally have been unsuccessful in their attempts to persuade the Government of Kenya to adopt a more stridently nonaligned position or accept military aid. Communist representatives continue to attempt to influence students, labor leaders, politicians, and others—but with little success. The USSR, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and several East European countries have resident ambassadors in Nairobi.

f. Economic Factors

Compared to most other African countries, Kenya has a relatively high per capita income but is capable of sustained economic development only if the favorable investment climate shaped by Kenya's history of political stability is maintained. The Government, however, has been unable to arrest an economic decline and is struggling with inflation and the rising cost of oil imports, and the economic impact of a 4-percent population growth rate (the world's highest). The economic situation has slowed the expansion and modernization of the armed forces. Additionally, the drought that Kenya is experiencing is the worst in 100 years.

(U) The agricultural base of Kenya's economy is significantly augmented by industrial production in petroleum refining, cement production, light industry (e.g., plastics, batteries, and textiles), and tourism. The 1983 GDP was $5.88 billion with a per capita income of $316. Kenya's major exports are coffee, tea, livestock, cement, refined petroleum products, and pyrethrum. Major imports are machinery, transport equipment, crude oil, and paper products. Leading trade partners are the European Community countries, Japan, and the US.

g. Military and Political Alignment

Although nominally nonaligned, Kenya has long fostered close ties with the West, principally the United Kingdom and the United States. Major weapon systems have been acquired from these countries. Kenya has also been host to limited military exercises conducted by both countries, and the UK maintains a small advisory contingent in-country. Additionally, Kenya and the US concluded a facilities access agreement in June 1980, allowing the US increased utilization of Kenyan port and air facilities.
Kenya's formal regional military agreements are limited to its mutual defense pact with Ethiopia. In being since 1964, this treaty has seen little use, with the exception of periodic bilateral military operations against the Shifta bandits along the Ethiopia-Kenya border area.

Chief of Mission (Nairobi): Ambassador Gerald E. Thomas
(b)(3), 50 USC 3024(i)
2. MILITARY, GENERAL

   a. (U) Key Military Officials

      Department of Defense (KDOD):
         Permanent Secretary for Defense (Office of the President): Joseph Muliro
         Chief of the General Staff: General Jackson K. Mulinge

      Army (KA):
         Deputy Chief of the General Staff and Army Commander,
         Lieutenant General John M. Sawe

      Navy (KN):
         Commander: Brigadier Eliud S. Mbilu

      Air Force (82 AF):
         Commander: Lt Gen Haji Mohamoud Mohamed

      Kenya Military Intelligence Service
         Commander: Brigadier Joseph R. Kibwana

      Armed Forces Training Center (AFTC):
         Commander: Brigadier David N. Meli

      Kenya Police Force (KPF):
         Commissioner: Bernard Njiimu

      General Service Unit (GSU):
         Commandant: Erastus M'Mbijjiwe M'Ionga

   b. Position of the Armed Forces

      The political influence of the Armed Forces in Kenya has been expanding since Moi's rise to power in 1978. The military, and more specifically the Kenya Army, (KA) has become more aware of its political clout since its suppression of the 1982 Air Force coup attempt. As the senior service, the KA has repeatedly brought pressure to bear against the President's office for increased budgetary considerations. So far this has produced $8 million (US) for the construction of military housing, plus a 20-percent pay raise for all ranks. However, due to Kenya's depressed economic situation, government corruption, and high priority nonmilitary funding requirements, it is highly unlikely that further large increases in military allocations will be forthcoming in the near term. If the Kenyan Government proves consistently unwilling or unable to respond to further increases in Kenyan military requirements, the relationship between the government and the military will become increasingly strained. Such a turn of events could result in military moves against the Moi regime.

   c. Military Trends and Capabilities

      While the acquisition of new weapons for the military services has improved combat capabilities the modernization and expansion program has not been without problems. It is a considerable strain on the national economy; lack of management at the KDOD and service headquarters has been cause for significant delays in decisionmaking on policy and program issues; and logistic and training programs in the services at present are not capable of supporting the more sophisticated weapon systems.
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There are at present no facilities in Kenya for the indigenous production of military equipment, spare parts, and munitions. The Kenyan Armed Forces are totally dependent upon foreign sources for these needs. Further, they will continue to require extensive foreign technical assistance for the recently acquired weapon systems for some time to come.

d. **Military Budget**

(U) $120,190,000 for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1983; this is 5.2 percent of the central government budget and 2.1 percent of the estimated GDP. No service allocation is available. Dollar values converted from Kenyan pounds at the exchange rate of 15.0 shillings equals $1.00.

e. **Population**

19,362,000 as of 1 July 1984
Males (ages 15-49): 3,816,000; physically fit, 2,349,000
Ethnic Divisions: 98 percent African; .5 percent Asian; 1 percent European, Arab, and others
Literacy: 27 percent
Languages: English, Swahili, and over 30 tribal languages and dialects.
KENYA

3. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

a. Army

(1) Mission

(U) To defend national borders and assist the Kenya Police Force (KPF) and the General Service Unit (GSU) in the maintenance of internal security.

(2) Capabilities

(\textlbrace} While by African standards the Army is an efficient combat force, in terms of overall combat capabilities the KA would have little chance of defending Kenya against an attack from its much stronger neighbor, Ethiopia. The KA would be somewhat more successful in defending against an attack from either Somalia or Tanzania. Although incapable of preventing penetration of Kenyan territory by these two nations, the Army may well be capable of containing any such conventional attacks. Kenya could be reasonably confident of defending against any conventional military threat from Uganda or Sudan, although chances of attacks from these quarters are remote. Kenya is not capable of launching a viable military campaign against any of its neighbors except Uganda.

(\textrbrace) The KA is capable of containing the present low level of bandit (Shifta) activity in the North-Eastern Province. However, if relations between Kenya and Somalia were to deteriorate, and Somalia were to renew major support to the Shifta, the Army would be hard-pressed to counter them. There have been occasional coordinated Kenyan/Ethiopian military exercises along the common border against Somali guerrilla groups operating through Kenya into Ethiopia. These operations fulfill the terms of a defense agreement between these two countries.

(\textlbrace} The KA has grown substantially in the past few years, but remains a small force when compared with most other East African armies. Although the modernization and expansion program is slowly improving the Army’s combat capabilities, problems remain. These are chiefly in the areas of logistics and training. The acquisition of the new weapons is compounding existing equipment maintenance deficiencies, logistics handicaps, and management shortcomings. Further, there is a lack of technically qualified personnel, and the mid-level officer and NCO ranks lack supervisory training and experience. The dispersion of qualified personnel from older operational units to newly formed units has to some extent degraded the capabilities of the overall organization. In addition, the influx of new personnel into the Army frequently exceeds unit training capabilities, making it difficult to maintain traditionally high standards.

(\textrbrace) Army field operations and joint operations with the Kenya Navy and Air Force are limited by insufficient communications and poorly defined rules of engagement. There is a lack of clarity in the national chain of command, further limiting command and control. Tactical intelligence is provided to the military by the KPF and the GSU, which have primary responsibility for border
KENYA

control and surveillance of the interior; however, neither organization adequately fill the Army's intelligence needs. KA involvement in amphibious and land combined military exercises with the US is providing the Kenyans a hands-on opportunity to learn modern warfare techniques.

(3) Personnel Strength

Estimate 13,000

(4) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

The combat forces of the Kenyan Army are divided into four brigades: two infantry; one armor; and one artillery. Infantry brigades have a total of five battalions. These units are the Army's primary tactical maneuver forces. Plans to form a sixth battalion to bring both brigades to full strength have been scrapped due to budgetary considerations. The Army's deployment pattern for its infantry forces indicates a strong concern over defense of the Nairobi area. Brigade headquarters are located in Gilgil and Nanyuki. Garrisons for the five infantry battalions are in Eldoret, Nakuru, Gilgil, Nairobi, and Wajir.

The armor brigade, headquartered at Isiolo consists of two battalions with one located at Gilgil and the other being collocated with the brigade headquarters. Artillery assets have their organizational headquarters in Nairobi. Subordinate to the brigade are two artillery battalions, one stationed at Gilgil and the other at Mombasa.

Providing engineering support for the Army's ground combat forces is Kenya's newly organized combat engineer brigade. Headquarters for this organization as well as one of the brigade's two battalions is in Isiolo. The remaining battalion is located in Nanyuki. A variety of other support units exist to support Kenyan Army combat units. Most of these are headquartered in Nairobi, and some (such as logistics and maintenance units) are field deployed with combat forces as required.
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(b) Ground Combat Units

Major Tactical Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Description</th>
<th>Authorized*</th>
<th>Assigned Average/Actual**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 Infantry Brigade HQ</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Infantry Battalions</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Armor Brigade HQ</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Armor Battalions</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Artillery Brigade</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Artillery Battalions</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Combat Engineer Brigade</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>1,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Combat Engineer Battalions</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Parachute Battalion</td>
<td>550-600</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Air Cavalry Battalion</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Signals Battalion</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Deployment

Army units are garrisoned as discussed in 3. a. (5) (a). Every 6 months, however, a battalion equivalent unit is deployed to the North-Eastern Province with headquarters at Wajir. The rotation usually takes place in January and July.

(d) Ground Weapons and Equipment (major items only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armored Vehicles:</td>
<td>Medium Tank, Vickers</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ARV, Panhard, AML-45/90</td>
<td>FR</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ARV, Panhard, AML-45/60</td>
<td>FR</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>APC, Panhard, AML-VTT, M-3</td>
<td>FR</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>APC, UNIMOG, UR-416</td>
<td>GE</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ARV, Saladin</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wombat, 120-mm SP AT gun</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery:</td>
<td>Howitzer, 105-mm</td>
<td>IT</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Light gun, 105-mm</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gun-Howitzer, 25-pd</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Authorized strength levels in most cases are estimated to run 10-30 percent higher than assigned strength.

** (U) Estimated strength per unit.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mortars:</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>120-mm IS</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81-mm UK/IS</td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-in UK</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-in/60-mm UK</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Antitank Weapons:</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATGM, TOW (helicopter Platform) US</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATGM, Milan FR</td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATGM Swingfire Ichr UK</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCLR, 84-mm Carl Gustav SW</td>
<td></td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCLR, 3.5-in UK</td>
<td></td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Helicopters:</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hughes 500MD Scout US</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hughes 500MD TOW US</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hughes 500MD Trainer US</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transport:</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tank Transporter, Scammel UK</td>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trk, 10-ton, Mercedes Benz GE</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trk, 5-ton, Mercedes Benz GE</td>
<td></td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trk, 3-ton UK</td>
<td></td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) Weapons and Equipment

(a) General

The addition of sophisticated weapon systems (Vickers tanks, 105-mm artillery, and Hughes 500MD helicopters) to the KA inventory has enhanced the combat capabilities of the Army. The lack of properly equipped workshop facilities at Isiolo precludes virtually all tank repair and can be regarded as a major deficiency. The Scammel tank transporters used to move the Vickers tanks also present problems due to low operational readiness (OR) rates. The Army is also currently having difficulties equipping artillery units with appropriate prime movers.

The air cavalry battalion is equipped with 15 Hughes 500MD Scout, 15 Hughes 500MD TOW, and 2 Hughes 500D trainer helicopters. The Scouts are equipped with 7.62-mm chain guns and 2.75-in rocket pods. The remaining 15 Hughes 500MD are equipped with TOW ATGMs. This program will require foreign technical assistance for some time if the current level of combat capability is to be sustained.

(6) Logistics/Maintenance

The Army is totally dependent upon foreign sources for materiel. Equipment acquisitions have come from the United Kingdom, West Germany, France, and the United States. Israel and Belgium are also suppliers of equipment and
spare parts. Generally, the preventive maintenance and organizational maintenance posture of the Army is good. Adherence to instruction and procedures outlined in operators manuals is strict, supply personnel and first-line supervisors are knowledgeable. However, at higher levels the maintenance system is ineffective. Logistic problems generated by the multiplicity of equipment suppliers has been further complicated by the lack of emphasis on logistics at senior command levels, inadequately and inaccurately stocked inventories, and insufficiently qualified technical and supervisory personnel. In an effort to correct its logistics and maintenance shortcomings, the Army has elevated the rank of its Chief of Logistics to Brigadier and has expanded the functional areas of his staff to provide better command and control.

(7) Personnel Procurement and Retention

There is no conscription, and manpower needs are adequately met by volunteers. The armed forces in general, however, are losing skilled personnel, both officer and enlisted, to private industry. Personnel trained in foreign technical schools have found civilian pay more attractive, and employment readily available in the private sector. Further, recruitment is being manipulated to bolster the military representation from tribes who are supporters of President Moi.

(8) Training

Army recruits attend a basic training course at the Armed Forces Training College (AFTC) at Lanet near Nakuru. With the exception of combat support personnel who receive specialty training at Kahawa, recruits receive advanced individual training with their units.

Officers receive their training both in-country and overseas. Officers attend courses covering the entire spectrum of combat arms and staff training through the staff college level at the AFTC. They also attend basic, advanced, and staff college courses in the United States, the United Kingdom, India, Canada, and Israel.

While small-unit training is generally considered very good, reflecting a high state of individual discipline and professionalism within the Army, there is little combined-arms training and few interservice exercises.

(9) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

The Army does have a reserve organization plan to supplement the active duty force during a national emergency. However, specifics regarding this plan are unknown.
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(b) Mobilization

Mobilization plans are unknown; without significant foreign logistic support, expansion of the force would be difficult, due to the shortage of air transport and the low operational rate of army trucks.

b. Navy

(1) Mission

(U) To defend territorial waters, protect coastal shipping, and prevent smuggling.

(2) Capabilities

The Kenya Navy (KN) is capable of performing only limited coastal patrols; however, it is reasonably efficient considering its small size and limited resources. The addition of the Gabriel missile system to the Brooke Marine patrol craft has given the KN a capability to interdict shipping.

(3) Personnel Strength

Estimated 650

(4) Ship Strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Op</th>
<th>Nonop</th>
<th>In Reserve</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PCF (Fast Patrol Craft)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGG (Guided Missile Patrol Combatant)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total: 7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) Organization and Deployment

Naval headquarters is located at Mombasa, Kenya's only deepwater port. The Navy consists of two major operational elements, the Mombasa Naval Base and the Patrol Squadron, both subordinate to the Kenya Navy Commander. Additionally, the naval organization consists of a communications center, a training facility, and a maintenance support base, each of which is located within the naval complex at Mtongwe, in Mombasa. There is a small naval mooring at Lamu, some 250 km north of Mombasa.

(6) Status of Equipment

The three Vosper 31.4 m patrol craft are armed with 40-mm dual-purpose Bofors guns. These vessels were provided to Kenya by the UK in 1966 and have reached the end of their economic service life. Hull deterioration caused by climatic factors makes refitting and overhauling an unacceptable alternative. Spare parts are increasingly difficult to obtain due to the age of the craft.
KENYA

Plans appear to be underway to obtain replacements for the old Vosper patrol craft; however, the Navy is handicapped in obtaining replacements by budgetary constraints.

The four Brooke Marine patrol craft (3 32.6m and 1 37.5 m) are equipped with 40-mm dual-purpose guns. Radars, communication equipment, and weapons aboard these vessels are well maintained. The 37.5-meter vessel was delivered to Kenya in 1974. The three 32.6-meter vessels were delivered to Kenya in 1976. Three of these craft have undergone modification to accept the Gabriel missile system.

(7) Logistics/Maintenance

The KN is completely dependent upon foreign sources, principally the United Kingdom, for equipment and spare parts. Because of the Navy's small size and limited manpower, the Army provides the logistic support. All common-use items are controlled, stocked, and issued by a central Army depot in Nairobi. Some specifically designated naval supplies are retained in Mombasa.

The Navy's support facilities are well managed, efficient, and adequate to provide limited maintenance support to the operational forces.

All diesel engine repair is accomplished at the small Naval Base at Mombasa. Major hull repair, machining, and electrical work are contracted to the African Marine and General Engineering Company (shipyard) in Mombasa. The shipyard's new 20,000 DWT drydock can repair ships in excess of Kenya's needs. It does not have a capability for ship construction. The navy has developed preventive maintenance schedules which include periodic maintenance and planned overhaul of all patrol craft.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

Applicants for vacancies in both officer and enlisted ranks are plentiful, but most candidates cannot meet the high entrance requirements. The Navy often has difficulty recruiting an adequate number of Kenyans with the potential to learn required engineering skills.

(9) Training

The KN is well trained and disciplined. All officers and enlisted ranks receive basic military training at the Armed Forces Training College (AFTC) at Lanet, naval indoctrination at the Naval Base, and advanced schooling outside the country. The United Kingdom, India, and Israel have been the primary sources of this advanced education. A few officers have received technical training in the United States. Periodic combined exercises (the most recent took place February 1984) and other contact with the US Navy provides Kenyan naval personnel an opportunity to gain up-to-date knowledge and practical operational experience.
KENYA

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

The Navy has no reserve organization to supplement the current force during a national emergency.

(b) Mobilization

Mobilization plans are not known, but would depend upon ship acquisitions and recruitment programs. The present manpower base does not provide for expanded or improved capability.

(c) Merchant Marine

The Kenya Merchant Marine consists of one ship, a 1,168 gross register ton (GRT) breakbulk ship. Its deadweight tonnage (lift capacity) is 1,590 tons of cargo. Since the ship is over 20 years old, it has minimal military support potential.

c. Air Force

(1) Mission

To defend territorial airspace; provide close air support for ground forces; and conduct logistic, airlift, and reconnaissance support for the Army and Navy.

(2) Capabilities

The Kenya Air Force, renamed the 82 Air Force following the August 1982 coup attempt, is not able to fully perform its mission. The incarceration of most air force pilots and technicians following the coup severely degraded operational capabilities. The force is now a mix of vindicated personnel from the precoup attempt Air Force and some 2,000 men transferred from the Army. The latter have been slow to learn their new, more technically demanding, Air Force duties. This personnel situation, plus shortages of spare parts and fuel, have contributed to marginal performance. Nevertheless, overall proficiency is probably as good or better than any other Air Force in East Africa except for Ethiopia. Of the 12 air interceptor aircraft in the Kenyan inventory, only 3-4 are normally operational. The Hawk and Strikemaster aircraft, which represent the balance of Kenya's combat aircraft, have maintained a higher OR rate (50-60 percent) due to the fact that maintenance for these systems is provided by British contract technicians. The shortages of operational aircraft, and fuel restrict the number of training sorties. During early May 1984, however, the Air Force flew several combat missions into eastern Uganda in support of government forces against tribal dissidents. The use of F-5 and Hawk aircraft in these operations indicates at least some recovery of operational combat capability. Flight time for aircrews of transport aircraft is more
KENYA

readily available than for fighter pilots since the transports are frequently used to fly support missions for the military as well as various government agencies. Although the transport aircrews have the benefit of additional flight time, they are also faced with the problem of aircraft down time for maintenance deficiencies or shortage of spare parts, which result in 30-40 percent nonoperational status among Kenya's transport aircraft at any one time.

(3) Personnel Strength

Estimated 3,000

(4) Aircraft Strength

Total: 72 (fixed wing; 61: 28 jet, 33 prop; helicopter: 11)

In operational units: 72
(28 fighters: (12 multipurpose; 11 ground attack; 5 trainers)
13 basic trainers
18 transports: 18 short-range
2 utility
11 helicopters: 10 medium
1 recon)

(5) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

82 AF headquarters is located at Eastleigh Air Station Nairobi. Eastleigh also houses the transport, air support, and helicopter squadrons; the depot-level supply; depot maintenance facilities; and the basic flying training wing. In addition to Eastleigh, the 82 AF also operates from Laikipia Air Station, where the F-5, Hawk, and Strikemaster squadrons are deployed, and Embakasi Air Station, the location of a new technical training center.

The Air Force is operationally controlled from Eastleigh Air Station. Collocated is the Air Operations Center, the focal point for command and control of all 82 AF assets and current status of Kenyan airspace activity. Operational commitments of 82 AF assets are made by the Air Force commander through subordinate air station and squadron commanders.
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(b) **Summary of Units**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Principal Base</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 air defense sqdn</td>
<td>F-5 E/F</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Laikipia Air Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 ground attack sqdn</td>
<td>Hawk T-1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Laikipia Air Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strikemaster</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Laikipia Air Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 transp sqdn</td>
<td>Caribou</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Eastleigh Air Station, Nairobi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Buffalo</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Eastleigh Air Station, Nairobi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Navajo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Eastleigh Air Station, Nairobi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 air spt sqdn</td>
<td>Skyservant</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Eastleigh Air Station, Nairobi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 helicopter sqdn</td>
<td>Puma</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Eastleigh Air Station, Nairobi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hughes 500D</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Eastleigh Air Station, Nairobi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 flight tng sqdn</td>
<td>Bulldog</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Eastleigh Air Station, Nairobi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>72</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) **Status of Equipment**

Because of the fairly rapid expansion of the Air Force and its various sources of aircraft and supplies, the operational status of the units varies. Maintenance and logistics are the important limiting factors affecting aircraft readiness. The flying situation at Laikipia is hampered by the lack of radar and approach aids. Management and funding problems seriously limit the ground air defense control unit from becoming operational. The Israeli-supplied air defense guns are seldom used, and the Tigercat missiles are in storage. Until a missile maintenance facility is built these systems will remain nonoperational. The continued presence of foreign contract technicians is required if the air defense radar systems are going to remain operational. Even with continued foreign technical assistance, because of the poor serviceability of these systems, there is a growing lack of confidence in the Air Force, particularly with regard to its early warning and ground-controlled intercept capabilities.

(7) **Logistics**

The 82 Air Force is heavily dependent upon several foreign suppliers for repair parts and technical support. This dependence produces complex problems that often are beyond the capability of the Air Force to address. The Air Force's central parts depot and the headquarters of its logistic and supply functions are located at Eastleigh. Other smaller spare parts and supply stockpiles are maintained at the operating bases. Lack of spare
parts and qualified maintenance and supervisory personnel are key factors limiting the operational capability of the 82 Air Force.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

All manpower requirements in the 82 Air Force are met by volunteers. Difficulties arise in securing recruits who can meet the minimum educational and physical standards for technical training. The Air Force, perhaps more than the other services, is experiencing some problems with the loss of technical personnel to private industry. The technical manpower pool was severely drained following the August 1982 coup attempt when many air force technicians were convicted of coup involvement and sentenced to long jail terms. Most of these vacancies have been filled with untrained army personnel.

(9) Training

Air Force officers and enlisted ranks receive basic training at the Armed Forces Training College (AFTC) at Lanet near Nakuru.

Advanced training for 82 Air Force personnel is conducted both in Kenya and abroad (US, UK, India, Canada, and Israel). The 82 Air Force operates a technical school, the Armed Forces Technical College, as well as basic flying training. The 82 Air Force relies primarily on the US and British schools for advanced pilot and aircraft maintenance training.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

(U) The Air Force has no reserve organization to supplement the current force structure during a national emergency.

(b) Mobilization

Mobilization plans are not known but would depend upon aircraft acquisitions. Civil aircraft probably would be pressed into service if a national emergency were declared.

(c) Civil Aviation

(U) There are approximately 14 civil transport aircraft of 9,000 kilograms or more in maximum takeoff weight registered, owned, or operated in Kenya. The majority of the aircraft are operated by Kenya Airways, the government-owned national flag carrier.

(Virtually all of Kenya's indigenous civilian aviation personnel and the civil transport aircraft operated by the government or by Kenya Airways could be mobilized for military use in the event of war or comparable national emergency. The availability of the leased Boeing 747 would be subject to circumstances. Without foreign assistance, a lack of fully qualified,
indigenous maintenance personnel would prevent maximum effective use of the mobilized aircraft, especially if prolonged or intensive air transport operations were required.

d. Paramilitary Forces

(1) General Service Unit

(a) Mission

The General Service Unit (GSU) is responsible for border patrol, controlling intertribal raiding, and mounting counterinsurgency operations. It also serves as a reserve to reinforce regular police as well as Army units. The Presidential Escort Unit, an elite element of the GSU, is tasked with protecting the President.

(b) Capabilities

The GSU is mobile and its companies are capable of operating independently for short periods as light infantry units. The units are capable of performing their assigned missions on a small scale. However, in the event of a significant escalation of activity (such as a major rise in Shifta activity in the North East Province) the GSU would quickly be forced to call for military assistance.

(c) Strength

Estimated: 2,000

(d) Organization

The force consists of a headquarters and 2 training centers in Nairobi, 11 rifle companies, 1 reconnaissance company, and possibly a stock (cattle) theft unit. The rifle companies are rotated every 6 months among permanent positions throughout Kenya. Approximately 200 men are assigned to GSU headquarters in Nairobi.

(2) Kenya Police Force

The Kenya Police Force (KPF) has an estimated personnel strength of 8,000 with an additional reserve force numbering an estimated 4,000. A conventional police force, it does not contribute significantly to Kenya's military combat strength; however, it would be available to serve as a local defense or rear area security force.

(e) Status of Equipment

The force is equipped principally with older British equipment, including rifles, automatic weapons, rocket launchers, armored cars,
KENYA

and trucks. Reconnaissance, liaison, and medical evacuation support are available from the Police Air Wing, which has two US-made Bell helicopters and nine Cessna aircraft.

e. **Total Military Personnel Strength**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>13,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSU</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>18,650</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f. **Foreign Military Presence**

(1) **Foreign Military In-Country**

- **UK:** 4 Army advisers
- **Israel:** 4 Air Force adviser (Puma Instructor Pilot), 3 Navy technicians (Naval Missile Conversion Program)
- **France:** 2 Air Force advisers (Puma Instructor Pilots)
- **Canada:** 1 military adviser

(2) **Presence Abroad**

None
Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
LESOTHO

1. Political-Military Situation: One of the world's poorest countries, Lesotho is an economic and geographic captive of South Africa. Its economy--revenues, imports, exports, and employment of 200,000 Basotho migrant workers--is heavily dependent on South Africa. Although it would like to reduce its reliance on South Africa, this will be very difficult to accomplish. Lesotho considers itself a nonaligned nation but maintains close relations with the West. It is a member of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, and the Nonaligned Movement. Lesotho has established diplomatic relations with Cuba, and in mid-1983 it authorized the PRC and USSR to open embassies in the capital of Maseru. Nominally a constitutional monarchy, Lesotho has been dominated by the conservative Basutoland National Party (BNP), led by Prime Minister Jonathan, since independence in 1966. Jonathan has maintained his power by suspending the Constitution in 1970, when it appeared he would be voted out of office, and by suppressing the opposition.

Internal opposition to the Jonathan regime comes from the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP). The BCP was the first political party in Lesotho and appeared to have won the 1970 election before the counting of ballots was halted by the Jonathan government. Since that time the BCP has operated from exile. In December 1979 the BCP announced the formation of a military wing, the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA), to pursue an armed insurgency against the Jonathan regime. LLA guerrillas supported by South Africa and Transkei, mounted an increasingly costly series of terrorist attacks during 1982 and 1983 to protest the exclusion of the BCP from political power. Following a joint South Africa-Lesotho security conference in November 1983, attacks by the LLA dramatically dropped off when both South Africa and Transkei took steps to control LLA operations in their territories. Lesotho promised to control African National Congress (ANC) activities, and there is some evidence that Lesotho has in fact expelled or repatriated large numbers of South African refugees, some of whom were ANC members identified as particularly objectionable by South Africa. South Africa, on the other hand, promised to lift an embargo on much needed arms shipments, cease the intermittent border closures, stop delays in payments from the Southern Africa Customs Union, and to resume consultation on the Highland water scheme. By responding to South African security demands, the Jonathan regime appeared to join Mozambique and Angola in reaching a modus vivendi with South Africa. These bilateral relations are following a regional pattern in which Pretoria's neighbors find it increasingly to their advantage to avoid antagonizing their powerful and dominant neighbor.

The army, known as the Lesotho Paramilitary Force (LPF), was established as a separate entity from the Lesotho Mounted Police (LMP) on 1 April 1978. It was formally declared an army in August 1979. Transformation of the police paramilitary unit into a separate force was stimulated by a revival of insurgent activity by followers of Ntsu Mokhele and his Basutoland Congress Party and the subsequent need for a better equipped force. Also, the move had roots in internal power politics, probably in the Prime Minister's desire to offset the armed potential invested until then solely in the police. Both remain under the control of Chief Jonathan in his role as Minister of Defense and Internal Security. A coordinating staff in the office of the Prime Minister coordinates police and army matters. The army commander, police commissioner.
and head of the Special Branch all enjoy equal rank. The army mission is to
defend the borders, provide internal security, and support the LMP. Its modest
headquarters, which includes a weapons storage and maintenance facility, is
located in Maseru (BE 1398-00724; CAT 91010; CORD 2919005 0272900E). Without
improved training, equipment, and leadership, the LPF will remain a marginally
capable force. In the absence of LLA terrorist activities, its shortcomings will
not be as apparent.

2. (U) Key Officials:
King: Moshoeshoe II
Prime Minister, Minister of Defense and Internal Security: Chief Leabua
Jonathan
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Vitus Mooki Molapo
Minister of Interior: Sekhonyana Maseribane
Commissioner of Police: Maj Gen Shadrack R. Matela
Chief of National Security Service: Maj Gen Joel Mafa S. Molapo
Commander LPF: Maj Gen Justinus M. Lekhanya
Deputy LPF Commander: Brig B.M. Ramotsekhoane

3. (U) Military Budget: $13.2 million (proposed) for fiscal year ending
30 March 1984; this is 4.7 percent of the proposed central government budget.
Dollar value converted at an exchange rate of 0.955 moloti equals $1.00.

4. (U) Population: 1,474,000 as of June 1984
Males (ages 15-49): 335,000; 179,000 physically fit
Ethnic Divisions: 99.7 percent Sotho; 1,600 Europeans; 800 Asians
Literacy: 40 percent

5. Army:
Personnel Strength: 2,000 estimated. (A small number of women serve in the
LPF in medical and clerical fields.)
Major Units: Two infantry battalions, one "recce" (special forces) platoon, one
support company containing various combat support elements such as signal,
engineer, medical, supply, and transportation.
Major Equipment: Rifles (Rls of South African manufacture and AK-47s); light
machineguns (RPD and RPK); heavy machineguns (M-60s from Taiwan); 81-mm
mortars (Taiwan); 2-inch mortars; various Land Rover and jeep-type vehicles;
Bedford 3-ton riot trucks. Lesotho is known to be seeking additional arms
and equipment. West Germany has provided some aircraft and heavy duty all-
terrain vehicles.

6. (U) Navy: None

7. Air Force: The Air Wing of the Paramilitary Force has two Short SC7
Skyvan STOL utility aircraft, a Cessna 152, a Dornier Do-27, Dornier Do-28, two
MBB BO-105 utility helicopters, two Augusta-Bell 412 helicopters, 2 Mi-2
helicopters, and a small utility type (bubble canopy) helicopter (type unknown.)
These are used in border patrol and for the delivery of a quick-reaction force.
Eight pilots have received training in West Germany. The Air Wing has
approximately 10 foreign contract personnel who supply support/maintenance. At
present, the entire Air Wing is based at Leabua Jonathan Airport (BE 1389-08022; CAT 80106; CORD 2918055 0273020E); but a new military airstrip is under construction at the Mantseho training facility.

8. (C) Paramilitary: The Lesotho Mounted Police (LMP) has been upgraded to a regular military unit. This leaves the a strength of about 1,000. No further information on the LMP is available.

9. (U) Key US Officials:
Chief of Mission: (Maseru) Ambassador S.L. Abbott

10. (U) Foreign Military Presence:
Republic of China: One training adviser (three civil engineers advising on civic action construction projects.)
German Federal Republic: Helicopters and Dornier aircraft are maintained by West German contract personnel.
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Liberia

1. Government

a. (U) Key Government Officials

Head of State: Samuel Kanyon Doe
Acting Speaker of the Interim National Assembly: Brig Gen Abraham O. Kollie
Secretary-General of the Interim National Assembly: Gen J. Patrick Bedo
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Ernest T. Eastman
Minister of National Defense: Maj Gen Gray D. Allison
Minister of Commerce: Ms. McLeod Turkette Darpah
Minister of Information: Carlton Karpeh
Minister of Finance: Maj G. Alvin Jones
Minister of Labor: Brig Gen Frank Senkpeni
Minister of Planning and Economic Affairs: Maj Emmanuel O. Gardiner
Minister of National Security: Maj Patrick M. Minikon

b. Type and Stability of Government

Four years have passed since the 12 April 1980 coup d'etat that resulted in the suspension of the 133-year-old Liberian constitution, the violent overthrow of the existing government, and the brutal end to the lives of President William R. Tolbert, Jr. and 13 government and private sector leaders. Since then, the country has been ruled by decree, and the administration of justice and human rights has been assumed by military tribunal. The group of noncommissioned officers and soldiers who rode the coup d'etat into positions of responsibility were ill prepared to take control of the reins of government.

As the senior military member of those who took part in the overthrow of the Tolbert government, then Msgt Samuel K. Doe, now a five-star general and Head of State, became the chairman of the People's Redemption Council (PRC), and then, in late July 1984 when the PRC was dissolved, Doe became president of the new Interim Assembly. He is usually referred to as Dr. Doe, referring to an honorary doctorate degree that he received from the University of South Korea in 1982.

The economic, political, social, and military problems that plagued Liberia prior to the coup d'etat were exacerbated by the shortage of experienced leadership in the new government. The effects of that violent overthrow of constitutional government and the vacuum of experienced leadership that it caused are still evident 4 years later. However, the events of 1983 tend to confirm that Head of State Doe is committed to returning Liberia to civilian rule. These events included the following: first a special constitutional commission drafted and submitted a new constitution. Second, an election commission was formed that prepared a new election law and elections procedures as well as selected regional elections coordinators. Third, a timetable specifying milestones for the return to civilian rule was widely published. Fourth, Doe has not publically wavered from his promise to return Liberia to civilian rule. Current speculation focuses on Doe as a possible presidential candidate rather than on an extension of military rule.

15 October 1984
Liberia

The main governmental bodies in Liberia since the 1980 coup d'état include the People's Redemption Council (PRC), the government cabinet, and the Interim National Assembly. The PRC was an all-military group consisting of 22 members. Seventeen members of this group represented the most powerful faction of the PRC because they claimed active involvement in the 1980 coup d'état. The second, less powerful group consisted of five members who were brought in to broaden the ethnic base of the council. The PRC acted as an oversight and planning group to provide directional change and improvement in the quality of life. In Liberia, unfortunately, the inadequacy of PRC members' education and experience prevented the accomplishment of these goals. Many PRC members have used their offices for personal, economic, and political gain. The Interim National Assembly, which came into being on 21 July 1984, is comprised of all PRC members and representatives from each of Liberia's subdivisions. The purpose of the Assembly is to aid the country in returning to civilian rule.

Generally decisions to be implemented by the Liberian Government were made by Doe and the PRC; however, during the past year Doe has been governing the country through his cabinet and referring matters to the PRC either after the fact or when consensus was required.

The only real threat to government stability occurred during October 1983 when Doe fired Brigadier General Thomas Quiwonkpa from his position as Commander of the Armed Forces of Liberia. This event set in motion the plans for at least one coup that was discovered prior to its execution in November 1983.

c. External Threat

There is no real threat from Liberia's neighbors. Relations with Ivory Coast are cool but correct. Relations with Guinea since the death of Ahmed Sekou Toure are cautious. Head of State Doe held Sekou Toure in high esteem and appears willing to accept Guinea's new military leaders. However, following the military takeover in Guinea, an AFL staff officer was sent to the Liberia-Guinea border to prepare Liberian forces to react to unusual border crossings resulting from the coup. There was some concern that Fulani who were oppressed by the Toure government might take revenge on the Malinke who were supported by Sekou Toure, and that this fighting could spread across the border into Liberia where many Fulani and Malinke live. Another security problem for Liberia lay on its border with Sierra Leone. Doe believes that Liberian and Ghanaian dissidents are resident in Sierra Leone and may attempt to enter the country and overthrow the government. Little evidence exists to support this fear, but it is taken very seriously nevertheless. Additionally, in January, 1984 conflicts in Sierra Leone between ethnic groups near the Liberian border resulted in large numbers of Sierra Leone nationals crossing the border. The government regarded this exodus as a potential threat to the security of the country because of the strain the refugees could place on the nation's economy.
d. **Internal Threat**

The PRC did not have widespread appeal among its initial supporters. There were numerous reports of coup plots and assassination attempts. Nineteen individuals were arrested in connection with the November 1983 coup plot that was discovered in the planning stages. Although some of the plotters, including Quiwonkpa fled the country, 19 individuals were charged with treason and 13 were tried. Three were executed. Government officials who will lose their positions under civilian rule could threaten the peaceful return to civilian rule. The military could also pose a threat should they perceive ethnic favoritism on the part of the civilian government or perceive that they are not getting their share of the economic benefits. The most critical issue facing the country is the poor state of the economy. Factors affecting the economy are the worldwide depression in markets for Liberia's main exports, iron ore and rubber; the large gap between revenue and expenditures, and large bills for imported fuel. In his 1982 Christmas address to Liberians, Doe announced a cut in government and military salaries. He also imposed a local tax on rural inhabitants, a reduction of rents, the lifting of duties on nonluxury imports, and the institution of price controls. Most Liberians supported salary cuts realizing that reduced pay was better than no paycheck at all. The stability of Doe's regime will depend on his ability to continue the reforms and policies he has begun, to improve economic conditions, and return the country to civilian rule. Paramount to these efforts is the need to curb corruption that existed in Liberia even prior to Doe's coup. Salary cuts and austerity programs will be unconvincing to Liberians who see government officials reaping the economic benefits of corruption.

e. **Terrorism and Counterterrorism**

There have been no reports of terrorist activity in Liberia. There is no knowledge of any antiterrorist organization within the existing police or military structures. Even so, Doe has considered counterterrorism training for the Liberian Army. Liberian participants attended an Anti-Terrorism Executive Seminar in May in Washington, D.C.

f. **Communist Influence**

There is no significant Communist influence in Liberia. The Soviet ambassador was expelled on 22 November 1983 following Doe's announcement that a foreign mission had offered to assist the coup plot. Doe also strongly condemned the Soviets for the Korean Air Liner incident in September 1983. An Aeroflot office was opened in October 1981. Aeroflot flights continue to land in Liberia once a month; however, since October 1982, flight crews are now permitted to remain overnight at Roberts International Airport. There were no official visits between Liberia and the USSR in 1983. The close historical ties the US has with Liberia, the high level of US economic assistance to Liberia, and Doe's anti-Communist views act as impediments to more Soviet involvement in the country.
Ethiopia, Cuba, and Libya have all made offers to provide various levels of economic and military support to the Doe regime. Shortly after the coup, Doe visited Ethiopia and was given a gift package of 200 AK-47s. Cuba has been allowed to open a diplomatic office in Liberia. The two Cuban staff members are to assist Cuba's nonresident Ambassador in Sierra Leone. There is some speculation that the Ambassador may be moved to Liberia. The Libyan People's Bureau was closed in May 1981 because Doe perceived Libya as meddling in Liberia's internal affairs.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) has an estimated $60 million aid program with Liberia. The PRC has an embassy staffed with 34 people. China is Liberia's largest Communist trading partner. In May 1982, Doe visited the PRC. The Chinese are building a sports complex and assisting with agricultural projects in the country. In 1983, the Chinese increased the number of scholarships for Liberian students in health, agriculture, and science.

Liberia receives no military assistance from Communist countries. The PRC promised Liberia some military vehicles during Doe's visit; and delivered 22 utility vehicles (jeeps) along with four buses and two limousines.

g. Economic Factors

Liberia's agriculturally based economy is augmented by iron mining, which contributes over 46 percent of GDP. Rubber exports also play a large role in the Liberian economy. In 1981, Liberia's GDP reached $715 billion, or $384 per capita. Major exports are iron ore, rubber, diamonds, and lumber. Leading imports are machinery, transport equipment, petroleum products, and manufactures. Major trading partners are the US, West Germany, Netherlands, and Italy.

Liberia has no military equipment production capability. Suppliers of military materiel have been Sweden - patrol boats; Israel - small arms; Switzerland - armored reconnaissance vehicles; West Germany, Japan, and China - trucks; and the US - ammunition, small weapons, trucks, and communication equipment. Liberia has received no aerospace materiel, and has received no military assistance from a Communist country.

h. Military and Political Alignment

Liberia is formally associated with the United States by virtue of a 1959 Defense Cooperation Agreement: "In the event of aggression or threat of aggression against Liberia, the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Liberia will immediately determine what action may be appropriate for the defense of Liberia." Further, by an exchange of confidential notes, Roberts International Airport remains available to the US for operational support of US aircraft, and the US has the right to establish military installations at the port of Monrovia should they become necessary for international peace and security. On 3 February 1983, the US and the Government of Liberia signed an agreement to allow the US to upgrade Roberts International Airport. In FY82, the US provided $75 million in economic and military assistance to Liberia.
Liberia is an original member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU); established in 1963. It has been a consistently moderate voice in the OAU and was a prominent catalyst in the reconciliation between radical African states and moderates (in 1961 and 1962) that led to the formation of the OAU. Liberia is also a member of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), albeit not a prominent one. The NAM is a political alignment with no military connotations. In addition, Liberia and Guinea signed a mutual defense and nonaggression agreement in January 1979. This agreement was implemented in April 1979, when Guinea sent a company of paratroopers at Liberia's request to help quell civil disorders. Liberia is also a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Mano River Union (MRU).

Doe has expanded relations with the international community by visiting not only the PRC but the US, France, South Korea, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. This expansion is in keeping with his nonaligned foreign policy and helps decrease the appearance that Liberia maintains exclusive ties with the US.

I. (U) Key US Officials (all located in Monrovia)

Chief of Mission: Ambassador William Lacey Swing

(b)(3): 50 USC 3024(1)
2. MILITARY, GENERAL

a. (U) Key Military Officials

Armed Forces

Commander in Chief: General of the Army Samuel K. Doe
Chief of Staff: Lt Gen Henry S. Dubar
Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence: Col Thomas G. Gaye
Commander, Liberian Army: Brig Gen Morris Zaza
Commander, Liberian National Coast Guard: Capt Patrick D. Wallace
Commander, Air Reconnaissance Unit: Col Augustus B. Jarba

b. Position of Armed Forces

The Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) is organized into two services: the Armed Forces of Liberia (Army), and the Coast Guard (Navy). The Air Reconnaissance Unit (ARU) is part of the Army. The small defense establishment is responsible to the Head of State, who also is the Commander in Chief, through the Minister of Defense. Operational control of the AFL is held by the Chief of Staff. Of the two services, the Army is the most important to national security and consequently receives the majority of funding for training and equipment. The Navy has been relegated to a secondary role within the defense establishment.

The Liberian military traditionally has been pro-US and strongly anti-Communist. Almost all training and equipment received by the AFL comes from the United States. In 1981 and 1982, joint US-Liberian exercises were held in Liberia.

c. Military Mission

The mission of the Army is to defend the national borders, maintain internal security, and conduct antismuggling operations. The mission of the Liberian National Coast Guard is to protect territorial waters, and conduct search and rescue, port security, and antismuggling operations. Generally, the capability of the Armed Forces to perform these missions is minimal. Equipment readiness is poor in both Services and the Army lacks the leadership, training, and manpower necessary to defend the nation against an external conventional or unconventional threat.

d. Military Command and Control

The Head of State is the Commander in Chief of the Liberian Army. The chain of command extends from the Head of State, through the Minister of Defense, through the Armed Forces Chief of Staff, through the Commanders of the Army and Coast Guard, to commanders of line and staff units.

e. Military Trends and Capabilities

Recently, there have been signs that the Doe government is sincere in its effort to let nothing interfere with planned free elections in 1985 and is
LIBERIA

moving to quietly control the visibility and political activities of the Armed Forces. For example, the creation of an agricultural battalion reduces the numbers of soldiers in other battalions diverting them to noncombat farming and husbandry duties. The Armed Forces played a much diminished role by design in the 1983 Redemption Day celebration. Head of State Doe has traded in his camouflage fatigues for a three-piece business suit and is rarely seen in uniform. The figure of 6,000 most approximates the AFL's current size.

Through US military assistance, the Armed Forces of Liberia are building much-needed barracks, providing formal military training at Tubman Military Academy, emphasizing training in command and control, implementing logistic systems and training, and undergoing a reorganization under a conventional US Infantry Division organization concept. The Liberian Government would like to have more sophisticated weapons and equipment; however, it realizes the level of AFL skills, the high costs, and the strain on the Liberian budget, and is concentrating on programs to instill discipline and a sound functional structure in the AFL. The MILMISH is guided by a report by the United States Army Security Assistance Assessment Team (SAAT), completed in March 1982, which recommends as major points:

- Reorganize the AFL for greater capability and control.
- Reduce troop strength in Monrovia and distribute units throughout the country.
- Reduce AFL by 10 percent or 500 personnel.
- Strengthen military mission and define responsibility between police and military.
- Improve Roberts Field facilities.
- Develop a logistic maintenance system that meets Liberian Army needs.
- Conduct a total equipment inventory.
- Cross-level weapons within units.

The reorganization plan to redesignate general ("G") staff to joint ("J") staff has not gotten off the ground and best estimates indicate that the AFL will resist this recommendation. Troop strengths have been reduced in Monrovia via the barracks construction project. A Roberts Field improvement project has just been conducted with Liberian authorities. The remaining recommendations are being implemented with planned MTTs, but it remains to be seen if the AFL has the willingness to make the necessary decisions to achieve the desired goals of these recommendations.

f. Military Budget

$23.2 million for fiscal year ending 30 June 1984. This is 5.5 percent of the central government budget. This total defense figure includes AFL general support. $7 million; for Army, $16 million; for the National Guard; for Coast Guard, $1 million; for aviation, $822,000; for joint security, $133,750; for administration, $459,000. One Liberian dollar equals one US dollar.
g. (U) Population

2,160,000 estimated as of 1 July 1984
Males (ages 15-49): 467,000; physically fit, 252,000
Ethnic Divisions: 5 percent coastal descendants of immigrant black Americans; 95 percent indigenous African groups, including Gola, Kissi, Vai, Kpelle, Kru, Mandingo, Bassa, Grebo, and Krahn.

Literacy (1979): About 24 percent over age 5
3. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

a. The Armed Forces of Liberia (Army)

(1) Mission

(U) The mission of the Armed Forces of Liberia (Army) is to defend the country from any external aggression, conduct antismuggling operations, maintain law and order, and involve itself in civic action.

(2) Capabilities

The Army may be an effective fighting force in limited engagements. It is capable of providing internal security unless widespread disturbances occur.

Small detachments are assigned to border-crossing points but would suffer from inadequate manpower, and communications and transportation problems in the event of an externally based incursion.

The capabilities of Liberia's military units vary. The Armored Reconnaissance Unit is probably one of the more combat-capable units in Liberia due to the status of their equipment and training, and their mobility. Most of the leaders in the unit are members of the Krahn and Kru tribes. The 6th Battalion is highly trained and motivated and perhaps the best unit in the Army. The 1st, 2d, and 6th Battalions are considered tactical battalions. The 1st Battalion has made much progress in integrating officers from tribes other than the Krahn and Kru. This battalion has a large number of officers from the Lome tribe—the tribe that comprises most of Liberia's enlisted infantrymen. The 2d Battalion appears well motivated and unified. Problems plaguing it are a lack of water supply and medical facilities. The 3d Battalion provides security details, bodyguards, drivers, and aides to senior officers and government officials throughout Liberia. The 4th and 5th Battalions have border security missions. The Commanding General of the Armed Forces is a Loma while the Commandant of the Coast Guard and the Commanding Officer of the Air Reconnaissance Unit are members of the Grebo ethnic group. Only one Coast Guard member is a member of Doe's Krahn tribe; however, the majority of Coast Guard members are Kru, the second largest tribe in Liberia. The Kru, as a coastal tribe, have a liking for the sea, which perhaps explains why the Coast Guard as a unit is regarded as being the most efficient and disciplined of Liberia's military units. The Air Reconnaissance Unit is hampered in its mission by fuel costs, limited training, and maintenance problems. The unit primarily transports troops on changes of assignment to other units, and performs road reconnaissance for Doe's in-country road trips. The Army's G-2 section has a mission of internal security rather than military intelligence.

Antismuggling activities are also conducted by the Army and some drug busts have been made; however, customs officials are frequently the source of drugs, especially marijuana.
By regional standards, Liberia's Army compares unfavorably with those of Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Mali, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, and Sierra Leone.

(3) **Personnel Strength**

4,900 (409 officers, 40 WO, 5,043 enlisted men). The total includes the 24 officers and 32 enlisted men of the Air Reconnaissance Unit, and the 34 officers, 6 warrant officers, 5 civilians, and 403 enlisted men of the National Coast Guard.

(4) **Organization and Deployment**

(a) **General**

The Army's operational chain of command extends from the Minister of Defense, through the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, through the service commanders, to the line units.

(b) **Ground Units**

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<tr>
<th>Major Units</th>
<th>Strength Per Unit</th>
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<th>Assigned</th>
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<tr>
<td>1st Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>6th Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Artillery Bn</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>421</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Armor Scout Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Air Reconnaissance Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Executive Mansion Guard Bn</td>
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<td>1 Brigade Support Unit</td>
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<td>1 Military Police Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Logistics Command</td>
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(c) **Army Aviation Units**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Principal Base</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Air Recon Unit</td>
<td>172 Cessna</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Spriggs Payne Airfield, Monrovia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>180 Cessna</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>206 Cessna</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Piper Aztec</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>102 Arava STOL</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>101 B Arava</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(d) **Deployment**

Units are deployed throughout the country. The only concentration of troops is in the vicinity of Monrovia where the 3d and Executive Mansion Guard Battalions are located. The 1st Battalion is at Camp Schiefflin; the 6th Battalion is at Bomi Hills. The 2d Battalion is at Camp Todee; the 4th is at Zwedru; the 5th is at Gbarnga. The new Agricultural Battalion will be at Camp Todee.

(5) **Weapons and Equipment**

(a) **General**

Most weapons and equipment in the Armed Forces of Liberia inventory are of US origin and have been provided during the last 20 years through grant aid and foreign military sales (FMS). Small arms are in abundance numbering about 1,046 M-16s, at least 200 AK 47s, an estimated 1,000 Belgian FALs, and some UZZIs. The AFL also has several antiaircraft weapons but they could not be effectively employed. The howitzers and recoilless rifles are in good enough condition to display in parades; however, soldiers have only very limited training and proficiency with these weapons. No nitrogen is available to charge the howitzer recoil cylinders, and seals have deteriorated so it is doubtful that the weapons are useable. Present and short-term plans call for acquiring additional US material, consisting of engineering equipment, trucks, rifles, grenade launchers, ammunition, and personnel gear. A recent purchase of some US commercial vehicles for tactical use has brought the inventory up by 70 vehicles.

Liberia's military transport fleet is almost nonexistent. Of the 101 transport vehicles listed in the inventory, more than half are deadlined and the remainder are in various stages of disrepair. By the AFL's own evaluation, no vehicle is rated as being in good condition—remarks range from fair to very poor to unreparable. A recent purchase of some US commercial vehicles for tactical use should produce an improvement in this situation.

(b) **Ground Weapons and Equipment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Artillery:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeep mounted</td>
<td>US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75-mm howitzer</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105-mm howitzer</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Armor:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOWAG APC</td>
<td>SZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mortars:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-mm</td>
<td>US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81-mm</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2-inch</td>
<td>US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Liberia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rkt Lchrs (RL) and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5-inch rocket launchers</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rcl Rifles (RCLR):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106-mm recoilless rifle</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Motor Transport:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2-ton truck</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/4-ton truck</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton truck</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton dump truck</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton truck</td>
<td>US/FRG</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151-Al jeep</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeep, NFI</td>
<td>JA,PRC</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Transport Commercial:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2 ton pick up</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shorthaul Stock</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longbed Stock</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total: 11 fixed wing, all prop</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In operational units: 6 operational</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Logistics

The AFL has an ineffective supply and service organization. The few management inventory records that exist usually are inaccurate. Availability of spare parts is limited because procurement and requisition of the simplest items requires inordinate paperwork. The number of logistics personnel, including those at the G-4 level, is inadequate. Routine care and maintenance are nonexistent. The Government has displayed a complete lack of commitment to require proper maintenance procedures. This has resulted in wholesale cannibalization of equipment, causing otherwise valuable and serviceable assets to be made inoperative.

There is no known armament/ammunition production in Liberia. The West African Explosives and Chemicals, Ltd., produces shotgun shells and an explosive slurry used in mining operations in Liberia.

Personnel Recruitment and Retention

Recruitment is normally conducted whenever there is a need. Historically, there has been a surplus of respondents. For this reason, letters of recommendation are considered in the selection process. Preinduction mental and physical examinations, while given, are not demanding. Retention does not appear to be a problem in the AFL.
(8) Training

In 1982, a US Mobile Training Team (MTT) went to Liberia to reestablish a cadre for the Tubman Military Academy. The academy is Liberia's basic training facility. Recruits receive training for 4 months. The school is lacking in a clean, reliable water supply, basic medical facilities, and insufficient equipment for the English language lab. The school has a rifle range on which M-16 rifles are utilized on bullseye stationary targets at 250-meter range.

Additional MTT teams in FY82 trained coast guardsmen; advised the brigade staff on combat support, and combat service support procedures; and upgraded maintenance procedures at the Armed Forces depot.

In FY82, 31 Liberian students received training in the US under the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET). Generally, these students have proven to be well motivated and eager to learn.

(9) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

The AFL has no effective reserve system.

(b) Mobilization

Mobilization plans are not known. Three civil transport aircraft with a gross takeoff weight of at least 9,000 kilograms currently are believed to be registered, owned, or operated in Liberia. There is one Boeing 707-320C long-range transport; one Boeing 727-100, and one British Aerospace HS-748-2A medium-range transports. The aircraft are believed to be in the fleet of Air Liberia, which is wholly government owned. The Air Liberia fleet also includes as many as eight Britten-Norman and Cessna light aircraft.

Because of severe financial difficulties and a lack of trained personnel, none of the major transport aircraft are believed to be in reliable operating condition, and no more than two of the Britten-Norman light aircraft have been reported in operation on domestic routes.

The number of licensed civilian pilots of major transport aircraft in Liberia is not known.

Virtually all of Liberia's civil aircraft and indigenous civilian aviation personnel could be mobilized in the event of war or comparable national emergency. Considerable foreign assistance would be required, however, in the form of financial aid and additional qualified flight crews and maintenance personnel before Liberia's civil air establishment could make any significant contribution to the country's military airlift capabilities.
b. Liberian National Coast Guard (Navy)

(1) Mission

- The mission of the Coast Guard is to protect territorial waters and to conduct search and rescue, port security, and antismuggling operations.

(2) Capabilities

- The miniscule Coast Guard has limited combat capability. Sea search and rescue and antismuggling operations are minimal because of inadequate training, insufficient equipment, and poor maintenance. Port security units have been established at Greenville and Harper. Other units are at Monrovia and Bassa.

(3) Personnel Strength

- 448: (Breakout by rank; 34 officers, 6 warrant officers, 5 civilians, 403 enlisted men)

(4) Ship and Aircraft Strength

(a) (U) Ships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Op</th>
<th>Nonop</th>
<th>In Reserve</th>
<th>Status Unknown</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PC (motor gun boat)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Port of Monrovia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PB (patrol boat)</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>do.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) (U) Aircraft

- None

(5) Organization and Deployment

(a) General Service

- The Liberian National Coast Guard is organized into four functional units. The operational organization is slightly vague and is loosely structured as follows: Coast Guard Base Unit; Task Force Unit; Port Security Unit; and Lighthouse Unit. All units operate from the Liberian Coast Guard base at Monrovia Harbor. In addition, the main naval headquarters and all patrol craft/boats are also at the Coast Guard base.

(b) Marine Corps

- (U) None
The exact command relationship between the Commandant, Captain Patrick D. Wallace, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Coast Guard Affairs, Captain Alfred S. Cheaye, and Assistant Minister of Defense for Coast Guard Affairs, Commander S. Weaka Peters, is not clear. However, most important decisions or requests that require coordination at the ministerial level or higher go through Captain Cheaye.

Four of the patrol boats/craft in the equipment inventory are of US origin. The remainder were delivered from Sweden in September 1980. The older US patrol craft are operational but in deplorable condition. Routine maintenance is seldom performed, although some maintenance equipment is available. Consequently, communications and electronics equipment are in unsatisfactory condition. There are virtually no spare parts except for the spares that were delivered with the boats. Under the new postcoup leadership, the LNCG appears to be more interested in correcting these problems.

The Coast Guard's logistic system is almost nonexistent. There has been little planning to organize programs to support maintenance of its forces. A continued shortage of funds and materials has been harmful to the development of a viable force. Several members of the Coast Guard have the capability to repair vessels; but they are hindered by a lack of tools and spare parts. Cannibalization further hampers equipment availability. When units are available fuel shortages restrict use.

(9) Personnel Procurement and Retention
(U) See paragraph 3.a. (7)

(10) Training
The overall training program has been inadequate. Although there is some basic seamanship and academic training, no follow-on training is conducted. There is no program in fleet operations or on-the-job training once personnel are assigned. Virtually all officers have been trained in the US, but their skill levels are low because of a lack of actual operational experience.
LIBERIA

(11) **Reserves and Mobilization**

(a) **Reserves**

(U) None

(b) **Mobilization**

(U) Mobilization plans are unknown. Without foreign assistance across the board, the Coast Guard could not be augmented substantially. Although Liberia has the largest merchant fleet in the world in terms of dead weight tons, the majority of those ships are operating under a "flag of convenience" arrangement with foreign ownership. Only one or two older hulls are operated in country and could be mobilized for internal use.

c. **Air Force**

(U) None

d. **Paramilitary Forces**

(U) There are no paramilitary forces capable of making a substantial contribution to the country's combat strength. In the event of hostilities, the 1,300-man police force could serve as a local defense and rear security force. The police force comes under the control of the Department of Justice and is organized into a department headquarters located in Monrovia and county headquarters located in the county seats.

e. **(U) Total Military Personnel Strength**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces of Liberia (Army)</td>
<td>4,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast Guard (Navy)</td>
<td>448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>1,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>6,648</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f. **(U) Foreign Military Presence**

US Military Personnel: Eight (7 army, 1 coast guard)
Withheld pursuant to exemption (b)(3) 10 USC 424 of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act.
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APPENDIX

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1. GOVERNMENT

a. (U) Key Government Officials

President: Admiral Didier Ignace Ratsiraka
Prime Minister: Colonel Desire Rakotoarjaona
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Jean Bemananjara
Minister of Defense: Rear Admiral Guy Albert Sibon

b. Type and Stability of Government

The Democratic Republic of Madagascar received its independence on 26 June 1960 after 64 years of French colonial rule. Following independence, the country underwent 15 years of political turmoil with many divergent groups controlling the new nation's government. Finally, in June 1975, then Lieutenant Commander Didier Ratsiraka was elected as the Head of State and Chairman of the Supreme Revolutionary Council and since that time has been able to consolidate his power. The President ostensibly rules the country in conjunction with the Supreme Revolutionary Council (the country's principal policymaking body that is chosen by the President) and the National Assembly. In fact, real power remains vested in the President. The President is elected by universal direct suffrage for a 7-year term. Although the electoral process is not completely open, there is a broad spectrum of opinion represented in the country and elections are allowed to be contested within the political framework sanctioned by the Government. The President has broad constitutional powers and his position is strengthened by the extensive majority the President's political party, AREMA (Avant-Garde de la Revolution Malgache), holds in the National Assembly. The President was also instrumental in creating a National Front for the Defense of the Revolution into which he brought seven political parties that form his opposition. Only parties that agreed to back Ratsiraka's policy of "revolutionary socialism" were incorporated into the Front and no party was allowed to legally exist outside the Front. Needless to say, many political parties not truly socialistic initially agreed to support the "revolution." In fact their party ideologies range from a relatively moderate, pro-Western stance to pronounced radicalism.

Opposition in Madagascar is threefold. There is growing popular discontent due to governmental policies particularly in economics and foreign relations. The second is a basic ideological difference between the government and the people. And, finally, there are ambitious individuals who oppose the present regime because they want to take control. At present the elements of potential threat to Ratsiraka are dispersed. However, as pointed out by the US Ambassador, if the three elements came together, an idealist to fire the popular opposition, and a ready opportunist to take the top spot, any small event could create instability for the Ratsiraka regime.

c. Internal Threat

The primary internal threat to Madagascar comes from the public's general dissatisfaction with the Government's management of the country's economy. Due to governmental mismanagement, there have been sporadic shortages

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of day-to-day necessities such as rice, cooking oil, and petroleum products. In the past, similar shortages have led to large-scale civil unrest, but the use of limited low-level military force has been effective to date in quelling such incidents. However, as the economic situation in Madagascar continues to deteriorate, violent crime has become a way of life for a large number of island inhabitants. In the capital, Antananarivo, the police have been unable to cope with the increase in security problems and cannot mount effective patrols due to vehicular constraints or nonavailability. Large numbers of unskilled peasants are migrating to the capital where little work is available and housing is either nonexistent or substandard. In the countryside, over the past 2 years many villages have turned to stealing cattle and other forms of banditry. Since late 1983 gendarmerie and military units stationed throughout the countryside have been able to control this activity in all but the Fivondronana D'Ambalavao region. Nevertheless, internal security remains fragile and is of utmost concern to the Government.

Ethnic differences also strongly influence political development within the country and could pose an additional threat to the present regime. President Ratsiraka is from a coastal tribe (cotier), whereas traditionally the central highland tribes (Merinas) have controlled and governed the island. Despite tribal factionalism, the nationalistic spirit and increasing importance of the military in Malagasy society brought about by Ratsiraka have allowed most military leaders to transcend traditional biases and support the present regime. However, recently there have been reports that there is discontent among some junior officers that may be rooted in ethnic rivalry and tribal factionalism. This potential threat to the Ratsiraka government, though remote, cannot be ignored.

In spite of longstanding economic problems and ethnic rivalries, there exists no organized opposition to Ratsiraka, nor has there emerged any organization, open or clandestine, which has as its goal the overthrow of the Malagasy Government. Ratsiraka is politically stronger than in the past. Nevertheless, since he has had no success in improving the country's economic situation, the possibility of an individual or small faction assuming power by force cannot be ruled out.

Reportedly, Malagasy President Ratsiraka wants to hold a referendum to amend the constitution and establish a one-party state. Strong opposition from the major political parties can be expected. If the proposed constitutional change is adopted the political situation, particularly in the capital, will become extremely tense and could provide a serious crisis for the President.

d. External Threat

Malagasy President Ratsiraka has identified the primary external threat to his country as attack from South Africa. This perception was reinforced by the staging of mercenaries from South Africa during the attempted coup d'etat in the Seychelles in November 1981. However, despite the influx of Soviet-supplied equipment and technicians, including air defense artillery and armored vehicles, Madagascar is not capable of repelling its perceived external
threat without extensive foreign assistance, because of the low operational readiness of the equipment and combat readiness of the Malagasy military. In reality, the external threat to Madagascar's security, from any party, is negligible.

e. Communist Influence

Relations with Communist countries have expanded over the last several years. The Soviet Union and North Korea have been the primary supporters of the regime's desire to expand its military by supplying large amounts of military aid. Included in the Soviet military package have been jet fighter aircraft, radars, tanks, armored cars, and artillery. Soviet advisers are providing maintenance and instruction on much of this equipment. In addition, an increasing number of Malagasy military personnel are training in the USSR. The Soviet Union has also provided limited economic assistance. In recent years, this growing dependence upon, and indebtedness to, the Soviets was putting increased pressure on the President to allow Soviet access to Malagasy air and naval facilities. However, in recent months there has reportedly been a desire expressed by the Malagasy presidency to reduce the scope and amount of Soviet military assistance.

In 1983, the Soviet Union established three FULL HOUSE direction finding signals intelligence sites on the island. These sites were located at Tamatave on the central east coast, Majunga on the northwestern coast, and Fort Dauphin on the southeastern coast. These sites provided a cross-island intercept network and allowed monitoring of international shipping through the Mozambique channel. The sites could be used by the Soviet Union to analyze more effectively US naval movements and air traffic in the area as well as other strategically important US facilities in the Indian Ocean region including the US tracking station on Mahe Island in the Seychelles and the US naval facility located on Diego Garcia in the Mauritius Archipelago. In July 1984, the Majunga site was dismantled, possibly as a result of US pressure on the Malagasy President tying US economic assistance to the removal of the FULL HOUSE sites. At the present time, the location or the disposition of the third site is unknown. Possibilities exist as to its current status: (1) the site has been permanently removed to another unidentified location on the island; (2) the Majunga FULL HOUSE was only temporarily dismantled and will be reinstalled at a later date; and (3) the site has been dismantled for removal and possibly other sites are being consolidated in the new Consulate the Soviets have recently constructed and occupied in the coastal city of Tamatave.

Ratsiraka has courted the Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc countries since Madagascar turned toward "revolutionary socialism" in 1975. In recent months, however, the Admiral seems to be moving away slowly from Soviet aid and positions on international issues in order to encourage additional Western aid. Ratsiraka reportedly recognizes that the Soviet Union intends to keep the Malagasy military dependent on its assistance as long as possible. The military itself has been dissatisfied with the current Soviet technical advisory program, in particular the one for An-12 (CUB) transport aircraft. The military's major complaint has been that there are too many advisers and that the expenses for their support, which must be borne by the Malagasy Government, are too great for the return.
AWARE that Ratsiraka is interested in looking toward the West for future military and economic aid, and that the military is beginning to chafe over the Soviet Union's military assistance programs, the Soviets have been pushing in recent months to obtain new military assistance agreements with Madagascar. The Soviet Union has offered the government patrol boats and aircraft, along with technical advisers. Other projects that have been proposed by the Soviets include sending a hydrographic team to the island, a geological survey team to look for uranium, and additional Soviet educators to teach at national universities. To date, however, Ratsiraka has rejected these overtures. The President has, however, agreed to permit Soviets to train Malagasy pilots on An-12 CUBs in an effort, he hopes, will ultimately make the country less dependent on the Soviet Union.

North Korea has also been a leader in providing military equipment and training personnel to Madagascar. Economic assistance by North Korea has included road construction, the building of an ammunition factory near Moramanga, agricultural improvement projects, and other construction activities.

Other Communist countries which have, or have had, relations with Madagascar are East Germany, Cuba, Romania, and Bulgaria. East Germany has provided a small amount of ground force related military equipment. Cuba for a time was involved with intelligence service training and some limited economic assistance. Romania has provided some military equipment as well as some training to Malagasy military units in air defense techniques. Bulgaria has a commercial agreement, as well as an economic and scientific-technical agreement, with Madagascar.

f. Economic Factors

Agriculture employs the overwhelming majority of Madagascar's labor force while generating 80 percent of this country's export earnings. Madagascar's major industries include agriculture processing and light consumer goods. In 1981, GDP was $3.4 billion, about $393 per capita. Leading exports are coffee, vanilla, cloves, and livestock. Major imports are crude oil, fertilizers, foodstuffs, and consumer goods. Leading trading partners are France, West Germany, US, Japan, and various other European countries. North Korea began constructing an ammunition factory at Moramanga, but this has not been completed.

Efforts by the Malagasy Government to improve economic conditions have focused on the continuing balance of payment deficits and a lack of productivity. Industrial production and agriculture have remained stagnant the past few years due to the country's inability to finance the importation of raw materials, spare parts, machinery, and other necessary input. Irrigation systems have broken down, port facilities are deteriorating, and a deplorable transportation network creates a dismal future for economic improvements. Recent cyclone and flood damage has compounded these problems. The Government's policies have not provided adequate incentives and in fact often block free market practices. Production deficiencies, import austerity, and the continuing depreciation of the FMG combine to make amelioration of living standards unlikely in the near term. In addition unemployment is expected to rise as migration to the cities, in particular the capital, continues.
MADAGASCAR

Madagascar has no military equipment production capability. The current principal military supplier is the USSR—with shipments valued at $104 million in the last 6 years. North Korea has provided infantry weapons, artillery and patrol boats valued at $15 million. Major items from Moscow are fighter and transport aircraft, helicopters, light tanks, APCs, field artillery, ADA, small arms, radar, and ammunition. Prior to Soviet influence, France shipped a limited number of transport aircraft, helicopters, patrol and landing craft, field artillery, small arms, and trucks. In recent years, equipment and/or training has also been received from the PRC, Romania, Canada, West Germany, and Spain.

g. Military and Political Alignment

Madagascar is a member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and a regular participant in Third World forums such as the Nonaligned Movement. President Ratsiraka aspires to be a respected Third World leader. He repeatedly declares Madagascar's nonaligned status and has strictly adhered to a policy of denying military basing or access to foreign powers. In pursuing the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace concept, he supports regional efforts to reduce superpower presence in the area.

While officially adhering to a nonaligned policy, President Ratsiraka ideologically embraces the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, he plays East against West in hopes of improving Madagascar's economic and military situation. After his election as President in 1975, he evicted the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) from its Madagascar facility and in June 1976 nationalized American-owned petroleum companies. In August and September 1978 he expelled three individuals from the US Embassy for their purported involvement in civil unrest. At the same time, Ratsiraka expanded political and military relations with the Soviet Union. The country began to receive considerable Soviet military equipment; Soviet personnel began to provide maintenance and instruction for the equipment; Malagasy military personnel began to be trained in the USSR.

However, Ratsiraka continued to foster relations with the Western world in an attempt to gain greater economic and military assistance from Western sources and thereby lessen his dependence on the Soviet Union. In 1980, a US ambassador presented his credentials and took up residence on the island. Since 1982, several US oil companies have signed exploration agreements with Madagascar, and in November 1983, Ratsiraka announced that a small number of senior enlisted men and junior officers would be permitted to attend training courses in the US under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program. Although Ratsiraka aborted the FY84 program, this military assistance program remains open. The MOD is highly supportive of the program in spite of Soviet protests over its existence. Conversely, in recent months Ratsiraka has requested the number of Soviet advisers in Madagascar be reduced and the Soviet Union train Malagasy crews to operate the An-12 (CUB) aircraft. He also continues to deny military access to the Soviets for use of the Diego Suarez naval base and other Malagasy facilities.
Madagascar's relations with the other island nations in the southwest Indian Ocean are cooperative. In April 1979, 200-250 Malagasy military personnel were deployed to the Seychelles to assist that nation during a threatened coup attempt. Although no coup materialized, the morale of Malagasy Army personnel was enhanced simply because they were able to respond to this request by another government.

h. (U) Key US Officials

Chief of Mission (Antananarivo): Ambassador Robert B. Keating
(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)
2. MILITARY, GENERAL

a. (U) Key Military Officials

Secretary-General of the Ministry of Defense: Colonel Jean-Jacques Rasoalomalala
Popular Armed Forces (PAF): Chief of Staff, Brig Gen Jean Rakotoharison
Force Aeronavales: Commander, Colonel Raymond Michel Rakotobe
Gendarmerie: Commander, Colonel Jean-Philippe*
Intelligence and State Security Service (DGID): Lt Col Christopher Raveloson-Mahasampo.

b. Position of Armed Forces

The Malagasy Popular Armed Forces (PAF) are generally apolitical, leaving President Ratsiraka to set policy and other civilian politicians to carry out day-to-day national administration. However, the President has not succeeded in creating a military united and uncritical in its loyalty to him; he cannot count on the officers as a group to agree with whatever he might do. At this time the Armed Forces play no significant role in national-level policy formulation. However, President Ratsiraka remains aware of the potential threat posed by his military. When he assumed power in 1975, he worked to lessen ethnic tensions in the military and to balance the various forces. At that time the Army was primarily Merina and the Gendarmerie primarily Cotier. Ratsiraka, a navy man wasn't liked by either group. Initially Ratsiraka reduced the Army's dominance by unifying the Air and Navy officer corps and providing the Air Force with priority military assistance by purchasing Soviet MIG aircraft. Additionally, he weakened the Army by removing the Development Corp and creating the Development Armed Force. He then strengthened his position by moving the Gendarmerie from the Ministry of Interior (headed by Ratsiraka opponents) to the Ministry of Defense and securing internal security by placing the Internal Security Service (DGID) to the Presidency. In weakening the military or at least neutralizing the threat it initially posed to the early days of the regime he also attempted to build prestige and goodwill within the military toward his regime. Today the military is better paid than the civilian government. The main threat remains small elements of the older Merina Army officers as the Cotiers begin to expand their numbers in the officer ranks. Here tribal factionalism helps insure the Ratsiraka's regime as the growing Cotier ranks would not support a Merina-backed coup.

Coup plots do surface from time to time but one deterrent to an attempt to overthrow Ratsiraka has been the right wing opposition's belief that the Soviet Union might uphold Ratsiraka or even worse that they might be instrumental in installing a Soviet puppet followup regime. The most disturbing threat from the military may have occurred in 1983. A coup plot was uncovered that may have been initiated by Cotier Gendarmerie officers. Although this has not been confirmed Ratsiraka would be more threatened from any Cotier-based opposition in the military.

* Colonel Jean-Philippe is terminally ill. In March 1984, he was temporarily replaced by Col Desire Rakotoarijona, the Prime Minister. It is not known at this time whether Rakotoarijona will remain dual-hatted or whether a permanent replacement will be named.
c. Military Trends and Capabilities

The Malagasy military comprises the People's Armed Forces (PAF), or Army; the Aeronaval Force, which includes the Air Force and Navy; and the Gendarmerie. The Army, by virtue of its size, is the predominant force. Total armed force strength is estimated at close to 30,000 men.

The President of the Republic is currently the Supreme Commander of the Malagasy Armed Forces. The chain of command runs from the President through the Ministry of Defense, to the commanding officers of the three forces, then extends from the respective service commanders to the regional commanders and their subordinate units. President Ratsiraka monitors defense matters on a day-to-day basis. His extreme fear of being overthrown or assassinated is reflected in the fact that he will not delegate matters of state to other officials.

The primary mission of the Malagasy Armed Forces is to protect national integrity and maintain internal security. The secondary mission is to carry out civic action activities. The Development Force units of the PAF, in particular, are responsible for building and improving roads so that surplus food production can be transported from one region to another and distributed in areas where it is needed. To assist the development units, the Air Force also utilizes its transport aircraft to distribute supplies throughout the country. Yet, with aging equipment, and a paucity of spare parts and qualified personnel, the Armed Forces remain severely restricted in performing these mandates.

In September 1984, personnel from the national police, the National Gendarmerie, and the People’s Armed Forces were combined to form a mixed brigade to fight the rising crime rate in the capital. Reportedly other such mixed brigade operations are underway in the other areas—Antsirabe, Tulear, and Majunga. These operations are aimed at reducing crime by patrolling high crime areas. The men involved in the operations do not care for this type of service; however, if the mixed brigades continue to be effective they are not likely to be disbanded in the near term.

Even though the Ministry of Defense has the highest percentage of the national budget for 1984, morale among the Armed Forces is on the decline. The country’s overall economic crisis, and its impact on the military standard of living, as well as renewed ethnic rivalries are the key problems causing discontent among the military. Junior officers, in particular, are finding they have no opportunities to advance through the ranks. As Cotiers (Malagasy from the coastal regions) trained in the eastern bloc or by Soviet advisers, they believe that the senior officers, who are predominantly Merina (Malagasy from the high plateau) educated and trained in France, are getting more than their fair share of scarce resources (i.e., jobs, promotions). The junior officers are complaining that the socialist revolution has been betrayed by the lack of revolutionary zeal on the part of the Western-oriented Merina senior officers.
In November 1983, the Malagasy Government announced a personnel drawdown that eventually will affect all branches of the Armed Forces. The gendarmerie is the first force to undergo this large scale force contraction. It had 9,000 men at the end of 1983, the gendarmerie now has an estimated strength of 7,600 men, and has an end strength objective of approximately 5,000 to be reached by the end of 1984. The force drawdown in the Gendarmerie is being accomplished by closing the Military Academy, giving "early outs" to those enlisted who want to leave, stopping all recruiting, and selecting out those individuals that are marginal or below average performer.

The morale of the Aeronaval Forces is also at an all time low. Morale is poor among the naval personnel due to a lack of government emphasis on naval activities and equipment shortages. Pending shipments of naval hardware from France may partially solve the problem. Pilots also are discontent because of the almost total lack of flight operations. Many of the 15 Malagasy MiG-21 pilots have inadequate flying time and lack confidence. To overcome this problem, some military pilots reportedly have been flying as copilots on Air Madagascar's Boeing 747. This decision, in turn, has caused conflict between displaced airline pilots and the military.

Madagascar continues to rely on Communist Bloc military equipment, particularly that of the Soviet Union. In the last several years, Soviet military deliveries have included radars, communication and electronic intelligence equipment, artillery, spare parts, and assorted types of ammunition and aircraft. In late 1983 and early 1984 Soviet equipment delivered to Madagascar included radio high frequency and direction finding equipment. Reportedly there has been a desire expressed by the Malagasy presidency to reduce the scope and amount of Soviet military assistance. Since late December 1983, when President Ratsiraka sent the Malagasy Finance Minister on a whirlwind tour of Western capitals to convince lenders to offer better loan terms, the President has been pushing for additional Western aid and for a reduction of Soviet advisers in Madagascar, and more training of Malagasy personnel on Soviet aircraft.

d. Military Budget

$68.25 million is budgeted for the fiscal year ending 31 December 1984; this is 15.9 percent of the central government budget. Of the total, $25.38 is budgeted for Army operations; $21.97 million for the Gendarmerie; $6.26 million for the National Service; $4.74 million for the Regiment of Presidential Security; $2.5 million for the Ministry of Defense, $2.28 million for the Police Academy of Antsirabe, and $353 thousand for the Directorate of Combatants of Revolution. $4.4 million is designated for defense capital expenditures, and $400 of capital expenditures for the Development Army. Dollar values converted from Malagasy francs at the exchange rate of 500 Malagasy francs equal $1.00.
e. Population

(U) 9,645,000 estimated as of July 1984
Males (ages 15-49): 2,135,000 physically fit, 1,306,000, draft age: 20
Ethnic Divisions: Basically split between highlanders of predominantly Malayo-
Indonesian origin, consisting of Merina and related Betsileo, on the one hand
and coastal tribes with mixed Negroid, Malayo-Indonesian, and Arab ancestry on
the other; coastal tribes include Betsimisaraka, Trimitiety, Sakalava, and
Antaisaka; there are also French, Indians of French nationality, and Creoles.
Literacy: 45 percent of population age 10 and over.
3. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

a. Army

(1) Mission

The primary mission of the Army is to defend national borders and assist in maintaining internal stability. The force also has a secondary mission, which includes growing and transporting agricultural produce, working on engineering projects, and distributing food supplies.

(2) Capabilities

The overall capability of this force has declined. The Army can maintain internal security in the capital and Diego Suarez, but would be hardpressed to respond to widespread unrest in other areas. It is incapable of defending national borders, and can only perform part of its secondary civil development mission.

(3) Personnel Strength

21,315 (11,815 are combat and support unit personnel; 9,500 are development force personnel)*

(4) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

The President exercises authority over the Army, the largest force in the military, through the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff. Headquarters for the Army is located at the capital, Antananarivo. The four intervention force regiments, combat units responsible for territorial defense and internal security, are stationed at Antananarivo and Diego Suarez. The intervention forces are not combat ready because they are not able to conduct realistic combat training, although they do conduct small arms firing practice. Five development force** regiments, responsible for public works, are deployed throughout the six military regions with two units assigned to the more remote Majunga military region. All other military regiments are located around the capital and are available for deployment throughout the country as needed. The term regiment as used in the Malagasy Army does not denote a regiment in US terminology. The personnel strengths for these regiments are listed below. The Army was able to deploy 250 men to the Seychelles in November 1981 for a short time to bolster the Rene Regime.

* Over the next year some decline in this strength is expected.

** Recently the Development Forces were resubordinated from the Army to the People's Armed Forces. Command and control still is the perview of the Military Regional Commander.
(b) **Ground Combat Units**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Tactical Units</th>
<th>Strength Per Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 intervention force regiment (infantry/abn) (bn size)</td>
<td>Unk 750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 intervention air defense regiment (bn size)</td>
<td>Unk 750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 intervention field artillery regiment (bn size)</td>
<td>Unk 750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 armored regiment (bn size)</td>
<td>Unk 500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) **Combat Support Units**

| 1 communications regiment | Unk 750* |
| 1 administration and personnel regiment | Unk 750* |
| 1 combat support regiment | Unk Unk* |
| 1st Presidential Security Regiment* | Unk 750 |
| 1 engineer regiment | Unk 750 |

(d) **Civic Action Forces**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Development Units</th>
<th>Strength Per Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 development force regiments</td>
<td>Unk Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 engineer regiment</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) **Weapons and Equipment**

(a) **General**

The Army inventory has been improved primarily as a result of Soviet equipment deliveries. This aid has allowed the Malagasy military to expand the Army and at the same time develop a better command and control network. Army expansion over the last several years has included the addition of an artillery brigade, an armor brigade, an air defense brigade, and a motor transport regiment. These units are all equipped with military equipment delivered from Communist Bloc nations.

* The Presidential Security Regiment (PSR) has overall responsibility for movement security and liaison with the security organizations of visiting dignitaries. Commanding officer of the PSR is Colonel Rajaonarison. Two majors, one from the Army and Gendarmerie, are designated as deputies. The Gendarmerie major is responsible for the general presidential palace and communications security. The PSR is armed with 7.62-mm AK-47 assault rifles and 7.62 Dragunov sniping rifles. The PSR also mans a ZPU-4 antiaircraft gun on the palace grounds.
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(b) Ground Weapons and Equipment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mortars:</td>
<td>FR</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60/81-mm</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCLR &amp; AT:</td>
<td>FR</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73-mm, Model 1950</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons:</td>
<td>FR, UR</td>
<td>5, 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58-mm, SARPAC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-mm, RPG-7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery:</td>
<td>UR, KN, UR, RN</td>
<td>24, 32, 4, 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76-mm, field gun, ZIS-3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85-mm, field gun, D-44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122-mm, howitzer, M-30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122-mm, howitzer, D-30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122-mm, field gun, D-74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122-mm, howitzer, A-19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD Artillery:</td>
<td>KN, FR, CH, UR</td>
<td>50, 5, 18, 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.5 mm, ZPU-4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-mm, AD, M621</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-mm, ZU-23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37-mm, AD, M1939</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75-mm, recoilless rifle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Vehicles:</td>
<td>UR, FR</td>
<td>23, 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRDM-2 armored car</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M3A1 armored car</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferret scout car</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks:</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT-76 light amphibious tank</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) Logistics

Madagascar is not capable of producing military equipment, nor does it have depots or reserve stock. All materials and spare parts are supplied by foreign sources, but in 1983 Madagascar began to make overtures toward Western nations rather than to traditional Communist bloc suppliers. There is a slow response time when ordering spares from the Soviet Union, due to a lack of foreign exchange and Soviet requests for payment in advance. Madagascar contracts out, usually to Communist Bloc countries, for maintenance of equipment and training of personnel.

(7) Personnel Procurement and Retention

(8) There is no conscription; manpower needs are adequately met by volunteers, although some difficulty exists in securing recruits with an educational level acceptable for technical training. Morale is good due to the influx of more modern equipment and improved salaries.
(U) The Malagasy National Service, which is under Army auspices, was initiated in 1980 to recruit men and women ages 18 through 34 to perform civic action duties. The service requires 6 weeks of basic military training at a local gendarmerie station or the Antananarivo stadium, followed by 12-18 months of national service. Jobs include some military duties, but primarily comprise duties of a more humanitarian nature such as teaching in outlying schools and agricultural or rural development. The service is compulsory for all men of high school age and for those women who have received high school diplomas. Compulsory service may be waved if the individual already holds a permanent job. No statistics are available for the strength of this organization, nor how many participants the service has recruited in the past.

(8) Training

Military training is conducted in Madagascar as well as abroad. Soviet, East German, and North Korean technicians have been responsible for training the Malagasy military at air and naval bases in country. Except for the Military Academy at Antsirabe, which offers a firing range, the only other formal training facility in Madagascar is the National School for the Teaching of Aviation and Meteorology located at the old airport in Arivonimamo. This facility offers flight training on lighter aircraft. Senior officer military training is accomplished principally in France. Most training for junior officers occurs in the Soviet Union, in particular, for student pilots training on the MiG-21 fighter aircraft. To a lesser extent, junior officers also have received counterinsurgency and antiaircraft artillery training, and attended the war college in North Korea. Some training in past years has taken place in Cuba and Romania. In 1983, two Aeronaval Force pilots received Boeing 737 conversation training for 6 weeks at the Air Lingus facility in Dublin, Ireland. In 1978, several Malagasy pilots attended the Air Force Flight and Flight Mechanics School in Indonesia.

(9) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

There is no known Army reserve; however, the National Service provides minimal military training to its recruits prior to assigning them civic action roles. Service personnel could be mobilized in a national emergency.

(b) Mobilization

Mobilization plans are not known; however, Army units could call on the Gendarmerie and police elements to augment their ranks.

b. Navy

(1) Mission

The primary mission of the Navy is to provide surveillance and protection of territorial waters. It is also tasked to support ground and air force units by transporting materiel between coastal cities.
(2) **Capabilities**

The capability of this naval force to perform its mission is poor. The force's overall performance is limited because of a lack of trained personnel, low operational rates of its equipment, and the lack of adequate funding by the Government. However, in November 1981, naval craft, aided by civil air, transported 250 Malagasy troops and equipment, to the Seychelles in response to President Rene's request for assistance in deterring a purported coup attempt on his regime.

(3) **Personnel Strength**

Estimated at 400

(4) **Ship Strength**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Op</th>
<th>Nonop</th>
<th>In Reserve</th>
<th>Status Unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PB (fast patrol craft)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC (patrol craft)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSM (medium amphibious assault landing ship)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AG (miscellaneous auxiliary)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) **Organization and Deployment**

The Navy comprises half of the organization called "Force Aeronavales," which also includes the Air Force. Navy units are primarily based at the country's major port, Diego Suarez, with other units deployed at Majunga, the country's second largest port located on the west coast. Headquarters for naval forces is at the "Force Aeronavales" headquarters in the capital, Antananarivo.

(6) **Status of Equipment**

The Navy is experiencing numerous maintenance problems with its naval craft principally due to age and a lack of repair parts. As a result, only limited numbers of vessels are operational at any one time. Even the newest patrol craft in the inventory, the fast patrol craft, have experienced severe mechanical problems.

* The April 1984 cyclone that hit Diego Suarez seriously damaged the naval base and destroyed many naval vessels including the North Korean supplied Nampo Class patrol boats.
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(7) Logistics

Naval logistics is dependent on foreign sources, primarily North Korean. Poor maintenance and the lack of spare parts are the major logistic problems facing this naval force. Drydock repairs can be accomplished at Diego Suarez when and if spare parts are available. The presence of several French naval technicians at Secren Naval Facility and possible acceptance of French aid offered in late 1983 could improve the situation.

Naval ship repair is accomplished at the former French Naval Base at Diego Suarez, the country's second largest port. Drydock repairs can be accomplished here, but Madagascar's capability to use this facility is dependent on French technical assistance.

The Merchant Marine fleet of Madagascar has 16 ships of over 1,000 GRT. Of these, 14 have military support potential. Ten breakbulk ships, 2 RO/RO ships, and 2 POL tankers with a combined deadweight tonnage (lift capacity) of 88,600 tons of cargo. Five of the 14 ships are 20 years old or older. None of the ships were built in Madagascar since the country does not have a commercial shipbuilding industry.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

Little information is available on procurement and retention procedures. Little attention is paid to obtaining high-quality recruits because of the low emphasis placed on this unit.

(9) Training

The level of unit training and combat proficiency is not high. The majority of naval personnel receive their training in Madagascar at Diego Suarez. This training is conducted by North Korean naval technicians/advisers and is rated as poor because of inferior equipment and personality problems between North Korean and Malagasy naval personnel.

(10) Reserve and Mobilization

(a) Reserve

No formal reserve unit exists.

(b) Mobilization

There is no mobilization pool of either reserve personnel or ships. The only vessels that could possibly be called on to support naval operations would be the ships that compose the merchant marine fleet.
c. Air Force

(1) Mission

The primary mission of the Air Force is to defend territorial airspace and provide air transport/liaison for the Armed Forces. The force is also tasked to perform VIP transport duties.

(2) Capabilities

Malagasy air capability remains heavily dependent on the Soviet Union, and without Soviet technicians and advisers would have only a limited ability to maintain any aircraft. The Air Force, which in the past has had little combat capability and only limited transport capability, is improving its overall ability as a result of the recent influx of Soviet-supplied equipment and advisers. The addition of jet fighter aircraft and transport aircraft will eventually give the Air Force the ability to conduct air intercept missions, provide close air support for the Army and Navy, and better fulfill its transport requirements.

(3) Personnel Strength:

Estimated at 500

(4) Aircraft Strength

Total: 39 (18 jet, 18 prop, 3 helicopter)

In operational units: 39

(16 jet fighters: 4 day, 10 all-weather, 2 trainers;
15 transports; 5 utility;
3 helicopters)

(5) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

The Air Force is one branch of the organization called the "Force Aeronavales," which also includes the Navy. The Air Force is headquartered at the military side of Ivato Airfield, an international airport just outside the capital, Antananarivo, and includes 10 MiG-21/FISHBEDs. Future plans call for a reorganization of this force to provide a better command and control network. This will result in the MiG-21s being based at Arivonimamo Airfield, located 25 miles west of the capital. There is also a possibility that one of these two squadrons could be based or deployed to Andrakaka military airfield at Diego Suarez.
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(b) Summary of Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Principal Bases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 combination fighter/</td>
<td>MiG-21/FISHBED</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Antananarivo/Ivato</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transport/helicopter unit</td>
<td>MiG-17/FRESCO</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Antananarivo/Ivato</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiG-21/MONGOL</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Antananarivo/Ivato</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yak-40/CODLING</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Antananarivo/Ivato</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An-12/CUB</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Antananarivo/Ivato</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An-26/CURL</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Antananarivo/Ivato</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-47 Douglas Skytrain</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>Antananarivo/Ivato</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS 748 Series 2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Antananarivo/Ivato</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reims-Cessna F-337</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Antananarivo/Ivato</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BN-2 Defender</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Antananarivo/Ivato</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR-1521 Broussard</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Antananarivo/Ivato</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U-11A Aztec</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Antananarivo/Ivato</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-8/HIP</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Antananarivo/Ivato</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) Status of Equipment

Aircraft are of mainly Soviet origin and are for the most part flown and maintained by Soviet pilots and technical personnel. Because of the relatively recent delivery of the Soviet-supplied equipment, these aircraft are mostly operational; however, there have been some problems obtaining adequate repair parts. A MiG-21 crash landed at Ivato airfield in early Nov 1983, suffering irreparable damage to the landing gear and wings. This aircraft may be cannibalized for parts. The four MiG-17s are on loan from North Korea and are flown and maintained by North Korean pilots and technicians. The operational ready rate of these aircraft is limited by the lack of repair parts and the age of the MiG-17 fighters. Aircraft of Western origin suffer from age and a lack of spare parts and also suffer from limited operational ready rates. For instance, of the six C-47s only three are operational; the others are being cannibalized for parts. The three C-47s are very active and contribute significantly to the force's transport mission but may be replaced by the Soviet-supplied An-26/CURL.

(7) Logistics

Because of the reduction in military assistance to Madagascar, maintenance of MiG-21 aircraft has suffered. Maintenance of other indigenous aircraft is performed by Madagascar personnel who are capable of extensive repairs. Madagascar Air Force technicians are generally competent. The Soviet Union is the primary supplier of spare parts to Madagascar. Delays are encountered in requesting spares from the Soviet Union because of Soviet demand for payment in advance. The Air Force is also experiencing a depletion in supplies such as engine hydraulic fluid and jet fuel.
(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

(U) All members of the Air Force are volunteers. There is no conscription of personnel at the present time to fill Armed Forces' personnel needs. For this reason, Madagascar has had problems procuring recruits with requisite aptitudes and skills necessary to support Air Force needs.

(9) Training

Training for Malagasy Air Force personnel is being conducted primarily in the Soviet Union. This training includes courses for fighter, transport, and helicopter pilots, mechanics, and air defense personnel. At the present time, there are an estimated 100 Air Force personnel undergoing instruction in the Soviet Union. Training for Western fixed-wing aircraft has been conducted in France and Canada in the past. There has also been some unidentified Air Force related training taking place in Indonesia.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

(U) There is no formal air force reserve. However, there is a limited reserve capability for personnel and military aircraft from the civil air fleet.

(b) Mobilization

The major problems limiting mobilization of civil air assets are the same as those in the Air Force—the shortage of pilots and technical personnel and a shortage of spare parts. Civil air assets available to the Malagasy Armed Forces include two Boeing 737s, one Boeing 747, and three HS 748s. In the event of a national emergency, all of the country's aircraft and indigenous civil aviation personnel would be available for government service. Without foreign assistance, a lack of fully qualified, indigenous flight and maintenance personnel would prevent maximum effective use of the mobilized aircraft, especially if prolonged or intensive air transport operations were required.

All of the above aircraft are considered to be in the fleet of Air Madagascar, which is owned by the Malagasy Government (66 percent) and Air France (30 percent). The Boeing 747 is operated jointly by Air Madagascar and Air France. One of the HS-748s is VIP-configured and is for the use of the President and other senior officials. Air Madagascar reportedly is operating this aircraft until Forces Aeronavales (FAN) personnel can be trained, at which time it is to be turned over to the FAN. FAN transports carry civil registration markings and sometimes fly civilian-related passenger and cargo missions on behalf of the government.

Civil aircraft along with naval craft were mobilized to assist in transporting 250 Malagasy personnel and supporting equipment to the Seychelles in November 1981.
d. Paramilitary Forces

(1) Gendarmerie

(a) Mission

The primary mission of the Gendarmerie is to maintain national stability in conjunction with the Armed Forces and assist the Army in the event of any external threat.

(b) Capabilities

Until recently, the force reportedly has been sufficiently mobile, and has had adequate armament and communications to carry out its mission. However, in September 1983 when the gendarmerie was called out to quell cattle thieves in the Madagascar's Fivondronana D'Ambalavao region, their effectiveness proved minimal due to poor communications and the lack of working equipment. The reduction of force strength since October 1983 from 8,000 to 5,000 men as a result of budgetary constraints has further limited its capabilities.

(c) Strength

Estimated at 5,000

(d) Organization and Deployment*

The Gendarmerie is headquartered in the capital, Antananarivo. The force is composed of six regional groups and one special intervention group (commando battalion) with approximately 700 personnel in each. These units are deployed at major population centers throughout the six major military regions: Antananarivo, Firanarantsoa, Tamatave, Majunga, Tulear, and Diego Suarez. Also, there are several units that are not assigned a particular geographical responsibility. These "floating" units would be used to augment territorially assigned forces when necessary.

(e) Status of Equipment

The equipment holdings of the Gendarmerie have improved markedly due to recent Soviet equipment deliveries. These have included 4 PT-76 light amphibious tanks, 18 BRDM-2 armored cars, and assorted light arms and ammunition. This upgrade of the force's equipment holdings has augmented previous deliveries of equipment from Western sources, which have combined to improve the capabilities of this force.

* It is anticipated that President Ratsiraka will reorganize the Gendarmerie by early 1985. At this time it is unknown how the service will be resubordinated or how command and control will be affected.
MADAGASCAR

(2) Other

In addition to the Gendarmerie, there are local police forces throughout the island that assist in maintaining law and order. Little is known about the organization or the capabilities of these forces.

e. Total Military Personnel Strength

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>21,315</td>
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<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>400</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gendarmerie</td>
<td>5,000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>27,215</strong></td>
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</tbody>
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f. Foreign Military Presence

(1) Foreign Military In-Country

Soviet Union: 100+ advisers/technicians* To maintain radar equipment, and MiG-21 and An-12 aircraft; also to provide general military assistance.

North Korea: 75-100 advisers/technicians

50 Army technicians To train in artillery, martial arts; to assist intelligence unit (DOID); to provide general military assistance.

25 Navy technicians To assist in operation of Nampo Class patrol boats.

25 Air technicians To fly and maintain MiG-17 aircraft.

* Presence may vary from time to time from 100 to a high of around 150.
East Germany: 12 advisers/technicians

France: 3 advisers 3 Navy advisers

Unknown; may assist with intelligence unit (DGID).

Soviet Union: 12 advisers/technicians

France: 3 Navy advisers

Marine engineers at Diego Suarez.

(2) Presence Abroad

Soviet Union: 174 Air Force trainees; unknown number of Army trainees

France: 96 Air Force trainees*

* Madagascar requested 150 training positions in France for 1984. Ninety-six positions have been granted. The Malagasy also requested five quotas for service war colleges, of which three positions were granted.
Withheld pursuant to exemption
(b)(3) 10 USC 424
of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
1. Political-Military Situation: Malawi became an independent member of the British Commonwealth on 6 July 1964, following almost 75 years of British colonial administration. Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda, leader of the independence movement, was named in the Constitution as the first President. Dr. Banda heads the Malawi Congress Party (MCP), which is the only legal political party in Malawi. Two years after independence, Malawi became a republic on 6 July 1966. The Constitution provides that the President of Malawi be selected every 5 years by officials of the MCP and tribal chiefs; however, by a unanimous resolution of the MCP, Banda was acclaimed President for Life in 1970. The National Assembly is a single-chamber legislative body with 96 elected members. According to the Constitution, all legislative power is vested in the Parliament. However, such power has never been realized because of President Banda's predominance, a position based on control of the governmental structure and leadership of the MCP.

Malawi has experienced nearly 20 years of prosperity relative to other black-ruled African countries. It is a landlocked country with virtually no natural resources. Its only assets are fertile soil and adequate rainfall with a climate favorable to crop production. Since Malawi's economy is based on agriculture, in particular the growth and export of tobacco and tea, the Government has undertaken a program of agricultural expansion. Based on per capita income criteria (GDP $1.3 billion, or $208 per capita), Malawi remains among the 25 poorest nations of the world; however, it was self-sufficient in basic foodstuffs and enjoyed annual growth in GDP during the 1970s. Boundary disputes between Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia will impede development. Malawi is heavily dependent upon South Africa for both investment and trade. South Africans make up a large percentage of the tourists who visit Malawi and when petroleum supplies from Mozambique were interrupted in 1980, South Africa airlifted petroleum products to Malawi. Simultaneously, Malawi exports and imports via Mozambique's rail and port systems, precariously balancing its economy between these two southern African foes.

President Banda, thought to be in his mid-80s, enjoys the affection and loyalty of the people. Although there are no indications that the people, the Army, or the police will not remain loyal to him, the President is extremely wary of threats to his position and authority. This was reflected in May 1983, when three prominent cabinet ministers with large constituencies and a member of parliament died in an auto accident. Reports suggest that they may have been murdered by the police. President Banda tolerates no opposition, and anyone emerging as a political threat risks imprisonment or financial ruin.

President Banda's health appears to have deteriorated of late. Reporting suggests that the transition of leadership in Malawi is underway, even though Banda remains in power. His closest advisers are exerting increasing influence and making decisions for him, most notably in the foreign policy arena. For example, President Banda was unaware of Malawi's abstention on the United Nations Grenada resolution. Until recently, no one other than the President would attempt to take a position on foreign policy issues. Whoever succeeds Banda will likely continue many of his basic policies, while trying to bring Malawi back into the mainstream of African thinking. African acceptance of Malawi under Banda's rule has been cautious due to his maverick style and
decisions, such as maintaining diplomatic relation with South Africa, Israel, and Taiwan. However, despite past reports concerning the President's deteriorating health, he has continued to be the major power in Malawi. Banda's demise or incapacitation could create a leadership vacuum. In such a situation, the Army and police would play an important role in maintaining stability during a transition period and in choosing Banda's successor. The Malawi Constitution provides for a Presidential Council of three MCP members to rule the country in the event of Banda's death until a new president can be elected by the MCP. Reliable sources have reported, however, that the Council will have five members, three from the MCP plus the Chief of Police and Commander of the Army.

President Banda judges external matters strictly on the way they affect Malawi. He is a staunch anti-Communist (there is no Communist diplomatic mission in Malawi; however, in 1982 Malawi gave nonresident accreditation to the North Korean Ambassador to Lusaka) and is pro-Israeli. In an effort to maintain a policy of contact and dialogue with neighboring countries, President Banda takes a firm stand of no aid or sanctuary for insurgent groups. Malawi continues to enjoy close ties with the United Kingdom, benefiting from aid for social and economic development projects. In addition to being a member of the Commonwealth, Malawi is a member of the OAU, the UN, and the Southern African Development Coordinating Committee (SADCC).

Although there are known dissidents in and outside the country, there does not appear to be an immediate threat to the political stability of Malawi. These dissidents are few in number, weak in capability, and currently without a major benefactor. The major opposition groups outside Malawi are the Socialist League of Malawi (LESOMA), the Congress of the Second Republic (CSR), and the Malawi Freedom Movement (MAFREMO). The leaders of these groups met in Salisbury, Zimbabwe during March 1981 to discuss unification of the disparate anti-Banda movements. The meeting ended in failure. In late December 1981, the Malawi Security Forces announced the capture of MAFREMO leader Orton Chirwa when he attempted to reenter Malawi to lead an anti-Banda coup. The capture of Chirwa and subsequent trial for treason by the traditional court system is not expected to have a long-term effect on the other elements of the dissident community nor to slacken their interest in coming to power in a post Banda Malawi.

The Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO), although not directly engaging in activities against landlocked Malawi, has caused major economic problems in the country by sabotaging the important Mozambique rail link leading from Malawi to the Indian Ocean ports of Beira and Nacala. Malawi has had difficulty exporting its major cash crop—tobacco—and importing fertilizer and necessary consumer items. The 1983 rains washed out the tracks in Nampula Province, Mozambique, and inadequate management and operational policies have forced Malawi to negotiate with alternate sources for fuel. By early 1983, fuel supplies to Malawi, which pass through Nacala, had dwindled to a mere trickle.

As a result of the insurgency affecting Mozambique, the Malawi Army, fearing that it may face similar problems, has included counterinsurgency operations in its training program. In September 1982, the Army conducted the first in a series of field training exercises involving an insurgency scenario. There are indications that both the CSR and LESOMA have received promises of
Soviet and Cuban support. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) may have trained members of the CSR. Although there is very little support within the country for these insurgency organizations, the military is preparing for the contingency.

The Armed Forces are the direct responsibility of the President, who personally handles all defense matters. In the event of external aggression, the Malawi Army Commander has been designated by the Life President as responsible for all command decisions, while the other services will perform such functions as the Army Commander directs. Internal problems are the primary responsibility of the Inspector General of Police. The President has three advisory boards to assist him with the formulation of defense policy; they include the Operational Committee, the Army Council, and the National Intelligence Committee (NIC), the latter being the most important. The NIC comprises the Army Commander, Inspector General of Police, Chief of the Police Special Branch, Secretary of the President and Cabinet, and Secretary General of the Malawi Congress Party.

The Malawi Army, with an illustrious history dating back to the King's African Rifles of the colonial era, has the mission to defend the country and to maintain order. Although one of the best trained and disciplined armies in the region, it is smaller and less well equipped than those of neighboring states. The Army would be unable to protect Malawi against a major incursion by Tanzanian, Mozambican, or Zambian forces, but the likelihood of such direct aggression in the foreseeable future appears minimal. The Army probably could suppress internal disturbances or small-scale raids launched by Malawian dissidents from neighboring states. Man for man, it is one of the finest small armies in black Africa. Despite its excellent training in combat skills, the Malawi Army is not equipped for modern conventional warfare. It would be heavily outgunned and outnumbered by any of its neighbors. Malawi's military force, with the aid of the police, is capable of suppressing local disorders and small guerrilla incursions, provided they do not occur at several locations simultaneously.

Key Officials:

President and Minister of External Affairs (also responsible for defense functions): Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda

Member of the National Intelligence Committee, Minister without Portfolio
Secretary General of the Malawi Young Pioneers, and Secretary-General Malawi Congress Party: Dick T. Matenje

Army:
Commander, General Melvin Khanga
Deputy Commander (Administration): Maj Gen Wilfred John Mponela
Deputy Commander (Operations and Training): Maj Gen Issac Yohane
Director of Military Intelligence: Brigadier Robbie G.L.O. Liabunya
Chief of Staff in Charge of Training and Operations: Brigadier Dimus A.N. Maulana

Police:
Inspector General, Mackson J. Kamwana; Chief Special Branch, Mc. B.J. Itimu; Commander Mobile Force, Faison George Kadja
3. Military Budget:

(U) $22.9 million (excluding the Malawi Young Pioneers and Police) for fiscal year ending 31 March 1984; this is 6.4 percent of the central government budget. No service allocation is available. Dollar values converted from Malawi Kwacha at an exchange rate of 1.0555 Kwacha equals $1.00.

4. (U) Population: 6,829,000 as of June 1984
Males (ages 15-49): 1,451,000;
physically fit, 735,000 as of 1 June 1984
Ethnic Divisions: Over 99 percent African, less than 1 percent European and Asian
Literacy: 15 percent of population

5. Personnel Strength: 6,000 (300 officers, 2,100 NCOs, and 3,600 enlisted).

Major Units: The major units of the Malawi Army are 3 light infantry battalions. Each battalion has an authorized strength of 1,114 men, with a large headquarters company and five rifle companies. A fourth battalion was reportedly in the planning stage, but its formation may have been delayed indefinitely or postponed. In addition to the three light infantry battalions, there is an air wing (see Air Force) and a support battalion. The support battalion consists of a 105-mm artillery battery, a reconnaissance troop, an air defense detachment, and a naval detachment (see Navy). A paratrooper wing and airborne school were formed in 1981 with instructors trained in West Germany and most recently the United States. In addition, the Malawi Army Commander is interested in forming a special forces company, a combat engineer company, and one additional 105-mm artillery battery. In December 1982, the Paratrooper Wing Commander, Major Issac G. Longwe, briefed General Khanga on a proposed special operations company organization that would include one special operations platoon composed of six detachments, and three paracommando platoons. The missions of these specialized units would include unconventional operations and training, counterinsurgency, and border surveillance. In early June 1983, a six-man detachment from the Paratrooper Wing went to West Germany to participate in training by the US Army Special Forces Detachment in Europe. It is hoped that this organization will greatly enhance the Malawi Army's ability to meet real and potential threats to the Banda government. There is also a military college that is probably one of the finest, most efficiently organized and operated military training schools in Sub-Saharan Africa. The college conducts recruit training, numerous enlisted courses, officer cadet courses, platoon leaders course, company commanders course, communication courses, NCO courses, a catering course, and will add a staff officers course in the future. The military college has responsibility for training not only the Army but also the militia.

Major Equipment: Major items in the Malawi Army inventory are mainly of British origin and include 22 Fox armored cars, 10 Ferret Mk-II scout cars, 12 105-mm guns, at least 14 81-mm mortars, and 52 7.62-mm light machineguns. The acquisition of the 105-mm light guns gives the Malawi Army its first artillery capability. Additional equipment includes 1 mortar-locating radar and approximately 11 Blowpipe SAMs.
MALAWI

Reserves: Regular forces are complemented by the militia led by officers from the Malawi Army and, in the past, cadres of the Malawi Young Pioneers. The militia has the strength of approximately 1,500. The militia are recruited from every sector of Malawian society with each district in the country receiving a certain quota each year. Their mission is to provide personnel in case of a national emergency. Militia personnel are given 8 weeks of military training by the Malawi Army and are under the command of the Army commander. Since 1978 it is estimated that 750 men have received training for the militia. The Army should be able to equip at least 600 militia members in an emergency.

6. Navy: The Malawi Army Naval Detachment has 4 patrol craft (of which 3 are operational) with approximately 60 combat trained and 42 support personnel stationed at Monkey Bay on Lake Malawi. Each patrol craft is armed with a 20-mm cannon. Two patrol boats were acquired from the Portuguese and the other two were acquired from South Africa. The Naval detachment also maintains the President's boat, a small fiberglass coupe, and one additional fiberglass boat. In 1982 the detachment purchased six inflatable assault boats with twin 50 HP Mercury outboard engines. The detachment has received some training and maintenance support from South Africa. In the future, the detachment will be assigned a Coast Guard-type mission. The detachment also has two trained scuba divers and limited amounts of scuba equipment. The Naval Detachment conducts patrols on Lake Malawi, an area of increasing interest because of potential gas and oil deposits under the lake. In the past, Lake Malawi has been the cause of territorial disputes between Tanzania and Malawi. Malawi shares the lake with Mozambique, but does not recognize a Tanzanian territorial claim to any part of the lake. The Naval Detachment has a limited capability to patrol Lake Malawi. Without increasing the size and acquiring replacements for its obsolete patrol boats, the Naval Detachment will remain only marginally capable of performing its mission.

7. Air Force: The Malawi Army Air Wing (MAAW) has one fixed-wing squadron and one helicopter squadron. The MAAW has the capability to transport a small contingent of troops, perform a limited visual reconnaissance role, and provide some VIP transport. The fixed-wing squadron has six Dornier-27 trainers and five Dornier-28 Skyservant utility aircraft for troop transport. Pilots receive basic training for the Dornier aircraft in West Germany, and there are believed to be four German advisers attached to the air wing. Most recently, the US provided training for this squadron in Phoenix, Arizona. The helicopter squadron is equipped with four French helicopters, two SA-330 Pumas, one Alouette III, and one AS-350 ECUREUIL. Currently there are 13 rotary-wing pilots in the MAAW. The helicopter squadron was temporarily grounded in August 1980 following the crash of a third Puma helicopter that was reportedly ordered into the air over the objections of a French adviser. Three French advisers are attached to the helicopter squadron.

Military Aid: Malawi receives no military assistance from Communist countries. Since 1975, $51 million worth of equipment has been sent to Malawi. The United Kingdom has delivered $32 million of this including armored cars, transport aircraft, and 105-mm guns. France is second with $10 million in deliveries including helicopters and transports. Third is Belgium with $5 million in deliveries including various small arms and ammunition.
8. **Paramilitary:**
   a. **Police Mobile Force**
   Personnel Strength: 460
   Units: 4 companies (13 platoons total)
   Major Equipment: Eight Shorland armored cars, one Britten-Norman Defender (BN-2A) light transport aircraft, one Cessna 185 utility aircraft, and one Short Skyvan 3M STOL light transport. The force is used for a variety of special missions including riot control, counterinsurgency, and reaction force type operations. The mobile force arrested dissident leader Orton Chirwa last December when he attempted to return to Malawi. It receives marksmanship training from the Malawi Army Rifle Team.
   b. **Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP)**
   Personnel Strength: Estimated at 600 with military training.
   Units: Organization unknown. The MYP was established in 1963 as an organization to spearhead economic development, particularly agriculture. It long has been suspected of having a paramilitary element. The MYP maintains an air detachment as well as a Presidential Guard of about 100. If other such units exist, their presence is a closely guarded secret. MYP training, however, incorporates heavy doses of military discipline and indoctrination in citizenship. The program continues to process approximately 3,000 youths each year. Altogether about 24,000 youths have been trained at 23 bases throughout the country. The role of the MYP was reduced in 1981 after former head of the MYP Guanda Chakuamba Phiri was arrested and put on trial for gross breach of party discipline. Phiri's crime appears to have been the accumulation of too much power. It is unlikely that Phiri accumulated this power to pose a threat to the Life President. Rather, he was probably preparing for the power struggle that is expected to follow Banda's death. The Malawi Army has taken over the naval detachment and now has its own air wing, thereby reducing the military significance of the MYP in relation to the police and Army. The Life President still has an MYP bodyguard when he appears in public, but MYP uniforms are less in evidence than in the recent past.

9. **(U)** Key US Officials (Lilongwe):
   **Chief of Mission:** Ambassador Weston Adams

10. **Foreign Military Presence:**
    German: Four advisers with fixed-wing squadron.
    France: One Army captain, two civilian technicians with the helicopter squadron.
Withheld pursuant to exemption
(b)(3): 10 USC 424
of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
Mali

1. (6) Political-Military Situation: In June 1979, the Military Committee of National Liberation (MCNL) that came to power in a 1968 coup was replaced by a single-party constitutional government. Despite a coup plot being uncovered in February 1978 and mounting rumors of disaffection among the officer corps in 1979, President Traore proceeded with the formation of the Democratic Union of Malian People (UDPM). The UDPM, consisting of the National Union of Malian Women, the National Union of Malian Workers, and the National Union of Malian Youth, provided the political structure for implementing the constitution that was adopted by popular referendum in 1974. A national convention of the UDPM was held in the spring, and legislative elections took place in the summer of 1979. Continuity in the transition from military to civilian rule was provided through the election of Brigadier General Moussa Traore, President of the MCNL as President of the Republic and by the election of six senior military officers to the party's Executive Committee.

(6) President Traore's control over internal politics has been secure. However, Mali's perennial problems of economic stagnation, corruption, and threatened labor unrest persist as overall economic conditions worsened because of drought. In addition, IMF conditions for granting assistance, which requires restricting of state enterprises and massive layoffs in the parastals and government threatens internal stability. Mali was accepted for readmission to the West African Monetary Union (franc zone). This could assist Mali's economic reintegration with its neighbors and make smuggling less attractive. Economic reform was the central topic of a meeting of the National Council of the UDPM in February 1984. President Traore appears to be responsive to Mali's persisting economic problems and has moved toward greater reliance on the private sector in order to curb mounting debt. Discontent within the military over the government's failure to regularly meet military payrolls persists suggesting the possibility of future unrest in the military.

(6) Mali, like other Sahel states, is ethnically divided between northern Arab Berbers and southern blacks. Tuaregs, nomadic desert northerners, resist subordination by the black-dominated central government. Sentiments fueled by fierce repressions during a Tuareg revolt in the early 1960s and continued inequities make the desert peoples vulnerable to external manipulation. The Tuaregs have purportedly been armed by Libya. Military units in northern Mali have been reinforced; however, the harsh terrain there seriously restricts their mobility and, therefore, their capability to contain an uprising.

(6) In defense of the country, the Army has developed a capability for sustained action against a major attack and for effective control of most internal disorders. However, all Malian security forces will remain heavily dependent upon outside sources for military material and training. The Soviet Union is the primary source of military assistance. While the inventory of Soviet equipment is excessive to Mali's legitimate need, Moscow's soft loan repayment provisions along with Traore's political need to appease the military leadership contribute to Mali's continued dependence upon Soviet military aid. The Soviets have completed work in extending the runway at Mopti Barbe. They

1 15 October 1984
Mali are continuing work at Bamako Ville and on improvements at the airport at Gao.
The scheduled improvements for San, Tombouctou, and Sikasso Airfields have not
yet begun. These improvements, especially in the case of Mopti Barbe Airfield,
exceed Malian needs. They most likely have been undertaken with the aim of
providing the Soviets with at least one versatile advance airfield in support of
any Soviet operations in Western or possibly Southern Africa. Currently, there
are no reports to indicate whether the Soviets have received access rights to any
of these fields. Yet, because of the heavy dependence upon Soviet military aid,
it is very likely that Mali will accede to Soviet requests for the use of these
facilities.

Mali's relations with its neighbors improved during 1983. The threat of
armed conflict with Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta) over disputed border
areas is currently diminished following an agreement to submit the case for
arbitration before the World Court at the Hague. The longstanding border dispute
had led to minor armed confrontation between the two countries in 1974 and
Burkina's earlier insistence that it would block Mali's readmission into the
franc zone resulted in tensions. President Thomas Sankara's offer to support
Mali's reentry and seek a peaceful resolution has led to good current relations
between Mali and Burkina Faso. However, if the World Court finds against Mali,
its leadership may decide to put discontented soldiers and its arsenal of Soviet
applied equipment into the field against its neighbor.

Despite extensive Soviet aid, the USSR and Mali have experienced
relatively tense relations over the years. The quality of Soviet military
assistance has not been met with much satisfaction among some members of the
military leadership. Some of these officials have openly expressed their
disapproval of the Malian-Soviet relationship. They are suspicious of the Soviet
presence in and intentions toward Mali and other states in the West African
region. However, many of the younger military officers who have received
extensive training in the USSR harbor pro-Soviet views. In the event of a
military coup or the eventual rise to senior positions by these officers, Mali
could well become more cooperative with goals in West Africa.

Relations with the West are cordial, and may improve as far as the
economic sector is concerned. The French and Japanese are currently engaged in
oil and uranium exploration efforts in the eastern part of the country.
Relations between the US and Mali are correct. The US is playing a key role in
helping the Malians get through their current drought crisis by giving them large
quantities of Public Law 480 food supplies. The US may even play a limited role
in military assistance in the future. Such assistance would include English
language training and basic officer courses.

2. Key Officials:
President, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, Minister of Defense, and
Director of Security Services: Brig Gen Moussa Traore
Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation:
Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye
Armed Forces: Chief of Staff, Col Abdoulaye Ouologuem
Mali

Army: Chief of Staff, Lt Col Koke Dembele  
Air Force: Commander, Lt Col Mamadou Coulibaly  
Gendarmerie: Chief of Staff, Col Mahamadou Keita  
Republican Guard: Commander, Lt Col Amara Danfaga

3. (U) Military Budget: $28.5 million for fiscal year ending 31 December 1982 (latest available); this is 23 percent of the central government budget. No service allocation is available. Dollar value converted from Malian francs at the exchange rate of 675 francs equal $1.00.

4. (U) Population: 7,562,000 (estimated) as of 1 July 1984  
Males (ages 15-49): 1,654,000; physically fit, 835,000  
Literacy: 10 percent

5. (U) Army:  
Personnel Strength: 7,500 (No breakout available)  
Reserve: Although no organized reserve system exists, authorities probably can identify veterans of French service now in civilian status in Mali.  
Major units: 4 inf bns, 1 prcht bn, 1 tank gp, 1 special bn, 1 Sahelian bn, 1 engr bn, 1 mixed arty gp, 1 SA-3 missile btry, and several service units located in Bamako.  
Major Equipment: Armor: 20 T-34 tanks, 20 Type 62 tanks (Chinese), 30 PT-76s lgt tanks, 15 BTR-40 APCs, 14 BTR-50 APCs, 30 BTR-60 APCs, 154 BTR-152 APCs, 128 BRDM-2 armored cars, 21 amphibious APCs; Artillery: 8 122-mm guns (D-30)  
16 100-mm, 19 105-mm, 25 85-mm, 33 37-mm AD, 27 57-mm AT, 6 132-mm truck-mounted rocket launchers, 6 122-mm multiple rocket launchers, 30 SA-3 surface-to-air missiles. These are the large items of equipment known to be in the inventory. The Soviet Union has delivered additional quantities of arms that cannot be individually indentified, but which probably include additional tanks, APCs, truck-mounted rocket launchers, other vehicles, and artillery.

6. (U) Navy: None

7. (U) Air Force:  
Personnel Strength: 400 officers and men  
Reserve: None  
Units: 3 squadrons (1 transport, 1 fighter, 1 maintenance)  
Aircraft: 47 (21 fighter, 3 trainer, 15 transport, 1 fighter/trainer, 7 helicopters)

8. (U) Paramilitary:  
a. Gendarmerie  
Personnel Strength: 2,000 (30 officers)  
Units: 7 companies, no major equipment  
b. Republican Guard  
Personnel Strength: 2,000
Mali

Units: 1 central co, 1 prison det, small units stationed in the largest population centers, and 9 desert scout dets of 20 to 50 men. Additionally, there is a 700-man police force, and a corps of 720 Nomad Security Guards (GOUMS) that would serve in the event of hostilities as local defense and rear area security forces. There is no major equipment.

c. National Police
Personnel Strength: 1,000

9. (U) Key US Officials:
Chief of Mission (Bamako): Ambassador Robert J. Ryan, Jr.

10. Foreign Military Presence:
Soviet: Estimated at 125. While the exact distribution of Soviet personnel is unknown, their roles probably include pilot training and aircraft maintenance assistance to the Air Force; artillery, engineer, and airfield construction assistance; and parachute and language training for the Army. In May 1977, a Soviet language school for Army personnel was established at Kati, and 40 artillery personnel went to the USSR for rocket and guided missile training. A base camp at Mopti Barbe Airfield houses Soviets who are involved in airfield expansion construction. Additionally, there is a seven-man West German Advisory Team providing advanced armor training in operations, logistics, and maintenance. Foreign military attaches in Mali: Algerian, French, West German, and Soviet.
Withheld pursuant to exemption
(b)(3) 10 USC 424
of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
SECRET

MAURITANIA

1. (U) Political-Military Situation: In July 1978, 13 of Mauritania's 18 field grade military officers led a bloodless coup that toppled the 18-year regime of President Moktar Ould Daddah. The coup was precipitated by the Government's deteriorating military posture in the Western Sahara conflict. Presidential criticism of senior military commanders and a bankrupt economy were also contributing factors. The coup leaders dissolved all democratic institutions of government, suspended the constitution, and established an 18-member Military Committee of National Recovery (CMRN). The Committee was subsequently renamed the Military Committee for National Salvation (CMSN).

(U) Domestic politics and external relations have been closely tied to Mauritania's role in the Western Sahara conflict. In 1975, Mauritania joined Morocco in extending claims to the former Spanish Sahara (Nouakchott claimed the southern third), but their joint action was contested militarily by the POLISARIO Front.* Guerrilla attacks in northern Mauritania—the main avenue of approach by the guerrillas to the disputed territory—forced the Government to conclude a mutual defense treaty with Rabat in 1977, brought more than 8,000 Moroccan troops to Mauritanian soil, and contributed to the downfall of the Ould Daddah regime.

(U) After the coup, the CMSN, split into two factions—leftist pro-Algerians who supported reconciliation with the POLISARIO on the one hand, and pro-Moroccan members who opposed what they perceived to be a policy of peace at any price, on the other. The pro-Algerian faction gradually increased its power. A cease-fire was declared in July 1978, and a separate peace accord with the POLISARIO was signed in August 1979. In the peace agreement, Mauritania relinquished all claims to sovereignty in the Western Sahara and withdrew all troops from the territory. After applying increasing pressure, Mauritania gained the complete withdrawal of Moroccan troops from Mauritania in December 1979. Since that time, Mauritania has claimed neutrality in the war between Morocco and the POLISARIO.

(U) Mauritanian Chief of State, Lt Col Mohamed Haidalla, unexpectedly announced on 12 December 1980 that a civilian prime minister would be appointed and a civilian government formed. The CMSN announced the implementation of the new civilian government and the appointment of Sid Ahmed Ould Bneijara as Prime Minister on 15 December 1980. Bneijara was Director General of the Central Bank under Daddah, and along with the military, helped plan the coup that toppled the former President's regime. He was known to have pro-Algerian and pro-Libyan sentiments. On 16 March 1981, pro-Moroccan Mauritanian Army units attacked the Presidential Palace in Nouakchott in an unsuccessful attempt to seize power. As a result of the strong suspicion that Morocco was behind the coup attempt, Algeria and to a lesser extent Libya, began shipping significant amounts of military hardware to Mauritania. Bneijara, however, was eventually fired because of Haidalla's fear of too much Libyan influence in the aftermath of the failed coup. Bneijara's dismissal ended progress toward civilian rule. There are no plans at the present time to reinitiate a process toward civilian rule.

* The Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio d'Oro (POLISARIO Front) is the Algerian and Libyan supported guerrilla movement that is seeking independence for the Western Sahara, also known as the Sahraouri Democratic Arab Republic (SDAR).

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The relatively unstable military government survived another coup attempt on 6 February 1982. One of the leading perpetrators was Bneijara, suggesting some form of Algerian or Libyan complicity. It is possible that the major backers of the POLISARIO would prefer a more pro-POLISARIO government in Nouakchott. Mauritania recognized the POLISARIO in February 1984 creating serious divisions within the fragile political fabric. The likelihood of another coup in the near term cannot be ruled out.

Internal political stability in Mauritania is not always affected by outside forces. The country's racial issue is a major concern of the Government. The northern based Moors are divided between Arab-Berbers (whites) and black serfs and former slaves. The country's military, political, and business sectors are dominated by white Moor elites. Southern blacks, the other major group, are primarily farmers and laborers; approximately two-thirds of the Mauritanian military in enlisted ranks are southern blacks. The poor state of the economy has had a far greater negative impact on blacks, and social inequities have led to strong resentments by blacks toward the Moor elites. Haidalla, a white Moor, has attempted to achieve a greater racial balance and has brought more blacks into leadership positions in the Government and the military. However, underlying tensions remain from past discrimination. Currently, racial problems in Mauritania have been somewhat stabilized but are far from being totally resolved.

Although no longer a direct military threat to Mauritania due to that country's unilateral withdrawal from the Sahara War, the POLISARIO Front still poses an indirect threat politically. The POLISARIO maintains a force of approximately 5,000 heavily armed insurgents.* At present, the delicate racial balance of Mauritania is such that the blacks would never permit the Sahraouri** to become partners in a future federation or other power-sharing arrangement with the Mauritanian Government. The rumors of black Mauritanian POWs being murdered by their POLISARIO captors during the war continue to retain credibility throughout the black population.

Already tense relations with Morocco deteriorated further following Mauritania's recognition of the POLISARIO. However, direct Moroccan military actions against Mauritanian forces are considered unlikely. Mauritania has not objected strenuously to Morocco's extension of its defensive berm into Mauritania that took place in late 1983 and early 1984. However, the likelihood of Moroccan air and/or ground attacks against the POLISARIO in northern Mauritania is very high. The Mauritanian Army attempts to patrol this area, but it has

* This figure may be as low as 3,000 actual combatants because the POLISARIO have suffered mass desertions, primarily the non-Sahraouri conscripts from Mali and Mauritania. Some POLISARIO units are armed with conventional armor and artillery.

** Sahraouri is the name of the indigenous population of the Western Sahara, who make up most of the POLISARIO ranks. They are an Arabic ethnic group similar to the Moors in Mauritania. Many of the Sahraouri are related through marriage or family ties to the Mauritanian Moors.
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insufficient men and equipment to secure this isolated area roughly the size of Kansas. The Mauritanian Army would not be a match for the POLISARIO, a force that has proven itself capable of concealment, evasion, and hard desert fighting. Morocco suspects Mauritania of complicity in the POLISARIO cause. Rabat feels that the POLISARIO SA-6 SAM unit responsible for the loss of three Moroccan aircraft in the fall of 1981 was transported through Northern Mauritania with the knowledge and consent of the CMSN. The Route du Mauritania is part of the road leading from Tindouf, Algeria, a major POLISARIO base, which continues south through Bir Mogrein in Mauritania, and on into the Western Sahara. Although Mauritanian complicity is unproven, recent evidence shows that the POLISARIO is using northern Mauritania as a sanctuary.

Relations with Algeria are good. There is a joint defense agreement between the two countries that was initiated following the March 1981 coup attempt. In the event of a Moroccan attack against northern Mauritania, Algeria has agreed to assist in the latter's defense. Algeria could intervene in Mauritania to maintain a regime supporting its interests.

Relations with the West have been subject to constant change. During the latter part of 1982, the government-controlled press was noticeably anti-American, but by the end of the year, the government began warming up again to the United States. Mauritania may be responding to radical Arab government pressures, possibly in hopes of increased aid, or the certainty of continuing levels of aid.

The political alignment of Mauritania has shifted during recent years. At one time, the CMSN was aligned with the conservative Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, and later with the more radical states. Mauritania has not closed its doors to any possible donor of military assistance. France and Spain have been the traditional donors and will continue to assist in a lesser role. The United States has been approached by Nouakchott to provide some training. At present though, it appears that Algeria and Egypt, as well as a number of other Arab and African states, are the major donors of military aid. Libya, in providing some military aid, has made attempts to increase its influence in Mauritania. The Mauritanian Government does include pro-Libyan members who could gain power in any future coup d'etat.

In a national emergency, Mauritania would have to rely heavily upon outside assistance. Currently, any immediate foreign military aid probably would originate from Algeria. Mauritania requested Algerian assistance following an unsuccessful coup attempt against the Nouakchott Government in March 1981. Algeria, and to a lesser extent Libya, responded by flying over 40 sorties to Mauritania and delivering close to 1,500 tons of equipment. This aid included trucks, 37-mm ADA, SA-7s, and small arms (AK-47s). The SA-7s and small arms are believed to have fallen into the hands of the POLISARIO.

The Mauritanian Army has the mission of defending the borders and in maintaining internal order. Yet, with aging equipment and a paucity of spare parts and qualified personnel, the Army is severely restricted in the performance of its mission. The vast, harsh terrain is a further obstacle, as many roads are
impassable due to frequent sand storms. Troops were redeployed to the Western Sahara frontier in response to construction of the Moroccan Berm. Most troops are located in the northwestern part of the country along the Mauritanian-Western Saharan frontier. Approximately 30 Companies are located in Bir Morgen, Zouirat, and Nouadhibou with the remainder of the armed forces located sparingly in southern and western Mauritania. There are no units located on the eastern border with Mali and on the northeastern border with Algeria.

2. (U) Key Officials:
President of the Committee for National Salvation and Chief of State: LtCol Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla
Prime Minister and Minister of Defense: LtCol Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla
Minister of Interior: LtCol Abdoulaye Yall
Armed Forces Chief of Staff: Col Maaowya Ould Sid'ahmed Taya
Permanent Secretary of CMSN: Mohamed Ould Amar
Army, Chief of Staff: LtCol Abdoulaye Alassane Yall
Navy, Chief of State (Interim): Maj Mohamed Ould Sidi Ahmed Lakhal
Air Force, Chief of Staff: Capt Ain Sidi Be
Director, Gendarmerie: Capt Mohammed Lemine Ould Zeine
Inspector, National Guard: Capt Ahmed Ould Aida
Director, Surete Nationale: Commissaire Ahmedou Ould Meicheine
Director, National Police: Captain Jeddou Ould Haki

3. (U) Military Budget: $39.4 million for fiscal year ending 31 December 1983; this is 17 percent of the central government budget or 4 percent of GDP. No service allocation is available. Dollar values converted from Mauritanian ouguiya at the exchange rate of 55 ouguiyas equal $1.00.

4. (U) Population: 1,623,000 as of 1 Jul 1984
Males (ages 15-49): 355,000; physically fit, 172,000
Ethnic Divisions: Nearly one-third Arab-Berber Moor, at least one-third Negro, one-third mixed Moor and Negro.
Literacy: 17 percent

5. Army: Personnel Strength: 8,300 (250 officers, 1,100 NCOs, 6,950 EM)
Reserve: None
Major Units: Defense forces are deployed in numbered regions*. The Army units are frequently reinforced by paramilitary units. The regional headquarters are located at: Region I - Nouadhibou; Region II - Zouirat; Region III - Atar; Region V - Nema; Region VI - Nouakchott; Region VII - Rosso.
Types of Tactical Units: The Army is divided into a series of units no larger than a company. This is because the Army is so small and the territory to defend is so large. Several companies reporting directly to regional headquarters is considered the best way for the Mauritanian Army to perform its mission. Included among these units are infantry companies, armored car troops, and artillery batteries. There is, however, one small autonomous infantry battalion stationed in Nouakchott.

* The former Region IV - Tidjikdja, no longer exists. There are currently no plans to reinstate it.
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Methods of Unit Identification: Most of the units have numerical designations such as the 1st and 2d Infantry Companies. Other units are known by their function such as the Air Defense Battery and Commando Company. There are still a number of unidentified units that are operational even though Mauritania has been out of the war in neighboring Western Sahara for over 3 years. There is no known plan to demobilize these units.

Major Equipment: The Mauritanian Army has approximately 65 French Panhard armored cars, 12 105-mm howitzers (US), 100 mortars (French/US), 47 recoilless rifles, 26 23-mm AAA, 16 122-mm D-30 howitzers, and 15 122-mm D-74 field guns. Mauritania also has in excess of 600 Land Rovers some of which are armed with either 50-caliber machineguns or 37-mm recoilless rifles.

6. Navy:
Personnel Strength: 320 (no breakout available)
Reserve: None
Ships: 8 vessels: 4 patrol boats (PB), 2 patrol combatants (PC), 1 amphibious warfare craft (GCM), and 1 coastal patrol craft (PCF). The Navy has the mission of coastal patrol and protection of Mauritania's territorial fishing waters. Naval capabilities to effectively patrol its 200-mile maritime economic zone were dramatically curtailed when French forces left Mauritania in 1980.

7. Air Force:
Personnel Strength: 150 (no breakout available)
Reserve: None
Aircraft: 11 transport and utility aircraft in 1 unit (1 DHC-5D Buffalo, 2 Skyvans, 6 Norman Defenders, and 2 Cessna 337Cs). Defenders are armed with 10 Sura ASMs on each pylon. Total weapon load of 2,300 lbs with sideways-firing machineguns. All are based at Nouakchott. The Air Force is ineffective because of poor maintenance, aging aircraft, and lack of spare parts.

8. Paramilitary: Total Force Strength: 6,970
   a. Gendarmerie
   Personnel Strength: 2,200 (10 officers, 205 NCOs, 1,935 constables)
   Reserve: None
   Units: Six territorial companies, 12 combat squadrons, and a Gendarmerie school. The Gendarmerie is responsible for maintaining internal security in the urban areas.
   Major Equipment: None
   b. National Guard
   Personnel Strength: 3,000 (25 officers, 205 NCOs, 2,770 EM)
   Units: Eight intervention groups. The National Guard is responsible for internal security, primarily in the rural areas.
   c. National Police
   Personnel Strength: 1,700. The mission of the National Police is basic law enforcement.
   d. Other: Nomad Security Guard (GOUMS).
   Personnel Strength: 70
   Units: A camel-mounted nomad auxiliary unit used for surveillance operations along the border.
Major Equipment: None

9. (U) Key US Officials:

Ambassador: Edward L. Peck

10. Foreign Military Presence:
French Advisers: 33
Algerian Advisers: 10-20
Withheld pursuant to exemption
(b)(3) 10 USC 424
of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
1. (U) Political-Military Situation: Mauritius is an Indian Ocean Island nation lying 450 miles to the east of Madagascar, 400 miles south of the Seychelles, and 1,000 miles southwest of Diego Garcia. The nation also includes the island of Rodrigues, situated some approximately 370 miles to the east of Mauritius and two tiny dependencies situated to the north of Mauritius, which are virtually unpopulated: the Agalega Islands and the Cargados Carajos Shoals. Mauritius is one of the few developing countries that has maintained its democratic institutions. It has maintained its democracy for 16 years despite factors such as severe overpopulation (more than one million people crowded into 720 square miles), racial and ethnic tensions, and extremely high unemployment.

(U) Mauritius has had a parliamentary democracy since gaining independence from Great Britain in 1968. The constitution, which guarantees the fundamental rights and freedoms of the people, calls for a parliament comprised of the governor-general, representing the British Monarch as titular head of state, and a Legislative Assembly elected from 23 member constituencies and one 2-member district on Rodrigues. In addition, eight assembly seats are apportioned to the "best losers" among the unreturned candidates, according to their ethnic affiliation--two each for the Hindus, Muslims, Chinese, and the "general population." The assembly is responsible for all legislation and appropriations and may amend the Constitution by either a two-thirds or a three-quarters majority, depending on the part of the Constitution in question.

(U) The rights and duties of the governor general--appointing a prime minister and a leader of the opposition, approving legislation, dissolving the assembly, and declaring states of war or emergency--are closely circumscribed by law and convention. The real seat of executive power is in the cabinet. The prime minister, appointed from the ruling party or coalition, may appoint a maximum of 20 ministers in addition to the attorney general, who also has cabinet rank.

(U) Following an economic boom in 1974-75, Mauritius entered into a period marked by the deceleration of gross domestic product, a decline in exports especially resulting from a drop in sugar production, and a rapid deterioration in balance of payments. To remedy the situation, austere economic policies were adopted beginning in late 1979 and most recently strengthened in 1982 to include: exchange rate devaluations; restraints on wage rates; increases in retail prices of imported foodgrains and vegetable oil; budgetary restraint; increases in domestic interest rates; a successful family planning program; and the encouragement of private enterprise development along labor-intensive, export-LED lines. As a result of these steps, Mauritius is considered one of the model Third World countries for its compliance with World Bank and IMF Programs.

(U) The final arbiters of that country's politics are religious affiliations, communal interests, and caste prejudice, rather than economic pragmatism. In June 1982, the Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM)/Mauritian Socialist Party (PSM) coalition won a landslide victory, ousting the Labor Party of Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, who had been Prime Minister since the country's independence in 1968. Anerood Jugnauth, President of the MMM, became Prime Minister, and Harish Boodhoo, leader of the PSM, became Deputy Prime Minister. Paul Berenger, founder and real-leader of the MMM, became Minister of
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Finance—the key portfolio in the government. Since that time, the Government has been in a constant state of turmoil due to personal and political infighting, ethnic and religious tensions, and a deteriorating economy.

(U) The MMM/PSM coalition failed to fulfill its pre-election pledges concerning the economy. The stability of the coalition centered principally around the personal and political differences between Boodhoo, part of the country's Hindu majority, and Berenger, the son of a middle-class, union oriented native French family. Despite his socialist credentials, Berenger instituted economic reforms benefiting the native French-owned sugar industry to fulfill IMF loan requirements rather than instituting socioeconomic reforms benefiting the Indian trade unions and lower classes. This policy rendered him unacceptable to the country's Hindu majority. As a result, after 6 months in office, Berenger was forced to resign. The coalition split, Jugnauth adjourned parliament and formed an Alliance against Berenger that comprised his newly established Mauritian Socialist Movement (MMM), Harish Boodhoo's PSM, Ramgoolam's Labor Party, and current Deputy Prime Minister Gaetan Duval's Mauritian Social Democratic Party (PMSD). In August 1983, Jugnauth called again for elections. The Alliance Party, pitted against the MMM, received 41 seats to Berenger's 19, in the 70 seat parliament. Jugnauth's victory was hailed as a triumph of the non-white poor over the elite whites.

(U) To date, Jugnauth, has benefited from the electorate's dislike of the religious/communal divides that arose during the controversy concerning the sugar industry while Berenger was Minister of Finance. Paradoxically, he is now falling into the same trap as Berenger in seeking external assistance to alleviate the country's economic problems while soothing the popular nationalism. Unemployment is rising; the all-important sugar industry, which provides 70 percent of the national economic output, has an even bleaker future; and the national economic output has stagnated. The current coalition could split again in the coming months. The Labor Party portion of the coalition, in an effort to survive as a single party, has begun a campaign against overall government policy. As a result, its current leader, Satcom Boolell was fired as Jugnauth's Minister of Planning and Development in February 1984 causing the third government crisis in less than a year and a half. The working classes and trade unions, without whose vote Jugnauth could not survive, sense their interests are under attack and have turned their allegiance to the Labor Party as well as Paul Berenger's MMM, which espouses the Communist doctrine and is pro-Soviet.

(U) In spite of popular opposition to former government policies, Jugnauth's new Alliance emphasizes many of the same policies as the PSM/MMM coalition. It defines its foreign and national stands as "pragmatic" to foster close relations with those countries which help Mauritius the most in overcoming its economic difficulties. The Government continues to woo Western capital and investment, and the 1983-84 budget has been geared toward this end. Jugnauth has been trying to promote an "Export Processing Zone" in the Far East (Japan and Taiwan) and South Africa, which will offer fiscal benefits to foreign investors and create jobs on the national front. However, many Mauritians oppose involvement with South Africa because of that country's apartheid policies.
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Prime Minister Jugnauth, since leading his new government into power in August 1983, has made a concerted effort to move Mauritius to a more openly pro-Western (though still nonaligned) stance in its foreign policy. In the OAU, Mauritius was recently instrumental in producing the final moderate OAU resolution on the Southern Africa negotiations. In January 1984, all Libyan diplomats were expelled for meddling in internal Mauritian affairs. Jugnauth has refused to let the Cubans establish an embassy and maintains a cool relationship with the USSR. Mauritius welcomes visits of US Navy vessels to Port Louis Harbor, notwithstanding the fact that Mauritius claims sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago (which includes the US Naval Support Facility on Diego Garcia).

Despite their unwillingness and/or inability to furnish any significant economic assistance to Mauritius, the Soviets have made a major but unsuccessful effort to cultivate political influence with Prime Minister Anerood Jugnauth over the past year. Unfulfilled Soviet promises of financial support for Jugnauth in his intraparty power struggle and later electoral campaign against Berenger, as well as Jugnauth's perception that the Soviets were assisting Berenger's MMM, have led Jugnauth to ignore Soviet overtures. During Jugnauth's December 1982 trip to Moscow, the Soviets did make an offer of two coastal patrol boats, but Jugnauth's cabinet colleagues considered the acceptance of this offer impractical. Meanwhile, the Soviets pressed for an Air Service Agreement which would allow for Aeroflot service to Mauritius and urged the conclusion of a bilateral fishing agreement. These initiatives were being considered by the Mauritian Government until Jugnauth received information that the Soviets were supporting the opposition MMM. Jugnauth's anger with the Soviets culminated with his public refusal after the election to receive Soviet Ambassador Pankov just prior to the latter's previously scheduled annual vacation. Although Pankov has still not returned to Mauritius, emotions appear to have calmed somewhat. Jugnauth recently decided to "test" Soviet willingness to assist Mauritius by asking for a small cargo ship in place of the Soviet offer of two coastal patrol boats. The Soviets will probably not fulfill this request. However, a 1961 Soviet-Mauritius Fisheries Agreement, renegotiated in 1978 allows the Soviets the use of harbor facilities at Mauritius' primary port, Port Louis (BE 1280-00059, CAT 47400, 20-09-225 057-29-37E), and also grants them aircraft landing rights to support trawler operations. The Soviet Union, however, has not provided much assistance to Mauritius in developing the country's own fishing industry.

The only economic assistance projects financed by a Communist country during 1983 included a PRC agricultural assistance program, which focused on rice and citrus growing efforts, and a project to modernize the Mauritian international airport at Plaisance, which began in June 1983 after Jugnauth's official visit to China. The project involves a long-term interest-free loan of 13.5 million pounds sterling (about USD 22 million) and technical assistance from a visiting team of five Chinese engineers.

There are no military assistance agreements or military alliances between Mauritius and any Communist country.
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There is no external or internal military threat to Mauritius. However, Mauritius could face serious social upheaval unless solutions are soon found for serious economic and unemployment problems.

A paramilitary Special Mobile Force (SMF), a Police Riot Unit (PRU), and a general duty police force compose the only Mauritian security forces. Mauritius has no military equipment production capability and has received small amounts of military equipment from Free World countries—France, the UK, and India. French assistance has been the provision of APCs, light weapons, training, and technical support. All of the assistance from all suppliers has been grant aid. Most foreign assistance is for training rather than equipment.

In addition to these forces, a 130-man National Intelligence Unit (NIU) is tasked to collect information on subversion within the country. Other duties assigned to the NIU include monitoring the Soviet Embassy. The NIU is armed with small arms and is now undergoing weapons training with the Special Mobile Force (SMF).

The Mauritian Police Force and its paramilitary component are adequate at present to meet the potential threat to internal stability. As long as the security forces remain loyal, there is no group on the island capable of seizing power.

2. (U) Key Officials:
Prime Minister, Minister of Defense and Internal Security, Minister of Information, Minister of Administrative Reform, Minister of External Communications, Minister of Reform Institutions: Aneerood Jugnauth
Deputy Prime Minister, Attorney General and Minister of Justice: Sir Gaetan Duval
Minister of Finance: Seetanah ("Mishnu") Lutchmeenaraidoo
Minister of External Affairs, Tourism, and Emigration: Anil Kumarsingh Gayan
Commissioner of Police: B. Juggernaught
Special Mobile Force Commander: Col Dunputhlall Bhima
Special Mobile Wing Commander: Lt Col Raj Dyall

3. (U) Military Budget: $4.5 million for fiscal year ending 30 June 1983 (latest available); this is 2.9 percent of the central government budget. (Special Mobile Force $4,149,820; Police, $393,714). Dollar values converted at an exchange rate of 11.091 rupees equal $1.00.

4. (U) Population: 1,018,000 estimated as of July 1984
Males (ages 15-49): 271,000; 142,000 fit for military service
Ethnic Divisions: 67 percent Indians, 29 percent Creoles, 3.5 percent Chinese, 0.5 percent English and French
Literacy: Estimated 60 percent for those over 21 years and 90 percent for those of school age.

5. (U) Army: None. See para. 8.a.

6. (C/WD) Navy: Mauritius does not have a Navy. The Amar, an ex-Indian Abhay Class large patrol craft is assigned to the police force and tasked with search.
and rescue and transport for the SMF. The crew of the craft is composed of men from the police force and three Indian naval officers (the commanding officer, executive officer, and navigation officer) and four Indian enlisted personnel. Training for the Mauritian crew was provided by the Indian Navy. In 1981 the craft underwent overhaul in India and returned to Mauritius. The vessel regularly goes to Platte Island to conduct military exercises with a group of SMF personnel.

The Mauritius Merchant Marine consists of four ships of over 1,000 gross register tons (GRT). Types include three breakbulk ships and passenger/cargo ships with a total deadweight tonnage (lift capacity) of 40,200 tons of cargo. All ships are over 10 years old.

7. (U) Air Force: None. The Special Mobile Force of the Police has a Helicopter Branch equipped with two SA-315B Allouette III helicopters, only one of which is operational.

8. (U) Paramilitary Forces:
   a. Special Mobile Force (SMF)
   Personnel Strength: 700
   Major Units: One headquarters company, three rifle companies, one engineering squadron, and a mobile wing comprised of two squadrons. The well-trained SMF is capable of performing its mission of maintaining internal stability. SMF training has included antiterrorist tactics. Its operational readiness has been steadily declining due to a lack of spare parts for vehicles.
   Major Equipment: 11 VAB APCs (one VAB-PC command vehicle, eight troop transport VAB-VTTs, two VCS TC 120s with 20-mm cannons), several Land Rovers, two 81-mm mortars, numerous assorted trucks, and a variety of small arms (FN and G-3 rifles, and 20 LAAI Bren light machineguns).
   b. Police Riot Units (PRU)
   Personnel Strength: 240
   Units: There are four PRUs; each contains four baton sections and a rifle section.
   Major Equipment: None  
   c. Other
   4,000-man regular police force (strength includes personnel assigned to PRUs) is capable of helping the paramilitary forces to perform their internal security mission. The Group D'Intervention De La Police Mauricienne (GIPM) is a well-disciplined commando unit comprising approximately 20 select officers and enlisted men from the Mauritian Special Mobile Force (SMF) tasked with a counterintelligence mission. In 1979, the GIPM received training in France to respond to hijacking and/or hostage situations. The counterterrorist group is under the direct control of the Commissioner of Police.

9. (U) Key US Officials:
   Chief of Mission (Port Louis): Ambassador George Roberta Andrews
   [b](3) 50 USC 3024(1)
10. Foreign Military Presence:
   a. Foreign Military In-Country
   India: 9 (7 naval advisers/technicians, maintenance team for antiquated ex-
   Indian patrol craft, 1 adviser to the SMF Helicopter Branch; 1
   adviser to the SMF)
   France: 2 (one adviser and one enlisted technician who maintains APCs purchased
   from France)
   United Kingdom: 1 (engineer and training adviser)

   b. Presence Abroad
   United Kingdom: Unknown (six training slots are made available to SMF each year;
   none known to currently be in UK)
   France: 1-4 (technical training)
   India: 6 (SMF personnel in photography course; paramilitary company
   commanders course; Indian Staff College; medium machinegun
   course; 81-mm mortar course.)
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(Reverse Blank)
1. GOVERNMENT

a. Key Government Officials

President of Mozambique and the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), Minister of National Defense and Commander in Chief of the People's Forces: (Field Marshal) Samora Moises Machel
Chief, FRELIMO's Economic Planning Department: Marcelino Dos Santos
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Joaquim Alberto Chissano
Deputy Minister of Defense and Mozambique Armed Forces (FAM) Chief of Staff: Sebastiao Marcos Habote
Minister of Security: Sergio Vieira
Commandant General, People's Police of Mozambique: Osvaldo Tazama

b. Type and Stability of Government

(U) The constitution adopted after the Portuguese withdrawal from Mozambique in 1975 established the country as a People's Republic with only one officially recognized party, FRELIMO. The head of FRELIMO is also the head of state. Under the Constitution, ultimate power rests with the People's Assembly, which was formed in December 1977. The People's Assembly is composed of the Central and Executive Committees of FRELIMO, the Council of Ministers (Cabinet), the provincial governors, representatives of the Armed Forces, FRELIMO cadre, and other mass organizations chosen by the Central Committee from each province.

At the time of independence, Samora Moises Machel was the President of FRELIMO and thus became the President of the People's Republic of Mozambique as well as the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. Despite the theoretical power of the People's Assembly, President Machel is in complete control of the Government and the Armed Forces. Decisions are made by the President in consultation with an ad hoc group of three to six FRELIMO members from a small inner group of party confidants.

When FRELIMO took over the Government, very little of the country was under its control. As a result, Machel perceived that it was necessary to build a national organization, overcome regional and ethnic rivalries, revitalize the economy, and set the country on a socialist course. Government control over all aspects of national life has gradually intensified, particularly in urban areas and those rural parts of Mozambique where FRELIMO did not operate or draw support during the war against the Portuguese. Machel has incorporated the experience of the Soviet, Chinese, and Tanzanian political and economic systems into his rule, but this has not revived the economy. Rather, he has left himself open for attack from many sides and has failed to rally popular support throughout the country.

The major consequence of Machel's failure has been the increasing popularity of the insurgent National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO). Lacking any real political ideology, RENAMO is composed of a diverse segment of Mozambican society unified by its dislike of Machel and Marxism. Though limited to the nonurban areas and largely dependent on South Africa for military aid,
RENAMO emerged as a real threat to the stability of Machel's government during 1982 and 1983. A series of negotiations between Mozambique and South Africa during late 1983 and early 1984 culminated in the signing of a nonaggression pact in March 1984. The Nkomati Accord, as the agreement is called, pledged the two countries to cease all military support of antigovernment dissident groups. Specifically, South Africa agreed to stop providing aid to RENAMO, to include external bases, training, weapons, and other logistic and operational support, while Mozambique agreed to terminate the same kind of support for the African National Congress (ANC).

RENAMO's failure to develop a political infrastructure has been detrimental to its goal of replacing the Machel government. Its military successes in the field, have, however, aggravated differences between pro-Soviet, pro-Machel, and moderate factions within FRELIMO over the best strategy to deal with RENAMO. The Nkomati Accord has had the effect of further delineating the differences between the moderates in the government, who backed Machel's decision to sign the agreement with South Africa, and the pro-Soviet radicals, who viewed any accommodation with South Africa as a betrayal of Marxist socialist and anti-apartheid principles. In June 1984, Machel implemented a cabinet reshuffle that consolidated his own position and decreased the influence of the radicals on his left. However, in order to show his constituency that the decision to enter into the security agreement with South Africa was correct, Machel is under pressure to show substantive short-term improvement in Mozambique's heretofore deteriorating economic situation. Through mid-1984, a major obstacle to Machel's efforts to rescue the economy was the intensification, despite the cutoff of South African assistance, of RENAMO guerrilla activity directed against the country's economic infrastructure. While the insurgents probably do not have the military wherewithal to actually seize control of the government, they may be able to force Machel to the bargaining table and negotiate for some sort of coalition government.

c. Internal Threat

The RENAMO insurgency is perceived by the Machel government as the major internal threat. During 1982 and 1983, RENAMO rapidly grew in both size and capability, while it steadily expanded its area of operations. Current RENAMO strength is estimated to be 10,000–12,000 personnel. Operating in units of 20 to 1,000, it regularly conducts military operations in all of Mozambique's provinces. Largely confining itself to rural areas, RENAMO has focused on attacking the economic infrastructure of Mozambique. Recently, RENAMO has attacked within several kilometers of the major cities of Nampula, Nacala, and Maputo, the capital. Its military strategy appears aimed at aggravating already endemic weaknesses in Mozambique's political and economic systems in order to force Machel to accept a negotiated settlement. A lack of political strategy, however, has severely limited the organization and, more than the efforts of the FAM, has probably prevented it from becoming a viable alternative to the Machel government.
To cope with RENAMO, in 1982 Machel altered both Mozambique's international political strategy and domestic military strategy. In the military field, Machel decentralized command and control of the FAM to better allow local commanders to conduct counterinsurgency operations. It appears that this strategy has met with a modicum of success. On the international political front, Machel opened Mozambique to the non-Soviet world for the first time since independence. Particular emphasis has gone to securing economic aid from the US, EEC, Scandinavia, and Japan to shore up the crumbling economy. Other states approached for both economic and military aid have included the PRC, North Korea, Yugoslavia, Portugal, Brazil, France, the UK, and the Netherlands. As noted earlier, Mozambique engaged South Africa in negotiations to stop its support of RENAMO in return for an end to anti-South Africa guerrilla operations out of Mozambique. Whether or not the Machel government continues its move away from the Soviets depends upon a number of factors. The Mozambican economy will require considerable Western aid in order to have any chance of survival. At the same time, the FAM must achieve positive results in its attempts to contain RENAMO. Should FRELIMO's military position become untenable, Machel may again be forced to look toward the Soviets as his primary source of support.

The perception of RENAMO by the Machel regime is clearly valid. RENAMO still holds the initiative in the struggle against Machel. It poses a serious threat to government control over large rural areas of the country and is a potential threat to the Machel regime itself. Machel's military position has been further weakened since the Nkomati Accord due to the intensification of RENAMO attacks. RENAMO must rapidly achieve substantive military successes against the government before logistic shortages resulting from the break with South Africa diminish its combat effectiveness.

d. External Threat

With the Zimbabwe settlement in April 1980, the only external threat perceived by the Government of Mozambique came from the Republic of South Africa. Machel continued his support for the liberation of South Africa from minority rule, as he did in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, and as a result he faced the danger of South African retaliation. The South African raids into Maputo and its suburbs against African National Congress (ANC) offices and facilities in January 1981 and May and October 1983 illustrated the inability of the FAM to protect Mozambique from South African forces. The aim of the South African raids was not the downfall of the Machel regime, but they did point out the danger to be faced if Machel continued to support the ANC.

Until March 1984, South Africa indirectly threatened Mozambique by providing military training, equipment, and advisory personnel to RENAMO that permitted its rapid growth. With the cutoff of South African aid in March 1984, RENAMO's effectiveness will likely be somewhat reduced over the long term. Nevertheless, South Africa has the capability of reforming its relationship with RENAMO should the Nkomati Accord break down. Machel is working under this perception and is extremely hesitant to offend South Africa. With the Nkomati Accord in place, Mozambique's formal relationship with South Africa is the best it has been since independence and, as long as Machel continues to deny support
MOZAMBIQUE

to the ANC, South African raids and conventional attacks into Mozambique are extremely unlikely.

South Africa is the only potential external threat to Mozambique, and relations between the two countries are steadily improving. Maputo enjoys fair-to-good relations with its other regional neighbors.

e. Communist Influence

Machel is a self-proclaimed Marxist and has sided consistently with the Soviet Union on international questions. The number of Soviet Bloc advisers in Mozambique is the third highest in Africa, following Ethiopia and Angola. It would be incorrect, however, to view Machel as a Soviet dupe. He has not given the Soviets the basing rights that they have sought and is reported to have warned Zimbabwe's Prime Minister Robert Mugabe to exercise caution in his dealings with the Soviets. There is, however, a pro-Soviet faction within the Mozambican Government led by Marcelino Dos Santos, which would prefer expanded Soviet influence, whatever the cost.

With regard to economic aid and recognition of Mozambique as a socialist nation, the USSR has not been forthcoming. The Soviet Bloc is Mozambique's main supplier of military equipment and exerts a strong influence over the FAM through the large number of Soviet and Cuban advisers in-country. There have been reports, however, of high-level dissatisfaction with the condescending attitude of the advisers and poor quality of the Soviet-provided equipment.

Relations between Mozambique and its Soviet benefactors deteriorated sharply in 1983 and early 1984. Mozambican dissatisfaction with Soviet assistance intensified during the period. Soviet economic aid was insufficient to repair the economy. Despite massive Soviet military assistance, RENAMO continued to make gains against the Mozambican Government. From the Soviet point of view, Machel's negotiations and resulting security accord with South Africa betrayed the Marxist-Leninist and antiapartheid movements in southern Africa. A particularly bitter pill for Moscow to swallow was Machel's termination of support for the Soviet-sponsored ANC. Probably to insure Mozambique's future military dependence upon the USSR, Moscow has continued to deliver large quantities of weapons to Mozambique. However, the weapons reportedly have not been of the type, quantity, or quality desired by Mozambique, and have done little to improve the battlefield situation.

f. Economic Factors

Mozambique's agriculturally based economy is augmented by the food processing and chemical industries. More than 90 percent of Mozambique's population is engaged in subsistence agriculture. However, recent droughts have cut production to one-half of what is needed and the country is dependent upon foreign food aid. In 1981, GNP was $1.8 billion, $140 per capita. Leading exports are sugar, cashew nuts and oil, cotton, tea, and shrimp. However, the ongoing drought and continuing insurgency appear to have stretched the economy to
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its limit. Mozambique's major imports are food; mechanical, electrical, and transport equipment; petroleum; spare parts; and industrial and agricultural raw materials. Leading trading partners are the US, France, Brazil, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and Venezuela.

MOZAMBIQUE has no military equipment production capability. Military equipment is supplied mainly by Communist countries, led by the USSR, with shipments valued at over 800 million since independence. This is about two-thirds of the total value of all deliveries. Other significant suppliers are East Germany and Hungary. Free World suppliers provided material valued at only $14 million during the same time period. Major items provided by the USSR have included jet fighters, transport aircraft, helicopters, patrol boats, tanks, APCs, field artillery, mortars, ADA, small arms, ammunition, trucks, and communications equipment. In 1983, the Soviet Union stepped up deliveries to Mozambique. Deliveries included T-55 tanks, M-8 and M-24 helicopters, and MiG-21 fighters, which were part of a 1979 agreement. Total value of these deliveries was about $240 million. Deliveries in early 1984 included Mi-24 helicopters and MiG-21 fighters.

g. Military and Political Alignment

Mozambique is a member of the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the United Nations (UN), and the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), and has requested full membership in the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA). In the past, the Mozambican Government has supported the Soviet Union and Cuba on almost all global issues. In 1977 Mozambique signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union. Despite its pro-Soviet position, Mozambique continues to deny the Soviets and their allies base rights in Mozambique, although Soviet naval vessels do make periodic port calls at Maputo, Beira, and Nacala. Mozambique is also one of the Front Line States (the others are Angola, Botswana, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) and maintains especially good relations with both Tanzania and Zimbabwe. Mozambique and Zimbabwe have signed a Defense Protocol that has been invoked. Zimbabwe is providing support to the FAN against RENAMO. President Nyerere of Tanzania allowed FRELIMO to operate from Tanzania during the insurgency and sent troops to assist the Machel government in defending Mozambique after independence. The Tanzanian troops remained in Mozambique for nearly 4 years before being withdrawn in late 1980.

A number of foreign military missions now operate inside Mozambique, with Cuba maintaining the largest mission, followed by the Soviet Union. Additionally, there are some Czechoslovak, Tanzanian, PRC, and North Korean military personnel working with the FAN.

At the request of Machel, there are also 2-3,000 Zimbabwe National Army troops deployed inside Mozambique. These forces are providing security for Zimbabwe's vital lines of communication to the sea against attacks by RENAMO.

h. Key US Officials

Chief of Mission (Maputo): Ambassador Peter Jon DeVos
2. MILITARY, GENERAL

a. (U) Key Military Officials

Armed Forces: Commander in Chief of the Mozambique Armed Forces (FAM) and Minister of Defense, Field Marshal Samora Machel; Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff of the FAM, Col Gen Sebastiao Marcos Mabote; Chief of Intelligence/Counterintelligence, Col Lagos Henrique Lidimo
Vice Defense Minister and Political Commissar of the FAM: Maj Gen Armando Alexandre Panguene
Army (Ground Forces): Commander, Maj Gen Joaquim Munhepe
Navy: Commander, Major Manuel Jimo Caetano
Air Force: Commander, Maj Gen Joao Hama Thai
Border Guard: Commander, Maj Gen Tome Eduardo

b. Position of Armed Forces

The Mozambique Armed Forces (FAM), formerly and still popularly known as the Popular Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique (FPLM), consists of the Ground Forces (Army and Border Guard), Naval Command, and Air Force. The 30,000-32,000-man Ground Forces predominate over the fledgling 1,000-man Air Force and the 700-man Navy. The FAM evolved from the military arm of FRELIMO, which had waged a guerrilla war with the Portuguese for 9 years prior to 1974. The strengthening and development of the FAM has been one of the major tasks of the Machel regime since independence.

Since independence, the FAM leadership has played an important role in national-level policy formulation. Military officers completely control the defense structure, view themselves as the military arm of FRELIMO, and generally belong to the moderate faction of the Party. Because of the constant security threats faced by Mozambique since independence, first Rhodesian cross-border raids and now the National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO), the military has consistently been able to claim a major portion of scarce national resources and has been the predominant player, behind Machel, in national councils.

During 1982, the influence of the military below the national level rapidly expanded as the Government sought to cope with the RENAMO threat. A military commander was appointed for each Province and District within the country and counterintelligence officers were assigned down to village level. In many cases, particularly in areas where RENAMO was highly active, the local military commander also assumed all civil responsibilities. Regardless of who is formally in control at the local level, however, the military has first priority for regional resources. This has not endeared the military to the general public, but civic action programs are underway in an effort to recapture popular support.

In recognition of the increasing importance of the military to the survival of his Government, Machel has played up his role as Minister of National Defense, Commander in Chief and Field Marshal, publicly assuming leadership of the fight against RENAMO. Also, he has directed many of FRELIMO's civilian personnel to don military uniforms and sent them to the field to aid local military commanders in administering the struggle against RENAMO.
overlooking the political angle, Machel has also assigned many FRELIMO civilians as local military commissars and beefed up the military commissar program in an effort to insure the loyalty of the troops to FRELIMO.

(U) The mission of the FAM remains to defend the national borders, conduct counterinsurgency operations, and maintain internal security.

The chain of command for the FAM runs from the President, who holds the rank of Field Marshal and is the Minister of Defense, to the Service and Provincial Commanders. Because of the appointment of Provincial Commanders, the role of the Service Commanders has been reduced to mainly administrative and logistics matters. Though not formally in the chain of command, the Deputy Minister of Defense plays a major role in directing military operations.

c. Military Trends and Capabilities

(U) The FAM is incapable of defending Mozambique from the primary external threat, South Africa, and is having little success in conducting counterinsurgency operations against RENAMO. Because of its preoccupation with RENAMO, the FAM would have insufficient resources to meet widespread outbreaks of internal violence at this time.

Perhaps the only strength of the FAM is its growing level of practical experience. Its principal weaknesses are manpower shortfalls, persistent logistic failures, and an ineffective command and control structure.

(U) When the Portuguese turned the administration of Mozambique over to the leaders of FRELIMO in 1975, the military arm of FRELIMO consisted of a loosely disciplined guerrilla force of about 15,000 men under the nominal control of district commanders. They were armed with the light weapons they had used to fight the Portuguese and a small amount of mostly old equipment left behind by the departing colonial forces. One of Machel's first formal acts was to incorporate about 5,000 of the guerrillas into the FPLM.

Steps were taken to provide for the national security, and to overcome the lack of discipline and equipment. The military budget was significantly increased in the early years of independence, reflecting FRELIMO's concern for national security, and attempts were made to recruit from among the black Mozambicans who had served in the Portuguese forces prior to 1975. These troops, believed to number about 40,000, had been trained in conventional and counterinsurgency warfare. The exact degree of success of these recruitment drives is not known, but the FPLM did increase to 12,000-15,000 men by the beginning of 1977.

The acceleration of the Rhodesian conflict in the mid-1970s and the increased cross-border operations by Rhodesian forces against Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) bases in Mozambique accentuated the need for a more capable and larger military establishment. However, the weaponry in use continued to be that which was available at independence. Limited amounts of Soviet equipment began to arrive in 1976. After Mozambique and the Soviet Union signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation on 31 March 1977 and agreed to coordinate their positions with regard to the external security threats (Rhodesia and South
Africa), there was a sharp increase in Soviet arms deliveries. Items such as T-34 tanks, artillery pieces, armored personnel carriers, and a variety of small arms supplemented or replaced the aging equipment left behind by the Portuguese.

In consideration of the conventional threat from Rhodesia and the perceived potential for a similar threat from South Africa, the Soviets in 1977 began a program to convert the FPLM from an essentially guerrilla force into a combined-arms, conventional force along Soviet lines. Their program included the establishment of a complete range of basic and advanced training schools covering the full spectrum of military subjects; the organization of an FAM General Staff; and the establishment of three major regional commands to control the operations of all combat forces. An eight-brigade structure of the Ground Forces was at the center of the Soviet program, with each brigade organized as a combined-arms unit having motorized infantry, armor, artillery, and air defense artillery under one commander. To operate this program, large numbers of Soviet and Cuban military advisers were sent to Mozambique. Though mainly involved in training functions, these advisory personnel have provided detailed planning guidance from the General Staff to the battalion level, and have functioned as maintenance personnel for the more sophisticated items of military equipment.

In 1979 the Soviet advisers also assisted in the formation of four border guard brigades. These units were originally intended to counter the threat of Rhodesian raids, but with the continuing RENAMO conflagration the units have taken on a broader counterinsurgency role.

With the end of the Rhodesian conflict in December 1979, the FAM looked forward to a period of peace and consolidation. An indication that the Ground Forces structure had reached its planned size was a downturn in Soviet ground equipment deliveries in 1980 and 1981. By mid-1980, however, the FAM would be trying to cope with the growing RENAMO insurgency. Much to the dismay of the Mozambican military and civilian leadership, the lumbering, conventional FAM proved inadequate for the demands of counterinsurgency warfare. Chasing RENAMO through the bush strained the FAM operational and logistic structure to the breaking point, while RENAMO's successful attacks against economic targets weakened the base upon which the FAM drew support. Its constant losses to RENAMO demoralized the force and led to serious personnel and logistics problems. Much to its credit, however, the FAM continued to take the field against RENAMO and suffered no major defeats.

By early 1982, Machel decided to decentralize the FAM, going back to the old FPLM structure of District and Provincial commands and employing smaller-size military units to carry out search and destroy missions. He also secured fresh shipments of arms and ammunition, mainly from the Soviet Bloc, to replenish the FAM. Additionally, a militia was organized to provide local security.

In 1983, the FAM placed an increased priority in the development of units tailored to fight the guerrilla insurgents. A number of "special" counterinsurgency units were formed and committed to the battlefield. The FAM was better able to support these units through improved intelligence collection and analysis. Despite some limited battlefield successes against RENAMO in the
southern part of the country in late 1983 and early 1984, the FAM has remained unable to turn the tide of the war decisively in favor of the government. RENAMO's areas of operation have continued to expand. Severe personnel, logistic, and command and control shortcomings have largely prevented the FAM from taking advantage of improvements in the conduct of tactical operations.

(3/4) During 1978 the Soviets began developing an air force to complement the ground force structure. Between 1978 and 1981 a small number of helicopters, transport aircraft, and ground attack jet fighters and trainers were provided to Mozambique by the Soviet Union and East Germany. During 1983 and early 1984, the capabilities of the Air Force were significantly upgraded with the deliveries of sophisticated aircraft to include MiG-21/FISHBED jet fighters, AN-26/CURL transports, Mi-8/HIP transport helicopters, and Mi-24/HIND attack helicopters. Unlike the Ground Forces, most training for the Air Force has been conducted in Eastern Europe and the USSR, though Soviet advisers provide on-the-ground technical support inside Mozambique. The Soviets apparently plan to continue expanding this force. Progress is, however, quite slow due to a lack of trained Mozambican pilot personnel.

d. Military Budget

(U) $177.4 million for the fiscal year ending 31 December 1982; this is 29.0 percent of the central government budget. No service allocations are available. Dollar values converted from meticals at an official exchange rate of 35.0 meticals equals $1.00.

e. Population

13,413,000 as of June 1984
Males (ages 15-49): 2,951,000; 1,744,000 fit for military service
Ethnic Divisions: 99 percent African, less than 1 percent European and Asian
Literacy (1983): 20 percent
3. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

a. Ground Forces

(1) Mission

(U) To defend the national borders, conduct counterinsurgency operations, and maintain internal security.

(2) Capabilities

The Ground Forces are incapable of defending Mozambique from the primary external threat, South Africa, and have had only limited success in conducting counterinsurgency operations against RENAMO. Because of their preoccupation with RENAMO, the Ground Forces would have insufficient forces to meet widespread outbreaks of internal violence at this time.

Perhaps the only strength of the Ground Forces is its growing level of practical experience. Its principal weaknesses are manpower shortfalls, persistent logistics failures, and an ineffective command and control structure.

(3) Personnel Strength

Estimated 30,000–32,000 (officer/NCO, enlisted breakdown not known). This total includes 24,000–25,000 Ground Forces (Army) and 6,000–7,000 Border Guard personnel.

(4) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

The chain of command for the Ground Forces runs from the President, who holds the rank of field marshal and is also the Minister of Defense to the Commanders of the Ground Forces (Army and Border Guard) and the Provincial Military Commanders. The Service commanders exercise formal command of their major subordinate units, but in actuality are mainly concerned with administrative, personnel, and logistic matters. Operational control of the various brigades and independent battalions of the Ground Forces is normally exercised by the provincial military commander.
MOZAMBIQUE

(b) Ground Combat Units

Major Tactical Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strength per Unit</th>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Average Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 motorized infantry brigades</td>
<td>1,500-2,300*</td>
<td>1,000-1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 counterinsurgency brigade</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 tank brigade</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 air defense brigade (SAM)</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 border guard brigades**</td>
<td>1,200-1,500*</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 separate infantry battalions</td>
<td></td>
<td>200-250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Deployment

In the northern four provinces—Niassa, Cabo Delgado, Nampula, and Zambezia—the Ground Forces are very lightly deployed. The 4th Border Guard Brigade and the 7th Motorized Infantry Brigade are both based in Niassa Province, but provide smaller elements to support defense operations in the other three northern provinces. The 9th Motorized Infantry Brigade is based in Cabo Delgado Province. To the west, the 4th Motorized Infantry Brigade and 3rd Border Guard Brigade are based in Tete Province. In central Mozambique, the 5th Motorized Infantry Brigade is based in Sofala Province while the 3rd Motorized Infantry Brigade and 1st Border Guard Brigade are responsible for Manica Province. Moving south, the 2nd and 8th Motorized Infantry Brigades, along with the 2nd Border Guard Brigade, are based in Gaza Province but also operate in Inhambane Province. A special North Korean-trained counterinsurgency brigade is also based in Gaza Province. In the vital Maputo Province the 1st Motorized Infantry Brigade and the 6th Tank Brigade provide security for the capital.

The FAM is equipped with a full spectrum of weapon systems that compare favorably with the conventional inventories of its neighbors, even South Africa to a degree. Since independence, the USSR and its East European allies have been Mozambique's main suppliers of equipment. Additionally, North Korea, the PRC, Yugoslavia, Libya, India, France, the Netherlands, and Tanzania have provided small quantities of equipment. Over the past year Mozambique has approached Portugal, the UK, and other western European countries, in addition to its past non-Soviet Bloc suppliers, for armaments in an attempt to diversify its sources of supply, but has met with limited success in its efforts. Constant operations against RENAMO keep Ground Force stocks of equipment at low levels and shortages of ammunition are frequently reported.

* Organization of motorized infantry brigades is not uniform. Brigades differ in number of battalions authorized.

** Each Border Guard Brigade has four to five infantry battalions of two to four companies each.
(5) Weapons and Equipment

In addition to the major items of equipment detailed below, the PAM is equipped with a full variety of Soviet-style infantry weapons including 7.62-mm light machineguns; submachineguns, 7.62-mm assault rifles; RPG 2 and 7 antitank rocket launchers; 9-mm pistols; and 12.7-mm and 14.5-mm antiaircraft machineguns:

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<tr>
<th>Mortars:</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
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<tr>
<td>160-mm M-1943</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82-mm M-1937</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-mm</td>
<td>YO</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60/82-mm</td>
<td>CH</td>
<td>1,000</td>
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<tr>
<th>Antitank Weapons:</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AT 3/4 (SAGGER)</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>Unk</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rkt lchr (RL) and Rcl Rifle</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>122-mm rkt lchr, BM 21, 40 rd</td>
<td>UR</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>122-mm single rd</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>180</td>
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<td>107-mm rkt lchr</td>
<td>NK</td>
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<tr>
<td>82-mm B-10 rcl rfl</td>
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<th>Artillery:</th>
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<tr>
<td>76-mm fild gun, Z15-3, M1942</td>
<td>BU, HU</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85-mm fild gun, D-44</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>66</td>
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<tr>
<td>85-mm fild gun</td>
<td>CH</td>
<td>100+</td>
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<tr>
<td>100-mm fild gun, M-1944-1945</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105-mm how M18/49</td>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122-mm how M1938</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122-mm fild gun, D-74</td>
<td>CH</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122-mm how D-30</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130-mm fild gun M-46</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>152-mm M-37</td>
<td>UR</td>
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<th>ADA:</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
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<tr>
<td>SA-3 msl lchr</td>
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<td>12</td>
</tr>
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<td>SA-7 msl lchr</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.5-mm ZPU-1/ZPU-2/ZPU-4</td>
<td>UR, GC</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-mm ZU-23</td>
<td>CH, CZ</td>
<td>120</td>
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<tr>
<td>30-mm AA gun</td>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37-mm M1939</td>
<td>BU, PRC, HU, UR</td>
<td>150</td>
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<tr>
<td>57-mm S-60</td>
<td>HU, UR</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57-mm SP, ZSU-57-2</td>
<td>GDR, UR</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85-mm</td>
<td>CH, CZ</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### MOZAMBIQUE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Armor:</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tank, T54/55, mmd</td>
<td>GDR, UR</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank, T34, mmd</td>
<td>GDR, HU, UR</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank, PT-76, lgt</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMP, AIFV</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTR-152 APC</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>150+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTR-60 PB APC</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>75+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OT-810 APC</td>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UI APC</td>
<td>NK</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRDM I/II ARV</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UI ARV</td>
<td>HU, UR</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motor Transports:</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7/8-3.4-ton truck</td>
<td>GDR, HU, UR</td>
<td>615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5-7.5-ton truck</td>
<td>GDR, UR</td>
<td>506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 7.5-ton truck</td>
<td>CZ, UR</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UI truck</td>
<td>RO, PRC, UR</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank transports</td>
<td>CZ, UR</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other:</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GSP amph ferry</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTS amph tranpt</td>
<td>GDR, UR</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMM scissors bridge</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored landing bridges</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Logistics**

The Ground Forces have severely limited abilities to plan and carry out the movement of their forces and the maintenance of their equipment. Combat units frequently run short of food, ammunition, and other supplies. The military lacks sufficient means of transportation, and the country's railroads, bridges, and roadways have suffered from a lack of maintenance and the damage caused by the ongoing insurgency. The rail system that does exist is in poor repair and is oriented toward the distribution of goods from Mozambique's ports to the interior of southern Africa, not internal transportation. The three major rail lines are oriented from east to west, while Mozambique is oriented north to south. To move troops from Nacala to Beira by rail, for example, it is necessary to travel through Malawi. The rail lines have been frequently attacked and cut by RENAMO insurgents, further exacerbating the logistics situation.

**Personnel Procurement and Retention**

All Mozambicans 18 years or older are required to register for the National Recruitment and Induction System. Callups generally occur twice a year to fill the levy set by the FAM Department of Personnel and the Ministry of Defense. Those inducted are required to serve 2 years. Women are not obligated to register, but they may do so. In spite of the draft, most of the FAM units are not at full strength. Units have experienced problems with poor morale and desertion, especially with the new inductees. It is also believed that the insurgency is making recruitment more difficult as RENAMO spreads its influence.
over more of the population. The insurgents are also disseminating propaganda against the Machel regime in the cities that discourage compliance with induction processes. For career soldiers there are few incentives to leave the military, as they do not have the skills for civilian employment commensurate with the current status and privileges the FAM enjoys in Mozambican society.

In an effort to beef-up the strength of the Ground Forces, Machel has ordered the mobilization of qualified government and party civilians, especially those 4,000-5,000 who served with the FPLM before independence. These men serve as political commissars and in communications and logistics assignments. Machel has also called to active duty persons who served with the colonial Portuguese forces. While only 400-500 have responded to Machel's call, potentially this group represents a 40,000-man pool of semitrained manpower.

Training

Basic and most advanced military training, to include officer candidate training, is conducted at several camps throughout Mozambique. Instruction is provided by Soviet, Cuban, and Tanzanian advisers. Although some advanced training is provided in the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Eastern Europe, the trend is toward in-country training.

Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

The Ground Forces are supplemented by a militia force of undetermined strength that was revitalized in 1982 at Machel's direction. Provincial militia units have mainly been established at the village level, but some urban militias have also been formed. Organized into small units with minimal formal training, the militia is equipped with various types of rifles. Its mission is to supplement the Ground Forces by providing local area protection. However, Ground Forces commanders, due to personnel shortages, often impress the militia into their units for local operations. While it is too soon to evaluate the militia's effectiveness, it does seem to be aiding the FAM in efforts against RENAMO.

(b) Mobilization

Mobilization plans are not known. It is probable that Mozambique would require months to mobilize.

b. Navy

(1) Mission

The mission of the Navy is ill defined. On Lake Malawi it patrols Mozambican territorial waters. In the Mozambique Channel its mission is coastal patrol.
The capabilities of the Navy to carry out its mission are marginal. The service has too few ships and personnel to be able to effectively monitor Mozambique's extensive territorial waters and major ports.

Estimated at 700 men. The breakdown between officers and enlisted men is unknown.

Mozambique maintains two naval contingents, one on Lake Malawi and the other on the Indian Ocean. Ports used by the Navy include Metangula (Lake Malawi), and Maputo, Beira, Nacala, and Pemba (all on the Indian Ocean).

The three Jupiter and two Bellatrix Class patrol boats were turned over to Mozambique by the Portuguese in 1975 along with the three medium landing craft. Their condition is questionable. The three Zhuk and two unidentified patrol craft from the Netherlands were delivered during 1979 and 1980 and should be in good condition, although the Navy may lack qualified personnel to man these craft. Additional Soviet equipment may be on order.

The ability of the Navy to maintain its new equipment is questionable. It may be receiving foreign assistance until Mozambican personnel can be fully trained. A floating drydock was delivered from the Soviet Union in late 1981. With a capacity of 4,500 tons and a maximum length of 120 meters, this drydock could be used for the patrol craft of the Mozambican Navy, but its primary function is support for the Mozambican and Soviet fishing fleets.

There is no detailed information available on training in the Navy; however, some training for the Navy is being conducted in East Germany.
Reserves and Mobilization

There is no information available on the status of reserves or mobilization in the Navy.

The Mozambican Merchant Marine has eight ships of 1,000 GRT or over. Of these, seven would have limited military support potential. Types include: six breakbulk, and one POL tanker with a combined deadweight tonnage (lift capacity) of 18,800 tons of cargo. None of these ships are new.

c. Air Force

(1) Mission

(U) The Air Force's mission is to provide air defense for the country and tactical support for the Ground Forces.

(2) Capabilities

The Air Force has no air defense capability beyond its SAM-3 forces. A shortage of transport aircraft and helicopters plus a general shortage of qualified pilots also severely limit the ability of the Air Force to perform its ground support role. The shortage of modern aircraft and qualified pilots will continue until at least the mid-1980s. As the Air Force accumulates more experience and receives new aircraft, its capabilities will increase, but for the near term it is not capable of defending the country or giving adequate tactical support to the land forces.

(3) Personnel Strength

Estimated at 1,000; no breakdown of officer/enlisted personnel available. At least 50 pilots have received training in the Soviet Union.

(4) Aircraft Strength

Total: 125 (fixed wing: 88 jet, 9 turboprop, 8 prop; helicopters: 21 turbine)

In operational units: 104

(63 fighters: all weather (plus 18 in storage)
9 transports: 9 shortrange
15 trainers: 7 jet, 8 prop
17 helicopters: 9 medium lift support,
8 attack (plus 4 in storage))

(5) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

The Air Force is organized into eight squadrons. This includes four fighter squadrons, a fixed-wing transport squadron, a
transport helicopter squadron, an attack helicopter squadron, and a training squadron. Fighter aircraft are periodically assigned to Tete and Maputo in support of tactical operations.

(b) **Summary of Units**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Principal Bases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Transport Sqdn</td>
<td>An-26/CURL</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Maputo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Fighter Sqdns</td>
<td>MiG-21/FISHBED</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>Nacala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MiG-17/FRESCO</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Beira (with detachment at Maputo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Training Sqdn</td>
<td>MiG-21/MONGOL</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Maputo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MiG-15/MIDGET</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MAX</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Transport Helicopter Sqdn</td>
<td>Mi-8/HIP</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Beira</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Attack Helicopter Sqdn</td>
<td>Mi-24/HIND</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Maputo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) **Status of Equipment**

All of the equipment in the Air Force inventory has been supplied by the Soviet Union or the German Democratic Republic since 1978. Technicians for this equipment were trained in the Soviet Union, but the overall status of maintenance is unknown. It is believed that fewer than 10 MiG-17/FRESCOs are still operational. Some of the MiG-21s, Mi-8s and Mi-24s are still in storage and have not yet been assembled.

(7) **Logistics**

The ability of the Air Force to provide transport within the country and to maintain its equipment poor.

(8) **Personnel Procurement and Retention**

No data available.

(9) **Training**

Flight training and technical training have been provided by the Soviet Union, both in the USSR and by Soviet advisers in Mozambique.
(10) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) No data are available on the reserves or mobilization of the Mozambican Air Force.

(b) Civil Aviation

Approximately 8 civil transport aircraft with a gross takeoff weight of at least 9,000 kilograms currently are registered, owned, and operated in Mozambique:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Long-Range Transport Aircraft (greater than 3,500 NM or 6,500 km)</th>
<th>Owner/Operator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Il-62 Classic</td>
<td>LAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 McDonnell Douglas DC-8-62</td>
<td>LAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30</td>
<td>LAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Medium-Range Transport Aircraft (1,200-3,500 NM or 2,200-6,500 km )</th>
<th>Owner/Operator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 Boeing 737-200</td>
<td>LAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Boeing 737-200C</td>
<td>LAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 British Aerospace HS-125-700</td>
<td>TTA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Tupolev Tu-134 CRUSTY</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) LAM (Linhas Aereas de Mocambique) and TTA (Empresa Nacional de Transporte e Trabalho Aereo) are both government owned and operated. LAM is Mozambique's domestic and international flag carrier. TTA is exclusively a domestic carrier and primarily operates numerous light aircraft.

(U) The DC-8-62 is leased from a French airline, along with its crew and maintenance support. The DC-10-30 was obtained on a lease/purchase arrangement and the same French airline also provides its crew and maintenance support. The Tu-134 is a former Mozambican Air Force aircraft and reportedly is VIP configured. All of the above aircraft carry civil registration markings.

(U) The total number of licensed civilian pilots of major transport aircraft in Mozambique is not known. LAM employs approximately 32 pilots.

(U) Virtually all of Mozambique's civil aircraft and indigenous civilian aviation personnel could be mobilized for military use in the event of war or comparable national emergency. Without considerable foreign assistance, a lack of fully qualified indigenous flight and maintenance personnel would prevent maximum effective use of the mobilized aircraft.
d. Paramilitary Forces

There are no paramilitary forces in Mozambique that would be of importance in the event of hostilities. In order to provide more protection against RENAMO insurgents, weapons have been given to some of the citizenry. There is only minimal training of such personnel in military subjects, however, and their utility is suspect.

e. Total Military Personnel Strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military Branch</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ground Forces</td>
<td>30,000-32,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>31,700-33,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f. Foreign Military Presence

1. Foreign Military In-Country

- Soviet: 800-850 (instructors/technicians/advisers)
- Cuban: 800-900 (military instructors and advisers/security assistance; figure includes 200-250 intelligence personnel)
- East German: 200-250 intelligence/internal security personnel
- Czechoslovak: 50+
- Hungarian: Unk
- Romanian: Unk
- North Korean: 100+
- Tanzanian: 120+
- Zimbabwean: 2,000-3,000

2. Presence Abroad

- Soviet Union: Unk
- Cuba: Unk
- German Democratic Republic: Unk
- Hungary: Unk
- Tanzania: 1,500+
- Portugal: Unk
Withheld pursuant to exemption
(b)(3) 10 USC 424
of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
NAMIBIA
(South-West Africa)

1. Political - Military Situation: Namibia (South-West Africa)--a territory about the size of the UK and France combined--is not yet an independent country, and the search for an internationally acceptable solution to the Namibian problem places the territory in a highlight it might not otherwise deserve. South Africa occupied the German territory of South-West Africa during World War I and in 1920 received a mandate from the League of Nations. The UN claimed to have inherited the League's authority and refused to allow South Africa to annex the territory. South Africa refused to recognize any trusteeship arrangement with the UN. As a result, each party pursued different courses of action with regard to Namibia.

The legal conflict over the status of Namibia has continued for 30 years. In 1950, the International Court of Justice ruled that Namibia had an international status but that South Africa did not have to agree to a trusteeship for the territory. In 1966 the UN formally terminated South Africa's mandate and in 1967 established a UN Council for Namibia to administer the territory. The UN Security Council declared South Africa's administration of Namibia illegal in 1970, and the International Court of Justice supported that opinion in 1971. Numerous resolutions have been passed by the UN in an effort to force South Africa out of Namibia, but with no effect.

The South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) has waged a guerrilla war against South African rule of Namibia since 1966. At present, the SWAPO military component, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), numbers about 6,000-8,000. Unable to operate and establish permanent bases inside Namibia, SWAPO's efforts have been limited to rainy season incursions (March-April) aimed at the white farming areas south of Ovamboland. It is estimated that SWAPO within Namibia never numbers more than 100-600 guerrillas.

Since the mid-1970s, in order to cope with the SWAPO insurgency, South Africa has had to devote an increasing number of the South African Defense Force (SADF) troops to the task. In 1973, the SADF took responsibility for border security from the South African Police, and in 1974 a special military area was established along the border. Since then, the region, called the Border Operational Area (BOA), has been subdivided into sectors. The SADF has constructed a number of military bases in the BOA from which it conducts routine border and counterinsurgency (COIN) patrols, hot-pursuit raids into Angola and Zambia, and supporting airstrikes and reconnaissance. Despite the independence negotiations, the SADF has continued to improve its facilities and increase the number of small bases in the BOA. While the SADF has not been able to eliminate the SWAPO insurgency or to halt its growth, it has managed through major cross-border raids to achieve short-term advantages.

Since the 1975 Angolan war, the SADF has conducted seven major preemptive strikes into southern Angola. Although many smaller reactive or hot-pursuit operations took place during the intervening time, the major raids were all highly successful and, with few exceptions, strikingly similar. Each raid took advantage of favorable weather conditions, excellent intelligence, and an improving military infrastructure inside Namibia. At first the military goals were modest, having been chosen to lessen the potential for conflict with Cuban-
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Soviet-Angolan military forces. Although each raid could have hampered Namibian negotiations among SWAPO, South Africa, the Frontline States, and the Western Contact Group, SADF apparently decided that the risk was justified by the outcome—reduction of the SWAPO military threat.

Indicative of the increasing aggressiveness and determination of the SADF to counter the SWAPO insurgency is South Africa's mounting death toll. The following casualty figures show that the SADF suffered nearly two and one-half times as many killed in the first 9 months of 1983 as during all of 1978.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>SADF/SAP</th>
<th>SWAPO</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>1:27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1,000+</td>
<td>1:33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>1,106</td>
<td>1:13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>1:20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>1,268</td>
<td>1:16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983*</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>1:15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Note: Figures are based only on the first 9 months of 1983. Total SADF/SAP killed will likely exceed previous year total and SWAPO killed will be less.

(U) Early in 1984, South Africa agreed in principle to a phased withdrawal of all its forces from much of southern Angola. Billed by the South Africans as the first necessary step to be taken prior to the implementation of a ceasefire between South Africa and Angola, the disengagement process has led to the formation of an Angolan-South African Joint Military Commission (JMC) and the opening of a United States Liaison Office (USLO) at Windhoek. If all goes as planned, the implementation of a ceasefire may lead to agreement on phase one of the three-phase negotiating process designed to end with Namibian independence. However, this process, which should take place under the terms of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 (UNSCR 435), must overcome some very difficult diplomatic hurdles. It is not clear at this time whether or not the process will continue toward implementation of the already mutually agreed upon UNSCR 435. It is likely that progress will be slow and that South Africa will continue to maintain sizable military forces in northern Namibia.

While negotiating with the Contact Group, the Frontline States, and the UN, South Africa has followed a dual-track policy toward Namibia by concurrently sponsoring various schemes leading to a unilateral "internal settlement." One significant step in this process was the establishment of a South-West Africa Territory Force (SWATF) in 1980. The force has been designed to augment the SADF and to form the nucleus of an armed force for a future independent Namibia.

By law, the SWATF falls under the authority of the Administrator General (AG) for Namibia who is appointed by the South African Government. All operational matters are carefully controlled from SADF Headquarters in Pretoria. In fact, because the SADF tightly controls funds, equipment, weapons, training, and engineering assistance, the effect of the authority of the AG is minimal on day-to-day SWATF matters. Commander SWATF (a South African general) commands
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(South-West Africa)

separate SAA units deployed in Namibia as well as Namibian military forces. There is no unified command structure in Namibia.

(U) On 3 September 1980, the Namibian National Assembly passed a motion requiring national military service for all racial groups. Previously only white males were subject to conscription into the SADF. The law took effect on 1 January 1981 and applies to men ages 16 to 25. National servicemen serve for 2 years and then are assigned to a reserve unit with an obligation for 30-day camps, usually on a yearly basis for 8 years. In November 1980, selective notification of conscription began; however, no one from the northern areas of Kaokoland, Ovambo, Kavango, or Caprivi was included. Although the SADF has said that this was because no reserve units exist in the region into which to funnel the servicemen after 2 years' active duty, the more important reason was that the authorities did not wish to precipitate movement of young men across the border to swell the ranks of SWAPO. Authorities continue to cite the availability of volunteer duty with the local ethnic infantry battalions should a northern Namibian wish to fight. Basic training is conducted at Walvis Bay. Advanced training takes place at the unit level in Namibia.

Although military conscription was introduced in January 1981, SWATF receives most of its twice yearly intake from volunteers. Namibians of all racial groups are subject to conscription, but no black or colored persons have been drafted. The ample numbers of black and colored volunteers is probably due to the SWATF pay scale, which is the same as the SAA's and therefore much better than these men normally could expect in civilian life. The 2SAI Bn Gp in Walvis Bay trains 3,000 Namibians per year for service in SWATF mixed battalions and reserve forces.

A new and separate command has been formed for Walvis Bay. This command includes the 1,500 SADF troops stationed in Walvis Bay and is called the Walvis Bay Territorial Command (WBTC). This administrative rearrangement furthers South Africa's claim that Walvis Bay, due to a different historical route of acquisition, is not part of Namibia. However, SADF, SWATF, and WBTC remain closely associated. For instance, SWATF conscripts are being trained at a WBTC facility.

2. (U) Key Officials:
Administrator-General (appointed by South Africa): Dr. W. A. van Niekerk
South-West Africa Territory Force, Commanding Officer: Maj Gen George L. Meiring
South-West Africa Territory Force, Chief of Staff for Operations and Second in Command: Brig Gert D. B. van Niekerk
South-West Africa Territory Force, Chief of Staff, Intelligence: Col J.J. H. Bissehof
South-West Africa Police, Divisional Commander: Col Johan V. van der Merwe
Republican Party: Dirk Mudge
Rehoboth Baster Party: Ben Africa
South-West Africa National Union (SWANU): Moses Katjiuogua
Damara Council of Chiefs: Justos Gabroeb

3
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SWAPO-Democrats: Andreas Shipanga
National Party of SWA: Kosie Pretorius
Christian Democratic Action (CDA): Peter Kalangula
Colored Labor Party: Barney Barnes
National Independence Party: Charlie Hartung and Otilie Abrahams
National Unity Democratic Organization (NUDO): Kuaima Riruako
Caprivi African National Union: Muyongo

3. (U) Military Budget: $64.8 million for fiscal year ending 31 March 1984; this is 7 percent of the proposed central government budget. No service allocations are available. Dollar value converted at an exchange rate of .903 Rand equals $1.00.

4. (U) Population: 1,111,000 estimated as of June 1984
Males (ages 15-49): 248,000 physically fit, 148,000
Ethnic Divisions: 11 percent white, 6 percent colored, 83 percent African; over half the Africans are Ovambo.
Literacy: High for the white population; low for nonwhite.

5. (U) Army: Namibian units are playing an increasing role in the cross-border operations into Angola. During Operation Askari in January 1984, Namibian units were major participants. Clearly the SAC is trying to shift a greater burden of the fighting in Angola and Namibia to SWATF despite its limited capabilities. Even with increasing numbers of volunteers, SWATF remains heavily dependent on the SADF for all levels of military assistance, from uniforms, to weapons, to leadership. It will be very difficult, if not impossible, for the SWATF to survive if negotiations result in a SWAPO ruled independent Namibia. On the other hand, if the talks fail and South Africa chooses to act unilaterally on Namibian independence without SWAPO participation, the SWATF, with significant South African assistance, could become the nucleus of an independent Namibian armed force.
Personnel Strength: About 22,000 total active duty composed of about 10,000 SWATF and about 12,000 SADF personnel in Namibia. In addition, there are 1,500 SADF permanently stationed in Walvis Bay.
Reserve: Namibia now has its own reserve program separate from that of the SADF. The old Citizen Force (firstline reserve) is called the Reaction Force. There are an estimated 2,500 white Namibian males in Reaction Force units. These forces have both a conventional and COIN mission. The old commando force (home defense reserve) has been renamed the Area Force. Between 2,000 and 5,500 white Namibian males and 500 nonwhite Namibians belong to Area Force units.
Major Units: South-West African Territory Force (SWATF): 10 light infantry bns, est str 100-400 each; 1 field artillery bn, 2 armored car bns; 1 abn bn; 1 signal bn, est str 200; 1 Specialist Unit (employs dogs, horses, motorcycles); 6-7 company-size combat service support units designed to support active duty SWATF.
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South African Defense Force (SADF): 1 inf bn gp (mech), est str 1,500; 1 FA bn; 1 armd car bn; 5 (est) separate cos; 1-2 cos recon commando (special forces); 1-2 cos paratroops; unknown number of equestrian, motorcycle, and canine units; 1 irregular unit (32d bn) consisting of ex-FNLA, UNITA supporters, and Portuguese Angolans, est str 1,500.

South-West Africa Northern Logistics Command: Located at Grootfontein and Windhoek, est str 5,000 (included in the 22,000 manpower str listed above).

Major Equipment: Namibian light infantry units equipped with rifles (R-1 and R-4), mortars, and rocket launchers. SADF estimated to have at its disposal: mortars; FA (possibly including the new G-5 155-mm gun); Eland armd cars; Ratel IFV; indigenous lt armd veh (known as Buffel); Oliphant Tanks.

6. Navy: No navy separate from the SADF. Walvis Bay constitutes one of three South African Navy (SAN) regional naval commands. Several harbor patrol craft, Namacurra Class PSB, are probably present. Occasionally, a SAN ship deploys to Walvis Bay. Formation of a naval component to SWATF was discussed and rejected. Company strength elements of SAN marines are being rotated into the BOA for 3-month tours in order to gain counterinsurgency experience.

7. Air Force: The 1st South-West Africa Squadron is the only air element of the SWATF. Formerly the 112th Commando Squadron of the South African Air Force (SAAF), it consists of civilian pilots holding reserve commissions in the SWATF who make their own aircraft and ground support crews available for military missions. Headquartered at Eros Airfield outside Windhoek, the Squadron is organized into four flights and operates in close coordination with the Western Air Command (WAC) which controls all military air operations in Namibia. Squadron personnel rotate on a weekly standby roster and are subject to frequent callup. Most operations are staged out of Eros and consist of providing aerial reconnaissance, communication, and personnel transport support to the SWATF and SAA elements operating in Namibia.

(U) Three civil transport aircraft with a gross takeoff weight of at least 9,000 kilograms currently are believed to be registered, owned, and operated in Namibia:

Medium-range transport aircraft
(1,200-3,500 NM or 2,200-6,500 km)
1 McDonnell Douglas C-47/DC-3 SKYTRAIN

Short-range transport aircraft
(less than 1,200 NM or 2,200 km)
2 Convair 580

(U) These aircraft are operated by Namib Air, which is a subsidiary of Safmarine, South Africa’s national shipping line. One of the Convair 580s is
believed to be leased from a South African mining company. Namib Air also operates a number of Piper and Cessna light aircraft. All aircraft in Namibia are registered in South Africa.

(U) The total number of licensed civilian pilots of major transport aircraft in Namibia is not known. Namib Air reportedly employs about 18 pilots.

Virtually all of Namibia's civil aircraft and indigenous civilian aviation personnel could be mobilized by the Administrator General of the territory, or by the South African Government, in the event of war or comparable state of emergency affecting Namibia.

8. Paramilitary:
   a. Police

Prior to 1 September 1980, police services in Namibia were provided by some 1,700 to 1,900 South African Police (SAP). As of 1 September 1980, an independent police force was created for South-West Africa. The strength probably remains about the same. It has its own budget and all the traditional national police functions except for security (Special Branch) and intelligence, which remain under the control of the South African Government. Until such time as the training cycle can provide police personnel of local origin, many members of the new force will be seconded from SAP. Routine police services are performed from 52 stations throughout the territory.

In addition to regular police, a program to develop ethnic police units for northern Namibia has been underway since 1978. A 3-month version of the usual 5 1/2-month SAP training course has been conducted at various locations in the north. Training consists of drill, tactical formation, COIN operations, and marksmanship. Some 2,500 ethnic policemen have completed the training, are assigned to duty in their home areas, and are said to comprise a "Special Force." The Special Force is also known as the Home Guard.

Members of the Mobile Police—a paramilitary section of SAP—continue to rotate in and out of several companies deployed to the BOA. This unit continues to play an increasingly important role in counterinsurgency operations in Namibia. Called "Koevoet" (crow bar), this unit has a strength of 1,000 including 200 white South Africans. This force has evolved into the primary counterinsurgency force inside Namibia. Rarely deployed outside the territorial limits, Koevoet enjoys the highest kill-ratio among SADF SWATF/SAP elements. Over 80 percent of all SWAPO guerrillas killed in Namibia are credited to Koevoet units.

9. (U) Key US Officials:

10. (U) Foreign Military Presence: None
Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
NIGER

1. Political-Military Situation: Niger is governed by the Supreme Military Council (SMC), led by Gen Seyni Kountche, who ascended to power via a military coup in April 1974. Kountche shuffled his cabinet twice during 1983 with the latest occurring in November. All members are civilian for the first time since 1974. President Kountche's suppression of attempted coups in March 1976 and October 1983 left him firmly in power. Legal political parties are absent in Niger, and there is no indication of political liberalization or a return to civil government. However, the President maintains close contact with traditional leaders and the rural population to sustain his base of support. He has declared economic development the Government's first priority, and is carefully monitoring the exploitation of the nation's resources in support of that goal. He is also attempting to mobilize the people in support of the development effort and to increase the nation's technical capabilities. Officials have been pleased with US drought assistance and have welcomed US private investment.

President Kountche's foreign policy is focused on stemming Libyan expansionism. On 13 January 1981, 1 week after the announced Libyan annexation of neighboring Chad, Niger broke off diplomatic relations with Tripoli.* Kountche, realizing that his forces are unable to stop a direct Libyan attack, has increased his reliance upon French military assistance. France is concerned about the security posture of Niger because about one-third of French uranium is imported from the Arlit mines in northwestern Niger.** If the French perceive that access to this uranium is threatened by Libyan adventurism, they could be expected to play an active military role in Niger but may not go as far as committing combat troops. Kountche is also concerned over Libyan attempts to foment dissension among the Tuaregs, a nomadic and independent-minded group in the northern part of the country. Finally, Soviet activities in neighboring Mali and Benin, as well as their military aid to Libya, are viewed by Niamey as part of an overall strategy to achieve hegemony throughout the region. In response to the Libyan threat, plans were made to form a new parachute company in 1984. Kountche sees the US as the only counterbalance to Soviet aims and, consequently, relations between Washington and Niamey are currently very good.

There is little likelihood that Libya will be able to foment changes in the Kountche regime. Kountche retains wide respect as an honest and effective leader and is reportedly surrounded by loyal subordinates. The local population tends to view his government as functioning much better than its predecessor, though that memory is fading.

Kountche has little confidence in the longer-term prospects for Qadhafi renouncing his historical designs to territory in Niger. The country will remain highly vulnerable to Libyan adventurism for the foreseeable future. Barring some unexpected upturn in uranium prices before the end of the decade, Niger will be increasingly dependent on major infusions of foreign assistance to sustain its efforts at national unity.

* Relations were restored in March 1982.
** There are no restrictions on the sale of uranium to France, meaning that the French are free to use it in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

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The Nigerien Armed Forces can maintain order in the major populated areas but cannot adequately protect the nation's 6,000-km frontier. No military exercises have been conducted in 3 years. Petroleum, oil, and lubricants are in short supply and would hamper any operation's success. The Army's airborne company is considered its best unit. Logistic shortcomings would limit operations in the field to 1 week or less. In a move to enhance security in the east, the Nigerien Army formed the 7th Saharan Motorized Company (7CSM) at N'gourti, which is subordinate to the new 3d Battalion/3d Defense Zone at Zinder. The location of the 7CSM at N'gourti, one armored car platoon from the first battalion in Niamey at Bosso (near Lake Chad), and an infantry detachment from the 6th Mechanized Infantry Company at Dirkou posted at Madama (near the Libyan border in the NE), all reflect Nigerien security concerns in the Chad-Libyan border areas. Combat effectiveness, limited by a lack of roads and vast areas of responsibility, has been improved somewhat by the acquisition of transport aircraft from the US and West Germany. Command and control have been enhanced by the creation of three defense zone headquarters, each the equivalent of a battalion headquarters, to control the company-size units. Firepower and mobility increased with the creation of a second armored squadron. France continues to be Niger's primary source of military and economic aid. West Germany is providing significant motor transport and engineer advisers and equipment as well as assistance in pilot training. Limited military training has also been provided by Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Morocco, and Madagascar. The US provided C-130 pilot and maintenance training in 1983 for one officer and six mechanics. Additional requests for US military assistance were agreed to in February 1984 for medical supplies, communications equipment, generators, and parachute material. The purpose of this agreement is to outfit an additional parachute company to be formed in 1984.

Niger's economy has experienced a marked decline in the 1980s, as uranium mining revenues have fallen. With the exception of uranium, Niger is a resource poor country and its economic prospects are not very good. The overwhelming majority of Niger's work force is employed in agriculture. Leading crops include sorghum, millet, peanuts, cotton, and livestock. Uranium accounted for 65 percent of its export earnings in 1980. Niger also has deposits of tin, iron ore, and coal. Niger's GDP for 1982 is estimated to equate to $2 billion or $425 per person.

2. (U) Key Officials:
Chief of State; President, SMC; President, Council of Ministers; and Minister of Defense: Gen Seyni Kountche
Prime Minister: Hamid Algabid
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Mr. Ide Oumarou
Armed Forces: Chief of Staff, Lt Col Ali Saibou
Army: Same as Armed Forces
Air Force (Escadrille Nationale): Commander, Maj Francois Wright
Gendarmerie: Commander, Maj Maiga Mamadou Youssoufa
Republican Guard: Commander, CPT Issaka Ousmane
Presidential Guard: Commander, CPT Moussa Hassane
National Police: Commander, Mr Saka Issoufou
3. (U) Military Budget: $13.6 million for fiscal year ending 30 September 1982; this is 4.3 percent of the central government budget; GNP percentage not available. Dollar values converted from CFA francs at the exchange rate of 422 francs equal $1.00 as of February 1984.

4. (T) Population: 6,284,000 as of 1 July 1984
   Males (ages 15-49): 1,364,000; physically fit, 735,000
   Ethnic divisions: Main Negroid groups 75 percent (of which, Hausa are 50 percent, and Djerma and Songhai 25 percent); Caucasian elements include Tuaregs and Toubous; mixed groups include the Fulani.
   Literacy: 5 percent

5. (T) Army:
   Personnel Strength: 3,500. No Reserve
   Major Units: Three defense zone headquarters, one headquarters and headquarters support Company, one abn company, two armed reconnaissance squadrons, one engineer company, six Saharan motorized infantry companies.
   Major Equipment: 18 Panhard armd cars, 12 Panhard APCs, 70 VLRA scout vehicles

6. (U) Navy: None

7. (T) Air Force:
   Personnel Strength: 100 (no breakout available). No reserve. Four cadets
   Aircraft: 9 (8 trnsp, 1 utility in a composite unit)

8. (T) Paramilitary Forces:
   a. Gendarmerie
   Personnel Strength: 900
   Units: Seven Groupements (companies)
   Major Equipment: Unimog trucks, Land Rovers
   b. Republican Guard
   Personnel Strength: Approx 1,600
   Units: Major formations are three mobile platoons and four nomad platoons. No major equipment.
   c. Presidential Guard
   Personnel Strength: Approx 200 (no breakout available)

9. (U) Key US Officials:
   Chief of Mission (Niamey): Ambassador William R. Casey

10. (T) Foreign Military Presence:
    French Military Advisers: 65 (no breakout available)
    West German Military Advisers: Eight (one Army engineer captain, one Air Force captain, five Army engineer NCOs, and one Army military police master sergeant).
# NIGERIA

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(Reverse Blank)
1. GOVERNMENT

a. (U) Key Government Officials

Head of State, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council (SMC): Maj Gen Muhammadu Buhari
Chief of Staff, SMC: Brig Baba Tunde Idiagbon
Minister of External Affairs: Dr. Ibrahim Agboola Gambari
Minister of Defense: Maj Gen Domkat ya Bali
Minister of Justice and Attorney General: Chike Ofodile
Director General, National Security Organization: M.L. Rafindadi
Inspector General of Police: Mr. Etim Inyang

b. Type and Stability of Government

(U) Since Nigeria gained its independence from Great Britain in 1960, the major problem for Nigeria's various rulers has been to find a political system that can accommodate the country's tribal, regional, and religious diversity within a framework of national unity. This quest has involved sharp and often violent political change as well as a civil war. Nigeria's two post-independence experiments in multiparty democracy failed. The latest failure occurred on 31 December 1983 when a few general officers successfully staged a coup and overthrew President Shehu Shagari who had been elected to a second term of office in August 1983 with 47 percent of the popular vote. The general officers ousted Shagari to preempt a coup being planned by disgruntled middle level officers, ostensibly on the grounds that rampant corruption existed in the Shagari government.

(U) The present Federal Military Government (FMG) consists of three national councils—a 19 member Supreme Military Council (SMC), the Council of State, and the Federal Executive Council. The Supreme Military Council is the highest decisionmaking body. It consists of the Head of State, the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Military Council, the Minister of Defense, the Armed Service Chiefs of Staff, the division commanders, Artillery Corps commander, the Minister of Justice, Inspector of Police, Director General of the National Security Organization, six designated senior officers of the Armed Forces, and other members that the SMC may deem to appoint. The SMC determines national policies, constitutional matters, national security matters, and the appointment of key government and military officials. The Council of State consists of the service chiefs and the state military councils. The Council executes policies and manages affairs of the 19 states. The Federal Executive Council or cabinet consists of the ministers.

(U) Head of State Buhari has consolidated his power in 1984 by enacting a Constitutional Decree (modifying the 1979 Constitution), a State Security Decree, and the Recovery of Public Property Decree. The Buhari regime in some respects is modeled after the Supreme Military Council established in 1967 following the 1966 coup. The provisions of the constitution regarding elective and appointive offices and representative political institutions were abolished. The Supreme Military Council's decisions are final and binding. The

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State Security Decree provided for the arbitrary detention of suspected corrupt politicians. The executive authority is vested in the Head of State, but his authority is to be exercised in consultation with the SMC. In Head of State Buhari's absence, the chairmanship goes to the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Military Council, who acts as a vice president when Buhari is present. Buhari is a member of the Hausa ethnic group; Chief of Staff of the SMC Brigadier Baba Tunde Idiagbon is a member of the Yoruba ethnic group. Under the State Security Decree, the Chief of Staff of the SMC may order the detention of persons involved in acts prejudicial to state security or has contributed to the economic adversity of the nation or plans or instigates such acts. The Recovery of Public Property Decree established military tribunals to investigate and try corrupt officials. The present government is susceptible to political infighting and to coup plotting by middle level officers displeased with the slowness of the government in punishing corrupt officials in the previous regime. The Buhari government also faces serious economic problems that if not rectified, could cause widespread discontent and cause the military to intervene.

c. Internal Threat

Regional, ethnic, and religious rivalries have disrupted Nigerian politics in the past and continue to pose a threat for the future. In February 1984, a riot broke out in Yola when members of the fanatical Islamic sect, the Maitatsine, clashed with police who were trying to quell the disturbance. Elements of the Army had to be called in to restore order. The drought in Nigeria's neighboring countries has resulted in an influx of aliens into Nigeria in search of employment. Northern Nigeria has also experienced the drought. The result is high unemployment and social grievances on the part of people who consider themselves less privileged members in the country. The dismissal of many southern military and civilian officials has caused ethnic groups such as the Yoruba and Ibos to regard the present government as favoring Northerners.

The military is the greatest threat confronting the government. The 1983 coup occurred because the military was dissatisfied with former President Shagari's continuing mismanagement of the country and with the corruption among key officials. Head of State Buhari has not been able to solve the country's economic problems. Moreover, there are reports of rivalry among Head of State Buhari, Chief of Staff of the SMC Brigadier Idiagbon, and Chief of Army Staff Major General Babangida. Unless some of these problems are effectively addressed by the Buhari regime, the possibility of another military coup—perhaps more radical in character—remains a constant threat.

d. External Threat

There is no appreciable external threat confronting Nigeria. Nigeria perceives South Africa as a threat since Lagos supports the frontline states against apartheid South Africa. Nigeria is concerned about Libyan adventurism in West Africa, and although it supports President Habre of Chad, it
would like to see all foreign military troops out of that country. Nigeria prefers to see itself as the lynchpin to stability in the region thus negating the need for foreign forces in the area. However, Nigeria has not offered to deploy its troops to Chad outside of a UN or OAU peacekeeping force. Border tensions currently exist between Nigeria and Cameroon over potential offshore petroleum areas and with Chad in the Lake Chad region. Nigeria recently increased troop strengths along its Chad border because of increased insecurity.

e. Communist Influence

Nigeria maintains cordial relations with Communist nations. A Nigerian delegation went to Moscow in January 1984 to assure the Soviets that Nigeria would honor its previous agreements with the USSR. Nigeria is interested in technical cooperation with the Soviet Union. The Ajaokuta steel mill was the Soviets biggest project in Nigeria, but it can be considered a failure. The project was behind schedule; the mill is located away from needed infrastructure and its technology is outdated. In addition, technical teams from Bulgaria, China, North Korea, Yugoslavia, Poland, and Cuba are involved in development projects in Nigeria. There are about 25 Nigerian military personnel training in the USSR. They are in-country for 5 months and receive only technical training on equipment. Nigerian military personnel are also studying in Hungary and East Germany. There is a Soviet Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in Nigeria headed by a Soviet general officer. The MAAG works primarily with the MIG-21 program in the Nigerian Air Force.

f. Economic Factors

Nigeria is potentially the richest country in Black Africa, with known petroleum reserves of approximately 16.7 billion barrels. Yet, it too is facing a financial crisis brought on by an overdependence on oil revenues, financial mismanagement of these revenues, and a downturn in world prices and demand for oil. Petroleum exports account for 95 percent of Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings and these revenues have fallen from $25 billion in 1980 to an estimated $10 billion in 1983. The former Shagari government was slow to apply austerity measures, preferring to consider this downturn as only a temporary problem. Nigeria, therefore, amassed a current account deficit of some $16.5 billion between 1981 and 1983. Nigeria has drawn down its reserves; increased trade arrears to as much as $7 billion; and will spend almost one-third of its foreign earnings in 1984 and 1985 to pay current payment requirements.

Little was done in the oil boom years to broaden Nigeria's economic infrastructure. Nigeria's industrial sector must buy 75 percent of its raw material internationally and consequently, more than 100 businesses closed in 1983 due to scarce resources to pay or imported industrial goods. Unemployment was up 40 percent in 1982 and is still increasing, and inflation is estimated at 50 percent or more.
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(U) Nigeria's agricultural sector has stagnated as a result of neglect, a severe drought, and disease epidemics. Drought in the northern sector may have reduced crops by as much as 50 percent, and there is an outbreak of rinderpest in cattle. Nigeria will likely have to import at least $2 billion in food in 1984.

(U) Nigeria exports some cocoa, rubber, timber, and tin. Important imports are machinery, raw materials for industry, transportation equipment, manufactured goods, and food. Nigeria's GNP for 1982 is estimated at $83 billion (about $750 per capita).

Nigeria's major military equipment suppliers in the last 6 years have been France with shipments valued at $269 million; the UK at $159 million; and the USSR at $102 million. Soviet equipment includes aircraft, tanks, APCs, ADA, and small arms. The UK has sent patrol boats, tanks, APCs, ADA, and small arms, and an agreement for 18 Jaguar aircraft in 1982. Twelve Alpha jets have been received from Germany with an agreement for 12 more. Recent agreements with West Germany also include 18 Dornier 128-6 transport aircraft and a torpedo boat; Italy has agreed to sell 5 G-222 transports, 12 MB-339 jet trainers, 1 Lerici Class minehunter, and various types of missiles and rockets; the Netherlands has sold Nigeria F-27 maritime aircraft.

Military and Political Alignment

(C) Nigeria is pro-West in its orientation, yet assumes a nonaligned posture in the area of foreign affairs. Rhetorically, it has taken a harder line on issues than the previous government. Nigeria still regards itself as an important West African and African nation and an important country in the international community. However, Nigeria's Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Ibrahim Gambari has stated publicly that Nigeria will deal firmly and decisively with any act of provocation by any of its neighboring countries. Nigeria sees itself as the protector of the frontline states in their efforts to defeat South Africa's apartheid policies. Regarding Chad, Head of State Buhari would like to see all the warring factions brought together and the establishment of a government whereby the factions shared political power. On the Palestinian issue, Buhari favors a homeland for the Palestinians and will not reestablish diplomatic relations with Israel until Israel changes its policy toward the Palestinian issue. Relations with the Soviets and Libyans are cordial.

(C) To properly develop its military capabilities, Nigeria requires foreign military assistance. The Soviet Military Assistance Program (SMAP) has decreased in Nigeria and the Soviets have been phased out of the MiG-21 instructor pilot (IP)/technician program. They were replaced primarily by Indian IPs and technicians. To Nigeria's chagrin, the Soviets are perceived as providing tacit support for Libyan activities in Chad. This, coupled with failures in the SMAP should cause a further decline in Soviet influence in Nigeria. Positive ties with the West should continue, particularly with Germany and Italy, as larger defense expenditures are appropriated for Western technology. Training in the US, the UK, Canada, France, and Germany will continue to produce an institutional bias favorable toward Western programs.
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h. (U) Key US Officials (Lagos)

Chief of Mission: Ambassador Thomas W.M. Smith

(b)(3): 50 USC 5024(i)
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2. MILITARY, GENERAL

a. (U) Key Military Officials

Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces: Maj Gen Muhammedu Bahari
Minister of Defense: Maj Gen Domkat ya Bali
Commandant, Nigerian Defense Academy: Maj Gen Paul Tarfa
Commandant, Nigerian Command and Staff College: Brig Paul Omu
Army: Chief of Staff, Maj Gen Ibrahim Babangida; Commanding General (CG) 1
   Mechanical Division, Brig J. Ola Oni; CG 2 Mechanical Division, Brig Sanni Abacha; CG 3 Armored Division, Brig Salihu Ibrahim; CG 82 Division, Brig Y.Y. Kure; Commandant, Artillery Corps, Brig M.G. Nasko; Commander, Brigade of Guards, LTC A.A. Sabo Aliyu; and CG Training and Doctrine Command, D.O. Ajayi
Navy: Chief of Staff, Commodore Augustus A. Aikhomu; Flag Officer Commanding (FOC), Western Naval Command, Capt Ogon Ebitu; Flag Officer Commanding (FOC), Eastern Naval Command, Capt M. A. B. Elegbede
Air Force: Chief of Staff, Air Vice Marshal Ibrahim Alfa; Commander, Training Command, Air Commodore M. Yahaya; AOC Tactical Air Command, Air Commodore A. H. Lawal; AOC Support Command, Air Commodore N.M. Iman; Commander, Strike Group, Group Capt Ben Ekele; Commander, Air Transport Group, Group Capt J. Atanda; Commander, Flying training Group, Group Capt Aziz
Acting Director, Military Intelligence: Lt Col Haliru Akilu

b. Position of the Armed Forces

The military is not apolitical. Nigeria has experienced four military coups and one civil war since it gained its independence in 1960. After 31 December 1983, the military once again has become the dominant political force.

c. Military Trends and Capabilities

Nigeria's Armed Forces today number approximately 136,000, down from a high during the civil war of over 250,000. Nigeria would like to reduce its 120,000-man Army to 80,000-100,000 by selectively retiring eligible personnel, through normal attrition; and since the 1983 coup, by discharging personnel suspected of being disloyal to the Government or involved in corruption. The Government believes Nigeria can maintain what it perceives as its preeminent role as a black African armed force by improving training and obtaining better equipment. Nigeria would like to increase its Air Force personnel strength from 10,000 to 14,000 and its Navy strength from 6,000 to 10,000. Austere economic conditions will slow progress in modernizing the armed forces. Currently, there are tank battalions without any tanks, mechanical battalions with limited mobility for troops, and the special brigades of the 82 Division are in the planning stages of development. The Army is continuing its efforts to fully equip and train one battalion in each of the four divisions to be used as elements of a reinforced brigade size rapid deployment force (RDF). Equipment is to be consolidated in each division for the RDF. An engineer regiment and artillery regiment would also be upgraded to support the RDF. In addition to serving as a rapid deployment force, each RDF in the divisions could serve as a readily available force capable of quelling internal disturbances
within the division commander's sector of responsibility. The armed forces also lack adequate command, control, and communications (C3); however, the military is interested in improving these capabilities.

d. Military Budget

(U) The Nigerian defense budget amounted to $1.59 billion in 1983 or 9.27 of the central government budget. The Air Force was to receive $529 million, the Army - $750 million, and the Navy - $145 million.

e. Population

(U) 88,148,000 estimated as of June 1984
Males (ages 15-49): 18,934,000; physically fit, 10,887,000 (draft age 18)
Ethnic Divisions: Of the more than 250 ethnic groups, the Hausa and Fulani of the north, the Yoruba of the west, and the Ibo of the east make up 70 percent of the population; about 69,000 non-African: American 5,000; German 5,000; Dutch 5,000; British 7,000; Soviets 8,000; French 6,000; Indians 10,000; Lebanese 10,000; Filipinos 10,000; and other 3,000.
Literacy: Estimated at 30 percent
3. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

a. Army

(1) Mission

The mission of the Nigerian Army is to maintain a strong, efficient, and mobile military force capable of guaranteeing the internal and external security of the nation.

(2) Capabilities

The Nigerian Army, the region's major military force in terms of manpower and equipment, is only partially capable of performing its mission. However, as more modern weapons and equipment are received along with increased unit and individual training, the Army's capability will improve. The Army was successful in sustaining a peacekeeping battalion force in Lebanon and a three-battalion force in Chad. The Army continues its plans to develop an airborne brigade, an airportable brigade, and an amphibious brigade. The Army essentially remains an infantry force as to current mobility and firepower; however, it should improve in these areas. The hundreds of Army officers and enlisted men trained overseas show continuous, although modest, improvement in staffing, leadership, and training. The Army is plagued by maintenance, logistic, and communication problems. It has a variety of foreign communication equipment that makes communications link up difficult.

(3) Personnel Strength

The strength of the Army is estimated at 120,000.

(4) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

The Army is organized into three mechanized divisions, and an armored division. The 1 Mechanical Division is deployed in Kaduna and consists of three mechanical brigades, and a reconnaissance battalion. Each division has the necessary combat support and combat service support battalions. The 2 Mechanical Division at Ibadan consists of two mechanical brigades with eight subordinate battalions, a reconnaissance battalion, one armored brigade with three subordinate armored battalions, a Brigade of Guards based in Lagos with three subordinate mechanical battalions and a reconnaissance battalion. The 3 Armored Division, headquartered in Jos, has one reconnaissance brigade, one mechanical brigade with five subordinate mechanical battalions, and two armored brigades with a total of six subordinate armored battalions. The 82 Division at Enugu, consists of one reconnaissance battalion; one airborne, one airportable, and one amphibious brigade. The amphibious brigade has three subordinate battalions; the airportable also has three battalions. The airborne brigade has four subordinate battalions. An Artillery Corps is headquartered at Lagos, but
there are plans to move it to Abuja, the new federal capital. The corps consists of 4 brigades and 16 regiments plus the necessary support units; 1 is subordinate to a division. The Artillery Corps headquarters retains control over the artillery units.

(U) Each division has territorial responsibility for about one-fourth of the country—1 Mechanical Division, the northwest; 2 Mechanical Division, the southwest; 3 Armored Division, the northeast; and 82 Division, the southeast.

(b) Ground Combat Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Units</th>
<th>Estimated Strength Per Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mechanical brigades (6)</td>
<td>2,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanical battalions (27)</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored brigades (2)</td>
<td>2,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored battalions (9)</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery brigades (4)</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery regiments (16)</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special brigades (3)</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special battalions (10)</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance brigade (1)</td>
<td>1,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance battalions (3)</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade of Guards (1)</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Deployment

In-country: 120,000

(5) Weapons and Equipment

(a) General

The Army is equipped with a mix of British, Soviet, Belgian, French, and other arms. The Soviet T-55 is the Army's main tank. Panhard, Ferret, Saladin, Fox, 4K-7 FAG 127, armored cars, and the Scorpion light tank are used in reconnaissance roles. The Soviet 122-mm howitzer is the basic direct support artillery weapon. The Army desires to become self-sufficient in arms production and has established a Defense Industries Corporation toward achieving this goal.

The Army has a wide mix of trucks, most of which are commercial chassis/body design. The enormous vehicle maintenance problem is most apparent with the US-made trucks, where less than half are estimated to be usable. The problem is both parts availability in Nigeria and the lack of a distribution system within the country. The goals of the Army are to draw down
to or below 100,000 in strength and raise the educational level of recruits to
permit more effective training in the operation of increasingly complex equipment
being acquired. The army has commissioned a vehicle manufacturing company in
Nigeria to produce military transport vehicles. However, the company is limited
in production.

(b) Ground Weapons and Equipment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Armor:</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tank, Vickers MBT, MkIII, 105-mm</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>46</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tank, T-55, mmd, 100-mm</td>
<td>UR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tank, Scorpion, Lte, 76-mm</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARC, Panhard, HE 60-12</td>
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<td>ARC, Panhard AML 90</td>
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<td>ARC, Engesa EE-9 Cascavel</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARC, Fox FV 721, 30-mm</td>
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<td>APC, Panhard, M-3 VTT</td>
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<td>APC, Mowag, NFI</td>
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<td>APC, 4K-7 FAG 127</td>
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<td>FA, pack how, 105-mm</td>
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<tr>
<td>FA, pack how, 105-mm</td>
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<td>Unk</td>
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<tr>
<td>FA, how, 105-mm</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA, how, 122-mm, D-30</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA, how, 155-mm, FH 77B</td>
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<table>
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<th>Air Defense Artillery:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADA, 40-mm, Bofors L60</td>
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<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA, 40-mm, Bofors L70</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA, 20-mm, Oerlikon L70</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADA, 23-mm, SP, ZSU-23/4</td>
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<td>ADA, 37-mm, M1939</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADA, MSL, lchr, SA-7/CRAIL</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA, MSL, lchr, Blowpipe</td>
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<table>
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<th>Infantry Weapons:</th>
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<tbody>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar, 81-mm, NFI</td>
<td>UK</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mortar, 82-mm, NFI</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCLS, 106-mm</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCLS, 84-mm, Carl Gustav</td>
<td>SW</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCLS, 82-mm, NFI</td>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATRLTL, 40-mm, RPG-7</td>
<td>BU</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Nigerian Army has had a history of providing inadequate logistics support to its combat elements. For practical purposes the Nigerian logistical system is nonexistent as a unified, well-managed, coordinated support system. There is a chronic shortage of spare parts with no stock control/inventory system. Spare parts have been procured, but they cannot be located or identified.

The Army is particularly weak in maintenance management. Establishing stock levels and reorder points, maintaining accurate inventory data, securing equipment from pilferage, and timely reorders are but a few of the areas that need increased emphasis. Senior officers are beginning to recognize the importance of a properly managed logistics system. There are men with satisfactory maintenance skills, but the lack of leadership and management concepts among the NCOs and junior officers prevents those skills from being efficiently used. Control of spares and repair parts is often quickly lost after arrival of new equipment. Improvements may be seen soon, perhaps, as increasing numbers of officers are being trained in modern small business-type management systems.
The Nigerian Army continues to have problems with ammo storage. A six-man Indian Army team has been attempting to upgrade ordnance storage practices at the main ordnance depot outside Lagos. In addition, the Army has sent NCOs out-of-country to receive training in ammo storage. The Nigerian military purchases all explosive ordnance from various foreign countries since they have no internal production capability.

The Nigerian military currently uses the Air Force C-130s to transport quantities of military supplies from supply warehouse of support units at Ikeja near Lagos to the various Army units throughout the country. In the future with the construction of truck assembly plants, Nigeria could increase its capability to transport supplies and equipment overland by truck. In addition, the associated industries could provide necessary spare parts for military vehicles.

In its present state, the logistics system is inadequate to provide sustained logistic support for military operations.

(7) Personnel Procurement and Retention

Nigeria relies on volunteers to staff its Army because there is no conscription. Recruitment is based on a quota system that applies to each state and is to serve as a means of achieving an ethnic balance in the Army. However, the North usually experiences a recruiting shortfall. The current economic problems and high unemployment have helped in the recruitment of personnel to fill the army ranks but recruitment of technically qualified personnel remains a difficulty despite the requirements that recruits must have a high school diploma.

(8) Training

The Nigerian Army has placed heavy emphasis on training. Its ultimate desire is to become self-sufficient in training. The Nigerian Defense Academy has a 5-year degree awarding program whereby cadets receive specialized training in skills critical to the Army. Emphasis is being placed to insure that all enlisted personnel become functionally literate. Classes in reading and writing skills are held in the units for soldiers who are weak in these areas. Some military officers are sent to the Nigerian Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies which is presently the only comparable school to the US National War College. The Government of Nigeria would like to establish a war college or institute for defense studies.

(9) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

No organized system, however, the Army has a Directorate of Recruitment and Reserves and desires to establish a reserve system. Enlisted men leaving the Nigerian Army are assigned to a reserve pool and are subject to
recall for 3 years. The 99,000-man police force could be called upon to assist the Army in emergency situations.

(b) Mobilization Capacity

(U) Unknown

b. Navy

(1) Mission

The mission of the Nigerian Navy is to defend the country's 500-mile coastline, with emphasis on preventing smuggling, providing naval firepower support for amphibious operations, furnishing naval transport and supply support for the Armed Forces, protecting merchant shipping in Nigerian waters, and providing security for petroleum operations and fishermen in Nigerian territorial waters.

(2) Capabilities

By Western standards the Nigerian Navy is small, but by African standards it represents a potentially formidable force. Although it is the most powerful naval force in West Africa, the Nigerian Navy cannot operate effectively on the open seas. The technical know-how to conduct operations in open water, to sustain them, and to conduct routine maintenance and provide logistic support are all sorely lacking. Newly acquired vessels or recently refitted ones seldom are permitted to operate far from major Nigerian ports. Training is seriously hampered by a low operational ready rate and infrequent opportunities to put to sea. Exercises are virtually nonexistent. Relying exclusively on outside sources for spares, maintenance overhauls, and refittings severely limits the capabilities of the Nigerian Navy. The lack of qualified crews inhibits the development of tactics and practical exercises.

Painfully aware of its limitations, the Navy has invested heavily in acquiring a greater degree of self-sufficiency and is expanding its operations. Technical and professional training schools are being developed or expanded to accommodate greater numbers of seamen.

The Nigerian Navy is concerned with improving its command, control, and communications (C3) capability. Much of the Navy's communications equipment is outdated and incompatible with other equipment. Some progress is being made. The frigate NNS "Aradu" is equipped with a version of the RDL-2 ESM system and RCM-2 jammer.

(3) Personnel Strength

6,000 (500 officers and warrant officers, plus 5,500 enlisted men). These figures are approximate.
(4) **Ship Strength**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Op*</th>
<th>Nonop</th>
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<tr>
<td>FFG (guided missile frigate)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFT (training frigate)</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGG (guided missile patrol combatant)</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PG (patrol combatant)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PB (patrol boat)</td>
<td>4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC (patrol craft)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGS (hydrographic survey)</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>YTR (tug)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AXT (training ship)</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSM (medium amphibious landing craft)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSB (harbor patrol craft)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBR (river/roadstead patrol boat)</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>39</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) **Organization and Deployment**

The Nigerian Navy is commanded by a Commodore, who, as Chief of Naval Staff, reports through the Minister of Defense, through the Chief of the Supreme Military Council, and to the Head of State. Naval headquarters in Lagos has two subordinate commands. The Western Naval Command, located at Apapa and the Eastern Naval Command, at Calabar. Both are commanded by a flag officer. The country is divided on a north-south plane at 6 degrees east longitude. The Western Command is responsible for support to bases west of this division and the Eastern Command supports those to the east. The Commanders of the Fleets report directly to the flag officer commanding of their respective fleet. Boats have not been permanently assigned to a specific command.

(6) **Status of Equipment**

Virtually every piece of equipment owned or operated by the Navy reflects improper care and maintenance. New vessels age prematurely and old ones are seldom in commission. The disregard for preventive maintenance is a major concern of the Navy's leadership, and in spite of high-level interest to modify maintenance practices, few improvements are evident. Delays in obtaining spares and an unresponsive logistic system compound the problem.

* Many Nigerian vessels listed as operational are subject to periodic nonoperational status due to poor maintenance and other problems.
(7) Logistics

Logistics support throughout Nigeria is poor. Ships frequently spend prolonged periods out of commission because of poorly managed spares inventories and the inability to monitor use rates or to accurately predict material requirements. Logistic procedures are ill defined. However, even this system is occasionally circumvented to reduce prolonged delays in acquiring materials. Unusual demands are placed on the system for spares because of unorthodox maintenance practices. The Navy's system is complicated by its reliance on external sources for spares, major repairs, and refits. For economic gain, many foreign governments, such as those of West Germany and the US, are eager to assist the Navy in developing a viable logistics system. In 1983 the Nigerian Navy purchased approximately $1 million (US) worth of maintenance, training, and hardware to support foreign-manufactured gunmounts. Because of currency shortfall the Nigerian Government is considering a countertrade of oil for future gunmount purchases. A few Navy personnel received organization logistics training in 1983 but depot-level logistics expertise is lacking. The expansion of the Wilmont Point dockyard in Lagos is progressing and soon should provide the Navy with a limited repair, maintenance, and shipbuilding capability. Most important, the development and construction of a new spare parts and logistics center is expected to relieve some of the logistic problems.

Most indigenous naval repair capability is centered in Lagos requiring ships to rotate from their deployment bases on a periodic basis. Wilmot Naval Shipyard in Lagos has been under construction for the past few years and should be completed soon. The facilities consist of three drydocks, the largest of which is 180 x 25 m which will provide hull repairs to the largest of Nigeria's combatants. The yard will also have a marine railway and numerous shops and cranes for shipfitting and weapons system installation. A naval ammunition facility at Kiri Kiri west of Lagos offers munition storage and weapons support. The newly expanded base at Calabar in eastern Nigeria offers berthing and shore support facilities but only limited alongside repair. At this time, Nigeria must still send its ships to foreign yards for repair.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

The Navy is experiencing recruitment and retention problems. The austere economic conditions in the country have eroded recruitment incentives such as increased wages and benefits. In 1983, the naval forces at the Eastern Command experienced only a 15-percent retention rate of technically trained personnel at the end of their 10-year enlistment. Competition from the civilian sector erodes the Navy's manpower because the well-educated, skilled technician or laborer is in demand. Attempts to achieve a greater ethnic balance in the Navy between the Hausa-Fulanis, Yorubas, Ibos also have fallen short because few northerners are interested in serving so far from their homes (exclusively along the southern coastal waterways). Many Nigerians from different ethnic groups cannot meet the educational prerequisites set by the Navy.
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(9) Training

Basic seamanship training is accomplished in Lagos at the NNS Olokun Divisional Training School, Apapa Naval Base in Lagos, and both aboard ship as well as in the classroom and at the NNS Akaso Seamens' Training Facility at Port Harcourt. Initial officer and enlisted technical training is received primarily in the UK, India, and the US. Officer candidates now receive their cadet training at either the Nigerian Defense Academy at Kaduna, a triservice commissioning school; or the newly commissioned naval school at Onura located outside of Port Harcourt. Like the other Services, the Nigerian Navy is attempting to phase out its personnel training abroad. Local technical and professional schools are being organized and courses developed to meet the sailors' needs. However, because of the pace of the Navy's growth, indigenous training programs will in no way satisfy the Navy's training needs. As an alternative, the Navy is studying the possibility of requesting foreign navies to send advisory teams to assist in technical and operational training.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

(U) The Nigerian Navy has no reserve personnel or ships.

(11) Merchant Ships

(U) There are 41 merchant ships under Nigerian registry of 1,000 gross registered tons (GRT) or more. Total GRT for all ships is 441,754; deadweight tonnage (DWT) is 618,933. Of these, only 24 general cargo ships totaling 273,882 GRT (324,633 DWT) and 2 oil tankers totaling 144,151 GRT (274,416 DWT) are of value for mobilization purposes. A significant percentage of officers and specialists serving in the merchant marine are foreign nationals.

c. Air Force

(1) Mission

The mission of the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) is to defend Nigerian airspace; to provide tactical support for ground and naval operations; and to provide transport, liaison, and reconnaissance for the Armed Forces.

(2) Capabilities

(a) The NAF capabilities vary considerably depending upon the type of mission performed. Capabilities for noncombat support operations are fair to good, but for combat missions poor. The Air Transport Group (ATG) located at Ikeja is the workhorse of the Air Force. The C-130 remains the backbone of the airlift program, but continues to be plagued with supply and maintenance problems. A lack of spare parts and qualified maintenance personnel reduces the C-130 operationally ready (OR) rate. Two additional C-130s are on order. A Boeing 727 provides VIP airlift to senior civilian and military leaders of the Government. SA-330s (Puma), BO-105s, and Hughes 300-Cs comprise the helicopter inventory at the ATG. The Hughes 300-C helicopter is programmed to be
used in the primary helicopter training program being developed at the NAF base at Kaduna. From there students will transition to the BO-105 at the NAF base, Jos, for further flight training. Despite maintenance and supply problems, the rotor-wing units have been able to carry out their relatively unchallenging missions.

(b) The NAF now possesses 17 MiG-21/FISHBED aircraft, of which 5 are the two-seat MONGOL Trainer version. The MiGs are deployed to two squadrons, the 64th and the 75th Fighter Squadrons, both of which comprise the Strike Group. The NAF conducts little, if any, tactical training and is virtually incapable of intercepting aircraft or delivering ordnance. It is attempting to remedy the situation by developing an air-to-ground and air-to-air gunnery range complex. The NAF desires to enter an agreement with the USAF though the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program for the development of such a range. This will be the first FMS equipment agreement between the US and Nigeria. Heretofore, it has been either FMS training or commercial transactions. Indian instructor pilots (IP) have assumed responsibility from the Soviets for providing flight training. All training is done at the NAF base at Makurdi, new home of the MiGs. The NAF continues to expand its own IP program with NAF pilots trained in the US. Nine combat capable Alpha Jets are used as trainer aircraft have been tabled due to financial constraints. Negotiations with the USSR for the purchase of new MiG-21/FISHBEDs are still going on. The Soviets attempted to pressure the Nigerians to purchase MiG-23s, but latest reports (unsubstantiated) indicate that the Soviets will agree to a MiG-21 purchase. NAF plans to replace the MiG-21 fleet with Alpha Jets, Jaguars or F-20 aircraft, the NAF has been hampered by incompatible IFF and communications due to its varied foreign sources of aircraft.

(3) Personnel Strength

Air Force strength is estimated at 10,000 and should remain at about that level for the foreseeable future.

(4) Aircraft Strength

Total: 145 (fixed wing: 47 jet, 10 turboprop, 43 prop; helicopters: 45 turbine)

In operational units: 145
(30 reconnaissance; 11 fighters, 19 attack; 26 transports: 11 medium range, 15 short range; 44 trainers; 45 helicopters: 11 medium, 34 utility)

(5) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

The NAF is commanded by Air Vice Marshal Ibrahim Alfa. The NAF Headquarters is collocated with the other service headquarters within the Ministry of Defense in Lagos. There are three major commands: Tactical,
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Training, and Support. The Tactical Command consists of the Air Transport Group (Ikeja), Strike Group (Makurdi), and National Air Defense Corps (Ikeja). The Ground Training Group at Kaduna, Flying Training Group at Kano, and Command and Staff College, with a split operation at Kaduna and Jaji, make up the Training Command. The Support Command formed in October 1979 has these subordinate units: the Logistics Group, NAF Air Traffic Services, NAF Communication Services, NAF Pay and Records Group, NAF Medical Services, and the Air Provost Group.

(b) Summary of Units

Aircraft

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Rate</th>
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<td>B-727</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Ikeja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C-130</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SA-330</td>
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<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BO-105</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F-27</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Hughes 300C</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Strike Gp</td>
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<td>90</td>
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<td></td>
<td>L-29 Maya</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>145</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: Other than occasional run-ups, the Hughes 300Cs are not flown since the undergraduate Helicopter Training Program has not begun yet.

(6) Status of Equipment

Despite technical assistance from US, UK, Czechoslovak, Dutch, German, and Soviet advisers, the NAF still suffers from poor maintenance. The operational status of most aircraft is seldom higher than 50 percent and there is an inadequate supply system. Training is underway at the Technical Training Wing, Kaduna, to produce qualified maintenance officers and technicians; however, this problem will continue to plague the entire NAF operation into the foreseeable future.
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(7) Logistics

Management and inventory control are severe problems within the NAF. Numerous logisticians have received training in the US and UK, but quickly revert to outdated methods when they return to Nigeria. The Logistics Group, located at Ikeja near Lagos, is responsible for field depots (called logistics wings) at Kaduna, Kano, and Makurdi. The NAF is dependent upon foreign sources for replacement aircraft, repair parts, and supplies.

The Air Force has gained valuable logistics experience during the past year by participating in peacekeeping missions in Lebanon and Chad and during the border conflict with Chad. Nigeria, because of its nonaligned posture and lack of domestic production, has drawn on both the East and West for military supplies and assistance. The Soviets continue to supply technical and logistical personnel in support of the MiG-21 program. The Nigerian Air Force also obtains Soviet equipment and spare parts from India.

The reputation of the NAF is closely tied to its airlift mission using C-130 and F-27 transports. These operations also highlight the continued problem the NAF has in supply and maintenance areas. The NAF is currently capable of operating only two of the six C-130s at any one time. This poor rate is attributed to the lack of spare parts, lack of proper tools and the lack of experienced technicians to repair the aircraft. Lockheed provides an in-country representative, a major factor in keeping aircraft in commission. In-unit repair capabilities are extremely limited and inventory control almost nonexistent. The average in-commission rate for aircraft in the NAF in 1982 was less than 50 percent.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

Through aggressive advertising in newspapers and other periodicals, as well as during NAF Day, the Air Force is portrayed as a promising profession for aspiring young Nigerians. Historically, the NAF has done well in recruiting and retaining its personnel. However, because of the NAF's need for technically oriented and capable individuals, it now is facing stiffer competition with the civilian industrial sector than are its sister services. Recruitment efforts are visibly more aggressive and the stepped-up campaigns seem to draw the required number of recruits, although not necessarily with the background or prerequisites the NAF desires. As a result, the NAF now relies more heavily on formal and technical training to offset recruitment shortfalls.

(9) Training

All those who aspire to a regular commission in the NAF attend the NDA, a triservice school at Kaduna. Those selected to attend pilot training following graduation from NDA receive 100 hours training in the Bulldog aircraft (60 hours dual; 40 hours solo). Following primary flying training, pilot candidates then go to basic flying training at Kano for a 10-month course.
they receive 140-150 hours in the Czech L-29 aircraft. Upon completion they are awarded their wings. Depending upon quotas, students also attend pilot training courses in the United States and the United Kingdom. These students are generally selected to fly the MiG-21 and now the Alpha Jet. The NAF is currently developing a basic helicopter training program to be located at Kaduna and Jos. Those selected for helicopter training will receive an initial 50 hours in the Bulldog, then move to the Hughes 300C helicopter. Once this phase is completed, they will move to Jos to transition into the BO-105 helicopter. No hours have been allotted yet, as this program is still under development. Officers and enlisted men engaged in other than aircrew specialties are trained in the USSR, the US, and the UK. Basic training for enlisted men consists of a 6-month course at Kaduna. Unit-level training continues to be limited, but efforts remain to develop this capability. Formal officer training is conducted at the Nigerian Junior Command and Staff College at Kaduna (flight lieutenants), and the Command and Staff College at Jaji (squadron leaders, wing commanders). Selected officers also attend professional schools of the USAF such as Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, and the Air War College.

The NAF's focus on formal training is paralleled by efforts to upgrade its technical training capabilities. By contract with Dornier, the NAF has constructed a major technical training facility at Kaduna. Subjects in science and engineering now are being taught, and both officers and others receive training in aircraft and automotive maintenance, avionics, and supply. Although the NAF continues to send its people abroad for training, the NAF's objective is to maximise its training at home. To this end, the NAF is inviting more and more specialists to come to Nigeria to train or supervise training of NAF personnel.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

Approximately 72 civil transport aircraft with a gross takeoff weight of at least 9,000 kilograms currently are registered, owned, and operated in Nigeria:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Long-Range Transport Aircraft (greater than 3,500 NM or 6,500 km)</th>
<th>Owner/Operator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 Boeing 707-320C</td>
<td>Nigeria Airways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Boeing 720B</td>
<td>Central Airways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Boeing 747-200B</td>
<td>Nigeria Airways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Boeing 747-200B COMBI</td>
<td>Nigeria Airways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 McDonnell Douglas DC-8-50</td>
<td>Inter Continental Airlines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30</td>
<td>Nigeria Airways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NIGERIA

Medium-Range Transport Aircraft
(1,200-3,500 NM or 2,200-6,500 km)

4 Aerospatiale SE-210-3 CARAVELLE
1 Boeing 727-100
1 Boeing 727-100C
2 Boeing 727-200
10 Boeing 737-200
1 Boeing 737-200C
4 British Aerospace (BAe) BAC-1-11
20 BAe HS-125

1 Dassault-Breguet Falcon/Mystere 20
1 Dassault-Breguet Falcon 50
1 Grumman G-159 Gulfstream Two
2 Gulfstream American G-1159 Gulfstream Two
1 Lockheed L-1329 Jetstar
2 McDonnell Douglas C-47/DC-3 Skytrain

1 McDonnell Douglas C-54/DC-4 Skymaster
1 McDonnell Douglas C-118/DC-6

54 Total

Short-Range Transport Aircraft
(less than 1,200 NM or 2,200 km)

5 Fokker F-28-2000 Fellowship
2 Fokker F-28-4000 Fellowship
7 Total

(U) Nigeria Airways (NA), the country's domestic and international flag carrier, is wholly government owned; the remaining carriers are private. The "private firms" cited are believed to use their aircraft in support of company operations rather than for commercial revenue services. One of NA's Boeing 707-320Cs reportedly is operated by the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) for VIP use. The Government's HS-125 is operated by the Civil Aviation Flying Unit (CAFU) of the Federal Ministry of Aviation.

(U) In addition, to the above aircraft, the NAF also operates six medium- and short-range aircraft for VIP governmental use with civil registration markings: one Boeing 727-200, three HS-125-600Bs, one F-28-1000 Fellowship, and one G-1159 Gulfstream Two.
NIgeria

(U) The Boeing 720B operated by Central Airways, the 727-100C operated by Kabo Air, and NA's 737-200C are leased from foreign companies. NA's two Boeing 747s are leased from Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS), along with flight crews and maintenance support.

(U) The operating condition of the older Douglas aircraft is uncertain.

(U) NA has ordered four medium-range, Airbus Industrie A-310s and has placed options on four more. Delivery of this equipment has been delayed by financial difficulties.

(U) The total number of licensed civilian pilots of major transport aircraft in Nigeria is not known. Nigeria Airways reportedly employs about 280 pilots, over 200 of whom are believed to be Nigerian nationals.

Virtually all of Nigeria's indigenous civilian aviation personnel and the civil transport aircraft operated by the Government or by Nigeria Airways could be mobilized for military use in the event of war or comparable national emergency. The availability of aircraft leased from foreign countries or operated by private companies would be subject to circumstances. Because of a lack of fully qualified, indigenous flight and maintenance personnel, foreign assistance would be required to achieve maximum effective use of mobilized aircraft, especially if prolonged or intensive air transport operations were required.

d. Paramilitary Forces

While Nigeria's paramilitary forces cannot make a significant contribution to the country's combat strength, the 99,000-man Nigerian Police Force could serve in local defense and in rear guard actions. Its current major contribution is in crowd control.

(1) Personnel Procurement and Retention

The standards for the NPF are relatively high, but the need for qualified personnel is greater than the supply of qualified applicants. Once recruited, the NPF officer is not inclined to separate from service, mainly because of the social standing the position offers. This does vary, by location, particularly in highly populated, industrial areas where exposure to industry and business occasionally provides suitable employment alternatives.

(2) Training

In the past, training has been poor. Recruits are trained at a number of police colleges in Ikeja, Kaduna, and other locations throughout the country. Other institutions provide in-service training to members of the force, and officers receive training at the Police Staff College in Jos. Some units,
such as the PMF, receive specialized training. At the present time, the police are making a concerted effort to update current training with the hope of improving their public image. Over the years, this image has suffered because of poor relations with the local populace.

e. **Total Military Personnel Strength**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>136,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f. **Foreign Military Presence**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Advisers</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Advisers at Command and Staff College, Jaji, and Training Depot, Zaria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Advisers with the Nigerian Army Medical Directorate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Advisers with the Nigerian Army Ordnance Directorate and Engineering Directorate, also with Nigerian Navy at Western Naval Command, Lagos and Naval School, Onura.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Advisers with the NAF.</td>
</tr>
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g. **Civilian Technicians With Armed Forces**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Technicians</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovak</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>L-29 air/ground program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West German</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Dornier air/ground and technical training program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British contract</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ex-RAF pilots with Bulldog trainers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Armed Forces Medical Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korean</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Teach Tae Kwan-Do at the Physical Training School in Zaria.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Withheld pursuant to exemption
(b)(3) 10 USC 424
of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
Withheld pursuant to exemption
(b)(3) 10 USC 424
of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
1. (U) Political-Military Situation: The island of Reunion is an overseas department of France lying 420 miles east of Madagascar. The island is administered by a Prefect appointed by the French Minister of Interior, assisted by a Secretary General and an elected 36-man General Council. The department is represented in the French Parliament by three delegates to the National Assembly and two senators.

While Reunion enjoys one of the more stable economies in the region because of its relationship with France, there are political factions within the island nation that could alter Reunion's present status. The Rally for the Republic party, which dominates the General Council, is the primary party in support of the present French status of the island. This party represents the largest political group on Reunion and recognizes both the economic benefits and the degree of internal stability derived from French control. The Reunion Communist Party (PCR), led by Paul Verges, is the primary opposition party on the island. The PCR, funded by the French Communist Party, is the best organized political party, with a 34-member Central Committee, an 11-member Political Bureau, and a Secretariat. The PCR does recognize the importance of French economic aid to the survival of the island's stability and, as a result, does not advocate complete independence from France. Rather, it advocates local autonomy because it believes the island cannot be adequately governed from France.

On the other hand, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Reunion, formerly called the Communist Marxist-Leninist Organization of Reunion (OCMLR), does advocate total independence from France. Led by George Sinimale, a former member of the PCR, the Liberation Party has had contacts with various African liberation groups as well as Libya. To date Libya has not provided any major financial assistance. Because of the ideological differences between the antigovernment movements on the island, they are unable to inspire large-scale opposition and have been able to generate only sporadic labor unrest.

The Reunion economy is dominated by the cultivation and processing of sugar cane. A gross national product is not separately available as Reunion is an overseas department of France. Exports fell sharply in 1982 to $82 million of which sugar probably accounted for about 90 percent. Imports totaled $720 million in 1982. The country is dependent on imports for manufactured goods, food, beverages, tobacco, machinery, transportation equipment, raw materials, and petroleum products. France is Reunion's major trading partner. It is estimated that France supplies 69 percent of the department's imports and purchases two-thirds of its exports.

There is no Reunion security force; security for the island is maintained by French military and paramilitary units. Reunion is the headquarters of France's Indian Ocean forces and has been since French troops were expelled from Madagascar in 1973.

2. (U) Key Officials:
Prefect: Michel Levallois
President of the General Council: Dr. Pierre Lagourgue
Commander in Chief (CINC), French Forces Indian Ocean Islands: Brig Gen Louis Bonnin
REUNION

Commander, French Naval Forces Indian Ocean (ALINDIEN): Rear Admiral Dominique Lefebvre

3. (U) Military Budget: None. Department of France.

4. (U) Population: 535,000 estimated as of July 1984
   Males (ages 15-49): 152,000 physically fit, 79,000
   Ethnic Divisions: Most of the population is of thoroughly intermixed French, African, Malagasy, Chinese, Pakistani, and Indian ancestry.
   Literacy: Over 80 percent among the younger generation.

5. (U) Army: None. See paragraph 10, Foreign Military Presence.


8. (U) Paramilitary: None.

9. (U) Key US Officials: None.

10. (O/H) Foreign Military Presence:

   French Ground Forces: 1,270 personnel. A command and support battalion, paratrooper regiment, and an airborne company (on rotation) are assigned to Reunion.

   French Naval Forces: 175 personnel. Ships homeported at the French naval base at Ports-des-Gatets include two patrol craft, one amphibious craft, one auxiliary craft.

   French Air Force: 300 personnel. The Air Force operates three medium-range and nine short-range transports, two helicopters, one utility aircraft, and one ocean patrol aircraft. The modern airbase at Saint Denis provides the support facilities necessary for launching small-scale military operations in Africa and the southwestern Indian Ocean. Air facilities with limited staging capabilities include St. Pierre, Europa, Grand Glorieuse, and Juan de Nova.

   French Paramilitary: 500 gendarmes. Equipped with small arms and one helicopter.
1. (U) Political-Military Situation: Rwanda gained independence from Belgium on 1 July 1962, and for 11 years was governed by a civilian regime. On 5 July 1973, however, members of the Rwandan Army (Armee Rwandaise) led by Defense Minister Colonel Juvenal Habyarimana overthrew the government of Gregoire Kayibanda, abolished the discredited National Assembly, and established the Second Republic. Habyarimana then ruled by decree, but with the intention to expand popular political participation and to return to constitutional rule. On 23 July 1975, he announced the formation of the Mouvement Revolutionnaire National Pour Le Developpement (MRND) as a grass roots political organization aimed at promoting peace, unity, and national development. Under the direction of the MRND, Rwandans adopted a new constitution by referendum on 17 December 1978, and then elected Major General Habyarimana President on 24 December 1978. Pursuant to the constitution, legislative elections were held in December 1981, to establish the Conseil National De Developpement, which shares law-making authority with the President. Both the President and the legislature stood for reelection in December 1983.

(U) Habyarimana's government policy has sought to redress regional and ethnic grievances, end corruption, and stimulate economic development of the country's population, which is growing at a rapid rate. The moderate ethnic policies of the government have considerably reduced tension between the 85 percent Hutu majority and the 14 percent formerly dominant Tutsi minority. The most concerted challenge to the government occurred in April 1980, when state security chief Major Theoniste Lizinde and a number of other military and civilian officials and business people were arrested and charged with a plot to seize power and eliminate President Habyarimana. They were subsequently tried and many were found guilty in the fall of 1981. Lizinde and one other person involved were given death sentences, which were commuted in 1982. This cabal, anti-Tutsi and anti-Burundi, has been eliminated, but these sentiments continue to be held by some Hutus who could use them to oppose Habyarimana in the future.

(U) Rwanda's external relations with neighboring Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire have steadily improved in recent years despite lingering Rwandan concern about the intentions of Tutsis who have fled Hutu domination to neighboring countries. Rwanda is wary of Burundi's Tutsi-led government and army but works actively to reduce tension with Bujumbura. Relations with Uganda, through which most Rwandan trade passes, were strained by Ugandan domestic conflict in recent years, but became more favorable after the fall of Uganda's President Idi Amin. Relations became aggravated again, however, by the expulsion to Rwanda in October 1982 by Local Ugandan authorities of thousands of alleged Rwandans who had been resident in Uganda. Subsequent expulsions have also occurred, but because of Rwanda's dependence on trans-Ugandan trade routes, Rwanda has little recourse. Relations with Tanzania have also improved since the end of Tanzania's 1979-81 intervention in Uganda, which cut Rwanda's supply line. Regional cooperation has grown since September 1976 when Rwanda, Burundi, and Zaire established the Economic Community of the Great Lakes (CEPGL), which includes mutual security provisions. Moreover, Rwanda joined Burundi and Tanzania in 1977 to establish the Organization for the Management and Development of the Kagera River Basin, to which Uganda adhered.

15 October 1984
in 1981. Rwanda is a member of the UN, OAU, Nonaligned Movement, and other international organizations.

(RW) Rwanda's relations with Communist states are reserved. With the exception of China, which has provided technical and some military assistance, and to a lesser degree North Korea, Rwanda has been disenchanted with the small amount of economic assistance provided by Communist states. The Soviet Union's primary contribution has been 25-40 scholarships yearly. North Korea has provided organizational assistance to the MRND as well as economic and limited military aid, but has aroused suspicion because of its doctrinaire approach. Rwanda has established relations with Cuba, which exercises no evident influence.

(U) The Rwandan Army can maintain internal security and probably resist an attack from Burundi. It could not, however, cope with an invasion from its more powerful neighbors. The Army and a separate Gendarmerie comprise the Rwandan Armed Forces (Forces Armees Rwandaises - FAR). Conviction and training compensate for the FAR's shortage of resources. Rwanda has no military equipment production capability. Since independence, military assistance from abroad has totaled about $38 million. The principal suppliers are Libya, the PRC, and Belgium. Military support from Belgium, the traditional supplier, has been in the form of training, advisers, and infantry weapons and equipment while Libya has supplied APCs, trucks, training, and a helicopter. The PRC has supplied primarily field artillery, ADA, and small arms. Assistance to Rwanda is mostly grant aid rather than sales.

(U) Rwanda is the most densely populated country in sub-Saharan Africa, with approximately 500 people per square mile. Over 90 percent of the country's 5.5 million people are subsistence farmers. Coffee accounts for around 60 percent of its export earnings. Tin ore, processed tin, and tea are its other major exports. The US accounts for 50 percent of Rwandan coffee sales. Beans, potatoes, sorghum, peanuts, and manioc are the main food crops. Shortages of natural resources, capital, and skilled labor, as well as transportation difficulties, complicate domestic production, which is limited to selected consumer goods. Rwanda's GDP in 1982 is estimated to be the equivalent of $1.45 million or $280 per capita.

2. (U) Key Officials:
President, Commander in Chief, Minister of National Defense, Chief of Staff of the Army and of the Gendarmerie, and President of the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND): Maj Gen Juvenal Habyarimana
Secretary General, MRND: Bonaventure Habimana
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation: Francois Ngarukiyintwali
Minister of Interior: Thomas Habanabakize
Chef de Cabinet, Ministry of Defense: Maj Leonidas Rusatira
Deputy Chief of Staff, Army: Lt Col Laurent Serubuga
Commander, Aviation Company: Maj Sebastien Ntahobali
Deputy Chief of Staff, Gendarmerie: Lt Col Pierre Celestin Rwagafilita
Chief, Central Information Service (Secret Police): Joseph Habyamure
3. (U) Military Budget: $34.4 million for fiscal year ending 31 December 1983; 14 percent of the central government budget. No service allocation is available. Exchange rate used is 91.48 Rwandan francs equals $1.00.

4. (U) Population: 5,836,000 estimated as of June 1984
Males (ages 15-49): 1,248,000; physically fit, 632,000
Ethnic Divisions: 85 percent Hutu, 14 percent Tutsi, 1 percent Twa (Pygmoid)
Literacy: 37 percent, primarily in French or Kinyarwanda

5. Army:
Personnel Strength: Approximately 5,000 (200 officers, 35 WO, 4,765 EM). Officers from northern Rwanda dominate the Armed Forces. Quality of training is good. Rwandans have been trained in Zaire, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, North Korea, and elsewhere; about 400 paracommados also have been trained in Libya, but Rwandans were very unhappy with the quality of the training. Three years of officers training is provided at Kigali; NCOs are trained at Butare. Basic and infantry training is at Gako. Following basic training, every recruit also completes a 3-month commando training course at Bigogwe. Weapons specialization and other advanced training is acquired abroad, especially in Belgium. Morale appears to be fairly good and the officers are believed loyal to the President.
Reserve: An unknown number of reservists reportedly serve under the direct control of the 10 Rwandan prefectures and are expected to operate the communications system being installed by the West German military mission. There also may be an honorary reserve system.
Major Units: Three paracommado bns, 9 or 10 prefectural light infantry cos, 1 recon sqdn, 1 hvy wpns co, 1 engr co, 1 aviation co, and a logistic support base.
Major Equipment: 24 armored cars, (including 12 French AML-245s), 4 57-mm recoilless rifles, 2 37-mm guns, 79 2-inch mortars, 5 3-inch mortars, 1 60-mm mortar, and 3 81-mm mortars. Rwanda received from North Korea in 1979 about 50 artillery pieces--twin 37-mm AA guns (probably M1939) and 4-barrel guns (probably ZPU-4 14.5-mm AA machineguns).

6. Navy: None. A maritime section of the Army at Gisenyi operates two power boats armed with machineguns.

7. Air Force: None. The Army, however, has an aviation company with 10 aircraft (2 DHC-6 Twin Otter Short-Range STOL transports, 1 NORD 2501 Noratlas medium-range transport, 4 SA-341 Gazelle light utility helicopters, and 3 Alouette III light transport helicopters) and 150 personnel. These aircraft are operated and maintained by Rwandan personnel. There are a few Rwandan pilots.

8. Paramilitary: Personnel Strength: reportedly 1,500 (officer/enlisted breakdown not available). The National Police were merged with the Army (then known as the National Guard) in June 1973 by the previous regime; about 40 percent of the personnel were released from duty at that time. In December 1973 a National Gendarmerie was authorized, but it did not come into effective existence until some time after October 1974. While the National Police had received advisory assistance from Belgium and later the
FRG, the Gendarmerie has been assisted by France since the arrival of the first two French advisers in late 1975. The present French team teaches at the Rwandan Gendarmerie NCO Academy (Ecole de Gendarmerie) and at the Rwandan Military Academy (Ecole Superieure Militaire), where Gendarme officers are trained. The team also gives instruction in auto repair, communications, and police techniques.

9. (U) Key US Officials:
Chief of Mission (Kigali): Ambassador John Blane

10. (S/NF) Foreign Military Presence:
Belgian military advisers: Approximately 20 (includes Army commando, aviation, and medical personnel)
French Army, Air Force and Gendarmerie advisers: 20
West German communications team: 6
North Korean military advisers: 4
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

1. Political-Military Situation: The Republic of Sao Tome and Principe, which achieved independence from Portugal in July 1975, is ruled by a government headed by the President and Prime Minister, Manuel Pinto da Costa. The primary task of the Government is to improve economic and social conditions in this small, obscure nation of islands. In 1984, da Costa reshuffled his cabinet, which consolidated his power in the ruling body—the Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe (MLSTP). The changes, the third in 2 years, allegedly reflected the Government's need to cope with the nation's economic problems.

The Government identifies with Marxist ideology and doctrine, a product of Communist support for the independence struggle, but its overriding objective is a pragmatic approach to economic development. The Republic has moved on several fronts: Sao Tome and Principe maintains active trade relations and economic assistance programs with Portugal, the US, France, Japan, Cuba, and the USSR. The President and others in the Government appear to have lost faith in the Soviets' willingness or ability to provide useful economic assistance. Disillusionment with the Soviets and Cubans is gradually eroding their privileged position in the country. Small contingents of Dutch and Japanese and increasing numbers of French and Portuguese are working on a variety of development projects in the country, and Pinto da Costa has indicated that more of the same would be welcome. He has also openly expressed his desire for extending economic relations with the US, which culminated in February 1981 in the signing of a $1.5-million agriculture diversification project extended over a 3-year period, and the first visit of Sao Tome and Principe cabinet officials to the US in March 1981. However, the steady deterioration of the economy contributes to political unrest, forcing the Government to rely on foreign aid to keep the economy afloat.

The Government of Sao Tome and Principe defines its present foreign policy as one of nonalignment. This nonaligned posture has become much more apparent as the regime has gained self-assurance and a sense of independence. There were clear signs in 1983 of increasing contacts with the West. Although the Soviet and Cuban presence remains constant, there are indications that the country is searching for practical solutions to problems rather than ideological ones. Ties with Angola and Guinea-Bissau have been enhanced, placing it firmly in the Lusophone orbit and both countries maintain troops in Sao Tome to help provide internal security. Sao Tome has acted to improve relations with Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and other Central African neighbors, and views Libyan involvement in Chad as a continental threat. Sao Tome's 1983 UN General Assembly vote on Afghanistan that supported the US position rather than the Soviet position was one more sign that the nation is moving toward a more nonaligned position. In October 1983, Sao Tome was one of 10 nations that formed the Economic Community of Central African States.

Reportedly, Sao Tomean exiles based elsewhere in Central Africa and Portugal have been organized since 1982 to overthrow the da Costa government. The group has no known military capability nor is it able to influence events in the country; but, it has obtained some limited financial support from private sources in Europe. Nine leaders of an attempted coup in 1977 were released from prison in July 1983.
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

There has been a lessening of the Government's opposition toward its so-called "nonprogressive" neighbors. Where the Government once condemned those African states it considered moderate, it now stresses improved relations with all of its neighbors. Coincident with this change of policy is an attempt by the Soviets and Cubans to discourage this sort of conduct by Sao Tome and Principe leaders.

There is also a small contingent of East German personnel in the country. The nature of its presence is not known; but it is likely that they are involved in security or intelligence training.

The PRC has provided limited economic assistance to Sao Tome and Principe. Chinese physicians and technicians are said to be preferred by both the Government and people of the country over those from the Soviet Union and Cuba. In August 1983, a medical team went to PRC to study Chinese medicine. This has reportedly upset both the Soviets and Cubans who are further angered by their inability to influence significantly local opinion.

While there were no reports of coup plots this past year, serious market shortages caused growing popular discontent and demonstrations in Principe. Food shortages were critical by November 1983. The stability of the current regime will depend in part on securing economic aid from potential Portuguese and French donors. Externally, Sao Tome, virtually isolated from its neighbors, faces no apparent threat.

Sao Tome and Principe has no military equipment production capability. Arms and equipment inherited from the Portuguese colonial government probably are still in use. Soviet military assistance during 1983 included two An-2/COLE transports and one ZHUK Class patrol boat.

Sao Tome and Principe is in the process of forming and training an Army. Currently, national and presidential security is provided by Angolan and Cuban military personnel, respectively. The number of Angolan troops increased from approximately 1,000 to 2,000 during the past year. The most likely reason for this change is that the lower number was too small to secure the island of Principe, in addition to Sao Tome.

2. (U) Key Officials:
President, Prime Minister: Manuel Pinto da Costa
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation: Maria do Nascimento da Graca Amorim
Chief of Staff of Security Forces: Daniel Lima dos Santo Diao
Army Chief of Staff: Raul Wagner Braganca da Conceicao Neto
Minister of Nat'l Defense and Nat'l Security: Oscar Aguiar do Sacramento de Souza
Head of Intelligence Department of the Revolutionary Armed Forces: Cpt Celestino de Abreu Pires dos Santos

3. (U) Military Budget: No information available
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

4. (U) Population: 100,000 estimated as of 1 July 1984
Males (ages 15-49): 20,000; physically fit, 10,000
Ethnic Divisions: Indigenous Sao Tomeans, migrant Cape Verdeans, and Portuguese
Literacy: Estimated at 50 percent

5. (S/NF) Army: (Revolutionary Armed Forces)
Personnel Strength: 1,200
Reserve: None
Compulsory Military Service: As of April 1979, 2-year compulsory military service for every male over 17.
Combat Units: Unknown
Major Equipment: 50 82-mm mortars, 3 ZPU-2 and 6 14.5-mm antiaircraft guns, 3 U/I armored vehicles, reportedly 2 Soviet-type early warning radars, and SA-7 missiles.

6. (U) Navy: In a formative stage.
Personnel Strength: 25 (Estimated)
Reserve: None
Ships: No combatants; several small patrol craft includes one delivered from the USSR in early 1983.

7. (U) Air Force: None. Two An-2s, one Britten-Norman Islander, three Piper Cubs, and two Fokker F27s used for civilian purposes. There are 10-15 F27 pilots. There are plans to develop an Air Force.

8. (U) Paramilitary:
The People's Militia was formed in February 1979. A volunteer organization, it is subordinate to the Minister of Defense and National Security.
Personnel Strength: 125 (estimated)

9. (U) Key US Officials:
Chief of Mission (Libreville, Gabon): Ambassador Francis T. McNamara

10. (S/NF) Foreign Military Presence:
Cuban: 100 military advisers
Angolan: 2,000
Guinea-Bissau: One infantry company (100-150 estimated)
Soviet: 20 estimated military advisers
North Korean: Unknown number of advisers
Libyan: Unknown number of advisers
# SENEGAL

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## APPENDIX

Installation BE List | 17 |
SENEGAL

1. GOVERNMENT

a. (U) Key Government Officials

President: Abdou Diouf
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs: Ibrahima Fall
Minister of Defense: Medoune Fall
President of the National Assembly: Habib Thiam

b. Type and Stability of Government

The Republic of Senegal received its independence from France in 1960. The political situation has been largely stable since independence, principally because of former President Leopold Senghor's ability to balance the contending forces in Senegal, which include the military, labor unions, the Muslim Brotherhoods, and students. Senghor was reelected four times—in 1963, 1968, 1973, and 1978. In 1970 the position of prime minister was reestablished. Through a 1976 constitutional amendment, the prime minister became the successor to the presidency in case of the president's death, resignation, or incapacity. On 1 January 1981, Senghor voluntarily stepped down and Abdou Diouf, the prime minister since 1970, became president. The prime minister theoretically appoints the cabinet; however, the real power resides with the President who is also secretary general of the ruling party, the Socialist Party (PS - Partie Socialiste). Diouf was overwhelmingly elected to the Presidency on his own accord in February 1983. Shortly after his election, Diouf strengthened his power by reorganizing the cabinet and replacing the older "barons" who were sympathetic to former President Senghor with younger members. The "barons" were relegated to honorial posts in the National Assembly. Diouf convoked an extraordinary congress of the ruling PS party in January 1984 to reorganize it so that the party would become more supportive of his government. Numerous personnel changes were made within the party leadership although for the present, there has been no similar change of cabinet ministers. One individual, Jean Collin, the Secretary General of the Presidency, emerged as a rising political star and will be an individual to watch in the near term. Diouf continues to follow a course of "guided change" by retaining the basic tenets of former President Senghor's policies. However, Diouf has broadened Senegal's foreign relations, fostered regional security, and modernized the country's political and social institutions.

On the domestic political front, Diouf democratized the political process by expanding the party system, while deftly coopting the positions of his political rivals. At the same time, he is careful not to alienate socialist party regulars by straying too far from Senghorian precepts. There are at present 15 political parties active in Senegal. They offer the Senegalese legitimate avenues to express their views through the four main political currents: Marxist-Leninism, liberalism, socialism, and conservatism. Each of the parties must be open to individual Senegalese regardless of ethnic group, religion, race, region, or sex. Nine of the parties are Marxist-Leninist in ideology; however, membership in these parties is small and they present no serious threat to the government.

15 October 1984
Politics in Senegal has historically revolved around personalities that coopted clan, religious, and economic interests. In the February 1983 presidential and legislative elections, Diouf and the Socialist Party won the large support of his political opponents and potential opposition groups. Diouf polled 85 percent of the votes. The two large Muslim Brotherhoods, the Mourides and the Tidiane, supported Diouf.

The 120-member National Assembly assists the government in the affairs of state. The Socialist Party dominates the National Assembly; about nine seats are held by the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS). There may be some coalitions formed among the opposition groups in the future; however, it is doubtful that the Marxist-Leninist groups would ever gain a majority. Senegal's conservative Muslim traditions and pro-West political orientation will likely dominate the political scene for the foreseeable future. There are "barons," senior politicians who had served under Senghor, who disagree with some of the changes Diouf has made; however, the barons lost much of their political clout at the January 1984 PS Party Congress. The democratic process and economic stability in Senegal minimizes any real threats to the government.

c. External Threat and Government Counterstrategy

There is currently no serious external threat confronting Senegal. Relations with most neighbors are cordial. However, the relatively unstable government in Mauritania to the north, and the Soviet presence in neighboring Mali, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau are of major concern to the Senegalese Government, as is Libyan adventurism. Diouf opposes the expansion of Soviet influence in Africa and adheres to a foreign policy of keeping Senegal in the pro-Western camp. The Senegalese also regard Libya as a primary source of leftist, and even pro-Soviet destabilization efforts in Senegal. In reality, Senegal's close economic and political alliance with France hinders the Soviets and Libyans from gaining any substantial influence in Senegal. President Diouf is concerned about Morocco's rigid position on Western Sahara and its impact on domestic turmoil in neighboring Mauritania. The internal stability of Mauritania is further threatened by ethnic tensions between blacks and moors. Senegal's mutual defense agreements permitting the stationing of a French Marine infantry battalion in Senegal underwrites a strategy where the French are committed to maintaining the territorial integrity of Senegal as well as assisting to maintain internal order. About one fifth of Senegal's population is made up of immigrants from neighboring countries--600,000 from Guinea, 300,000 from Mauritania, 150,000 from Gambia, and 30,000 from Cape Verde. Subversive activities from a foreign base, especially in view of Libya's adventurism in the area, is a perceived threat by the Senegalese Government. However, Diouf has developed a friendly though cautious relationship with Mauritania and Mali. To the south in The Gambia, Senegal's military support of President Jawara in July 1981 under the terms of a 1965 defense agreement prevented a coup there. In February 1982 the two countries formed the Senegambia Confederation that allowed for Senegalese troops to be stationed in The Gambia. The confederation exemplifies the extent of Senegal's concern with subversive outside influences that could undermine the government from a foreign base. Senegal has a 1974 defense agreement with France whereby France would provide defense assistance to Senegal if the Government of Senegal requested it and if the threat was from a non-African country. Finally,
there is a potential threat from Guinea-Bissau. In January 1984, Guinea-Bissau sent two MiG fighter planes to patrol an area where a Canadian-operated oil rig was drilling in disputed waters near Senegal. However, Senegal is determined to improve relations with Guinea-Bissau and does not expect further incidents.

d. Internal Threat and Government Counterstrategy

(b) The internal threat to Senegal is thought to be minimal. There are elements of the society that disagree with the Senegambia Confederation, Senegal's close association with France, and Senegal's expanded foreign contacts. A group of several hundred Senegalese—primarily of the Diola ethnic group—that staged a separatist demonstration in Ziguinchor, the provincial capital of the Casamance region, in December 1982 and again in December 1983. The 1982 demonstrations appeared to have been led by students who had recently returned from France. However, members of the elite paramilitary unit, the Intervention Unit of the National Gendarmerie (GIGN-Groupe d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale) quickly dispersed the demonstrators. The 1983 demonstrations appear to have been initiated by separatists who want independence for the entire Casamance Region. Again the GIGN rapidly restored order.

e. Terrorism and Counterterrorism

(b) The GIGN is a crack antiterrorist unit that was organized in 1977 and consists of 120 members. The first unit of the GIGN was trained in France. Training for subsequent units has been conducted by members of the French GIGN visiting Senegal. Intensive training is done at the Gendarmerie School. The unit uses HK-33 5.56-mm assault rifles and Smith and Wesson revolvers, and possesses such antiterrorist equipment as bullet-proof vests and explosives. Members are chosen from the elite of the gendarmerie. The GIGN's chain of command extends from the commanding officer of the Gendarmerie's Intervention Legion (LGI-Legion de la Gendarmerie), which comes under the Ministry of the Armed Forces, to the NCO who is in direct command of the unit. The GIGN performed admirably in a hostage release in August 1981 when coup plotters in The Gambia held a wife of the Gambian President hostage. The GIGN stormed the Bakau Field Barracks in The Gambia and freed the hostages.

(b) Another antiterrorist force is the Mobile Intervention Group (Groupe Mobile d'intervention—GMI). It is separate from, but parallels, the GIGN and is based at Thies. In addition to its antiterrorist and anticoup roles, the GMI performs riot control operations. The GMI at present uses 9-mm MAS model 1950SL and 9-mm NAB model PA15 pistols of French manufacture, but it has purchased 200 Smith and Wesson model 59 semiautomatic 9-mm pistols, thus a departure from the use of French weapons by paramilitary units. The GMI is also interested in purchasing Smith and Wesson 9-mm and 357 magnum revolvers.

(b) A third antiterrorist group is the French trained Brigade d'Intervention Polyvalante (BIP). The 30-man brigade is an element of the Surete Nationale and is charged with responding to terrorist acts, aircraft piracy, and hostage-taking situations. The BIP participated in the August 1981 Gambia rescue operation.
f. Communist Influence

Senegal's relations with Communist countries are minimal. The nation's pro-Western orientation remains firm although they have made cosmetic improvements with the Soviet Union. This pro-Western commitment is a product of historic ties to Europe and Islamic rejection of atheism. Senegal hosted two groups of visiting Soviets in 1983. The Senegalese Armed Forces have no military assistance agreements with Communist countries, and there are no Communist military advisers or technicians in Senegal. A Chinese military delegation visited Senegal in 1982 and a cultural exchange agreement was signed in May 1983. About 50 Senegalese students were granted scholarships to study in China, Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia, with most students going to Romania because of its preferred, relaxed atmosphere. The Senegalese Armed Forces appear committed to a Western democratic form of government.

North and South Korea are represented in Senegal. They appear to be interested in Senegal as an observation post for one another's activities throughout the region. Senegal also has relations with Kampuchea and hosted Prince Sihanouk in July 1983.

Although foreign financial contributions to political parties are illegal in Senegal, it is possible that the Soviets have attempted to support financially some of the small, Marxist-Leninist parties; however, as mentioned previously, these parties do not have a large following in Senegal.

g. Economic Factors

Senegal, as other Sahelian countries, is impoverished and has been seriously affected by a decade-long drought. It has also suffered from declining terms of trade for its groundnut and phosphate exports—the principal sources of foreign exchange. Senegal's agriculturally based economy is augmented by fishing, food processing, light manufacturing, and phosphate mining. In 1982, GDP was $751 billion, $370 per capita. Leading exports are fish, peanuts and peanut products, and phosphates. Major imports are petroleum, manufactures, and foodstuffs. Leading trading partners include France, the European Economic Community, and franc zone member-states.

Senegal relies heavily on France for its military equipment and in-country training. France has delivered $10 million worth of equipment since 1983 including patrol craft and transports. The Senegalese also have an International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) with the US.

Senegal's economy faces serious difficulties. Austerity measures were announced in August 1983 to arrest its deterioration and avoid national bankruptcy. Both the US and France provided financial assistance. Clearly, economics is a factor in future stability.
h. Military and Political Alignment

Senegal has military defense agreements with France and The Gambia. It is a member of the Organization for African Unity (OAU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Organization for the Development of the Senegal River Valley (OMVS). In 1982, the US and Senegal signed an agreement whereby Dakar-Yoff International Airport will be used as both a transatlantic abort landing site and as an emergency landing site for NASA's space shuttles. During the Falkland Islands' War in 1982, the Senegalese allowed the British to use Dakar-Yoff to refuel their aircraft. The US used Dakar airfield three times in 1983 to stage aircraft flying supplies to Chad.

i. (U) Key US Officials

Chief of Mission (Dakar): Ambassador Charles W. Bray III

(b)(3) 50 USC 3024(1)
2. MILITARY, GENERAL

a. (U) Key Military Officials

Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces: Brig Gen Joseph Tavares Da Souza
Special Chief of Staff to the Presidency: Brig Gen Mamadou Mansour Seck
Armed Forces Inspector General: Brig Gen Coumba Diouf Niang
Army Commander: Col Victor Joseph Barry
Navy Commander: Capitaine de Fregate Gassama Faye
Air Force Commandant: Lt Col Amadou Lam
Gendarmerie and Military Justice: Maj Gen Waly Faye
Commanding Officer of CIGN: Capt Ndiour (Groupement d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale)
Commanding Officer of LGI (Legion de la Gendarmerie d'Intervention): Lt Col Francois Gomis
Commander, Gambia Military Zone: Maj Sylla

b. Position of the Armed Forces

The military is not politicized. The Senegalese Armed Forces represent highly disciplined and trained personnel who have distinguished themselves by their actions in The Gambia in 1981, and by their contributions to international peacekeeping missions in Zaire, Lebanon, and Chad. The Armed Forces carry out Senegal's foreign policy objectives of maintaining close ties with the West while assuring regional stability. Under the Senegambia Confederation formed in February 1982 and the defense protocol of the confederation signed in January 1983, about 450 Senegalese troops remain in The Gambia under the command of Maj Sylla. Most of the Senegalese troops are members of the Wolof ethnic group as are most of the Gambians in the areas where the troops are stationed.

c. Military Mission

The mission of the Army is to protect national security, maintain internal order, and participate in national development. The latter mission, civic action, was the primary mission of the Army from independence in 1960 until 1976. The Navy's mission is coastal surveillance, fisheries protection, and search and rescue. The mission of the Air Force is surveillance, troop transport, and paralift support. Generally, all three Services are capable of performing their missions, and could defend Senegal against a conventional attack from any of its neighbors.

d. Military Command and Control

The President of Senegal is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. The chain of command extends from the President to the Ministry of State for the Armed Forces through the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces to the various Service chiefs and on to the various tactical and support commands.
e. Military Trends and Capabilities

The Armed Forces can adequately defend the country against foreign aggression and provide internal security. The Senegalese military proved its ability in late July and early August 1981 when about 2,000 Senegalese troops intervened in The Gambia to successfully quell a coup attempt staged by Kukoi Samba Sanyang, a disgruntled local politician intent on overthrowing The Gambian Government. Approximately 420 Army troops reinforced police and gendarmerie units during the December 1983 violence in Ziguinchor area of Casamance Province.

The President, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, exercises close control over the Services. He is involved with the promotion and assignment of Senegal's senior officers. The Armed Forces owe allegiance to the civilian government. Senegal's Armed Forces are assessed as among the best disciplined and best trained in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The major weaknesses of the Armed Forces are its shortage of qualified officers, illiteracy, and its dependence on France for much of its equipment, logistics, and administrative support. Budgetary constraints severely limit opportunities for regular training in brigade-level tactics. Additionally, Senegal's inventory of equipment is aging and will soon have to be replaced. The Senegalese also send some of their military to the US for training under MET.

By regional standards, the Senegalese military is a highly professional force. About 1,400 French troops are stationed in Senegal to assist with training the Senegalese and to present a formidable military presence in form of the French Rapid Deployment Force. The Senegalese and French conduct annual military exercises in Senegal. The French 23d Marine Infantry Battalion (BIMA) is one tactical component of this force. Another component is stationed in Ivory Coast. Each acts as a guarantor of French reinforcement in a crisis.

Senegal has no military equipment production capability. France has been the major supplier of military materiel and training supplying about $4 million in equipment each year. The French have provided trainer aircraft, helicopters, a patrol boat, armored reconnaissance vehicles, and rifles. The total value of all military deliveries since 1977 is $76 million, and about 60 percent accounted for by France. The only Communist supplier has been East Germany with a small shipment of ammunition in 1979.

f. Military Budget

(U) $60 million for fiscal year ending 30 June 1983; this is 11 percent of the central government budget. No service allocations nor percent of GNP are available. Dollar value converted from CFA Francs at the exchange rate of 353 francs equal to $1.00.
g. (U) Population

6,541,000 estimated as of 1 July 1984
Males (age 15-49): 1,460,000; physically fit, 736,000
Ethnic Divisions: 36 percent Wolof, 17.5 percent Fulani, 16.5 percent Serer, 9 percent Tukulor, 9 percent Dyola, 6.5 percent Malinke, 4.5 percent other African, 1 percent Europeans and Lebanese
Literacy: 10 percent (est) in 14-plus age group
3. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

a. Army

(1) Mission

c. The mission of the Senegalese Army is to insure national security, maintain internal order, and participate in national development.

(2) Capabilities

c. The Army is a light infantry force capable of quelling internal unrest and combating external aggression. It is also capable of providing forces for regional stability missions. It is actively involved in civic action projects such as building roads and bridges.

By regional standards, the Senegalese Army is one of the best-trained and disciplined armies in West Africa. It is far superior in terms of combat capabilities to the armies of Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, and Guinea.

(3) Personnel Strength

c. 10,196 (306 officers, 1,740 NCOs, and 8,150 enlisted)

(4) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

c. Senegal is divided into five military zones that adequately provide protection for the five geographical regions of the country. These zones are known as the western, northern, central, eastern, and southern military districts. The President is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. In this capacity, he implements defense policy. The Minister of Defense assists the President on organization, management, readiness, mobilization, and operation of the Armed Forces. During a national crisis, the Defense Minister has the authority to manage the national resources, transportation, and communication systems. Officers in charge of each military zone are responsible for the zones detailed defense organization under the guidance of the Army Commander. Zone Commanders work with the governors and departmental prefects who are members of the Regional Defense Committee. One infantry battalion is stationed in each district. Artillery, airborne, armor, commando, combat support, and combat service support units are located at Dakar. There is a military intelligence unit responsible to the Minister of the Armed Forces, which handles both intelligence and counterintelligence activities.
(b) Ground Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Ground Units</th>
<th>Authorized Strength</th>
<th>Assigned Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces Headquarters</td>
<td>UNK</td>
<td>UNK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 infantry Bns one stationed with UNIFIL</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armor Bn</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery Bn</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer Bn</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commando Bn</td>
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<td>600</td>
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<tr>
<td>Airborne Bn</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>600</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance Squadron</td>
<td>UNK</td>
<td>UNK</td>
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<tr>
<td>Motor Transport Bn</td>
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<td>Communication, Co</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Co</td>
<td>UNK</td>
<td>UNK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Co</td>
<td>UNK</td>
<td>UNK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Deployment

The infantry battalions of the Senegalese Army are deployed as follows: 1st Infantry BN at Dakar; 2d Infantry BN at St. Louis; 3d Infantry BN at Kaolack; 4th Infantry BN at Tambacounda; and the 5th Infantry BN at Ziguinchor. All other units are based at Dakar. Currently, the deployment of Senegalese Army troops includes a combined force of 450 Senegalese Army and Navy personnel in The Gambia. This force is organized as an infantry battalion with 3 operational companies (100 men each), and 1 headquarters and service company. This unit is reinforced by 2 sections of Naval Commandos (30 men each), which is commanded by Major Amadou Nourou Sylla and Deputy Commander Captain Mamadou Toure. Army infantry troops are stationed in Bakau and Brikama. They provide security for the capital, Banjul. They guard the two radio stations, Two Mile Prison, and the airport. Troops which had been stationed at other strategic points have been withdrawn to their barracks. Finally, the deployment of Senegalese Army troops includes one infantry battalion (No. 5), a light reconnaissance unit consisting of three armored cars, and one platoon troops. These forces have been reinforced by one infantry company (120 men) from the infantry battalion at Kaolack; the entire airborne battalion (300 men); 400 Gendarmerie of the GIGN; and 400 police from the GMI (Groupement Mobile D'Intervention). These units are deployed throughout the Ziguinchor area with a platoon-size unit at Cap Skirring and a company at Bigona from the infantry battalion based at Ziguinchor. Senegalese Army Battalion No. 12 is deployed in Lebanon as part of the peacekeeping force there and is commanded by Col Papa Assane Mbodje. It might be withdrawn in late 1984.

(5) Weapons and Equipment

(a) General

The Army is lightly armed. Most of the equipment is French, outdated, and lacks spare parts.
SENEGAL

(b) (U) Weapons and Equipment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Armored Cars:</strong> Panhard AML</td>
<td>FR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Artillery: 155-mm howitzer</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105-mm howitzer</td>
<td>US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD Artillery: 20-mm Mobile AD guns</td>
<td>FR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-mm Bofors</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antitank: 75-mm</td>
<td>FR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73-mm</td>
<td>FR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5-inch rocket launcher</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milan</td>
<td>FR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortars: 120-mm</td>
<td>FR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81-mm</td>
<td>FR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-mm</td>
<td>FR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) Logistics

The Army has an adequate supply and maintenance system; however, since much of the Army's equipment is outdated, it has difficulty in obtaining spare parts.

(7) Personnel Recruitment and Retention

The Senegalese Army depends upon 2 year conscripts for manpower. It is not a standing army but rather a citizen force held together by a small professional cadre. Resource constraints limit the yearly intake of new recruits to 1,600.

(8) Training

Soldiers undergo basic training for 3 months followed by advanced training for another 3 to 4 months. The Army trains its NCOs using French programs and standards. A National School for Active Duty NCOs was opened in 1971 and trains 80 students annually. NCOs in technical fields are sent to France for training. The Senegalese Army trains about 600 NCOs and junior enlisted personnel annually. The majority of specialists leave service at the end of their tours and enter the business and industrial market. Officers have been trained in France, Morocco, the US, and Belgium.

(9) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

There are General Reserve Forces in Senegal but little is known about them.
(b) **Mobilization**

(U) Mobilization plans are unknown; some expansion of the force is certain, however.

b. **Navy**

(1) **Mission**

The mission of the Senegalese Navy is coastal surveillance, fisheries protection, and search and rescue, and hydrographic research at Senegal's rivers.

(2) **Capabilities**

The Navy is capable of conducting coastal patrols and limited rescue operations. Seventy percent of its time is devoted to fisheries patrols.

(3) **Personnel Strength**

696 (24 officers, 122 NCOs, and 550 enlisted)

(4) **Ship and Aircraft Strength**

(a) **Ships**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Op</th>
<th>Nonop</th>
<th>In Reserve</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PG (patrol combatant)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC (patrol craft)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PB (patrol boat)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCU (utility landing craft)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCM (medium landing craft)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) (U) **Aircraft**

None

(5) **Organization and Deployment**

(a) **General Service**

The Senegalese Navy has divided its areas of responsibility into zones. Coastal surveillance craft patrol the country's 150 nautical miles of territorial waters. The larger patrol craft protect the intermediate zone to 150 nautical miles, and the high sea patrol craft protect the exclusive economic zone (200 nautical miles).
(b) **Marine Corps**

(U) None. There is a Marine-Commando Company within the 1st Senegalese Naval Group.

(c) **Naval Air Arm**

(U) None. The Senegalese Air Force assists in rescue operations and a Atlantic Aircraft based in Dakar is available to augment search and rescue efforts upon request.

(6) **Command and Control**

The Chief of Staff of the Navy is subordinate to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. The Commander of the 1st Senegalese Naval Group is subordinate to the Naval Chief of Staff. Within the Naval Group are a Command and Administration Company, Military Port Company, Support Company, Marine-Commando Company, and a Naval Instruction Center.

(7) **Status of Equipment**

The Senegalese perform most maintenance on their ships. The Navy's Vessels are of French and Canadian origin.

(8) **Logistics**

All Senegalese Navy combatants are stationed at one base--Dakar--and the majority are of French construction. This single location and the fact that a large French naval contingent is located there greatly simplifies logistics support. Dakar Marine is the best shipyard in West Africa and is capable of performing sophisticated repairs on combatants and auxiliaries of up to 28,000 tons. Facilities include a large plate shop, engineering specialty shops, a floating drydock, graving dock, and syncrolift. A Nigerian frigate was overhauled at this yard in 1983. Senegal does not have a large merchant marine.

(9) **Personnel Procurement and Retention**

(U) Although military service is obligatory under the Senegalese Constitution, present manpower requirements are being met by volunteers.

(10) **Training**

Training is provided with French assistance. Officers receive training in the US, France, Great Britain, and Greece.

(11) **Reserve and Mobilization**

(a) **Reserves**

(U) None
c. Air Force

(1) Mission

The mission of the Senegalese Air Force is to provide aerial surveillance, paralift support, and troop transport.

(2) Capabilities

The Senegalese Air Force is capable of providing aerial surveillance. There are an inadequate number of aircraft for troop transport and air support to ground operations. Major strengths of the Air Force are the quality of pilot and support personnel training.

(3) Personnel Strength

565 (45 officers, 200 NCOs, 320 enlisted)

(4) Aircraft

Total: 23 (4 jet fighters/trainers, 13 transport, 2 utility, 3 helicopters)

In operational units: 23

(5) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

The Air Force Commandant is subordinate to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.

(b) Summary of Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Utility</td>
<td>De Havilland Twin Otter</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MH-1521 Broussard</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>Fokker F-27</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DC-3/Sky train</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jet Fighter-</td>
<td>CM-170 Magister</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopter</td>
<td>SA 330 Puma</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trainer</td>
<td>Alouette II</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Status of Equipment

The Senegalese aircraft are primarily of French origin.
(6) **Logistics**

The Senegalese maintain their own aircraft with French assistance.

(7) **Personnel Procurement and Retention**

The Air Force apparently has no problem procuring and retaining Air Force personnel.

(8) **Training**

Air and ground crews are trained in France.

(9) **Reserves and Mobilization**

(a) **Reserves**

(U) Unknown

(b) **Mobilization**

(U) Mobilization plans are unknown. Several short-range transports serve with Air Senegal and supplement the Air Force. Transport aircraft of the Senegalese Air Force also operate with civil registration markings. Three medium-range transports—two British Aerospace HS-748-2A, and one McDonnell Douglas C-47 Dakota—are owned and operated by Air Senegal. The civilian airlines is 50 percent owned by the government, 40 percent by Air Afrique, and 10 percent by private interests. One of the British Aerospace transports is leased to a Tunisian carrier.

(U) The number of licensed civilian pilots of major transport aircraft in Senegal is unknown. Air Senegal reportedly employs 13 pilots. A significant number of Air Senegal's flight crews and key maintenance personnel are French nationals.

(U) Virtually all of Senegal's civil aircraft and indigenous civilian aviation personnel could be mobilized in the event of war or comparable national emergency. Because of a shortage of fully qualified, indigenous flight and maintenance personnel, continued foreign assistance would be required to achieve maximum effective use of the mobilized equipment.

d. **Paramilitary Forces**

(1) **Gendarmerie**

The mission of the 3,195-member (70 officers, 425 NCOs, 2,700 enlisted) Gendarmerie is to provide internal security. It is comprised of eight companies of gendarmes who form the Territorial Legion, five companies which form the Security Legion, and five companies and one armored car squadron comprising the Intervention Legion. The Gendarmerie could augment the military in a combat
role. A brigade named the "Brigade of Kayar" was activated on 1 November 1982 and stationed at Kayar (14-55N 017-07W). It is attached to the gendarmerie company at Thies and is responsible for the rural communities of Dinder (14-27N 016-07W) and half of the community of Pout (14-46N 017-04W).

(2) Surete Nationale

The 3,700-man Surete Nationale has the mission to assist in providing national security. It is responsible to the Minister of the Interior and consists of four directorates. One directorate within the Surete Nationale is the Direction Surete d'Etat (DSE) which is responsible for checking potential subversion. Within the DSE are three bureaus. The FI-5 handles counterespionage and monitors activities of foreigners. Another DSE bureau monitors the activities of labor unions, student organizations, and opposition parties; a third bureau handles reports. The three other directorates in the Surete Nationale are the Judicial Police, the Public Security, and the Foreign Police directorates. These three directorates control movement of persons at frontiers, weapon importation and handling, and other routine police functions.

e. (U) Total Military Personnel Strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>10,196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gendarmerie</td>
<td>3,195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surete Nationale</td>
<td>3,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18,352</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f. Foreign Military Presence

There are 1,400 French military forces in Senegal and 27 French military advisers. There is a 450-man French naval force at Dakar, the 400-man 160th Air Detachment, and the 525-man 23d Marine Infantry Battalion (23d BIMA) at Dakar. The 23d BIMA has two landing craft; the 160th Air Detachment has four Jaguar fighters in-country, two Alouette and one Puma helicopters, and four Noratlas transports at Dakar/Yoff air base. There are also various support units concerned with naval weapons and operations, supplies, medical services, and military security.
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(b)(3): 10 USC 424
of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
Withheld pursuant to exemption
(b)(3): 10 USC 424

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
SEYCHELLES

1. (U) Political-Military Situation: The Seychelles, a cluster of 100 some islands (various sources reflect from 85-115 islands in the Seychelles cluster) in the Indian Ocean about 1,000 miles east of the African coast, became an independent republic within the British Commonwealth on 29 June 1976.

President France Albert Rene, who heads the Seychelles only political party, the Seychelles People's Progressive Front (SPPF), came to power in June 1977, seizing control of the Government while then-President, James Mancham, was out of the country. Rene had been prime minister in an uneasy coalition with Mancham. His socialist principles were at odds with those of Mancham, who spent little time in the Seychelles tending to what Rene viewed as the "needs of the people."

Upon gaining the country's highest office, Rene abrogated the Constitution, dissolved the National Assembly, and ruled by decree until a new constitution, which incorporated his socialist ideology, took effect on 5 June 1979. Following the general elections held 23-26 June of the same year, which by a large majority installed Rene as President for a 5-year term, the President began to show signs of shifting the Seychelles previous pro-Western stance. In 1979, President Rene reshuffled his cabinet and replaced his Western-leaning ministers with pro-Soviet ministers. However, in attempts to attract more Western aid, Rene in November 1982 again reorganized his cabinet reducing the responsibilities of his pro-Soviet ministers. During 1983, Rene has tried to improve contacts with the West in order to help alleviate his economic and political problems at home. He is encouraging the US to maintain its tracking station in the Seychelles and to resume ship visits to island ports. He hopes to attract additional economic assistance and increase tourism, thereby forcing an economic turnaround to help stabilize his government. Nevertheless, Rene continues to espouse a Marxist Socialist philosophy. Rene won the June 1984 elections, gaining an additional 5-year term, and with the 23 June Party Congress constitutional changes has become Secretary General, now the most powerful position in the country. He has announced a government monopoly on all imports, continued dedication to the principles of socialism, and a program to crush all attempts at division inside the Party or the country.

Since coming to power in 1977, Rene's leftist regime has been characterized by political chaos, racial tension, and economic decline. Since 1977, the country has experienced half a dozen coup scares, a foreign mercenary invasion, and a major mutiny in the Army. The Government continues to face threats from South African mercenaries abroad, who, financed by former President James Mancham, hope to mount an attack and countercoup against President Rene. Although a mercenary attack supported by Mancham failed in 1981, the exiles continue to seek ways to topple the current regime. In December 1983, a coup plot against the Rene government was uncovered that was planned by the Mouvement por la Resistance (MFR), one of five pro-Mancham opposition groups. In February 1984, additional reports claimed that two anti-Mancham Seychellois dissidents had arrived in Uganda, from London and Nairobi, to seek a new refuge from which to operate. Also, in March 1984, there were reports that European mercenaries were being trained simultaneously in South Africa and Israel for an attack on the Seychelles before June. In late September 1984, yet another coup plot was uncovered. Although the Government of the Seychelles continues to look to its
enemies abroad as the country's most serious threat to stability, and while some
anti-Rene plotting undoubtedly goes on, an imminent invasion by mercenaries is
unlikely.

Racism, one of the causes of the Army mutiny, has surfaced as the key
division among the Seychellois. The vast majority black population is dominated
by a small group of whites and mulattoes who are better educated and more
experienced in politics. The poor economy has exacerbated this problem and
helped widen the gulf between the white minority that runs the government and the
black populace.

The rapid deterioration of the economy also poses a serious threat to
the longer term stability of the Rene regime. Tourism, which accounts for 90
percent of the Seychelles foreign revenue, has experienced a serious decline in
recent years, mainly as a result of the government's radical image and the
recession in Europe. The Seychelles, which heretofore enjoyed one of the highest
standards of living among Indian Ocean and African nations, is fast on the way to
emulating the economic disasters of its political allies in Tanzania and
Madagascar.

A fourth, perhaps more serious threat to Rene's government, exists
within the military. The August 1982 mutiny, sparked by junior officers and
enlisted men in the Seychellois People's Liberation Army (SPLA) to overthrow
their senior officers and challenge Rene's ability to remain in power, destroyed
Rene's credibility and popular support. Army morale has improved somewhat since
that time, but the government has not yet faced some of the key causes of
dissatisfaction within the enlisted ranks and risks of another army mutiny remain
high, particularly if the economic situation does not improve. The SPLA was
established to maintain Rene's rule, however, it is not capable of putting down
any large-scale uprising without outside assistance. The Army continues to lack
discipline, is not well motivated, and could not be counted on in a serious
attack on the island. SPLA defense of any but Mahe, the main island, or, for
that matter, adequate surveillance and patrol of surrounding waters by the Navy
is virtually nonexistent. The only unit with reliable, tested military skills is
the commandos who receive the bulk of the training budget. They form the first
line of defense for President Rene whether against dissident SPLA or an invasion
force.

Significant problems notwithstanding, Rene remains the dominant
political figure in the Seychelles, and it is doubtful the present system could
survive his departure. His death or retirement almost certainly would
precipitate a power struggle between moderate and radical factions. Should a
successor regime turn toward the West, a small number of key military officers
(Soviet-trained and Soviet-influenced), perhaps aided by foreign troops, probably
would attempt to assume control of any successor regime and pattern it along
marxist lines.

The stability of the Rene regime is likely to remain fragile and will
continue to depend on security support from the Soviet Union and North Korea,
backing which guarantees these countries a degree of influence. Rene is gambling
that he can maintain a delicate east-west balance between his economic and
SEYCHELLES

security requirements. While he will attempt to keep the Seychelles in the nonaligned camp, any new security threat to his regime--real or perceived--could strengthen the Soviets' hand in the Seychelles.

Trier President Rene maintains a nonaligned posture and relies heavily on Third World sources to provide necessary military training and equipment to his fledging force. Officers and enlisted personnel have been trained primarily in the USSR, Tanzania, Algeria, and India. Rene initially turned to Tanzania in 1979, since the Tanzanians had helped train and equip the participants in the coup that brought him to power. Most of the Tanzanians departed in August of 1984 as Rene turned increasingly to the North Koreans.

Since 1977, the Seychelles has relied almost exclusively on weapons supplied by the Soviet Union. Initially, however, Rene sought Tanzanian military equipment, of Soviet types, and, more recently, air defense guns and ammunition from North Korea. In 1978, the Soviets began supplying the Seychelles with various military equipment including naval patrol craft, antiaircraft guns, trucks, and small arms and ammunition. In 1981, as the Seychelles continued to shift from its self-proclaimed nonaligned status toward a closer ideological identification with the Soviet Bloc, President Rene accepted seven Soviet military advisers to instruct the SPLA in communications and vehicle maintenance. This move provided a departure from the past Seychelles policy of accepting Soviet military equipment, but rejecting Soviets advisers and technicians. The same year the Soviets also delivered a Zhuk Class patrol boat. During 1983, the SPLA acquired two mobile coastal Sheet Bend radars equipped with Square Head IF, an antiaircraft defense system comprised of 10 shoulder-launched SA-7 surface-to-air missiles, and two BM-21 multiple rocket launchers. Antiaircraft defenses also were improved with the acquisition of a 14.7-mm cannon. The Soviet Navy has made several port calls to the Seychelles. Several visits were made during Rene's absence, apparently to bolster security while he was abroad. In December 1983, the Soviet Union donated 5,000 tons of marine diesel fuel to be stored in old tanks on Saint Anne's Island near the port of Victoria. The fuel is said to be exclusively for the use of the Seychellois patrol boats to enable them to mount a more effective surveillance of the country's economic zone. The Government of Seychelles remains adamant that the St. Anne's storage facility will not bunker any foreign vessels. Although neither the USSR or any other Communist Bloc country is known to have promised further naval assets, the Seychelles remains interested in enhancing its currently inadequate patrol boat fleet and has expressed interest in acquiring greater capability for air surveillance of its widespread island realm.

In April 1983, 56 North Korean military personnel arrived in the islands to train the SPLA in basic military skills and air defense techniques and restructure the Army emphasizing the use of small arms and quick reaction forces. They also train the presidential bodyguards and assist with airport security. The GOS reportedly is very satisfied with the levels of training supplied by the North Koreans, who maintain a very low profile and whose numbers have grown steadily.
2. (U) Key Officials:
- President, Minister for Administration, Agriculture, Finance, Industry, External Relations, and Tourism: France Albert Rene
- Minister for Youth and Defense and Commander of the SPLF: Col Ogilvie Berlouis
- Minister for National Development: Jacques Hodoul
- Deputy Secretary General, Seychelles People's Progressive Party, Chief of Staff, Seychelles People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and Commander, Militia: Lt Col James Michel
- Commander, Presidential Guard: Maj Claude Vidot
- Commander, Commando Unit: Col Bob Ndodyn
- Director of Intelligence and Chief of Presidential Security: Maj Roland Marie
- Commander, Naval Forces: Capt Raul Hodoul
- Commissioner, Air Wing: Captain Francois Jackson
- Commissioner of Police: James Pillay

3. (U) Military Budget: $8 million for fiscal year ending 31 December 1982; this is 12.6 percent of the central government budget. No service allocation nor percent of GNP are available. Dollar value converted from at the exchange rate of 6.2 Seychelles rupees equal $1.00.

4. (U) Population: 66,000 estimated as of July 1984
   (Approximately 75 percent of the population lives on the main island of Mahe)
- Military Manpower: Males (ages 15-49): 16,000; physically fit, 8,000
- Ethnic Divisions: Seychellois (a mixture of Asians, Africans, Europeans)
- Literacy: 60 percent adult; 75 percent school-age children

5. (U) Ground Forces:
   - Combat Units: eight infantry companies (vary in size from 50-200 men), 2 radar units.
   - Major Equipment: Most equipment has been supplied by the Soviet Union and Tanzania. The SPLA inventory includes 6 BRDM-2 armored cars, 2 BM-21 multiple rocket launchers, 6 37-mm antiaircraft guns, 10 SA-7/GRAIL shoulder-launched SAM systems, 10 75-mm recoiless rifles, 44 RPG-7 grenade launchers, 16 14.5-mm AAMGs, 9 12.7-mm AAMGs, and 4 Sheet Bend coastal surveillance radar systems.
   b. Presidential Protection Unit
   - Personnel Strength: 300
   - Combat Units: one Presidential Guard Unit (150-men) and one Commando Unit (150-men).

   Each unit reports directly and separately to the President. The Commandos, commanded by a Belgian mercenary, are structured as a rapid reaction and military police force. They are the elite SPDF unit and receive regular training in helicopter assault, patrolling, demolition, ambushes, and small unit tactics. The two units are located at the State House and Camp L'Exile (the President's House).

   Major Equipment: The Presidential Guard controls all the SPDF's air defense weapons and artillery (see para. 5. a.) The two Air Force Alouette helicopters are operationally assigned to the Commandos (see para. 7).
6. **Navy:**
Personnel Strength: 100 (estimated).
Ships: Five patrol craft (four available for operations, one not available).

7. **Air Force:**
Personnel Strength: 12 (estimated)
Aircraft: Two Alouette III helicopters (Chetak) and two Rallye utility aircraft, (also flies the President's Beechcraft Super King Air, a Merlin aircraft that belongs to the Island Development Company, and shares three Pilatus Britten-Norman Defenders with the Ministries of Agriculture and Fisheries).

8. **Paramilitary:**
a. **Police**
Personnel Strength: Approximately 500. This force remains separate from the Army and continues to be responsible for the maintenance of law and order. It consists of a Commissioner, a Deputy Commissioner, 6 senior and about 30 junior officers, and over 520 other ranks including a number of policewomen. The force is centered on Mahe with small detachments on Praslin, La Digue, and Silhouette Island. Included in the above is a special paramilitary force, the Police Mobile Unit, of about 125 personnel that has been formed to respond rapidly to emergencies in any part of the country.

b. **Militia**
Personnel Strength: 500 (with an additional 500 in the reserve). At one time composed of 2,000 men, the strength has been cut due to poor discipline and a lack of training resources. Occasionally it is called on to assist at road blocks and check points. Normally militia personnel are unarmed. It appears to be based on the Tanzanian pattern of providing military training to school dropouts, after which some are selected for further training with the Army.

9. **Key US Officials:**
Chief of Mission (Victoria): Ambassador David Fischer
Defense Attache: None

10. **Foreign Military Presence:**
a. **Foreign Military In-Country**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Advisers</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>to train SPDF in basic military skills and air defense techniques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. **Presence Abroad**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Branch</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>pilot training since July 1983 (6 are in a 4-year jet program)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
1. **Political-Military Situation:** The Republic of Sierra Leone received its independence from the United Kingdom in 1961. A constitution adopting the present form of republican government was put into effect in 1971. The House of Representatives (Parliament) appointed Siaka Stevens as President of the Republic in April 1971. The 97-member parliament consists of 85 elected members and 12 paramount chiefs. In June 1978, President Stevens strengthened his power base through a constitutional amendment calling for a single-party state and endorsing the All People's Congress (APC). General elections were held on 1 May 1982 for the first time since Sierra Leone became a single-party state. The elections were marked by violence and elections in 13 constituencies had to be canceled due to voting irregularities. Nevertheless, Stevens retained the presidency and his preeminent position. Forty members of parliament lost their seats. Of the 40 new members elected, 14 were members of the Temne ethnic group, 14 were Mendes, 5 were Creoles, 2 were Limbas, 2 were Konos, 2 were Doronkas, and 1 was a Susu. Thus, the elections produced a rather ethnically and regionally balanced parliament. Jusu-Sheriff, a Mende, and former leader of the now defunct Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), was named as Minister of Finance. Overall, the elections resulted in no significant policy changes in the Stevens government.

Discontent exists in Sierra Leone that in the past has motivated coup plotters and could do so again in the future. Among the concerns of Sierra Leoneans are growing economic problems, corruption that they perceive as causing decreases in government services—a deteriorating standard of living, inadequate medical care, and a lack of economic opportunity. Violence was widespread in 1983 and early 1984 and there were indications that middle-level and junior officers are becoming dissatisfied with the existing government.

Stevens appears to be in control of military and security forces as well as political events in Sierra Leone. However, a problem is likely to arise when Stevens, who is officially 77 years old, but is in reality closer to his mid-80s, leaves the political scene. There is no politician being groomed to replace him. Although the succession rules of the constitution call for the First Vice-President to serve as acting President until the APC elects a new secretary general (who would become the only candidate), Sierra Leone would likely experience a period of unrest. Sorie Koroma, the First Vice President, represents Temne interests but is in poor health. Francis Minah, the Second Vice President, is a Mende. He is an effective politician who would have the support of Lebanese businessmen and would be ruthless in advancing his interests. However, his chances of becoming President are limited because many consider him responsible for the recent violence in the Pujehun district. President Stevens, a charismatic leader, tightly controls the reins of government and closely controls the military. It is questionable that another politician in Sierra Leone could win the support of or at least control the political, ethnic, and security factions in Sierra Leone. Thus, it is likely that the Army could intervene during the post-Stevens transition until elections could be held.

Sierra Leone maintains cordial diplomatic relations with Communist countries, and has received military assistance from China, Soviet Union, North Korea, and Poland. In 1982, a delegation from the All People's
Congress National Youth League visited the People's Republic of China (PRC) and observed the activities of the All-China Youth Federation. Relations with Communist countries are based on economic, technical, and cultural interests of the Sierra Leone Government. China provides the largest economic and technical assistance of the Communist countries. Previously, Cubans trained members of the paramilitary Special Security Division; however, the Cuban instructors returned to Cuba in 1980 and were not replaced. Cuban-Sierra Leone relations are not as close as they were in the 1970s. Although the North Koreans initiated talks in 1981 to develop irrigation projects in Sierra Leone, no action was taken. Monthly Soviet Aeroflot flights initiated in 1981 continue. In that same year, the USSR and Sierra Leone concluded a fisheries agreement. The Soviets are suspected by officials of overfishing in Sierra Leone waters. Generally, Communist countries have negligible influence on domestic politics.

Recently, Sierra Leone has enhanced its ties with the West. In 1982, a US Mobile Training Team (MTT) trained the newly established Sierra Leone Navy in basic seamanship skills. The one operational ship in the Navy was provided by the British in 1981. Sierra Leone also maintains an International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) with the US. During the Falkland Islands crisis in 1982, the Government of Sierra Leone permitted the British to reprovision their ships at the Port of Freetown en route to the Falkland Islands. Sierra Leone established closer ties with Arab States in 1982 when it became a member of the Islamic Development Bank.

There is no current external threat confronting the government of Sierra Leone. Relations with neighboring states are correct, if not cordial. Even relations with Liberia improved as both countries cooperated to stem the flow of refugees from Sierra Leone's Pujehun District into Liberia during the fall of 1983 when violence caused excessive damage and required force to quell.

The military is a potential threat to Sierra Leone's current government primarily because the loyalty of the military is suspect. Stevens tends to rely more on the Special Security Division, and his military commanders do not have direct access to arms rooms. Currently, Stevens appears to have the military under control. The leadership believes that the armed forces should be apolitical and subordinate to civilian authority. Moreover, there is a series of competing informant networks throughout every Sierra Leonean institution that acts as a check on conspiracies since it creates an environment in which people fear they are being watched. Nevertheless, there is discontent in the Army over a deteriorating quality of life while observing that government officials and wealthy Sierra Leoneans are improving their standard of living. However, historically the Army has acted in the interests of the country as a whole when it intervened in politics and is, in fact, more pro-West than the current government.

The Government claims a policy of nonalignment; both Cuba and the People's Republic of China maintain a presence within the country. The Chinese remain actively engaged in agricultural projects.
About 70 percent of Sierra Leone's population is involved in subsistence agriculture. A country rich in minerals, Sierra Leone has relied upon the mining sector, and especially diamonds, as the primary economic resource. The economy has declined as a result of the general slowdown in the world economies and the increased cost of oil imports. Soft markets and low prices for its major mineral and agricultural exports, declining crop production, high energy costs, and extensive smuggling and black marketeering, have all contributed to the problems. Diamonds have consistently accounted for half of Sierra Leone's export earnings. Sierra Leone's gross domestic product amounted to $800 million or $232 per capita in 1981.

The mission of the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force (RSLMF) is to maintain internal security, to defend the country against external aggression, and to provide contingents for ceremonial occasions. The RSLMF is not capable of sustained combat or of controlling widespread internal disorder, but it could quell a local disturbance. The military forces are directly subordinate to the President and closely monitored by him. Its long involvement in the turmoil of Sierra Leone's political affairs has had an adverse effect upon morale and seriously reduced its effectiveness. Elements of the Armed Forces are reported to be weary of corruption and incompetence in the Government. The President has attempted to improve the morale of both the Army and the Police by appointing the Armed Forces Commander and the Commissioner of Police as members of Parliament and Ministers of State. The Army has conducted field training exercises, civic action, and self-help projects to keep the men more fully occupied. Training is conducted primarily at the Benguema Training Center. The sports-minded Commander of the Armed Forces, Brigadier Momoh, includes intramural activities in the military's training as one way to keep the troops occupied and their minds off coup-plotting. Much of the defense budget appears to supplement the allowances of ranking officers. Apparently, the troops are satisfied with their salaries and are further compensated with rice subsidies and free electricity.

Sierra Leone has no military equipment production capability. The primary supplier of military equipment historically has been the UK, with grant aid valued at $6 million in 1964. That aid was all in the form of training and technical assistance. In 1980, the USSR delivered a patrol boat valued at $2.5 million; in 1981 the UK delivered a patrol craft.

Key Officials:
President: Siaka P. Stevens
Minister of Defense: Siaka P. Stevens
Minister of Finance: Dr. Abdulai Conteh
Armed Forces: Commander, Major General Joseph S. Momoh
Army Chief of Staff: Brigadier Sheku Tarawalli
Permanent Secretary of Defense (Acting): T. D. Mutturi
Police: Acting Commissioner, John Grant
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Dr. Sheka Kanu
Chief, Special Security Division: M. S. Dumbuya
3. **Military Budget:** $22.8 million for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1983; this is 8.1 percent of the central government budget. No service allocation nor percent of GNP is available. Dollar value converted from leones at the exchange rate of 0.7925 leones equal $1.00.

4. (U) **Population:** 3,805,000 estimated as of 1 July 1984
- Males (ages 15-49): 840,000; physically fit, 408,000
- Ethnic Divisions: Over 99 percent indigenous African, 13 tribes; remainder European and Asian
- Literacy (1975): About 10 percent

5. **Army:**
- Personnel Strength: 3,000 (150 officers)
- Reserve: None
- Combat Units: Two battalions. The 1st Battalion, stationed at Wilberforce Barracks in Freetown (BE-0780-00041, CAT: 90110, coord: 08-28-06N 013-15-33W) consists of four rifle companies; the 2d Battalion, stationed at Makeni, consists of three rifle companies.
- Major Equipment: 20 Swiss Mowag armored cars; unknown number of 122-mm rocket launchers; 60-mm and 82-mm mortars; and machineguns.

6. **Navy:** (Coast Guard)
- Personnel Strength: 5 officers, 40 enlisted.
- Mission: The mission of the RSLMF Navy Wing is fisheries control, search and rescue, and antismuggling operations.
- Capabilities: The Navy has minimal capability at the present time due to insufficient equipment, training status, and maintenance capability.
- Equipment: One operational 63-foot Tracker II patrol boat purchased from a British firm in 1981, and one nonoperational ex-Soviet 180 foot side trawler. Three of the officers have spent approximately 6 years training in Ethiopia, India, and Nigeria, and they are training the remaining officers (recruited from civil marine engineer status), and the enlisted men, who have little or no seafaring experience. All of the enlisted men came from the Army.
- Command and Control: There is no clear cut head of the Navy; leadership is shared among the three trained officers.

7. **Air Force:** None. The Sierra Leone Government has three helicopters including one MBB BO-105 helicopter and two AEROSPATIALE AS-355s. All helicopters are used for VIP travel. The helicopters are maintained by a German and French technicians under contract. The military does not have access to the helicopters.

8. (U) **Paramilitary:**
- National Police Force: A 3,300 national police force supports the Army in maintaining local security. The 800-man Internal Security Unit (ISU), believed to be subordinate to the police, is charged with riot control and Presidential guard duty. Its members are ill disciplined but well armed.
9. (U) **Key US Officials:**
   **Chief of Mission (Freetown):** Ambassador Alexander W. Lewis

10. **Foreign Military Presence:** None
VIIIth held pursuant to exemption
(b)(3) 10 USC 424
of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act.
SOMALIA

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SOMALIA

a. (U) Key Government Officials

President and Secretary General of the Somali Socialist Revolutionary Party (SSRP): Maj Gen Mohamed Siad Barre
Minister of Defense and First Vice President: Lt Gen Mohamed Ali Samantar
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Abduraham Jama Barre
Commander, National Security Service: Gen Mohamed Jibril Mussa

b. Type and Stability of Government

The Somali Democratic Republic is ruled by Mohamed Siad Barre on the basis of a complicated and interlocking system of authority and control. Siad exercises great power by the skillful and simultaneous manipulation of traditional tribal relations, unofficial elite groups, and modern mass participation political instruments and techniques.

On 21 October 1969, Somalia's parliamentary government was overthrown in a coup d'état led by Major General Mohamed Siad Barre and other senior military officers. The coup leaders stated that their action was motivated by the increasing corruption and nepotism that was prevalent in the civilian regime. They established the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) consisting of military and police officers. Parliament and political parties were abolished. The country's name was subsequently changed to the Somali Democratic Republic.

The SRC, under the direction of Siad Barre who was named president of the republic, established a socialist society and economy guided by the doctrine of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. The Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) was formed in 1976, with Soviet prompting. Although the change was intended to reduce the role of the military in governmental affairs, real power continued to be exercised by Siad and a small group of military and police officers. The Somali political structure evolved further in 1979 with the introduction of a new Constitution that provided for a national legislature, the People's Assembly, which elected Siad president in 1980. The changes ushered in by the new Constitution, were very limited. The political supremacy of the SRSP, particularly its Central Committee composed of Siad's small circle of advisers, was reaffirmed by this document.

The new constitution and reorientation toward greater civilian involvement in the decisionmaking process came after an abortive military coup attempt in 1978. Opposition to Siad's rule had surfaced in the armed forces in response to his handling of the 1977-78 Ogaden War, particularly its latter phase when he decided to withdraw from the region without organizing any final defensive efforts. The coup attempt was harshly suppressed by Siad and his supporters with the execution of leading plotters followed by the purge of the upper echelon of the Army. Many of the surviving coup sympathizers, primarily Majertain clan members, fled to Ethiopia where they formed the core of the Somali Salvation Front (SSF), which has since become the Somali Democratic Salvation Front (SDSF).

15 October 1984
Siad's movement to greater civilian participation in government came to an abrupt halt in October 1980 when he declared a state of emergency and reconstituted his group of military counselors, the SRC. This renewed official collaboration with the armed forces followed a series of military setbacks in the Ogaden that precipitated the inundation of Somalia by refugees and exacerbated already severe economic conditions. Siad ended the state of emergency in March 1982 attempting to placate growing criticism within his regime and instances of civil unrest in the north. In response to the allegations that his policies were directly contributing to the growing economic deterioration, tribalism, and corruption in Somalia, Siad made numerous cabinet changes and enacted some economic reforms. The discontent failed to subside, however, and actually gained impetus in the north due largely to the Somali National Movement (SNM), an anti-Siad organization dominated by the Issak clan.

In an apparent effort to capitalize on these various sources of instability, Ethiopia launched attacks against Somali positions along the central border area in June 1982. The Ethiopian forces, reinforced by the SDSF, overwhelmed the undermanned and underequipped Somali Army units in the vicinity of the villages of Bilenbale and Goldogob. These incursions, rather than bringing about the demise of the Siad regime, resulted in an alliance of the central government with its opponents against the common enemy, Ethiopia. In addition, Siad's status as the preeminent national and military leader of Somalia was enhanced by the rapid and generous Arab and Western responses to appeals for assistance. This unusual 2 years of national unity is ending as the stalemate on the battlefield continues and the threat posed by the Ethiopian occupation of traditional Somali territory loses its sense of urgency.

c. Internal Threat

Since coming to power via a coup in 1969, Siad has ruled Somalia by keeping the Army placated and the tensions among the different clans and subclans within controllable limits. Using this political strategy he has succeeded in maintaining his rule but has been left with little time for effective administration. Though the Siad regime has encountered only one narrow-based coup attempt in 1978, it has to confront several other sources of internal instability.

Among the most serious internal obstacles to stability is the rampant tribalism that defines Somali society. There are six major tribes in Somalia, further divided into clan and subclan groups, to which nearly all Somalis feel they owe first loyalty. President Siad, himself, has been guilty of slighting the concept of a central government with his continual displays of favoritism to his own Marehan clan which, in turn, is an important source of his power. Though there is no question of the Marehan's loyalty, there is a major problem of allegiance among several subclans of the Majertains who inhabit strategic areas along the central border with Ethiopia. The dissident elements of the Majertains have extended significant support to the anti-Siad Somali Democratic Salvation Front (SDSF) whose successful insurgent activities serve as a model for other dissatisfied tribal groups.
Tribal unrest also exists among the Issaks and has taken on a regional character pitting the north against the southern-based central government. The Issaks, who predominate in the north, have long felt discriminated against in matters relating to the allocation of economic development funds, inadequate access to commercial services, and inadequate representation in the central government. Discontent came to a head in early 1982 with riots in Hargeisa and civil disturbances in other northern locations. Following a crackdown, many important Issaks defected to the dissident Somali National Movement (SNM) based in Ethiopia. President Siad attempted to defuse the northern situation by sending delegations to negotiate with local dignitaries, but was compelled to travel there himself in February 1983, following the daring SNM raid on Mandera Prison the previous month. The popularity of the central government apparently increased somewhat after Siad promised several economic reforms and declared an amnesty, whose scope was originally thought to cover northerners arrested for crimes against the state. Much of this goodwill was lost, however, when several political prisoners were returned to custody. Problems have also surfaced with the Hawiya clan family, the subtribes of which have warred openly against Siad Barre's Marehan tribe and even against Somali regular army units. Problems with the Issaks and Hawiya have been so serious that during 1983, President Siad virtually removed all of them from significant military commands.

The stability of the Siad regime is also threatened by a host of economic problems. Somalia is one of the world's poorest nations. Its current economic difficulties are a result of a poor resource base, centralized mismanagement, corruption, lingering dislocations caused by a severe drought, a large refugee population, and the burden of heavy military spending. Popular discontent has been kept in check by Western and Arab largesse, assistance programs by international lending institutions, and Somali Government economic reforms designed to strengthen the private sector at the expense of previous socialist practices.

The Armed Forces present Siad with the greatest potential internal threat though it is also one of his most important sources of power. Siad has managed to keep the military under control by the use of a network of informants, a pervasive intelligence apparatus, the placement of fellow clansmen in key military assignments, and by efforts to upgrade and increase the equipment and weapons inventories. In spite of these precautions and expenditures, however, discontent within the military persists because of the country's poor economic condition, weapon obsolescence, inadequate training, poor morale resulting from adverse conditions of service, and the embarrassing stalemate in the conflict with Ethiopia. Military assistance from the United States, Italy, and certain Arab countries has improved morale somewhat, but morale remains an overall problem.

d. External Threat

The greatest external threats to Somalia as perceived by the Somalis and the US are the Ethiopian regular forces and Somali dissident groups. The relationship between the two states is one of open hostility, that has
resulted in ongoing conflict that could widen in scope at any time. Although the possibility exists for a major conventional attack by Ethiopia, the current probability is somewhat reduced due to Ethiopia's President Mengistu's position as chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Ethiopia is interested in the overthrow of President Siad's regime, replacement with a weaker government more favorable to its position on the Ogaden issue, and a government that would remove US facilities from the country. Ethiopian support of two major Somali dissident groups, the Somali Democratic Salvation Front (SDSF) and the Somali National Movement (SNM) are the primary vehicles through which Ethiopia is attempting to accomplish its objectives.

Somalia is, however, as much at fault in this relationship as is Ethiopia. Since the early 1960s, Somalia has intermittently supported and directed insurgency in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia as part of an effort to unite under one flag all ethnic Somalis many of whom live in or migrate into the Ogaden for pastorage. Somalia ultimately launched an invasion of the Ogaden in July 1977 in an attempt to capitalize on a revolution-torn Ethiopia. However, with massive Soviet assistance and a Cuban expeditionary force of 17,000, the Ethiopians managed to drive the Somalis from the region in March 1978. Since the end of the war, the Ogaden insurgency has undergone phases of varying intensity, with regular Somali units again operating in the region in 1979. In 1980, though a dramatic shift in the conflict occurred with a carefully planned and well-executed offensive that enabled Ethiopian forces to reoccupy much of the Ogaden and gain military superiority along the border. As Ethiopia consolidated its gains in the Ogaden, it conducted incursions into Somalia until June 1981 and then limited its activity to sporadic artillery and small arms exchanges until the summer of 1982. In June 1982, Ethiopian military units, in cooperation with the forces of the Somali Democratic Salvation Front (SDSF), attacked Somali positions in the vicinity of the disputed central border area. The Ethiopians, supported by superior air, artillery, and armor forces, overwhelmed the poorly equipped, undermanned, and dispirited Somali units. Since July, static, fortified positions have been manned by both sides within Somali-claimed territory around Balenbale and Goldogob that are currently the scenes of intermittent, light fighting. The Somalis would like to launch major attacks to retake Balenbale and Goldogob but they do not feel they have sufficient armor or air cover to do so with the equipment they currently possess or expect to receive. Politically, they cannot tolerate a failed attempt to retake either town. At the present time, however, given the balance of forces in the combat area the Ethiopians would be capable of resisting any conventional Somali attempt to expell them from their locations. And, considering the longstanding animosity between Ethiopia and Somalia, no settlement of the Ogaden dispute is likely in the near future is likely, though third party efforts are being made in this direction. As a result, Ethiopia, with one of the largest and best-equipped armed forces in Sub-Saharan Africa, will continue to pose the most significant external threat to Somalia.

In addition to direct attacks by its regular forces, Ethiopia has supported the activities of the anti-Siad Somali Democratic Salvation Front (SDSF). The SDSF was formed in October 1981 when the Somali Salvation Front (SSF) aligned itself with two minor ideologically oriented, anti-Siad
organizations. Senior military officers of the Somali Majertain tribe, who fled to Ethiopia after staging an unsuccessful coup attempt against Siad in April 1978, form the core of the SSF. The original concept of the SSF anticipated that its insurgent activities would serve as an umbrella organization under which all anti-Siad opposition groups would unite. Intertribal frictions, however, have been severe obstacles to the implementation of this plan. The SDSF has been noted operating in all regions of the Ogaden but has usually concentrated its activities in the central border area where large numbers of Majertains live. The SDSF insurgents have received training and backing from both Ethiopia and Libya; material assistance from Ethiopia, Libya, and South Yemen; and at least moral support from the Soviet Union. The strength of the SDSF is estimated to be about 3,000 men formed into units that can operate independently or in conjunction with Ethiopian ground units. The SDSF has a variety of weapons and equipment including small arms, crew-served weapons, trucks, and armored vehicles. Early in its existence, the SDSF limited its activities to mining roads and conducting raids against small, isolated targets. In the latter half of 1981, SDSF units began to stage raids against Somali border towns. In June 1982, the SDSF escalated its operations by joining regular Ethiopian units in incursions along the disputed border. In the course of these attacks, the SDSF suffered heavy casualties that brought about morale problems, characterized by heavy desertions, and created recruitment difficulties. In addition, this clear-cut collaboration with Ethiopia has harmed the SDSF's cause among potential supporters within Somalia. The SDSF continues to stage guerrilla attacks against Somali civilian and military targets while maintaining more conventional positions within Ethiopian lines along the border area. The effectiveness of those attacks was demonstrated on 16 July and 5 September 1983, when the SDSF attacked two Somali battalions positions, inflicting very heavy casualties and taking or destroying much of those units' equipment. In an attempt to broaden its base and preserve its position as the primary anti-Siad organization, the SDSF has been seeking, with some success, a more formal alliance with the Somali National Movement (SNM). The SDSF will continue to pose a significant insurgent problem to Somalia in the border region, but due to both internal and external tribal strains its ability to threaten the Siad regime will be limited.

Ethiopia also supports the anti-Siad guerrilla operations of the Somali National Movement (SNM). The SNM is primarily composed of Issaks, the predominant tribe of northern Somalia. The SNM originated in the mid-1970s when Issaks working in Persian Gulf countries organized under the leadership of political dissidents. In 1971, the SNM was formally established in London but moved its headquarters to Addis Ababa in March 1982. In concert with this shift, the SNM began to organize a military wing with support from both Ethiopia and Libya. By the fall of 1982, the SNM threat to Somalia became a reality with increasing instances of attacks on both road traffic and police posts as well as kidnappings. The raid on Mandere Prison and the nearby military training camp in January 1983 by the SNM indicated a much improved capability of projecting its military forces as well as its significant base of support among the local populace. The SNM, for instance, currently has a fighting force of between 500 and 1,000 men and is attempting to gain access to sophisticated arms and equipment from Libya. Following the Mandere incident a harsh crackdown by the much disliked northern military commander, Brig Gen Ganni, caused the atmosphere
in the north to become so unsettled that Said felt compelled to travel there in February. In an effort to calm tempers and undercut popular support for the SNM, Siad declared a number of reforms designed to appeal to the pragmatic Issaks. Nevertheless, his failure to effectively follow through with promises, canceled most of the positive aspects derived from the trip. Siad’s decision to appoint a senior Issak as the Governor of a major northern city in September 1984, has been considered by Issak elders to be a sign that Siad is planning to improve central government relations with the Issaks. Nevertheless, the threat to the Siad regime from the SNM also depends on that organization’s ability to extract greater assistance from Ethiopia and Libya. These nations have been reluctant to extend more aid to the SNM in the absence of greater linkages, especially those creating cooperation and urification with the SDSF. In mid-1984, several Djiboutian citizens pledged financial support and assistance during the Congress of SNM in Ethiopia.

Neither neighboring Kenya nor Djibouti pose a significant threat to the Siad regime. Somalia’s continued preoccupation with forming a Greater Somalia uniting all Somali people, some of whom reside within the territorial boundaries of northeast Kenya and Djibouti, established the basis for Somali irredentist claims to those areas. This concept remains a primary source of tension between Somalia and its neighbors. Somalia has not acted overtly to implement its objective in those countries primarily due to the French military support and presence in Djibouti as well as Somali realization that such actions would be incongruous with US interests.

e. Communist Influence

The Soviet Union first gained a foothold in Somalia in the mid-1960s by providing military assistance to Mogadishu. Soviet influence increased dramatically after Siad came to power in 1969, primarily because of ideological compatibility between Soviet Communism and Siad’s Marxist brand of “scientific socialism,” as well as the Somali desire to upgrade its military capabilities. By the mid-1970s the Soviet-Somali alliance was cemented by military and economic assistance and capped by a 1974 Friendship Treaty—the first with an African nation. The Soviets developed and utilized extensive military facilities there in exchange for the provision of military equipment and advisory assistance to Somalia.

During this period of close Soviet-Somali association, Somalia’s exposure to Communist influence was substantial within the Government and the military. In late 1976, the Soviets also started to provide limited military assistance to Somalia’s chief rival in the area, Ethiopia. By supplying military equipment to both Somalia and Ethiopia, the Soviets hoped to control the amount of arms flowing into the region and, thereby, the level of conflict between these two historical antagonists. As the source of arms for both countries, the USSR felt that it would eventually be able to would assume the role of arbitrator and negotiate a settlement between Somalia and Ethiopia that would leave the Soviets with a high degree of influence in the area. In July 1977, Soviet plans received a setback when Somali forces invaded the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, an area claimed by Somalia because it is largely inhabited by ethnic Somalis. Because of
the increasing quantities of arms the Soviets were supplying to the Ethiopians, and the impact those weapons were having on the fighting in the Ogaden, President Siad terminated 14 years of close military cooperation with the USSR in November 1977. All Soviet military advisers were expelled and Somalia renounced the 1974 Soviet-Somali Friendship Treaty. Though Somalia and the Soviet Union still maintain diplomatic ties, their relationship remains strained and is characterized by Somali accusations that Moscow instigates Ethiopia's aggression. It is unlikely that relations will improve given the Somalis' current border conflict with Ethiopia whose military capabilities are heavily dependent on Soviet assistance.

(U) Relations with Cuba, which were broken at the time of the Soviet expulsion, remain completely severed.

Relations between Somalia and the PRC reached a low point in early 1982 primarily due to Somalia's inability to pay for Chinese military assistance. After the border incursions by Ethiopia in June 1982, however, Chinese interest in Somalia increased. In addition to providing Somalia economic assistance, the PRC also has a team of air force advisers supporting the F-6 aircraft and has considered assisting the Somali Navy.

North Korea provided Somalia with $3-4 million worth of small arms and ammunition early in 1982. The North Koreans also have a small group of advisers involved in the operation of an ammunition factory outside of Mogadishu. Nevertheless, relations between Somalia and North Korea have been steadily deteriorating since late 1983 due to North Korea's increasing support to Ethiopia.

Despite the fact that relations with Communist nations are currently low key, individuals remain within the armed forces who spent formative years in training in the USSR. Some would like to return to the Soviet style of military assistance. However, tribal politics is more likely to determine the government in Somalia than Communist ideology.

f. Economic Factors

Somalia, one of the world's poorest countries, has few natural resources on which to base economic development. Manufacturing is rudimentary and primarily involved in food processing and producing import substitutes. Somalia's most important economic activity has been livestock husbandry with live animals generating 80-85 percent of this country's export earnings. In 1983, Saudi Arabia banned the importation of Somali animals, which has severely limited export earnings, leaving Somalia in an even worse economic position. Few animals have been exported since mid-1983. Other leading exports are bananas, hides, and skins. Major imports are textiles, cereals, transport equipment, machinery, construction material and equipment, and petroleum products. Leading trading partners are Arab countries and Italy.

Somalia has no military equipment production capability. In terms of value of equipment delivered (over $400 million) the USSR has been the major supplier. The last Soviet military agreement with Somalia, however, was in
1976 and final shipments were made in 1977. The principal suppliers since 1978 have been Italy ($419 million) and Egypt ($133 million), with Saudi Arabia picking up most of the payments. In addition, the US recently began to provide over $76 million worth of equipment to Somalia per terms of the 1980 access agreement.

Saudi Arabia continues to provide the Somalis with economic support although less arrived in 1983 than in previous years. Economic assistance has included payment of the crude oil contract between Somalia and Saudi Arabia. The Saudis sold oil to Somalia at $36 ($25 US) per barrel. As of early 1984, the Saudi petroleum agency has offered to renew the basic crude oil contract but the Saudi government has not shown a willingness to assume payment as they did in 1983. In February 1984, the Saudis provided Somalia a limited amount of military equipment which included Panhard armored cars, Panhard armored personnel carriers, (APCs), artillery, and antiaircraft weapons. President Siad's successful negotiations with the Saudi Government in August 1984, have resulted in balance of payments support that should permit Somalia to close out 1984 without a major financial crisis. The Saudi Government also reportedly offered Somalia 100,000 metric tons of crude oil and financing for approximately $2 million worth of military communications equipment.

g. Military and Political Alignment

In November 1977 President Siad announced the abrogation of the 1974 Soviet-Somali Friendship Treaty and expelled all Soviet military personnel, thus ending 14 years of close military cooperation with the Soviets. Concurrently, relations between Somalia and Arab nations improved as many of these nations began to provide military assistance. A limiting factor on the amount of aid from many Arab countries had been Somalia's support of Egypt on the issues of the Camp David Accords. Egypt repaid Somalia for this support by supplying Somalia with significant amounts of heavy military equipment such as medium tanks and artillery. Somalia has subsequently repaired its relations with other conservative Arab countries particularly Saudi Arabia. Relations with Western nations also have improved. Increased interest in Southwest Asia led to the signing of a facilities access agreement with the United States in August 1980, granting the US use of ports and airfields at Mogadishu and Berbera. In exchange for use of these facilities, the US will provide some $32 million (US dollars) worth of defensive military equipment to Somalia in FY 1984. Somalia is a member of the Organization of African Unity, and was the first non-Arab member of the Arab League, and is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement and the UN.

h. (U) Key US Officials

Chief of Mission (Mogadishu): Vacant

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(h)
SOMALIA

2. MILITARY, GENERAL

a. (U) Key Military Officials

Minister of Defense: Lt Gen Mohamed Ali Samantar
Army: Commander, Lt Gen Mohamed Ali Samantar
Navy: Commander, Admiral Mohamed Omar Osman
Air Force: Acting Commander, Colonel Mohamed Nur Dudi
Air Defense: Commander, Colonel Siad Daoud Judai
Chief, Military Intelligence and Security Service: Lt Col Abdiweli Mohamed Sheik Hussein
National Police: Maj Gen Abdi Duale

b. Position of the Armed Forces

The President, Major General Siad, is the Commander in Chief of the Somali National Army (SNA), which is the mainstay of his regime. The Navy, Air Force, and Air Defense forces are subordinate to the SNA. Historically, the military has been held in reasonably high regard by the Somali people; however, their image has suffered due to Ethiopia's continued occupation of Balenbale and Goldogob. This state of affairs has seriously hurt officer morale and Siad Barre has done what he could to remedy this situation and bolster the image of the Army within the society by acquiring new and more sophisticated military equipment and training from abroad. His efforts thus far have helped, but grumbling within the ranks of the Somali Officer corps continues due to perceived shortcomings of foreign military assistance. Today, many younger officers advocate closer ties to the West and hope for strengthened relations with Western Europe and especially the United States. Nevertheless, many Soviet-oriented senior officers remain pro-Soviet.

Despite public protestations against tribalism, balanced clan representation in the military remains a sensitive if not a critical issue. During the past years President Siad has removed virtually all Hawiya and Issak officers from major commands and has replaced them with officers from more loyal tribes. Within the Ministry of Defense, most senior officers hold prestigious positions because of their demonstrated loyalty to the current regime and not as a result of their military record or capabilities. These strategies are used by Siad to increase his personal control over the military. Although President Siad survived the 9 April 1978 coup attempt, just as he had survived previous power struggles, he remains vulnerable to future challenges from a dissatisfied military.

c. Military Trends and Capabilities

The SNA underwent a period of rapid expansion and reorganization during the 1977-78 Ogaden War, reaching an estimated strength of about 60,000 in the ground forces. During the expansion, militia and police were integrated.

By late 1984 the Somali military is expected to be restructured. Key personnel changes will also take place.
into regular ground units. Some 40,000 personnel were deployed to the Ogaden at the height of the fighting. When the tide turned in Ethiopia's favor, most Somali units were forced to withdraw. While taking only moderate casualties, the SNA was forced to leave large amounts of heavy equipment behind. An estimated 30 to 40 percent of prewar inventories of major items of equipment were lost to the advancing Cuban and Ethiopian forces. The results of the war, together with the abrogation of the Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union, and the inability of Siad to obtain a major source of arms, marked the beginning of a steady decline in SNA capabilities.

As evidenced by recent equipment acquisitions, the SNA has been making a concerted effort to reverse the downward trend by upgrading its mobility and antiarmor capabilities, both of which are essential to an effective defense of Somali borders. The Army's equipment acquisitions, however, have not begun to match the amount of Soviet equipment flowing into Ethiopia. The continuing conflict with Ethiopia and the resulting loss of weapons and equipment have further detracted from any gains that might have been made by the SNA. The steady expenditure of scarce ammunition and POL stores has placed an increasingly severe strain on the logistic system. As a result, the SNA has not come close to approaching military parity with Ethiopia, and will remain hard pressed to defend against any further Ethiopian attacks into Somali territory. Foreign military assistance to the Somali military has not significantly altered the inferior state of Somali readiness compared with Ethiopia.

Somalia's overall military capability is extremely poor. The Somali military lacks an offensive capability and does not have a logistics system which can sustain an offensive effort. There are severe ammunition and spare parts shortages in the forward units along the Ethiopian border. This situation is further complicated by a food shortage experienced by forward units in early 1984, as well as poor morale.

The Somali military is controlled centrally by the Ministry of Defense (MOD) that limits initiative and reduces efficiency. Guidance is dispatched from the MOD headquarters to the sector commanders, through long-range radio communication; however, communications equipment within Army units is in short supply.

Officer leadership tends to range from very good to extremely poor. Military unit proficiency tends to be directly tied to the ability of the commander. Where the officer is motivated and has received training, the unit has some combat efficiency. Nevertheless, overall poor leadership tends to outweigh good leadership.

d. Military Budget

Military Budget: $85.2 the fiscal year ending 31 December 1983; 29.5 percent of the central government budget. No service allocation is available. Dollar value converted at the exchange rate of 25.74 Somali shillings equal $1.00.
e. (U) Population

6,393,000 estimated 1 July 1984. Average annual growth rate 2.3 percent
Males (ages 15-49): 1,248,000; physically fit, 674,000
Ethnic Divisions: 85 percent Hilo-Hamitic speaking. The rest mainly Bantu-
    Speakers; 30,000 Arabs, 3,000 Europeans, 800 Asians
Literacy (1979): 60 percent
3. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

a. Army

(1) Mission

(U) To protect the territorial integrity of the nation and assist police and other paramilitary organizations in maintaining internal security.

(2) Capabilities

The abrogation of the Soviet-Somali Friendship Treaty and the subsequent ouster of the Soviets in November 1977 terminated 14 years of military cooperation between the two countries. Until that time, the Somalis had been the principal recipients of Soviet military aid in Sub-Saharan Africa, receiving some $400 million worth of equipment. When the flow of equipment, spare parts, and technical advisers halted, the Somali logistic base rapidly deteriorated. Subsequent major equipment losses in the 1977-78 Ogaden War resulted in the severe decline of the operational capabilities of the SNA. These problems, together with the task of defending an extremely broad front—some 1,800 km—with many of its 11 divisions undermanned, has rendered Somalia's capability to protect its border marginal at best. The poor overall condition of the SNA has been highlighted by the recent conflict with Ethiopia along the central border region. The main problems facing the SNA continue to be low inventories of serviceable equipment (especially armor, field artillery, and antitank weapons); an inadequate logistics system (characterized by low stores of ammunition, fuel, rations, and repair capability); a primitive communications network, and units plagued by leadership, manning, and morale problems. Somalia has sought and received some equipment, spare parts, and technical assistance from a variety of Western and Arab countries. The influx of aid, however, has not been great enough to offset the numerically superior, Soviet-backed forces fielded by its traditional enemy, Ethiopia.

In addition, the attacks by the Somali Democratic Salvation Front (SDSF) and the Somali National Movement (SNM) at numerous locations within Somalia have demonstrated the Somali Army's inability to conduct effective counterinsurgency operations in coordination with local paramilitary forces.

(3) Personnel Strength

36,000

(4) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

The President exercises authority over the Armed Forces through the Minister of Defense. The Minister is assisted by two assistant ministers of defense which have subordinate to them a series of directorates. The Somali National Army consists of the SNA headquarters at Mogadishu and four defensive headquarters: 26th Sector headquartered at Hargeisa, 54th Sector headquartered at Garowe, the 21st Corps headquartered at Dusa Mareb, and the
Southern Sector with the 60th Sector headquartered at Baadioa. These sector commands have 11 subordinate divisions. Additionally, there are two administrative military districts in the Mogadishu and Chismaio areas.

(b) Ground Combat Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary of Major Tactical Units</th>
<th>Strength Per Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 Sectors</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 divisions</td>
<td>9,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 infantry brigades</td>
<td>3,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 mechanized infantry brigades</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 armor brigades</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 FA brigades</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 commando brigades</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 motorized infantry brigade</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Army Aviation Units

None

(d) Deployment

Somalia’s 11 infantry divisions are divided among the sector areas, with 3 assigned to the Northern, 3 to North Central, 3 to the Central, and 2 to the Southern. The combat brigades of the divisions are deployed across the most likely avenues of approach to Somalia from Ethiopia, control key transportation and communication junctions, or are stationed in areas potentially disloyal to the central government.

The USSR was the primary supplier of equipment to Somalia from 1963 to 1977. Major items the Somali Army acquired included T-54/55 medium tanks, field artillery, armored cars, and armored personnel carriers. A significant percentage of Somalia’s ground equipment was destroyed in the Ogaden War and many of the losses have not been replaced. Small arms, ammunition, artillery pieces, trucks, medium tanks, and APCs have been provided by both Western and Arab countries, but there still remains a shortage of major items of military equipment in the ground inventory.

The most critical categories of weapons that the Somali ground forces require are antitank weapons, field artillery, and armor. Two of the most effective weapons in the Somali inventory are the Mil3A1, Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) with the TOW missile system and the jeep mounted 106-mm recoilless rifle. It has been reported, however, that the poorly maintained jeeps often break down during use in the rough terrain that typifies the current combat area.
Somali field artillery generally suffers from problems associated with aging, which results in decreased tube-life as well as deteriorated sighting mechanisms. Some relief to this situation has been brought about by the 105-mm howitzers, numbering in excess of 70, which were received primarily from Italy in 1982. This acquisition will cause a new artillery brigade to be formed as well as enable the replacement of dated and dilapidated inventories. The 18 anticipated 155-mm howitzers from the United States will enhance the preparedness of Somali artillery. As with other significant weaponry these weapons will most assuredly be dispatched to support units directing Somali efforts in the central border area.

The Somali armor inventory is also suffering from a lack of maintenance and problems associated with age, including some of the most recently acquired items, the T-54/55 medium tanks from Egypt and the M-47 medium tanks from Italy. And it is unlikely that the Somalis are capable of maintaining the M113 APCs for very long without US or other nation assistance. Overall, it is estimated that only 50 percent of Somalia's armor is operational, and those are severely limited in their effectiveness due to transportation problems—poor roads and the shortage of tank transporters.

(5) Weapons and Equipment

(a) General

The USSR was the primary supplier of equipment to Somalia from 1963 to 1977. Major items the Somali Army acquired included T-54/55 medium tanks, field artillery, armored cars, and armored personnel carriers. A significant percentage of Somalia's ground equipment was destroyed in the Ogaden War and many of the losses have not been replaced. Small arms, ammunition, artillery pieces, trucks, medium tanks, and APCs have been provided by both Western and Arab countries, but there still remains a shortage of major items of military equipment in the ground inventory.

The categories of weapons that the Somali ground forces have the most critical requirements for include antitank weapons, field artillery, and armor. Two of the most effective weapons in the Somali inventory are the M113A1, Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) with the TOW missile system and the jeep mounted 106-mm Recoilless Rifle. It has been reported, however, that the poorly maintained jeeps often break down during use in the rough terrain that typifies the current combat area.

Somali field artillery generally suffers from problems associated with aging, which results in decreased tube-life as well as deteriorated sighting mechanisms. Some relief to this situation has been brought about by the 105-mm Howitzers, numbering in excess of 70, which were received primarily from Italy in 1982. This acquisition will cause a new artillery brigade to be formed, as well as enable the replacement of dated and dilapidated inventories. The 18 anticipated 155-mm Howitzers from the United States will add still another enhancing dimension to the preparedness of Somali
artillery. As with other significant weaponry these weapons will most assuredly
be dispatched to support units directing Somali efforts in the central border
area.

The Somali armor inventory is also suffering from a
lack of maintenance and problems associated with age, including some of the most
recently acquired items, the T-54/55 medium tanks from Egypt and the M-47 medium
tanks from Italy. It is unlikely that the Somalis are capable of maintaining the
M113 APCs for very long without US assistance or the support from other nations
with this vehicle in their inventories. Overall, it is estimated that only 50
percent of Somalia's armor is operational, and these are severely limited in
their effectiveness due to transportation problems--poor roads and the shortage
of tank transporters.

(b) Ground Weapons and Equipment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mortars:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-mm</td>
<td>IZ, PK, IT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81-mm</td>
<td>IT, EG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82-mm</td>
<td>UR, PRC, KN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120-mm</td>
<td>UR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160-mm</td>
<td>UR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RCLR and AT Weapons:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-mm AT rkt 1chr, RPG-2</td>
<td>UR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-mm AT rkt 1chr, RPG-7</td>
<td>UR, EG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75-mm RCLR</td>
<td>IT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82-mm RCLR, B-10</td>
<td>UR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82-mm, SPG-82</td>
<td>UR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106-mm RCLR, jeep-mounted</td>
<td>PK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106-mm RCLR</td>
<td>US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107-mm RCLR, B-11</td>
<td>UR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRIM rkt 1chr</td>
<td>FR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILAN ATGM 1chr</td>
<td>FR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILAN ATGM</td>
<td>FR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Field and Rkt Arty:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57-mm ATGN, NFI</td>
<td>UR, IT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76-mm, ZIS-3, M1942</td>
<td>UR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85-mm, gun, D-44</td>
<td>UR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88-mm, gun, NFI</td>
<td>IT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100-mm, gun, 1955</td>
<td>UR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100-mm, gun, M53</td>
<td>CZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105-mm how, NFI</td>
<td>IT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The overall support capability of the Somali logistics system has markedly deteriorated since 1977. The cessation of Soviet military aid and equipment deliveries combined with massive material losses in the Ogaden conflict resulted in a significant decline in operational capabilities. Although Somalia has received some military material and technical assistance from various Western and Arab countries, the amount is much less than that being provided to Ethiopia by the USSR. Furthermore, the equipment delivered to Somalia has in most cases, not been successfully assimilated into the operational levels of the Somali National Army due to logistic and training shortcomings. No aspect of the Somali logistics infrastructure—organization, administration, procurement, and operations—is without major deficiencies.
Whereas centralized control of logistics functions is normally an asset, centralization in Somalia is consolidated at the Ministry of Defense level with little or no delegation of authority to subordinate unit commanders. Consequently, no effective control or accountability of resources exists at the operational level. The management/control problem is further exacerbated by the scarcity of trained logistics officers in the Somali Armed Forces.

Only two major maintenance and supply depots serve the Somali National Army. Located at Mogadishu and Hargeisa, the depots are intended to support the southern front and northern front, respectively. The maintenance facilities at these depots are adequately equipped to conduct major repairs on most types of military equipment, however, machinery breakdown, lack of spare parts, few competent technicians, and poor management severely erode maintenance capabilities. Depot stockage levels of most major military classes of supply are inadequate to support sustained large-scale military operations.

Excessive deadline rates are the norm for all types of military equipment due to acute shortages of spare parts, paucity of competent technicians, and haphazard or nonexistent preventive maintenance procedures. First-phase deliveries and resupply operations are severely hampered by poor operational readiness rates of military transport vehicles and chronic misuse of these vehicles. Although the Ministry of Defense is acutely aware of logistic system deficiencies and is making a concerted effort to remedy the problems, continued large-scale external aid and assistance will be required to revive the support infrastructure.

Personnel Procurement and Retention

In early 1984, the Somali Government planned to implement a new national draft law that would establish a 2-year compulsory military service obligation. Under terms of the plan, the names of male secondary school graduates would have been assembled by existing National Service workers and from that list 20-30,000 recruits would have been selected and trained for a 2-year military obligation.

The Mobilization Directorate within the Somali Ministry of Defense is charged with procuring eligible male recruits for military service; however, it has done little to contribute to the success of the program, and practically nothing has been accomplished in surveying the numbers of possible recruits. Little emphasis is placed on the success or failure of the program within the rest of the Ministry of Defense. The Minister of Defense has expressed only mild concern over the success or failure of the mobilization effort. This situation is further complicated by the fact that the present induction infrastructure is not prepared and cannot handle a heavy recruit influx. Although the Somali Army is short on qualified personnel within its ranks, it cannot properly train, equip, or support a sudden substantial increase of new personnel. The Somali Army will likely maintain its present strength and recruit "unwilling volunteers" from the streets as the need arises.
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(8) Training

The Somali Army training program is controlled by the Ministry of Defense and takes place primarily at the Division level. Training is generally based on experiences gained in the 1977-78 Ogaden War, but is frequently limited by the scarcity of resources (funding, ammunition, spare parts, etc.). Training is conducted on both the individual and unit level. The SNA operates a number of basic training centers and specialty schools for enlisted personnel. Subsequent training is conducted at the unit level in accordance with detailed guidance emanating from the MOD and sector training plans. NCOs are usually returned to their specialty school for additional training or sent to the General Daud NCO academy for a development course lasting about 4 months. Officers, following graduation from high school or the university, begin a 2-year course at the Siad Military Academy in Mogadishu. Additional or advanced officer training is continued at the Ahmed Gurey Academy in Mogadishu, the Army's senior officer professional development school.

(a) Reserves

The size and readiness of Somali reserves are not known. Responsibility for the administration and training of the reserves rests with civilian regional governors. Compulsory military training is provided to all graduates of secondary schools, high schools, and the university. Regional training centers provide 3 months of initial training and 1 month of refresher training every 3 years until age 48. Secondary school graduates fill the enlisted ranks of the reserves, while high school graduates are trained as NCOs and university graduates as officers.

(b) Mobilization

In the past, Somali officials have claimed that during emergencies or at times of increased alert, trained mobilization designees would bring significantly undermanned SNA units to 80-85 percent strength in about 4 to 5 days. Mobilization plans also called for one militia division to be formed for each sector as a sector reserve. Since the Ethiopian invasion in June 1982, however, the majority of Somali units are still undermanned and there has been no evidence that sector reserves have been activated. Instead, the Somalis have focused their efforts on the time consuming process of forming new units such as battalions, brigades, a division, and a corps.

b. Navy

(1) Mission

The Navy is charged with the following missions: coastal surveillance, coastal defense, defense of the economic zone (200 NM), fishing protection, mine countermeasures, military cargo lift, and convoy escort.
(2) Capabilities

The Somali National Navy (SNN) has insufficient craft to patrol the 3,035-km coastline. Coastal patrols are performed only on a very irregular basis in specific areas such as Berbera, Mogadishu, and Chisimaio. The intent is to provide early warning of attack to shore installations and to enforce claims on coastal waters.

With the present personnel and equipment, none of the Navy's missions can be adequately accomplished. The Navy's two OSA II missile attack boats, which compose the main antishipping capability, are based at Berbera to counter threats from Ethiopia or South Yemen but are believed to be non-operational. The Somali Government has made attempts to obtain parts and technical assistance from the People's Republic of China to put the vessels back into operational conditions, but the Government is experiencing some difficulty in obtaining hard currency for payment. As a result, the necessary parts and technical assistance may not be obtained. The inability of the Somali Air Force to provide air superiority would prevent the Somali Navy from conducting effective operations against attacking naval forces. Coastal defense is severely hindered by the limited number of coastal defense weapons systems, operational radars, and reliance on visual observation posts.

(3) Personnel Strength

2,000

(4) Ship Strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Op</th>
<th>Nonop</th>
<th>In Reserve</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PTG (OSA-II missile attack boat)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT (MOL torpedo boat)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTL (P-6 torpedo boat)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PB (MOL patrol boat; POLUCHAT-1 patrol craft)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSM (POLNOCNY landing craft)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCM (T-4 landing craft)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YDT NYRYAT II</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) Organization and Deployment

The Navy is subordinate to the SNA. Naval Headquarters is located at Mogadishu, with operational bases at Berbera, Chisimaio, and Mogadishu responsible for the three coastal defense areas. Two 100-mm Coastal artillery batteries provide coastal defense at Berbera and Mogadishu; however, one of the batteries was moved from Mogadishu to the central sector in support of operations.
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in that area. The operational status of the guns at either location are unknown. The Somali Navy also maintains six radar and four visual surveillance sites, as well as nine signal stations along the coast. The serviceability of the radars and the signal equipment is questionable.

(6) Status of Equipment

The general condition of the Soviet-supplied Somali vessels is marginal to poor. The OSA II and MOL patrol craft, the newest boats in the Somali inventory, are not operational, due to engine, fire control, and weapons problems. None of the combat vessels are believed to be combat effective. The ability of the Somali Navy to maintain its equipment has been and will continue to be limited by the availability of spare parts and the lack of support facilities.

Coastal surveillance radars (Sheet Bend) are reported to be inoperable due to poor maintenance and a shortage of spare parts though a refurbishment program is being considered.

(7) Logistics

While the organization of the logistics system of the Navy is fundamentally sound, inadequate quantities of fuel, repair parts, and technical equipment inhibit its effective operations. Somalia is totally dependent on external sources for Navy materiel. All of the ships and most of the vehicles organic to the Navy are of Soviet origin, old, and worn out. Spare parts for maintenance and repair of Soviet-supplied equipment are not available from the USSR. The probability that the operational readiness rate of the existing Soviet-supplied equipment will improve is low.

Machine shop repair facilities, located at Chisimaio and Berbera, have limited repair capabilities and the number and skill-level of maintenance technicians are inadequate. While proper training can marginally improve the Navy's logistics operations, a significant infusion of new support equipment and repair parts is necessary to attain an effective logistics capability.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

Personnel initially enlist in the Navy for 4 years. At the end of the enlistment, personnel can be placed on an indefinite "operational hold" status. This occurs primarily with trained technicians.

(9) Training

Training in the Somali Navy is primarily operational in nature and includes officer cadet, staff officer, enlisted recruit, enlisted rating specialty, and shipboard crew. Initial recruit training is conducted at the Naval Training Center at Brava, while advanced job specialty training is done at the bases in Chisimaio and Berbera. The scope of the unit training is very
limited and the standards are very low due to disorganization, lack of teaching aids, and lax discipline. All officer training, including cadet and staff officer training, is conducted outside the country, notably in Egypt, and Italy.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

No reserves are identifiable apart from the Army reserves. Being subordinate to the Army, the Navy could draw upon the Army's reserve pool.

(b) Mobilization

There is no evidence that the Somali Navy has mobilization plans. Somalia has a small merchant fleet which could possibly be called upon to support the Somali Navy in times of crisis. The Somalia Merchant Marines has three ships over 1,000 gross register tons (GRT): Two are aging refrigerator cargo ships and the third is a small breakbulk ship. Because of their size and age, these ships have only minimal military support potential. Their combined deadweight average (lift capacity) is 9,800 tons of cargo.

c. Air Force

(1) Mission

To secure Somalia's airspace and provide tactical support, airlift, reconnaissance, and liaison for support the Army and Navy.

(2) Capabilities

The offensive potential of the Somali Air Force (SAC) was reduced considerably during the 1977/78 Ogaden War by the loss of many fighter aircraft and the best pilots in the force. Ethiopia established air superiority over the battlefield early in the conflict, and continued to enjoy that strategic advantage throughout the 9-month duration of the war. Since the end of conventional fighting, Ethiopia has used its large and modern air force to strike at Somali targets in an attempt to punish President Siad for his continued support of the Ogaden insurgency. The SAF, lacking sufficient numbers of trained pilots, and operational aircraft, as well as adequate radar support, has been unable to challenge these incursions into Somali airspace. The SAF, has not been able to provide tactical support to ground forces inside Somali borders during the current border conflict aside from a few strafing runs and an occasional reconnaissance flight over the combat area. The transport capability of the SAF is inadequate to provide any but the barest of support. Heavy dependence upon foreign suppliers for spare parts, training, and technical assistance is a prime factor hampering SAF capabilities, and there is no indication that this dependence will be reduced in the foreseeable future.
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(3) Personnel Strength

(3) Estimated 2,000

(4) Aircraft Strength

Total: 109 (fixed wing: 61 jet, 10 turboprop, 28 prop; helicopter: 6 turbine, 4 piston)

In operational units: 108

(54 fighters: 26 all weather, 19 day, 9 general purpose (fighter-bombers;
3 bombers: 3 intermediate - range;
17 transport: 11 short range, 2 medium range;
24 trainers: 20 fighters, 4 transports;
4 utility
10 helicopters: 10 medium)

(5) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

The SAF is subordinate to the Somali National Army. The Air Force is commanded by a brigadier general who directly supervises the commander of the several air bases in the country from the Air Force Headquarters in Mogadishu. The current commander, Brigadier General Osman Mohamed, is an Army officer who had no Air Force experience prior to his current assignment. The Air Force has a conventional staff structure with a chief of staff for day-to-day direction. Major subordinate units and bases are located at Balidogle Air Base at Unle Uen and Hargeisa Air Base at Hargeisa, the training base at Kismayo, and the air base at Baidoa.

(b) Summary of Units

Aircraft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Principal Base</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 fighter squadrons</td>
<td>Mig-15/MIDGET</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Baledogle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mig-15/MIDGET</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hargeisa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mig-15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Baidoa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mig-17/FRESCO</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Baledole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mig-17/FRESCO</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Hargeisa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mig-21/FISHBED</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Baledole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F-6/FARMER</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Baledole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Bomber Squadron</td>
<td>I1-28/BEAGLE</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Hargeisa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F-74A/HUNTER</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Baidoa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T-77/HUNTER</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Baidoa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SOMALIA

Aircraft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Principal Base</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Flying Training Squadron</td>
<td>SF-260 Marchetti</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Chisimaio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Transport/Utility/ helicopter Squadron</td>
<td>P-166, Piaggio</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Mogadishu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-148, Piaggio</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mogadishu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>An-24, COKE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Baledogle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>An-24, COKE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mogadishu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>An-26, CURL</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Baledogle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AB-212, Augusta-Bell</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Mogadishu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>An-2, COLT</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mogadishu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mi-4, HOUND</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Mogadishu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mi-8, HIP</td>
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<td>Mogadishu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T-6 N. Amer.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mogadishu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Texan</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G-222 Aeritalia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mogadishu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BN-2 Islander</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Baidoa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BN-2 Islander</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mogadishu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) Status of Equipment

The operational readiness of SAF equipment varies significantly from the more modern F-6 aircraft acquired from the PRC in 1980 to completely unserviceable airframes delivered by the USSR in the 1960s. When Somalia broke relations with the USSR, the major source of spare parts was eliminated. This resulted in a rapid and irreversible decline in the readiness rate of the Soviet-supplied equipment. Systematic cannibalization and Egyptian and Chinese assistance have enabled some of the aircraft to remain flyable.

Egyptian and Chinese technicians have assisted the Somalis with the maintenance of the F-6 (MiG-19) Aircraft and a small number of flight instructors from these countries taught F-6 flight training to Somali pilots. The absence of the maintenance personnel will eventually ground these planes, which are the most sophisticated ground attack and reconnaissance fighter aircraft in Somalia's inventory. The readiness of Western aircraft will continue to depend on the Somali ability to obtain spare parts and requisite maintenance assistance. Somalia's reoccurring inability to pay for this foreign, usually civilian, support results in long periods of time when transport and training aircraft are out of service.

Since early 1984, no Egyptian personnel have provided aircraft technical support and none are expected in the near future. At the present time, only the Chinese F-6 maintenance team remains.
(7) Logistics

Without the current level of foreign assistance, Air Force logistics capability would be nearly nonexistent. While there are a small number of semiskilled maintenance technicians in the Somali Air Force, the majority of logistics problems endemic to the air operations are beyond their level of expertise. Primary training and maintenance support is currently provided by China. Facilities and support equipment for the Air Force are marginally adequate for routine or preventative maintenance operations, and major engine or airframe overhaul must be conducted out of country. Even with continued foreign assistance, the Air Force logistics system is incapable of providing the quality of support required for efficient air operations.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

All SAF personnel are volunteers and are obligated to serve 4 years on active duty at the completion of their technical training or, in the case of pilots, after they receive their wings. Because of the ineffectiveness of the Air Force, retention of officers and enlisted men has become a problem. As a result there is a severe shortage of trained pilots.

(9) Training

Primary flight training is conducted at Chisimaio Training Center. The classroom portion of this training has been rated highly for its syllabus and training aids. Actual flight instruction, however, suffers from the frequent periods when training aircraft are inoperable due to a lack of spare parts or fuel. One hundred and fifty Somali pilots are receiving basic flight training at the Chisimaio pilot training school; however, due to an insufficient amount of aviation gasoline for the SF-260s, the pilot training program was suspended. Nevertheless, pilot training is generally accomplished in the following sequence: SF-260, FT-5, FT-6. Follow-on jet training takes place at Baledogle Airfield. Combat squadrons have prepared training plans, but often lack the resources to implement them which adversely impacts on pilot proficiency. Finally, there is no evidence that either all-weather or night-flying training is being provided to Somali pilots.

Air Force maintenance technician training is also conducted at Chisimaio. The training program effectively covers subjects such as pneumatics, hydraulics, and avionics with the aid of mockups. Approximately 100 maintenance technicians are trained annually.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

No reserves are separately identifiable from the Army reserves.
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(b) Mobilization

(U) In the event of a national emergency, the mobilization of civil aviation can be expected. Three civil transports with at least 9,000-kg cargo capacity are operating currently or are available for use in Somalia, including two Boeing 707s and one Fokker F-27. All of these aircraft are in the fleet of Somali Airlines, which is owned jointly by the Somali Government (51 percent) and Alitalia (49 percent). Use of these assets, however, could be restricted by the limited availability of indigenous maintenance personnel.

(U) The total number of licensed civilian pilots in Somalia is not known. Somali Airlines reportedly employs about 38 pilots.

d. Air Defense Command

(1) Mission

(U) The Air Defense Command (ADC), in conjunction with the Air Force, has the responsibility for defending Somali airspace with its missile units, providing air defense artillery protection for the sectors, corps commands and various air bases in the country, and supplying warning of hostile air action with its radar network.

(2) Capabilities

(U) The Somali Air Defense has been at a standstill since 1977. Some air defense artillery units, were formed in 1977 prior to receiving equipment from the Soviets, which still have no ADA equipment. Approximately 50 percent of the ADA guns are inoperative and the missile systems are old and poorly maintained.

Although the Air Defense Command is responsible for collaborating with the Somali Air Force in the defense of Somali air space, there are no dedicated communication lines or networks between the Air Defense Force and the Air Force that greatly limit Somali air defense capabilities. In fact, there are few dedicated lines between any of the radars and the air defense gun or missile sites. Information from the radars outside Mogadishu is forwarded to the Command Center at Air Defense Headquarters in Mogadishu by common user Morse Code stations all stations monitor the message at the same time. Although voice communication is not yet available, it should be later in 1984 with the installation of the TPS-43 radar systems at Hargeisa, Galcaio, and Baidoa. Those locations will be connected by voice with the Command Center in Mogadishu.

In general, the operational readiness of air defense units is marginal. A shortage of spare parts, poor condition of the equipment, limited training opportunities, a lack of basic preventative maintenance, and insufficient communications have impaired air defense capabilities. Without significant outside assistance, the Air Defense Command is unable to satisfactorily perform its mission.
(3) Personnel Strength

3,500 (tactical air defense units--2,000; strategic air defense units--1,500)

(4) Organization and Deployment

The Air Defense Command is headquartered at Mogadishu. Although air defense units are organized on the basis of a separate service and retain responsibility for their own administration, logistic support, and technical training, they are operationally subordinate to the Army. Tactical air defense units such as artillery battalions are frequently attached to and controlled by Army field forces, while strategic air defense units such as surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and radar battalions remain sector/corps assets and defend airfields.

The Air Defense Command is organized into seven brigades equipped with antiaircraft guns and SAM systems and one brigade equipped with radar equipment. It is estimated that the majority of the 2,000 men assigned to air tactical defense are organized into approximately 15 deployed combat battalions. The 1,500 personnel assigned to strategic air defense units are primarily organized into 10 SAM battalions. And, in addition, personnel are assigned to radar sites located all over the country.

(5) Weapons and Equipment

(a) Tactical Air Defense, General

The USSR was the primarily supplier of air defense guns, related equipment, and spare parts to Somalia until 1977. Since that time, China and Egypt have provided a limited quantity of equipment.

(b) Summary of Tactical Air Defense Equipment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Air Defense Guns</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Number in Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12.7-mm, DSHK</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.5-mm MG, ZPU-2</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-mm NFI</td>
<td>IT</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-mm, HSS-804</td>
<td>EG</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-mm, ZU-23</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-mm, ZSU-23-4</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-mm, HSS 831</td>
<td>EG</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37-mm, ML939 (twin)</td>
<td>UR, EG, PRC</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-mm NFI</td>
<td>UNK</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-mm, M42</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-mm, NFI</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Soviet Union provided Somalia with SA-2 and SA-3 missiles in two phases. In 1973, SA-2 missiles were installed in classic Soviet style in Mogadishu. Buildings, bunkers, and the necessary support structures were constructed, then the missiles were delivered. In 1976-77, the remaining SA-2 battalions and all the SA-3 battalions were established but were deployed in a short period of time. During this time period, some of the units had no permanent site preparation as the units were deployed directly into desert locations where they remain.

There are three missile brigades in Somalia; two for SA-2 and one for SA-3 missiles. Each SA-2 battalion site has six launchers and each SA-3 site has three four-rail launchers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3rd (SA-2 Missile Brigade)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st (SA-2) Battalion</td>
<td>Balidogle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd (SA-2) Battalion</td>
<td>Mogadishu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd (SA-2) Battalion</td>
<td>Mogadishu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U/I (SA-2) Technical Battalion</td>
<td>Mogadishu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U/I (SA-2) Training</td>
<td>Mogadishu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th (SA-2 Missile Brigade)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st (SA-2) Battalion</td>
<td>Hargeisa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd (SA-2) Battalion</td>
<td>Berbera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd (SA-2) Battalion</td>
<td>Berbera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th (SA-2) Battalion</td>
<td>Hargeisa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U/I (SA-2) Technical Battalion</td>
<td>Berbera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th (SA-3) Missile Brigade</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st (SA-3) Battalion</td>
<td>Balidogle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd (SA-3) Battalion</td>
<td>Mogadishu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd (SA-3) Battalion</td>
<td>Balidogle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U/I (SA-3) Technical Battalion</td>
<td>Balidogle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SOMALIA

(6) Status of Equipment

(a) Tactical Air Defense Equipment

The condition of most air defense guns and associated equipment is poor. Many of the weapons suffer worn gear assemblies and barrels, rusty and missing components, and inoperative sights. In addition, a large number of the electronic fire control systems are not functioning due to poor maintenance procedures and a shortage of spare parts. Reporting indicates that Ethiopia has flown over Somali positions along the border with almost virtual impunity due, in part, to the ineffectiveness of the Somali tactical air defense.

(b) Strategic Air Defense Equipment

The SA-2 missile sites in Berbera are in extremely poor condition and not effective. However, at Berbera, as well as some of the other SA-2 sites, a missile could probably be fired but could not be tracked to its intended target. In general, the SA-3 missile sites are in the best condition and are the easiest to repair and put into operational condition. The 3d (SA-2) Battalion in Mogadishu is considered the best of all the missile units since this unit could probably successfully acquire and fire upon an incoming target. Nevertheless, an important problem to missile units is the lack of a dedicated communication between the battalions and their brigade headquarters. The R-405 radio provides a common net for all air defense missile units.

In 1983, Egypt repaired and refueled the SAM systems as required. It is believed that the missiles will now fire, but it is not known if the radar systems can locate and guide the missiles to their targets.

Soviet-origin radars in use at the Air Defense headquarters, which control the approaches to Mogadishu, have recently been reconditioned by US Air Force personnel. The US is also considering a program for the refurbishment and follow-up maintenance training of 10 of Somalia's SPOON REST radars (early warning system sometimes used in conjunction with the SA-2 system). Additionally, delivery and installation of three Westinghouse radar systems TPS-43 began in January 1984. In conjunction with this acquisition Somali Air Defense Command personnel have undergone training on these systems in CONUS.

(7) Logistics

The logistic system supporting the Air Defense Command is generally unsatisfactory. There is no capability in Somalia to calibrate testing equipment. Although the Somalis have a knowledge of electrical and electronic calibration, they cannot accomplish it. As a result, calibration support must be accomplished out-of-country. With equipment out of calibration, the missiles cannot be accurately prepared for firing.

In each brigade, there is reportedly a five vehicle support van set, described as one mechanical van, one test van, one spare parts van, one workshop van, and one calibration van. The test vans are new and have never been
used. Although there are a lot of spare parts in Somalia for repair of missile systems, distributing parts to units in need is a very significant problem. The Somalis do not conscientiously distribute spare parts to units in need as a result of lacking an established maintenance management system.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

Individuals coming into the ADC first go through army basic training and then are assigned to the Command that has a school at Baledogle Air Field. Personnel in the ADC retain their status as members of the Army. There is no information available on personnel retention.

(9) Training

The missile units lack fully qualified personnel resulting from minimal training, lack of qualified instructors and inoperative equipment. In April of last year, one SA-2 missile was launched at two US Navy F-14 aircraft. Since the pilots did not note a lock-on by the missiles' radar system, the missiles may have been fired at the aircraft without the benefit of any guidance radar. The condition of most air defense equipment, however, suggests a lack of training on basic preventive maintenance procedures.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

There are no known reserve units or mobilization plans.

e. Paramilitary Forces

(1) Police Field Forces (Darawishta)

(a) Mission

Border patrol, counterinsurgency, and reinforcement of conventional police to control serious civil disorders. The Darawishta has a military mission in wartime and coordinates its operations with the Army on a regular basis.

(b) Capabilities

The Darawishta Division (mobile division), is capable of independent operation as light infantry. The Darawishta is well trained for controlling limited border violations but has been overwhelmed by the current insurgency by the SDFS and SNM.

(c) Personnel Strength

2,000
(d) **Organization**

The Darawishta Division is subordinate to the National Police who reports directly to the President. The division is organized into six battalions. Each battalion has about 400 men. Each battalion is composed of three regular companies and a command company each manned by about 110 men. Each company has a command platoon, three troop platoons of three squads each armed with antitank rockets, a weapons platoon of two mortar squads, and two machinegun squads.

(e) **Status of Equipment**

The Darawishta is equipped as light infantry. They are armed only with rifles and pistols.

(2) **Other**

In addition to the foregoing paramilitary force the following forces also have some potential for augmenting the regular forces in the event of hostilities.

(a) **Somali National Police (SNP)**

Officially part of the armed forces, the SNP has an overall strength of about 20,000. The SNP, which is headquartered in Mogadishu and deployed country-wide, is the most effective organization of its type in Somalia. It is organized into 50-100 man divisions (commanded by a police colonel) which have their headquarters in every regional capital. Below the divisions are district commands (commanded by captains and first lieutenants) with four-five policemen. Under the districts are outposts with one-two policemen. All of these personnel are armed with rifles and pistols. The communications structure is such that the policeman at an outpost can start a message which can quickly reach the headquarters of the SNP in a matter of a few hours. Eighty percent of the communications equipment is considered serviceable at any given time.

(b) **Territorial Police**

There is a territorial police or guard force of about 4,000 men, which could serve as a substantial local defense or rear area security force in the event of major hostilities. The territorial police comes under the operational control of the SNP. It consists of 1 division command HQ for each of the 16 regions in Somalia. Each division is commanded by a major or lieutenant colonel. The 16 divisions are further divided into 84 district offices commanded by a lieutenant or a noncommissioned officer. Territorial police man positions along the border and the large villages. In all, there are about 300 offices of 3 to 15 men each.
SOMALIA

(c) National Security Service (NSS)

The NSS mission is to maintain internal security and coordinate all domestic and foreign intelligence collection activities. It effectively monitors possible threats to the regime and enforces stringent security laws enacted by Siad. It operates in the general areas of intelligence, counterintelligence, espionage, and technical intelligence. Its external efforts are focused primarily on collecting and evaluating information on the capabilities and intentions of Ethiopia and Kenya, and on reporting on border incidents and the activities of dissidents in neighboring countries. It also keeps abreast of the activities of foreign nationals in Somalia, monitors foreign radio broadcasts, and provides security for top-level government officials. Its total strength, organization, and equipment are unknown. At the present time the NSS maintains an antiterrorist unit to respond to increased SDSF terrorist activities. The group includes a combat department composed of paramilitary forces trained by West German Police advisory personnel. The combat unit responds to terrorist acts and assists the SNA and police in counterguerrilla activity. The total strength of this unit is about 60 men.

(d) Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF)

The Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) has long sought to free the Ogaden Region from Ethiopian control. During this struggle, the WSLF has relied heavily upon Somali financial, material, and political support. In early 1982, President Siad ordered the Somali Army to take complete control over the activities of the WSLF because of problems stemming from internal feuds, inefficiency, and corruption.

The WSLF has been the primary guerrilla force in the Ogaden since the mid-1970s, when it was moderately successful in harassing Ethiopian convoys and outposts. During the 1977-78 Ogaden War, the WSLF was integrated with the Somali Army. After the Somali defeat in that conflict, President Siad loosened the WSLF's ties with the SNA which resulted in disarray for this group. Since that time, the WSLF has been attempting to regroup as a result of pressure from President Siad for the group to conduct more operations.

The WSLF is estimated to have 3,000 personnel organized into three guerrilla operation commands with a total of six divisions. The primary weapons of the WSLF are small arms—AK-47 and G-3 rifles, grenades, and antitank and antipersonnel mines.
f. (S/N) Total Military Personnel Strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>36,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defense</td>
<td>3,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darawishta</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Somali Liberation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>48,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

g. (S/N) Foreign Military Presence

(1) (S/N) Foreign Military In-Country

- **West Germany:** 8 (est) Advisory team training police and maintaining police vehicles.
- **North Korea:** 3 (est) Advisory personnel at small arms ammunition factory.
- **People's Republic of China:** 20 Assisting Air Force with F-6 aircraft.

(2) (S/N) Presence Abroad

- **Italy:** 50 Army, Navy, Police.
- **Egypt:** 70 Army trainees.
- **France:** 2 French War College, and Medical College.
- **Saudi Arabia:** 135 Air Defense personnel.

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Withheld pursuant to exemption
(b)(3). 10 USC 424

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
SOUTH AFRICA

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1. GOVERNMENT

a. (U) Key Civilian Officials

State President: Pieter Willem Botha
Minister of Transport Services: H. Schoeman
Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning: J.C. Heunis
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Roelof F. "Pik" Botha
Minister of Home Affairs and National Education: F.W. De Klerk
Minister of Law and Order: Louis Le Grange
Minister of Communication and Public Works: L.A.P.A. Munnick
Minister of Health and Welfare: C.V. Van Der Merwe
Minister of Cooperation, Development, and Education: G. Van N. Viljoen
Minister of Defense: Gen Magnus A. De M. Malan
Minister of Manpower: P.T.C. Du Plessis
Minister of Industries and Commerce: D.J. De Villiers
Minister of Justice: H.J. "Kobie" Coetsee
Minister of Agricultural Economics and Water Affairs: J.J.G. Wentzel
Minister of Energy Affairs: D.W. Steyn
Minister of Finance: B.J. Du Plessis
Minister of Environment Affairs and Tourism: J.W.E Wiley
Chairman, Ministers' Council for White Affairs: C.V. Van Der Merwe
Minister of Agriculture and Water Supplies: S.A.S. Hayward
Minister of Local Government, Housing, and Works: A.A. Venter
Minister of the Budget: E. Van Der M. Louw
Minister of Education and Culture: J.C.G. Botha
Chairman, Ministers' Council for Coloured Affairs: Rev. H.J. Hendrickse
Minister of Local Government, Housing, and Agriculture: D.M. Curry
Minister of the Budget: A.A. Julies
Minister of Health Services and Welfare: C.J. April
Minister of Education and Culture: C.H. Ebrahim
Chairman, Ministers' Council for Indian Affairs: A. Rajbansi
Minister of Education and Culture: K. Ramduth
Minister of Health Services and Welfare: Dr. M.S. Padayachy
Minister of the Budget: E. Abramjee
Minister of Local Government, Housing, and Agriculture: B. Dookie
Leader of the House of Assembly: H. Schoeman
Chief Parliamentary Whip: A. Van Breda

b. Type and Stability of Government

(U) South Africa has been an independent republic since 1961, when a constitution was drafted, the Union of South Africa was abolished, and ties with the British were severed. For over 20 years, the Republic of South Africa was ruled by an all-white Parliament. A new constitution, the result of 10 years of preparation, was adopted in Parliament in September 1983 and sanctioned in public polls in September 1984. The new constitution was adopted after a lengthy and tumultuous campaign fraught with boycotts by Indian and Coloured segments of the population dissatisfied with the continued lack of direct representation of the black majority in Parliament.

15 October 1984
The new constitution combines the offices of State President and Prime Minister and gives the State President potentially authoritarian powers. The Senate was eliminated and replaced by the "President's Council," a group of approximately 60 members drawn from Parliament or appointed by the State President. Parliament consists of three houses, namely, a House of Assembly, a House of Representatives, and a House of Parliament.

The new constitution, perceived by South-African nonwhites as a possible ploy to enlist colored and Indian support for resisting power sharing with blacks, has been rejected by a large number of members of these ethnic groups as well as by the international community in general, to include the United Nations. There is no evidence that the Government is considering sharing political power with the black community in the near future.

The National Party (NP) has the overwhelming following of the white electorate. The Conservative Party (CP) was formed in March 1981 by disaffected members of the NP who were upset by some constitutional reforms proposed by the NP leadership proposing colored and Asian participation in the Government. Although the eventual strength and influence of the CP is problematic, its formation does represent a serious challenge to the NP for the political allegiance of traditional Afrikanerdom. The more liberal parties are the Progressive Federal Party and the New Republic Party. The Herstigte Nasionaal Party represents an extreme right portion of the electorate. The most contentious and sweeping NP policy is apartheid, or separate development, which seeks to perpetuate white dominance of the political process in all of South Africa with the exception of a number of relatively small, scattered areas (totaling about 13 percent of South Africa's land area) designated as "homelands." Four "homelands," Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei, have been granted independence (see separate MIS sections that appear after South Africa). Kangwane and Swazi "homelands" may become independent within a few years. Gazankulu, Lebowa, Suid-Ndebele, and Basotho Qwa-Qwa are farther from independence. This devolution of power is not recognized by the international community. Some "homeland" leaders, for example Chief Buthelezi of Kwazulu, are opposed to the independence scheme.

Despite increasing dissatisfaction with the Government among blacks, coloreds, and Asians; the outspoken animosity of independent black African states; and vocal world disapproval, the Government is in firm control of the country. Since late 1978, when P.W. Botha assumed the mantle of Prime Minister in the wake of financial scandal, he has advocated changes in racial policies to gain the cooperation of all population groups and prevent internal unrest while perpetuating white control and quieting external critics. Issues to be addressed include the political and economic position of urban blacks, the reapportionment of land to the homelands, security laws, and citizenship for black South Africans. In part, Botha's strategy reflects the defense establishment's concern that steps must be taken to prevent the growth of a major threat from within the country. Always the consummate politician, Botha's plans are often vague and he has on occasion pulled back, indicating that despite his bold, risk-taking approach, he will exercise judiciousness in finding a path between the NP and the nonwhite population. Botha has raised hopes that his government will find ways to move away from discrimination. Any change may be regarded as quite fast and progressive by Afrikaners, but the
actual changes are not expected to meet nonwhite demands. However, problems that are expected to compound in coming years—raised black consciousness and expectations, urban violence and sabotage, increased external support for insurgency in South Africa proper, and various economic difficulties—probably will not seriously endanger the Government's stability over the next 5 years.

c. Internal Threat

(U) The Soweto riots of June 1976 and disturbances since that time, such as school boycotts and strikes, have demonstrated the breadth of deep-rooted dissatisfaction within the urban black community and vividly illustrate that blacks are not satisfied with shallow, slow-paced improvements. The violent protests resulted in over 300 deaths, mostly of blacks, but did not reach a level that threatened overall public order. To date, through bannings, detentions, and surveillance, the Government has been able to effectively and ruthlessly suppress any increase in internal disorder. The majority of the white electorate continues to lend the Government its support, but there are some glimmers of awareness even among the Afrikaners that there must be movement toward change.

African nationalist organizations, antiapartheid movements, strikes by black workers, and the opposition of a number of white intellectuals also can be considered part of the internal threat. Political developments in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Namibia (South-West Africa) have served to raise the level of economic, social, and political expectations among South African blacks. Urban terrorism is still sporadic in South Africa. Two anti-South African groups, the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan African Congress (PAC), operate from exile. The ANC has been particularly adept at staging terrorist attacks within South Africa. These attacks are becoming more bold and reflect better training and a growing self-confidence. The eventual goal of these groups is to wage guerrilla warfare against the white government to gain political control of South Africa. At present they are involved primarily in recruitment, training, and arms acquisition activities. (See Insurgencies in Sub-Sahara Africa, DDR-23005-5-84, June 84.) It is clear that the insurgents, especially those belonging to the African National Congress (ANC), are becoming better equipped and more aggressive. The police, military, and the economic infrastructure are increasingly targeted. The 20 May 1983 ANC bombing of the South African Air Force Headquarters in Pretoria represents the most dramatic and significant act of sabotage perpetrated to date. Although there is no active insurgency in South Africa at present, externally based liberation movements are receiving assistance from a variety of sources in their efforts against the Republic. Isolated acts of sabotage, terrorism, and other outbreaks of disorder do not at this time constitute a significant threat to South Africa. A quantitative jump in the number of terrorist attacks is not expected, but it is likely that the qualitative effect of terrorist efforts will be increased (e.g., increased civilian casualties, more attacks on SADF military facilities, and even on operational patrols, and increased efforts to damage key facilities of the South Africa economic infrastructure).
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SOUTH AFRICA

Tanzania will continue to provide havens for anti-South African forces while Zimbabwe and Lesotho will treat the problem with more circumspection. Botswana and Swaziland will pursue very cautious policies toward South African insurgents but will not be able to completely control the activity of those groups. As a result of the March 19, 1984 "Nakomati Accord," Mozambique has apparently stopped supporting the ANC, and has denied them the use of bases from which to launch attacks on South African targets. In spite of the February 19, 1984 "Lusaka Agreement," Angola still turns a blind eye to continued, though reduced SWAPO incursions into northern Namibia.

White, ultrarightwing, extremist groups have recently appeared. Groups such as the Wit Commando, the Wit Hand, and the Afrikanse Weerstand Fëvëling (AWB) (Afrikaner Resistance Movement) are a new phenomenon. They are strongly opposed to any form of integration and, while not having caused extensive damage yet, they are a potential problem for the Government.

d. External Threat

At the present time there is very little external threat to South Africa. The South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) wages the only active insurgency. Its 6,000 to 8,000 guerrillas operate out of bases in Angola and Zambia against South African control of Namibia. Their activities consist predominantly of sabotage, ambushes, laying landmines, assassinations, and intimidation and kidnapping of the populace. Perhaps 200 to 600 SWAPO guerrillas are present in northern Namibia at any one time. South Africa responds with preemptive or retaliatory cross-border military strikes after the Israeli and Rhodesian models.

South African emphasis on building up its military forces, materiel stockpiles, domestic arms production, border defenses, and overall capabilities stems from the anticipated external threat of widespread active insurgent opposition with worldwide support. As the physical and political buffers against black Africa have eroded, South Africa has attempted to encourage the emergence of moderate neighboring regimes. The 1975 intervention in Angola and current cooperation in efforts to peacefully resolve Namibian independence and improve relations with Mozambique are examples of South African attempts to preserve some regional leverage and ameliorate potential external threats.

South Africa fears the development of an external threat from the Cuban presence in Angola. The establishment of new military bases in the north and east Transvaal indicates marked South African concern for the potential threat from Mozambique and Zimbabwe. In the worst instance, South Africa envisions a Cuban presence and a Soviet-backed Marxist government in Namibia, something the political leadership has indicated it will not accept. South Africa is pessimistic about events in Zimbabwe and afraid that an unfriendly Zimbabwe will offer safe havens and training bases to anti-South African groups. Continuing international condemnation of South Africa's apartheid policies has entrenched the white's perception that a lonely battle to preserve their way of life lies ahead.
**SECRET**

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e. Economic Factors

The Republic of South Africa is the most developed industrial nation in Africa. GNP in 1983 was $70.2 billion. It is practically self-sufficient in food production; however, the current drought has temporarily set back its goal of becoming a major food exporter. South Africa is heavily dependent upon outside sources for machinery and equipment. While it is almost completely dependent upon foreign sources for crude oil, and a 3 year supply has been placed in underground storage areas, the domestic petroleum industry can process and store a full range of fuels and lubricants. Recent decreases in the gold market continue to fuel double-digit inflation and continuing depreciation pressures on the Rand. Growing black unemployment, increasing balance of payments, and increasing balance of payments deficit does not bode well for any dramatic improvement in the economy.

The Republic ranks first in world reserves of platinum group metals (82 percent), chromite (68 percent), gold (52 percent), and vanadium (49 percent). It ranks second in world reserves of industrial diamonds (7 percent) and manganese (41 percent).

In world production of minerals, the Republic ranks first in chromium (35 percent), gold (57 percent), and vanadium (32 percent). South Africa and the USSR each produce about 48 percent of the world output of platinum group metals. South Africa ranks second in production of manganese (20 percent) and is third in asbestos (5 percent), industrial diamonds (14 percent), and antimony (15 percent). It is also the third largest Free World producer of uranium (13 percent). Adding significance to the above statistics are the highly sophisticated ore extraction, transportation, export, and management capabilities of the Republic.

South Africa is also actively engaged in nuclear research. A uranium enrichment pilot plant has been built and successfully operated at Valindaba. Although plans for a commercial-scale plant that would enable South Africa to export uranium in an enriched form have been postponed, the pilot plant is being expanded. While supposedly designed to produce low-enriched uranium for power reactor fuel, the Valindaba facilities are believed capable of producing highly enriched uranium. This capability could have far-reaching political as well as economic ramifications, especially in light of the discovery of a purported nuclear test site in the Kalahari Desert in July 1977 and a probable nuclear test in the South Atlantic-Indian Ocean area on 22 September 1979. South Africa is not a signatory of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty but is a party to the Limited Test Ban Treaty.

South Africa has the capability to produce almost all of its required ground force equipment and can meet some of its naval and aerospace needs. Ground force production facilities produce the Ratel series IFVs and Eland armored cars, 155-mm field guns, 127-mm rocket launchers, 35-mm ADA, 60-mm and 81-mm mortars, 7.62-mm and 5.56-mm machineguns and rifles, 9-mm submachineguns, and pistols. They also produce a series of antilandmine vehicles, troop carriers, and gun-tractors. Truck production is approximately 100,000 vehicles annually.
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Prior to the arms embargo, agreements were concluded for production of two aircraft under license: the Impala MK II trainer/ground attack aircraft and the Kudu light transport. In the past the South Africans assembled the high performance French Mirage F-1, also under license. An indigenously designed air-to-air missile, the V-3B Kukri, entered production in late 1980 or early 1981.

The current production of naval vessels consists primarily of the Minister Class guided missile boats, based on Israeli Reshef design, and a few auxiliary and patrol boats. It is believed that South Africa could produce or assemble combatants up to frigate size, but would require outside technical and materiel assistance. Submarines could be produced but only at great expense and considerable assistance from a submarine-producing country.

Despite the stimulation provided by the voluntary arms embargo enacted in 1963 and the mandatory arms embargo enacted in 1977 that is driving South Africa's policy of military self-sufficiency, most sophisticated weapons technology and component parts, and some spare parts and ammunition, still must be obtained abroad. The arms embargo has not succeeded in isolating South Africa from foreign military materiel sources, but it has increased the difficulty and cost of procuring foreign arms.

f. Military and Political Alignment

South Africa has no publicly acknowledged alliances; however, there is known military cooperation with Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile, Taiwan, and Israel. In 1975, the UK Labor Government terminated the Simonstown agreement, which allowed for use of the Simonstown naval facilities. South Africa is not known to receive military aid from any country. It retains a military assistance agreement with Malawi. South Africa also has training agreements with Taiwan, Argentina, Chile, and Paraguay.

South Africa closely watches the progress of military relations with France. Although French spares continue to arrive, albeit not from official sources, the South African Government is genuinely concerned about France's theoretical ability to leave the country with a lack of spare parts for the French equipment already purchased and onhand. Defense cooperation with Israel is thought to be considerable, particularly in arms production and sales. In addition, Israel is thought to have a sizable training team in South Africa, and several quasi-military personnel are attached to the Israeli embassy.

The mandatory United Nations arms embargo theoretically cuts South Africa off from all outside sources of military materiel. It has, in fact, had a mixed impact. France canceled the sale of two submarines and two light frigates. On the other hand, Israel did not abrogate existing contracts for Reshef patrol boats. Most Western nations appear to be enforcing the embargo, and though the South Africans do not like it, they had expected the boycott and had taken steps to improve their self-sufficiency in arms production. They also undoubtedly maintain contacts with private arms dealers. Several Western countries have cut back their contacts with the South African military establishment.
South Africa's isolation from changes elsewhere in Africa has ended. In April 1974, when Portugal dismantled its centuries-old African empire, South Africa and Rhodesia suddenly were exposed to the danger of being the last two exclusively white governments in Sub-Saharan Africa. The advent of black majority rule in Zimbabwe on 18 April 1980 leaves the white South African Government completely alone. South Africa's future now depends more than ever on its continental relations and its willingness to compromise with black African states, a process that is difficult because of its internal policies. Pretoria has declared officially that it is willing to cooperate fully with black governments in Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. Prime Minister Botha has put forward a proposal for a "Constellation of Southern Africa"—a loose association of southern African states focused on cooperative economic and collective security schemes and meant to increase regional interdependence. As a first step, the South African Government has proposed publicly security pacts to unify its adherents against external threats, specifically as a "counter to the perils of Cuban and Marxist intervention in Africa." South Africa revealed early in 1984 that it had signed a secret security pact with Swaziland 2 years earlier Angola and Mozambique each signed agreements with South Africa, in February and March 1984, respectively. The "Lusaka Agreement" and the "Nkomati Accords" resulted in an official if ineffective Angola attempt to control SWAPO in southern Angola and a complete ban on the use of Mozambican territory by the ANC to launch attacks against South African targets Conversely, the SADF began a phased withdrawal from southern Angola, and the Government of South Africa stopped supporting RENAMO in Mozambique. Botswana, Lesotho, and the independent homelands are the next most likely candidates for membership. South Africa has offered to sign nonaggression treaties with any neighboring state that disassociates itself from the activities of the ANC and PAC.

Chief of Mission: Ambassador Herman Nickel
2. MILITARY, GENERAL

a. (U) Key Military/Police Officials

SADF: Chief of the South African Defence Force: Gen Constand L. Viljoen
Chief of Staff, Operations: Lt Gen I.R. Glee son
Chief of Staff, Logistics: Lt Gen I. Lemmer
Chief of Staff, Intelligence: Lt Gen Peter van der Westhuizen
Chief of Staff, Personnel: Lt Gen R.F. Holtzhausen

Army: Chief of the Army: Lt Gen J.J. Geldenhuys
Deputy Chief of the Army: Maj Gen D.R. Marais
Chief of Army Staff, Operations: Maj Gen M.J. du Plessis
Chief of Army Staff, Personnel: Maj Gen L. D. Meyer
Chief of Army Staff, Logistics: Maj Gen R. Badenhorst
Chief of Army Staff, Intelligence: Brig R. R. Verbeek
OC, SADF forces in SWA: Maj Gen Charles J. Lloyd

Navy: Chief of the Navy: VAdm A. P. Putter
Chief of Navy Staff, Operations: Rear Adm G. Syndercombe
Chief Naval Staff, Personnel: Como. R. Eberlein
Chief Naval Staff, Intelligence: Como. J. A. de Kock
Chief Naval Staff, Logistics: Como. N. F. Wise

Air Force: Chief of the Air Force: Lt Gen Denis J. Earp
Chief of the Air Staff, Operations: Maj Gen A.J.S. van der Lith
Chief of Air Staff, Logistics: Maj Gen H.C. du Plessis
Chief of the Air Staff, Personnel: Brig G. J. Coetzee

Medical Service: Surgeon General: Lt Gen N. J. Nieuwoudt
Chief Medical Service Logistics: Maj Gen C. F. Scheepers
Chief Medical Service Operations: Brig D. P. Knobel

Police: Commissioner: Lt Gen Johann Coetzee
Chief, Security Police: Maj Gen Frans Steenkamp
Chief, National Intelligence Service (NIS): Lucas Daniel "Neil" Barnard

b. Position of Armed Forces

The South African Defence Force (SADF) is composed of four services--Army, Navy, Air Force, and Medical Service--each headed by a three-star service chief. About 700 officers and NCOs serve at the multiservice SADF headquarters. The SADF's British-type dual-structured staff system has been supplanted by a general/specific staff system modeled along French/US lines. Each of the five major headquarters (SADF and the four services) is organized into five major staff sections, which are numbered 1 through 5 in the sequence of personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, and finance. In the SADF HQ, SAN HQ, and generally throughout the SADF structure, the staff operations chief is the de facto second-in-command and can act for the commander when necessary. The only two known exceptions to this rule are the South African Medical Service (SAMS) HQ, in which the Chief of Medical Staff, Logistics, is the de facto...
number two, and the Army HQ, in which the position of Deputy Chief of the Army was created effective 1 September 1982. The Defense College and the Military Academy are under staff supervision of the Chief of Staff, Personnel.

The SADF, particularly the Navy, has in the past been generally pro-US or pro-UK, but this atmosphere has eroded in view of the US-UK policy toward South African issues. Most members are suspicious of these nations because of their support of the UN arms embargo. English-speaking personnel are the majority in the Navy, compose about 50 percent of the Air Force, and are less than 20 percent of the Army. Almost all responsible positions are held by Afrikaners. Military personnel are highly regarded, enjoy a favorable social status, are loyal, support the policies of the Government, and are strongly anti-Communist.

Most SADF personnel are white South Africans; however, because of increasing manpower demands in both the military and civilian sectors, increased use of nonwhites on a voluntary basis in the SADF is taking place. All official bars to racial integration and upward mobility in the military service have been removed from SADF and South African Government (SAG) directives. The SAG has agreed in principle to compulsory military service for colored and Indian personnel. Major impediments to implementing this act are said to be facilities and funding. Colored, Indian, and black contributions to the SADF effort have been small despite undertakings such as the use of colored and black troops in a combat role in Namibia. Viewed in the South African context, however, considerable progress has been made toward racial integration in the SADF. The SADF is well ahead of South African society in general in lowering racial barriers. Under the leadership of Gen Magnus Malan, formerly SADF Chief and now Minister of Defence, pressure will continue to be applied in the political domain to equalize pay and allowances.

Following are current SADF nonwhite strength figures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blacks</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloreds</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>5,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indians</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>8,150+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**c. Military Trends and Capabilities**

The armed forces are capable of conducting counterinsurgency and conventional operations within the Republic and to a lesser degree in neighboring states. Weaknesses are the diminished logistic and support capabilities caused by the arms embargo and the inability of the industrial base to support an all-out military effort along the breadth of the northern border. Emphasis continues to be placed on improving the quality of training and increasing the military equipment inventory. South Africa is concerned about the obsolescence and inadequacy of its military equipment inventory, its uncertain sources for arms, and its isolation from the West.
In an effort to insure arms supplies and to promote its own arms industry, South Africa formed the Armaments Corporation of South Africa (ARMSCOR) in 1968. Tasked specifically to procure weapons, ammunition, and technology based on the needs of the SADF, ARMSCOR's duties today cover the entire process of weapons production from research through manufacture, servicing, and repair, as well as procurement from private concerns. ARMSCOR, although government funded, functions as a private corporation that employs over 25,000 people. It relies on its own subsidiary weapons factories to produce weapons for the SADF. However, it does not hesitate to acquire arms by tasking private South African industry to meet the needs of the SADF. To this end, it is now estimated that over 100,000 people are employed in the South African arms industry. ARMSCOR is often tasked to obtain weapons and technology in the open international arms market or covertly from sensitive sources. In addition to promoting arms production, ARMSCOR is now actively involved in overtly seeking markets for South African produced weapon systems.

d. Military Budget

(U) $3.074 billion ($2.613 billion for defense and $461 million for police) for fiscal year ending 31 March 1983; this is 17.9 percent of the central government budget. Dollar value converted at the exchange rate of 1.1079 South African rands equal $1.00.

e. (U) Population:
26,200,000 estimated as of June 1984
excluding Bophuthatswana 1,502,000 (June 1984); Transkei 2,861,000 (June 1984); Venda 401,000 (June 1984), and Ciskei 675,000 (June 1984)
Males (ages 15-49): 5,946,000 (193,000 Asian; 4,202,000 black; 615,000 colored; and, 1,054,000 white). Physically fit: 3,697,000 (113,000 Asian; 2,192,000 black; 354,000 colored; and, 903,000 white).
Ethnic Divisions:* 16.5 percent white, 71.5 percent black, 9.2 percent colored, 2.8 percent Asian
Literacy: Almost all white population literate; Government estimates 50 percent of nonwhites literate.
3. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

a. Army

(1) Mission

To defend the national borders, conduct counterinsurgency operations, and support the police in maintaining internal security.

(2) Capabilities

The South African Army (SAA) is capable of defending the country against any probable aggressor, including any group of black African states. The force is capable of conducting counterinsurgency and conventional operations in the Republic and, to a lesser degree, in neighboring states. A coordinated attack all along the country's northern borders would strain the Army's capabilities, but would not destroy its ability to resist successfully. Capabilities are improving as training and equipment are being improved.

The Army is a modern military force and is superior in overall combat capability to any army in Sub-Saharan Africa. Its major strength is in the relatively high quality of its professional soldiers, who provide excellent training and leadership for the force. Its main weaknesses are a shortage of skilled personnel in the Permanent Force (PF), its reliance on reserves and national servicemen to fulfill the bulk of its missions, and a shortage of sophisticated equipment. The lack of combat experience has been rectified to a degree by the 1975 incursion into Angola and constant operational border duty since. The Army is defense oriented but could mount a limited-duration multibrigade operation with full logistic and air support outside its territory. The two-division conventional force under the control of SAA HQ has improved the Army's capability to deploy troops for combat. The formation of subordinate division and brigade headquarters facilitates the mobilization of a conventional combat force of corps size from the reserves at short notice.

(3) Personnel Strength

The SAA is composed of Permanent Force (PF) personnel who are career soldiers, Citizen Force (CF) personnel on active duty who serve 2 years as conscripts (national servicemen), and any other reserves called up. Citizen Force (CF) personnel who have completed 2 years of national service have a 10-year reserve commitment. Volunteers who have completed all national service requirements are assigned to conventional force units and Army Commandos.

* (U) These figures include the Homelands' population total.
The active duty strength of the SAA is 76,500, out of which 28,000 are PF. Between the CF (a ready reserve force) and the Army Commandos (home guard reserve forces that contain volunteers as well as men completing their reserve commitment), the SAA has a 240,000-man reserve pool that can be activated within about 30 days.

(4) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

The South African Army is organized into three groups of forces: conventional forces, counterinsurgency (COIN) forces, and infrastructure forces.

The SAA's conventional forces consist of one infantry division, one armored division, and one airborne infantry brigade minus. Each is directly subordinate to SAA HQ. The bulk of the personnel assigned to these units are CF reservists but some PF members are also assigned.

COIN units are subordinate to the 10 South African Army Territory Commands into which South Africa proper is divided. They are Western Province, Southern Cape, Eastern Province, Natal, Far North, Eastern Transvaal, Witwatersrand, Northern Transvaal, Northwestern Districts, and Orange Free State Territory Commands. In addition, a Walvis Bay Territory Command (WBTC) is sometimes mentioned but probably exists in name only. (For information on the South-West Africa Territory Command, see the section on Namibia.) COIN units consist largely of local home defense forces called commandos. They are manned by members of the Army Commandos. Their primary mission is to defend the home area and to guard key installations and facilities. There are also COIN infantry battalions manned mainly by CF personnel not on active duty. PF administrative and support units, manned by PF and CF personnel subordinate to the local territory command, support the various COIN units. Together these units (300 of at least company size) furnish the SAA's COIN combat capability.

Infrastructure forces are part of, and draw their name from, the SAA's infrastructure, which consists of the SAA HQ, the training establishment, logistics command, separate engineer and signal units, and the chief of the Army's Reserve Force (operational active army combat units). Infrastructure units are manned by PF personnel and second-year draftees.
**SOUTH AFRICA**

(b) Ground Combat Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Tactical Units</th>
<th>Strength Per Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Infrastructure Forces (Active duty army consisting of PF personnel and CF personnel on active duty)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Inf Bns (white)</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Ethnic Inf Bns (5 black and 1 colored)</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Reconnaissance/Special Forces Cos</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Airborne Bn</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Armor Bns</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Artillery Bns</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Air Defense Bn</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Engineer Bn</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conventional Forces (Ready Reserve consisting of CF personnel not on active duty)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 Division HQ (1 infantry, 1 armor)</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Brigade HQ</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46 Infantry Bns (estimated)</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Reconnaissance/Special Forces Co</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Armored Bns (10 armored car, 2 tank)</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Artillery Bns</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Air Defense Bns</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Engineer Bns</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Airborne Bns</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Counterinsurgency Forces (Army Commandos consisting of CF personnel not on active duty and volunteers) | Unk | 130,000 |
| 30-35 Commando Group Headquarters; about 180-200 light infantry units (range in size from company to reinforced battalion) | Unk | Unk |

* The basic active duty SAA infantry battalion from the training establishment has a strength of 750 men; however, these units serve as training cadre to the semiannual intake of National Servicemen. As a result, these units may have as many as 2,000-3,500 men in various stages of training at any one time. Normally a battalion has elements operating simultaneously in the BOA and training at the battalion home base. The basic infantry company has about 100 men and a squad has 10 men. Infantry companies are either mechanized (Ratel IFV) or motorized (SAMIL, Hippo, or Buffel light armored indigenous APC).
SOUTH AFRICA

(c) Deployment

In-country: 57,000 (all training establishment units except those listed below).

Namibia: Some 18,000 active duty South African military are regularly deployed in Namibia and 1,500 in Walvis Bay.

Foreign: The SADF provides some limited naval advisory assistance to Malawi. Assistance to the Angolan insurgent group (UNITA) probably continues but currently at a somewhat reduced level. Assistance to the National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO) has reportedly stopped since early in 1984. The SADF on occasion has launched cross-border raids against SWAPO bases in Angola and Zambia and against the ANC in Mozambique and Lesotho.

(5) Weapons and Equipment

(a) General

The Army has excellent domestically produced small arms, infantry support weapons, adequate and improving communications equipment, transport and command vehicles, and miscellaneous service items. Defense planners are working actively on replacing the Army's older heavy equipment, and attempts are being made to acquire a new family of field artillery pieces, heavy mortars, AT weapons, infantry-operated AD weapons, and armor. The "Ratel," a South African-produced infantry fighting vehicle (IFV), has been produced in sufficient numbers to enable the SAA to fully equip several infantry battalions. Some 350 Ratels and Elands have even been sold to Morocco. South Africa also produces an armored car called the "Eland," which is the local version of the Panhard AML-24s, and a series of light armored landmine-resistant personnel vehicles (essentially modified truck and auto chassis), called "Hippo," "Leopard," "Rhino," "Kudu," and "Buffel." The Buffel has become the standard vehicle in the SAA motorized battalion and plays an increasingly important combat support role in the Border Operation Area (BOA). In 1979, the SADF announced development of a new field gun, the 155-mm G-5, and the R-4, an assault rifle based on the Israeli Galil. There is no evidence that the G-5 has been issued to any units. However, it is now believed to be in production. In 1982 ARMSCOR announced the development of a prototype self-propelled version of the G-5 called G-6. A 127-mm multiple rocket launcher is also produced by South Africa. This indigenous weapon system was based on and designed to outdistance the Soviet BM-21 122-mm rocket launcher that gave the South Africans trouble during the 1975 Angolan War.

** (U) See separate section on Namibia for details.
A variety of general transport vehicles are acquired from local sources, some of commercial design. They are generally designated SAMIL for South African military vehicle. Four-passenger "mini-jeeps" of Australian manufacture probably have been obtained. Light weapons are of modern Belgian and Israeli design. Some equipment, such as Oerlikon ADA and wire-guided AT missiles, has been obtained abroad. Equipment in use is maintained in excellent condition. One of the training establishment force's chief functions is to maintain equipment stocks.

During Operations Protea and Askari, the SADF captured several thousand tons of SWAPO and Angolan military equipment. Some of this equipment has been incorporated into the South African inventory. Of particular note are 57 Soviet antiaircraft weapons that have been refurbished and deployed with the SAA. Reporting also indicates that South African infantry units are increasingly issued captured antitank weapons like the RPG-7.

Heavy equipment currently held is still largely old, post-World War II materiel (British and some US); most is in storage and is believed to be in good to excellent condition. Some key items, such as the Centurion tanks, are being rebuilt in-country. Major armor and artillery items of equipment are listed below.

(See also DDB-1921-5-81, Foreign Army Materiel Production: Africa South of the Sahara, February 1981.)

(b) Ground Weapons and Equipment (Estimated)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Infantry Weapons</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-mm mortar</td>
<td>FR Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81-mm mortar</td>
<td>FR 2,000+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81-mm mortar</td>
<td>SF 2,000+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-in mortar</td>
<td>UK Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5-in rocket launcher</td>
<td>UK Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RPG-7</strong></td>
<td>UR** Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Entac wire-guided AT missile</strong></td>
<td>FR Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SS-11 wire-guided AT missile</strong></td>
<td>FR Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Artillery</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-5, 155-mm gun</td>
<td>SF 7-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-pounder, SP, Sexton</td>
<td>UK 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-pounder how</td>
<td>UK 132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5-in gun</td>
<td>UK 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127-mm MRL</td>
<td>SF 40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The SAA also may be in possession of the M-79 grenade launcher (at least one has been observed in country) and the STRIM 89-mm AT rocket launcher.

** Captured in Angola.
### Air Defense

| Artillery: | 3.7 in ADA | UK | 22 |
| 40-mm ADA (Bofors) | | UK | 24 |
| 35-mm ADA | SF | Unk |
| 35-mm ADA (Oerlikon) | SZ | 78 |
| 14.5-mm ADA (KPU-1) | UR | 24 |
| 23-mm ADA (ZU-23) | UR | 13 |
| 20-mm ADA (M-55) | YU | 13 |
| SA-7 | UR* | 200+ |

### Armor:

| Tank, Centurion, Mk III/IV/V** | UK/JO/IN/SF | 225 |
| Armored car, Eland*** | FR,SF | 1,800+ |
| (w/90-mm gun) | | 1,200 |
| (w/60-mm gun mortar) | | 600 |
| IFV, Ratel@ | SF | 1,000+ |
| Universal carrier, tracked | UK | 200 |
| Recovery and special purpose vehicles | UK,US | 13 |
| Light armored personnel carriers (e.g., Hippo, Rhino Kudu, Buffel, etc.) | SF | 1,000+ |
| Tank Transporters | US | 198 |

(6) Logistics

The Army is experiencing only some minor difficulty in maintaining the standing force. The Army has some 40 depots and subshops devoted to supply and maintenance. The capacity of these facilities appears to be adequate. Although the voluntary arms embargo instituted in 1963 made materiel acquisition troublesome, the mandatory arms embargo established by the UN on 1 November 1977 has magnified South African procurement difficulties. The arms embargo will have a long-range debilitating impact that will be especially evident in the defense budget.

* Captured in Angola.

** Centurions equipped with the 83.4-mm gun are gradually being refitted with 105-mm guns and diesel engines. Perhaps 120 have been transformed. Once upgraded they are called the Oliphant (Elephant) tank.

*** The Ferret scout cars and Saracen APCs, formerly in the inventory, probably have been transferred either to duty with police or to mothball war reserve storage.

@ Includes an unknown number of Ratels modified with the addition of 90-mm gun.
Self-sufficiency in Army equipment has increased significantly in the past decade and a half; however, heavy and sophisticated items and some components and weapons technology still must be imported. ARMSCOR directs numerous companies producing Army materiel. These include firms producing arms and ammunition, vehicles, heavy engineer equipment, electronics, and quarter-master supplies.

The 1975 Angolan involvement pointed up shortcomings in ammunition production and reserve stocks. For example, there was a shortage of artillery ammunition (25-pdr and 5.5-inch). It was not manufactured locally and had to be purchased in Western Europe. At present, South Africa manufactures almost all of the ammunition required by the SAA.

About 1,800 Eland armored cars (based on the French Panhard AML) have been built locally, as have some 1,000 or more Ratels. In early 1975, it was announced that South Africa would build tanks; however, it appears that older tanks like the Centurion have been purchased abroad and are being refurbished and upgraded locally. Principal modifications include 105-mm guns, diesel engines, and improved optics and fire control systems. Although South Africa does possess the technological capability to produce a modern tank, the cost of such a project is thought to be prohibitive for the fledgling arms industry.

Personnel Procurement and Retention

Medically fit white males (18-25) are chosen by the National Service System for compulsory service. Conscripted personnel are assigned to the Army, Navy, or Air Force by selection boards composed of PF officers. In addition, a small number (about 500) are assigned to the paramilitary police. Under the present system, National Servicemen are required to begin 2 years of active duty in early January or early July. Following 2 years of active duty, they are assigned to a CF or Commando unit; they are called up for eight additional annual training periods not to exceed a total of 720 days' reserve during the 12-year active reserve service. National Service can be avoided by enlistment in the South African Police, the Harbors and Railway Police, or the Prison Service; however, the enlistment must have been accomplished before callup for National Service occurs. Six-month deferments may be obtained if the individual is enrolled in a college or university. The annual callup, distributed semiannually, provides 33,000-44,000 conscripts. Most of these go to the Army; the remainder go to the Air Force (3,800) and Navy (1,200). Voluntary enlistments for the PF are for a minimum of 3 years. Four-thousand medically qualified coloreds currently serve in the SAA in three separate command elements. The infantry battalion consists of several companies of volunteer National Servicemen and one PF company. A second element is the South African Cape Corps (SACC) Maintenance Unit, which is one of two PF maintenance units in the SAA. The third element is the Cape Corps School, which is staffed by PF SACC members and is responsible for training colored volunteers for the Army. Currently, the school teaches technical skills such as driving, maintenance, supply, and cooking. Some coloreds serve away from their parent units in white units, in technical specialties such as those mentioned above. Colored units and individual soldiers have served with distinction in the BOA.
Blacks were introduced to the SAA in January 1974 after General Malan called for a black training center in November 1973. The 21st Battalion is located south of Johannesburg at Lenz. More than 2,000 black volunteers have passed through the 21st Battalion; its present strength is over 600 men. There are black NCOs and a few black officers, but the unit is white led. Originally the unit was intended for a support mission, but it has served successfully in a combat capacity in the BOA.

Although the 21st Battalion is actually a training school and not an operational unit, it does deploy company-size units of graduates for combat operations in the BOA. Following their deployment to the BOA, black soldiers are assigned an area of specialization and enter short courses to qualify as clerks, cooks, drivers, etc. A small number are selected for a longer period of additional training to qualify as instructors. Eventually all are assigned either to ethnic battalions or to the staff of the 21st Battalion. In addition to preparing black soldiers for service in the SAA, 21st Battalion also trains men to become noncommissioned officers in the black "Homeland" armies. Qualified recruits from Bophuthatswana, Venda, Transkei, and Ciskei are now being accepted for training.

During 1979-80, the SADF formed five new black ethnic battalions or regional units as the SADF calls them. The 121st Battalion, essentially Zulu in makeup and home-based at Jozini in northern Natal, has participated in counterinsurgency operations in northern Natal and has sent at least one company to Namibia for duty. A Xhosa unit, the 141st Battalion, is also located in Natal. The other ethnic units, all located in the Northern Transvaal Command, are the 111th Battalion (Swazi), the 112th Battalion (Venda), and the 113th Battalion (Shangaan). The 112th has become the primary force of the nascent Venda National Force (VNF) and is no longer considered part of the SAA. These units are trained to operate in the countryside near their camps but all will probably send elements to the border to enhance their training. The Government began the regional program to prepare for a possible rise in insurgency in rural areas. The black units are viewed as a stabilizing factor and a way for blacks to participate in their own defense.

Blacks can join the SAA Training Establishment Force for an indefinite term of service and may resign by giving 1 month's notice. While enlistment and promotion standards are to be equal with those of whites, the generally lower educational level of blacks may work as an impediment to advancement. Recruitment has not been a problem because SAA service offers job security, a good wage, family benefits, and the prestige of a uniform. When an individual black soldier's homeland becomes independent, he has the choice of serving with the homeland force or remaining with the SADF.

Training

The overall quality of training enables the Army to fulfill its mission. Training at all levels is vigorous, intense, and heavily emphasized. The Army successfully handles the training of about 25,000-39,000 conscripts annually and also supports the training of reserve units despite the shortage of PF cadre. Conscripts receive a period of basic and advanced training that
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includes the acquisition of a skill. After about 8 months they are considered combat ready and serve a 3- to 5-month period of operational border security duty in Namibia or in Northern Transvaal.

Training is oriented toward both counterinsurgency and conventional operations in border areas. Unit training is satisfactory, but the SADF is working toward improvement of combined-arms training. In the past the Army has conducted several brigade-size exercises to improve command and control, coordination, and logistic support at that level. The Army Battle School near Sishen is used regularly for the annual training of conventional force units. A two-division exercise (Thunder Chariot) was unsuccessfully conducted there in September 1984. Usually, 11 months out of the year, at least one battalion (regt) is training there. Army Commandos periodically train as light infantry at the Daniel Theereon Combat School near Kimberley. A two-division exercise was programmed for September 1984.

(9) Reserves

South Africa relies on an extensive reserve system. Its personnel components are summarized below.

(a) Conventional Force

The Conventional Force is a first-line reserve that is composed of personnel who have completed their active service obligation and have been posted to CF units (conscripts are assigned either to a Conventional Force or a Commando unit upon completion of the 2-year active-duty obligations). These units are called up for annual training periods of a minimum of 30 days each. Current estimated conventional force strength is about 125,000. There are about 75 battalion-size combat units and an equal number of support units of company-size or larger. Combat units are organized into seven brigades and two divisions that are subordinate to Headquarters South African Army.

(b) Army Commandos

The Army Commandos are organized into about 300 light infantry units termed "Commandos." The Commandos have been an all-white force but now are being encouraged to recruit blacks, coloreds, and Indians. Several Commandos have been successful in recruiting black and colored members but the practice is not widespread. Women volunteers now are accepted to serve in a noncombatant capacity. In the past, units received training in counterinsurgency warfare and were not expected to operate for sustained periods in the field. However, recent changes in training emphasis and an improved personnel assignment policy have enhanced the operational capability of the Commandos. It is clear that much of the burden of conducting COIN operations will fall to the Commandos in the future. Commandos will be increasingly tasked to provide security for sensitive installations such as powerplants, bridges, utility installations, and government buildings. The territory command (TC) will become increasingly active in providing medical, communications, and transportation support for subordinate Commandos. In the past, Commandos were dependent on civilian facilities for support.
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(10) Women's Army Corps

The SAA has about 3,000 women volunteers in noncombatant-type duties including civil defense, communications, nursing, driving, and clerical duties. Recently the role of women in the SADF has been expanded. Career fields open to women are in the Personnel Services Corps, Signal Corps, Catering Corps, Ordnance Service Corps, Finance Corps, Intelligence Corps, Military Police, and the Engineering Corps. Basic training for Permanent Force women has been moved from the Women's Army College at George to Personnel Services School at Voortrekkerhoogte. This move will permit an increased number of Citizen Force women volunteers to be trained at George and is indicative of the increased role women are playing in the SAA.

(11) Mobilization

Specific mobilization plans are not known. However, if a serious threat to the country's security should develop, COIN and Conventional Force units would be mobilized along with the paramilitary South African Police, which would come under the jurisdiction of the SADF. Without outside logistic support, full mobilization capacity is estimated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel Corps</th>
<th>Div (Inf/Armd)</th>
<th>Bde (Inf/Armd/Mtd)</th>
<th>Bn</th>
<th>Commando Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M-day 70-75,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M+15 150,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M+30 300,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M+90 375,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M+180 400,000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Full mobilization would be avoided if at all possible because of the skilled (white) manpower shortage it would create. Mobilized forces could not be maintained for any extended period without severe countrywide economic repercussions. In 1976, the Defense Act was revised to increase the period of liability for continuous service, short of full mobilization, to 4 months (from 2 previously). This increased mobilization flexibility in situations short of an all-out emergency, thereby making it feasible to call up selected reserve units to combat a limited threat.

b. Navy

(1) Mission

The missions of the South African Navy (SAN) are to defend the nation against seaborne attack, to protect against infiltration from the sea, to provide harbor security for all South African port installations, to survey and maintain the lines of communication around the Cape of Good Hope, and to police the Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ) to the extent of its capabilities. When directed by the Chief of the Navy, the SAN has the mission of conducting submarine, mine warfare, and offensive small craft operations. The SAN also is
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tasked with conducting hydrographic operations. Surveillance of the Cape Sea Route is a joint responsibility with the South African Air Force Southern Air Command (SAC).

(2) Capabilities

The Navy is incapable of protecting the nation from attack by a modern naval force and in itself would be only a minor factor in a general war. Nevertheless, the SAN is one of the most effective naval forces in Africa. It is capable of limited escort, patrol, and minesweeping operations in local waters. The ability of the SAN to operate effectively with NATO or other friendly forces is questionable because of the lack of contact and joint exercises with NATO navies. SAN ASW capabilities are deficient, but it continues to train and maintain a limited ASW capability. The submarine force has a limited attack capability. The degradation of ASW capability is due primarily to a loss of ASW platforms, experienced personnel, realistic training exercises, and state-of-the-art techniques and systems. Development of a harbor defense capability continues. The Navy is able to undertake limited sea search and rescue.

Despite these limitations, the Navy is working toward improving its capabilities with emphasis on coastal defense. South Africa claims 12 nautical miles (NM) as territorial waters and a 200 NM exclusive fishing zone. Addition of patrol guided missile combatants to the inventory has increased coastal patrol potency, but many additional PGGs will be needed before the entire 2,881-km* coast can be adequately covered. To carry out the new harbor defense role, the SAN has established marine units.

(3) Personnel Strength

6,600: About 3,600 are Permanent Force personnel (525 officers) and 1,500 are Citizen Force conscripts performing National Service. (In addition, 800 colored and 550 Indian SADF personnel are assigned Navy duties. There are also some 150 women in the South African Women's Naval Service (SWANS).)

(4) Ships and Aircraft Strength

(a) Ships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Op</th>
<th>Nonop</th>
<th>In Reserve</th>
<th>Status Unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SS (Submarine)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF (Frigate)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGG (Patrol Guided Missile Combatant)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC (Patrol Craft)*</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSB (Harbor Patrol Boat)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* (U) The Namibian coast is an additional 1,489 kilometers.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship Type</th>
<th>SAN 1</th>
<th>SAN 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PBR (River/Roadstead Patrol Boat)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSC (Coastal Minesweeper)*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHC (Coastal Minehunter)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR (Replenishment Ship)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGS (Hydrographic Survey Ship)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AG (Misc Auxiliary)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN (Net Tender)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APB (Barracks Ship)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVR (Rescue Vessel)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YAG (Service Craft)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YPT (Torpedo Retriever)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YTB (Large Harbor Tug)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YTM (Medium Harbor Tug)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YTL (Small Harbor Tug)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YXT (Training Craft)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>69</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### (b) Aircraft

None. The SAN depends upon the South African Air Force's Southern Air Command (SAC) for support. Five units stationed in the vicinity of Cape Town at Yesterplaat and D.F. Malan Airfields provide the bulk of SAC assets devoted to maritime roles. Wasp HAS-1 helicopters perform ASW duties from the President Class frigate. Piaggio 166 light transports routinely perform short range and coastal surveillance duties. Aging Shackelton MR-3s are capable of long-range missions but are used sparingly. Shackelton flights were expected to end in September 1984. C-47 aircraft support the SAN by providing logistic and personnel transport between various military bases. The Air Force also has a squadron of Buccaneer maritime strike aircraft, but it is inadequately trained for naval support operations.

#### (5) Organization and Deployment

**(a) Command Relationships**

Subject to the direction of the Chief of the SADF, responsibility for naval operations is vested in the Chief of the Navy. The Chief of the Navy, his immediate staff, and the staff planning elements are located in Pretoria. Operational planning and control is vested in the Commander Naval Operations (COMNAVOP), located at Joint Maritime Operations Center (JMOC), Silvermine. Conduct of joint SAN-SAAF maritime operations depends on a cooperative relationship between the Chiefs of the Navy and the Air Force, and on a lower level between the COMNAVOP and his SAAF counterpart, the Southern Air Commander. Joint maritime operations are conducted out of the Maritime Defense Headquarters (MHQ) located near Westlake, a suburb of Cape Town. Satellite centers of the MHQ are located at SAS* Bluff, Durban, and in Walvis Bay.

* One MSC and one PC are assigned to CF units.
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(b) Naval Headquarters Organization

Naval Headquarters, Pretoria, is divided into five functional areas: Chief of Naval Staff Personnel, Chief of Naval Staff Intelligence, Chief of Naval Staff Operations, Chief of Naval Staff Logistics, and Chief of Naval Staff Finance.

(c) Organization of the Navy

The SAN is organized around separate commands under the Chief of the Navy. The largest of these separate commands is the Commander Naval Operations (COMNAVOP). Early in 1978, Commander Naval Logistics and Commander Naval Training were established in the Cape Town area. In July 1980, SAN further decentralized management by reorganizing the shore component into three geographical regional Naval Commands—Natal, Walvis Bay, and Cape Province. SAN Citizen Force units, previously subordinate to Training Command, now come under the regional naval commands as do other shore activities such as schools and training centers. The port naval commands, which are located at major ports or can be activated as required and which have responsibility for port and harbor security, also are subordinate to the regional naval command.

The new Marine force (a subspecialization of the seaman branch) is subordinate either to the regional naval command or the installation it is charged to guard.

(d) Commander Naval Operations

COMNAVOP is the senior operational commander responsible to the Chief of the Navy for South Africa's area of maritime interest. He has operational command over all surface and subsurface forces and other operational forces assigned by the Chief of the Navy and is responsible for all maritime operations and exercises of the SAN. Forces are organized administratively under COMNAVOP into the 10th Frigate Squadron, the 147th Minecountermeasures Flotilla, the Submarine Flotilla, the Strike Craft Flotilla, and a Search and Rescue unit.

(e) Deployment

The preponderance of naval forces are located at SAS Simonstown in Cape Province. The naval base located there now has been expanded to the limit of its capacity. Because of this condition and the fact that the major threat to South Africa is perceived currently as coming from its northern neighbors, the SAN now is dispersing its forces to the areas of major concern. SAS Salisbury Island in Durban Harbor was reoccupied by the Navy in 1976 and is being renovated from a dead WW II naval base to an active naval base beginning to Challenge Simonstown in importance as it has become home of the Strike Craft

*(U) Traditionally, South African naval stations, as well as South African ships and some units, are called SAS.*
Flotilla. An advance naval operations center at Richards Bay has been established. On the west coast, the SAN has bases at Saldanha Bay and Walvis Bay. Associated with Saldanha Bay is the search and rescue facility named SAS Flamingo. The Submarine Flotilla, the 10th Frigate Squadron, and the 147th Minesweeping Flotilla are all home-ported in Simonstown. The Strike Craft Flotilla (SAS Skorpion) is located at SAS Salisbury Island, Durban Harbor. The Marines, organized into harbor protection units, are assigned to the major ports.

(6) Status of Equipment

Larger combat ships are primarily of British origin while most smaller vessels, particularly patrol craft are built in South Africa. Most are maintained in good material condition. Vessels normally in reserve are in good condition but are stripped of armament, which is stored at Simonstown. The SAN's principal combatants are one FF acquired new from the UK in the early 1960s, three Daphne Class SSs acquired from France in the early 1970s, and eight Reshef Class (called Minister Class by the SAN) patrol guided missile combatants. Patrol and mine warfare ships are in rotating service; about 25 percent of the fleet inventory are in reserve or overhaul status at any given time.

The SAN dockyard has modified the frigate to carry helicopters. Two MSCs have been converted to coastal gunboats, and work has commenced on at least one of four more scheduled for this conversion. The dockyard also has converted two minesweepers into minehunters (MHCs).

The SAN has eight operational Minister Class patrol boats. Three were built in Israel and South Africa has built at least four under license from Israel. These vessels are armed with surface-to-surface missiles called the Skorpion, probably a modified version of the Gabriel (possibly the Gabriel II).

The locally built harbor defense launch (PSB), a 9-meter catamaran called the Namacurra Class, was unveiled in early 1979. Twenty-four have been completed to date.

The SAN has embarked upon a plan to begin construction of corvettes, probably in the mid-1980s timeframe. South Africa's shipbuilding industry could satisfy the SAN's needs in the following areas: completion of the Reshef program; minigunboats for harbor defense; a resupply and replenishment ship; and institution of a corvette-building program. It is likely that the SAN is also studying the feasibility of developing a submarine construction capability.

(7) Logistics

The Ship Repair Yard at the Simonstown Navy Base is capable of performing repairs and major overhaul on any ship in the Navy inventory and is also capable of accomplishing extensive modifications. The facility consists of a drydock capable of handling the Navy's largest combatant, an expanded synchrolift for patrol or strike craft, and ample berthing. South Africa also has two large Government-owned drydocks in Cape Town and Durban that are used for refitting, repair or modifications, and construction as the Minister Class strike
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craft. Durban has two major commercial shipyards of such vessels that also use the drydock. The Navy has experienced, occasionally, a shortage of repair parts and equipment, even though South Africa is virtually self-sufficient in such items.

Salisbury Island, in Durban harbor, is the second major operating base for the South African Navy. It has undergone a major renovation highlighted by the installation of the country's second syncholift.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

The Navy continues to experience personnel shortages. The critical personnel shortage was relieved somewhat when those personnel who were committed to the French ship acquisition program returned to South Africa in mid-1978. The economic recession South Africa is experiencing has improved SAN procurement and retention. To a limited degree, the SAN is expanding its use of nonwhites, especially in technical fields, which has helped relieve the strain in those fields. The Navy was the first force to use nonwhites with the recruitment of coloreds in 1965. Indians were introduced into the SAN in 1974. Several naval vessels have mixed crews. Colored and Indian midshipmen have been taken into the Naval College at Gordons Bay, and there are a few Indian commissioned officers. Women also are being recruited on a larger scale. The South African Women's Naval Service (SWANS) augments shore-based male personnel. For details on conscription and terms of service, see sec. 3.a.(7). For details on use of nonwhite personnel, see sec. 3.d.

(9) Training

Training in the SAN in some areas is adequate. However, in most areas poor training techniques, lack of training aids, shortage of qualified instructors, and lack of regular training exercises continue to retard the training effort. Early in 1978 a separate command was established under the Chief of the Navy to administer all basic and initial technical training. As late as 1976 SAN officers were attending courses at most levels in the United Kingdom and France. The SAN maintains an exchange program at the junior officer level with Chile. Israel may be providing training on the Reshef patrol boats, but this has not been confirmed. SAN officers attend regular joint staff courses and staff courses of other services in the SADF.

(a) Training Facilities

Seven training facilities--the Naval Staff College, the Naval College, the South African Military Academy, SAS Simonsburg, SAS Wingfield, SAS Saldanha, and the Action Operations Center Bluff--provide a full range of naval training opportunities. (See DDB-1200-SF-82, NAFIS, for details.)

(b) Exercises

The SAN does conduct training exercises. In October 1978, two frigates participated in a naval gunfire exercise off the coast of Namibia near Walvis Bay. Wasp helicopters performed fire control duties. The SAN also occasionally conducts long-distance patrol and SICINT gathering exercises with
the Minister Class patrol boats through the Mozambique Channel. In November 1981, four SAN vessels--two frigates, a tanker, and a strike craft--completed an 18-day, 6,000-kilometer training patrol of the Southern Indian Ocean. The Task Force left Durban, passed by Reunion and the Comoro Islands on its way around Madagascar, turned south again near Dar es Salaam, and returned along the Mozambique coast. Although such an operation clearly taxed the capability of the SAN, the exercise once again pointed out South Africa's determination to periodically demonstrate its ability to project naval power in the region, despite turning away from a blue-water concept. In the past, the SAN has conducted ASW, submarine warfare, and minesweeping exercises; because of personnel and logistic constraints these are believed to be carried on less frequently now.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

The Navy CF reserve numbers about 11,000. These men serve in "paper units" and are assigned to 11 reserve training centers located in Cape Town, Simonstown, Durban, Port Elizabeth, East London, Johannesburg, Pretoria, Richards Bay, Mossel Bay, Saldanha Bay, and one holding company. One seaward defense boat (PC) has been transferred to the Pretoria and Johannesburg units for training, maintenance, and manning, which is conducted in Simonstown. This should improve inland CF effectiveness. A minesweeper that was converted to a patrol boat also has been assigned to a CF unit. Reserve effectiveness would be severely limited by the lack of depth in their training. Only a few hundred receive brief periods of shipboard training each year. The principal focus of the port CF units is on harbor defense, harbor security, salvage, and mine countermeasures. The Johannesburg CF unit mans the command and control facility at Walvis Bay.

(b) Mobilization

All reservists could be mobilized within 30 days. They probably would be assigned to reserve training centers, to other shore establishments, and to vessels in reserve status. Their combat efficiency and overall capability would be marginal because of inadequate training. By law the assets of the country can be mobilized in a national emergency and can be used as the Prime Minister sees fit. This action could include all vessels owned by the South African Merchant Marine that fly the South African flag. National Service can be satisfied by signing on in the South African Merchant Marine and attending the Merchant Marine Academy Louis Botha in Cape Town. All of the commercial companies' assets that serve tankers in South African ports and waters can be nationalized in the event of a national emergency. This includes helicopters and aircraft services as well.

The South Africa Merchant Marine has 54 ships of over 1,000 gross register tons (GRT). Twenty-two have military support potential: 9 breakbulk ships constructed in the 1960s or early 1970s, 10 container ships, built in the late 1970s and the 1980s, 2 POL tankers, and 1
small transport vehicle. Total deadweight tonnage (lift capacity) of these 22 ships is 470,200 tons of cargo. Five of these ships were constructed in South Africa, the only Sub-Saharan Africa country that has a significant shipbuilding industry.

c. **Air Force**

(1) **Mission**

The missions of the South African Air Force are supporting the Army and police in maintaining internal security; providing air transport and tactical air support to the South African Defense Force; assisting the Navy in protecting sea approaches, and providing air defense for South Africa and Namibia.

(2) **Capabilities**

The Air Force is capable of providing air support, both tactical and logistic, to the country's internal security forces. The force also would be effective in a defensive role, including air defense intercept and maritime sorties. The South African Air Force (SAAF) is by far the most powerful air force in Africa south of the Sahara, and could easily defeat any likely aggressor (i.e., any African state); however, it could not guarantee the country's airspace over the long term if opposed by a major power. The SAAF is capable of short-duration offensive operations in nearby countries and could be employed successfully in a counterinsurgency role. The SAAF has a basic ECM capability. Its strengths are quality personnel, high standards, and nucleus of relatively modern well-maintained aircraft and numerous second-line aircraft equipped for counterinsurgency duties. The SAAF's chief weaknesses are its reliance on overseas POL sources, limited availability of aircraft and parts (because of the arms embargo), a shortage of personnel including pilots for certain types of aircraft, and the inexperience of younger airmen.

(3) **Personnel**

Overall personnel strength of the SAAF is currently 11,300—about 6,500 Permanent Force personnel. This includes an estimated 1,100 pilots, 180 pilot trainees, and an estimated 500 other aircrew personnel. Another 4,000 are National Servicemen. It is estimated that there are 150 female personnel, 300 coloreds, 50 Asians, and 100 blacks also serving as volunteers with the SAAF.

(4) **Aircraft Strength**

Total: 902 (fixed wing: 369 jet, 23 turboprop, 316 prop; helicopter:* 194)

*A few helicopters are on rotating loan to the police but are operated by SAAF personnel.
In operational units: 764
(158 fighters: 18 multipurpose
13 air defense
121 ground attack
6 reconnaissance

5 light bombers
57 transports: 47 medium-range
10 personnel transporters

23 maritime patrol
325 trainers: 258 fighter/ground attack
3 bombers
15 transports
28 helicopters
21 utility

40 utility
154 helicopters: 14 heavy
15 medium
80 light
9 maritime ASW)

2 test range support

(5) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

Since the beginning of 1980, the SAAF has undergone a major reorganization. This effort has changed the Service from a functionally organized force to a more flexible, regionally oriented entity. Specifically, the system allows for the newly established regional commander to organize fighter, transport, helicopter, and light aircraft forces under his command to better meet the local threat.

Recognizing the shortcomings inherent in the old system, the Air Force reorganized to better deal with the rapid pace of modern conflict. Under the original set up, the Service was functionally structured and consisted of the following major organizations: Strike Command, which controlled all fighter, bomber, and air defense forces; Transportation Command; and Maritime Air Command, which controlled all naval support aircraft. Although squadrons of different commands were often based together, they remained under the control of their functional chain of command. Thus, to conduct combined air operations, particularly in support of the regionally based Army units, Air Force Headquarters became involved because it was the only echelon authorized to task reorganize the various commands for short-term missions.

Under its new system, the SAAF is organized into three regional commands and four functional commands under Air Force Headquarters. Operational control is exercised by the Air Force Command Post (AFCP), which is collocated with Headquarters in Pretoria. The three regional commands control
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all aircraft based within their boundaries. These are: the Main Threat Area Command (MTA), which is responsible for the northern half of the country; the Southern Air Command (SAC), which is responsible for the southern half of the country and the adjacent coastline; and the Western Air Command (WAC), which is responsible for Namibia. The MTA is located with the AFCP in Pretoria and has 20 subordinate squadrons (8 of the squadrons are reserve units); SAC is headquartered at Silvermine, near Cape Town, and has 9 subordinate squadrons (3 are reserve units); and the WAC is located at Windhoek in Namibia, and commands aircraft as assigned from its sister commands.

The AFCP is in charge of overall planning for the Air Force. It delegates authority and responsibility for tactical operations to the SAC and WAC. Since the AFCP and MTA are commanded by the same individual, the AFCP directs all operations in the MTA area. The regional commanders can further delegate command of tactical operations to their airbase commanders, squadron commanders, or forward air control posts established for a particular operation. Under this system, the former administrative and support-oriented airbase commander has now become an integral part of the chain of command, a role some South African Air Force personnel find difficult to understand and accept.

Training Command, which manages most service training, and the Air Logistics Command, which oversees a nationwide system of Air Force depots, remain from the previous organization. Two new functionally organized commands have also been established to support the regional headquarters. The Airspace Control Command, headquartered at Swartkop Airbase in Pretoria, controls all early warning radar units, the 250th Air Defense (surface-to-air missile) Group, and the Air Defense School. The Tactical Support Command, headquartered at Snake Valley Airbase in Pretoria, controls a number of small units that support tactical operations in the field. These include six reserve tactical airfield support units, two forward air control posts, three tactical ground-controlled intercept units, and a mobile photographic interpretation unit.

SAAF aircraft are deployed formally to some 12 airfields in South Africa; the main airbases are located at Pietersburg, Pretoria, and Hoedspruit; other important bases are near Cape Town. SAF operations in Namibia are conducted from airfields at Rundu, Grootfontein, Mpacha, and Ondangwa. Over the past few years, the SAAF has been gradually upgrading and expanding its military airfields throughout the border area opposite Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique. Also construction of a major SAAF base began in 1983 in the Northeastern Transvaal. In addition to the new airfield and the upgrading of existing facilities, South Africa has begun to open a series of combination roads and airstrips in remote border areas. The strengthening and widening of a part of an ordinary road will cost a fraction of what it would cost to build a full-fledged runway. The conversion of national roads to aircraft runways will allow for added mobility needed in counterinsurgency operations.
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### (b) Summary of Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Principal Base</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main Threat Area Command (MTA)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 all-weather ftr sqdn</td>
<td>Mirage III-CZ</td>
<td>15 Hoedspruit AFB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mirage III-BZ</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mirage III-R2Z</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mirage III-RZ</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 air defense ftr sqdn</td>
<td>Mirage III-EZ</td>
<td>Unk Waterkloof AFB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mirage F-1CZ</td>
<td>13 Pretoria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 gnd spt atk sqdn</td>
<td>Mirage F-1AZ</td>
<td>31 Hoedspruit AFB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 light bmbr sqdn</td>
<td>Canberra B(I)6</td>
<td>5 Waterkloof AFB, Pretoria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Canberra T-4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 atk sqdns</td>
<td>Buccaneer</td>
<td>5 Waterkloof AFB, Pretoria; Louis Botha AFS, Durban; J.B.M. Hertzog Afld (Bloemspruit AFS); Lanseria AFB, Pretoria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 VIP trnsp sqdn</td>
<td>HS-125</td>
<td>4 Waterkloof AFB, Pretoria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Viscout</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Merlin IVA</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Falcon-50</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 mdm trnsp sqdn</td>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>7 Waterkloof AFB, Pretoria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C-160</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 light trnsp sqdn</td>
<td>C-47 Dakota</td>
<td>14 Swartkop AFB, Pretoria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C-54</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 hell sqdns</td>
<td>Alouette III</td>
<td>46 Louis Botha Afld, Durban; Swartkop AFB, Pretoria; Hoedspruit AFB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Puma</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Super Frelon</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 utility sqdns</td>
<td>C-4M Kudu</td>
<td>24 Lanseria AFB, Pretoria; Potchefstrom AFS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AM3C Bosbok</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 advanced flying school (fighter)</td>
<td>Mirage III-DZ</td>
<td>3 Pietersburg AFB, Pietersburg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mirage III-EZ</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mirage III-D2Z</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aermacchi MB326K</td>
<td>28 J.B.M. Hertzog Afld (Bloemspruit AFS).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 advanced flying school (transport)</td>
<td>C-47 Dakota</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SOUTH AFRICA

Airspace Control Command
4 permanent radar sites

3 mobile radar sqdns

1 AD Group*

Southern Air Command (SAC)
2 atk sqdns

1 maritime/recon sqdn

1 light recon sqdn

1 ASW heli sqdn

1 mixed heli sqdn

1 light heli sqdn

1 light trnsp sqdn

1 advanced flying school

Uses aircraft from other SAC AFB.

** (O.R.W.) In the first operational sighting of the Tigercat since it was acquired, 11 launchers and 11 guidance trailers were identified at Ondangwa AFS in August 1982.

*** (O.R.W.) Out of a total of five, only three shackletons are serviceable; two are being cannibalized to keep the remaining three operational.

* (O.R.W.) One battery has three acquisition units and six to nine firing units. South Africa has three batteries of equipment, but only one battery is believed to be operationally deployed.
Training Command

1 primary fly sch  T-6 Harvard  108
          Dunnottar
          FTS, vic
          Johannesburg.

1 basic jet fly sch  Aermacchi MB326M  55
          Langebaanweg
          AFB, vic
          Langebaan.
          J.B.M.
          Hertzog
          (Bloemspruit
          AFS),
          Bloemfontein.

1 helicopter sch  Alouette II  4
          Alouette III  24
          (Bloemspruit
          AFS),
          Bloemfontein.

1 light aviation sch  Cessna 185  21
          Potchefstroom
          Afd, Potchefstroom.
          Langebaanweg
          AFB.

Air Navigation sch  C-47 Dakota  3

Air Commandos

12 recon/utility sqdns* various privately
owned light aircraft

*  A 13th squadron has been transferred to the South West African
Territory Force at Eros Airfield and is now known as the 1st South West Africa
Squadron.
SOUTH AFRICA

(6) Status of Equipment

Almost half of the aircraft are of UK, US, and Canadian origin; the majority are aging second-line machines. Modern aircraft are predominantly French and Italian types, many produced in South Africa. The French have provided helicopters, jet fighters, and transports; the Italians jet trainers, ground attack, and transport/utility aircraft.

The SAAF acquisition program has been severely limited by the arms embargo. If it were not restricted, the SAAF would be in the market to replace aging items in its inventory, such as long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft, helicopters, transports, and follow-on fighters. To overcome the impact of the embargo, the SAAF has adopted the dual strategy of developing a domestic military aircraft industry while covertly acquiring those items that cannot be indigenously produced. Large sums of money have been and continue to be expended in order to develop and produce military aircraft, armaments, and spare parts. Covert acquisition efforts have also been somewhat successful over the past few years, particularly in securing spare parts, helicopters, and light transport aircraft. Indications are that the SAAF will continue this dual strategy in the years ahead.

The Air Force has two mobile SAM systems in its inventory—the Cactus/Crotale and the Tigercat. SAAF has 3 batteries of French-made Cactus/Crotale missiles—about 24 launcher vehicles. Only one battery is believed to be operational. It is located at Waterkloof, and the system is experiencing technical difficulties. In 1976, 36 British-built Tigercat mobile launchers were purchased from Jordan along with all the ancillary equipment. In the first operational sighting of the Tigercat since it was acquired, 22 launchers and 11 guidance trailers were identified at Ondangwa AFS in August 1982. It appears that overall, the Air Force SAM units maintain a low degree of readiness. Judging from the annual exercise conducted by the units, it would take 1-2 days for either system to be set up to conduct operations.

(7) Logistics

Aircraft maintenance is good, although there are some problems in retaining qualified aircraft mechanics for first and second echelon maintenance. All third echelon (depot maintenance) is handled by regional depots, which are supported by Atlas Aircraft. The Atlas Aircraft plant at Kempton Park near Johannesburg can overhaul any of the diverse aircraft in the inventory. In some cases, however, the unavailability of parts causes problems. The SAAF is dependent on foreign sources for some repair parts and all crude oil supplies. A strategic reserve of crude oil is maintained in abandoned mine shafts; stocks of processed fuel are adequate for at least 30 days of sustained operations. Tactical airfield units can be deployed to operational airfields anywhere in the Republic or Namibia for aircraft servicing duties.

SAFAIR, a partially Government-owned cargo airline, operates 12 L-100 (C-130E) aircraft. About 20 percent of its operations are official LOGAIR, i.e., logistic contracts for the SADF. There is close cooperation between SAFAIR
SOUTH AFRICA

and the SAAF and the actual percentage of LOGAIR missions is probably much higher.

South Africa has a small but growing aircraft industry. The Government-owned Atlas Aircraft Company, a subsidiary of ARMSCOR, supports military and some light civilian aircraft needs. Both MB-326 aircraft built by Atlas are produced under a license awarded by Aermacchi of Italy in 1964. In August 1983, ARMSCOR ended its series production of the MB-326 jet aircraft. Since production began over 200 MB-326 M/K models (called the Impala MK I/II by South Africa) are believed to have been completed. The majority of these aircraft were built mainly from South African-manufactured components. Impala MK-I began using the uprated Viper 540 engine. Atlas Aircraft will now switch emphasis to production of spare parts for the Impala and upgrading existing SAAF aircraft. Atlas has produced two types of single-engine light utility type aircraft with Aermacchi help. The 40 AM3C Bosbok assembled at Atlas are in the SAAF inventory. The C-4M KUDU is a hybrid of the AL-60 and the AM3C and was developed by Atlas and Aermacchi to meet SAAF requirements. Total production of the C-4M Kudu may exceed 60; about 40 are estimated to be in SAAF units. Currently, only the C-4M communications/utility aircraft is in production in South Africa. Atlas does not produce any supersonic jet aircraft but does have production rights for the SNEMCA Atar 9K50 turbo jet engine, which is standard for the Mirage F-1. It did assemble the Mirage F-1s, which had been previously assembled in France. There is, however, an apparent advanced fighter development program underway designed to produce a replacement for the Mirage F-1.

South Africa provided considerable financial support for French development of the Crotale mobile SAM system, known as the Cactus in South Africa. The Cactus was scheduled for licensed production in-country, but the SADF dissatisfaction with the system's performance has clouded its future. Thus far, problems have included unreliability, limited operational flexibility, and the need to have French technicians on hand to keep the Cactus operational. Over the past few years, the ARMSCOR missile production subsidiary, Kentron, has developed an AAM derived from the US Sidewinder. The missile, known as the Kukri (formerly referred to as the Whiplash) has been extensively modified to improve stability and maneuverability. The Kukri system incorporates an integral sight that is superimposed on the visor of the pilot's helmet, thus allowing the pilot to initially guide the missile by looking at the target. The Kukri AAM probably entered series production in 1980 or early 1981. It is assembled by hand at a rate of 1 per working day, or about 250 annually. Currently, Kentron has other missiles and drones under development.

(8) Personal Procurement and Retention

Over the past few years, the SAAF has found it increasingly difficult to recruit the quality personnel it needs to sustain operations. This is particularly true for the technical officer and pilot career fields. The SAAF estimates it will need about 800 applicants for flight training each year over the next 4 years. Pilot trainees must be volunteer high school graduates with passing marks in mathematics, English, and Afrikaans, who are between 17 and 25, unmarried, and willing to accept a 10-year service obligation. Recent pay raises
and a well-orchestrated recruiting campaign brought in a sufficient number of volunteers in 1982. But the lure of high-paying civilian technical jobs will continue to drain the SAAF of some of its best people. For details on conscription and terms of service of national service personnel, see section 3, a, (7).

As a partial response to its personnel shortfalls, the SAAF liberalized its personnel policies in mid-1974 by commissioning two women 2d lieutenants and assigning three females as stewardesses aboard SAAF VIP aircraft. In early 1976, the Air Force stated that it intends to use women as pilots for certain noncombat roles. Squadron No. 114 Air Commando has been formed with only women pilots. The Air Force received its first nonwhite volunteers in 1977. Coloreds, Asians, and blacks now serve the SAAF in such positions as firefighters, cooks, supply clerks, drivers, apprentice mechanic's and security enlisted billets. Also, in December 1981, six coloreds began officer training courses, three of them in the pilot field, the present status of these individuals is unknown. Additionally, the SAAF says pilot training is open to all races as long as the individual can meet the qualifications.

An increase of nonwhite recruits in the skilled and operational positions in the SAAF will probably be slow in coming. It is the one force in the SADF that has a backlog of white applications for enlistment and a need for manpower with highly technical skills. As a result, the SAAF will move slowest in absorbing nonwhites.

(9) Training

Individual and unit training is of high caliber, approaching US standards. All pilots now begin training with 130 hours in T-6 Harvard prop aircraft. Then the students go directly to specialty flying training. Selected pilots receive 117 hours' transition training to jets; others are assigned to helicopter school, some to light aviation; and others to transports. The program produces over 100 new pilots a year.

Tactical training emphasizes support to ground forces, and the SAAF participates in most Army exercises. SAAF pilots excel in individual skills (i.e., bombing, strafing, aerobatics) and are rated as among the best in the world. There has been some difficulty in fully qualifying F-1AZ pilots. Air-to-ground coordination is apparently a serious problem that the SADF is working to correct. An additional problem area is a lack of training in low-level combat tactics which are needed to meet the modern SAM and AAA threat in Angola and Namibia.

Training experience includes participation in the paratroop exercises, night bombing practice, joint SAN/SAAF ASW exercises, and a naval gunfire control exercise. Operational experience has been gained in support of SADF requirements in Namibia and Angola—including ground attack, paratroop delivery, aerial reconnaissance, medical evacuation, and logistic support—and in support of South Africa's Antarctic research program.
In addition to the eight flying schools detailed in para. 3, c, (5), (6) there are four other major air force training schools under the Training Command. These include: the SAAF College (officer courses, advance course, and staff courses) at Voortrekkerhoogte, Pretoria; the Survival School at Hoedspruit AFB; and the School of Technical Training at Lyttelton. The Airspace Control Command controls the Air Defense School (radar and SAM operations) at Waterkloof AFB.

(10) **Reserves and Mobilization**

(a) **Reserves**

Currently, it is estimated that the SAAF has a total of 30,000 CF and Commando personnel. However, probably no more than 10,000 of these—including some 4,000 aircrew—have received sufficient training to constitute an effective reserve. The rest of the CF spend an occasional short period with the regular force or are assigned to a CF reserve squadron. Reserve units are kept at strength by transfers from the PF (i.e., regular Air Force) and by personnel completing their service with the PF.

There are also 12 Air Commando units, composed of privately owned light aircraft, directly controlled by the Air Force. Air Commandos are responsible to the regional commands and are capable of performing reconnaissance, air resupply, and search and rescue missions, and of providing general support to the defense force or police in an emergency. They probably also have a minor armed reconnaissance capability. Air Commandos have a 10-day encampment annually during which their training is supported by the regular Air Force. They also participate in SADF joint exercises.

Beginning in 1980, a new type of Air Force organization was formed, the Tactical Airfield Unit (TAU). There are now six of these units under the Tactical Support Command, wholly composed of CF personnel. Each is a self-contained mobile unit with the mission of supporting field-deployed SAAF units. TAU tasks include air traffic control, security, firefighting, movement, control medical support, billeting, and communications support. It appears that these units frequently exercise in South Africa proper, but have not as yet been deployed to Namibia. Exercise activity mainly takes place at small, civil airfields, which have been upgraded for military contingency purposes.

(b) **Mobilization**

Reservists could mobilize quickly. They probably would be assigned to designated airfields within the country, but lack of equipment and facilities would preclude complete use except for the minority who are already assigned to units. Those personnel with much regular force experience would be assigned to regular duties.
SOUTH AFRICA

(c) Civil Aviation

1. Aircraft

(U) Approximately 82 civil transport aircraft with a gross takeoff weight of at least 9,000 kilograms currently are registered, owned, and operated in South Africa:

Long-Range Transport Aircraft
(greater than 3,500 NM or 6,500 km)

5 Boeing 747-200B
2 Boeing 747-200B Combi
6 Boeing 747SP
13 Total

Medium-Range Transport Aircraft
(1,200-3,500 NM or 2,200-6,500 km)

4 Airbus Industrie A-300B2 Airbus
2 Airbus Industrie A-300B4 Airbus
1 Airbus Industrie A-300C4 Airbus
18 Boeing 737-200
1 British Aerospace (BAe) HS-125-1B
1 BAe HS-125-3B
5 BAe HS-748-2A
12 Lockheed L-100/L-382 Hercules
1 Lockheed L-1329-25 Jetstar Two
17 Douglas C-47/DC-3 Dakota

3 Vickers-Armstrong VC-2 Viscount
64 Total

Short-Range Transport Aircraft
(less than 1,200 NM or 2,200 km)

2 Convair 580
3 Fokker F-27-200 Friendship
5 Total

SAA also has ordered two Boeing 747-300 SUD (Stretched Upper Deck) aircraft. Delay in delivery is possible if the airline is unable to renegotiate its payment schedule with the manufacturer.
SECRETSOUTH AFRICA

(U) SAA has converted one of its older Boeing 737s to a VIP configuration for use by the President and other Government officials. The Government-operated HS-125 and C-47/DC-3 Dakota are registered to the Directorate of Civil Aviation (DCA). The operating condition of some of the old Dakotas is uncertain. Two of the Viscounts in the Protea Airways fleet (which also uses the name Aviation Hire and Travel) are leased from Air Zimbabwe and the third has been leased out to Air Botswana.

(U) Magnum Airlines, a domestic carrier, has ordered two new short-range de Havilland Canada DHC-8 for delivery in 1986.

2. Pilots

(U) The total number of licensed civilian pilots of major transport aircraft in South Africa is not known. SAA reportedly employs as many as 540 pilots.

3. Mobilization and Potential

Virtually all South African civil aircraft and indigenous civilian aviation personnel could be mobilized for military or other Government use in the event of war or national emergency. By law, the South African Defence Force (SADF) may seize any civil aircraft, even if no national emergency has been declared. Most South African Airways personnel are former SADF members, and most transport pilots throughout the country are ex-military, many of whom maintain Citizen Force commissions. Safair Freighters in particular has accumulated considerable experience in hauling military cargo for the SADF under a charter contract.

d. Paramilitary Forces

(1) South African Police (SAP)

(a) Mission

To maintain internal security, counterguerrilla activity, patrol hostile borders, and provide a ready force for deployment against insurgent elements.

(b) Capabilities

The SAP is well trained and equipped to perform its routine internal security mission, but it would rely on support from the military forces to deal with any serious threat. It also could provide rear area security during hostilities. The deployment of paramilitary companies to Rhodesia in the late 1960s and early 1970s for counterinsurgency duties provided field training and operational experience and served to improve the capability of the SAP to cope with an insurgent environment. Counterinsurgency capabilities continue to be exercised in Namibia, the northern Transvaal, and northern Natal.
SOUTH AFRICA

(c) **Strength**

About half of the 33,500-man (41,482 authorized) force consists of nonwhite members. (About 14 percent of the 930-man officer corps are nonwhite, 8 percent black, 2 percent Indian, and 4 percent colored.) The exclusively paramilitary element is composed of about 3,000 SAP specially trained for their military role; some nonwhites are now included among these specially trained troops. SAP reserves total 17,000. Any ex-policemen can be called to serve up to 30 days annually. In 1974, the Government allotted about 50 conscripts to the SAP. Service is from 1 to 2 years, including an initial 6-month training period.

SAP was understrength by some 8,000 enlisted men at the end of 1980. A major problem in recruitment and retention has been low police pay. The number of whites in the force is expected to continue to decrease.

SAP strength in Namibia is estimated to be 1,700-1,900. About 1,000 of the total serve in the Border Operation Area.

(d) **Organization**

The SAP employs military organization and is divided into 20 geographic divisions covering the entire country, including Namibia. Specially trained personnel are organized into about 25 mobile police companies. In early 1973, nonwhite SAP were assigned to border patrol in Namibia with the mobile companies for the first time. The SAP conducted the counterinsurgency effort in Namibia from the mid-1960s until 1973, when the SAA took on the responsibility. In late 1978 mobile police companies were noted supporting the counterinsurgency campaign. The SAP presence in Rhodesia increased from 250 to over 1,400 in 1974, when it was withdrawn. The experience in Namibia border patrol and in assisting the Rhodesia security forces has been invaluable both in training and in gaining operational sense.

(e) **Status of Equipment**

SAP members are equipped with modern small arms including the South African-made R-1 rifle, over 4,000 motor vehicles, indigenous light armored vehicles, 80 Saracen armored personnel carriers, Alouette helicopters (on loan from the Air Force and flown by Air Force personnel), and a number of light utility aircraft. Equipment is generally well maintained; the Army is thought to provide training in the use and care of military-type weapons. Mobile companies are equipped as light infantry and are specially equipped to operate in rural areas.
SOUTH AFRICA

(2) Other

(a) South African Railways and Harbors Police

The Railways and Harbors Police relieve the regular police of security concerns for railways, harbors, and airports. They receive specialized infantry training relating to security measures and are armed with handguns, R-1 rifles, and Uzi machineguns. The force includes men, women, whites, blacks, coloreds, and Indians. While the authorized strength is 6,556, the force currently has actual strength of 5,616. In port areas, the force works closely with the Marines.

(b) Cadet Corps

In addition to the South African Police, which is capable of a substantial contribution to the country's combat strength, there is a Cadet Corps composed of high school student volunteers who could be mobilized in the event of a national emergency to perform certain rear area military functions. There are an estimated 100,000 active Cadet Corps members. Similarly, veteran's groups maintain strong military identification and could provide an immediate source of personnel to perform paramilitary activities.

e. Total Military Personnel Strength*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>73,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>6,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>11,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Corps (serve with SAA, SAN, SAAF)</td>
<td>5,000+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Corps (serve with SAN, SAAF)</td>
<td>470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks (serve with SAA and SAAF)</td>
<td>1,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAP Mobile Forces</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>101,770+</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f. Foreign Military Presence

Israel: Israeli advisers and technicians are thought to be present in South Africa working with the Army, Navy, and ARMSCOR.

g. Military Presence Abroad

An unknown number of South African military personnel are assigned to Israel and Chile. In addition there are a few student officers in training in Taiwan and Spain.

* Includes PF cadre and active duty conscripts. Strengths are estimates. Nonwhite strengths are listed separately. The forces of the Transkei, Venda, Bophuthatswana, and Ciskei "homelands" are not included, nor are those of the South-West African Territory Force (see separate sections).
Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act.
SOUTH AFRICA/BOPHUTHATSWANA

1. (C) Political-Military Situation: The seven widely scattered parcels of land in north-central South Africa, reserved for the Tswana ethnic group and called Bophuthatswana, were declared independent by the South African Government on 6 December 1977. This action, creating the second of four independent homelands, was another step in the attempt to implement South Africa's separate development program. Mineral wealth, including one of the world's largest platinum mines, and some industrialization give this homeland a better economic outlook than the others. In addition, the heavily South African financed construction effort principally in Mafeking (BE 1300-09933; CAT 70220; CORD 25-51-40S 025-38-30E) and Mmbatho as well as an Israeli-promoted large-scale, capital intensive agricultural development program in south eastern Bophuthatswana, contribute to a potential economic viability not enjoyed by other homelands. In September 1980 the town of Mafeking was incorporated into the independent homeland but consolidation of Bophuthatswana's six scattered parts and the citizenship of Tswanas living in South Africa remain as contentious issues between the two governments. The independent homeland is recognized by no government other than South Africa.

(U) With independence, an embryonic defense force designated the Bophuthatswana National Guard (BNG) was established under the aegis of the South African Defense Force. In December 1979 the National Guard was proclaimed a Defense Force by Minister of Defense Hennie Riekert. Located near the new capital of Mmabatho (near Mafeking), the Defense Force occupies a military base newly constructed by the South African Government. The mission of the BDF is to defend Bophuthatswana, to prevent infiltration through its territory, and to provide civic action assistance to other government departments. All BDF personnel are volunteers; the Government has seen no need to institute a callup system. There are a number of Tswana officers; the highest rank held is major. Each BDF soldier completes a 14-week basic course and then chooses to go on to either combat or technical training. Combat training centers on counter-insurgency. Those who choose technical training may become motor mechanics, builders, electricians, chefs, storekeepers, or clerks. Candidates for officer training are selected after the specialized training course is complete.

(U) The Bophuthatswana Defense Force is the most capable homeland military unit. The force can carry out ceremonial duties and could contain very limited, localized civil disturbances. It increasingly operates along the border with Botswana. Bophuthatswana is not known to have any serious internal problems, but a police station in the town of Mabopane was attacked by members of the African National Congress (ANC), in September 1981. Continuing infiltration of anti-South African guerrillas through the independent homeland is likely to continue to be a major concern. While it shares a border with Botswana, there is no known external threat from that country. Future development of the force will be tightly controlled by the South African Government. The BDF commander has called for improving the force's mobility and counterinsurgency capabilities—probably as part of a general South African attempt to use homeland forces for such operations.

15 October 1984
2. (U) **Key Officials:**
   - Chief Minister: Lucas Mangope
   - Minister of Defense: Brig Hennie Riekert (South African, retired)
   - BDF Commander: Brig H. S. (Jack) Turner (Seconded South African Army officer)
   - Director of Intelligence: Richard Knowlles (former Rhodesian police officer)
   - Chief of Security: Richard Mosiane

3. (U) **Military Budget:** Unknown

4. (U) **Population:** 1,502,000 estimated as of June 1984
   - Males (ages 15-49): 308,102; 159,600 physically fit
   - Ethnic Divisions: 67.9 percent Tswana and 32.1 percent Non-Tswana (7.4 percent North Sotho, 6.3 percent Shangaan, 3.2 percent South Ndebele, 3.1 percent Xhosa, 3.0 percent South Sotha, 3.0 percent Zulu, 1.1 percent Swazi, 0.6 percent Venda, 4.4 percent other)
   - Literacy: Not available.

5. **Army:**
   - Personnel Strength: Estimated 600.
   - Combat Units: One infantry battalion, probably consisting of three or four rifle companies; in addition there is a maintenance unit and a military school.
   - Major Equipment: Rifles (provided by South Africa).

6. (U) **Navy:** None

7. (U) **Air Force:** None

8. (U) **Paramilitary:** None

9. (U) **Key US Officials:** None, considered an administrative subunit of the Republic of South Africa by US Government.

10. **Foreign Military Presence:**
    - South Africa: A number of South African Defense Force commissioned and noncommissioned officers are seconded to the BDF. There are some reports of Israeli advisers assisting the BDF, but this is unconfirmed.
SOUTH AFRICA/CISKEI

1. (C) Political-Military Situation: On 4 December 1981, the Ciskei became the fourth South African homeland to be granted independence. Located south of the Transkei and the city of East London on the Indian Ocean, Ciskei is, along with Transkei, one of two Xhosa homelands. No foreign governments recognize the independence of the South African homelands because they view Pretoria's homelands policy as an attempt to maintain white suzerainty over black enclaves and deprive blacks of South African citizenship. The Ciskei Government of President Lennox Sebe was established in the town of Bisho, just outside the white city of King William's Town, which was to have been the capital of the new country until white protests forced a last minute change. The boundaries of Ciskei have been gerrymandered to exclude almost all white areas. Pre-independence negotiations between the Sebe government and Pretoria left about 90 percent of all disputed lands under South African control. The new homeland has no resource base to provide employment for the 2.1 million Ciskei Xhosa, of whom fully two-thirds live outside Ciskei. Both industrial areas and viable agricultural lands remain under white control. It is expected that Ciskei will remain dependent on Pretoria for financial assistance for the foreseeable future despite a relatively important growth in the number of new industries within the last year.

Even though security laws in Ciskei are considered even more stringent than those in the Republic of South Africa, opposition to the authoritarian rule of President Sebe continues to grow. In this regard 1983 was an event-filled year for the Lennox Sebe regime as it survived both serious labor unrest in Mdantsane and a coup attempt by former Commander of Ciskei Security Forces, Major General Xhanti Charles Sebe, brother of the President. Although events in Ciskei seemed to embarrass South Africa at times, such as a lengthy bus-strike in mid-1984, Ciskei's security remains very important to Pretoria. The Xhosa are the largest ethnic group in South Africa and have longstanding connections to the banned African National Congress (ANC), an anti-South African insurgent organization. Nelson Mandela, imprisoned Chairman of the ANC, is a Xhosa and the Xhosa language is reportedly used among the ANC community in exile. The fear in Pretoria is that the homelands, and especially Transkei and Ciskei, could harbor ANC insurgents.

To maintain internal security, the Sebe government created a combined police, security, paramilitary, and defense force for Ciskei in February 1981. This force has been trained by the South African Police and Defense Forces and is probably similar to the Venda National Force, which is also a combined police and defense force. The size of the Ciskei Security Forces is undetermined, but probably consists of 300 police and over 400 Defense Force personnel. The capabilities of the new national force are not believed to be significant but may allow the authorities to control localized civil disturbances.

2. (U) Key Officials:
President: Chief Lennox Leslie Wongama Sebe
Foreign Minister: Ray Mali
Commander Ciskei Security Forces: Unknown
Deputy Commander Ciskei Security Forces: Unknown
Commissioner of Police: Col L. R. Madolo
Chief of Security Police: Zebulon Makuzeni

3. (U) Military Budget: Unknown

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4. (U) **Population:** 675,000 estimated as of June 1984
   Males (ages 15-19): 153,000; 90,000 physically fit
   Ethnic Divisions: Unknown, majority of population is Xhosa, estimated less than 1 percent European.
   Literacy: Unknown, probably very low for blacks, high for whites.

5. (U) **Army:**
   Personnel Strength: Estimated 800
   Combat Units: One light infantry battalion; one counterterrorist squad; one airborne company
   Major Equipment: Rifles (provided by South Africa).

6. (U) **Navy:** None

7. (U) **Air Force:** Two Skyvan Troop carrier aircraft, six Mooney TX1, one MBB BO-105, one MBB-BK 177A-1, and one British-built Islander. Some Ciskeians were reportedly sent to Israel for training as pilots and mechanics.

8. (U) **Paramilitary:** None; however, the Ciskei Security Forces are essentially paramilitary.

9. (U) **Key US Officials:** None; considered an administrative subunit of the Republic of South Africa by the US Government.

10. (U) **Foreign Military Presence:** Limited reporting suggests that some South Africans may be assisting the security forces. Reporting suggests that recent aircraft additions to Ciskei Air Force may be accompanied with some in-country Israeli adviser efforts.
1. **Political-Military Situation:** The first South African homeland, Transkei, was granted independence on 26 October 1976, but it has not been recognized by any other government or any international organization. It remains heavily dependent on South Africa for administrative and economic support. The Transkei consists of three noncontiguous segments of territory located between Lesotho and the Indian Ocean, south of Durban. It is one of two Xhosa homelands, the Ciskei is the other. Transkei is beset with problems that include national development, internal dissidence, potential assassination attempts, a border dispute with Lesotho, and reluctance of other countries to recognize its sovereignty. Internal resistance to independence—the final evolution of South Africa's separate development policy—is the major threat to the regime of President Kaiser Mantzima and his brother Prime Minister George Mantzima. The Government has dealt repressively with the opposition, arresting opposition leaders or forcing them into exile.

Relations with South Africa have followed an irregular course. In April 1978, apparently in a bid for foreign recognition, Transkei broke diplomatic relations with South Africa. The independent homeland subsequently abrogated a nonaggression treaty with South Africa and asserted that the South African military no longer had overflight or passage rights through Transkeian air space or territorial waters. Transkei also warmed toward banned South African opposition groups. To date its efforts have been essentially symbolic. South Africa continues to provide some two-thirds of Transkei's national budget. Transkei has no capability to detect or contest any infringement upon its air or sea space and is dependent on the South African Defense Force for protection. Further, the display of antipathy toward South Africa has brought no foreign recognition.

(U) Relations with the other Xhosa Homeland, the Ciskei, are not good. Transkei does not recognize the "pseudo-independence" of Xosaland. Although the Ciskei has urged economic, scientific, social, and industrial cooperation with the Transkei, Mantzima has steadfastly refused. The dispute between Ciskei and Transkei complicates the South Africa Government's plans for a constellation of states in the southern Africa region.

(SECURITY) The army, the Transkei Defense Force (TDF), consists of both Permanent Force (Regular Army) and Citizen Force (reserve) members. At this time the Permanent Force is in the process of being expanded and made more capable of fulfilling its mission, the protection of Transkei's territory from internal and external threats. The commander of the TDF is Lt Col Reid-Daly, former commander of the Rhodesian Selous Scouts. He is likely responsible for the active role the TDF has played in supporting the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) in its struggle against the Jonathan regime. It is clear that much of the infiltration into Lesotho by the LLA originated in territory controlled by the TDF, but it is not clear to what extent Reid-Daly and the TDF are influenced or controlled by South Africa. Although Transkei will remain dependent on some ex-Rhodesian (Selous Scouts) and seconded South Africans to staff and run the TDF, it is likely that Reid-Daly will soon step down as commander of the TDF. Col Mtirara, the present TDF deputy commander, would probably become the commander TDF. During the period of estranged relations between South Africa and the Transkei, plans existed for the formation of 9 Citizen Force units with a mobilization potential of 800 men. Only two such units, however, are known to have received military training. Plans for the formation of a Transkei Navy were reportedly motivated by the
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suspicious activities of unidentified naval craft off Transkei's coast. At present, these plans have resulted only in the training of a small number of frogmen by two reportedly former Selous Scouts.

2. (S/RE/WH/NO) Key Officials:
President: Paramount Chief Kaiser Matanzima
Prime Minister and Minister of Defense and Police: Chief George Matanzima
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Reverend G.T. Vika
Defense Force Commander: Major Gen Ronald Reid-Daly
Director-General of Civil Defense: Major Gen Martin Ngceba
Commissioner of Police: Maj Gen J. Mantule
Head of Security Police: Brig L.S. Kawe
Deputy Defense Force Commander: Col Mtirara

3. (S/RE/WH/NO) Military Budget: Unknown

4. (U) Population: 2,861,000 estimated as of June 1984
Males (ages 15-49): 551,000; 330,000 physically fit
Ethnic Divisions: 98.9 percent blacks, 0.6 percent white, 0.5 percent colored (mulatto); Africans belong to Xhosa ethnic group
Literacy: High for whites and coloreds; low for blacks

5. (U) Army:
Personnel Strength: 1,000 estimated
Major Units: 1 infantry battalion, 1 special forces regiment (company size)
Major Equipment: Equipped with South African rifles, limited infantry support weapons, and Land Rovers. Probably in the market for additional items such as mortars, rocket launchers, antitank weapons, and perhaps even armored vehicles.

6. (U) Navy:
Personnel Strength: 23 estimated
Major Units: None
Major Equipment: None. Attempts have been made to acquire unidentified patrol craft.

7. (U) Air Force: None. South African Air Force (SAAF) supports TDF in training as well as air operations.


9. (U) Key US Officials: None, considered an administrative subunit of the Republic of South Africa by the US Government.

10. (O) Foreign Military Presence:
An unknown number of South African Army personnel have been seconded to the TDF. Transkeian police trainees are known to be attending the South African Police Training College at Hammanskaal. (BE 1300CA0092; CAT 90110; CORD 25-24-005 028-16-02E) and it is likely that some South African Police have also been seconded to Transkei police forces. TDF officers and noncommissioned officer candidates are trained at the SADF 21 Bn near Lenz (BE 1300-00684; CAT 91160; CORD 26-19-005 027-49-00E).
1. Political-Military Situation: Venda, about half the size of Connecticut, is a two-part homeland for the Venda-speaking people strategically located near the borders of Zimbabwe and Mozambique in the northern Transvaal. It was declared independent by South Africa on 13 September 1979. Venda was the third independent homeland created and is recognized by no government other than South Africa. Venda is the smallest, poorest, and most isolated of the four independent homelands. Although Venda is largely supported by financial aid from the South African Government (SAG), there has been little accomplished to advance the economic or social well-being of the population of Venda. Venda has some agricultural potential, but the lack of available land investment in equipment and training of local farmers has retarded agricultural development. There is little mineral wealth in Venda although there are some coal deposits with potential for exploitation. Lack of both infrastructure and access to export harbor facilities will continue to delay development. Venda lacks any industrial development and has few transportation or communication links with South Africa.

The Government of Venda under President Mphephu has become increasingly repressive. Twice rejected by the voters, Mphephu has remained in power by shrewdly manipulating the traditional chiefs and by judicious use of the small security forces. Dissident elements have been detained with the number of detentions and reported incidents of torture increasing. Much publicized deaths in detention of foes of the Mphephu regime have embarrassed the government. There is some evidence that Mphephu was shaken by the international reaction to detentions and prison deaths. He may be softening his government's approach to the foes of his regime. However, it is clear that Mphephu and the increasingly influential General Malaudzi will continue to use the small Venda security forces to control, and in some cases eliminate, opposition to the regime.

A combination of military, police force, and prison service, the Venda National Force (VNF) is responsible for preserving internal security, maintaining law and order, controlling traffic, and performing detention services. The commander of the VNF is a former South African police member who will eventually hold the rank of lieutenant general. Other Vendas serving in the South African Prison Service and the Transvaal Traffic Department were allowed to transfer to the VNF, while new recruits were also sought. South African assistance will be required for some years and is probably covered by agreements with South Africa, such as a nonaggression pact, signed at the time of independence.

The VNF is composed of three branches. A Law and Order Branch is responsible for preventing crime and protecting citizens. Under the purview of this branch are a Mobile Unit, a Traffic Unit, the Prison Service, and probably the Counterinsurgency Unit. The Security Branch and the Management Services Branch constitute the remaining elements of the force.

In September 1983 Venda announced the creation of the Venda Defence Force (VDF). Probably formed from both the Counterinsurgency Unit of the VNF and former element of South African Army (SAA) 112 Battalion, a 300-500 man force of ethnic Vendas, the VDF will likely patrol the northern and eastern borders of the country as well as the buffer zones between Venda and the neighboring states of Zimbabwe and Mozambique. The creation of the VDF probably relegates the VNF to roles most often associated with police. South Africa will continue to train and
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equip the 112 Battalion. It is likely that from time to time Venda military units could be placed under the operational command of the SAA and deployed to Namibia or newly created border operational areas in the Northern Transvaal. The VNF 112 Battalion is now commanded by a seconded SAA officer.

2. (U) Key Officials: President and Commander in Chief: Paramount Chief Patrick R. Mphephu
Vice President: Khosi Madzivhandila
Commander Venda National Force: General Tshikhakhisa R. Malaudzi
Commander Venda Defence Force: Unknown

3. (U) Military Budget: $4,556,000 for fiscal year ending 31 March 1981; not available are percentages of central government budget and of GNP and service allocation. Dollar value converted from South African rand at the exchange rate of 0.746 rand equal $1.00.

4. (U) Population: 401,000 estimated as of June 1984
Males (ages 15-49): 84,000; 44,600 physically fit
Ethnic Division: 90 percent VhaVenda, 7 percent Shangaan, and 3 percent Pedi
Literacy: Not available

5. (U) Army:
Personnel Strength: 300-500
Major Units: Former SAA 112 Battalion
Major Equipment: Small arms provided by South Africa

6. (U) Navy: None

7. (U) Air Force: None

8. (U) Paramilitary: The VNF is a 600-man paramilitary organization, which is evolving into a national police force with some counterinsurgency capability.

9. (U) Key US Officials: None; considered administrative subunit of the Republic of South Africa by the US Government.

10. (U) Foreign Military Presence: Some South African Police and possibly South African Defense Force personnel are seconded to the VNF. All officers and most NCOs in the 112 Battalion are seconded from SAA. However, Venda junior leader candidates are regularly trained in South Africa, and it is likely that the leadership positions in the battalion will be increasingly filled by Vendas.
## SUDAN

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(Reverse Blank)
1. GOVERNMENT

a. (U) Key Government Officials

President, Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, and Secretary General of the Sudanese Socialist Union: Gen Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiri (Head of State)
First Vice President and Minister of State Security (Head of the State Security Organization): Maj Gen (Ret) Umar Mohamed al-Tayyib
Second Vice President: Lt Gen (Ret) Joseph Lagu
Third Vice President: Vacant
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Abbas Musa Mustafa
First Secretary, Sudanese Socialist Union: Badr Eddin Suleiman

b. Type and Stability of Government

(U) Sudan's contemporary political history, since gaining independence from the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium on 1 January 1956, has been marked by coups, antigovernment plots, and the historical legacy of a nation divided between northern Arabs and southern, primarily animist, black Africans. In 1958 a military coup overthrew the postindependence civilian parliamentary regime. The subsequent government survived its own dissident military coup attempt, but collapsed in 1964 against a background of public demonstrations over its inability to solve Sudan's political and economic problems. The civilian parliamentary regime that followed met with little success as various political and religious factions proved unable to govern decisively or to gain broad popular support. Sudanese Communists, joined by at least one military unit, failed in a coup attempt in 1966. Following 3 more years of ineffective government, during which time fighting between the northern and southern regions of the country steadily increased, Sudan's President (then Colonel) Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiri led a successful coup by leftist field grade officers and seized power in 1969.

(U) The civilian government was replaced by a 10-man military Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). The RCC was a collegial body, but Nimeiri quickly emerged as the dominant member. Professing a nationalistic form of reformist socialism, the RCC briefly ruled in league with the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP). Foreign property was nationalized and ties with Egypt (then enjoying close relations with the Soviet Union) and with the Soviet Union itself were strengthened. A breach between the military regime and the SCP developed early on, however, when in 1970, three RCC members were dismissed for having ignored collective RCC policy decisions in favor of the SCP line.

(U) Increasingly concerned about the SCP as a potential rival, Nimeiri announced plans to place trade unions (a base of Communist strength) under government control in March 1971. In addition, all political parties, including the SCP, were to be subsumed by the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU), the official state organization through which all political activity was to be conducted.

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(U) In July 1971, the three dismissed RCC members led a coup attempt against Nimeiri. The SCP and several dissident military factions participated. The coup failed and over 1,000 Communists and dissident military officers were arrested. More than a dozen of the coup leaders were later executed. Sudanese relations with the Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc nations were strained near the breaking point because of those countries' immediate recognition of the coup leaders before Nimeiri had been able to reassert his authority.

(U) With the SCP eliminated as a rival and the loyalty of the bulk of his military forces proven, Nimeiri turned his attention to the insurrection that was occurring in the south. Most southerners, themselves racked by provincial and tribal rivalries, were generally united in their fear of political domination and "Arabization" of their cultures and lifestyles by northerners. Beginning with a short-lived southern army garrison mutiny in 1955, southerners operating in Sudan and from across the border with Ethiopia continued to oppose the central government by force of arms. The major southern resistance group was the Anya Nya (snake poison - literally venom of the Gabon viper), led by Joseph Lagu.

(U) By the mid-1960s a civil war was in progress between Lagu's 5,000-10,000 man Anya Nya forces, supplemented by smaller groups, and the Sudanese Army. The fighting, combined with disease and malnutrition that resulted from forced relocations of the populace, is believed to have cost at least 500,000 southern lives.

(U) Although southerners had spurned early Nimeiri offers of a negotiated settlement, by 1972 both sides were ready for compromise. Meeting in Addis Ababa that year, the southerners relinquished their demand for a federated Sudanese state with the south retaining a separate army. The central government in the north gave up its demand that the south be fully integrated into a unitary Sudanese state. The 1972 compromise guaranteed the south regional autonomy under a regional president, appointed by the national president upon the recommendation of a popularly elected regional assembly. The Southern Regional President would appoint his own cabinet, the High Executive Council (HEC). Finally, a 12,000-man Southern Command was to be established within the Sudanese People's Armed Forces (SPAF), composed of southerners (including Anya Nya veterans), and commanded by an equal number of northern and southern officers. Northern and southern military units were to be rotated periodically as a precursor to a fully integrated SPAF.

(U) With the successful conclusion of the Addis Ababa agreement, Nimeiri turned his attention to the institutionalization of Sudan's national political framework. The RCC had been abolished and a civilian regime reestablished in October 1971. In May 1973, Sudan's first permanent constitution formalized executive and legislative institutions, dividing legislative powers between each, similar to the general form of parliamentary government found in many West European states. In actual practice, the President of the Republic enjoys far greater powers than does the chief executive within more conventional parliamentary systems.
The Constitution gives the president very broad appointive powers. Solely at his own discretion, he selects up to three vice-presidents, a prime minister (optional, or the president may hold the post concurrently, as Nimeiri has done for all but a brief period in 1976-77), all ministers (who may concurrently hold seats in the legislative assembly), and all other senior-level civil officials at both the national and regional levels; he may also dismiss them at his own discretion. The president is responsible for the conduct of foreign relations. He also is Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, and as such, approves all senior-level officer appointments. Finally, the president also heads the SSU.

The president has broad emergency powers. Given certain stipulated conditions that threaten the country, he may declare a state of emergency. During the period of the state of emergency the president may suspend constitutional rights and issue provisional orders having the force of law. (Such measures must be submitted to the assembly if it is in session, or immediately after a new legislative session convenes, for its approval.) Following the 1975 coup attempt, five constitutional amendments were passed that, in effect, granted the president the authority to take any measures he feels necessary to meet a threat to the nation. Nimeiri has used these powers to create a parallel court system of security and military tribunals that try cases involving sedition and national security. He also has granted, by provisional decree, the power to law enforcement officers to make summary judgments in cases involving public disturbances.

In 1971, Nimeiri was designated the president of Sudan for a 6-year term, by popular plebiscite. The Constitution formalized this process by stipulating that in the future the SSU would nominate a single candidate, who in turn would take office upon approval by popular vote. The term of office remained 6 years, and no restrictions were imposed regarding either the serving of consecutive terms, or the total number of terms that could be served. Nimeiri was reelected by this process in 1977 and again in 1983.

The unicameral legislature, or People's Assembly, shares legislative power with the executive branch. In practice, assembly members exercise little or no legislative initiative of their own, and instead spend most of their time considering bills proposed by the executive branch.

The People's Assembly has the power to call ministers, including the prime minister, to appear for interrogation or to deliver statements concerning the conduct of their offices. If not satisfied, the assembly may vote for the removal of any individual minister, or vote no confidence in a prime minister's government. No such power extends over the president, however. In fact, even should the legislature call for a ministerial or governmental resignation, it remains with the president to make a final determination in the matter. While the assembly cannot affect presidential tenure, the president can dissolve the legislative body, so long as the current budget has been passed and at least 1 year has elapsed since the last parliamentary elections were held. Nimeiri dissolved the assembly in 1980 and in 1981.
The size of the assembly has varied since its creation, depending upon the electoral scheme in force at any given time. In 1978 the basis for legislative representation was changed from multimember to single-member districts. Total membership of the current legislature is 153, of which 68 represent geographical constituencies, 70 represent economic sectoral and professional constituencies (farmers, workers, businessmen, armed forces, etc.), and 15 are appointed by the president. The legislative term is 4 years and that body must meet in at least one 6-month session annually.

Although the old political parties are formally prohibited, many legislative factions have emerged that reflect the views and policies of these officially defunct organizations. Members of these factions are not reluctant to criticize national government policy, particularly in the realm of taxation and regional allocations of development funds. Thus, the People's Assembly has become a forum for the discussion and even the debate of national issues. It has not been effective, however, in blocking or substantially altering government policy.

The judiciary is by far the weakest of the three branches of government in Sudan. The Constitution established the independence of the judiciary, but at the same time, gave the responsibility for appointing and dismissing the chief justice and other senior judges to the President of the Republic. Given this situation, the Supreme Court has been unable to perform its role of protecting constitutional rights and freedoms. Since 1970, the Supreme Court has been requested to hear at least 15 cases involving major constitutional issues. It has chosen to hear only two, both of which it decided in the government's favor.

In 1979, Nimeiri decentralized the national government by abolishing the ministries of interior, religious affairs, and youth and sports. Their responsibilities, and some of those of still-existing ministries such as finance and economic planning, agriculture, and health were later given to five newly created regions, now the highest level of subnational government. Each of the regions is composed of two or more of the old provinces, which continue to exist as subordinate administrative units. Nimeiri delegated his presidential authority to supervise provincial commissioners to the regional governors. The "National Province," comprising the Greater Khartoum area, exists as a separate entity, not subordinate to any region.

The Southern Region, established by the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, was not affected by the decentralization of the national government in 1979. In May 1983, however, Nimeiri announced that the south would be divided into three smaller regions, based on the traditional provinces in that area. The controversial division plan had been pending for several years and the smaller Equatorian tribes generally favored it as a means of limiting the regional predominance of the larger Nilotic tribes (especially the Dinka, as well as the Nuer and the Shilluk). Other southerners viewed the division as a northern attempt to dilute the south's influence as a single unit within the national political arena and to abrogate the Addis Ababa Agreement's protection of southern customs and lifestyles.
Shortly after the announcement of the decision to divide the south, the Sudanese People's Armed Forces (SPAF) 105th Infantry Battalion, stationed in southeast Sudan, mutinied when ordered to rotate locations with a northern unit. The rotational scheme had been included in the Addis Ababa Agreement as a means for eventually integrating Army units composed of southerners with the national armed forces. The plan had never been implemented on a large scale, however. Many southern soldiers, unable to afford to move their households (often including multiple wives, extended families, livestock, and farm plots) and wary about having northern troops in their home areas, opposed the redeployments that involved several battalions.

Some senior SPAF officers who considered the reassertion of military authority and discipline to be of utmost importance approved the use of force by loyal troops to end the mutiny. Others regarded the move as a tactical blunder, coming as it did so soon after the president's decision to divide the south had raised tensions in the area. These two events began to raise questions both in and out of SPAF about Nimeiri's judgment.

In September, the President undertook his most controversial policy—the application of the Sharia (Islamic legal code), complete with the hadd (severe physical punishments for serious crimes and administered by Decisive Justice Courts), to the Sudanese society. Even in the north, the conservative orthodox Muslims who enthusiastically welcomed the move were in the minority. The invocation of the sharia was viewed as a reflection of Nimeiri's personal identification with Islam that was inconsistent with Sudan's tradition of religious tolerance. In the south, the President's sharia policy was regarded as another sign of insensitivity to southern customs and religions, or worse, the start of a concerted effort to dominate the region.

By early 1984, Sudan's continuing economic deterioration and the increasingly effective insurgency in the south were undermining the country's stability. This situation was all the more exacerbated by questions concerning the president's poor judgment based on the series of controversial policies implemented during the previous several months including the imposition of a state of emergency. Rumors had even begun to circulate that Nimeiri, long the consummate Machiavellian manipulator of Sudanese politics, was depressed and had lost the will to govern because of declining physical and mental health. During September 1984 in an apparent about face, however, President Nimeiri announced the end of the state of emergency, suspended the Decisive Justice Courts and affirmed that the southerners could reunify the south if they desired.

c. Internal Threat

The most serious threat to stability in Sudan in early 1984 was that posed in the south. Since the mid-1970s, a few of the old Anya Nya and groups totaling several hundred new Anya Nya (or Anya Nya II) dissidents engaged in attacks against isolated military patrols and police posts, in opposition to the central government of President Nimeiri. Raids were frequently staged from camps in Ethiopia, where the dissidents received arms and other assistance from Ethiopians and Libyans. They were most effective during the May-October rainy
season, when low cloud cover and impassable roads minimized the SPAF’s superior air, ground, and transport capabilities and tall elephant grass concealed dissident movements.

By late fall of 1983, the disparate southern groups that began to engage in armed attacks on isolated government outposts in the mid-1970s had significantly increased in size and were beginning to coalesce into an organized insurgency under the leadership of John Garang de Mabior. Garang de Mabior, a former SPAF lieutenant colonel, headed a new group called the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its military wing, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). Deserters from the SPAF’s 105th Infantry Battalion formed a cadre for the SPLA, and the movement received increased amounts of arms and training at its Ethiopian camps, located in the Gambella area.

In November 1983, southern dissidents—probably SPLA or an allied group—kidnapped Western oil company and economic development project workers at Bentiu and the Jonglei Canal, gaining international publicity. Soon thereafter, SPLA forces made numerous attacks on SPAF military units in the Upper Nile Region and laid siege to towns there. The insurgents used mortars and heavy machineguns for the first time during these attacks. They later began using land mines against SPAF forces and commercial road traffic in the south. Their activities spread to the Bahr al Ghazal region in early 1984.

The insurgent successes in the south underscored the weaknesses of SPAF—its poor leadership, lack of training, low morale, and the low operational rates of its equipment. The early sieges of southeastern Sudanese towns were lifted by SPAF helicopter gunships, but the insurgents’ use of heavy antiaircraft machineguns and the downing of two Sudanese Air Force Puma SA-330 helicopters on a single day in early December significantly undermined the self-confidence of government forces. By early February 1984, a stalemate had developed where SPAF forces controlled the major towns, but SPLA forces roamed the countryside at will, interdicting lines of communication and transportation in the process. In June and early July 1984 the town of Malwal and Pachala were laid siege to by the dissidents and on 3 September 1984 Bentiu was attacked and cutoff. Although the SPLA could not fully control the south, it was isolating the region from its normal links with the north.

Insurgent gains are expected to continue. However, friction is developing among the SPLA and its allies, based on political and tribal considerations. Many of the Anya Nya II, favor the nullification of the sharia in the south, increased development funding, and the administrative reunification of the southern provinces into the old autonomous Southern Region. Most of Anya Nya II’s 900-1,000 followers are of the Nuer tribe. Anya Nya II’s leadership, Samuel Gaitut, and Akout Atem, were killed in separate actions, thereby dramatically decreasing the effectiveness of this faction. Garang’s SPLM/SPLA are predominantly Dinka and are believed to total at least 12,000. The SPLM’s goals involve the overthrow of President Nimeiri and the formation of a new national relationship in which the south would assume a more equal status with the other regions. The SPLM also had demanded a socialist government for Sudan and early manifestos involved much Marxist ideological jargon. Whether the leftist ideological content reflects the two aims of the SPLM, or is forwarded to keep the movement’s Ethiopian hosts happy is unclear.
Numerous other groups form either current or political opposition to the Nimeiri regime. These include the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP), Ansar Movement, Muslim Brotherhood, Khatmiyyah Order, Baath Party, Beja People's Congress, Abyei Liberation Organization, and a western dissident group headed by Yaqub Ismail Yaqub.

Estimates of the size of the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) range from 3,000 to 15,000 or more members, perhaps one-third of whom are active. Many thousand more Sudanese support the SCP. It is by far the best organized, both structurally and geographically, of the anti-Nimeiri opposition groups. The SCP is particularly strong among some elements of organized labor and within leftist student circles. It is closely monitored by the government security apparatus, and it is opposed by conservative Islamic groups, including those that share the party's opposition to Nimeiri. The SCP has led attempts to develop a united front of opposition groups, but these attempts have not been very successful. Efforts to win support in the south following Nimeiri's controversial policies in late 1983 also have met with little success.

The Ansar Movement comprises 5-6 million Muslims, some of whom are descendents of the original Mahdi (awaited guide or messiah), who overthrew the Egyptian colonial administration in the early 1880s. The movement is anti-Communist and favors Nimeiri's views on decentralization of central government authority. It opposes close bilateral relations with Egypt, however, a position that places the movement in opposition to the Egyptian-Sudanese Integration Charter, signed in October 1982. The death of the Ansar leader in 1970 split the movement into two main factions. The larger is headed by Sadiq al-Mahdi, the smaller, by his uncle Ahmed al-Mahdi. Sadiq fled Sudan after the 1976 Libyan-supported coup attempt in which Ansars participated, then accepted Nimeiri's offer of reconciliation in 1977 and returned. He subsequently criticized Nimeiri's "closed political system" and again left Sudan, returning for an extended visit in September 1982. Kept under close surveillance and not allowed to engage in political activities, he again left the country in February 1983. Before leaving he claimed that he would no longer actively oppose the Nimeiri regime, because he felt it would collapse of its own weight. Sadiq subsequently returned to Sudan and was arrested in September 1983 for making a speech critical of Nimeiri. The possibility that he might resume active opposition, combined with his leadership of the UMMA (the Ansar's political party) and his former close ties to Libya, make Sadiq a concern to the Sudanese Government.

Nimeiri has fairly successfully exploited the Ansar split, making overtures to Ahmed and receiving at least his tacit support for close Sudanese-Egyptian relations in return. Still another Ansar faction, led by Sadiq's first cousin, Wali Eddin al-Hadi al-Mahdi, also exists. It is the most militant faction, but also the smallest and least influential within the overall Ansar movement. Of the several thousand Ansars now in Ethiopia, a few hundred live in camps, where they are provided with training and weapons. Libya is the source of this assistance at some of the camps. Small groups of exiled Ansars infiltrate eastern Sudan across the border with Ethiopia, but they do not engage in violent dissident activities on the same scale as southern groups, such as the New Anya Nya.
More than any other opposition group, the Muslim Brotherhood, and its political party, the Islamic Charter Front, have attempted to work for change from within the political parameters set by the Nimeiri regime. In 1980, for example, the Brotherhood was the only group to challenge regular SSU candidates in the People's Assembly election. It won approximately one-third of the seats. The Brotherhood's membership numbers between 50,000 and 250,000, and is composed primarily of the urban elite and university students. It has been particularly interested in the Islamization of Sudanese law. As strong supporters of Nimeiri's Islamization program in general and his application of the sharia to Sudanese society in particular, the Muslim Brotherhood's political fortunes have improved over the last several months. In fact, the group's leader, Dr. Hassan Abdallah al-Turabi is the president's adviser on foreign affairs. A smaller, more radical Muslim Brotherhood faction, led by Sadiq Abdalla Abdel Magid, renounced Numeiri's reconciliation policy in 1980. Any attempt by Nimeiri to retreat from his Islamization policy would be resisted by the Muslim Brotherhood.

The Khattmiyya Order is a traditional Islamic group whose original leaders had close ties with Egypt under the Turkiya (the 1821-85 period of Egyptian administration of Sudan on behalf of the Ottoman Empire). Not surprisingly, the group continues to support close Egyptian-Sudanese relations. It is anti-Communist, but also privately critical of the lack of economic reform under Nimeiri. Roughly as large as the Ansar Movement, the Khattmiyya have a strong following among Sudanese expatriots in Egypt and the Gulf states. The group's leader, Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, and the order as a whole, have steadfastly remained aloof from involvement in contemporary politics in order to avoid attempts at cooption by the Nimeiri regime. Similar to the Ansars, the Khattmiyya have at least one camp in Ethiopia, where they have received training and weapons from Libya, and from where they infiltrate Sudan.

The Baathist Party numbers no more than 200 members in Sudan, and echoes the Iraqi Baathist Party's line that calls for pan-Arab unity through Arab socialism. The Baathists are highly critical of Nimeiri's regime and its Western ties. The commitment of Sudanese troops to Iraq, beginning in late December 1982, to assist in the war against Iran was undertaken in large part to improve relations with the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi Baathist Party. It was hoped, in turn, that improvement in these relations would lead to the muting of Baathist criticism of Nimeiri from within Sudan. Relations have improved somewhat with the Iraqi Government, but the Iraqi Baathist party continues to be a vociferous critic of Nimeiri.

The Beja People's Congress is a Nimeiri opposition group representing the northern, non-Arab, Beja ethnic group, which comprises four subgroups (the Beni Amer, Amarar, Bisharin, and Hadendowa). The congress has demanded complete autonomy for the region inhabited by the Beja, an area encompassing northeastern Sudan, from the Red Sea coastline west to about Abu Hamad and south to Kassala. It is believed that the Libyans are providing a small number of this group's members with guerrilla training in Ethiopia.

The Abyei Liberation Organization has operated primarily in the Bahr El Ghazal Province of the Southern Region, north of the town of Wau. The group
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reportedly has engaged in terrorist acts including, possibly, the killing of 13 Arab merchants in Nyat, in January 1983. It is composed of less than 200 Dinka tribesmen and attempts to recruit from among soldiers, military deserters, and Dinka youths. Claims have been made that it is associated with the Anya Nya, but its violent acts appear to have little political motivation.

Yaquf Ismail Yaquf is a former SPAF paratroop lieutenant colonel. He broke with Nimeiri in the mid-to-late 1970s and almost immediately began receiving arms and funding from Libya. He divides his time between Libya and Ethiopia and may lead his few hundred followers on raids into Sudan from Ethiopia. The Libyans hoped Yaquf could unify the many Sudanese opposition groups, but as a westerner, he has no natural constituency in the south. One of the more radical and dangerous of Nimeiri's enemies, Yaquf may have cooperated with the SPLA on occasion, but he probably will not accept Garang's leadership.

To combat distinct acts of terrorism, such as hostage situations, there is the 144th Counterterrorist (CT) unit, an element of the Airborne Brigade. The unit was formed in 1978 and is designed for counterterrorist duties at Khartoum International Airport and for rapid deployment elsewhere in the country transported by the Air Force's C-130 aircraft. The unit's personnel were trained initially by a British Special Air Service (SAS) Regiment team. They are armed primarily with 9-mm pistols and submachineguns, and 7.62-mm assault rifles and machinegns. As in the case of the Sudanese military generally, the unit suffers from inadequate communications, maintenance, and logistics support.

Normal attrition has reduced the ranks of the 144th CT Unit to about one-third of its original 120-man strength. Specialized skills, such as sniping and building assault techniques have atrophied from lack of training. In its only live hostage situation (Boma Game Park, July 1983), members of the unit were delayed in reaching the operational area and did not participate in the rescue mission. Current unit capabilities probably are limited to airport security.

d. External Threat

Sudan perceives its primary external threats as emanating from Libya and Ethiopia. These perceptions were heightened with the August 1981 signing of the Tripartite Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation by Ethiopia, Libya, and South Yemen. No conventional military threat exists, however, at least in the sense of a large-scale invasion and occupation. Politically, Sudan's mutual defense pact with Egypt and close ties with the United States mitigate against such action. Militarily, both Libya and Ethiopia would find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to sustain large-scale aggression for any length of time given the inhospitable terrain, the distances involved, and the concomitant difficulties in establishing lines of supply and communications. These difficulties would be particularly hard for Libya's relatively small military to overcome. Ethiopia's Armed Forces are vastly superior to their Sudanese counterparts in both numbers and weaponry, and they could initiate, if not sustain, a major occupation of Sudanese territory. However, the Ethiopian forces currently are preoccupied in fighting a border war with Somalia and a
counterguerrilla war in Eritrea and Tigre Provinces, and they are likely to remain so committed for the foreseeable future.

While there is no potential for a lengthy invasion and occupation of Sudan, important military and commercial targets (including the capital city, Khartoum) are located well within the combat radii of both Ethiopian and Libyan military aircraft. As a consequence, the Sudanese do fear air attacks from these countries. The possibility that they might occur was given all the more credibility by the rumors of potential Libyan aircraft involvement in the alleged anti-Nimeiri coup plot of February 1983. Such an attack might well undermine some of Nimeiri's credibility with the public and the SPAF inasmuch as it would underscore Sudan's woefully inadequate air defenses. With Tu-22/BLINDER bombers in his Air Force's inventory, Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi might launch a limited airstrike on a Sudanese population center, either as a signal to Nimeiri regarding Sudan's vulnerability or in an attempt to neutralize Libyan critics of his regime who make propaganda broadcasts from Sudan. The Sudanese fears of such an attack were realized when, on 16 March 1984, a BLINDER attacked the radio and TV complex at Omdurman.

The Sudanese Government has allowed Ethiopian rebels to establish rest camps and carry on limited propaganda activities in Sudan. Rebel arms normally are confiscated and offensive operations prohibited, because the groups have been hard to control in the past, and there is the chance that attacks they might launch from Sudanese territory could draw the Sudanese to a direct confrontation with Ethiopia. By mid-March 1983, however, increased activity at the Sudanese dissident camps in Ethiopia, alleged culpability of Ethiopia in the February plot because it permits the existence of those coups, and possibly pressure from Saudi Arabia for Sudan to increase assistance to Ethiopian rebel groups, were causing Nimeiri to reconsider traditional Sudanese policy.

Nimeiri could decide to permit a wider latitude of action to Ethiopian rebels in Sudan, or even order small-scale border incursions by regular Sudanese military forces directed specifically at dissident camps just over the Ethiopian border. In the latter case, the Sudanese units, and perhaps Ethiopian regular forces, could be expected to avoid contact. The possibility of a direct confrontation remains, however.

e. Communist Influence

Although the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) has been officially banned, it is still thought to have as many as 15,000 members (of whom perhaps one-third are active), and another 10,000+ sympathizers among labor groups, urban intellectuals, and students. The party was decimated after the failure of the 1971 coup in which the SCP was heavily involved. The SCP played a part in the August 1979 large-scale civil disorders.

The Sudanese are suspicious and fearful of the USSR, and have not forgotten the Soviet association with the SCP and Ansar coup attempts in 1971 and 1976. The Soviet support of the unsuccessful Ansar coup attempt in 1976 prompted Sudan to expel all Soviet advisers in 1977, which halted military assistance from
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the USSR. Sudan remains concerned about Soviet influence and military presence in Libya and Ethiopia. There is little likelihood of a return to the previous cordial relations (1968-77) with the Soviet Union as long as Nimeiri remains in power. Relations with other Communist countries such as the People's Republic of China (PRC), Romania, and Yugoslavia remain friendly. Indeed, the PRC has become of major supplier of military equipment to Sudan.

f. Economic Factors

The social, religious, and political strains that affect the Sudanese society are further exacerbated by the continuing decline of the economy. High rates of unemployment, underemployment, and inflation; ever-increasing balance of payment and foreign debt gaps; and periodic shortages of gasoline, medicine, and consumer goods all contribute to declining living standards. Despite continual improvement in the productive sector, the Sudanese economy remains stalled. Low market prices for its agricultural exports, combined together with a drought affecting much of the country and a declining commercial market caused by credit and import restrictions, have perpetuated the depressed economic state. The country's financial situation is still characterized by heavy foreign debt, a large trade deficit, and high inflation. Sudan has implemented an IMF reform program, but it is only a beginning in measures needed to solve its chronic economic difficulties.

In late 1981, chronic shortages of consumer commodities, combined with an increase in the official price of sugar and other austerity measures required by an earlier IMF agreement, led to a wave of student demonstrations. Serious public reaction to the declining economy may again erupt as the current IMF agreement require that remaining government subsidies that hold down wheat/flour prices be removed.

Some of the international economic pressure on Sudan was removed in early February 1983, when the Paris Club of donor countries agreed to the extraordinary rescheduling of part of Sudan's foreign debt. However, private banks have yet to show any inclination to follow the Paris Club's lead.

Sudan relies on agriculture for 40 percent of GNP and 95 percent of exports. Augmenting agriculture are cotton ginning, textiles, breweries, and cement production. In 1983, GNP was $8 billion, $364 per capita. Major exports are cotton, sorghum, sesame, and peanuts. Leading imports are textiles, petroleum products, vehicles, tea, and wheat. Major trading partners are the United Kingdom, West Germany, Italy, India, China, France, and Japan. It was determined in 1982 that Sudan had sufficient oil reserves to support a modest crude oil export industry. A pipeline is to be constructed from the southern fields to an export facility near Port Sudan with an initial capacity of 50,000 barrels/day (to be doubled later). The planned completion date is 1986. The limited reserves and the mercurial nature of the international oil market and the southern insurgency, which has closed down most oil drilling operations, mitigate against oil as a solution to Sudan's economic problems.
Military equipment production is limited to the manufacture of ammunition for 5.56 millimeter, 7.62 millimeter, .30 caliber, and .303 caliber small arms. Although total annual production capacity is 30 million rounds, the average annual rate of production in recent years has been only 12 million rounds. Until 1976 the Soviet Union was Sudan's leading arms, military equipment, and spare parts supplier. By the late 1970s early 1980s, the United States and the PRC had become Sudan's primary military suppliers. Egypt and Yugoslavia help provide limited quantities of the spare parts Sudan needs to keep its aging Soviet arms inventory operational.

Recent equipment deliveries from the United States have included 30 M113A2 APCs, 40 Commando 100 armored vehicles, 12 155-mm M14A1 howitzers, 75 M40 jeep-mounted recoilless rifles, 2 F-5F fighter-trainer aircraft and 2 F-5E fighter aircraft. Recent PRC deliveries include additional Type-62 tanks (to total 82 over the last several years), 10 F-6 (MiG-19) aircraft, 91 Type-63 37-mm twin barrel antiaircraft guns, and 190 Type-63 60-mm mortars, and an undetermined number of Type-53 82-mm mortars and Type-55 37-mm single barrel antiaircraft guns. Recent acquisitions include 3 Strikemaster aircraft (7 more pending payment) from the UK that was paid for by Saudi Arabia. Romania delivered eight SA-330 PUMA helicopters in 1983 and four more in January 1984.

g. **Military and Political Alignment**

Sudan is a member of the Nonaligned Movement, Organization of African Unity (OAU), League of Arab States, and Arab League Collective Security Pact. A bilateral joint defense pact was signed by Egypt and Sudan in July 1976, as a direct result of the coup attempt earlier that month. Within the terms of the treaty, Sudan has extended the use of air and naval facilities to Egypt on various occasions. The treaty also provided the formal basis for Sudan's request for Egyptian assistance, and for Egypt's positive response, prior to the culmination of the February 1983 Libyan-supported coup plot. The broader historical ties between Egypt and Sudan were reflected and their special military relationship reaffirmed in the Integration Charter, signed by the two countries in October 1982. The Charter emphasizes close cooperation in economic development and provides for increased coordination in military planning and training.

Sudan plays a moderating role in Arab affairs. It supports the Camp David Accords and Reagan Initiative regarding Arab-Israeli Middle East peace negotiations. Yet it also was the first Arab country to offer to accept Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) fighters, after Israel's summer 1982 siege of Beirut caused their expulsion from Lebanon. Approximately 500 PLO guerrillas were sent to Sudan (at least one-half of whom soon departed for other Arab countries), and Sudanese relations with the PLO and some of the more radical Arab states were improved. Sudan's early support for the Camp David Accords strained its relations with Saudi Arabia for a while, but those ties are again close. Saudi Arabia provides an extensive amount of funding for Sudan's economic and military needs.
The 1976 Sudanese-Egyptian mutual defense pact is Sudan's most important military agreement. Military assistance agreements have been concluded with other countries, however, including the Soviet Union (1968), Yugoslavia (1968), Czechoslovakia (1970), the PRC (1972), and the United States (1977). Egypt, the US, the United Kingdom, the PRC, and (periodically) Yugoslavia maintain military missions in Sudan, but the Soviet military mission was expelled in the spring of 1977. While Sudan would allow no foreign military bases on its soil, Khartoum has permitted a limited pre-positioning site at Port Sudan for the US Central Command as part of the two countries' ongoing military cooperation. Sudan supports an increased US presence in the Horn of Africa region to counter Soviet influence there.

h. (U) Key US Officials

Chief of Missions (Khartoum): Ambassador Hume A. Horan

(b)(3):10 USC 424
2. MILITARY, GENERAL

a. (U) Key Military Officials

Supreme Commander, Minister of Defense, and Commander in Chief of the Sudanese People's Armed Forces (SPAF): Field Marshal Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiri

Minister of State for Defense: Lt Gen Abu al-Hasan Fathi Umar

Deputy Commander in Chief, SPAF: Gen Abdel Rahman Mohamed El Hassan Suwar Dahab

Chief of Staff: Vacant

Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration: Lt Gen Taj El Din Abdulla Fadi

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations: Lt Gen Akif Yassin Khatir

Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics: Lt Gen Mohamed Tawfik Khalil

Navy Commander: Lt Gen Yousif Hussein Ahmed

Air Force Commander: Lt Gen Mohamed Mirghani Mohamed al-Tahir

Air Defense Commander: Maj Gen Fuad Ahmed Saleh

Military Intelligence Director: Brigadier Faris Abdullah Husni (Acting)

National Police Director: Lt Gen Abdallah Hassan Salim

b. Position of the Armed Forces

The President of the Republic is the Supreme Commander of the Sudanese People's Armed Forces (SPAF). Command and control normally runs from the President through the Minister of Defense (MOD), Commander in Chief, and Chief of Staff of the SPAF. In November 1983, Nimeiri decentralized the SPAF General Staff by establishing separate staffs for each of what were previously its three major functions (operations, logistics, and administration). There are four military services: Army, Navy, Air Force, and Air Defense. There is no separate Army command; however, the Chief of Staff normally would be considered the Army Commander, and the SPAF General Headquarters functions as headquarters for the Army. SPAF Headquarters and Air Force Headquarters are located in Khartoum. Navy and Air Defense Headquarters are located in Port Sudan. Army officers occupy most of the key SPAF positions.

The SPAF is generally apolitical, leaving President Nimeiri to set policy and other civilian politicians to carry on day-to-day national administration. No regime could remain in power without the tacit support of the military; however, the SPAF has traditionally intervened in politics when civilian or military regimes appeared incapable of administering the country.

Together with serious reversals in the south and a continually deteriorating economy, at least basic issues undermined the Nimeiri-SPAF relationship in early 1984. These were the President's Islamization program and restrictions on promotions. Nimeiri's September application of the Sharia to the Sudanese society--complete with the more drastic physical punishments for serious crimes--and his concomitant policy of releasing thousands of prisoners jailed under prior, non-Islamic law were extremely controversial. Even worse to members of the SPAF was the new emphasis on Islam when applied to military regulations. A military act, enacted in fall 1983, imposed harsh punishments for actions previously regarded as minor infractions of military regulations. Men arriving
late for roll call, for example, were to be imprisoned 3 weeks. Men caught merely on the premises of a brothel or gambling establishment were to be imprisoned 5 years and dismissed from the military.

At least some SPAF officers and men, saw the invocation of the Sharia and other Islamic policies as reflecting a dangerous personal identification with conservative Islam by the president that is inconsistent with Sudan's tradition of religious tolerance. They can be expected to watch future presidential pronouncements carefully, and they probably would attempt to remove Nimeiri from power if they believed he had lost touch with reality.

In early February, the President tightened regulations pertaining to military promotions, making a 1-year staff college course a prerequisite for majors to advance to the rank of lieutenant colonel. A lieutenant colonel would need the same course and an additional 1-year battalion commander's course for promotion to full colonel. Normally, only about 50 slots are available annually for these types of courses; thus, the new regulations, scheduled to take effect in July 1984, will reduce drastically the potential for promotion among field grade officers.

As a professional, national force, the SPAF would be likely to defend the current regime against threats from Communists, fundamentalist Muslims, Baathists, and similar interest groups. However, their defense of the regime against a genuine popular uprising—most likely brought on by the weak economy and declining living conditions—is less certain. Indeed, knowledgeable American officers who have worked closely with Sudanese counterparts express doubt that the average SPAF soldier would fire on his civilian countrymen.

c. Military Trends and Capabilities

In January 1982, following public demonstrations protesting the deteriorating economy, President Nimeiri moved to stem criticism of his policies that was emanating from high military circles. He fired General Abd al-Majid Khalil and the Chief of Staff, as well as approximately two dozen other senior SPAF officers, and immediately assumed the additional responsibilities of Minister of Defense and Commander in Chief. The post of Chief of Staff was left vacant, and remains so today. Nimeiri retained and subsequently promoted the three Deputy Chiefs of Staff, but later shuffled their assignments. He also decentralized some of the authority General Khalil had accumulated as SPAF Commander in Chief, by transferring from that post the direct subordination of the counterterrorist special forces unit and the military intelligence directorate to the airborne brigade commander and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, respectively.

In assuming the posts of fired senior officers, shuffling commands, and realigning ordination and subordination, Nimeiri was attempting to keep potential rivals from the military off balance, undermine any personal followings they might have had, and concentrate as much command and control authority as possible in his own hands. He probably accomplished all of these goals, but the effect upon the SPAF system of command, already too centralized
and inefficient, was extremely detrimental. The president not only increased his command authority, but he also took over the day-to-day administration of all military affairs of any consequence. The three equally ranked Deputy Chiefs of Staff were left, in effect, to compete among themselves with no coordination, no immediate superior to settle disputes, and only occasional direction from a president preoccupied with such relatively unimportant matters as the personal interviewing and selection of dozens of junior officers for appointments to military training schools.

Although command and control remain too centralized and Nimeiri continues his personal involvement in relatively mundane military affairs, his selection of Abdel Rahman Mohmmed El Hassan Suwar Dahab as the senior SPAF officer has improved matters somewhat. In October 1982, the president promoted Suwar Dahab to general and assigned him to the post of Deputy Commander in Chief, concurrent with his position of Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics. Should a senior-level officer emerge who enjoys Nimeiri's trust, the appointment of a chief of staff fairly early in the president's next 6-year term of office would not be surprising.

Together with the command and control situation, the SPAF continues to face severe problems in keeping its inventory of military equipment operational. Age, mixed origin, and lack of spare parts have been the major contributing factors that have caused as much as 70 percent of all equipment to be nonoperational. President Nimeiri's demand that Soviet military advisers be withdrawn in the spring of 1977 led to a complete cutoff of spare parts from the USSR. Sudan receives some spare parts and military assistance from Egypt and Yugoslavia for the Soviet weapons still in the inventory. This allows some Soviet air, air defense, and armor equipment to be kept operational. Western sources have been contacted to provide spare parts and assistance for Western equipment in the inventory. However, Sudan's scarcity of funds has restricted major arms purchases.

Despite significant command problems and the low operational rates of its weapons and equipment, the Sudanese People's Armed Forces (SPAF) are capable of maintaining internal order. The exception to this, however, is the deteriorating situation in southern Sudan where government forces are experiencing increasingly sophisticated attacks by armed dissidents who are trained in Ethiopia by Libyans using Libyan-supplied weapons. Use, by the dissidents, of surface-to-air missiles has degraded the Air Force's capability to provide limited close air support. At the same time, Sudan has little or no air defense and naval capability, and its military inventory continues to age and is poorly maintained. Sudan depends on its 1976 mutual defense pact with Egypt to meet any serious external threat from neighboring states such as Ethiopia and/or Libya. Sudan would be able to defend itself against likely attack by any of the five other neighboring states.
d. Military Budget

$238 million for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1983; this is 13.9 percent of the central government budget. In addition to the budgeted figure, Sudan obtains significant amounts of foreign military aid and loans for military activities. No service allocations are available. Dollar value converted at an exchange rate of 9 Sudanese pounds equals US $1.00.

e. (U) Population

20,525,000 (estimate as of 1 July 1983)
Males (ages 15-49): 2,981,000; 223,000 annually reach military age (18)
Ethnic Divisions: 39 percent Arab, 6 percent Beja, 52 percent African
Literacy: 5-to-10 percent
3. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

a. Army

(1) Mission

(U) To defend the national territory and maintain internal security.

(2) Capabilities

(U) Provided it was not employed simultaneously in large-scale counterinsurgency operations, the Army could repel ground incursions from any neighboring state except Sudan’s ally, Egypt, Ethiopia, and perhaps Libya (in the northwestern desert region, an area of no military significance). In its internal security role, the Army, with air support, is capable of retaining control throughout the country, except in the Bahr al Ghazal and Upper Nile Regions of the south.

(3) Personnel Strength

51,000 estimated

(4) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

(U) The Sudanese Constitution stipulates that the President of the Republic is the Supreme Commander of the military. The chain of command normally runs from the President to the Minister of Defense, SPAF Commander in Chief, Chief of Staff, and the Deputy Chiefs of Staff. The SPAF comprises four separate services: Army, Navy, Air Force, and Air Defense Force. All of the services have distinct commands except for the Army. When the position is filled, the SPAF Chief of Staff functions as the Army commander; similarly, the SPAF general staff functions as the Army’s staff.

(U) President Nimeiri has altered the command structure by concurrently holding the posts of defense minister and commander in chief. The post of chief of staff remains vacant, but Nimeiri has appointed one of his former deputy chiefs of staff, General Suwar al-Dahab, to be deputy commander in chief. The Minister of State for Defense, Abu al-Hasan Fathi Umar, also appears to exercise some authority over the military, but both men function very much in the shadow of the President. Subordinate to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations are the infantry brigade commanders (who are responsible for separate geographical regions), and the corps commanders.

(U) Noninfantry ground forces are organized into corps, except for the small Airborne Brigade. Each corps has its own command structure and is responsible for administrative matters such as personnel promotions, transfers, and specialized training. The Armored Corps includes one division,
which comprises two brigades. The corps attach units to regional commands where they fall under the operational control of the local infantry commander. The attached unit remains formally subordinate to its parent corps, however.

Until 1983, there were six regional commands for the Southern, Eastern, Western, Northern, Red Sea, and Khartoum areas. (The Red Sea Command combines the Air Defense Force and the Navy within a joint organizational framework, but both Services remain directly and individually subordinate to SPAF headquarters.) Effective 1 September, however, the other four regional commands were reorganized and doubled in number. In addition, some of the new regional commands were subdivided into military sectors. The infantry division was replaced by the reinforced brigade (infantry brigade, plus attached units from other branches or services) as the ordinate military unit in each new regional command. The regional command and infantry brigade headquarters are collocated in all but the Equatoria and the Roseires Regional Commands.

(b) **Ground Combat Units**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Tactical Units</th>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Average/Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 Corps Hqs</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Cad Hqs</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Armor Div</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>5,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Artillery Corp</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Inf Bdes</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>2,000-3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Border Guard Bde</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>1,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Republican Guard Unit</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Presidential Body Guard Unit</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Armored Bdes</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Air Def Bdes</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Airborne Bde</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) **Deployment**

Troops are stationed throughout the country. Traditionally, there are heavy concentrations of Sudanese Army units in the south to counter any renewal of antigovernment activities or tribal problems, and in the east, to counter the threat from Ethiopia. Libyan military activities in Chad in 1981 caused the Sudanese to build up their military forces in western Sudan. As of September 1984, there is no evidence that these units have been moved back to their original locations, and as the French commenced troop withdrawal from Chad in September, it is likely that any redeployment will be delayed. Current basic combat unit deployment is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Command</th>
<th>Infantry Brigade</th>
<th>Headquarters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>10th</td>
<td>Shandi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>15th</td>
<td>Al Ubayyid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roseirees</td>
<td>14th</td>
<td>Ad Damazin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(5) Weapons and Equipment

(a) General

Major combat equipment still consists primarily of Soviet tanks, APCs, reconnaissance vehicles, and artillery. The remaining equipment (approximately 50 percent) is made up of a mix of US scout cars, tanks, and APCs; British, West German, US, and Italian artillery; British and Czechoslovak APCs; and Chinese light tanks. Small arms sources are primarily the UK, the PRC, and West Germany. Equipment on hand is no longer sufficient to meet current requirements. Ground equipment is old or inoperable, with spare parts difficult to obtain. The last Soviet military equipment was received in 1974 and included T-55 tanks and BRDM-2 armored reconnaissance vehicles. No Soviet-provided spare parts for USSR equipment have been received since Soviet advisers departed in 1977. Military assistance is provided primarily by the PRC, the US, and Egypt. Under a FMS agreement, US deliveries of M-113A2 APCs took place in 1981 and 1982. In 1981, Saudi Arabia delivered to Sudan 53 M-41 and 17 M-47 US-built tanks, with spare parts for 2 years, .30-caliber machineguns, ammunition, and uniforms. Contracts have been signed with France for the purchase of armored cars and air defense artillery equipment. Some armored cars have been received, but other deliveries have been delayed because of the lack of Sudanese funding for military purchases. In 1982 the US delivered M-60A3 tanks, M-125A2 mortar carriers for 81-mm mortars, 155-mm howitzers, and AN/PPS-5B ground radars. Also in 1982, the PRC delivered Type 62 tanks, 60-mm and 82-mm mortars, and 122-mm howitzers. An early-1983 Sino-Sudanese agreement provided for the Chinese to begin overhauling the older Type-62 tanks later in the year. The overhauls will be done in Sudan.

b. Ground Weapons and Equipment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mortars:</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-inch (51.2-mm)</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-mm Type 63</td>
<td>CH</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-mm, NFI</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81-mm Brandt M1927/31</td>
<td>FR</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## SUDAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>81-mm M31-or-M68</strong></td>
<td>YO 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>81-mm M29</strong></td>
<td>US 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3-inch (81.48 mm)</strong></td>
<td>UK Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>81-mm Type 53</strong></td>
<td>CH Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>82-mm M37</strong></td>
<td>UR Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>120-mm M43</strong></td>
<td>UR 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>120-mm Brandt AM49</strong></td>
<td>FR 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>57-mm RCLR, probable USM18A1</strong></td>
<td>SA 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>106-mm, RCLR, M40</strong></td>
<td>IR, US 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ATGM, Swingfire</strong></td>
<td>EG 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MRL, BM-21</strong></td>
<td>EG 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>76-mm (M1942) ZIS-3</strong></td>
<td>UR 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>85-mm gun D-44</strong></td>
<td>UR 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>25-pdr field gun, (87.6-mm)</strong></td>
<td>UK 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>100-mm field gun, M1944, BS-3</strong></td>
<td>UR 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>105-mm pack how, OTO Melara Mod. 56</strong></td>
<td>IT 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>105-mm how, M101/M101 GE Modified</strong></td>
<td>GE 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>122-mm how, M1938, M30</strong></td>
<td>UR 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>122-mm field gun, D-74</strong></td>
<td>CH 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>122-mm field gun-or-how, Type 50-or-Type 54</strong></td>
<td>CH 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>130-mm field gun, Type 59 or 59-1</strong></td>
<td>CP 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>152-mm gun-how, D-20</strong></td>
<td>UR 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>155-mm how, M114A1</strong></td>
<td>US 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MdM Tk, T-54/55</strong></td>
<td>UR, EG 155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MdM Tk, Type 59</strong></td>
<td>CH 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MdM Tk, M-47</strong></td>
<td>SA 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MdM Tk, M-60A3</strong></td>
<td>US 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lt Tk, Type-62</strong></td>
<td>CH 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lt Tk, M-41</strong></td>
<td>SA 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>APC, BTR-50</strong></td>
<td>UR 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>APC, BTR-60</strong></td>
<td>UR NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>APC, BTR-152</strong></td>
<td>UR 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>APC, OT-62A</strong></td>
<td>CZ 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>APC, OT-64B</strong></td>
<td>CZ 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>APC, Panhard M3</strong></td>
<td>FR 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>APC, M-113A2</strong></td>
<td>US 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>APC, Walid</strong></td>
<td>EG 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>APC, Commando V-150</strong></td>
<td>US 38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AV, Commando V-100</strong></td>
<td>US 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARC, Ferret</strong></td>
<td>UK 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARC, BDRM-2</strong></td>
<td>UR 30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The extreme diversity of equipment, paucity of spare parts, and limited technical and organizational capability, combine to produce poor maintenance and logistic support. As much as 70 percent of all equipment is nonoperational due to age, mixed origin, and lack of spare parts. The logistic support capability with few exceptions has not kept pace with the introduction of new equipment. Even when viewed in the African context, the logistics system is relatively unsophisticated and inefficient.

The Army is heavily dependent upon technical advisory personnel, maintenance and repair equipment, and spare parts from abroad. Western sources have been contacted to provide spare parts and maintenance training for Western equipment now entering the inventory. However, adverse terrain, poorly developed lines of communication, an inadequate maintenance system, the lack of a central supply system, the paucity of logistic facilities, and the scarcity of funds will continue to preclude efficient logistics operations.

The logistics as currently constituted could not support short-lived hostile incursions into neighboring countries and any sustained large-scale cross-border operations would require external support. The system would also not be able to provide support to SPAF units in the south facing increased dissident operations.

The armed forces are composed of volunteers who serve a minimum of 3 years. Service quotas generally are filled with little difficulty by such voluntary recruitment. Six reenlistments are allowed, each for a 3-year period. Specialists and technicians serve a minimum of 9 years. The Army has a difficult time retaining specialists and technicians after their initial 9-year enlistment because these personnel are highly sought after by private enterprise.

A conscription law was passed in July 1971, but was never implemented. It contained a mandatory military service obligation for all males between the ages of 18 and 30, for a term of 2 years. Still another bill, this time providing for 6-months' active duty, was passed by the People's Assembly in
SUDAN

December 1982. Earlier in the year the Sudanese News Agency (SUNA) reported that the SPAF General Command had established an administrative framework to manage compulsory military service. Regional governors were said to have been contacted about the establishment of recruitment centers in their capital cities. A draft now would be very unpopular in Sudan. Furthermore, budgetary constraints probably would prevent any significant expansion of the SPAF's manpower levels.

(8) Training

(3) Individual basic training is considered good by Arab standards. The greatest weakness is in the training of maintenance and supply technicians. The training received at the Military College and the Command and Staff School is efficient and practical in comparison with training elsewhere in the region. The majority of foreign training assistance is provided by advisory teams from Egypt, the UK, and the PRC. The US training role was greatly expanded in 1982, by the mobile training team programs for the M60A3 tank, M113A2 APC, and M114A1 howitzer. The attendance of Sudanese Army personnel has been noted at schools in Egypt and at least 20 other countries including, in the past, the Soviet Union.

(9) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

(3) A reserve program was part of the 1 July 1971 mandatory military service obligation law, which required that personnel be transferred into the reserve for 8 years following completion of active service. Neither the reserve program nor the conscript law, however, were ever put into effect. The 1982 legislation pertaining to compulsory military service also included provisions for reserve service. In addition, there has been planning that envisioned the National Defense Force or National Guard as a cadre that could train a future reserve force. Nevertheless, while planning may continue, budgetary constraints are likely to prevent the implementation of any significant reserve program in the foreseeable future.

(b) Mobilization

(3) There is no known national mobilization plan. Rapid mobilization of a large and effective force would be hindered by the necessity to maintain a large part of the Army in the south, the poor transportation infrastructure, and periodic severe fuel shortages. Former army members could be recruited, but insufficient arms and equipment and a poor logistic system preclude any appreciable increase in combat capabilities.

b. Navy

(1) Mission

(U) To defend the national coastline, prevent smuggling, guard territorial fishing waters, and perform sea search and rescue missions.
(2) **Capabilities**

The naval fleet comprises aged, second hand gifts, and purchases from other navies, resulting in a mixture of vessels that was not planned with specific Sudanese defense requirements in mind. The minimal, short-duration, coastal patrolling and search and rescue capabilities that exist could be significantly enhanced if more of the patrol vessels were operational. At present, coastal patrols are directed, with some success, exclusively against smuggling activities. Combat capabilities are nonexistent. The Navy lacks adequate funding and shipborne-trained personnel, and is dependent upon foreign assistance for future development.

(3) **Personnel Strength**

1,500

(4) **Ship Strength**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Op</th>
<th>Nonop</th>
<th>In Reserve</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PC (patrol craft)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PB (patrol boat)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBR (river/roadstead</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCU (utility landing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO (oiler)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGS (auxiliary)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YFL (launch)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YW (yard and service</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total: 19</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) **Organization and Deployment**

(a) **General Service**

The Sudanese Navy is organized into six squadrons of two to four ships each. The first, second, and fifth squadrons comprise patrol vessels of different sizes; the third squadron is composed of two landing craft; the auxiliary and service craft make up the fourth squadron; and the sixth squadron comprises harbor craft. A general service battalion, dockyard, and naval school is located at the Flamingo Bay Naval Base. Naval Headquarters is in Port Sudan. There are six permanent and two part-time coastal observation stations, which are manned by a coastal security battalion of about 330 men. A naval liaison office is maintained in Khartoum.
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(b) Marine Corps

(U) The Sudanese News Agency has reported on the anti-smuggling operations of a small marine unit (possibly the coastal security battalion), but details are unavailable.

(c) Naval Air Arm

(U) None

(6) Status of Equipment

Such a Sudanese-built launch, all naval craft have been acquired from Yugoslavia and Iran. Only the launch and three West German Abeking and Rasmussen 29-meter-class patrol boats are operational, and the latter's operational status is minimal. Nonoperational vessels include two Yugoslav Kraljevica Class patrol craft, four Yugoslav Trogir Class patrol boats, four US Stewart 40-foot-Dolphin Class river patrol boats (awaiting engine refits), two Yugoslav DTK-221 Class landing craft, one Yugoslav P12-Class tanker, one Yugoslav PB-35 Class general tender (used as a hydrographic survey ship), and one Yugoslav PV-6 Class water tender.

(7) Logistics

A small marine machine shop (purchased from Yugoslavia) and a drydock facility, both located at the Flamingo Bay Naval Base, give the Navy a very limited ship repair capability. The drydock facility cannot be used, however, because of settling in the roadbed of the railway slip used to lift vessels out of the water. The only other drydock facility, a commercial venture located in Port Sudan, could be appropriated by the Navy in an emergency. However, the long waiting time for its use, as well as the expense involved, preclude routine scheduling of naval craft repairs at the commercial facility. The Navy logistics system provides only minimal support because of an acute shortage of funds.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

(U) Refer to paragraph 3. a. (7).

(9) Training

The naval school at Flamingo Bay Naval Base maintains adequate classroom facilities to teach basic seamanship, navigation, gunnery, continuous wave communications, infantry skills, and electrical/electronic theory. Courses in mechanical and electrical engineering also are offered, but they suffer from a lack of training aids, lab equipment, and qualified instructors. Radar and radio technician schools are established, but they also suffer from the same deficiencies.
All naval personnel are required to undergo 6 months of basic infantry training prior to receiving instruction in naval skills. Most personnel are required to serve a minimum of 1 year with the general forces prior to receiving special training in a particular skill (e.g., radio operation, gunnery, engineering).

Advanced training for senior petty officers and commissioned officers is ordinarily conducted outside the country, with appropriate preparatory work taught at the naval school. Countries providing advanced training include the United Kingdom (UK), India, Greece, Egypt, Iraq, Yugoslavia, and Italy.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

(U) There are no reserve personnel or ships. In time of emergency, however, the Navy could recall the estimated 250 retired naval personnel who have been engaged, since 1981, in a commercial fishing venture on Lake Nuba.

(b) Mobilization

(U) The Navy has no mobilization plan or capability.

(c) Merchant Marine

The Sudan Merchant Marine has ten ships of over 1,000 gross register tons (GRT). All are new (under 10 years), and have military support potential. They include eight breakbulk ships and two RO/RO-breakbulk ships, with a combined deadweight tonnage (DWT-lift capacity) of 122,200 tons of cargo. The eight breakbulk ships were built in Yugoslavia, the two RO/ROs in Denmark. Sudan has no shipbuilding industry.

c. Air Force

(1) Mission

(U) To defend territorial airspace, provide close air support for ground forces, and conduct logistic and reconnaissance support for the regional commands.

(2) Capabilities

Although it acquired 10 PRC F-6 FARMER fighter aircraft in 1981-82, and 2 US F-5F Tiger II trainer-fighter aircraft in October 1982 (followed by 2 F-5E fighters in 1984), the Air Force is unable to perform its air defense mission. Only five of the F-6s have been assembled, and it will be several years before the F-5 squadron will be at full strength. At present, the Air Force relies on eight aging MiG-21/FISHBED-J aircraft, with an
operational rate of about 40 percent, as its primary air defense aircraft. Although the MiG-21's ATOLL infrared (IR) air-to-air missiles are considered operational, their overall reliability is suspect. The Air Force's weapons inventory also include Advanced ATOLL radar-guided air-to-air missiles, but these are nonoperational due to limited technical support and maintenance capabilities. Still another air defense weakness is that of radar support. Some early warning radar is operational at Wadi Seidna Air Force Base (north of Khartoum) and Port Sudan, but most of the inventory is nonoperational and even those units that work cannot be operated at full capacity. Air defense capabilities are further handicapped by the lack of coordination between the Air Force and the Air Defense Force (ground weapons), in large part due to the absence of a communications system linking the two services.

The Air Force is only marginally more capable of performing its ground attack and reconnaissance missions for the regional commands. There are no specialized reconnaissance aircraft in the inventory. Limited logistic support can be provided by four operational C-130H Hercules aircraft, one operational DHC-5 Buffalo aircraft, and a variety of helicopters. The transport capability of the Air Force is small, however, when the physical size of the country and its limited national road and rail networks are taken into consideration. The Air Force ability to perform all of its missions is severely undermined by several other factors, including: the small number of pilots and mechanics; insufficient live-fire training by combat pilots; fuel shortages; and inadequate logistic, maintenance, and communications systems.

(3) Personnel Strength

3,000 estimated. The number of pilots is estimated to be less than 100.

(4) Aircraft

Total: 127 (fixed wing: 71 jet, 13 prop; helicopters: 40)

In operational units: 108
(56 fighters: 32 day, 8 all-weather, 16 trainers; 12 transports: 10 medium-range, 2 VIP; 38 helicopters: 19 assault, 19 medium transport)

(5) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

The Air Force Headquarters is located in Khartoum. Aircraft are organized into 10 squadrons located at 2 principal bases in the Khartoum area. Most helicopters and transport aircraft are permanently based at Khartoum, fighter aircraft, at Wadi Seidna. In the past, aircraft also have been deployed as follows: MiG-17s to Kassala, Jet Provosts to Al Fashir and Malakal, Mi-8 helicopters to Al Fashir, and BO-105 helicopters to Port Sudan. A separate
SUDAN

A helicopter base is being built at Jabal Al Awliya near an Army installation where airborne units are stationed; however, the installation has not been completed because of lack of funds. Some construction continues, but Air Force personnel are resisting the move from Khartoum due to the lack of fuel, quarters, and other facilities at Jabal Al Awliya. The newly delivered Strikemasters will ultimately be deployed to Juba to be used in quelling the southern dissident problem. However, they remain at Wadi Seidna for the duration of pilot training and the arrival of additional aircraft.

When trainer aircraft are in the inventory, they are placed in the operational squadrons of the appropriate fighter aircraft, rather than being withheld to form a separate training squadron. Sudan's MiG-21 FISHBED/MONGOL and F-6/TF-6/FARMER aircraft are organized in this manner. A similar organizational scheme can be expected in the case of the US F-5 aircraft.

(b) Summary of Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Principal Bases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 fighter sqdns</td>
<td>MiG-21/FISHBED</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Wadi Seidna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F-6/FARMER</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Wadi Seidna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F-5/FRESCO</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Wadi Seidna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MiG-17/FRESCO</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Wadi Seidna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BAC 167/Strikemaster</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Wadi Seidna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MiG-21/MONGOL</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Wadi Seidna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F-5E/Tiger II</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Wadi Seidna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F-5F/Tiger II</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Wadi Seidna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T-55/Jet Provost</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Wadi Seidna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MiG-15/MIDGET</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Wadi Seidna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 transport brigade</td>
<td>DHC-5 Buffalo</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Khartoum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C-130 H Hercules</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Khartoum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fan Jet Falcon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Khartoum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fan Jet Falcon 50</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Khartoum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 helicopter brigade</td>
<td>SA-330 Puma</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Khartoum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BO-105 (MBB)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Khartoum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mi-8/HIP</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Khartoum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AB-212 Agusta Bell</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Khartoum</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(6) **Status of Equipment**

Aircraft are of Soviet, PRC, and Western origin. Only 35 to 40 percent of the aircraft in the squadrons are operational due to poor maintenance and insufficient funds to purchase needed spare parts. Even if there were sufficient spare parts, the Air Force is dependent upon foreign technical assistance for aircraft maintenance and training. Fifteen Mi-8 helicopters, 8 MiG-21/FISHBEDs, and 2 MiG-21/MONGOLs were overhauled in Yugoslavia in the 1979-80 timeframe. During September 1984 all the MiG-21s were nonoperational due to the lack of engine oil. The Jet Provost aircraft suffer from old age and a lack of spare parts. The Sudanese are having difficulty with the PRC F-5 aircraft due to environmental-associated maintenance problems. These F-5s have been crated and are to be rebuilt in China beginning in 1985. The PRC delivered five F-6 fighter and two TF-6 and two TF-6 trainer-fighter aircraft in 1981. Five more F-6 aircraft were delivered in 1982, increasing the number of these aircraft to a full squadron of 12. As of September 1984 all the F-6 aircraft were grounded due to faulty fuel pumps and after-burners. The operational rate of the BO-105 helicopters is low due to a lack of spare parts and qualified maintenance personnel. Two Puma helicopters were given to Sudan by France as gifts in 1981. One is inoperable. Romania sold eight Pumas (which it assembles under license) to Sudan in 1983 and four in January 1984. Sudan received two US F-5F trainer-fighter aircraft in October 1982. The training program, temporarily delayed by poor logistic support and fuel shortages, is now proceeding well. However, an F-5 was lost to ground fire while conducting operations against dissidents in southern Sudan on 23 June 1984. Annual deliveries of two F-5F fighter aircraft began in July 1984 and are to continue for 5 years. In early 1984, Sudan took receipt of the first 3 of 10 Strikemaster fighter aircraft from Great Britain. These aircraft are only armed with 7.62-mm machineguns. Reportedly, the Sudanese did not purchase bombs that the aircraft is capable of delivering. At the present time, there are only five pilots training to fly these aircraft. The seven additional Strikemasters may not be delivered unless Britain receives payment in advance.

(7) **Logistics**

The principal logistic problem confronting the Sudanese Air Force is the paucity of spare parts and the lack of necessary funds with which to purchase them. With the departure of the Soviet military advisory group in the spring of 1977, the spare parts pipeline from the USSR and East European countries (except for Yugoslavia) was closed. Extensive cannibalization of existing equipment has been necessary to keep aircraft operational. An agreement was concluded early in 1983 whereby the PRC would begin rebuilding its F-5 aircraft in China. Yugoslavia periodically has sent maintenance teams to assist in the upkeep of Sudan's Mi-8 helicopters and MiG-21 aircraft. In addition a Western source or the PRC has agreed to reconditioning the Mi-8 helicopters.

All munitions are of Soviet, Chinese, Yugoslav, or Italian origin. A reserve is onhand, but it is inadequate. Delivery of 20-mm munitions for the US F-5F aircraft was concluded in April 1983. The Sudanese Air Force has both radar- and IR-guided air-to-air missiles for the MiG-21s, but uses only the IR-guided ATOLL because it is unable to maintain the radar-guided missiles.
Workshops are clean and well organized, but they are limited by inadequate power and water supplies, and by a lack of maintenance equipment. Hangars at Wadi Seidna and Khartoum are large enough for most fighter and transport aircraft, but do not have sufficient height for C-130-type aircraft. Additional hangar facilities are under development.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

(U) Refer to paragraph 3.a.(7).

(9) Training

The Air Force has a pilot training requirement of approximately 15 pilots a year; however, with the expense of training abroad it is not always able to fill this quota. Pilots and ground crews have attended schools in Egypt, the PRC, Greece, Yugoslavia, the US, Saudi Arabia, West Germany, and probably other countries. Ten pilots (some transferred from other aircraft programs) were trained on the BO-105 helicopter in West Germany in 1982. Two C-130 pilots were trained in the US the same year. In 1983, basic flight training was being received by four Sudanese pilots in Saudi Arabia, six in Greece, and five in Egypt. Only about one-third of the Sudanese pilots are likely to complete the courses and graduate.

A pilot training center was established at Wadi Seidna Air Force Base in 1974, but it conducts only pilot-refresher training. A national flight training school has been under study for several years, but budgetary limitations have prevented its establishment. In-country training assistance is provided by Egyptian, PRC, Great Britain, and US (F-5) training missions. Most training flights are conducted by single aircraft, with few formation or joint air-ground exercises flown. Live-fire training also is rare. A chronic lack of spare parts, fuel, ammunition, and operational funds seriously hampers the Air Force's training program. Training for the Strikemaster is being conducted in-country. Originally there were 15 Sudanese pilots but this number has declined to 5 Sudanese majors. The decrease in number may have been caused as a result of the intent of the Sudanese Government to use these aircraft in a ground assault role against southern dissidents. This particular training program has shown the Sudanese to be better than average flyers but below average in firing the machineguns. As a result, the Sudanese would be only a show of force when the Strikemasters are deployed, not really an effective military response in support of Sudanese troops engaged in the south.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

(U) None
(b) Mobilization

Virtually all of Sudan's civil aircraft and indigenous civilian aviation personnel could be mobilized in the event of war or comparable national emergency. However, a lack of fully qualified, indigenous flight and maintenance personnel would prevent maximum effective use of the mobilized equipment without considerable foreign assistance.

(U) Approximately 13 civil transport aircraft with a gross takeoff weight of at least 9,000 kilograms currently are registered, owned, and operated in Sudan. The aircraft include: three Boeing 707-320C, two Boeing 737-200, one Boeing 727-200, one Dassault-Breguet Falcon 50, two McDonnell Douglas C-47/DC-3 SKYTRAIN, two Fokker F-27-200, and two Fokker F-27-400. Its Boeing 727-200 is leased from Tunis Air until January 1986. The FALCON 50 and one of the Boeing 707s are believed to be used for government VIP flights rather than scheduled services. Financial constraints have forced Sudan Airways to renegotiate some previous commitments to purchase additional aircraft. The airline ordered an additional Boeing 737-200 in late 1980, for example, but the aircraft has not yet been delivered. Sudan Airways also signed a letter of intent in late 1982 to purchase three medium-range A-310 Airbuses with delivery tentatively scheduled in 1984, if satisfactory financial terms can be arranged. The airline may seek to lease additional aircraft instead.

(U) Air Taxi is the name under which the National Agricultural Organization provides local, domestic air services; its remaining fleet consists of two Piper and about seven Pilatus light aircraft. The Kenana Sugar Corporation may operate as many as four additional C-47/DC-3 SKYTRAINs. All of the SKYTRAINs are in questionable operating condition.

(U) In addition to the above equipment, certain Sudanese Air Force aircraft operate with civil registration markings. These include a medium-range Dassault-Breguet FALCON/MYSTERE 20F, which is used for government VIP flights, and a medium-range Lockheed C-130 HERCULES, which has provided cargo service for Sudan Airways.

(U) The total number of licensed civilian pilots of major transport aircraft in Sudan is not known. Sudan Airways reportedly employs about 80 pilots, a significant number of whom are believed to be foreign nationals (past estimates range from 16 percent to over 40 percent).

d. Air Defense Force

(1) Mission

To defend, in conjunction with the Air Force, Sudanese airspace and national territory against enemy air attack, and to provide warning of hostile air action.
(2) **Capabilities**

The Air Defense Force is unable to perform satisfactorily its mission at the present time. Equipment deficiencies are far reaching, training is at a low level, and the lack of strategic and tactical communications results in a fragmented organization. There also is no central means of national command and control for air defense, and coordination with the Air Force is minimal.

(3) **Personnel Strength**

3,000 estimated

(4) **Equipment Strength**

All air defense equipment was delivered to Sudan by the Soviet Union in the 1969-71 timeframe, except the 37-mm antiaircraft guns delivered by the PRC in 1979 and 1982, and the 40-mm Bofors delivered in the 1960s. The Soviet deliveries included SA-2 launchers and missiles, SA-7 launchers and missiles, antiaircraft guns ranging from 12.7-mm heavy machineguns to 100-mm artillery, and approximately 30 air defense and missile fire control radar systems. Additional Soviet radar units subsequently were received from Egypt.

(5) **Organization and Deployment**

(a) General

Air Defense Force Headquarters is located at Port Sudan. Sudan is divided into two sectors for air defense purposes: the Central Sector, which includes Khartoum, and the Eastern Sector, which includes Port Sudan. The Central Sector commander is stationed at Wadi Seidaa Air Base, about 15 kilometers north of Khartoum. The Central Sector commander also is the Wadi Seidaa base commander. The commander of the Eastern Sector, who also is the Commander of the Air Defense Force, is stationed at Port Sudan. The air defense sector commanders at Khartoum and Port Sudan are responsible for defense of their respective critical target areas. At Khartoum, these consist of the Wadi Seidna Air Base, Khartoum International Airport, government buildings, the GHQ of the SPAF, and the bridges connecting the three towns that comprise Khartoum. At Port Sudan, critical targets include the naval installation, the seaport, the oil refinery, Port Sudan Airfield, bridges, and the railway center. Outside these air defense sectors, the protection of important targets, such as dams, is handled by Air Defense Force units attached to, and under the operational control of, regional infantry commands.

The Air Defense Force consists of three brigades. Two of the brigades are stationed in or near Port Sudan. They include the SA-2 brigade and one of two conventional AAA brigades (with 100-mm Soviet KS-19, 37-mm PRC Type-63 and 12.7-mm Soviet heavy machinegun weapons) that was redeployed from the Eastern Regional Command in 1981. The second conventional AAA brigade (with 100-mm Soviet KS-19, 57-mm Soviet S-60, 40-mm Swedish Bofor, 37-mm PRC Type-63 and possibly Type 55, and 12.7-mm Soviet heavy machinegun weapons) is stationed in...
the Greater Khartoum area. Most air attack protection is of the point defense type, and most airfields have AAA weapons in place on a generally permanent basis. Most such weapons are of the types in the inventories of the Air Defense brigades, but defenses at Wadi Seidna Air Force Base, for example, also include 57-mm Soviet S-60 guns. Together with the three brigades, there are Air Defense battalions deployed in each of the regional commands, where they come under the operational command of local commanders. There are three such battalions in the Eastern Command region, and one each in the Northern, Southern, and Western Command Regions. (An SA-7 platoon also is assigned to the Western Squadron Command). After the bombing attack at Omdurman on 16 March 1984, the Egyptians deployed two SAM-7 platoons to the Sudan—one to Khartoum International Airport and one to Wadi Seidna Airbase. The Egyptians plan to deploy an Air Defense Brigade (SAM 2) to Khartoum probably in early 1985.

(b) Air Defense Weapons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon Type</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Missile:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAM, SA-2/GUIDELINE</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>18 launchers; 70+ missiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAM, SA-7/GRAIL</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>54+ launchers; 150+ missiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defense Guns and Artillery:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMG, 12.7-mm Degtyarev</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>40-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMG, 14.5-mm single and twin (probable ZPU-1/2)</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA, 23-mm twin (probable 2U-23)</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA, 37-mm, M-1939</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA, 37-mm, Type 55 (single)</td>
<td>CH</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA, 37-mm, Type 63 (twin)</td>
<td>CH</td>
<td>75+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA, 40-mm, Bofors</td>
<td>SW</td>
<td>36+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA, 57-mm, S-60</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>30+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA, 85-mm, KS-12</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA, 100-mm, M-1944 BS-3</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) Status of Equipment

The general state of the air defense equipment is poor. Much of it is inoperative due to a lack of spare parts and trained maintenance technicians. There are no technicians in Sudan capable of troubleshooting the Soviet radar systems. Some spare parts for the radars are lacking, and most radar units are inoperative. The fuel shelf life of the SA-2 missiles has expired, and the missiles are considered nonoperational (although some Sudanese officers claim they still can be fired). Except for the newer PRC weapons, most of the conventional antiaircraft artillery pieces suffer from low operational rates due to limited maintenance capabilities and the lack of spare parts. The 100-mm Soviet guns in the Port Sudan area, for example, were not test fired between 1979 and 1981 due to the lack of spare parts.
(7) Logistics

The SA-2 brigade has a good logistic and support facility located in the Port Sudan area. There are complete facilities for all missile servicing, such as electrical checkout, propellant servicing, assembly, and repair. Air defense artillery (ADA) equipment is not as well supported, but ADA assets in the Khartoum area have some minor repair shops to perform second-echelon maintenance. Any ADA assets outside the Khartoum area must depend on a few technicians who travel to the various locations to perform onsite servicing.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

The Air Defense Command is composed of volunteers who serve a minimum of 3 years. A total of six reenlistments are allowed, each lasting 3 years. Specialists serve a minimum of 7 years. The number of volunteers usually exceeds the recruiting quotas.

(9) Training

Individuals coming into the command must first go through army basic training. They are then sent to the Air Defense Force School at Port Sudan. The school teaches a full range of SA-2/SA-7, AAA, and radar techniques and tactics courses. Modern training aids are lacking, however, and technical support is weak. Ammunition and spare parts shortages make live-fire practices very infrequent occurrences. No training has been conducted against airborne towed targets for at least 7 years. Missile maintenance and repair instruction is provided by a 10-man Egyptian team at Port Sudan. Antiaircraft gun crews are trained at the Air Defense Force School. They appear able to maintain the newer equipment, though to be effective, they obviously need live-fire/towed target training. Repair of the equipment, especially the older Soviet guns that lack spare parts, is far more problematical.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

There are no known reserve units or mobilization plans.

e. Paramilitary Forces

There are no paramilitary forces in Sudan. However, in the event of hostilities, the national police force would have some potential for augmenting and supporting the regular ground forces. The Sudanese National Police (SNP) is responsible, along with the Army, for national internal security, and they have primary responsibility for criminal investigation. For the maintenance of internal security, the Sudanese Government relies on small SNP posts scattered throughout the country. Army units are used to intervene in security problems when the police are incapable of handling them. The strength of the police is estimated to be 65,000, of whom 35,000 are in the south. Included in this figure is a special police commando (or riot control) battalion, called the Police Reserve, which is stationed in Khartoum. This unit's basic equipment is much like that of a motorized light infantry battalion. One company of special
SUDAN

Police is kept on 15-minute alert at all times in the capital. While the training and morale of the special unit is high, the overall morale of the SNP is said to be low when compared with the military services. This is because the police receive lower pay and have less authority than their counterparts in the Army, and because of the many hardship assignments the police receive in remote areas of Sudan.

f. [Table]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Personnel Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>51,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defense</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>58,500</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

g. [List]

- **Foreign Military Presence**
  - Egypt: 7 (military advisers)
  - People's Republic of China: 50 (primarily Air Force assistance personnel)
  - United Kingdom: 2 (instructors at Nimeiri High Academy)

h. [List]

- **Military Presence Abroad**
  - Egypt: 24 Army in various staff colleges
  - 50 Air Force
  - India: 1 unknown type of training
  - Italy: 12 unknown type of training (possibly helicopter pilot training)
  - Saudi Arabia: 20 Air Force in various programs including senior staff courses
  - United Kingdom: 9 (some Air Force)
  - West Germany: 13 Army in senior service schools
  - 10 Army in senior service schools
SWAZILAND

1. (U) Political-Military Situation: King Sobhuza II, the Lion of Swaziland, was the world's longest reigning monarch and the dominant political figure in Swaziland for 61 years. In 1900, following the Swazi tradition, Sobhuza was named King by a family council at the age of one. The country was ruled by a regency until Sobhuza assumed the throne in 1921. Independence from the British came in 1968. In April 1973 the King abolished the Constitution and Parliament and affirmed his personal rule. He ruled through a Cabinet appointed by him and retained the right to overrule bills passed by Parliament. Parliament was reopened in January 1979 with some members chosen through indirect election and others nominated by the King.

At the time of his death in August 1982, King Sobhuza II held supreme power over dual systems of administration—one for the modern sector and one for the traditional. These two systems operated independently and met only in the person of the King who headed both. Upon his death, one of his senior wives, who held the position of "Queen Mother," became regent and titular head of state. A teenage son of Sobhuza was selected to succeed to the throne but is not expected to assume power until he reaches majority some 8 years hence. Just prior to his death, Sobhuza also formally established under law a supreme Council of State, the Liqoqo, which was made up of leaders from the traditional sector who were to advise the regent. The Liqoqo was also empowered to appoint an "authorized person" who was to act on behalf of the Queen Mother in the event she was unable to perform her duties.

Since Sobhuza's death, the power struggles and intrigue that have always been an integral part of Swazi political life have flared. Two major factions had emerged within the government by early 1983. The modernization faction, which would like to bring the nation more fully into the twentieth century, was led by the Prime Minister Prince Mabandla with support from the Queen Regent Dazeliwe Shongwe. Opposing was a traditional faction centered in the Liqoqo and led by the "authorized person" Prince Sozisa. In March 1983, Prime Minister Mabandla was removed from office by the Liqoqo and the "authorized person" after he had attempted to assert the primacy of the cabinet over the Liqoqo. Political in-fighting continued in Swaziland until August 1983 when the authorized person, Prince Sozisa, executed a bloodless coup, deposed Queen Regent Dazeliwe Shongwe, and appointed a New Queen Regent, Notombi Thwala. In November 1983, elections were held and a new cabinet was formed.

Early 1984 saw the continuation of the power struggle between the Liqoqo, led by Prince Mfanasibile and Dr. George Nsibi, and the Royal Family, led by Prince Sozisa. Up to this time the Army and Police had distanced themselves from the political intrigue and avoided becoming involved in the struggle between the two power groups by maintaining an apolitical posture. However, in June 1984, the Queen Regent dismissed Army Chief of Staff Mangomeni Ndizimandze and Commissioner of Police Titus Nsibi. They were replaced with two conservatives who were known for their unwavering loyalty to the Crown. Minister of Defense, Colonel Gideon Fonono Dube was appointed Army Commander and promoted to Brigadier, while Majaji Simelane, the Chief of Intelligence Branch was named the new Commissioner of Police.

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Swaziland is a member of the Commonwealth, United Nations, Organization of African Unity, and the Southern African Development Coordination Conference. In international affairs it takes a conservative and anti-Communist stance. Although there is no external threat directed against Swaziland, its territorial integrity is occasionally violated when insurgent operations spill over from South Africa and Mozambique.

South Africa and Mozambique surround this landlocked country, and Swaziland attempts to maintain correct relations with both. In this regard, Swaziland is especially sensitive to refugee and South African liberation group activities within its boundaries, and has begun patrolling its borders in problem areas. Until early 1984, the African National Congress (ANC), a South African liberation group, was allowed in Swaziland; however, it was not allowed to conduct military operations and was closely watched by the police. In an effort to curb insurgent activity on its territory, the Swazi Government established a central processing center to handle South African refugees in order to increase Swazi control over the activities of the refugees and lessen the likelihood of South African incursions. The 16 March 1984 signing of the Nkomati Accord, a nonaggression pact between South Africa and Mozambique, caused a large number of ANC guerrillas to flee the latter country and seek sanctuary and safe houses in Swaziland. Previously, ANC activities in Swaziland had been severely restricted due to close cooperation between the Swazi and South African intelligence services and police forces. On 31 March 1984, the Swazi and South African Governments publicly revealed the existence of a 2-year-old security agreement between the two countries that provided for cooperation in countering insurgent groups. This announcement was followed in early April by the expulsion of a number of ANC refugees and guerrillas by the Swazi Government. After a Swazi police officer was killed while trying to arrest several ANC activists, Swazi police and military forces intensified their efforts to rid Swaziland of ANC personnel and conducted several raids against the ANC during which two of the guerrillas were killed. Should the ANC continue to operate from Swaziland, increased military and police cooperation with South Africa and harsh anti-ANC policies by the Swazi Government are likely. South Africa has also sought to increase Swazi vigilance against ANC border violations by holding out the possibility of territorial concessions. Talks have been held between the two governments concerning the transfer of the South African homeland, Kangwane, to Swazi sovereignty.

The official name of the Army, Umbutfo Swaziland Defense Force (SDF), recalls the age-group regimental system developed by the Swazis during the tribal wars of the early 19th century and carried on in social forms since. The present Armed Force was formed unofficially out of the traditional regimental system in 1973 following King Sobhuza's abrogation of the Constitution. Initially its purpose was to offset the police as a tool for the monarchy to wield against the populace should the need arise. After 30 months of training and a growing perception of an increased threat from the new FRELIMO Government in Mozambique, the Royal Swaziland Defense Force was formally established on 25 November 1975. The force is responsible through the Minister of Defense to the Queen Regent.
The Army's primary mission is border security and it has no military capabilities beyond its own borders. Army leadership is provided by middle-aged Swazis who served in noncombatant status in the British Army during World War II, and the typical volunteer is a barely literate rural youth. However, the force is capable of playing a key role in controlling any threat to the monarchy.

2. (U) Key Officials:
Queen Regent (Head of State): Ntombi Thwala
Prime Minister: Prince Bhekimpí Dlamini
Liqoqo Authorized Person: Prince Soziza Dlamini
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs: Vacant
Minister of Defense and Youth and Army Commander: Brigadier Gideon Fonono Dube
Army Chief of Staff: Vacant
Commissioner of Police: Majaji Simelane

3. (U) Military Budget: 23.3 million for fiscal year ending 31 March 1983; this is 9.2 percent of the central government budget. No service allocations are available but included is $11 million for the Royal Police Force. Dollar values converted at an exchange rate of 0.787 emalangeni equals $1.00.

4. (U) Population: 651,000 as of June 1984
Males (age 15-49): 140,000; physically fit: 81,000
Ethnic Divisions: 96 percent African, 3 percent European, 1 percent Mulatto
Literacy: About 25 percent

5. (U) Army:
Personnel Strength: 2,950 men (only 1,350 are estimated fit for duty and gainfully assigned. This figure includes the 350-man Border Guard unit.)
Reserve: None
Major Units: The Umbutfo SDF is organized into a 535-man Royal Guard unit, four regular infantry units called battalions, a training battalion, a mortar platoon, a 350-man Border Guard Unit, and an air wing. Each battalion has an authorized strength of 325 officers and enlisted personnel organized into 6 platoons. The infantry battalions are all assigned to remote areas away from population centers and normally will have half of the platoons on border duty and half in reserve (though most of the reserve group are on leave.) Most training is conducted under the auspices of the British Army team in-country, but some training is conducted abroad in the UK and Kenya. The Border Guard unit was reportedly trained in Switzerland.
Major Equipment: Assorted 7.62-mm rifles and machineguns (mainly FN); AR-18 5.56-mm rifles; machine pistols; six 81-mm, fifteen 60-mm, and six 120-mm mortars; eighteen 84-mm Carl Gustav antitank weapons; four 105-mm pack howitzers (for ceremonial functions); and three Shoreland armored cars. Transport includes 3/4-ton Land Rovers and a variety of 4-ton and 7-ton West German cargo trucks. Most weapons were supplied by Great Britain.

6. (U) Navy: None

7. (U) Air Force: The Air Wing of the SDF is based at Matsapa Airfield and equipped with two IAI-201 Arava light STOL transports. These aircraft are leased from Israel. One has no armaments and is used to support the civil
government. The other has ordnance racks and a pilot's lateral gunsight. Israel has reportedly agreed to sell Swaziland machinegun ammunition and rocket launchers for the two Arava aircraft. Four pilots and seven maintenance personnel have been trained in Israel. Until late 1982, two Israeli technicians were based with the Air Wing. Their departure leaves future maintenance of the aircraft in some doubt. South African instructors are training Air Wing personnel in subjects such as air operations and aircraft maintenance. Currently, three South African trained pilots are instrument rated.

8. **Paramilitary Police:**

The Royal Swaziland Police Force has a strength of about 1,111 men. This figure includes a police mobile unit of about 300 men that functions as a quick-reaction force for paramilitary police operations.

9. **(U) Key US Officials:**

Chief of Mission: (Mbabane) Ambassador Robert H. Phinny

10. **Foreign Military Presence:**

United Kingdom: Small army team (one major and two warrant officers) is assisting in training the SDF.

Republic of China (Taiwan): One medical officer and two vehicle mechanics are assisting the SDF.

Republic of South Africa: A six-man South African Defense Force (SADF) training team is providing SDF personnel training in weapons and vehicle repair and maintenance, training, intelligence, and anti-infiltration techniques.
Withheld pursuant to exemption
(b)(3): 10 USC 424
of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
# TANZANIA

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<td>Installation BE List</td>
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</table>
1. GOVERNMENT

   a. (U) Key Government Officials

   President: Julius K. Nyerere
   First Vice President and Chairman, Revolutionary Council, Zanzibar: Ali Hassan Mwinyi
   Prime Minister: Salim A. Salim
   Minister for Foreign Affairs: Benjamin Mkapa
   Minister for Defense and National Service: Muhidin Kimaro
   Minister for Finance: Cleopa David Msuya

   b. Type and Stability of Government

   The United Republic of Tanzania was established in April 1964 by the union of the governments of Tanganyika and the revolutionary regime that ruled the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba. The Government is dominated by the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party, led by President Julius Nyerere. Zanzibar's Revolutionary Council, under the leadership of mainland Vice President Ali Hassan Mwinyi, governs domestic affairs on the islands.

   In October 1980, the Tanzanian people returned President Nyerere to office with a 93-percent majority vote in their national election. Prior to the elections, there were widespread reports of dissatisfaction with Nyerere's policies coupled with apathy toward the election. However, Nyerere, the sole Presidential candidate, amassed a slightly higher proportion of the ballots than he did in 1975 and voter turnout also exceeded expectations, with 85 percent of the registered voters casting ballots. The results of the election did not alter voter dissatisfaction with the deplorable state of the country's economy or the Government's extensive military involvement in Uganda at that time. The people are continuing to press for a change in direction from the socialist path being followed by President Nyerere, a factor that could pose serious problems for him in the future.

   In a move by Nyerere, designed to demonstrate a strong degree of political control, Vice President Jumbe was forced to submit his resignation in January 1984. Jumbe was replaced by Ali Hassan Mwinyi on an interim basis. Mwinyi was subsequently elected to the position on 19 April 1984. Further complicating the Tanzanian political scene was the untimely death of Prime Minister Edward M. Sokoine. Prime Minister Sokoine was killed in an automobile accident in Tanzania on 12 April 1984. At the time of his death, the late Prime Minister was generally regarded as the most likely successor to President Nyerere.

   The Tanzanian Government's stability is increasingly threatened by the continued decline in the country's economy and the eroding confidence in President Nyerere's ability to improve this situation. Economic hardships experienced at all levels have generated rising levels of discontent among the general populace. Civil and military unrest have been evidenced in recent months by an aborted coup d'état and indications of some mutinous activity within the military and police barracks. The general mood within Tanzania, particularly in the urban areas, is that the government has failed to live up to either its responsibilities or the expectations of the Tanzanian people.

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Internal stability is further threatened by the survivability of the mainland's constitutional union with the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba. After 20 years of union, tensions between mainland Tanzania and the islands remain high. Zanzibaris are particularly dissatisfied with the meager benefits they have derived from their political union with the mainland. Tensions are likely to intensify as the economy declines and an internal Zanzibari power struggle offers opportunity for separatists to press their case. Acquiesence to separatist pressure could further tarnish Nyerere's image both domestically and abroad and could even jeopardize the survival of his regime.

c. Internal Threat

No well-organized civil group or faction has been identified that could pose a viable threat to the Government. Nevertheless, growing discontent among elements of the Tanzanian People's Defense Force (TPDF) could pose a serious threat to internal stability. Internal dissatisfaction, particularly among junior and noncommissioned officers within the TPDF, stems from increased taxation, escalating prices on consumer goods, low salaries, and shortages of food rations.

Since early 1983, Tanzanian Government authorities have uncovered three separate coup plots against the Nyerere regime. In one case 24 civilians and military persons were arrested and charged with conspiracy. Although specific details of these security incidents are not available, these occurrences indicated a mounting dissatisfaction over continuing erosion of the national economy and Nyerere's inability to resolve the situation. With each of these aborted coup attempts there has been a rise in grumbling among the rank and file of the TPDF. A major source of this discontent has been the rapid escalation on taxes levied on such items as beer, gasoline, and cigarettes.

In an attempt to avert further anti-Government actions by the elements of the TPDF, all unit commanders were ordered to monitor rank and file military morale and to make weekly status reports. In further reaction to the aborted coup and widespread complaints by military personnel about basic commodity shortages, President Nyerere has ordered all commodity parastatals to give priority allocations to the TPDF over the general domestic and exports markets.

Nyerere's difficulty in dealing with these domestic problems has had a profound impact on Zanzibari separatists. For example, the Zanzibaris regarded the coup plotting as further evidence of Nyerere's loss of political strength. As a result, Zanzibaris encouraged their leaders to press for constitutional amendments, key of which were those designed to guarantee Zanzibar's sovereignty and separate status within the union. In a move designed to end the threat of secession, Nyerere deployed a 1,500-man TPDF task force to Zanzibar in January 1984. Although the situation has since become somewhat less tense, the issue is by no means resolved.
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d. External Threat

The external threat to Tanzania has declined significantly since 1979. With the military ouster of former Ugandan president Idi Amin in that year, the era of Uganda's threat to Tanzania came to an end. The prominent role played by the Tanzanian People's Defense Force (TPDF) in Amin's defeat and the continuing close relationship between presidents Nyerere of Tanzania and Obote of Uganda has resulted in continuing cordial relations between the two governments. Further improving Tanzania's regional relations was the successful arbitration for the disbursement of assets held by the defunct East African Community (EAC). Not only did the successful conclusion of these negotiations remove a potential stumbling block to improving Tanzania-Uganda relations, but also significantly improved the diplomatic ties between Tanzania and Kenya. In fact, the EAC liquidation negotiations was in large part responsible for a bilateral reopening of the Tanzania-Kenya border in late 1983, ending its 6-year closure.

As a result of its longtime basing and training support to South African dissident groups and the recent neutralization of other nearby refuge like Mozambique, Tanzanian fears of South African retaliation have heightened. Tanzania fears attacks not only upon dissident camps and training bases but also upon its own strategic facilities. While the South African Defense Force in fact has the best regional capability for conducting air attacks, commando raids, and unconventional warfare, potential Tanzanian targets pose support and logistic problems.

e. Communist Influence

Although Tanzania has no Communist party, President Nyerere's continued dedication to national socialism is a key element in Tanzania's good relations with much of the Communist world. However, relations with specific Communist countries vary. For example, prior to the mid-1970s, the PRC was the primary Communist supplier of military and economic assistance to Tanzania. China has since been surpassed in this role by the Soviet Union. From 1975 to 1981 Tanzania grew increasingly dependent upon Soviet military hardware and training assistance. This relationship began to wane in 1982 as President Nyerere began expressing interest in moving Tanzania away from its dependence on Soviet arms and training. By far, the most significant move in this direction was the 1982 reduction of Soviet military personnel in Tanzania, from 186 to 122. Soviet personnel are scheduled to be further reduced to approximately 35 by late 1985. In addition, Tanzania has diversified its Communist assistance contracts by purchasing military equipment and accepting technical assistance from various Communist countries such as Bulgaria, Romania, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, and Cuba, as well as the PRC and the Soviet Union.

Since 1974, Tanzania has signed six separate military assistance agreements with the Soviet Union. Deliveries from the Soviet Union have included jet fighters, armored vehicles, rocket launchers, surface-to-air missiles (SAM), artillery, and trucks. In 1980, the PRC renewed its 1977 military agreement with Tanzania. PRC deliveries have included jet fighters, armored vehicles, rocket launchers, artillery, and naval craft. In mid-October 1982, Tanzania finalized a contract with the PRC for the repair of the TPDF naval maintenance facility in...
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Dar Es Salaam. Work on this project is continuing. Soviet-Bloc countries have provided small arms, artillery, and naval patrol craft. In the past, Cuba has trained Tanzanian Internal Security Service (TISS) personnel, and North Korea has provided commando training for Tanzanian People's Defense Force (TPDF) personnel.

President Nyerere is a long time advocate of international nonalignment. For this reason he has avoided wholesale identification with the Communist World and does not express frequent anti-US criticism. In fact, Nyerere has been extremely critical of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. However, the military continues to be reliant on Communist-supplied equipment, and as a result Tanzania will most likely remain generally sympathetic to Communist positions on international issues.

f. Economic Factors

(U) The Tanzanian economy is heavily dependent on agriculture that accounts for more than half of the total gross domestic product (GDP). Ninety-four percent of Tanzania's population is engaged in agriculture. More than two-thirds of all export earnings are derived from agriculture with coffee, tea, cashews, pyrethrum, and cloves contributing significantly. Tanzania's economy is augmented by agricultural processing industries, diamond mining, and petroleum refining.

(U) Tanzania's economy is one of the poorest in the world. In 1979 and 1980, the country was hard hit by a combination of high import prices, including oil, and by falling agricultural output. Other factors which have contributed to Tanzania's poor economic state include floods in 1978, a drought in 1980-81, and problems in maintaining the country's rail, air, and sea transportation network.

(U) The Government has responded to the economic crisis by promulgating the National Economic Survival Program that devalued the Tanzanian shilling in March 1982, and made cuts in the national budget, thereby halting or deferring nearly all new projects.

(U) Tanzania must import almost all of its military material. The scarcity of material resources and lack of skilled manpower have precluded the development of a significant defense industry. Tanzania does produce some small arms and ammunition but not in sufficient numbers to supply its military.

g. Military and Political Alignment

(U) Tanzania is a member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), a regular participant in Third World forums such as the Nonaligned Movement, and a major participant in African frontline state activities. Tanzania's relations with its neighbors are good. Moreover, during President Nyerere's visit to Nairobi in mid-February 1983, for the OAU mini summit conference, he informed Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi that he wanted to improve relations with Kenya. Nyerere further stated that Uganda and Tanzania must work together because they have mutual enemies. Additionally, Nyerere urged Moi on several occasions to talk to Ugandan President Obote in an effort to patch up relations between the
two countries. Such a dialogue between these states could, if continued, lead to improved relations. Nyerere's relations with the West are cordial but could deteriorate if relations with Communist countries improve markedly. Currently, Tanzania receives military assistance from the USSR, the PRC, East Germany, Bulgaria, Romania, and North Korea.

(U) Politically, Tanzanian relations continue to be closest with fellow Nonaligned Movement member Yugoslavia and with mainland China, which has generally been seen by Tanzanians as responsive to Third World concerns. Soviet and other Eastern Bloc support for Southern African Liberation movements remain an important factor in the maintenance of cordial relations with Tanzania.

(U) Key US Officials

Ambassador: John W. Shirley
Military Attache: None
2. MILITARY, GENERAL

a. (U) Key Military Officials

Tanzania People's Defense Forces (TPDF): Commander, Lt Gen D.B. Musuguri
(Commander, Zanzibar units: Brig Yusuf Hamidi)
TPDF: Chief of Staff, Maj Gen Martin Mwakalindile
TPDF: Commander, Col R.L. Makunda
TPDF Air Wing: Commander, Brig Robert P. Mboma
Tanzania Militia: Commander, Maj Gen John B. Walden
Chief Military Intelligence: Brig Sam T. Laiser
Inspector General of Police: Salomon Liani
National Service: Director, Maj Gen Nelson L. Mikisi

b. Position of Armed Forces

The Tanzania People's Defense Force (TPDF) is composed of three Services--Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Army, by virtue of its size, is the predominant force. Traditional factionalism in the Armed Forces temporarily declined during the late 1970s as a result of Tanzania's war with Uganda. However, with recent shakeups in the senior officer ranks, overtones of tribally based frictions within the military are beginning to surface again. Although the TPDF influence within the government has leveled, it remains a viable force in Tanzania's political arena and will continue to play an active, if somewhat moderate, role in influencing future Tanzania Government policies.

c. Military Trends and Capabilities

The Tanzanian People's Defense Force (TPDF) is capable of countering an invasion by modern African forces of comparable size and has showed itself capable of offensive operations across its borders.

The TPDF underwent a period of rapid expansion and reorganization during its 1978-79 war with Uganda. Until the latter half of 1981 TPDF Ugandan Task Force personnel numbering between 10,000 and 11,000 combat and advisory personnel were stationed in Uganda as a security force. This force was phased out at that time due to economic considerations in Tanzania. The confidence and experience gained by the TPDF during the war have improved the overall capability of the military. However, inadequate pay and limited chances for promotion have contributed to a decline in morale among regular military units.

Tanzania continues to diversify its military assistance relationships between Communist and Western nations. Sophisticated Soviet antiaircraft equipment, including SA-3, SA-6, and SA-7 missiles, have been provided by the Soviets to defend Tanzania against air attacks. Tanzania plans to expand its armored forces in the future by purchasing tanks and APCs from the USSR and the UK. In 1980, military assistance agreements were concluded with both the Soviet Union and the PRC for additional equipment and spare parts deliveries. The initial arrival of some of this equipment in the fall of 1980 and spring of 1981 contributed to improving existing military capabilities and provided necessary
replacement parts to return inoperable equipment to active service. The TPDF is continuing to upgrade its capabilities. In line with these efforts, the Tanzanian Government is negotiating an arms deal with the Soviet Union that would include artillery, armored vehicles, small arms and associated ammunition for these systems.

There are a variety of difficulties facing the TPDF. For example, the rapid expansion of the military in 1979 has produced problems with training and organization as well as with absorbing the influx of complex weapon systems. Also, TPDF personnel have developed an attitude of respecting only officers who were directly involved in the Tanzania-Ugandan war.

An indirect, but nevertheless significant factor contributing to the difficulties facing the TPDF is the Government's inability to sufficiently provide for the livelihood of Tanzania's military members. As a result, Tanzania's ability to effectively defend itself against an army of comparable size may be hampered by the military's preoccupation with developing its own "personal survival programs."

d. Military Budget

$155,000,000 for fiscal year ending 30 June 1982: this is 10.4 percent of the central government budget. No service allocation is available. Dollar value converted from Tanzania shillings at the exchange rate of 8.2 shillings equal $1.00.

e. (U) Population

20,524,000 estimated as of 1 July 1983
Males (ages 15-49): 4,428,000; physically fit, 2,544,000
Ethnic Divisions: 99 percent indigenous Africans consisting of well over 100 tribes; 1 percent Asian, European, and Arab
Literacy: 61 percent
3. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

a. Army

(1) Mission

(U) Defend national borders and assist in maintaining internal order.

(2) Capabilities

The Tanzanian People's Defense Force (TPDF) is capable of countering an invasion by modern African forces of comparable size. With the assistance of police and militia, it also can maintain internal security. Logistic problems have limited Tanzanian combat capability in the past; however, in the 1978-79 war with Uganda, the TPDF was able to operate despite these problems and mount a successful offensive operation outside its borders. However, Uganda had been able to mount a creditable defense against advancing Tanzanian forces, the latter would have bogged down due to logistic inefficiency. Since that time military equipment maintenance has improved. Discipline in Tanzania-based units is generally good; however, morale has suffered because of the deteriorating economic condition of the country. Prior to their withdrawal in 1981, Uganda-based TPDF forces, suffering from lack of pay and proper logistic support, experienced major disciplinary problems.

(3) Personnel Strength

Estimated at 40,000

(4) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

The President exercises authority over the Armed Forces through the Minister of Defense. Headquarters for all military services is at Dar es Salaam. Future plans call for Army headquarters to move to the more centrally located Dodoma. The Army consists of four infantry divisions. The 20th Division, headquartered at Tabora, defends central and northern Tanzania while the 30th Division, headquartered at Kibaha, retains responsibility for the eastern region of the country. The 40th Division operating in the vicinity of Songea is responsible for the southern and western portions of the country. The 20th and 30th divisions each include three infantry brigades plus supporting units, while the 40th division is still understrength with two brigades and support units. Tanzanian mainland brigades are normally deployed in Tabora, Musoma, Mbeya, Arusha, Biharamulo, Songea, and Dar es Salaam.

The traditional organization of TPDF units stationed on the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba include one brigade and support units as well as air defense units was altered in January 1984 when President Nyerere deployed a 1,500-man task force to the islands as a show of force to quell a rising secessionist sentiment among the Zanzibaris. This force, along with the Zanzibari garrisons have reportedly formed the 10th division.
(b) Ground Combat Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Tactical Units (Mainland)</th>
<th>Authorized Strength*</th>
<th>Actual Strength**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 division headquarters</td>
<td>400/division</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 brigade headquarters</td>
<td>250/brigade</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 infantry battalions</td>
<td>550/battalion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 field artillery regiments</td>
<td>400/brigade</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 light antiaircraft regiments</td>
<td>500/brigade</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 tank regiments</td>
<td>500/brigade</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 tank battalion</td>
<td>250</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 field engineer regiments</td>
<td>1,200/regiment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 communication regiments</td>
<td>500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 service battalions</td>
<td>700/battalion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Tactical Units (Zanzibar and Pemba)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 division headquarters</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 brigade headquarters</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 infantry battalions</td>
<td>600/battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 artillery regiment</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 light antiaircraft regiment</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 FA regiment</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 service battalion</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) Weapons and Equipment

(a) General

The TPDF's primary source of military equipment since 1974 has gradually changed from the PRC to the Soviet Union with additional equipment provided by other Communist Bloc nations. Tanzania has also received a small quantity of equipment from Western sources. Efforts to upgrade the Army's inventory have been limited because of the continuing deterioration in Tanzania's economy. However, deliveries of Soviet-supplied equipment, and the culmination of a Tanzania-Soviet agreement signed in February 1980, helped to fill existing gaps in TPDF units. These deliveries included T-55 medium tanks and 122-mm field artillery pieces. In the past, the Soviet Union has supplied several different types of field artillery, antiaircraft guns, armored personnel carriers (APCs), surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), ammunition, small arms, and heavy-duty trucks.

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* Authorized strength levels for individual TPDF units are unknown.

** (U) Actual strength levels provided are estimates based upon analysis of available intelligence.
(b) **Ground Weapons and Equipment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Tanks:**
- Medium tank, T-55: UR, 32
- Medium tank, Type 59: CH, 30
- Medium tank, T-34: EG, 34
- Light tank, Type 62: CH, 30
- Light tank, Scorpion: UK, 40

**Armored Vehicles:**
- APC, BTR-152: UR, 30
- APC, BTR-40: UR, 30
- APC, M1967: CH, 45
- Armored car, BRDM-2: UR, 25
- Armored car, Daimler Dingo: UK, 10

**AD Arty & SAM:**
- ADA, M1939 37-mm: UR, CH, 120
- ADA, ZU-23: UR, 40
- ADA, ZPU-2/4: UR, 285
- SAM, SA-3 (launchers): UR, 12
- SAM, SA-3 (missiles): UR, 150
- SAM, SA-6 (launchers): UR, 20
- SAM, SA-6 (missiles): UR, 150
- SAM, SA-7: UR, Unk

**Artillery:**
- Field gun, 130-mm, M-46: UR, CH, 40
- Howitzer, 122-mm D-30: UR, 20
- Howitzer, 122-mm M-30: UR, CH, 100
- MRL, 122-mm BM-21: UR, 50
- Rkt lchr, 122-mm Grad-P: UR, 40
- Coastal gun, 85-mm: CH, 18
- Field gun, 76-mm, ZIS-3: UR, 45

**RCLR & AT Weapons:**
- Field gun, 85-mm, D-55: CH, 80
- RCLR, 75-mm: CH, 540
- AT gun, 57-mm, M1943: UR, 15
- 40-mm, RPG-7: UR, CH, BU, 2,060

**Mortars:**
- 160-mm, M160: CH, Unk
- 120-mm, M1943: UR, CH, YO, 135
- 82-mm, M1937: UR, CH, YO, 345
- 60-mm, Type-63: CH, YO, 465

(6) **Logistics**

The TPDF is virtually entirely dependent upon foreign sources for logistics equipment and spare parts. Most equipment has been furnished by Communist Bloc countries.
Notwithstanding substantial amounts of foreign assistance, the logistics system suffers from a lack of funds for purchases of equipment and spare parts, and a lack of training in organizational and preventive maintenance at lower echelons combined with a lack of administrative competence at upper levels. Lead times for receipt of spare parts may be a year or more, particularly for Soviet-manufactured equipment. Sophisticated Soviet equipment must be returned to the Soviet Union for repair since the necessary facilities are not available in Tanzania.

During the 1978-79 war with Uganda, various weaknesses in the logistics system surfaced which hindered TPDF combat operations. Chief among these was the transportation system. Roads and railroads were inadequate to support large-scale military deployment to the border areas and the TPDF advance into Uganda was slowed by the Army logistics system's inability to provide timely resupply to forward combat elements. These difficulties continue to limit the TPDF's operational capabilities due to the sparse transportation network and budgetary constraints.

The domestic military production capability of Tanzania is now limited to the manufacture of ammunition, grenades, and landmines. Peak annual production rate is estimated to be as follows: ammunition - 5 million rounds; grenades - 15,000; landmines - 25,000. The major sources of military equipment and assistance are Communist countries with equipment deliveries valued at $375 million in the past 5 years, or all but $35 million of that acquired by Tanzania. Moscow accounts for more than 90 percent of the total from all sources. The major Free World supplier has been Canada with the delivery of transport aircraft and training assistance valued at $24 million.

(7) Personnel Procurement and Retention

There is no conscription of military trainees. Tanzania's limited literacy rate contributes to serious problems in securing suitable recruits for technical training. Recruits are drawn from volunteers who have completed basic training in the paramilitary National Service (NS). The retention rate is unknown.

(8) Training

The National Service (NS) functions as a recruitment/training mechanism for the TPDF, as a reserve force, and as a civic action organization. All Tanzanians, male and female, who complete high school or its equivalent must serve in the NS for 2 years; others also may join. All personnel receive basic military training and are then assigned to either the military or civic action programs.

Army training is accomplished in Tanzania as well as abroad. National training centers include the Military Academy at Dar es Salaam; the Tanzanian Security Service (TSS) Training Center in Malindi; the party cadre military school at Monduli; the officer cadre school at Mgulani (Tanga Region), the military academy, with a capacity for 750 cadets, at Monduli; the school of artillery at Arusha; the school of infantry at Nachingwea; and the military
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police school at Mpwapwa. The PRC has conducted a Battalion Command and Staff training course for TPDF officers in Tabora. In addition, the PRC has also conducted a TPDF Higher Command Studies course at the TPDF Officers School in Monduli. In the TPDF, considerable emphasis is placed on party philosophy and political education. Thus, much of the training at the military training facilities is directed toward these areas.

In the past, training courses overseas were conducted primarily in the PRC. However, training is taking place now in the USSR, North Korea, and Egypt as well. In late January 1983 Egypt offered 30 training slots in air defense equipment maintenance. Currently 25 of these billets are filled.

(9) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves/Militia

The militia is a conglomeration of various paramilitary units, both standing and on call, or reserves, plus townsmen and villagers who meet under TPDF tutelage for regular drills, physical training, and ideological discussion sessions. At any one time upwards of 100,000 people may be considered to be "in the militia," but only about 10,000 are armed. The militia is called upon to assist the police in crowd-control operations and to support the TPDF in border regions.

(b) Mobilization

The 1978-79 Ugandan war demonstrated the capability of Tanzanian forces to mobilize. Drawing primarily from the NS and the militia, the TPDF was able to field a formidable force to combat the Ugandan threat as well as to maintain internal stability in Tanzania. Tanzanian Army units were able to expand from an estimated 35,000-man force to a 70,000-man Army during the course of the 6-month war.

b. Navy

(1) Mission

The primary mission of the Navy (called the Naval Wing), which is under the control of the TPDF, is surveillance and protection of territorial waters. It also is tasked to assist the Police Marine Unit (PMU) in preventing smuggling, in maintaining a sea link between the mainland and Zanzibar, and in providing port security.

(2) Capabilities

The capability of the Naval Wing does not extend beyond routine patrols for the protection of coastal and territorial waters. The force has historically been hampered by low operational rates of its patrol craft because of antiquated equipment and lack of spare parts. Since 1982 this situation has been significantly improved with the assistance of the PRC, which has provided naval maintenance/repair teams to overhaul several Naval Wing vessels.
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(3) Personnel Strength

Estimated at 800

(4) Ship Strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Operational</th>
<th>Nonop</th>
<th>Reserve</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PTH, hydrofoils, Hu Chwan Class</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGM, Type 62, Shanghai Class</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGM, P-6 Class</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PB, 75 feet, Vosper Thornycraft</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>PBR, Yulin River Class</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PB, Bellatrix Class (modified)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PB, Schwable II Class</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCM, Yuchai Class</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 27

(5) Organization and Deployment

The Navy is headquartered at Dar es Salaam with detachments at Mtwara, Mwanza, and Zanzibar.

(6) Status of Equipment

The Navy has experienced severe maintenance problems with its Chinese-supplied naval craft, primarily because of a lack of spare parts and trained technicians. As a result, until early 1982 only a very limited number of vessels were operational at any one time. However, since the arrival of the PRC technicians and hardware in late 1981, there has been a major reversal in the combat readiness of TPDF naval vessels.

(7) Logistics

The Naval Wing is dependent on Chinese materiel, training, and support. As a result of the Chinese response to the Navy's needs, the overall capability of the force has improved substantially.

The Tanzanian Navy has the capability, with Chinese assistance to maintain their six Shanghai Class patrol craft at the Navy Base in Dar-es-Salaam. The repair facility built by the Chinese specifically for the six ships, consists of a marine railway and covered round house. Maintenance, originally accomplished by the Tanzanian Navy is now supervised by the Chinese. All repairs, including hull, can be performed at this facility. There are no other important repair facilities in the country.
The Tanzanian Merchant Marine has a total of nine ships of over 1,000 GRT. Although two are almost 30 years old, they have military support potential. The various types include five breakbulk ships, two passenger/breakbulk cargo ships, one RO/RO ship, and one POL tanker for a combined deadweight tonnage (lift capacity) of 61,500 tons of cargo. None were built in Tanzania since the country lacks a shipbuilding industry.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

(U) Tanzania's limited literacy rate contributes to serious problems in securing suitable recruits for technical training. The retention rate for Naval Wing personnel is unknown.

(9) Training

The level of unit training and combat proficiency is not very high. The majority of personnel received their ship and technical training in China and additional PRC training may be provided in communications, navigation, port services, and radar systems. The Chinese also offer courses at their Naval Staff College for TPDF naval personnel. Tanzanian naval personnel prefer to rely on basic training at their own facilities and, as a result, conduct most of their recruit training at facilities in Tanzania.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserve

No formal reserve unit exists, although the 130-man Police Marine Unit (PMU) would be available for augmentation as required.

(b) Mobilization

(U) None

c. Air Force

(1) Mission

Defend Tanzanian airspace, conduct close air support for the other armed forces, and provide logistic and airlift service for the Army.

(2) Capabilities

The air wing is very limited in its ability to meet its mission. Flying time has been restricted because of the lack of spare parts to maintain aircraft. Less than half of the aircraft are operational at any given time, and aircraft availability will not improve unless a satisfactory maintenance and logistic system is developed. Morale within the Air Force has declined over the last year, primarily because of poor economic conditions in the country and a lack of promotions within the service.
(3) **Personnel Strength**

- Approximately 1,000

(4) **(3/NS) Aircraft Strength**

Total: 75 (fixed wing: jet 32; turboprop 9; prop 23; helicopter 11)

In operational units: 75
- (39 fighters: 18 day, 10 all-weather, 4 trainers, 7 trainers (prop);
  17 transports: 9 medium range, 8 short range;
  8 utility;
  11 helicopters: 5 medium, 6 light)

(5) **Organization and Deployment**

(a) **General**

The Tanzanian Air Force is headquartered at Dar es Salaam. Fighter units are based at Mwanza, Ngerengere, and Mtwara. Transport units are located at Dar es Salaam. Future plans call for MiG-21s located at Mwanza to be deployed to a new base being constructed at Tabora.

(b) **(3/NS) Summary of Units**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Principal Base</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 fighter squadron</td>
<td>MONGOL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mwanza</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FISHBED</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Mwanza</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FRESCO</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mwanza, Ngerengere</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FARMER C</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Ngerengere, Mtwara</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MIDGET</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ngerengere, Mtwara</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 transport battalion</td>
<td>HS 748</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Dar Es Salaam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DHC-3 Otter</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Dar Es Salaam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DHC-4 Caribou</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Dar Es Salaam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Piaggio P-149</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Dar Es Salaam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U-3A</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Dar Es Salaam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cessna 404</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Dar Es Salaam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Piper Cherokee</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Dar Es Salaam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DHC-5D Buffalo</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Dar Es Salaam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COLT</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Dar Es Salaam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agusta Bell 205</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Dar Es Salaam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agusta Bell 206</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Dar Es Salaam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(6) Status of Equipment

All aircraft are of foreign origin, and the Air Force is dependent on foreign suppliers for spare parts. Over past years, all TPDF aircraft have suffered from low operational readiness (OR) rates because of insufficient spare parts and limited maintenance capability; however, both the Chinese and the Soviets have attempted to improve this situation. The addition of five PRC-supplied MiG-19s, along with technical personnel to repair some of the existing ones, has improved the operational rate of these fighters. The Soviet Union has also provided additional spare parts and advisory personnel to improve the MiG-21 operational performance. Transport aircraft have a high nonoperational rate. In an effort to improve the OR rates of TPDF transport aircraft, the Tanzanian Government concluded an agreement with the Government of Madagascar to conduct maintenance on TPDF transport aircraft. However, this agreement has not been implemented. Helicopters are used jointly by the Tanzanian Air Force and the Police Air Wing. For the most part, aircraft that were captured during the Ugandan war were not incorporated into the Tanzanian inventory.

(7) Logistics

During the 1978-79 Tanzanian-Ugandan war, the Air Force proved capable of providing only very limited support to Army units. Since that time there has been little change in this deficiency. Primary reasons are the large numbers of inoperable aircraft due to a shortage of spare parts, maintenance personnel, and qualified flight crew. Military budget projections indicate a continued shortfall of expenditures to alleviate these problems.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

There is no conscription effort to obtain Air Force personnel. While there are sufficient numbers of volunteers to supply the service, difficulties arise in procuring qualified recruits who can meet the minimum educational standards for technical training.

(9) Training

Current training programs appear to be inadequate to maintain pilot proficiency. Pilots do not log enough flying hours to maintain proficiency, because of extensive aircraft downtime, lack of aircraft fuel, and the cost of flying in terms of maintenance and repair. There is no internal flight training program; however, training is conducted in the Soviet Union. Further, aircraft maintenance and engineering training has historically been conducted in the Soviet Union and Pakistan. During late 1982, a Chinese military survey team recommended that a basic flight training school be constructed at Tanga and that an aircraft technical school be built in Dar Es Salaam or Ngerengere.
(10) Reserve

There is a limited reserve capability for personnel and military aircraft from the civil air fleet. Approximately nine civil transport aircraft with a gross takeoff weight of at least 9,000 kilograms currently are registered, owned, and operated in Tanzania. These aircraft include: 2 Boeing 737s and 5 Fokker F-27s operated by Air Tanzania; 1 British Aerospace HS-125 operated by the Tanzanian Government; and 1 BAe HS-748 operated by a private mining company. All of the country's aircraft and indigenous civil aviation personnel would be available for government use in the event of a war or other national emergency. Aircraft utilization, however, could be restricted by the limited availability of qualified flight and maintenance personnel.

d. Paramilitary Forces

(1) Police Field Force Units (FFU)

(a) Mission

Reinforce conventional police posts as necessary to control serious civil disorders.

(b) Capabilities

Each FFU is capable of brief independent operations as light infantry. They are more mobile than the army units and are capable of performing their missions near urban centers on short notice.

(c) Personnel Strength

1,600 (includes the 130-man Police Marine Unit and a 40-man Police Air Wing)

(d) Organization

Eighteen FFUs are stationed throughout the country but are concentrated near the urban centers. Plans call for an eventual strength of 2,400.

(e) Status of Equipment

Armament includes light automatic weapons, with maintenance being generally adequate. The Police Marine Unit (130 men) has the use of about 6 patrol boats and motor gunboats of West German, Yugoslav, Chinese, and East German origin to perform its mission. These boats are in poor-to-fair condition and are located at Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar, Mwanza, and Bukoba. Five Bell helicopters are available for joint TPDF Air Force and Police Air Wing use.
In addition to the FFUs, there may be about 10,000 Tanzanian police on the mainland and 1,000 on Zanzibar and Pemba. Until January 1982 approximately 1,000 police personnel were deployed in Uganda to provide training to Ugandan police personnel and helping maintain law and order.

**Total Military Personnel Strength**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police FFUs</td>
<td>1,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>43,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Foreign Military Presence**

(1) Foreign Military In-Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>Military advisers/technicians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>Working with the Navy as well as instructing in military schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East German</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Assisting the Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslav</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Assisting the police units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>FPLM students attending infantry training.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Presence Abroad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Army TPDF NCOs attending Maintenance, Communication, and Armor Training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>TPDF instructors provided to train UNLA forces on artillery and small unit tactics.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Withheld pursuant to exemption (b)(3) 10 USC 424 of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act.
1. Political-Military Situation: Togo gained its independence through a United Nations trusteeship in 1960. Since then, the republic has been ruled by three different presidents, two of whom took over by coups. General Gnassingbé Eyadema, the current President, came to power through the second coup in 1967. The 1979 Constitution established an elective presidential system and a 67-member National Assembly. Members of the Assembly are elected for 5-year terms. In December 1979, President Eyadema, the sole candidate, was elected president. Eyadema also heads Togo's sole legitimate political party, Rally of the Togolese People (Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais--R2T) which he uses to control the country's political system.

Economically, Togo has suffered from a high rate of inflation, rising debt, and ill-advised government investments. The Togolese economy is characterized by a heavy dependence on three major exports—cocoa, coffee, and phosphates—and by a traditionally active trading sector. The majority of the Togolese population, however, engages in subsistence agriculture. Togo was officially classified as one of the "Least Developed Among Developing Countries" by the United Nations General Assembly in December 1982. While the Togolese GDP has grown steadily in nominal terms over the past decade, in real terms it fell an estimated 8 percent from 1980 to 1982. Its decline in dollar terms is even more striking due to the increasing value of the dollar against the CFA franc. President Eyadema's tendency to listen to foreign investors without consulting his ministers seems to compound the economic problems. The Togolese Government has become increasingly concerned about the ability of state-owned enterprises to show profits. The appointment of certain key personalities to positions that influence the economy also portends a shift from the past policy of rapid industrialization to increased emphasis on agricultural development.

President Eyadema professes a foreign policy of nonalignment. Togo is a member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Economic Community of West African states, the Entente Council, the West African Monetary Union, and the Nonaggression and Defense Aid Agreement. In the past year, President Eyadema has played an active role in international and African affairs.

In October 1983, President Eyadema visited the US. His visit received extensive coverage by the US media and furthered his desire for international recognition. In 1983, the US Navy made a port visit to Togo. The US has a modest International Military Training and Education Program (IMET) of $75,000 programmed for FY 84.

In late 1983, French Defense Minister Charles Hernu visited Togo. France has a military accord with Togo whereby the French would assist the government in combatting any external aggression. Eyadema perceives that there is an increased subversive threat to his regime from radical external sources, particularly Libya. He sees the French military assistance to Habré's government in Chad as a sign that France acts on its military accords with African nations; however, he believes the French could have responded more forcefully to the Libyan threat in Chad. Every 2 years the French hold joint military maneuvers with the Togolese. In 1983, 800 Togolese and French military personnel held joint maneuvers along the Togolese and Ghanaian border. The exercise lasted for
In 1984, Togo will celebrate its centennial relationship with West Germany. Togo was established in 1884 as a Germany colony. Togo receives technical and economic development assistance from West Germany. The West Germans have been involved in the construction of Lome's port facilities and in rural development. Every 2 to 3 years West Germany gives $2 to $3 million in construction equipment to the Togolese military. In 1984, West Germany plans a naval visit to Lome.

Togo's relationship with its neighbors varies. Eyadema considers Upper Volta, Ghana, and Benin as threats to Togo's internal security, and he fears dissidents may use Togo's neighbors as bases of operation. He is also concerned over Libya's involvement in these countries. However, Eyadema is pragmatic and looks for opportunities to lessen Libyan influence in the region.

In January 1984, Togo and Upper Volta signed an agreement to seek ways and means to promote, develop, and reinforce the cooperation between the two countries. The agreement includes emphasis on transportation, finances, economics, science culture, and tourism.

Togo and Ghanaian relations have improved as Ghana's Head of State Rawlings has adopted more moderate foreign policies. However, President Eyadema fears Kojo Tsikata, the radical Special Adviser to Rawlings. Eyadema feels Tsikata is competing with Rawlings for influence in Ghana and maintains his own organizational apparatus in Ghana. The border between Togo and Ghana, closed since the December 1981 coup in Ghana, was reopened in June 1984. Rawlings still believes that Ghanaian dissidents in Togo could cross the border and attempt a coup. Security is tight at all border crossing points and at the airport.

The relations between Togo and Benin have cautiously improved, mainly because President Kerekou of Benin has replaced many radical ministers with moderates.

President Eyadema believes that the change in the Nigerian Government that occurred with the 31 December 1983 coup was for the better. But he does not discount internal unrest in Nigeria should Head of State Buhari fail to improve economic conditions in Nigeria. Eyadema plans to maintain discussions with Nigerian officials in hopes of strengthening the present regime in Nigeria. Although Eyadema supports the Habre government in Chad, he is suspicious of Libyan activity there and fears that the Libyans will seek to foment unrest in other West African countries.

Togo reduced its active relations with Communist countries in 1983. Eyadema neither visited nor received any Communist head of state. Togo maintains diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. In 1983 about 400 Togolese students were studying in the Soviet Union. Under a Cultural and Scientific Accord, renewed in 1984, the Soviet Union offers 137 scholarships a year to Togolese
students. A number of Soviet-educated technocrats hold low-level positions in the Togolese Government and the RPT. A few Soviet professors teach at Togolese universities and high schools. A small clandestine Communist party exists, composed mainly of students in France with a headquarters in Paris. Relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) are cordial. The PRC gives Togolese students scholarships and it completed building the headquarters for the RPT in 1983. Several students are studying agriculture in North Korea. Publicly, the Government of Togo supports efforts of Korean reunification.

The President, who is Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, appears to exercise his authority through a handful of commanders bound to him through past loyalties. Although Eyadema treats his fellow northern officers with favor, many key positions still are held by French military advisers.

President Eyadema also holds the rank of general and serves as the Commander of the Army. He maintains tight control over the Armed Forces. Togolese military officers have moderate influence in the Government. The main internal threat facing both the Government and the military comes from Libyan-backed dissident activities aimed at overthrowing the Government. In 1983, there were anti-government demonstrations by foreign-supported Togolese youths and students. Two political opposition movements are based in Togo—the civilian-led Movement for Togolese Democracy (MTD, Mouvement Togolais pour la Democratie), and the military-oriented National Front for the Liberation of Togo (FLNT—Front National de Liberation du Togo). Gilchrist Olympio, elder son of the assassinated President of Togo, is the leader of the MTD. Colonel Merlaud Lawson is reportedly the leader of the FLNT. Olympio reportedly keeps in touch with the radical adviser to the Head of State of Ghana, Kojo Tsikata. He also reportedly travels frequently to the Olympio family's residence in neighboring Benin.

Togo has no antiterrorist force. The National Police Force (Surete National) has the responsibility for countering terrorism. The National Police is prepared to respond to minor terrorist incidents including bomb threats and hostage situations. In the event of a major incident, the Togolese North Korean-trained Presidential Guard Regiment would be deployed as a reaction force.

The Togolese military and security forces could quell internal disturbances. They would be able to defend themselves against neighboring Benin, Ghana, or Upper Volta. France has 67 advisers in Togo. One serves as adviser to President Eyadema, one command Togo's Air Force, and a third commands the Togolese Navy.

Togo has no military equipment production capability. Most of Togo's military purchases are from France. During the last 5 years, France has delivered five Alpha jet trainers and other military equipment valued of almost $65 million.

2. (U) Key Officials:
President and Minister of Defense: Gen Gnassingbe Eyadema
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation: Koffi Amega
Minister of Interior: Kpotivi Tevi-Djidjogbe Laclé
Armed Forces: Chief of Staff, Gen Gnassingbe Eyadema
Armed Forces: Deputy Chief of Staff, Col Yao Mawalikplimi Amege
Army: Commander, Gen Gnassingbe Eyadema
Navy: Commander, LCDR Alain Hebert (French National)
Air Force: Commander, LTC Alfred Hamelin (French National)
Gendarmerie: Commandant Maj Agosseye Assih
Presidential Guard: Commander, Maj Falamio Tchapo
Senior French Adviser to President (Gen) Eyadema: Col Patrick Pacaud (French National)

3. (U) Military Budget: $14.34 million for fiscal year ending 31 December 1984; this is 7.8 percent of the central government budget and 2 percent of the GDP. Dollar values are converted at an exchange rate of 419.09 francs equal $1.00.

4. (U) Population: 2,926,000 estimated as of June 1984
Males (ages 15-49): 641,000; physically fit, 334,000
Ethnic Divisions: Some 18 tribes; largest and most important are Ewe in the south and Cabrais in the north; under 1 percent European and Syrian-Lebanese
Literacy (1975): 5 percent to 10 percent

5. (U) Army: The Army consists of two infantry regiments, a paracommando regiment, a Presidential Guard Regiment, a service and support regiment, a National Center of Instruction (Loma Kara), a Paracommando Training Center (Lome), and a Military College—preparatory school (Tchitchao). The 1st Infantry Regiment is located at Lome and consists of two battalions; the 2d Infantry Regiment at Atakpame consists of five companies and two armored squadrons; the Paracommando Regiment at Lama Kara consists of five companies. The Presidential Guard Regiment at Lome consists of two battalions, each with two companies; a fifth company comprises the air defense company, and a sixth company located at Pya (Piya) comes under the operational control of a French adviser. The Service and Support Regiment at Lome consists of a Command and Service Company, a Signal Company, an Engineer Company, a Light Transportation Company, and a 108-mm Artillery Battery. The Army is well trained, disciplined, and equipped. Its morale is high. However, it has adequate ammunition for continuous fighting for only 3 or 4 days.
Personnel Strength: 4,000 (no breakout available)
Reserve: Although no formal reserve system exists, a large number of army veterans could be considered a potential reserve force.
Major Units: Organized into five regiments including two infantry regiments, one paracommando regiment, one service and support regiment, and one presidential guard regiment (see Para 8.b.)
Major Equipment: 9 T-34 tanks, 4 105-mm howitzers, 7 M-8 light armored cars, 20 UNIMOG armored vehicles

6. (U) Navy: The Navy is based at Lome Port Facility and performs primarily coastguard functions inside its territorial waters. French technicians assist with ship maintenance. The Navy logs 30-50 hours a month at sea. Normal patrols last only 2 or 3 hours with one ship at a time. Occasionally, both of the Navy's boats engage in maneuvers. The Navy is not effective in carrying out its mission of patrolling its territorial waters. It lacks patrol aircraft and sufficient funds to maintain its boats. In 1983, two Togolese officers replaced
the two French Navy officers who formerly commanded the patrol boats. Although
the officers are well-trained and competent, they spend very little time at sea.
Routine maintenance is sometimes done at the Carena Shipyard in the Ivory Coast.
Personnel Strength: 105 (8 officers, 7 NCCs, 90 EM)
Reserve: None
Ships: Two patrol boats (PB)

7. Air Force: The Togolese Air Force (Groupement Aerien Togolais--GAT) is
commanded by a Frenchman. His deputy is Togolese. The Air Force has 11 pilots,
4 French and 7 Togolese. The six co-pilots are Togolese. The Togolese pilots
received their basic pilot training in France. The French pilots also serve as
instructors, hold key squadron management positions, and head the maintenance
section and shops. The Air Force is well equipped and trained. Togolese pilots
receive 20-25 flying hours per month. The young and inexperienced Togolese Air
Force officers depend on the French for assistance. The Air Force is capable of
providing troop transport and aerial reconnaissance.
Personnel Strength: 260 (no breakout available)
Reserve: None
Units: One squadron
Aircraft: 22 (14 jet trainers--5 Alpha jets, 5 Fouga CM-170 Magisters, 4
Aermacchi EMB-326GBs; 5 transports, 3 utility helicopters). The jet trainers
are located at Niamtougou Airbase; other aircraft are located at Lome Tokoin
Airfield.

8. Paramilitary:
   a. Gendarmerie: Responsible for security in rural and urban areas
      Personnel Strength: 750 (10 officers, 740 EM)
      Units: Two territorial groups, two mobile intervention squadrons, two horse
             squadrons, one motorcycle platoon, one service unit, and one gendarmerie school
             headed by a French adviser.
      Major Equipment: None
   b. Presidential Guard Regiment
      Personnel Strength: 800 (2 officers, 798 EM)
      Subordinate to the Army. It is responsible for protecting the President and
      the Presidential Palace and grounds.
      Major Equipment: 38 2PU-4 light antiaircraft machineguns, unknown number of
      rocket launchers

9. Key US Officials:
   Chief of Mission (Lome): Ambassador Owen W. Roberts

10. Foreign Military Presence:
    French Military Advisers: 67 (24 officers, 43 NCOs)
        Army: 28 (13 officers, 15 NCOs)
        Air Force: 26 (7 officers, 19 NCOs)
        Navy: 8 (3 officers, 5 NCOs)
        Gendarmerie: 5 (1 officer, 4 NCOs)
    North Korean Advisers: 0 (In 1983 six North Koreans trained the Presidential
                        Guard Regiment and departed.)
Federal Republic of Germany: 3 (work on planning and building military infra-
structure--landing strips, warehouses, barracks)
Withheld pursuant to exemption
(b)(3) 10 USC 424
of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
UGANDA

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(Reverse Blank)
UGANDA

1. GOVERNMENT

a. (U) Key Government Officials

President, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Finance and President Uganda People's Congress: Apollo Milton Obote
Vice President and Minister of Defense: Paulo Muwanga
Minister of State for Defense: Peter Otai
Prime Minister: Erifasi Otema Allimadi
Minister of Internal Affairs: John Luwuliza-Ki'unda

b. Type and Stability of Government

(U) The Republic of Uganda has a democratic government structure, with executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Since receiving its independence from Great Britain in 1962, Uganda's Government has undergone severe strains. In December 1980, as a result of the first election held in Uganda since the fall of Idi Amin in 1979, Milton Obote was inaugurated President of Uganda. Obote had held national office in Uganda previously. In 1962 he was elected Prime Minister in the first national election held shortly after the country received its independence from Great Britain. During his first term in office Obote assumed complete control of the Government, and became President with strong executive powers as stipulated in the interim constitution. In January 1971, Obote was ousted in a coup led by General Idi Amin, who ruled the country for 8 years with a regime based on terror and enforced by ethnically based security forces. Amin's years in power were characterized by economic decay, ethnic and religious persecution, and generally poor relations with other states.

(U) The end of Amin's reign of terror began in October 1978 when Ugandan troops crossed into the Kagera salient of northwestern Tanzania in pursuit of dissident Ugandan soldiers. They withdrew from Tanzania after 2 weeks of looting the local countryside. Tanzanian security forces, deployed to repel the Ugandan troops, probed across the border and encountering only light resistance, initiated more extensive operations into southern Uganda. In early 1979, Tanzanian People's Defense Force (TPDF) launched a major military campaign to take Kampala and oust Idi Amin. The fall of Kampala occurred in April 1979 when a combined force of over 30,000 TPDF soldiers and Ugandan insurgents defeated a combined Ugandan, Libyan, and Palestinian force southeast of the capital. Amin evaded capture and escaped to Libya in June 1979; currently he resides in Saudi Arabia.

Since Amin's fall, the leadership of the Ugandan Government has changed three times. The Ugandan Liberation Front, an ad hoc group of Ugandan exiles called together by Tanzanian President Nyerere in March 1979, elected an Executive Committee to govern Uganda until national elections could be held. Dr. Yusufu Lule, the head of this committee, exercised governmental control as President for 3 months until he was ousted by the quasi-legislative National Consultative Council (NCC), as the Executive Committee later came to be called. Lule was replaced by Godfrey Binaisa, who had been serving as the Minister of Interior. President Binaisa could not overcome differences with the NCC over the...
appointments to his executive cabinet, and he, in turn, was overthrown by Paulo
Muwanga, Minister of Interior, in May 1980. Muwanga became Chairman of the
Military Commission, an influential organization within the NCC, and this
commission became the center of political control in Uganda until the December
1980 national election. Since his election, President Obote has come under
increasing pressures, both foreign and domestic to solve a wide variety of
national problems, including: economic, ethnic, and national issues. Obote's
continued presence in office is not so much an indication of public support as it
is an indication of the lack of a viable successor.

Historically, Ugandan ethnic groups have been in conflict. That
rivalry contributes significantly to the present high degree of political,
economic, and military turmoil in the country. Also inability of Obote's
government to consolidate disparate political factions has led to serious
instability in Uganda. Further, undisciplined elements in the Ugandan National
Liberation Army (UNLA), and various political and tribal groups in opposition to
the Obote regime have been responsible for widespread lawlessness and violence.
These factors continue to weaken Obote's political support and have resulted in a
situation that makes a coup attempt increasingly likely.

c. Internal Threat

For 2 years following Amin's overthrow, internal security in Uganda
was the joint responsibility of the UNLA, the Uganda Police Force, and the 10,000
members of the TPDF task force that remained in Uganda after the 1978-79
Tanzania-Uganda War. In June 1981, this task force, the most effective element
of the bi-national security conglomerate, began a 6-month phased reduction of
forces from Uganda. Since the departure of these units in December 1981, the
security situation in Uganda has continued to deteriorate and presently is
extremely poor. In large part the poor internal security situation is a result
of poor discipline and very low moral in the UNLA. These problems have resulted
from a variety of factors such as: poor leadership, delinquent pay, scarce food
supplies, intertribal ethnic animosities and rivalry between the UNLA and the
Uganda Police Force. Members of these security forces, in particular the UNLA,
frequently exploit the general populace for personal gain (e.g., money, cars).
Frustrations over ineffective government and military policies are frequently
vented against the civilian populace in the form of rape, murder, and looting.
These human rights violations have reached epidemic proportions and have
virtually destroyed public confidence in the UNLA. In fact, the Ugandan military
itself has become a growing threat to the stability of the Obote regime rather
than its prime defender.

The increasingly unstable internal situation is also caused by the
active presence of several anti-Obote insurgent groups operating throughout much
of Uganda. These include: the National Resistance Army (NRA); remnants of the
Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM), now operating under the direction of the Federal
Democratic Movement (FEDEMU); elements of Idi Amin's former Uganda National Army
(UNA); and Acholi deserters from the UNLA. The most significant of these is the
NRA. Under Yoweri Museveni, this group has grown to an active combat force of
approximately 3,500 members. It is the best organized of all the insurgent
groups and has the best record of successful military operations against UNLA
units. The lack of coordinated efforts between these insurgents groups has
UGANDA

reduced their ability to conduct conventional military operations against the UNLA.

Further exacerbating the internal security situation is the large-scale refugee problem. There are 200,000-250,000 displaced persons within Uganda. Aside from the impact of their sheer numbers upon the security situation, many of these individuals have weapons and represent a significant potential security threat should total civil disorder erupt in Uganda.

d. External Threat

Uganda currently faces no threats to its national security from any of its neighbors or from other foreign sources. However, Ugandan insurgents staging from southern Sudan have periodically attacked UNLA outposts in Uganda's West Nile province. On several occasions UNLA forces have pursued these rebels back into Sudan and in two instances have exchanged fire with Sudanese Regular Army forces deployed along the Sudan-Uganda border. Given the tense security situation in each of these countries, minor border skirmishes could escalate. However, neither government desires such a development.

All Uganda's neighbors--Zaire, Sudan, Kenya, Tanzania, and Rwanda--are concerned about the turmoil within the country and fear the consequences of overflow across the border. Tanzania, Kenya, and Sudan could be expected to react vigorously to any border problems.

e. Communist Influence

Although Uganda has diplomatic ties with a number of Communist countries, including Cuba, North Korea, and the Soviet Union, Communist activities in Uganda during the post-Amin era have been on a limited scale. The failure of these Communist nations to expand their influence in Uganda is due in large part to lack of popular support among the general populace. Not only is there no Communist party in Uganda, there is also no discernible Communist influence within the Ugandan insurgent groups. In fact, because of Uganda's historical ties with the West, it is unlikely that communism will make significant inroads into either the Ugandan Government or society in the near to medium term.

One area in which several communist nations have had some success in expanding their level of influence is military assistance. Following the departure of the Tanzanian task force in late 1981 the North Korean military commitment was upgraded. The military advisory effort was expanded. A bilateral security agreement was signed calling for North Korea to deploy an infantry battalion to Uganda if requested by President Obote. Moreover, North Korea agreed to provide Uganda with 40 medium tanks, however, delivery of these vehicles has not yet taken place. While North Korea has been the primary Communist military aid donor to the current regime, the Soviet Union and East Germany have also provided assistance. The expansion of Communist military influence is due primarily to Uganda's inability to procure a ready flow of military hardware from Western sources.
f. Economic Factors

(U) The Ugandan economy is in chaos, with inflation soaring, black marketing rampant, and foreign exchange reserves virtually nonexistent. The Government is attempting to obtain economic assistance from any source. However, the inability of the Ugandan leadership to establish a semblance of law and order has resulted in a hesitancy on the part of foreign aid donors and business investors to provide necessary economic assistance and investment.

By mid-1981 following years of economic and financial mismanagement, a war, and the virtual breakdown of law and order, the economy of Uganda was in shambles. Production in almost every sector had declined. The volume of exports and per capita real GDP had fallen sharply. The annual increase in the cost of living exceeded 100 percent. In the public sector, financial discipline had broken down and Government expenditures were financed by bank credit. Essential imports were in short supply and the economy functioned through a widespread network of parallel markets, with foreign exchange being sold at 30 times the official exchange rate. In order to revive the economy, the Ugandan Government introduced dramatic changes in economic and financial policies with the implementation of three successive financial programs supported through stand-by arrangements with the IMF.

The measures taken under the 1981-82 and 1982-83 IMF programs included sizable and continued depreciation of the exchange rate, the removal of price controls, and substantial increases in the minimum producer prices of the major export crops and in the retail prices of petroleum products. These measures were supported by tighter fiscal and credit policies. Priority has been given to the productive sectors and the promotion of exports. In August 1982 a temporary dual exchange system was introduced to improve the mechanism of foreign exchange allocation, especially to the private sector, to eliminate the parallel market and determine the equilibrium of exchange within a unified exchange regime. The two exchange rates are gradually coming closer together. As a result of the measures taken, progress has been made towards economic and financial recovery. Real GDP increased by an average of 5 percent per year during 1981-82 and 1982-83. The volume of coffee exports increased by 22 percent and that of non-coffee exports by 30 percent, while the rate of capacity utilization of selected manufacturing industries rose sharply. Transport and distribution services have improved. Smuggling activities have declined, problems of foreign exchange allocation have been eased, and the parallel market has been sharply curtailed. In addition, deficits in Government operations and the overall balance of payments have narrowed considerably and the rate of inflation has declined.

g. Military and Political Alignment

Since independence the Ugandan military has a mixed history of involvement in political affairs. Although typically apathetic toward domestic politics, the military has on occasion made its influence known. The best example of this occurred in 1971 when then General Idi Amin Dada overthrew
UGANDA

President Obote in a military coup d'etat. The military's impact on the domestic political scene was again felt in December 1980 when the military was used to harass and intimidate Obote opponents attempting to cast their ballots in the national election. This heavy handed military involvement cost President Obote a degree of support among the general populace and continues to be a primary stumbling block in any negotiations with opposition political forces.

Currently the military is exerting an indirect influence on Ugandan politics. The Ugandan Armed Forces are predominantly from the Acholi and Langi tribes. For this reason Ugandan politicians from these tribes (President Obote is a Langi) can depend upon at least tacit support from large portions of the military.

President Obote's continued inability to deal with a wide range of national problems has weakened the military's support of his regime, even that within the Langi elements of the Armed Forces. Obote's relationship with the UNLA suffered a devastating blow with the death of Major General Ojok in December 1983. As the UNLA Chief of Staff and a firm Obote supporter, General Ojok was the key liaison between the President and the troops in the field. Further, due to the incompetence and apathetic nature of UNLA commander Lieutenant General "Tito" Okello, many of his duties had been subsumed by General Ojok. Also with Obote's weakened relationship with the UNLA, anti-Obote politicians have begun attempting to recruit the political support of Uganda's Armed Forces. This effort is particularly strong within the Democratic Party (DP), which seeks to preclude a repeat of President Obote's use of the military to influence the national election in favor of his own Uganda People's Congress (UPC). Political use of the military may well come to be a moot point, as the decline of discipline is rapidly turning the UNLA into a real threat to internal security.

Uganda has no formal military alliances with any other country and follows a foreign policy of nonalignment. Its voting record in the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) generally follows that line. Although Uganda has historically had close political and economic relations with the West, particularly Great Britain, in recent years it has sought to balance its foreign relations through expanded ties with North Korea and the Soviet Union.

As with its foreign affairs, Uganda maintains a nonaligned attitude when accepting foreign military assistance. In part this attitude toward military assistance came about when Great Britain's reduced its military support to Uganda during the postcolonial era and because successive Ugandan regimes have been unable to secure a sole donor country willing to underwrite the training and equipping of Uganda's military forces.

Currently, the bulk of Western military assistance is provided by Great Britain and Egypt, who provide basic military training and small arms, respectively. Assistance from the Communist bloc is provided chiefly by North Korea in the form of artillery training. Tanzania continues to maintain a military relationship and provides advisers. Ugandan soldiers attend military training courses in Egypt, Pakistan, Tanzania, the UK, and the USSR.
h. (U) Key US Officials

US Ambassador: Allen C. Davis
2. (U) MILITARY, GENERAL

a. (U) Key Military Officials

Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA): Commander, General Tereoning "Tito" Okello
UNLA Chief of Staff: Brig Gen Smith Opon Acak
Uganda Air Force (UAF): Vacant
Uganda Military Intelligence: Chief, Maj Johr. (Jpor
Special Forces: Commander, Ahmad Ogeny

b. Position of Armed Forces

The Ugandan military is a bi-Service organization composed of an Army and an Air Force. The Army, with a strength of 15,000 overshadows the 200-man Air Force.

(U) President Obote is the Commander in Chief of Uganda's Armed Forces. His authority flows through the Minister of Defense to the respective service commanders.

(U) In spite of Uganda's turbulent postcolonial political history, the Ugandan military is not an active political force. Overall, the military's attitude continues to be one of pragmatic (albeit impatient) servitude. Rumors of Acholi coup plotting in the military continue to surface but their grumblings have not yet coalesced into action against the Obote regime. Because of their longstanding ties with Western nations, there is no significant Communist influence in the military. In fact, efforts by Communist advisers to ideologically indoctrinate Ugandan trainees have been singularly unsuccessful.

(U) As the domestic situation in Uganda worsens, the national military forces have become less capable and, indeed, less interested in fulfilling their charter to defend the national borders against foreign aggression and to assist in the maintenance of civil order. The Army itself is contributing to internal instability.

(U) Uganda's Armed Forces have never recovered from the loss of training and discipline they suffered during the 1971-79 Idi Amin years, nor have their weapons inventories recovered from the destruction suffered in the 1979 war with Tanzania. The UNLA's recovery in these areas has been severely restricted by the disastrous state of the Ugandan economy. As a result of virtual destruction of Uganda's economy under Amin, the successor governments were left without an economic cushion from which the Armed Forces could be rebuilt. The inability to fund the national military has worsened. In May 1984, the Ugandan Government received notice from contractors responsible for providing various supplies to the military, including food, to the effect that these services had been terminated due to nonpayment of back debts. This means that the UNLA will be forced to provide for its own food requirements. The military's position has increasingly become one of self-subsistence, and has resulted in rising levels of criminal activity by military personnel against civilians.
c. Military Trends and Capabilities

In spite of continuing efforts on the part of the Ugandan Government and several donor nations to upgrade the performance of the UNLA, the devastated national economy and widespread banditry by Army personnel continues to override the efforts being made to reverse the trend of slow deterioration being experienced by the UNLA. Military capabilities have been severely degraded by the need for soldiers to spend more and more time providing for their own basic survival (e.g., food, clothing). This situation will continue to have a very negative impact on the UNLA's overall combat capability. Under the current circumstances the UNLA and UAF are not able to provide national defense against foreign military aggression nor maintain internal security. One of the few positive results of this situation has been the counterinsurgency experience gained by the Army in combating the thieves and insurgents who roam the Ugandan countryside. The Army has learned many valuable lessons from its encounters with these groups; however, the experience has not yet coalesce into an effective counterinsurgency capability.

d. Military Budget: Estimated at $129,800,000 for fiscal year ending 30 June 1982. Not available are percent of GNP and service allocation. Dollar values converted at the exchange rate of Ugandan shillings equal $1.00.

e. Population: 14,300,000 as of 1 January 1984
Males (ages 15-49): about 3,123,000, physically fit, 1,681,000
Ethnic Divisions: 99 percent African, 1 percent other
Literacy: approximately 30 percent
3. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

a. Army

(1) Mission
(U) To defend national borders and assist in maintaining internal order.

(2) Capabilities

The (UNLA) is not capable of successfully defending the nation against a major military incursion from any of its larger neighbors, i.e., Tanzania, Zaire, or Sudan. Even its other neighbors, Kenya and Rwanda, with man-for-man better trained and disciplined armies could outperform Uganda in any conventional situation. Uganda's military suffered a serious reversal during its 1978-79 war with Tanzania when the bulk of its military hardware was destroyed or confiscated. Continuing shortages of pay, food, and other supplies have seriously degraded the UNLA's morale and discipline, resulting in significant levels of criminal activity by Ugandan military personnel. The Army cannot perform its internal security missions, and, in fact, is rapidly becoming a major threat to Uganda's internal stability.

(3) Personnel Strength
(U) Estimated at 15,000

This figure includes only the Ugandan regular military forces plus the one militia battalion that is actually incorporated into the military command structure. However, given the number of armed militia, (see 3.a. (9)(a) and the existence of private "armies" recruited to protect the farms of several senior Ugandan officials, the total size of the combined regular and quasi-military forces under arms is over 30,000.

(4) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

The President exercises authority over the Army through Paulo Muwanga, Uganda's Vice President and Minister of Defense. UNLA headquarters, located in Kampala, directs the operations of Uganda's four combat brigades and their support units. Regional areas of responsibility for Uganda's four combat brigades, which control 17 subordinate infantry battalions, are unspecified. In general, however, the 10th Brigade headquartered at Gulu and its six combat battalions operate in the northern half of the country. The 20th Brigade at Mbale and its four battalions are assigned in the southeastern portion of Uganda while the 30th Brigade at Mbarara, also with four battalions, operates in southwestern Uganda. The UNLA's 40th Brigade, with its five battalions, is responsible for defense of the Kampala area. Support units for Uganda's ground combat forces are generally located around the capital. The Army artillery and other combat support elements are not organic to the brigade, but are assigned on an as needed basis.
**UGANDA**

(b) Ground Combat Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Tactical Units</th>
<th>Strength Per Unit</th>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 brigade headquarters</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>250/brigade HQ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 infantry battalions</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>500/battalion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 militia battalion</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>700</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 artillery battalion</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>350</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) Weapons and Equipment

(a) General

Uganda's 1978-79 war with Tanzania decimated the Army's inventory. The equipment that survived the war was either stolen by the remnants of Idi Amin's army when they fled into the bush or confiscated by Tanzanian forces. In an effort to rebuild Uganda's stockpiles the Government of Uganda (GOU) has sent official delegations to several nations requesting military assistance. Thus far the most significant donors of hardware are Egypt (small arms, mortars, and antiaircraft artillery) and North Korea (small arms and field artillery). Although the quantity and condition of the materiel provided by these donors is not sufficient to offset that lost to Tanzania, it has provided a badly needed infusion of operable equipment. The bulk of this equipment is of Communist manufacture and was accompanied by an ample supply of ammunition. The absorption of these systems into the Army arsenal has occurred with some difficulty.

(b) Ground Weapons and Equipment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanks:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium tank, T-54</td>
<td>UR, 5 (est)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium tank, T-34</td>
<td>UR, 15 (est)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium tank, M-4</td>
<td>US, 4 (est)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Vehicles:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC, OT-64B</td>
<td>CZ, 90-95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC, BTR-152</td>
<td>UR, 15-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARC, BRDM-2</td>
<td>UR, 10-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored car, Ferret</td>
<td>UK, 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD Arty &amp; SAM:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA, M1939 37-mm</td>
<td>CH, 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA, M1939 37-mm</td>
<td>UR, 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA, ZU-23 23-mm</td>
<td>UR, 12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
UGANDA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Artillery:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field gun, 122-mm</td>
<td>KN 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault gun, SU-100, 100-mm</td>
<td>UR 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field gun, M1942 76-mm</td>
<td>UR 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field gun, 75-mm</td>
<td>KN 12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recoilless (RCL) AT Weapons:</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RCLR, 75-mm</td>
<td>CH 12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mortars:</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>82-mm</td>
<td>KN 12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) **Logistics**

Although there are two service battalions in the Ugandan Army, specifics regarding their method of operation are unknown. Support services for the ground forces appear to be the responsibility of the individual unit commanders or the soldiers themselves. The logistics sector, like the Army itself is in disarray. Maintenance and distribution functions are generally not performed within military channels, resulting in low troop moral, requisition of civilian assets, and nonoperational equipment. Lacking indigenous organizational and materiel resources to revive the support infrastructure, large amounts of foreign military assistance would be required for Uganda to develop even a basic logistic capability. Such assistance has not been forthcoming.

(7) **Personnel Procurement and Retention**

The UNLA does not utilize conscription to supply its manpower needs. In spite of a relatively high personnel attrition rate (due to desertions and combat fatalities resulting from UNLA operations against Ugandan insurgent groups), volunteer recruits are sufficient to fill this manpower need. Although these recruits provide a sizable manpower pool, Uganda's limited literacy rate (approximately 30 percent) contributes to serious problems in securing recruits suitable for technical training. The UNLA's retention rate is unknown. Because of the importance of the Acholi and Langi tribes in the composition of the Army and the manner in which it enhances the power base of those tribes, recruitment levels from within those groups are consistently high.

(8) **Training**

Army training is accomplished in Uganda as well as abroad. National training centers include: the Uganda Military Academy in Gulu, the Jinja Military Academy, and the UNLA Artillery School in Masindi. The two academies teach a wide range of subjects such as: general military theory,
UGANDA

combat tactics, and military discipline. The academy in Gulu provides instruction for officer cadets, while the facility at Jinja, with a core of six British instructors, trains mid-level NCOs and officers. The UNLA's school in Masindi is designed purely for artillery training. The courses provided give the enlisted and junior officer students a basic knowledge in the capabilities and employment methodology for various artillery systems. The bulk of the training at this facility is done by Tanzanian and North Korean instructors.

Training abroad for Ugandan army personnel has been conducted in several countries including Great Britain, Egypt, Kenya, Libya, Pakistan, the USSR, East Germany, and Tanzania. Training is currently being conducted in Tanzania, Pakistan, Egypt, the USSR, and Great Britain.

(9) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves/Militia

The militia is a quasi-official organization consisting of geographically dispersed groups of villagers who have received rudimentary training by UNLA instructors in the use of small arms. These groups, representing most of Uganda's tribes, are trained in their home districts, and are tasked with augmenting UNLA efforts to defend or maintain internal security for its own particular area. Estimates on the size of the militia generally range between 40,000 and 50,000. The vast majority of these personnel train with wooden rifles and many have no uniforms. However, some 2,500-3,000 of these militiamen have acquired rifles, and approximately 6,000 have uniforms. While the militia is generally not incorporated directly into the UNLA organizational structure, the militia battalion at Mbale has received particularly comprehensive training, has conducted counterinsurgency operations with UNLA regulars, and is directly subordinate to 20th brigade headquarters in Mbale. With the exception of this battalion the militia is an ineffective force. Its members are rarely been willing to defend their own villages against rebel attacks.

(b) Mobilization

Uganda could mobilize to some degree should the need arise, but its present ability to do so would be restricted by both a shortage of operational military transport vehicles as well as rising levels of disciplinary problems within the Army. It is most likely that initial mobilization efforts would include elements of Uganda's militia.

b. Navy

Currently Uganda does not have a Navy. It was not reconstituted under the Obote regime. All of its vessels were destroyed during the Tanzania-Uganda conflict. The reactivation of a naval branch has been delayed until other, more pressing budgetary problems have been alleviated.
c. Air Force

(1) Mission

The primary mission of the Ugandan Air Force (UAF) is to fly President Obote, Government ministers, and other Government members on official business throughout the country. Its secondary mission is to fly rescue operations and transport food and medication in support of emergency relief efforts.

(2) Capabilities

The UAF is marginally capable of performing its assigned missions due to a shortage of spare parts, maintenance personnel, and proficient air crews. In fact, these handicaps have degraded not only the reputation but also the operability of aircraft to the point that Ugandan dignitaries do all in their power to fly by commercial airlines rather than use UAF transport aircraft. This situation is offset somewhat by the use of UAF helicopters for VIP travel. Although limited to short range operations, these rotary-wing aircraft are significantly better maintained and crewed than their fixed-wing counterparts. In spite of the pall cast upon their capabilities by the death of Brigadier General Ojok, the late UNLA Chief of Staff, in a helicopter accident in early December 1983, the UAF helicopters are fully capable of performing their mission. In fact their assigned responsibilities are being upgraded to include a direct combat role. This development has come as a result of official Ugandan satisfaction with the firepower and overall effectiveness of the Kenyan Hughes 500-MD gunships against rebels and bandits during the joint UNLA/Kenya operation along their common border. As a result, the UAF is in the process of converting several of its helicopters into gunships by equipping them with external gunpods. Such a modification will provide the UNLA with its own close air support capability. Further, it should allow the modified aircraft to operate in a hostile or potentially hostile environments with greater latitude than has previously been possible.

(3) Personnel Strength

The UAF consists of approximately 200 men including 100 technicians trained in various disciplines, such as radar and aircraft maintenance, and about 30 pilots. The remainder of the UAF personnel are detailed to the UAF from the UNLA and are involved with transportation logistics and general duty such as serving as security guards.

(4) Aircraft Strength

Total: 29 (fixed wing: jet 19; turboprop 1; prop 4; helicopter 5)
In operational units: 29
(16 fighters;
7 trainers;
1 transports;
5 helicopters)
(5) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

The UAF, composed of one fighter squadron, two training squadrons, one transport squadron, and one helicopter squadron, is directly subordinate to the Minister of Defense, although it is being commanded temporarily by Lt Gen Okello pending the completion of its reorganization and the appointment of a service commander. Headquarters for the UAF's five flying squadrons and their support units is at Entebbe airport, which is also its primary operating base and the location of its operational aircraft. Nakasongola and Gulu are the two other major airfields having aircraft assigned, however, all aircraft based at these locations have been nonoperational since 1979.

(b) Summary of Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Principal Base</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 fighter squadron</td>
<td>FRESCO</td>
<td></td>
<td>4*</td>
<td>Nakasongola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 training squadron</td>
<td>FISHPRED</td>
<td></td>
<td>12*</td>
<td>Nakasongola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 training squadron</td>
<td>Maya</td>
<td></td>
<td>3*</td>
<td>Gulu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 transport squadron</td>
<td>AS-202 Bravo</td>
<td></td>
<td>3*</td>
<td>Entebbe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saab-91 Safir</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Entebbe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 transport squadron</td>
<td>Lockheed L-100-20</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Entebbe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 helicopter squadron</td>
<td>AB-205</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Entebbe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AB-412</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Entebbe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) Status of Equipment

The UAF is wholly dependent upon foreign sources for its aircraft as well as spare parts, maintenance training, and other UAF materiel. The UAF currently has no operational combat aircraft. The few MiG aircraft that survived the 1978-79 conflict with Tanzania are in need of extensive repairs. The Air Force's transport aircraft are in somewhat better condition, although lack of spare parts and a shortage of trained maintenance and air crew personnel impact on operational readiness of this aircraft. By far, the helicopter assets of the UAF are the best maintained and crewed of all aircraft in the Ugandan military. Since the UAF helicopters are maintained and frequently flown by foreign contract personnel, they are not subjected to many of the shortcomings that plague other UAF aircraft.

(7) Logistics

The UAF has a limited air logistics capability. It has yet to acquire a long-range unfueled transport capability, and its medium airlift capability is limited to a single Lockheed L-100-20 aircraft. The short-range transport work is performed by the UAF's one Saab-91 aircraft and its five Agusta-Bell helicopters.

* (U) These aircraft are nonoperational.
(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

There is no conscription effort to obtain Air Force personnel at this time. Until the UAF reactsivate the fighter aircraft on hand, or expands its inventory, there is little need for additional personnel.

(9) Training

Current training programs for the crews of fixed-wing aircraft are inadequate to either meet or maintain pilot proficiency. Factors degrading pilot proficiency include maintenance downtime on the aircraft, shortage of fuel; and the prohibitive cost of flying, airframe maintenance, and repair. Uganda has no domestic flight training program. Flight instruction is being conducted for helicopter pilots in the US.

(10) Reserve

There is a limited reserve capability for personnel and aircraft from the civil air fleet. Uganda's commercial aircraft and indigenous civil aviation personnel would be available for Government use in the event of a war or other national emergency. Aircraft utilization, however, would be restricted by the limited availability of qualified flight and maintenance personnel.

d. Paramilitary Forces

(1) Police Special Force (PSF)

(a) Mission

To reinforce conventional police posts as necessary, to control serious civil disorders, and to conduct active counterinsurgency operations against Ugandan insurgents.

(b) Capabilities

Each Special Force company is capable of brief independent operations as light infantry. They are more mobile than UNLA units and are capable of performing their missions on short notice.

(c) Personnel Strength

Approximately 1,300
(d) **Organization**

The PSF consists of several field companies as well as an administrative support unit in Kampala. Plans call for an eventual strength of 3,000.

(e) **Status of Equipment**

The PSF has a good supply of small logistic vehicles (primarily landrovers) and small arms, however, specific information on types of equipment, inventory levels, or operational status is unavailable.

e. (U) **Total Military Personnel Strength**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Special Force</td>
<td>1,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>16,500</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f. **Total Military Presence**

(1) **Foreign Military In-Country**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Korea:</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>advisers work with UNLA artillery units and train presidential bodyguards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania:</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>advisers work with UNLA artillery units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>instructors teach at Uganda Military Academy in Jinja</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) **Presence Abroad**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt:</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Junior and mid-level NCOs attending ground equipment maintenance classes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan:</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Junior officers attending ground-based air defense courses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania:</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Junior officers and NCOs attending ground combat tactics training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK:</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Junior officers attending general courses on ground combat theory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR:</td>
<td>30-40</td>
<td>Junior officers and NCOs attending pilot and air defense training.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Withheld pursuant to exemption
(b)(3) 10 USC 424
of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
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1. GOVERNMENT

a. (U) Key Government Officials

President, State Commissioner for National Defense and Territorial Security; President of the Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution (Popular Movement for the Revolution, MPR): Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Wa Za Banga
Prime Minister (referred to as First State Commissioner) and Executive Secretary of the MPR: Kengo Wa Dondo
State Commissioner for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation: Kamanda Wa Kamansa
State Commissioner for Territorial Affairs: Munango Mwenda M'Siri
Chairman, General Security Council: Seti Yale
State Secretary for National Defense and Territorial Security: Vice Admiral Lomponda Wa Botende
Director of the Presidential Bureau: Niay Mayidika Ngimbi

b. Type and Stability of Government

The Republic of Zaire (formerly the Democratic Republic of the Congo) has been independent since June 1960. With military backing, Marshal Mobutu assumed the Presidency in November 1965 and continues to rule essentially by decree and by astute manipulation of key political and military figures who accede to his desires. The parliamentary and Presidential election held in 1970 unanimously approved the Mobutu regime and the single political party, the Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution (Popular Movement for the Revolution - MPR), of which all citizens are members. Constitutional amendments adopted in 1974 formally subordinated the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Government to the MPR. Under this new structure, the President of the MPR is automatically the President of the Republic. Mobutu, as President Founder, is exempt from most of the checks placed upon the President by the Constitution. Elections to borough and legislative councils and the MPR Political Bureau were held in October 1977. In December of that year Mobutu won a second 7-year term in a one-candidate election/referendum. President Mobutu was re-elected in August 1984 after running unopposed.

From 1965 to 1974, President Mobutu provided Zaire a degree of stability that contrasted strongly the chaos that followed independence. Economic difficulties since 1974 and Government insensitivity to social priorities have, however, contributed significantly to popular discontent with the regime. Zaire is in the midst of an economic crisis provoked by low copper prices, inflation, nationalization of businesses ("Zairianization"), and poor management. This crisis has been exacerbated by corruption and a decaying infrastructure. Living standards have deteriorated throughout the country since independence, and periodic outbursts of social discontent have occurred. The so-called "Shaba I" and "Shaba II" wars of 1977 and 1978 presented the greatest threat to the stability of President Mobutu's regime. These invasions by ex-Katangan gendarmes were repelled only with foreign assistance. Though these large-scale incursions and countless other minor disturbances were suppressed, a latent rage at social inequities exists throughout Zaire.

15 October 1984
Abroad, several dissident leaders have attempted to galvanize international condemnation against President Mobutu's policies. Most prominent among them has been former State Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Nguza Karl-I-Bond. In several public announcements, Nguza has called for the beginning of a "Shaba III" or a "Kinshasa I" in Zaire to destroy Mobutu's government.

Mobutu's political dexterity is evidenced by his ability to periodically convince Western states that earnest reforms in Zaire are underway. Occasional amnesties for exiles and internal dissidents are presented to the international community as signs of political moderation and tolerance. A most recent case involves 13 former members of the Zairian legislature who were imprisoned by Mobutu after they coauthored a letter of complaint against his rule and after they established a rival political party, the Union for Democratic and Social Progress (UDPS). After spending over 1 year in jail, members of the "13" were given amnesty by Mobutu. In October 1983 eight of the "13" welcomed an American congressional delegation headed by Democrat Howard Wolpe. At the national airport the "13" were publicly beaten by soldiers of the Special Presidential Brigade in full view of the American Delegation.

Mobutu's crackdown on civil liberties reflects his nervousness over what he feels are conspiracies to destroy him. One incident that heightened his suspicions was the theft from his Kinshasa office in July 1981 of the cane and leopard-skin cap that he wore during the Shaba invasions. There has also been an increase in opposition movements abroad led by individuals such as Nguza; Mungul Diaka, the former Minister of Education; General Nathaniel Mbumba, the former leader of the National Front for the Liberation of the Congo (FLNC); and Laurent Kabila, the leader of the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP). With the increase in political opposition and the worsening economic conditions, Mobutu can be expected to become increasingly nervous and accusatory toward any real or imagined domestic or international element that he feels will threaten his concept of a stable government.

From June through September 1982, Zaire held its first series of local, regional, and parliamentary elections since 1977. Under guidelines established by the MPR, dossiers on all candidates were screened by the Party to insure the loyalty of each candidate. Those who were suspected of harboring anti-Mobutu sentiments were not allowed to run for election. The fact that only Party stalwarts were allowed to run for election indicates that the Parliament will simply continue to endorse the main tenets of Mobutuism and will not attempt any drastic changes in the status quo without prior Mobutu approval.

Perhaps the most significant political development of 1983 was the anticorruption campaign personally led by Prime Minister Kengo Wa Dondo. The campaign, which netted over 200 individuals, cut across tribal and social lines and claimed a cabinet minister, two regional governors, several generals, and two of the President's sons. Corruption in Zaire is endemic and the 1983 campaign met with limited success. Nonetheless, the fact that key political figures were targeted marked a significant break from previous campaigns.
c. Internal Threat

(S/NK) Southern Zaire. In March 1977 and again in May 1978, the Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (FLNC), Zairian ex-Katangan Gendarmes who had fled into the neighboring countries of Angola and Zambia during the 1960s, invaded Shaba Province in an attempt to destabilize the Mobutu regime. The invasions did not galvanize well-organized opposition in the province, but they did illuminate the discontent that had festered there for years and that continues. Some members of the FLNC who reentered Zaire in 1978 probably remain, augmented by small numbers of others who have infiltrated or have returned under Mobutu's refugee amnesty program. Some of these probably are engaged in recruitment of disaffected Shabans and probably are hoping to foment popular uprisings. The presence in Shaba from the summer of 1978 through the fall of 1979 of an Inter-African Force (IAF) of about 2,350 troops from Morocco, Senegal, Togo, Gabon, and the Ivory Coast inhibited the expression of organized opposition to the Mobutu regime (and prevented FAZ depredations that otherwise could have provoked violent popular reactions). The FLNC increased its infiltrations into the region throughout 1980-82 for the purpose of collecting intelligence information. Throughout December 1982, units in the Shaba region were placed on alert in anticipation of a reported FLNC concentration along the triborder area of Zaire (Angola, Zambia, Zaire). The December attack never materialized. A major problem with the security of southern Zaire is the serious lack of logistic support for the military and police units in Shaba. The poor conditions found in the 21st Infantry Brigade and the Kamanyola Division—the units responsible for Shaban defense—provide an ideal opportunity for the several thousand FLNC members positioned on both sides of the borders of Zaire, Angola, and Zambia to launch another invasion into the Shaba, provided the FLNC receives substantial military and financial aid from third party countries.

(S/NK) Eastern Zaire. The most widely known dissident group in eastern Zaire, but a lesser armed threat to the regime, is the 150-200-man People's Revolutionary Party (PRP), which gained considerable notoriety in 1975 by kidnapping three US students from a research station in bordering Tanzania. PRP plans to disrupt or to destabilize the Zairian Government periodically surface. Some sources believe that the PRP may have become the catalyst for small insurgent operations in eastern Zaire such as an aborted attempt to destroy a fuel site in Uvira in early 1981. From time to time PRP leader Laurent Kabila talks with other dissident leaders in hope of cementing an alliance against Mobutu. As of early 1984, the PRP is pursuing a dual-track strategy of negotiating with the FLNC for military cooperation against Mobutu and of associating with nonmilitant Zairian exiles in Europe. In the last several years, however, the revolutionary zeal that fueled the PRP has waned. Currently, the PRP is little more than an irritation to the regime of Mobutu, and it is highly likely that this derelict band will continue to wither.

(S/NK) Northeast Zaire. In 1980, the stability of northeast Zaire was threatened by refugees fleeing from Ugandan Armed Forces into Zaire. The total number of Ugandan refugees now in northeastern Zaire is estimated at 50,000 in agricultural sites supported by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), and 30,000 outside the sites. The situation and political implications
have not yet become a major problem for the Mobutu regime. The interest shown by the UNCHR and various Western governments has kept the potential problems under control.

Kinshasa and Western Zaire. Internal dissidence includes Church-led opposition to the Government (45 percent of the population is Roman Catholic), economic stagnation, and attempts to create political opposition parties. Kinshasa and other Zairian cities have been the scene of near-annual student and teacher demonstrations. The problems of consistent escalation of inflation, widespread economic deprivation, and a defeatist attitude (often referred to as "Malaise Zairois") are especially endemic in this overpopulated area of Zaire. Despite reports of nearly 3 million of the region's population living under the worst conditions possible, they remain docile, tolerant, and seemingly unconcerned about improving their conditions through violence or the overthrow of the Government.

Other. Among the approximately 58 dissident organizations opposed to the current regime, only a handful are considered worthy of attention. These range from the Council for the Liberation of Congo-Kinshasa (CLC); the Zairian National Action Movement (MANZA); and the Action Movement for the Resurrection of the Congo (MARC); to the FLNC and PRP. The union of two or more of these movements could ultimately cause problems in Zaire, but Mobutu's present concern with these various organizations is that their activities could embarrass him either in Zaire or among his Western supporters overseas. Thus far, Mobutu has been able to limit the activities of oppositionists in Zaire through a very effective internal security service, the National Center for Research and Investigation (CNRI).

d. External Threat

President Mobutu characterizes the external threat as a "Red Belt" slowly strangling his country. He is concerned primarily about the presence of Cuban forces, backed by the Soviet Union, stationed in Angola and the Congo. In addition, his fears probably are exacerbated by the small Cuban influence in Burundi and the potential for such a presence in Uganda. In response to Libyan machinations in Chad, Mobutu in July 1983 dispatched nearly 2,000 troops from the 21st, 31st, and 41st Brigades to N'djamena and several Chadian outposts. In addition to supporting the defenses of Chadian President Habre against the hostile penetrations of Libyan-backed Chadian dissident forces, Mobutu sought to obtain funding from the United States. By early 1984, low morale and illness necessitated the withdrawal of 500 troops. Currently, approximately 1,500 Zairian troops are serving in Chad though it is likely that additional forces will gradually be withdrawn. Mistrust of both Tanzania and Uganda coupled with tense border situations with Zambia are not causes for immediate alarm but bear watching. Only Cuban-assisted Angola poses a substantive threat of major military attack. However, occasions have arisen that have resulted in localized skirmishes between Zairian forces and those of Zambia. The potential exists for this type of activity with Angola. Mobutu is not hesitant to address all of these potential trouble spots when seeking to reinforce his frequent bids for additional Western material and financial support.
Recently, relations with Angola and the Congo have improved. Although not warm, relations with Angola have stabilized in the spirit of non-interference with one another's internal affairs. The next greatest major external threat to Zaire is that posed by the FLNC (ex-Katangan Gendarmes) exiled to Angola (and in lesser numbers to Zambia) and supported by Angola, Cuba, and possibly the Soviet Union. This force, numbering 5,000 to 7,000, fought very effectively, first with the Portuguese and then with the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). When the FLNC invaded Zaire under Angolan sponsorship in March 1977 and May 1978, Mobutu's fears were realized. The second invasion of Shaba took place with five hostile battalions attacking from Zambia to take Kolwezi, one battalion unsuccessfully attacking Kasaji from Angola, and two battalions briefly successful in attacking Dilolo from Angola. The capture of Kolwezi by the FLNC and the resulting peril for the some 1,500 European and American citizens living and working there was cause for intervention by French and Belgian paratroopers, who retook the city on 21 May 1978. The extremely poor performance of the FAZ in both wars resulted in the formation of the IAF, which was sent to Shaba to stabilize the region, thus allowing the orderly withdrawal of the French and Belgian intervention forces. Following the withdrawal of the invaders, it was determined that the members of the attacking battalions had probably received training from Angolan-based Cubans. These conflicts helped to poison Zairian-Angolan relations.

The subsequent rapprochement with Angola has reduced this threat, although reports of FLNC invasion preparations recur. The FLNC has reportedly decided to launch small-scale guerrilla type operations, as opposed to the conventional attacks of 1977 and 1978. Sabotsge specialists have been trained in Angola by Cubans in preparation for targets in Kolwezi, Lubumbashi, and Dilolo. Although the FLNC constitutes the primary threat to Zaire, it is plagued by political infighting, and lack of supplies. Still, 1984 has seen a boost in morale among FLNC soldiers garrisoned in Angolan northern camps. Between 800 and 1,000 of these soldiers have reportedly received back pay and new clothing. The FLNC remains a threat if only a dormant one. Reports of the travels in the central African area of exiled rebel leader Antoine Gizenga and his followers, who are suspected of seeking Soviet, Cuban, and radical Arab and African support for anti-Mobutu subversion, have added to his concern. Additionally, in early 1979, a group of mercenaries was confirmed as being in Kigali, Rwanda, with the expressed mission of entering Zaire to cause disruption, thus aiding a planned attempt to overturn the Zairian Government. Belgian paracommandos were dispatched to Zaire and stationed in Kitona, with the official position being that these troops would help accelerate the training of the new Zairian infantry battalions, perform demonstrations, and participate in joint Belgian-Zairian maneuvers. Several unconfirmed reports indicated that these troops were dispatched primarily to discourage any coup attempts and to provide security for the some 35,000 Belgians living in Zaire. Mobutu's continued efforts to improve relations with Angola, Congo, and Zambia in particular have, through the end of 1981, held Zaire's external threat at bay.
REPUBLIC OF ZAIRE

e. Communist Influence

Despite the appearance of at least one tract in mid-1980 with the letterhead "Parti Communist Zairois" (Zairian Communist Party), there is no known effective Communist Party. The influence of foreign Communist states was negligible until 1973, when a new atmosphere of cordiality developed with Communist nations. The PRC established relations with Zaire in early 1973 and has provided agricultural and medical advisers, military training in Zaire, and arms (including ships, artillery, and tanks) for the FAZ. A Chinese training team apparently concluded its work and departed following an armor/artillery training exercise in May 1976, and Chinese naval technicians departed later that year. As a result of the two invasions of Shaba Province, the Chinese again provided Zaire with ships, artillery, tanks, and naval and armor advisers to support Mobutu against the PRC's Soviet and Cuban rivals in Angola and Congo. In March 1979, a PRC team arrived to train a light infantry brigade at Kisangani. By the end of 1980, the training of the officer and NCO cadre of the first of three battalions of the 41st Commando Brigade neared completion and the training of line soldiers commenced. Training of the first battalion, the 411th, was completed in June 1981. Training of the 412th Battalion was completed in October 1982, and the 413th Battalion began training in October 1983. North Korean military assistance began in early 1975 and included equipment and training for a Zairian army division, but by April 1976, the North Korean training mission had withdrawn. It became evident during late 1975 that events in Angola had dampened Mobutu's enthusiasm for Communist aid, and his attention returned to traditional Western sources. In 1978, Western intelligence learned that all the North Korean military equipment had remained in Zaire and that the North Koreans were pressing for payment. In February 1981, North Korea sought to have a military attache accredited to Zaire. Zaire refused to accredit an attache, and it is believed that the Mobutu government will continue to deny accreditation. Relations with the Soviet Union were cordial though distant until the March 1977 invasion by the FLNC sponsored by Angola. Mobutu accused Cuba and the Soviet Union of supporting the invasion, which he did again during the 1978 invasion. Relations with the USSR and Cuba have since been normalized.

f. Economic Factors

Zaire is one of the largest and most populous countries in Africa. It is endowed with abundant mineral resources (copper, cobalt, diamonds, and gold) and has no shortage of arable land. Yet, beginning in the mid-1970s, Zaire experienced steadily declining terms of trade as the price of its principal export, copper, tumbled. By 1981, to purchase the same real amount of imports (mostly manufactured and processed products), Zaire had to export three times the physical volume of coffee, copper, and other minerals than was required in 1970. The drastic decline in real export prices, coupled with lax government management, resulted in mounting balance of payments and government deficits, high inflation, and the accumulation of a massive external debt burden. In 1983, Zaire instituted a stabilization program in collaboration with the IMF and IBRD. A part of this program was a recent 80-percent devaluation of the zaire, and a revision of the method of issuing foreign exchange, import licenses, and tariff structure. Zaire's GDP amounted to $5.4 billion in 1982 or $179 per capita.
Zaire does not produce military equipment other than some quartermaster items. Zaire procured all of its military equipment from Western sources, principally France and the US and, to a lesser extent, Belgium, Israel, and Italy until 1974, when agreements were signed with North Korea and the PRC for military aid. In 1980, the PRC commenced making a significant contribution to Zaire by providing an $8-million grant aid package that included small arms, antiaircraft guns, ammunition, and instructional materials in support of their training program at Kisangani, repair of Shanghai patrol boats, and repair of T-59 and T-62 tanks of the 1st Armored Brigade.

The major supplier of military equipment has been France with equipment deliveries valued at $230 million or 45 percent of all assistance provided to Zaire. Following France is Belgium, with deliveries valued at $70 million; Italy - $63 million; and PRC - $49 million. French equipment provided includes fighter-trainer and transport aircraft, helicopters, river patrol boats, APCs, mortars, small arms, and radios. About half of this was delivered prior to 1976. Recent equipment shipments from the PRC include motor gunboats, tanks, recoilless rifles, field artillery, ADA, small arms, and trucks. Aircraft have come mainly from Canada, France, and Italy and include jet fighters, transports, helicopters, and trainer aircraft.

Military and Political Alignment

Zaire is a member of the Organization of African Unity and a regular participant in Third World forums such as the Nonaligned Movement. On 15 November 1981, Zaire dispatched the 850-man 311th Airborne Battalion to Chad as the initial contingent of the OAU Peacekeeping Force. The dispatch of troops to Chad in July 1983 made clear Mobutu's vision of Zaire as a key African power. Along with Rwanda and Burundi, Zaire is a member of a tripartite conference of heads of states and senior ministers who meet periodically on matters of mutual interest.

Relations with Zaire's nine neighboring countries are generally correct though periodic strains with Angola and Zambia surface. Mobutu has maintained essentially harmonious ties with the other contiguous states: Congo, Burundi, Tanzania, Rwanda, the Central African Republic, Uganda, and Sudan.

Mobutu had been deeply involved in support of insurgent groups in Angola, particularly the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Events of late 1975 and 1976 resulted in a decline in the fortunes of these factions at the hands of MPLA and Cuban forces, but UNITA experienced a quick resurgence in its resistance activities. In turn, Angolan leaders, first Dr. Neto then Jose Eduardo Dos Santos, availed themselves of Angolan-based FLNC fighters in Luanda's campaign against UNITA. In July 1978, however, a rapprochement was effected between the two states and genuine progress appeared to have been made in matters of mutual concern. This rapprochement has continued under the new Angolan regime of Dos Santos, and 1980 saw the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between these two countries. So, too, have relationships between Zaire and the Congo.
steadily improved, and the continued tripartite organization of the Great Lakes (Zaire, Rwanda, and Burundi) has proved a potentially positive forum for settling squabbles between these countries. Zaire continues to have border problems with Zambia and Angola, since both countries have allowed the FLNC to establish base camps and training sites close to the border with Zaire. It is unclear what specific actions have been agreed to in order to control FLNC elements in the border area, but it will likely take several years of patient negotiations between the three nations to settle the situation.

Zaire's military alignment also is affected by the fact that it has received technical military assistance from several Western countries—towards the ground forces from Belgium, France, Israel, and the US; to the Air Force from France, Italy, and the US; and to communications and transportation from the US and West Germany. A sharply contrasting influence was introduced in early 1975 when North Korea began an infantry training and equipment program. The PRC first delivered artillery and tanks to Zaire in June 1975. Both North Korea and the PRC have delivered naval vessels to Zaire and have given instruction on them as well as on the ground equipment, and have trained Army units. The departure of the North Korean military mission from Zaire in 1976 placed the PRC as the sole Communist military supporter of Zaire, and the PRC mission to date has been significantly beneficial to the Armed Forces of Zaire.

h. (U) Key US Officials (all located in Kinshasa)

Chief of Mission: Ambassador Brandon Grove, Jr.
2. MILITARY, GENERAL

a. (U) Key Military Officials

Supreme Commander and State Commissioner for National Defense, Territorial Security, and Veteran's Affairs: Marshal Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Wa Za Banga

State Secretary for National Defense and Territorial Security: Vice Admiral Lomponda Wa Botende

Chief of the General Staff, Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ): General Singa Boyenge Mosambay

Chief of Staff, Zairian Army (FAZ): Major General Eluki Monga Aundu

Chief of Staff, Zairian Navy: Lt Col Mavua Mudima (Captain de frigate)

Chief of Staff, Zairian Air Force (FAZA): Brigadier General Kikunda Ombala

Chief of Staff, National Gendarmerie (GN): Brigadier General Molamba Pene Lowa

Commander, 1st Military Region: Brigadier General Yeka Mangba Lokole

Commander, 2d Military Region: Lieutenant General Itambo Mukina Wa Kambala

Commander, 3d Military Region: Lieutenant General Danga Ngbokoli

Commander, Logistics Corps: Colonel Vuadi Nzinga Ne Palata

b. Position of the Armed Forces

The President controls the Zairian Armed Forces (Forces Armees Zairoises--FAZ) through the Department of National Defense. The FAZ includes four Services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and National Gendarmerie). The Gendarmerie is the largest Service, but the Army, by virtue of its command of resources, is the predominant force.

Because of the ongoing reorganizations, ideological reorientations, personnel flux, and the disastrous performance of the Army in the Angolan conflict and the Shaba invasions, the attitudes and loyalty of the military are not clear. Since independence, there have been pockets of dissatisfaction within the military. Causes of discontent have ranged from low and sporadically received pay to lack of promotions, tribal favoritism, lack of equipment, insufficient food, and poor equipment acquisition and management policies. It is probable that the FAZ will remain loyal to the Government as long as privileges are maintained; Mobutu pays attention to this factor and often gives special consideration to the military. However, of recent concern to policymakers in the FAZ is the return of Zairian troops currently serving in Chad. Disease, malnutrition, and improper provisions have taken a toll on the morale of some 2,000 troops who at one time saw service in that country. Should the economy continue to deteriorate and an opponent of the Government discover the appropriate catalyst to unify dissatisfied lower-ranking officers and NCOs, Mobutu's power could be threatened.

c. Military Trends and Capabilities

The military capability of the Armed Forces will continue to be hindered by weak leadership; low and irregular pay; lack of discipline; the low educational level of its personnel; a shortage of skilled technicians; tribal favoritism; unpopularity with civilians; heavy reliance on foreign assistance for...
materiel and training; and a poor logistic support capability. The personnel strength in the Army has begun to increase slightly with the recruitment of soldiers for the 31st Airborne Brigade and the Special Presidential Brigade throughout 1983. Navy strength has increased and Air Force strength has fluctuated, while the number of trained pilots has apparently decreased. Military equipment, traditionally acquired from Western nations, also has been supplied by North Korea and the PRC. The addition of Communist equipment has further complicated equipment maintenance by aggravating the shortage of spare parts and by exacerbating distribution problems and the shortage of skilled technicians. The upgrading of communications and transport capabilities and the development of quick-reaction forces, such as the 31st Airborne Brigade and the Special Presidential Brigade (BSP), are priority items in the Zairian military reorganization program. The influence of foreign advisers at select Zairian Army units is having a beneficial impact on the capabilities and discipline of these units. However, military exercises have indicated that any further improvements in the capabilities of the FAZ will be limited by the poor logistics system, superstitions, poor morale, and weak leadership. Without direct foreign military advisory assistance, the logistics system does not operate effectively. It must be recognized that the Zairian Armed Forces may never reach even a minimal level of military effectiveness, as measured against Western criteria, because of President Mobutu's reluctance to create a strong military establishment which might threaten the delicate balance of power that he must maintain to preserve his base of political power. The few units within the Zairian Armed Forces structure that do achieve a reasonable level of military professionalism are almost totally dependent on foreign military assistance. Therefore, cohesiveness and interoperability of the Armed Forces in general is unlikely to occur unless significant political, social, and economic changes occur. Since these changes are not likely to take place in the near future, Zaire will continue to be plagued with territorial security problems along most of its frontiers. Significant military shakeups and realignment of military power took place in 1980 and in 1981. In April 1982, the Israeli Military Mission officially opened. The primary mission of the Israelis is to train the BSP. The BSP recruited 800 personnel and the Israelis provided basic and advanced training. The BSP is today the finest military unit in Zaire and arguably one of the most professional in Africa. In the BSP, an antiterrorist battalion serves to repel security threats to President Mobutu. The soldiers who serve in this battalion have been trained by Israelis and West Germans. In early 1984, Israeli trainers began in earnest the reorganization of the Shaba-based Kamanyola Division. Because this Division is of lower priority to Mobutu than the BSP (his palace guard), funding as of 1984 has been insufficient to significantly upgrade the Kamanyola's capabilities. These events are examples of Mobutu's efforts to cope with the ever-changing ethnic rivalries within the ranks of the Zairian Armed Forces that could conceivably upset his master plan for a responsive but politically controlled military.

d. Military Budget

The military budget for the fiscal year ending 31 December 1983 was 42.8 million dollars - 6.3 percent of the central government budget. No service allocations are available.
US dollar values are converted from zaires at the exchange rate of 29.3 zaires equal to $1.00.

e. (U) Population:

32,158,000 estimated as of June 1984
Males (ages 15-49): 7,220,000; physically fit: 3,653,000
Ethnic Divisions: Over 200 African ethnic groups; the majority are Bantu; 4 largest tribes—Mongo, Luba, Kongo (all Bantu), and Mangbetu-Azande (Hamitic) make up about 45 percent of the population.
Literacy: 5 percent fluent in French; about 35 percent have an acquaintance with French
3. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

a. Army

(1) Mission

Territorial defense and internal security of the Zairian interior and the coastline.

(2) Capabilities

The Zairian Army (FAZ) is capable of limited defensive operations against unsupported small-scale attacks by neighboring African armies; poorly trained and equipped insurgent groups; and unarmed, unorganized demonstrators. Without substantial foreign advisory and logistic assistance, the FAZ would be hard-pressed to continue sustained operations for longer than 3-5 days.

Three of the Army's major weaknesses are the lack of communications capabilities, the lack of transport for its units, and the inability to support units after deployment. Continuing weaknesses include poor leadership, low or infrequently received pay, lack of discipline, low education levels, shortages of skilled technicians, tribal favoritism, unpopularity with civilians, and corruption. Temporary weaknesses include the organizational confusion engendered by a drawn-out reorganization program and a confused and fluctuating military assistance program. The Army relies heavily on outside assistance for materiel and training.

Priority items for improving the capabilities of the FAZ include upgrading communications and transportation assets and developing quick-reaction forces that can be airlifted to any area in Zaire. The presence of foreign advisers in selected units is having a beneficial impact on the capabilities and discipline of those units.

(3) Personnel Strength

Estimated at 22,000 (1,000 officers, 2,500 noncommissioned officers, 18,500 EM). A problem confronting the Army has been a lack of officer personnel. A 1979 reduction in force of 8,000 officer and enlisted personnel was offset by the induction of a like number of personnel. Significantly, those forced out were personnel who had large families and therefore were costing the Government considerably more than personnel with small or no families. From May 1983 through February 1984, an active recruitment increased the numbers of officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men.
(4) **Organization and Deployment**

(a) **General**

Army headquarters is composed of a Chief of the General Staff, a general staff, special staff directorates, and support units. The Chief of Staff is responsible to the Secretary of State for National Defense and Territorial Security, and to the Supreme Commander. Subordinate to Army headquarters are three military regions. The 1st Military Region is headquartered at Lubumbashi and encompasses the administrative regions of Shaba, Kasai Occidental, Kasai Oriental, and Kivu. The 2d Military Region is headquartered at Kinshasa and controls the regions of Kinshasa, Bas Zaire, and Bandundu. The 3d Military Region has its headquarters at Kisangani and controls the regions of Equateur and Haut Zaire.

FAZ is in the process of a large-scale reorganization, begun in the summer of 1977, which will alter the organization of the Army more than the other forces. The reorganization plan has changed several times and probably will change again before it is completed.

As part of the Organization of African Unity's Peacekeeping Forces, a FAZ battalion was deployed to Chad in November 1981. Though its performance was marked by desertions and low morale caused by poor logistic support, the unit accomplished its goal of buttressing N'Djamena against possible attacks. Zairian troops in Chad during 1983-84 continue to suffer from inadequate medical provisions and lack of food. Policymakers both in Kinshasa and N'djamena have concluded that the services of most of these troops are no longer necessary in Chad.

(b) **Ground Units**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Tactical Units (est)</th>
<th>Strength Per Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Authorized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Infantry Division (3 brigades)</td>
<td>6,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Infantry Brigades</td>
<td>13th (5 battalions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21st (4 battalions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Airborne Brigade</td>
<td>(3 combat battalions, 1 logistic battalion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Armored Brigade</td>
<td>(3 battalions; 1 tank, 1 artillery, 1 mechanized infantry)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Commando Brigade</td>
<td>(3 infantry bns, when artillery battalion completely formed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Special Brigade</td>
<td>(3 battalions; 1 airborne, 1 Presidential Guard, 1 honor guard; 1 artillery regiment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Special Detachment</td>
<td>(4 company-size units)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In the process of reorganization.
(c) **Deployment**

The Army Headquarters and logistics base, 31st Airborne Brigade, and the Special Brigade are located in Kinshasa. The 1st Armored Brigade is located at Mbanza-Ngungu, approximately 100 miles from the Capital. The Kamanyola Division has its operational headquarters in Kolwezi and tactical responsibility for the area from Kolwezi to Kananga to Tshikapa. The 21st Infantry Brigade is deployed from Kolwezi to Lubumbashi. The 13th Infantry Brigade is headquartered in Kalemie and has tactical responsibility along Lake Tanganyika.

(5) **Weapons and Equipment**

(a) **General**

Zaire has acquired its military equipment from the US, Egypt, Italy, West Germany, France, Israel, the UK, Belgium, North Korea, and the PRC; the majority comes from Belgium. Belgium has furnished infantry weapons, trucks, armored cars, and ammunition. The US has provided communications equipment, parachutes, transports and trainer aircraft, vehicles, and some small arms and ammunition. Egypt has supplied artillery. France has supplied armored cars, Entac AT missiles, Mirage aircraft, and helicopters. Israel, which concentrated its efforts in the field of airborne equipment and some quartermaster items in the early 1970s, has provided some infantry weapons to the BSP. In 1983 and 1984, Israel delivered domestically produced weapons as well as some captured from PLO terrorists. Equipment was used to outfit the BSP and to upgrade the Kamanyola Division. Further diversifying the already motley assortment of equipment in the inventory, Zaire took delivery during 1975 of North Korean and PRC infantry equipment, tanks, and artillery. In 1980, the PRC began delivering arms and ammunition for equipping the 41st Commando Brigade at Kisangani.

Maintenance of equipment is poor. Because of the difficulty in obtaining spare parts in the interior of the country, the deadline rate for some units is as high as 100 percent, and 50-75 percent is not uncommon. Given the shortage of skilled technicians, the introduction of foreign-supplied equipment has only further complicated equipment maintenance by aggravating spare parts supply and distribution problems. In September 1982, the PRC delivered several tons of repair parts for the PRC T-59 and T-62 tanks in the 1st Armored Brigade.

The Army's modernization program includes upgrading transport and communication capabilities and creating quick-reaction forces with the 31st Brigade and the BSP. Upgrading armor, artillery, and air defense capabilities has been postponed.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Armor:</strong></th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mdm Tk, Type 59</td>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lt Tk, Type 62</td>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Car, Panhard</td>
<td>FR</td>
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<td>APC, M-113</td>
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<tr>
<td>122-mm gun</td>
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<td>122-mm how</td>
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<td>106-mm gun</td>
<td>KN</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>85-mm gun</td>
<td>KN</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122-mm Rkt 1chr</td>
<td>KN</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107-mm Rkt 1chr</td>
<td>KN</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>83-mm Rkt 1chr</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-mm Rkt 1chr, Type 1956</td>
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<th><strong>Air Defense Artillery:</strong></th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>20-mm AD gun, Twin</td>
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<td>20-mm AD gun, Bofors and Oerlikon</td>
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<tr>
<td>14.5-mm AD hvy MG, Quad, 2PU-4</td>
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<tr>
<td>12.7-mm AD MG, Type 1956</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Antitank Weapons:</strong></th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
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<tr>
<td>ATGM, SNAPPER (Mtd on UAZ-69)</td>
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<td>18</td>
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<td>ATGM, ENTAC</td>
<td>FR</td>
<td>Unk</td>
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<tr>
<td>106-mm Rclr</td>
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<tr>
<td>83-mm Blindecide</td>
<td>BE</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82-mm Rclr</td>
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<tr>
<td>75-mm Rclr</td>
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<th><strong>Infantry Weapons:</strong></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mortar, 120-mm</td>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2-in mortar</td>
<td>BE, FR, US</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-in mortar</td>
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<tr>
<td>82-mm mortar</td>
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<td>54</td>
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<td>81-mm mortar</td>
<td>BE, FR, US</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-mm mortar</td>
<td>BE, FR, US</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-mm mortar, Type 1963</td>
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<td>36</td>
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<tr>
<td>52-mm mortar</td>
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<td>Unk</td>
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<td>Flmthr, Ptb1, Type 1965</td>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG, HB, .50 Cal</td>
<td>BE</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG, .30 Cal</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG, 7.62-mm, Type 1956</td>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMG, .45 Thompson</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMG, 9-mm, UZI</td>
<td>IS</td>
<td>Unk</td>
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### SECRET

**REPUBLIC OF ZAIRE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
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<td>PRC, KN</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>200</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**SMG, 9-mm, Sten**

**SMG, 9-mm, Vigneron**

**RFL, 7.62-mm, Type-1956**

**RFL, 7.62-mm (NATO), FN**

**RFL, 5.56-mm, M-16**

**RFL, 5.5-mm Galil**

**Pstl, .45-Colt**

**Pstl, 9-mm**

**Pstl, 9-mm Type 59**

**Pstl, 7.62-mm**

**Pstl, 38 cal, Smith & Wesson**

### Logistics

Support for FAZ is the responsibility of Corps Logistique (CORLOG), which is headquartered in Kinshasa. CORLOG Headquarters is considered to be on the same level as Headquarters of Ground Forces, Air Forces, Naval Forces, and Gendarmerie. The logistic system organization is based on Belgian doctrine with some US influence; approximately 40 Belgian officers are assigned to CORLOG. Subordinate to CORLOG Headquarters in Kinshasa is a Logistic Group consisting of a materiel battalion, maintenance battalion, supply battalion, transportation battalion, and ordnance battalion. Territorial depots with organic support companies exist at Kamina, Kisangani, and Kitona. Territorial depots are augmented by six forward logistic bases, four of which are subordinated to Kamina Depot. While a 1-year supply level is called for at the territorial depots, actual levels fall far short of this goal; as little as a 1-day supply for some items. The most recently established element of CORLOG is the Logistic School in Kinshasa, opened in the fall of 1982. Staffed primarily by Belgians, it now conducts basic-level training for officers only. Advanced training is obtained overseas. While the organization of the logistic system is relatively sound, even routine operational support activities are conducted in an inefficient and chaotic manner, despite direct foreign involvement and assistance.

Inadequate transportation and communication capabilities, improper maintenance procedures, and shortage of skilled personnel result in an unacceptable supply and distribution system. Although maintenance facilities, where they exist, are generally well equipped, maintenance is hindered by shortage of spare parts and skilled personnel, corruption, apathetic management, and scarcity of funds. Excessive deadline rates persist for all types of military equipment. To compensate for the shortage of transportation assets, operational equipment is not properly used. Overloading of vehicles is common, and principles of preventive maintenance are neither practiced nor promulgated. Chronic shortages of POL exacerbate the transportation problems and cause the drawing down of strategic stocks of fuel normally reserved for military operations when internal security is threatened.

Because of Zaire's large land area and sparse road and rail networks, air transport is critical to logistic operations. Air transport capability is inadequate due to extremely poor operational readiness rates of
Zairian transport aircraft. Consequently, Belgium has routinely been required to augment air transport operations with its own C-130s in order to avoid a total collapse of the distribution system. Foreign advisers and materiel assistance remain indispensable for maintaining even the current level of support capabilities.

(7) Personnel Procurement and Retention

Recruitment for the FAZ in the past has been by voluntary enlistment; however, personnel policies have become increasingly arbitrary. The President has the power (as he demonstrated after the student disturbances in 1982) to conscript personnel. Soldiers are enlisted for an initial term of 4 years. At the end of this term, they may be discharged or may reenlist for successive 3-year terms. President Mobutu decreed in January 1975 that all high school graduates, beginning in June 1975, would perform 1 year of national service prior to resuming their studies. That plan has been postponed. Apparently faced with a poor response to a recruitment drive to form the first new division, Mobutu resorted to levying quotas on JMPR units and conscripting unemployed men rounded up on the streets, a practice that continues.

(8) Training

Zairian military schools are operated under the supervision of the Defense Department's Directorate of Organization and Instruction (for the Senior Military Training Center--Centre Superior Militaire--CSM) and Army headquarters (for all other schools). Officer training for all forces is provided largely in-country by the CSM (Belgian commanders and Belgian and Zairian instructors), which is composed of the Command and Staff School, Kinshasa; and the Officers Formation School, Kananga. Basic training is conducted at the Kitona Training Center. Nine technical/specialty schools are operated by the Army at Kinshasa, and a commando training center at Kota-Koli. The Armor and Artillery Training Center is located at Mbanza-Ngungu. There is a communications training School at Kananga. An engineering School (now nonoperational) is located at Likasi. The National Gendarmerie is responsible for three gendarmeri schools--Matadi, Kasala, and Kapalata. Training at all levels is impeded by the Zairians' low level of education, unfamiliarity with mechanical equipment, and lack of adequate training aids.

All courses administered by the CSM except the Officers Formation School were closed in September 1975 to allow a "reorientation of the program of studies." This sudden action probably resulted from a shortage of officers to fill slots created by Zairian involvement in Angola, from the reorganization, and from purges within the officer corps. CSM was reopened in early March 1976. The Staff Officers School and the Battalion Commanders School, but not the Company Commanders School, resumed operation and were combined into the Command and Staff School conducted at the CSM. The classes have between 30 and 35 students. The transition from Belgian to Zairian commandants seemed to be going smoothly, with some improvement in discipline and morale, but after the 1977 Shaba invasion, the influx of foreign advisers included the return of Belgian commandants for the majority of the training centers and schools. At the
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Officer Formation School, candidates live and study in exceedingly deplorable conditions. As with many of the other military schools in Zaire, the Officer Formation School suffers from poor funding and lack of upkeep. It is possible that an infusion of capital will upgrade the materials and facilities in Zaire's military schools though no such funding appears imminent.

All basic training was in the hands of the North Korean military assistance team working with the Kamanyola Division at Kitona Base, but by 1 April 1976 all the North Korean advisers had left. Belgian advisers were eased out of their role at Kitona, and reportedly little actual training was done by the Zairians. In the 1977 Shaba invasion aftermath, the French were asked to provide advisers for the training of a parachute brigade, to act as helicopter instructor pilots and maintenance advisers in Kinshasa, and to provide advisers for a marine infantry brigade at Kalemie. They have trained the three parachute battalions and a support and services company of the 31st Brigade. The Belgians were asked to retrain the 21st Infantry Brigade at Kitona Base and provide a logistics system. The brigade has completed training and, together with Belgian advisers, is deployed in Shaba. The PRC specialized training course at the Armor Training Center on the Type 62 tanks and artillery and training for the first and second battalion of the 41st Commando Brigade at Kisangani are finished. Training of the Special Presidential Brigade is exclusively in the hands of several Israeli instructors. In January 1984, Israeli instructors laid the groundwork for upgrading the military skills of soldiers in the Kamanyola Division.

Military personnel from other African countries have received training in Zairian military schools. Soldiers from Congo, Mauritania, Rwanda, and Burundi have, over the course of the last 10 years, received training in various military disciplines in Zaire. Currently, Chadian soldiers are training in commando operations at the Belgian run center at Kota Koli. Mobutu, who is striving to establish himself as one of Africa's recognized leaders, sees military training as another means of increasing his prestige.

(9) Reserves and Mobilization

On 10 January 1974, Zaire announced the creation of its Reserve Cadre of Officers and NCOs. However, no activity has been observed in connection with the Reserve since its creation, and its existence is highly doubtful. The Department of National Defense would be unable to equip mobilized units without extensive foreign military aid.

b. Navy

(1) Mission

Surveillance and defense of territorial waters; protection of maritime traffic and fishing fleets; search, rescue, and assistance for foreign ships and aircraft; and assistance to the National Gendarmerie and Customs in repression of smuggling and clandestine entry into the country.
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(2) Capabilities

The Navy is barely capable of carrying out its mission throughout its area of responsibility. Careless operation and maintenance of boats, equipment, and armaments; failure to obtain supplies; and long, inefficient lines of communications are the basic causes for this situation. Despite these facts, the Zairian Navy continues to make serious efforts to upgrade its operational status by seeking increased foreign military assistance so that it can effectively patrol Zaire's rivers, seacoast, and lake areas.

(3) Personnel Strength: 1,153 (breakdown not available)

(4) Ship Strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Op</th>
<th>Nonop</th>
<th>In Reserve</th>
<th>Status Unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PC (coastal escort) (PRC SHANGHAI II)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PB (patrol boats) (US Swift 65 foot)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGM (motor gunboats)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PB (patrol boats) (US 50-ft)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBR (patrol boat) (31-ft)</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(5) Organization and Deployment

During the July 1974 reorganization of the Armed Forces, the Navy emerged as a separate and equal branch of the Armed Forces with its own Chief of Staff, headquartered in Kinshasa. The Navy Chief of Staff is responsible to the Secretary of State for National Defense and Territorial Security and to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.

The Navy is organized into three regions, which deal with coast, river, and lake duties. The 1st Region (lake), the oldest operational unit, is headquartered at Kalemie on Lake Tanganyika, has approximately 350 personnel (30 officers, 320 EM), and is assigned the 6 Swift patrol boats. This unit patrols the lake, attempts to control smuggling, and engages in joint operations with air and ground forces against rebels in Secteur Tanganyika. Headquartered at Kinshasa, the 2d Region (river) has some 450 personnel, who man guardposts along the Zaire River shore to detect smuggling into Congo, and who have begun to conduct very limited river patrols. The PGMs, remaining PBs, and one PBR are believed to be deployed in the Zaire River at, or above, Kinshasa. Third Region (coast) headquarters at Banana is manned by some 250 personnel. The PTs and PCs are deployed to Banana. Two PBs may be at Matadi. Boats assigned to ocean and river units cannot interchange with each other.
(6) Status of Equipment

Two of the Chinese-made Shanghai IIs, two of the US-made 65-foot Swift patrol boats (Lake Tanganyika), one US-made 50-foot PB, the 31-foot PBR, the 9-meter patrol boats, and two Vedettes are the only craft operational. Chinese naval advisory personnel are assisting Zaire with repair of the other two SHANGHAI IIs, which are located at Boma. The 14 French Vedettes that arrived in 1981 are believed to be located on the Zaire River and its tributaries north and east of Kinshasa.

(7) Logistics

A shortage of spare parts has caused occasional curtailment of operations. The force depends upon local suppliers for fuel but maintains a small reserve for use during temporary supply shortages. The Navy is completely dependent upon foreign sources for equipment and spare parts. Indigenous personnel are competent only for the simplest of repairs. US repair teams attempt to repair Swift boats on a periodic basis, but these boats are so poorly maintained between visits that only one out of six are fully operational. The PRC has sent spare parts and repair teams and is currently conducting a major overhaul of SHANGHAI Class patrol boats.

Repair of Zairian Navy units stationed at Banana is accomplished at the 1,800-ton drydock and shops at Boma. Repair facilities are also available for patrol craft at Kalemie where they are hoisted onto the quay for hull repair. Yards at Kinshasa are adequate to support the riverine forces. The large size of the country and lack of waterborne connectivity between the various operational regions of the Navy make logistics interface extremely difficult.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

Navy personnel are volunteers. Most have previous military experience and were selected from the Army for naval training and duty. Plans for future recruitment are unknown.

(9) Training

Some 131 personnel have been trained in naval operations in the US; some 60 have received training in the PRC. Naval training is ongoing at Banana; formation of a technical school at Kalemie has been planned for some time but has yet to be realized.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

Retiring Navy officers and NCOs probably are included in the FAZ Reserve Cadre. (See 3.a.(9).) Mobilization potential is unknown. Civil maritime resources probably can be mobilized in the event of a national emergency and include eight cargo ships (1,000 GRT or over) totaling 77,400 GRT, 117,443 DWT.
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(11) Merchant Marine

Zaire has eight cargo ships of 1,000 gross registered tons or over.

c. Air Force

(1) Mission

The mission of the Zairian Air Force (FAZA) is to cooperate with the other Zairian Armed Forces in the defense of national territory against external and internal attacks. Specific tasks include fighter support of ground forces, airlift support, and reconnaissance.

(2) Capabilities

The Zairian Air Force (Forces Aeriennes du Zaire—FAZA) has no strategic or air defense capability but can provide some close air support for the Army. None of the FAZA pilots are combat ready by US standards. They fly proficiency missions but seldom conduct gunnery or bombing practice. FAZA has been capable of performing its support tasks with the technical and logistic assistance of foreign military and/or private contract organizations. Its primary weakness lies in a severe shortage of operable aircraft and flying and nonflying personnel and the virtual absence of an indigenous technical and logistics base. Most of the actual flying is done by European expatriots. FAZA can perform limited liaison, reconnaissance, and search and rescue, but it currently suffers from lack of fuel, poor maintenance, and lack of qualified indigenous pilots.

(3) Personnel Strength

The strength of the Air Force is approximately 2,745 (280 officers, 625 adjutants*, 1,840 EM). Available aircrew personnel are broken down as follows: C-130 (17 pilots, 14 copilots), MB-326GB (23 pilots); Mirage 5M (1 pilot); DHC-5 (4 pilots); Cessna 310 and 150 (36 pilots); helicopter (19 pilots); flight engineers (54); navigators (27); and loadmasters (4).

(4) Aircraft Strength

Total: 54 (Fixed wing: 17 jet, 8 turboprop, 17 prop, 12 helicopters)

* In Zaire, adjutant is equivalent to US ranks of E7, 8, 9, and warrant officer.
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In operational units: 46
(20 fighters, 8 transport, 7 liaison, 11 helicopters)

(5) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

The Air Force, previously an integral part of the Army, is now coequal with the Army, Navy, and National Gendarmerie. It is headed by a Chief of Staff who reports to the Chief of the General Staff and to the State Secretary for National Defense and Territorial Security. FAZA is organized into a headquarters and three "commands." The three "commands" are the Central Operations Command (COC), the Air Force Schools Command (CEFA), and the Logistics Command. The FAZA is further divided into three operational regions. The 1st Aerial Region encompasses western Zaire (Kinshasa), the 2d encompasses southwestern Zaire (Kamina), and the 3d encompasses northeastern Zaire (Kisangani). There is no FAZA infrastructure supporting these Aerial Regions. The COC consists of the 11th (Macchi MB-326GB) and the 12th (Mirage 5M) Squadrons, the 21st Logistical and Transport Squadron (Lockheed C-130 and Dehavilland DHC-5), and the 31st Helicopter Squadron. Most elements of the COC operate out of N'Djili Airfield, Kinshasa; the helicopters operate out of N'Dolo Airfield, Kinshasa. The CEFA comprises the Kamina Base Flying and technical training schools, and the helicopter school at N'Dolo Airfield. The third command is composed of the technical and depot groups with its headquarters at N'Dolo Airfield. Elements of these groups are distributed throughout Zaire.

(b) Summary of Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Principal Base</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 fighter sqdn</td>
<td>Mirage 5M/DM</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Kinshasa/N'Djili Afld</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 fighter sqdn</td>
<td>MB-326GB</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Kinshasa/N'Djili Afld</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 tactical/transp sqdn</td>
<td>C-130H, DHC-5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Kamina Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 heli sqdn</td>
<td>Puma, Alouette III, Gazelle</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Kinshasa/N'Dolo Afld</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) Status of Equipment

All aircraft are maintained at N'Dolo Airport, N'Djili Airport or Kamina Base. Originally formed as an expatriate contract organization called SODEMAZ (Societe d' Operation et Maintenance des Aeriennes Zairoises), the maintenance unit at N'Djili Airport has been subsumed into FAZA and comes under the direction of the Air Force Chief of General Staff. It still employs expatriates--5 flight crew members (3 C-130 and 2 Macchi MB-326GB) and approximately 20 logistic/maintenance/administrative personnel. The capabilities
of the organization have diminished under Zairian direction and with the loss of some non-Zairian staff. Maintenance efforts keep about 50 percent of the aircraft in operational status. Recent crashes and accidents probably can be attributed to pilot error and flight crew inadequacy rather than maintenance. Six Lockheed technical representatives help maintain the C-130s.

The types of aircraft in the inventory include Lockheed C-130 and Dehavilland DHC-5 transport aircraft; Mirage 5 and Aermacchi MB-326MB fighters; Cessna 310 utility aircraft; and Cessna-150 trainer aircraft. Helicopters include SA-321 Super Frelons; SA-330 Pumas; Alouette IIs; and SA-341/342 Gazelles.

(7) Logistics

The Air Force is totally dependent on foreign assistance for its equipment, and its maintenance and service sectors are dominated by foreign contractors. Despite foreign involvement, the Air Force logistic system is in a severe state of disarray. Misappropriation of the few available funds, corrupt administration, shortage of aviation fuel, and scarcity of spare parts result in excessively poor operational readiness rates for military aircraft. Additionally, airfields and related support facilities are in a constant state of disrepair; operational status and fuel availability is uncertain from day to day. Without foreign assistance, maintenance and supply systems would rapidly break down.

The Lockheed and Cessna companies provide spare parts and overhaul on a contract basis for C-130 and Cessna aircraft. Aviation fuel is obtained from Petro Zaire in Kinshasa. Outside of Kinshasa, fuel stocks are controlled by the civil air company--Air Zaire. Aircraft maintenance is performed at N'Djili Airfield or Kamina Base. Deadline rates of 50 percent are common. Problems are caused by lack of funds, failure to release funds for parts, and internal administration procedures.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

All Air Force personnel are volunteers. The Air Force is able to attract personnel initially through the promise of acquiring desirable mechanical skills. However, low pay scales coupled with sporadic paydays have given rise to widespread theft of fuel, tools, and spare parts by FAZA personnel from Zairian Air Force facilities. Even though the number of volunteers is sufficient, problems arise in finding qualified recruits. Competition with civil airline companies for qualified personnel has caused retention problems for the Zairian Air Force.

(9) Training

An Italian Air Force Training Mission was terminated 31 December 1975. Zairian pilots are now trained in the US, Greece, and France. Small numbers of navigators and loadmasters also receive US training. Both the helicopter training program, which began in February 1977, and the Mirage training program are under the direct supervision of the French Military
Republic of Zaire

Assistance Group. A French team of three officers and five enlisted men assist with the in-country training program for FAZA Mirage pilots. Another team of one officer, three enlisted men, and one aerospace technician assist the 31st Helicopter Squadron in its training program. Due to lack of support and a lack-adaisical Zairian attitude toward maintenance, the Chief of the French Mirage mission has recommended to his government that the mission be terminated.

An upgraded training program for Mirage pilots is held at Kinshasa/N'Djili Air Base, while the FAZA helicopter training program is held at Kinshasa/N'Dolo Air Base. Low educational levels and the lack of mechanical aptitudes contribute to a student-pilot attrition rate of 50 to 75 percent. It is estimated that when the undergraduate pilot training school is established, there will be a period of high accident rates, high student failure rates, and poorly trained graduates.

20. Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

(U) There is no FAZA reserve organization at the present time.

(b) Mobilization

(U) When FAZA air transport capability has proved to be inadequate to meet operational commitments, civil airlines have been tasked to provide the required airlift. Aircraft tasked in the past have been Air Zaire's DC-8s, DC-10s, and SCIBE Zaire's L-100. On 15 November 1981, part of the Zairian contingent to the Chad Peacekeeping Force had to be airlifted using DC-8s from Air Zaire.

(c) Civil Aviation

1. Aircraft

(U) Approximately 57 civil transport aircraft with a gross takeoff weight of at least 9,000 kilograms currently are registered, owned, and operated in Zaire:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Long-range transport aircraft (greater than 3,500 NM or 6,500 km)</th>
<th>Owner/Operator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Boeing 707-120F</td>
<td>Private carrier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Boeing 707-320</td>
<td>Private Carrier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Boeing 707-320C</td>
<td>Private carrier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Boeing 707-420</td>
<td>Private carrier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 McDonnell Douglas DC-8-60CF</td>
<td>Air Zaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30</td>
<td>Air Zaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Medium-range transport aircraft (1,200-3,500 NM or 2,200-6,500 km)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
<th>Owner/Operator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 Aerospatiale SE-210 Caravelle</td>
<td>Private carriers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Boeing 727-100</td>
<td>Private carrier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Boeing 727-100C</td>
<td>Private carrier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Boeing 737-200C</td>
<td>Air Zaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Bristol 175 Britannia</td>
<td>Private carrier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 British Aerospace HS-125-400B</td>
<td>Private firm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 British Aerospace HS-125-600B</td>
<td>Private firm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Boeing 737-200C</td>
<td>Private carrier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Canadair CL-44</td>
<td>Private carriers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Dassault-Breguet Falcon/Mystere 20C</td>
<td>Private firm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Handley Page HPR-7 Herald</td>
<td>Private carrier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Lockheed C-130/L-100/L-382 Hercules</td>
<td>Private carriers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Lockheed L-188 Electra</td>
<td>Private carrier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 McDonnell Douglas C-47/DC-3 Skytrain</td>
<td>Private carrier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 McDonnell Douglas C-54/DC-4 Skymaster</td>
<td>Private carriers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 McDonnell Douglas DC-6A Liftmaster</td>
<td>Private carrier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 McDonnell Douglas DC-6B</td>
<td>Private carrier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Vickers-Armstrong VC-2 Viscount</td>
<td>Private carriers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>44</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) Numerous private charter carriers, mining companies, and other private business firms operate major transport aircraft, as well as light aircraft, in Zaire. "Private carriers," above, refers to companies offering passenger, cargo, or other air services for revenue; "private firms" refers to a corporation or other business using aircraft in support of company operations.

(U) The Boeing 707-320C is leased from a US firm. One of Air Zaire's DC-8-63CFs reportedly is leased to a Turkish airline. The operating condition of some of the older equipment, such as the Dakotas, Skymasters, and Commands, is doubtful.

(U) In addition to the above aircraft, the Force Aerienne Zairoise (FAZ) operates an HS-125-400B and a Dassault-Breguet Falcon/Mystere 20C, both VIP-configured, with civil aircraft registration markings.

### 2. Pilots

(U) The total number of licensed civilian pilots of major transport aircraft in Zaire is not known. Air Zaire reportedly employs over 130 pilots.

### 3. Mobilization Potential

(U) Virtually all of Zaire's indigenous civilian aviation personnel and the civil aircraft operated by Air Zaire could be mobilized in the event of war or comparable national emergency. The Zairian Armed Forces have relied heavily in the past on Air Zaire aircraft for troop deployments and...
logistic support. In a national emergency, the availability of the numerous aircraft operated by private companies would be subject to circumstances. Without considerable foreign assistance, a lack of fully qualified, indigenous flight and maintenance personnel would prevent maximum effective use of mobilized equipment, especially if prolonged or high intensity air transport operations were required.

d. National Gendarmerie

(1) Mission

The National Gendarmerie (GN) performs civilian police functions and is responsible for internal security. In the event of hostilities, the GN will be responsible for first-line defense until the Army can be brought into position.

(2) Capabilities

Since the Gendarmerie battalions were taken from the Army and were trained and employed as infantry, the combat capability of the Gendarmerie is somewhat greater than that of Gendarmerie units in other African countries. Another factor that contributes to the overall effectiveness of the organization is the Government's "retraining" of all former police officers in basic military skills. The Gendarmerie received training from a few Moroccan instructors in 1979. The GN is capable of limited civil disturbance control of small, unarmed, and unorganized groups. Most of the Gendarmes are over retirement age, inadequately trained, poorly equipped, and distrusted by the civilian population. As the first line of defense against military incursions or insurgent attacks, the Gendarmerie would be incapable of effectively halting an attacking force. Without radios to report attacks in the rural areas of Zaire, the Gendarmes must use messengers to alert the FAZ.

(3) Personnel Strength

Effective strength of the National Gendarmerie is approximately 24,000 although the official published strength is 35,100.

(4) Organization and Deployment

In July 1972, the decision was made to merge the seven Gendarmerie battalions of the Army with the National Police to form the National Gendarmerie. Among the factors leading to this move were the delicate political situation, reorganization of the Armed Forces, personalities of some military leaders, and volatile military-civilian relations.

The July 1977 reorganization of the Armed Forces made the National Gendarmerie coequal with the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The National Gendarmerie is headed by its own Chief of Staff who is responsible to the State Secretary for National Defense and Territorial Security Chief of General Staff
The National Gendarmerie battalions are deployed relatively evenly throughout Zaire. The nine administrative regions of Zaire correspond to nine National Gendarmerie Military Districts with headquarters in each of the regional capitals.

Under the July 1977 reorganization of the Armed Forces, the National Gendarmerie remains a separate and equal arm of the military. It has its own Chief of General Staff, as described above, a general staff, and nine Gendarmerie military districts, which correspond to the administrative regions. The Gendarmerie district headquarters are located in the respective administrative region capitals and Kinshasa.

(5) Weapons and Equipment

The National Gendarmerie is armed with small arms, primarily 7.62-mm Belgian FN rifles or outdated rifles. Although the mobile battalions are authorized trucks and other vehicles with which to deploy into the rural areas, most of the vehicles are inoperative or poorly maintained. The Gendarmerie has in the past commandeered civilian vehicles and trucks in order to deploy and they will probably continue this practice.

(6) Logistics

Although the National Gendarmerie is the largest of the ground force units in Zaire, the Army is the most powerful by virtue of its control of resources. As a result, the Gendarmerie battalions are usually among the last to be equipped or resupplied. Most of the equipment it receives is outdated and without sufficient repair parts.

(7) Brigade Disciplinaire

In late 1974, the MPR decided to reorganize its youth organization, the JMPR. In early 1975 that reorganization was framed and implemented. The new charter charged the Brigade Disciplinaire (BD) with the JMPR's paramilitary responsibilities, including insuring party discipline and providing an elite corps of trained and disciplined cadre to maintain a "permanent vigilance" over the revolution. In January 1978, the BD was placed under Gendarmerie control.

The estimated strength of BD personnel is 10,000. Membership is open to men and women. BD units usually are found at the zone level in cities. The BD currently is unarmed. The BD functions in a police surveillance role, conducting street patrols to curb vandalism and enforce curfews. The BD does not appear to be popular with the public, since its activities often are viewed as harassment rather than "revolutionary vigilance." The JMPR and the BD may be destined for a greater role in carrying out Mobutu's political decrees and in serving as political counterbalance to the National Gendarmerie.
The training program for the BD includes ideological, cultural, physical, socioeconomic (civic action), and security activities. Instruction in Mobutuism and loyalty to the concept is central. The regional National Gendarmerie organization provides paramilitary training for the BD. The course includes military discipline, map reading, hand-to-hand combat, physical endurance, intelligence, and civic training.

Although the BD does not contribute to Zaire's overall combat strength, during 1976 it and the JMPR became an important source of politically loyal manpower for the enlisted ranks of FAX. Loyalty to Mobutuism and the revolution became overriding criteria for military service following the alleged coup attempts in June 1975 and February 1978, and the North Korean refusal to train any but new recruits for the new divisions the Koreans were forming for Zaire. It is not known whether the JMPR will continue to serve as a recruitment pool for FAX, but as long as loyalty to Mobutu outweighs concern for FAX combat effectiveness, the chances are good that it will.

e. Total Military Personnel Strength

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>22,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>1,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>2,745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Gendarmerie</td>
<td>24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>50,395</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After the Shaba invasions, reorganization of the Armed Forces followed swiftly. The planned total force figure is approximately 45,000, with the Air Force and Navy possibly increasing in personnel strength.

f. Foreign Military Presence

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>110 with Logistics Corps, Military Schools, Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>132 with the Air Force and Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>7 army communications instructors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>126 42-50 training the 41st Commando Brigade; 36 naval technicians repairing Shanghai patrol boats, 32 tank technicians repairing PRC tanks; remainder in military mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>15 artillery instructors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>17 training the BSP and the Kamanyola Division</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

28
Withheld pursuant to exemption (b)(3) 10 USC 424 of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act.
ZAMBIA

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ZAMBIA

1. GOVERNMENT

a. Key Government Officials

President: Dr Kenneth Kaunda
Secretary General of the United National Independence Party (UNIP): Humphrey Mulemba
Prime Minister: Nalumina Mundia
Secretary of State for Defense and Security: Alexander Grey Zulu*
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Lameck Goma
Minister of Home Affairs: Frederick Chomba
Minister of Defense: Clement Mwananshiku
Zambian Intelligence and Security Service (ZISS) Director: Paul Malukutile

b. Type and Stability of Government

(U) Zambia is a one-party constitutional republic. The August 1973 constitution made the United National Independence Party (UNIP) Zambia's sole political organization. UNIP's Central Committee is the supreme policymaking body of the nation. Implementation of its policies is the domain of the President and his cabinet. Legislative powers are vested in Parliament, which is composed of the President and a National Assembly. All UNIP and government institutions are, however, dominated by President Kaunda who is head of state, head of the government, head of UNIP, and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Kaunda appoints Central Committee members and members of the judiciary; selects his cabinet from among the National Assembly; and has veto power over all legislation. According to the constitution, the President and his cabinet cannot be subjected to a vote of no-confidence by the National Assembly.

(U) The present government came into being after the October 1983 presidential elections. President Kaunda was sworn in for a fifth 5-year term after an overwhelming victory, receiving 93 percent of the national vote cast, on the basis of approve/disapprove of the UNIP candidate. Every 5 years prior to the national elections, UNIP's General Conference meets to elect the President of the Party, who then automatically becomes the sole candidate for President of the Republic. The Central Committee at the same time selects three UNIP candidates for each National Assembly seat, who then compete for election to Parliament in their home districts. The next series of party and general elections will be held during October-November 1988.

UNIP is a mass-type political party, which incorporates representatives from all segments of Zambian society. The Zambian political elite remains, however, largely divided along regional lines within the party.

* Zulu, who ranks fourth in the formal government structure, in practice is second in authority after Kaunda. He is the leading advocate of Zambia's growing military ties with the USSR.

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Four groupings dominate UNIP's Central Committee: Northern, Luapula, and Copperbelt Province representatives (Bemba-speaking); Eastern Province representatives (Nyanja speaking); Southern Province representatives (Tonga speaking); and representatives from Western Province (Lozi speaking). These blocs are locked in almost institutionalized struggle for their regional share of diminishing government resources and services. Their scramble to secure a larger slice of a progressively smaller pie forms the backdrop for the conduct of national politics. Kaunda is the cement that binds the country's disparate elements together.

Zambia's worsening economic situation has resulted in rising social problems and confrontations with government critics, in particular the labor unions. Throughout the past few years, Kaunda has been successful in outmaneuvering his critics. Meetings between government and labor defused serious problems and contributed to a year of relative stability. He has also retained the support of the military for his government. His image among the general populace as the father of Zambian independence, combined with his considerable political skills, give him a better than even chance of retaining power through the 1988 elections.

c. Internal Threat

Zambia's internal stability is being undermined by a deteriorating economic situation. Reliance on copper and cobalt mining industries to provide over 95 percent of exports and 30 percent of the gross domestic product, coupled with falling prices for these minerals in the world market, has resulted in the stagnation of Zambia's economy since 1974. Adding to Zambia's problems were the periodic disruptions in the 1970s of critical transportation routes to and from South Africa's ports by the Rhodesians in retaliation for President Kaunda's support to Zimbabwe African People's Union guerrillas based in Zambia.

The standard of living for the average Zambian has plunged over the last few years. Even with the end of the Rhodesian War in April 1980 and the reopening of transportation routes, the economic decline has continued. The population, which had previously accepted Kaunda's explanation that hostile external forces (Rhodesians and South Africans) were responsible for Zambia's economic problems, has begun to focus its disgruntlement on the President and UNIP.

This situation apparently led to a coup plot that was aborted by Zambian security forces in October 1980. The plot allegedly centered around a small number of influential industrialists and unhappy military officers who recruited a number of Gendarmerie ex-Katangese mercenaries, some of whom were based in northwestern Zambia. The trial of these individuals was held in early 1982 and was concluded in July. Although the state's case was composed primarily of circumstantial evidence, the primary leaders were convicted of treason in February 1983.
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Economic decline has also politicized Zambia's powerful and well-organized labor unions. Under the leadership of Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) Chairman Fredrick Chiluba, labor has become increasingly critical of Kaunda's economic policies. With the crucial support of the Mineworkers Union of Zambia (MUZ) the ZCTU conducted major work stoppages against Zambia's vital mining sector in January and July 1981. Culminating in the July 1981 strikes on the copperbelt. In essentially a standoff, government and labor achieved a degree of reconciliation in late November. Bitter antagonisms and fears, however, have festered throughout 1982 and 1983. As Kaunda continues his efforts to rein in labor, further conflict can be expected. Although the President managed to avoid a labor strike in 1983, by compromising with the unions on wage increase, the possibility of a successful general strike by labor is one of the major threats to the stability of Zambia.

Additional threats to Zambia's stability are posed by three foreign insurgent groups that base some military forces and dependents inside Zambia. Approximately 1,000 ex-Katangan gendarmerie members of the Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (FLNC) inhabit military camps in the area where Zambia's Northwestern Province borders Zaire. The FLNC professed aim is to overthrow President Mobutu of Zaire. Some nonmilitary members of the Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO) may still be encamped in southwest Zambia. Finally, the anti-South African African National Congress (ANC) maintains its political headquarters in Lusaka. The Zambian Government tolerates the FLNC and it provides political support to SWAPO and the ANC. Additionally, the FLNC receives considerable local support among that segment of the Zambian population that resides along the Zairian-Zambian border because of common ethnic ties. Adding to President Kaunda's security concerns is the anxiety of the Zambian populace over the threat of cross-border raids by South African military forces against SWAPO camps in southwestern Zambia.

d. External Threat

In President Kaunda's perception, landlocked Zambia is surrounded by countries whose future stability is at best uncertain and whose problems easily spill across the border: Angola is wracked by civil war; Zaire claims a small portion of Zambian territory next to Lake Mweru; Tanzania continues to expand its armed forces and is making unfriendly noises about discontinuing joint operation of the vital TANZAM railroad; Malawi claims a major portion of Eastern Zambia and will face a succession crisis; Zimbabwe may collapse into disorder; and South Africa has proved willing to use force to preempt dissident raids staged from nearby states, including Zambia. Kaunda's viewpoint led him to go ahead with his 1979 arms agreement with the Soviet Union, despite the imminent termination of the conflict in Rhodesia.

Kaunda's gloomy outlook is only somewhat justified; the only tangible external threat appears to be the possibility of future South African raids against SWAPO camps in southwest Zambia and the ANC headquarters in Lusaka. Tension has also been generated by FLNC guerrillas infiltrating Zaire from Zambian territory. Frequent border disputes, cross border banditry, and other security concerns have strained relations between Zambia and Zaire. In response,
during 1983 President Kaunda announced that he had ordered troops deployed along the border to stabilize the situation and reduce the recent crime wave. While the border situation with Zaire shows no sign of being resolved, there is little likelihood that it will escalate to major armed conflict.

e. Communist Influence

(Z) Zambia has no Communist Party; however, there are a small number of pro-Soviet Marxists within UNIP. These individuals have been successful in gaining some strategic party and government posts that have enabled them to inject a strong dose of Marxist ideology into Zambia's cultural and economic institutions. The position of these persons has been enhanced by UNIP fears over growing societal unrest driven by the failing economy. UNIP's reaction has been to seek methodologies that would enable the party to increase its control over all aspects of Zambian life. Their search led many of UNIP's leaders to the Marxist party models of Eastern Europe and the USSR. UNIP's Marxist minority facilitated a major political opening to the East in the mid-1970s. The party has sent hundreds of members of all ranks to East European and Soviet political training institutions over the past few years. Some returning graduates of these courses have been placed in party positions from the ward chairman level to provincial governor. These persons represent an opportunity for both party Marxists and their foreign allies to extend their influence within Zambia. While many UNIP leaders are in favor of adopting the form of Marxist parties, the majority do not appear particularly interested in the substance of Marxist ideology and show no sign of changing their attitude in the near future.

(3/WN/NO) Communist states view Zambia as a nation worth cultivating because it is strategically placed, wealthy in natural resources, has played a leadership role in the Nonaligned Movement, and has influence among African nations, particularly on issues concerning South Africa and Namibia. Zambia's nonaligned philosophy led to early political, military, and economic ties with Yugoslavia, Romania, and the People's Republic of China that continue on a somewhat limited scale. Over the past 2 years, political and military ties with North Korea have expanded. The security threat posed by the increasing level of conflict in southern Africa during the mid-1970s led Zambia to open ties with other East European states and the Soviet Union. The expansion of these relationships has been carefully cultivated by the Soviets and the East Europeans, particularly the East Germans. A major arms agreement—valued at over $190 million for MiG-21s, Mi-8 helicopters, spare parts, and small arms and ground equipment—was concluded in 1979 between Zambia and the USSR. The East Germans made sizable grants of military equipment in 1980 and have a liaison relationship with the Zambian Intelligence and Security Service (ZISS). Increasing Zambian interest in Marxist social models led Zambia to conclude cultural, media, educational, and limited economic agreements and protocols with the USSR, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Zambia's wide range of agreements with Communist states has led to the presence of numerous
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civilian and military advisers in-country, including Soviets, Chinese, North Koreans, Romanians, and Yugoslavs. Despite the high degree of Communist involvement, Zambia's positions on international issues have remained nonaligned. Since 1982, Zambian ardor for closer ties with the Soviet Bloc Communist states has diminished as the level of economic aid provided has failed to meet expectations, and the quality of military aid has proved disappointing.

f. Economic Factors

(U) Zambia's mining sector accounts for over 95 percent of export earnings, 45 percent of government revenues, and 30 percent of GDP. Agriculture, although the main livelihood for over half of Zambia's population, generates less than one-fifth of GDP. Manufacturing—led by food processing and textiles—contributes 18 percent of GNP. In 1982, GNP was $3.45 billion, $569 per capita. Major exports are copper (89 percent), cobalt (3 percent), zinc (3 percent), and lead. Leading imports are machinery and transport equipment, foodstuffs, electricity, mineral fuels, and chemicals. Zambia's leading trading partners are the European Economic Community countries, Japan, China, and South Africa. Zambia's economy was in a recession throughout 1983 as a result of depressed world prices for copper and cobalt exports.

The major supplier of military materiel has been the USSR with shipments valued at over $215 million in the last 5 years. Historically, shipments from Communist countries have accounted for 70 percent of all support to Zambia. Soviet equipment includes MiG-21 fighters, transports, helicopters, tanks, APCs, field artillery, mortars, SAM missiles, ADA, and small arms. The UK has supplied ADA guns, SAM missiles, and small arms; Italy has shipped utility aircraft, helicopters, and field artillery. Other countries have provided support mainly in training and technical assistance. Otherwise, Zambia is dependent upon foreign suppliers for its military equipment. Earnings from copper and cobalt have provided financing for arms purchases. Indications are that declining foreign exchange reserves have led to the provision of approximately 500 tons of cobalt to the USSR in 1981 to cover overdue payments for armaments.

g. Military and Political Alignment

(U) Zambia follows a policy of nonalignment in its foreign affairs and has taken a leading role in the Nonaligned Movement. It has no formal military alliances; however, it has an informal association with the Frontline States (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe) in opposing the white minority regime in South Africa. Under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Zambia provided a four-person element for the OAU peacekeeping effort in Chad from December 1981 through June 1982.

Zambia has shown a willingness to accept military assistance from virtually any country. Until the mid-1970s it was mainly dependent on the UK for such support, although countries as diverse as Belgium, Canada, Egypt, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iraq, Italy, and Sweden have also provided assistance. The PRC, the USSR, and Yugoslavia began providing military assistance in 1971. With the decline in PRC and Yugoslav aid over the past few
years, the USSR has moved up to become Zambia's largest supplier of armaments. The USSR's assistance was complemented by aid from East Germany and Romania in 1980. In 1981 North Korea also became a source of assistance.

At present India, North Korea, and the USSR, maintain military training missions in Zambia. Zambian military personnel have received military training abroad from a variety of countries including Canada, the PRC, East Germany, India, Ireland, Pakistan, Tanzania, the UK, and the USSR.

h. (U) Key US Officials

Chief of Mission (Lusaka): Ambassador Nicholas Platt
Defense Attache: None
ZAMBIA

2. MILITARY, GENERAL

a. (U) Key Military Officials

Army:
   Commander: Lieutenant General Malimba Masheke
   Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff: Major General Christopher Tembo

Air Force:
   Commander: Major General Hanania Lungu
   Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff: Brig General Herbert Simutowe

Zambian National Service: Brig General T. Faro

Inspector General of Police: Herbert Mapili

b. Position of Armed Forces

The Zambian National Defense Force (ZNDF) is composed of an Army, Air Force, and reserve forces. Major Army units include six regular and three reserve infantry battalions, one artillery regiment, and one armored regiment. The Army, with a strength of about 12,500, overshadows the Air Force, which includes approximately 1,800 men organized into 8 squadrons.

The mission of the ZNDF, which includes regular and reserve units, is to provide internal defense and border security throughout Zambia.

Under the ZNDF reorganization announced in December 1980, all military, paramilitary, and security services were placed under the control of the Secretary of State for Defense and Security, Alexander Grey Zulu. The Ministry of Defense is outside the military chain of command and serves as an administrative adjunct to Secretary Zulu for dealing with military administrative and logistic problems. Tactical command and control is exercised by three brigade headquarters elements in the Army and by the Zambia Air Force Headquarters.

The military has remained basically uninvolved in national politics and has fully carried out President Kaunda's directives in the past. Senior military officers apparently see no reasonable alternative to Kaunda's leadership and do not seem inclined to assume the mantle of power for themselves. In crisis situations, such as the October 1980 coup plot, the Army leadership seems prepared to follow the President. It appears likely that most officers and men would support the Army hierarchy.

The military is on the whole a very conservative organization. The reaction of many senior military personnel to the 1979 Zambian-Soviet Arms Agreement, and the increasing number of Soviet military advisers, has been negative. Numerous military personnel have expressed a view that the $190 million involved in the deal could have been better spent on upgrading military facilities and increasing military pay. The impact of large numbers of junior
personnel recently trained in Soviet and East German military schools upon the currently Western-oriented military remains to be seen, but indications are that these personnel developed a dislike for East-Bloc methods and the clearly racist attitude of their trainers.

The government and the military seem to have little mutual respect; each looks upon the other as incompetent. Kaunda has regularly reshuffled the military high command to prevent a possible concentration of power outside his hands. Throughout 1981 Kaunda became increasingly doubtful about the loyalty of the enlisted and junior officer ranks within the military. In reaction, requirements were issued for all new military recruits to be UNIP members; a political commissar training program was established to insure that UNIP political officers would be available to indoctrinate troops; and a new State House security unit was created. This caused great concern among military officers who probably felt insulted and threatened by these actions. The general public has looked upon the military as a second-rate organization, barely capable of defending the nation.

c. Military Trends and Capabilities

The Zambian military has been going through a process of reorganization with aims of increasing its size and upgrading its equipment. Communist arms have been acquired to expand air and ground assets. The military is primarily a defensive force with no capability to conduct offensive operations beyond its borders. Although Zambia has purchased military arms and equipment from the Soviet Union, it does not have qualified operators and most of the materiel remains in depot storage.

The most significant problems of the Armed Forces are shortages of qualified personnel, poor morale among officers and enlisted men alike, and an increasing lack of discipline. Ethnic and factional discontent, especially among the Bemba-speaking northern peoples, has had an impact within the military and has prompted government actions to limit Bemba and northern influence within the forces.

d. Military Budget

$324 million for fiscal year ending 31 December 1982 or 21 percent of central government budget. No service allocations are available. Dollar values converted from Zambian kwacha at the exchange rate of 0.781 kwacha equals $1.00.

e. (U) Population

6,554,000 as of June 1984
Males (ages 15-49): 1,413,000; physically fit, 737,000
Ethnic Divisions: 98.7 percent Africans, 1.1 percent Europeans, 0.2 percent other
Literacy: 28 percent
3. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

a. Army

(1) Mission

(U) To defend the national territory from outside attack and assist the police in maintaining internal security and public order.

(2) Capabilities

The Zambian Army is a defensive force with no capability to conduct offensive operations beyond its borders. The Army could probably successfully engage a large, slow-moving force from Malawi, Mozambique, or Zaire, or an Angolan force that did not enjoy Cuban troop support. However, the Army would be ineffective in interdicting rapid, short-term border incursions from these states due to logistic and transport problems. The Army is incapable of defending Zambia from border incursions and attacks from Zimbabwe or South Africa. In conjunction with the police, the Army can maintain internal security. Two major force problems are an equipment inventory so diverse it is impossible to maintain, and a shortage of technically qualified personnel.

(3) Personnel Strength

(U) Approximately 12,500 officers and men.

(4) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

The bulk of the Army's strength is assigned to three infantry brigades. Each brigade has two subordinate battalions. Engineer, signal, supply, medical, and maintenance support units are an integral part of each infantry battalion. Additionally, the Army is supported by field artillery batteries, company-size armored units, and antiaircraft artillery batteries. These units are composed of regular troops and may be augmented by the activation of various reserve forces.

(b) Ground Combat Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Tactical Units</th>
<th>Strength Per Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Authorized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Brigade Headquarters</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Infantry Battalions</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Armored Regiment</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Artillery Regiment</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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1 Engineer Regiment Unk Unk
2 Signal Squadrons Unk Unk
2 Transport Squadrons Unk Unk
3 Ordnance and Supply Companies Unk Unk
1 Medical Service Company Unk Unk

(c) Deployment

All units are deployed in-country. The 1st Brigade is headquartered in Lusaka, the 2d Brigade in Kabwe, and 3d Brigade units are concentrated in Ndola. Every 6 months a brigade rotates into Zambia's Western Province and conducts security operations along the Angolan, Namibian, and Botswanan borders. Army units from Ndola have been deployed to the Zaire border to assist police in curbing cross-border banditry and the rising crime wave in the Copperbelt Region.

(5) Weapons and Equipment

(a) General

Most basic infantry weapons in use are from the USSR, PRC, or Yugoslavia. This group includes 7.62-mm rifles and machineguns; 60-mm and 82-mm mortars; 14.5-mm antiaircraft machineguns; and RPG-7 rocket launchers. Chinese, Yugoslav, and Soviet-supplied artillery predominates in the force, as does Soviet-and Chinese-supplied armor. Over the past few years the military has made the transition from Western-supplied transportation vehicles to a wide variety of Soviet-and East European-manufactured vehicles. Most major pieces of equipment in the inventory are not available for use because of poor maintenance, no replacement parts, or lack of qualified operators. The Army has no known war reserve stocks, though the large amount of nonoperational equipment in the inventory would be available for cannibalization.

(b) Ground Weapons and Equipment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Artillery:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130-mm gun</td>
<td>UR, PRC</td>
<td>13+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122-mm howitzer</td>
<td>UR, GDR</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105-mm cannon</td>
<td>YO</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105-mm howitzer</td>
<td>IT</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76-mm field gun</td>
<td>YO, UR, GDR</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122-mm Bm-21 rocket 1chr</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ZAMBIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Air Defense:</strong></th>
<th>23-mm, SP, ZSU -23-4</th>
<th>UR</th>
<th>12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>85-mm ADA</td>
<td>CH</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57-mm ADA</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37-mm ADA</td>
<td>CH, YO</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-mm ADA</td>
<td>YO, EG, UK</td>
<td>60+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAM-7 1chr</td>
<td>IR</td>
<td>32+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Armor:</strong></th>
<th>T-59 tank</th>
<th>CH</th>
<th>20</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T-54 tank</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-34 tank</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT-76 amphibious tank</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRDM-1/2 recon vehicle</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTR-60 APC</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferret Scoutcars</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Mortars:</strong></th>
<th>120-mm mortar</th>
<th>EG</th>
<th>14</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>82-mm mortar</td>
<td>CH</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81-mm mortar</td>
<td>UK, FR</td>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-mm mortar</td>
<td>CH, UK</td>
<td>61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-in mortar</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>AT and Rcl:</strong></th>
<th>84-mm recoilless rifle</th>
<th>SW</th>
<th>40</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>75-mm recoilless rifle</td>
<td>CH</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57-mm antitank gun</td>
<td>EG</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Motor Transport:</strong></th>
<th>7/8-3.4-ton truck</th>
<th>UR</th>
<th>168</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.5-7.5-ton truck</td>
<td>GC, RO, UR, FN, IZ</td>
<td>926</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>over 7.5-ton truck</th>
<th>UR</th>
<th>31</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10-ton Bedford trk</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) **Logistics**

Zambia's Army suffers from a lack of standardization of equipment that impairs its combat capability and makes maintenance extremely difficult. Foreign technicians are hired on a contract basis to provide maintenance support. Zambian indigenous maintenance support is practically nil. Armaments are usually nonoperational because of poor maintenance. Army workshops are responsible for all maintenance that cannot be accomplished at the organic level.

(6) **The Army has been responsible since 1974 for the management of the Mechanical Service Branch (MSB) of the Ministry of Defense. The MSB provides depot-level support to all military vehicles. The increasing downtime and the continuing poor condition of the vehicles have contributed to the poor reputation of the MSB.**
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(7) Personnel Procurement and Retention

The Zambian Army is a volunteer force. Recruits are mainly drawn from those finishing their stint with the Zambian National Service (ZNS). Prospective enlisted personnel must be single, 18-25 years old, and have a junior high school education. Prospective officers must additionally have at least a high school diploma. Recruitment drives are carried out once a year. These drives aim at enlisting approximately 200 officer cadets and 1,100 enlisted personnel for various lengths of service. While the Army apparently has been able to recruit enough manpower for its needs, there is some question as to whether it is getting quality manpower. In Zambia, a trained technician or college-educated person can probably secure better wages and working conditions from the mining corporations. The lack of quality manpower could grow into a major problem as more sophisticated equipment enters the Army inventory.

(8) Training

Basic training is conducted at the Army Training Center in Kabwe. Basic training is essentially the same for officer and enlisted personnel; 14 weeks of basic military skills. Advanced individual training for personnel is conducted at the unit level. Advanced officer and NCO courses are available at the Training Center and at four NCO schools located around the country. The quality of unit training depends upon the unit commander.

(9) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

The Zambian Army reserve structure consists of two organizations: reserve infantry battalions and the Home Guard.

The manpower of the three reserve infantry battalions consists of approximately 3,000 officers and men who have received regular military training or have previous military experience. While poorly equipped, these units have performed moderately well in the past when called up to augment regular forces. These battalions have been called to active duty only two or three times since they were formed.

The Home Guard is a small organization centered on urban areas. It consists of 800-1,000 local volunteers who may or may not have formal military training. Usually organized into company-size units, the Home Guard is largely unequipped and undertrained. Since its creation in 1971, the Home Guard has been called to active duty once, in late 1979, during the height of the Rhodesian war. The callup went very poorly and the volunteers were rapidly demobilized. In early 1983, President Kaunda had announced intentions to expand the Home Guard with an emphasis on aiding the ZNP and Army units in patrolling the border areas. To date no such expansion has been observed.
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(b) Mobilization

(U) All members of the reserve battalions and the Home Guard are subject to mobilization on order of the President, acting as Commander in Chief. Additionally, the President has the power to recall all former Army personnel if he deems it necessary.

b. Navy

(U) The Zambian National Defense Force does not have a naval branch of any type; however, the Police Force does have a Marine Section with a strength of 32 men who operate a variety of launches and small motor boats. The major activity of the Marine Section is antismuggling patrols on Lakes Tanganyika, Mweru, and Kariba.

c. Air Force

(1) Mission

→ To protect Zambian airspace; maintain a tactical strike force; conduct reconnaissance; and provide airlift mobility for the military, police, and executive elements of the Government.

(2) Capabilities

→ The Zambian Air Force (ZAF) is capable of performing only part of its mission. The ZAF is capable of airlifting one or two Army companies, providing VIP transport, and flying reconnaissance in border areas under fair weather conditions. Its poor maintenance record, however, forces many aircraft to stay idle. Armed jet aircraft with inexperienced pilots give the force a minor combat capability, but it lacks the training and equipment to provide effective air defense, close air support, or to conduct successful offensive operations. There are insufficient qualified pilots for most types of aircraft in the inventory. Training of ground crews is ongoing, but the force still depends on foreign personnel to maintain its level of operations.

→ The ZAF has expanded rapidly over the last few years. This expansion has slowed down while the ZAF attempts to train its personnel and integrate the influx of Soviet equipment into its inventory. Currently, the ZAF is one of the largest black African air forces, but its modest combat capabilities compare unfavorably with those of neighboring South Africa and Zimbabwe.

(3) Personnel Strength

→ Estimated strength is approximately 1,800 (about 250 officers and officer cadets). An unknown number of pilots and pilot trainees are in various phases of flight training.
(4)  Aircraft Strength

Total: 160 (62 jet, 57 prop, 41 helicopter)

In operational units: 160
   (28 fighters;
    27 transports;
    64 trainers;
    41 helicopters)

(5)  Organization and Deployment

(a)  General

Early in 1964 the Royal Rhodesian Air Force was transferred almost intact to Southern Rhodesia when the Central African Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was dissolved. An air wing was formed with four C47s and two Pembroke aircraft, with the mission of providing transportation and air reconnaissance support to the ground force. The air wing was renamed the Northern Rhodesian Air Force in March 1964 and became the Zambia Air Force upon independence in October 1964. The Air Force continued to grow, and by 1981 it had reached its present size of eight squadrons: three combat, three transport, and two training. Air Force Headquarters is located in the capital, Lusaka. The ZAF has been known to disperse its aircraft throughout the country. This was done during the height of the Rhodesian raids, probably as a measure to protect the aircraft.

(b)  Summary of Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Principal Bases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 Trnsp Sqdns</td>
<td>DHC-5 Buffalo</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Lusaka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HS-748</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Lusaka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DHC-4 Caribou</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Lusaka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C-54 Skymaster</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Lusaka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DO-28 Skyservant</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Lusaka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yak-40/CODLING</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Lusaka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AB-205A Heli</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Lusaka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AB-206 Heli</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Lusaka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AB-47G Heli</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Lusaka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AB-212 Heli</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Lusaka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HIP (Mi-8) Heli</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Lusaka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Fighter Sqdns</td>
<td>FISHBED (MiG-21)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Lusaka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FARMER (F-6)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Mumbwa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FRESCO (FT-5)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mumbwa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SOKO-CALEB/JASTREB</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Mbala</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Zambia

2 Flight Training Sqdns
- Aermacchi MB-326
- Siai-Marchetti SF-260
- Saab 91 Safir
- Yak-18/MAX
- DHC-2 Beaver
- AB-47G Heli

SAM Unit
- SA-3 GOA lchr

(6) Status of Equipment

Older transport and utility aircraft were acquired from the UK and Canada. Trainers were acquired from the USSR, PRC, Sweden, Yugoslavia, and Italy. Jet fighters were acquired from the PRC and USSR, utility/light transport aircraft from West Germany and the USSR, and helicopters from Italy and the USSR. Most aircraft are operational but require foreign technical assistance for maintenance. In 1980, 14 MiG-21 aircraft, 5 Mi-8 helicopters, and a SA-3 regiment were delivered by the USSR.

(7) Logistics

Fuel has been in short supply at all ZAF bases. ZAF fuel stocks and other essential supplies are inadequate for sustained operations. Aircraft ordnance is sufficient. Each airbase has its own supply depot. Foreign contract and advisory personnel assist the ZAF in routine maintenance.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

The ZAF is composed of native Zambian volunteers except for foreign contract personnel. Competition with private industry for quality recruits is intense. The Air Force tries to recruit junior college and college graduates to fill technician and officer positions, respectively; but persons with this type of training are in high demand by the mining corporations. For non-technical airmen, the Air Force requires a junior high school education. Information regarding possible recruiting shortfalls or retention problems has not been reported.

Morale within the ZAF has declined over the last few years. Officers and enlisted men alike have turned to theft of ZAF property to compensate for their low salaries, which have been frozen since 1980 despite the steady climb in prices of Zambian goods. There is little chance the situation
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will improve since few funds have been allocated for ZAF purchases in 1984. Because most ZAF personnel feel they are not receiving sufficient compensation for their efforts, the quality of their work has also suffered.

(9) Training

Basic and advanced flight training is conducted within Zambia at Mbala and Mumbwa Air Force Bases. Specialized training on new aircraft is conducted out of country.

The ZAF has conducted combat training with its Caleb jets at Mbala since 1972. Both fighter and trainer jets have been observed at various airfields around the country, apparently conducting navigation and orientation flights for trainees. A live-firing range has been established in an area to the south of Mumbwa Air Base. Helicopter training is conducted on AB-47Gs. Basic pilot training for all programs is on the Saab aircraft. Conversion training is conducted on FT-5 (MiG-17) aircraft.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

The ZAF currently has no reserves. An air force auxiliary was included in the National Service Act of 1971, but is not known to have been formed.

(b) Mobilization

All former members of the ZAF are subject to recall by the President in the event of a national emergency.

d. Civil Aviation

(1) Aircraft

Approximately nine civil transport aircraft with a gross takeoff weight of at least 9,000 kilograms currently are registered, owned, or operated in Zambia:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
<th>Owner/Operator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Long-Range Transport Aircraft</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boeing 707-320C</td>
<td>Zambia Airways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium-Range Transport Aircraft</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boeing 737-200</td>
<td>Zambia Airways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Aerospace HS-125-1B</td>
<td>Safari Air Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Aerospace HS-748-2A</td>
<td>Zambia Airways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ZAMBIA

(U) Zambia Airways is wholly Government owned.

(2) Pilots

(U) The total number of licensed civilian pilots of major transport aircraft in Zambia is not known. Zambia Airways employs approximately 100 pilots, of whom over 20 reportedly are Zambian.

(3) Mobilization Potential

(Virtually all of Zambia's indigenous civilian aviation personnel and the civil transport aircraft operated by Zambia Airways could be mobilized in the event of war or comparable national emergency. Without foreign assistance, however, a lack of fully qualified indigenous flight and maintenance personnel could prevent maximum effective use of the mobilized aircraft.

d. Paramilitary Forces

The stature of Zambia's formerly low-budget paramilitary forces has increased dramatically since 1981. President Kaunda developed some doubts as to the reliability and loyalty of his military forces following the October 1980 coup attempt. He is especially concerned about their willingness to back him against internal dissidents or during periods of civil unrest, particularly by the labor unions. In reaction, President Kaunda, at the urging of Secretary of State for Defense and Security Zulu, has upgraded the status and equipment of Zambia's paramilitary forces in an apparent effort to balance the armed power of the military.

(1) Presidential Guard

(a) Mission

The unit's apparent mission is to insure the safety of President Kaunda by providing for his personal security and the security of his residences, particularly the State House in Lusaka.

(b) Capabilities

Training is being provided by a North Korean military team. Present capabilities are unknown.

(c) Strength

Unknown

(d) Organization

Unknown

(e) Status of Equipment

Unknown
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(2) Police Mobile Force Battalion

(a) Mission

(U) To provide an internal security force and to reinforce the military forces and police in an emergency.

(b) Capabilities

(c) Mobile elements are trained in rudimentary police and infantry skills, riot control, and counterinsurgency warfare. They are capable of coping with small-scale riots and tribal conflicts. These units have only minor combat capabilities. Problem areas have been leadership, training, and equipment. During 1981, this unit was twice deployed against striking mineworkers in the Copperbelt and successfully carried out its civil control mission. Elements were also deployed in the Zaire border area on a few occasions to control cross-border banditry and to monitor Zairian occupation of a small strip of Zambian territory on the north edge of Lake Mweru.

(c) Strength

(e) About 700

(d) Organization

(e) The Police Mobile Force Battalion is subordinate to the Zambian National Police Force Headquarters. Battalion personnel are recruited from the regular police. The unit has 16 platoons organized into 4 companies. Battalion headquarters is at Kanifson, near Kitwe. Platoons work in conjunction with Army, police, and Zambian Intelligence and Security Service (ZISS) elements.

(e) Status of Equipment

(e) Materiel is adequate for general duties, but is insufficient for sustained combat. Armament includes MX-3 .303 rifles, West German G-3 7.62-mm assault rifles; Sterling 9-mm submachineguns; Bren Mk-3 machineguns, some shotguns, riot guns, and tear gas; shields and batons; and a few 60-mm and 81-mm mortars. Land Rovers are assigned for transport. Maintenance has been poor.

(3) Police Paramilitary Battalion

(a) Mission

(U) To guard vital installations throughout Zambia and to provide a force to assist in the maintenance of law and order, particularly along the borders.
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(b) Capabilities

Little is known of the capabilities of this particular unit. The basic and ongoing training of paramilitary personnel appears to be much more like that of infantry than of police. An apparent major deficiency of the unit is that it has no organic transportation assets and must draw on the inefficient Lusaka police motorpool for support. Thus, it is unlikely that the unit could rapidly or effectively carry out the border patrol part of its mission. During 1981, the unit successfully blocked a demonstration by University of Zambia students directed against the US Embassy.

(c) Strength

(U) About 700

(d) Organization

(U) Headquartered at Lilayi, near Lusaka, the Police Paramilitary Battalion has four operational companies. Each of the companies has 4 operational platoons, each consisting of 40 men, which are designed to function as separate units.

(e) Status of Equipment

(U) Armament includes West German HK 7.62-mm rifles, HK 11 light machineguns, Sten 9-mm submachineguns, Browning 9-mm pistols, 12 20-mm Oerlikon cannons, and 81-mm mortars. This unit received an infusion of new Soviet equipment in 1981.

(4) Zambian National Police (ZNP)

(a) Mission

(U) The mission of the ZNP is to preserve the peace, prevent and detect crime, and to apprehend criminals throughout the Republic.

(b) Capabilities

(U) The ZNP has become increasingly ineffective over the past few years. The police are ill trained, badly equipped, corrupt, poorly led, and suffer from internal tribal rivalries. One informed observer estimated that it would take 20 years to rebuild the police if the process were begun today. Security is better in the Copperbelt Region than in any other area because of the presence of somewhat efficient private police forces employed by Zambia's major mining companies. The reported crime rate has risen over 800 percent since 1979.

(c) Strength

(U) The ZNP has an authorized strength of near 12,000, but it is known to be considerably understrength.
ZAMBIA

(d) Organization

(U) The ZNP is headquartered in Lusaka and divided into nine police divisions based on Zambia's eight provinces, plus Lusaka. Additionally, there are four special divisions: the Mobile Unit; the Paramilitary Battalion (see 3 above); the Police Training School; and the 140-man Railroad Police formed in 1975 to provide security for the TANZAM Railroad. Additionally, there is a Zambian Police Reserve with a strength of around 1,600, concentrated in the main population areas.

(e) Status of Equipment

ZNP officers are authorized to carry weapons in the performance of their duties. In the past, UK-supplied pistols and rifles have been the norm. Circumstances in which force may be used are restricted. Lack of operational vehicles is a major shortcoming of the ZNP.

(5) Zambian National Service (ZNS)

(a) Mission

(U) The ultimate mission of the ZNS is to prepare Zambia's future leaders--its youth--to serve the nation. This mission is accomplished by conducting training in leadership; UNIP political ideology; basic military skills; and developmental skills, with particular emphasis on agricultural subjects. After a state of emergency has been declared by the President, he may order the ZNS, or any part thereof, to serve with the defense forces.

(b) Capabilities

(U) The ZNS is capable of routine security duties, but its combat capability is negligible. ZNS cadre personnel have received training in Tanzania, the PRC, and most recently East Germany in a variety of skills, including paramilitary training techniques. North Korean military and East German civilian advisers are acting as instructors at ZNS camps. In 1976 and 1977, during the Rhodesian War crisis, ZNS personnel were mobilized and successfully carried out support missions for the Army. In recent years indications are that the ZNS has degenerated into an inefficient organization. A revitalization program is underway.

(c) Strength

(U) An undetermined number of men and women form a permanent ZNS cadre. Approximately 15-20,000 individuals between the ages of 18 and 35 are actively participating in ZNS training at any one time.
(d) Organization

The ZNS was removed from the defense force structure and placed under the Ministry of Youth and Sports in 1981. This shift was made in reaction to widespread public criticism over the poor conditions in ZNS camps. The ZNS operates 12 training centers around the nation. Members of the permanent cadre are seconded from the Army or recruited from among individuals completing their ZNS training. All male Zambians who have completed the Form V level of education (high school) must serve a 20-month tour in the ZNS, though this time need not be served consecutively. Female Form V graduates are also required to serve, but the only ZNS camp for females was closed in 1981. Other young persons of at least 14 years of age may enlist for tours of varying lengths.

(e) Status of Equipment

The force is equipped mostly with small arms provided by the PRC, mainly Type 56 carbines, and perhaps some machineguns. Maintenance is poor overall.

(f) Total Military Personnel Strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>12,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>1,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paramilitary*</td>
<td>1,400+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15,700+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Only the Presidential Guard, the Police Mobile Force Bn, and the Police Paramilitary Bn are capable of making a significant contribution to Zambia's overall combat strength at any given time.

(g) Foreign Military Presence

- **India:** 74 (Three officers and 70 EM provide staff and technical assistance.)

  73 contract military personnel with the Army

  1 Air Force adviser

- **United Kingdom:** None

- **Italy:** None

  (Two Italian Aermacchi civilian contract maintenance technicians work with ZAF at Mumbwa AFB.)
**ZAMBIA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Receiver</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>40 military advisers, 25 Army advisers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Assembling MiG-21 aircraft and SA-3 system components; training MiG-21 pilots; servicing Mi-8 helicopters and Yak-40 aircraft; training Army air defense and armor personnel.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>Army advisors</td>
<td>60-70</td>
<td>(Providing training to the Army, ZNS, and paramilitary personnel.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td>(Maintenance of Yugoslav equipment will be provided on a contract basis.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act.
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1. GOVERNMENT

a. Key Government Officials

President: Dr. Canaan Banana
Prime Minister and Minister of Defense: Dr. Robert Mugabe
Minister of Home Affairs: Mr. Simbi Veke Mubako
Minister of State in the Prime Minister's Office: Mr. Emmerson Munangagwa*
Minister of State in the Prime Minister's Office: Mr. Ernest Kadungure**
Chief, Central Intelligence Organization (internal security/counterintelligence/foreign intelligence): Mr. Sam Magadza

b. Type and Stability of Government

(U) After 15 years of white minority rule and a 7-year insurgency by the black majority population, the former British Colony of Southern Rhodesia became the independent Republic of Zimbabwe on 18 April 1980. Under the Lancaster House Accords, which set the stage for independence, the form of government must remain a British-style parliamentary democracy at least until 1987, unless a unanimous vote by Parliament approves a change. Additionally, the right to organize political parties is also guaranteed under these accords.

(U) Executive authority lies with a 28-member Cabinet led by the Prime Minister. Legislative authority resides in a Parliament consisting of a 100-member House of Assembly and a 40-member Senate, which serves basically as an advisory body. Within the House, 20 seats are reserved by the Constitution for representatives of the 140,000 whites who make up about 2 percent of the population. The remaining seats are controlled by three black nationalist parties—Prime Minister Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU), which is primarily composed of persons from the Shona ethnic groups who make up 70 percent of the population; Joshua Nkomo's Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), which is primarily composed of persons from the Matabele (Ndebele) ethnic group who make up 25 percent of the population; and Bishop Abel Muzorewa's United African National Congress (UANC), which is also a predominantly Shona-based organization. In the March 1980 elections, ZANU won a parliamentary majority of 57 seats, ZAPU won 20 seats, and UANC 3. Though political and military rivals during the independence struggle, ZANU and ZAPU formed a coalition government after the elections in a spirit of national reconciliation. This coalition probably prevented a postindependence civil war by allowing both parties to better monitor the activities of the other, to jointly supervise the creation of a new national military composed of ZANU, ZAPU,

* Mr. Munangagwa has functional responsibility for state security and supervisory responsibility for the civil intelligence/counterintelligence services.

** Mr. Kadungure monitors the Defense Portfolio for the Prime Minister.
and former Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF) personnel, and to share the spoils of government patronage. The next elections will be held in 1985.

By January 1981 the coalition government between ZANU and ZAPU had fallen apart as Prime Minister Mugabe moved to discredit his political rivals. Mugabe's apparent strategy was to weaken the opposition to the point where it could be quietly absorbed by ZANU, thus bringing about a de facto, if not de jure, one-party state. Within ZANU, however, a powerful radical political faction was pushing Mugabe to forego his careful political maneuvering and instead move rapidly to crush all opposition. Successfully balancing the radicals, Mugabe achieved some success in his efforts: UANC was convincingly portrayed as an irrelevant political force with possible links to South Africa and unworthy of political support; the white political community was split with half of the white representatives in the House breaking away from the Republican Front Party (RF) of preindependence Prime Minister Ian Smith and striking out as independents; and Nkomo was reduced from the important position of Minister of Home Affairs to the largely irrelevant position of Minister Without Portfolio. In January 1982, Nkomo and two other ZAPU Ministers were dismissed from the Cabinet and three important members of ZAPU (including the Deputy Commander of the Army) were arrested after large illegal arms caches were uncovered on property owned by ZAPU. While UANC and the RF now, called the Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe, have become increasingly alienated from Mugabe.

Since early 1983, the political situation between ZANU and ZAPU has continued to degenerate. The increasingly ascendent radical faction within ZANU apparently succeeded in convincing Mugabe that growing ZAPU dissidence (see para. 1.c. below) must be destroyed in its initial stages. In response, Mugabe ordered the military to "crush" the ZAPU dissidents. In the forefront of the initial military effort was the North Korean-trained, all ZANU 5th Brigade, which, during early and mid-1983, conducted a systematic campaign of terror and intimidation against the general populace in Matabeleland. This campaign was a bitter pill for the Ndebele to swallow and set the stage for violent, popularly supported ethnic conflict. Accusations of atrocities committed by the 5th Brigade against the Ndebeles caused the Prime Minister in June 1983 to appoint a Commission of Inquiry to investigate ZNA behavior in Matabeleland, where the vast majority of the Ndebele people reside. As of late 1984, the findings of the commission had not yet been made public by the GOZ. However, a major anti-dissident military operation in Matabeleland in February and March 1984 brought new allegations of ZNA excesses against the Ndebeles, including the claim that the Army was systematically starving them by preventing the delivery of vital food supplies.

c. Internal Threat

Responding to the rising political friction between Mugabe and Nkomo, approximately 5,000 of the 18,000 ZAPU guerrillas who were incorporated into a new national military following independence have deserted since early 1981. Of these individuals, about 600-1,000 have become engaged in armed dissidence against the government. Their activities have been centered in the
western half of the country (Matabeleland) where ZAPU's ethnic base is strongest. Operating in small groups of up to 40 men, the dissidents have struck at local government institutions—such as schools, agricultural centers, and police stations—and engaged in small-scale banditry. In late 1982, the dissidents began to use terrorist tactics aimed at intimidating the local population into supporting them, or at least not supporting the government. Between late 1982 and early 1984, a number of prominent white farmers, the backbone of Matabeleland's commercial agriculture industry, were ambushed and murdered. Ndebele men, women, and children were regularly brutalized and murdered for suspected collaboration with government security forces. The dissidents reinstituted mutilation, a practice not used since the 1965-80 guerrilla war, in reprisal against suspected government informers. Although a large number of the dissidents are probably nothing more than bandits operating under no central authority, a certain percentage probably belong to several organized, anti-government guerrilla movements. One of the largest and most active insurgent groups is "Super ZAPU," which operates from bases in Botswana and possibly South Africa. Whether or not this dissent develops into a full-scale insurgency depends upon the future relationship of ZANU and ZAPU, the effectiveness of government counterinsurgency operations, and the amount of support the dissidents are able to obtain from the local Ndebele and from external sources. However, the dissident problem will not be resolved in the near future.

d. External Threat

South Africa is the only external threat to Zimbabwe. The relationship between the two states is tense and could rapidly deteriorate into conflict. Pretoria fears that Mugabe will allow anti-South Africa insurgents to stage from Zimbabwe. To preclude this, South Africa has applied economic and military pressure to remind Harare of its economic dependence on South Africa and the price Zimbabwe would pay for supporting such insurgents. Notably, South Africa supported guerrillas in neighboring Mozambique—the National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO)—have regularly attacked the road and rail lines which provide Zimbabwe its only alternative to South Africa for an outlet to the sea. In response, Mugabe has deployed elements of three battalions, 1,500 to 2,000 men, to Mozambique. These troops not only assist the Mozambique Armed Forces (MAF) in providing security for the railroad and oil pipeline running from the port of Beira in Mozambique to Zimbabwe, but also provide security on the road that runs from Zimbabwe through Tete Province in Mozambique to Malawi. Reporting has also indicated that the Republic of South Africa may be a source of some weapons, supplies, and training to "Super ZAPU" and several other smaller dissident groups operating in Matabeleland.

e. Communist Influence

No Communist party exists in Zimbabwe, and it is unlikely that such an organization would be welcome. Though Mugabe and the left wing of ZANU are self-proclaimed Marxists, their political and economic philosophy is much closer to socialism, allowing for the existence of private property and competition in the economic sphere.
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Because of past Soviet, East German, and Cuban support for ZAPU, Mugabe has been cautious in developing a relationship with these states. He demanded a Soviet renouncement of ZAPU ties prior to the establishment of diplomatic relations on 18 February 1981. Zimbabwe seems to be important to the Soviets' apparent southern Africa strategy of fostering an unstable political situation throughout the region, with emphasis on destabilizing the Republic of South Africa. Owing to its central location, Zimbabwe is a natural base for staging guerrilla infiltration into South Africa. So far, Mugabe has refused to allow such activity to be carried out from Zimbabwean soil. Certainly, the Soviets would prefer to see a radical government installed in Zimbabwe that would be more receptive to Moscow's adventurism.

f. Economic Factors

Manufacturing, Zimbabwe's single largest economic sector, contributes nearly a quarter of the country's GDP. However, foreigners hold two-thirds of Zimbabwe's capital stock. Although contributing less than 10 percent of GDP in the past, mining provides over half of Zimbabwe's export earnings. Zimbabwe's agricultural sector, generating one-fifth of GDP, enables this country to be self-sufficient in most foods. However, in 1983 Zimbabwe had to import maize for the first time due to severe drought conditions. In 1982, GDP was $6.75 billion, $832 per capita. Major exports are ferrochrome, gold, tobacco, asbestos, copper, and tin. Leading imports are machinery, petroleum products, wheat, and transport equipment. Major trading partners are South Africa, West Germany, the United Kingdom, and the US.

g. Military and Political Alignment

Zimbabwe follows a policy of nonalignment in its foreign policy, and since independence has taken a leading role in the Nonaligned Movement. It has no formal military alliances; however, a defense protocol with Mozambique does exist under which the two countries have agreed to "support" each other in the face of South African military attacks or subversion.

The West continues to enjoy a very positive image because of past economic and political support. Zimbabwe's foreign policy focuses on contributing to stability in southern Africa by playing a constructive role as a member of the Front Line States, which champions majority rule for Namibia and South Africa, and as a member of the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference, which seeks to develop a degree of regional economic independence from South Africa. Concomitantly, Zimbabwe seeks to avoid antagonizing South Africa to the point where it will bring to bear its massive economic and military power against Zimbabwe.

Prior to independence, the worldwide arms embargo against the then Rhodesian Government precluded close military associations with any country but South Africa. Over the past 4 years, however, Zimbabwe has moved to upgrade its largely obsolete inventory of armaments. Replacement equipment is being selected on the basis of its compatibility with the present inventory, quality of manufacture, and cost. When new equipment is offered free of charge, however, it
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is gratefully accepted from whatever source. Since independence, Zimbabwe has signed major arms agreements with the UK, China, Brazil, and Spain. In 1982 it accepted a major grant of equipment from North Korea. During 1983, Zimbabwe signed two agreements with Italy, one for a SF-260 turbo-prop aircraft worth $500,000 and the other for two AB-412 helicopters worth $4 million. Zimbabwe also ordered 20 type-63 light tanks, 63 107-mm fieldguns, and 30 37-mm AA guns from China worth a total of $7 million. An agreement was concluded with Brazil for the purchase of 95 Cascavel armored cars, rifles, and ammunition. Zimbabwe may have concluded an arms agreement with Libya. Over the next few years the military will be shopping on the world market for a wide variety of army and air force equipment including communications gear, transport vehicles, maintenance equipment, ground combat vehicles, and transport aircraft. Additionally, it will be in the market for spare parts, particularly to maintain former guerrilla weapons that have been incorporated in the inventory and munitions.

Since independence, a British military advisory team has been present in Zimbabwe. Initially involved in forming a new national military, it now focuses on improving the quality of the military school system. To maintain Zimbabwe's nonaligned bona fides, in 1981 Mugabe accepted North Korean military assistance. From November 1981 until July 1982, a North Korean military training team formed, equipped, and trained the 5th Brigade at Inyanga. Most of this team departed Zimbabwe in July when the training was completed. However, a second similar team arrived in September of 1982 to provide training for the newly formed Presidential Guard Brigade and the People's Militia. Most of these North Korean advisers had departed Zimbabwe by the summer of 1983. Smaller North Korean training teams are working with the People's Militia and armored units. A small People's Republic of China military team is in the country providing field artillery and tank gunnery training and advising the Presidential Guard Brigade. Pakistani Air Force pilots, pilot instructors, and maintenance technicians are currently assigned to the Air Force of Zimbabwe. They are partially filling the vacancies left by departing white Rhodesian Air Force personnel and British Air Force advisers.

Zimbabwe has also sent hundreds of former guerrillas abroad for training in conventional military skills. Countries which have provided training assistance since independence include Bulgaria, Cuba, Canada, Egypt, Greece, Italy, Libya, Nigeria, North Korea, Pakistan, Romania, Spain, Syria, Tanzania, the UK, the US, and Yugoslavia. Training in the United States was begun in 1982 for Zimbabwe Air Force personnel and in 1983 for Zimbabwe National Army members.

h. (U) Key US Officials

Chief of Mission (Harare): Ambassador David C. Miller, Jr.
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2. MILITARY, GENERAL

a. Key Military Officials

Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA):
Commander: Lt Gen Rex Nhongo
Chief of Staff: Maj Gen Sheba Gaya
Commander, 1st Bde: Brigadier Edzai Chanyuka
Commander, 2d Bde: Brigadier Kindness Ndlovu
Commander, 3d Bde: Brigadier Chimombe
Commander, 4th Bde: Brigadier Ben Nleya
Commander, 5th Bde: Brigadier Dominic Chinenge
Commander, Presidential Guard Brigade: Colonel T. Nyika
Commander, 1st Parachute Group: Lt Col Lionel Dyke

Air Force of Zimbabwe (AFZ):
Commander: Air Marshal Azim Daudpota
Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff: Air Vice Marshal Josiah Tungamirai

Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) Commissioner: Wiridzayi "Willie" Nguruve

b. Position of Armed Forces

The Zimbabwean military is composed of an Army, Air Force, and reserve force. The ZNA with a strength of about 40,200 overshadows the 1,500-man AFZ.

The Zimbabwean military chain of command extends from the Prime Minister, who concurrently serves as Minister of Defense, to the commanders of the Army and Air Force. The Service commanders exercise command of major subordinate units. Mr. Ernest Kadungure, the Minister of State for Defense, monitors the defense portfolio on a day-to-day basis. Additionally, there is a Defense Council composed of the commanders of the ZNA and AFZ, which meets monthly with the Minister of Defense to discuss defense policy. Within the military structure, there is a Commander's Council composed of the commanders, deputy commanders, and chiefs of staff of the ZNA and AFZ, which meets every 2 weeks to discuss service and interservice problems.

The Armed Forces have traditionally avoided involvement in national politics. However, the integration of large numbers of ZANU and ZAPU personnel, who retain an intense loyalty to their parent organizations, has resulted in the politicalization of the military. On the whole, the AFZ and ZNA appear to be loyal to the Government and prepared to carry out Government directives against any external threat. It is unlikely, however, that ZANU or ZAPU personnel would fight against members of their own faction. Members of the armed forces who previously served in the old Rhodesian military are conservative in their outlook, anti-Communist, and pro-US. Members of ZANU and ZAPU profess a radical political outlook, but tend to lack a commitment to Marxist principles and an understanding of Marxist philosophy; both groups are conservative in their social relationships. ZAPU personnel tend to admire the Soviets, East Germans, and Cubans from whom they received military training and equipment when they were a fledgling guerrilla army. ZANU personnel distrust the supporters of their rival
organization, ZAPU, and are sympathetic to the Bulgarians, Chinese, Romanians, Yugoslavs, and North Koreans for their past support of ZANU. Neither ZAPU nor ZANU personnel appear to have any strong positive or negative feelings regarding the US.

The mission of the Zimbabwe military is to protect the national territory and to maintain internal security.

c. Military Trends and Capabilities

Despite force development problems, the Zimbabwe military is capable of defending the nation against any neighboring country with the exception of South Africa. The military can successfully conduct joint conventional or counterinsurgency operations throughout Zimbabwe and to a lesser extent in neighboring Mozambique, Zambia, and Botswana.

The most significant military trend of the past 4 years has been the increased size of the military. Military personnel strength had reached the 38,000 mark by independence. Even with the disbanding of many former Rhodesian units and the loss of white manpower, the number of persons in uniform had grown to about 55,000 by 1982 as a result of the force integration process. The projected financial burden of maintaining a force this size was judged to be unacceptable, and a voluntary demobilization program was implemented in 1982 designed to stabilize the military at a strength of approximately 37,000 by enticing former guerrillas to resign to civilian life. This program is managed by the Demobilization Directorate of the Ministry of Labor and Social Services. It provides financial support to ex-servicemen for up to 2 years while they learn civilian skills. Unfortunately, the program got off to a bad start as the first group of personnel to participate were not paid for over 3 months. In 1983, the total military strength stabilized at approximately 43,000. This halt in the demobilization was due to a combination of the poor security situation in Matabeleland and the potential adverse effects on the economy of a large number of unemployed soldiers. Should the internal security and economic situations improve, the demobilization may be continued until the 37,000-man strength level is reached.

The decision of the government in 1982 to form exclusively ZANU military units had a negative impact on the morale, cohesiveness, and effectiveness of the Zimbabwean military. The Presidential Guard Brigade was designed to provide an unquestionably loyal force to protect the residences and offices of the President and Prime Minister. The all ZANU, North Korean-advised 5th Brigade was created to put down internal civil disturbances. Equipped as a combined-arms brigade with organic armor and artillery, it had the potential of becoming the strongest unit in the ZNA. Although both units are formally in the ZNA chain of command, operational control initially was exercised directly by the Prime Minister's office. Consequently, ZAPU and former RSP personnel viewed these units as a manifestation of the government's lack of trust in the integrated regular Army and as potential instruments of repression. These fears were borne true in early 1983, when the 5th Brigade was used in antidissident operations in Matabeleland. The brigade, manned entirely by Shona-speaking,
card-carrying ZANU members, committed a large number of brutal excesses against the Ndebele civilian populace during its pursuit of ZIPRA guerrillas. The extensive atrocities committed by the 5th Brigade alienated the local population, turned them toward the dissidents, and embarrassed the Mugabe government. As relatively few bona fide dissidents were killed or captured, the military operation was considered a failure.

After this military and political fiasco, the Government reevaluated its use of the 5th Brigade to spearhead counterinsurgency operations. The 5th Brigade was withdrawn from Matabeleland and operational control of it reverted to the ZNA. Advisers from the British Military Assistance Training Team (BMATT) were given the mission of instilling discipline in and retraining the brigade.

1983 saw the emergence of the Government's dependence upon another unit to conduct counterinsurgency operations in Matabeleland and neighboring Botswana. The 1st Parachute Battalion was reorganized, enlarged, and redesignated the 1st Parachute Group. A racially integrated unit, many of the officers and NCOs in 1st Parachute Group are veterans of RSF units such as the Rhodesian African Rifles, the Rhodesia Light Infantry, and the Selous Scouts. Consequently, the unit has a large reservoir of experience in fighting a counterinsurgency. Additionally, the group commander was given the authority to recruit the best soldiers from other ZNA infantry brigades to fill out the Group's newly formed parachute battalion and Special Air Service (SAS) squadron. The 1st Parachute Group spearheaded ZNA counterinsurgency operations in late 1983 and early 1984 both in Matabeleland and neighboring Botswana. The unit rapidly won a reputation as an effective counterinsurgency force. It is reportedly a very well-disciplined organization whose members have rarely been involved in committing abuses against civilians. The 1st Parachute Group has rapidly gained the confidence of both the Army Commander and the Prime Minister.

The Zimbabwe military is now engaged in two campaigns, one in Zimbabwe and the other in Mozambique. Major antidissident operations are currently being conducted in Matabeleland North and South by elements of the 1st, 4th, and 5th Brigades; the Presidential Guard Brigade; 1st Parachute Group; 1 Commando Battalion; and Grey's Scouts. Two other forces, one from the 2nd Brigade and the other from the 1st Mechanized Battalion, are deployed inside Mozambique to defend Zimbabwe's vital lines of communication against attack by RENAMO. Between 1,500 and 2,000 troops are guarding the oil pipeline, railroad, and highway running from Beira through Sofala and Manica Provinces to Mutare on the Mozambique-Zimbabwe border. Another smaller mechanized element is providing convoy security on the road running from Nyamapanda through Mozambique's Tete Province to the Malawi border.

d. Military Budget

$402.99 million for fiscal year ending 30 June 1983; 11.9 percent of the central government budget (Army, $329.24 million; Air Force $64.56 million; paramilitary forces, $7.7 million; Ministry of Defense $1.46 million). Dollar values converted from Zimbabwean dollars at the exchange rate of .867 dollar equals US $1.00.
e. (U) Population

8,325,000 as of June 1984

Males (ages 15-49): 1,788,000; physically fit, 1,098,000

Ethnic Divisions: African--98 percent; European--about 2 percent; colored (mixed blood) and Asians--less than 0.5 percent

Literacy: 25-30 percent overall; nearly 100 percent among Europeans
ZIMBABWE

3. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

a. Army

(1) Mission

(\textit{\textbullet}) To protect the national territory and to maintain internal security.

(2) Capabilities

(\textit{\textbullet}) The Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) is capable of defending the nation against any neighboring countries with the exception of South Africa. The Army can conduct conventional or counterinsurgency operations throughout Zimbabwe and to a lesser extent in neighboring Mozambique, Zambia, and Botswana.

(\textit{\textbullet}) The new Zimbabwe National Army has been plagued by several problems since its inception in 1980. A major weakness is the lack of cohesiveness and esprit de corps among the three factions integrated to form the new Army. The spillover of ethnic and political conflicts into unit garrisons resulted in the breakup of many of the newly integrated units. Many of the white RSF personnel and ex-ZIPRA combatants have left the Army, leaving it staffed largely with former black RSF and ZANLA soldiers. The Army has suffered from an exodus of white officers and NCOs which has caused a lack of mid-level managers and technicians. However, this problem has not affected the Army as adversely as the Air Force.

(\textit{\textbullet}) The operational effectiveness of the Army also has been limited by a shortage of close air support and transport aircraft. As many of the Air Force aircraft have reached the end of their operational lives and must be replaced with new aircraft, the Army's planning for both training exercises and actual counterinsurgency operations has been severely constrained.

(3) Personnel Strength

(\textit{\textbullet}) Authorized active duty strength is 41,519. Actual strength is about 40,200.

(4) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

(\textit{\textbullet}) The major Army units include 5 infantry brigades that control a total of 18 subordinate battalions. Each infantry brigade has attached engineer, signal, maintenance, finance, medical, and military police units. The brigades are responsible for areas within the country and for security along given sections of Zimbabwe's borders. 1st Brigade HQ is in Bulawayo, 2d Brigade HQ is in Harare, 3d Brigade HQ is in Mutare, 4th Brigade HQ is in Masvingo, and
5th Brigade is in Guinea Fowl. Independent units include one each commando, horse-mounted infantry, and mechanized infantry battalion; an armored regiment (3 armored car squadrons); a tank regiment; a field artillery regiment (4 batteries); an air defense artillery regiment; a parachute group (2 parachute battalions and a Special Air Services Squadron); and the Presidential Guard Brigade (3 battalions).

(b) **Ground Combat Units**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Strength Per Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Permanent Force</td>
<td>Authorized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Brigade Headquarters</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Presidential Guard Brigade Headquarters</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Parachute Group Headquarters</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Air Defense Artillery Regiment</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Armored Regiment</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Artillery Regiments</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Tank Regiment</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Infantry Battalions</td>
<td>1,024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Parachute Battalions</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Commando Battalion</td>
<td>1,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Mounted Infantry Battalion (Greys Scouts)</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Presidential Guard Battalions</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Mechanized Battalion</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) **Deployment**

Infantry units are deployed throughout the country within brigade areas of responsibility. However, battalions from a brigade may be placed under the operational control of another brigade or Army Headquarters when conducting operations in the other brigade's area of responsibility. Other combat units, such as the parachute group, armored regiment, and the specialized infantry units, tend to be based in the capital city of Harare and deployed to brigade areas as needed. Additionally, district commands exist in Bulawayo and Harare to administer combat, combat support, service support, and reserve units that support the Army as a whole.

(5) **Weapons and Equipment**

(a) **General**

The equipment in the ZNA inventory is somewhat obsolete by Western standards. Large amounts of modern armaments manufactured in a variety of Communist states (which were previously in guerrilla hands) are being integrated into army stocks as the force integration process continues. The
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North Koreans provided a major infusion of armor, artillery, and small arms in 1981. Delivery of 90 Cascavel armored cars from Brazil was made in mid-1984. It is likely that the Zimbabwean Army will seek replacement parts for some of its Western equipment that is still usable, such as the 81-mm mortars and 106-mm recoilless rifles.

Concerning armored transport vehicles, the old Rhodesian Army had converted numerous trucks of various sizes into lightly armored mine-resistant transport vehicles by replacing bodies of the vehicles. The converted vehicles, which bear names such as Kudu, Tusker, Rhino, Puma, Hippo, Cougar, Leopard, and Crocodile, remain in the ZNA inventory and constitute the main form of troop transport.

(b) Ground Weapons and Equipment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Armor:</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tank -55</td>
<td>PL, UR, NK</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank, Type 68 (T-55 equivalent)</td>
<td>NK</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank, Type 59</td>
<td>PRC, NK</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank, T-34</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank, PT-76</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTR-152 armored personnel carrier (APC)</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRDM-II ARC</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crocodile APC</td>
<td>ZI, Unk</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferret scout car</td>
<td>UK, SF</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eland armored car, VA-60, VA-90</td>
<td>SF</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cascavel armored cars</td>
<td>BR</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Artillery:</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>122-mm howitzer</td>
<td>NK, PRC</td>
<td>4+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122-mm gun</td>
<td>NK</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88-mm (25 lb) field gun</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76-mm antitank gun</td>
<td>YU, NK, UR</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37-mm air defense gun</td>
<td>YU, UR, CH</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-mm AAMG</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.5-mm AAMG (ZPU-1, 2, 4)</td>
<td>NK, UR, CH, Yo</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mortars:</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>120-mm mortar</td>
<td>YU, NK</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82-mm mortar</td>
<td>NK</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81-mm mortar</td>
<td>UK, SF</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-mm mortar</td>
<td>GE</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-mm mortar</td>
<td>ZI</td>
<td>1,500+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rkt Lchr &amp; Rcl Rifles</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>107-mm rocket launcher</td>
<td>NK</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5-in rocket launcher</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88-mm rocket launcher</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-mm rocket launcher</td>
<td>NK</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106-mm recoilless rifle</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82-mm recoilless rifle</td>
<td>YO, NK</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75-mm recoilless rifle</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motor Transport</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/4-ton Land Rover trk</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haflander jeep trk</td>
<td>AU</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5-ton trk</td>
<td>NK</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton Bedford trk</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.35-ton Trk</td>
<td>NK</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton Mercedes trk</td>
<td>SF</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K-61 Tracked amphibioues</td>
<td>NK</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT-S Prime mover</td>
<td>NK</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSP Ferry vehicle</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) Personnel Procurement and Retention

(6) The Zimbabwean Government abolished conscription at independence. Recruitment has been limited to equipment technicians in order to give former guerrilla personnel priority placement.

(6) Retention of white officers and skilled technicians is a problem for the Army. Many are naturally reluctant to serve with their former opponents. Efforts to retain these personnel have centered around appeals to their esprit de corps and military professionalism, but have been largely unsuccessful. Reportedly, up to 95 percent of the white personnel present at independence have left the Army. Replacements are being drawn from ZANU and ZAPU officer and technical personnel, but these men lack the conventional unit experience to be effective at the present time.

(6) Fortunately for the Army, the majority of black NCOs and enlisted personnel carried over from the old force have elected to remain in service. These personnel have proven invaluable to the developing ZNA as training cadres, a professional NCO corps, and a source of skilled junior officer personnel.

(7) Logistics

(7) At present, the ZNA's logistics system remains capable of moving and supporting units inside Zimbabwe. The loss of most of the service's white technicians, however, has left the future of the ZNA logistics system in a questionable state. Vehicle maintenance facilities are understaffed and backlogged. Unit maintenance is being done at minimal levels. Former guerrilla
technicians are generally unfamiliar with Western-style equipment and maintenance techniques, though, as part of the British military assistance program, training is being provided to these individuals.

The old Rhodesian Army always worked from minimum supply and ammunition stock levels as a result of the UN arms embargo against the Rhodesian Government, which was lifted at independence. The explosions at the Inkomo Ammunition Depot in July 1981 destroyed over 60 percent of the Army's pre-independence ammunition stocks and caused the military to begin using former guerrilla arms and ammunition as the mainstay of the operational inventory. During 1983, Zimbabwe concluded a number of agreements for the purchase of small arms, mortar, and artillery ammunition from both Western and Eastern bloc suppliers.

(8) Training

As part of the integration process, a British military training team was running a program to convert former guerrillas into regular soldiers. The program was designed to produce battalion-size infantry units. The training cycle was 8 weeks long and divided into officer, NCO, and enlisted sections. The class standing of a person at the end of the training session determined his position in the new unit so that the number one graduate of the officer section became the battalion commander. One British officer and NCO stayed with each unit after training to continue conventional military instruction at the unit's garrison location. This program was completed in November 1981. During 1982 the British continued providing battalion-level advisers to conduct unit training. They also began a program to upgrade the quality and curriculum at the ZNA's numerous military schools. In 1983, the British instructors were concentrated at the Staff College, Military Academy, and Battalion Battle School. The Staff College, located at King George VI Barracks in Harare, is the site of the Intermediate Staff Course, which prepares officers for staff appointments in the ranks of Major and Lieutenant Colonel. The Junior Staff Course, scheduled to begin in early 1984, will prepare junior officers for staff appointments. The Foundation Course, Company Commander Course, and Battle Group Commanders Course are taught at the Zimbabwe Military Academy at Gweru. The first Battalion Battle School Course began at Iyanga in September 1983.

(9) Reserves

In late 1982, the People's Militia was formed to replace the old, white-dominated Rhodesian Territorial Army, which had been allowed to degenerate since independence, as the reserve component of the ZNA. The basic regulations of the Territorial Army Act were adopted to govern the new militia force. The first increment of 750 militia cadre and soldiers were trained at the Paradise Camp training center near Bindura. The first militia unit was
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established in Gokwe District, which borders Matabeleland North, in early 1983. Training of militia personnel has continued since that time.

(a) Mission

(U) To serve as a reserve back-up force to the ZNA and police by providing local area security, reinforcing the ZNA and police in anti-dissident operations, and, most importantly, gathering intelligence on anti-government dissidents.

(b) Capabilities

(U) The Militia is still under formation and has achieved only a marginal operational capability.

(c) Personnel Strength

(U) The present strength of the People's Militia is estimated at 6,000 to 8,000. Its target strength is 20,000. The early increments of militia trainees were trained by the North Koreans. Numbering about 1,000, these personnel now serve as militia instructors at eleven militia training camps located throughout the country. Officers from the Zimbabwe National Army have been seconded to the People's Militia to fill training, administrative, and command positions.

(d) Organization

(U) The People's Militia is organized around eight brigade headquarters, each of which is located in one of Zimbabwe's eight provinces. The brigade headquarters are under the control of the local ZNA commander. When fully organized, the brigades will control a total of 55 battalions, corresponding to each one of Zimbabwe's administrative districts.

(e) Status of Equipment

The Militia will be equipped as light infantry. To date only SKS carbines have been confirmed in use.

b. Navy

Zimbabwe does not have a navy. However, the Zimbabwe National Army Corps of Engineers operates a patrol boat-squadron on Lake Kariba. Approximately 50 soldiers operate a number of small patrol boats and a large landing craft on the lake. Their mission is to support Army amphibious operations and to assist the police in antismuggling patrols.
c. Air Force

(1) Mission

To defend Zimbabwe's airspace; to act as a strategic deterrent; to support the Army and police in maintaining internal security; and to support the civil power for all nonmilitary purposes.

(2) Capabilities

Unlike the ZNA, AFZ did not undergo a large-scale restructuring after independence. Retaining most of its ex-RSF personnel, the AFZ maintained a significant combat capability until mid-1982. A sabotage incident at the AFZ's main operating base in July 1982, which destroyed a major portion of the AFZ's combat aircraft has, however, cast a shadow over the AFZ's future. A number of ZANU radicals have long looked upon the Air Force as the last bastion of white supremacy in the military and have seized upon the incident as an opportunity to break this perceived white dominance. At their instigation, some apparently innocent senior white Air Force officers were arrested and tortured in connection with the sabotage. These officers were tried and acquitted of all the sabotage charges. However, they were redetained immediately after their acquittals. Although the officers were eventually released by the government, their treatment had an adverse effect on Air Force morale and readiness. In response, there have been a large number of resignations from the AFZ.

At present, the AFZ retains a minimal operational capability. The Air Force commander has been at least partially successful in stemming the tide of resignations. A few aircraft are involved in supporting ZNA operations against ZAPU dissidents in Matabeleland and against the RENAMO in neighboring Mozambique. Reporting suggests, however, that the AFZ will continue to experience a large number of resignations. The situation was exacerbated in early 1984 when the last Royal Air Force advisers departed Zimbabwe. The arrival of 42 seconded Pakistani Air Force personnel in late 1983 was intended to fill some of the vacancies left by the departing British and white Rhodesian personnel. However, serious questions have been raised concerning the competence of the Pakistani airmen. The loss of an operational Air Force would heavily cost Mugabe during any future internal or external challenge. Despite personnel shortfalls, the Air Force is not likely to collapse, although it will probably operate at a lower level of efficiency.

(3) Personnel Strength

The total authorized personnel strength of the AFZ is 2,564. This figure includes AFZ flight/flight support personnel (340 officers, and 1,098 enlisted technical and administrative personnel) and the AFZ Regiment (41 officers and 1,085 enlisted personnel). Actual personnel levels in the flying squadrons are probably 30 percent to 50 percent below what is authorized. Of 180 pilot billets, few are filled. The actual strength of the AFZ Regiment is believed to be 900-1,000.
(4) **Aircraft Strength**

Total: 134 (fixed wing: 91; 28 jet, 7 turboprop, 56 prop; helicopters: 43)

In operational units: 134

- 12 fighters
- 7 bombers
- 9 light strike
- 24 transports
- 33 trainers
- 6 utility
- 43 helicopters

(5) **Organization and Deployment**

(a) General

AFZ Headquarters at Harare is subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, and the Air Force commander is subordinate to the Defense Minister. Two permanent air stations are located at New Sarum (near Harare) and Gweru/Thornhill with subordinate flying, technical, and administrative wings. Tactical elements are organized into eight squadrons. Additionally, there is an Air Force Regiment headquartered at Flyde Air Station (near Harare), which controls two each physical security and air defense artillery squadrons. One each is assigned in support of the permanent air stations.

(b) **Summary of Units**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Principal Bases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#1 Squadron (Ground Attack)</td>
<td>Hawker Hunter GA-9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Gweru/Thornhill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hawker Hunter T-80</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#2 Squadron (Advance Training)</td>
<td>Hawk T-1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Gweru/Thornhill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#3 Squadron (Transport)</td>
<td>C-47</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Harare/New Sarum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Islander</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Casa C-212</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#4 Squadron (Light Support/ COIN)*</td>
<td>Cessna F337 (Lynx)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Gweru/Thornhill</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This squadron currently is disbanded due to lack of pilot personnel, but several aircraft are kept operational to support fire force operations when required.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Principal Bases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#5 Squadron (Light Bomber)*</td>
<td>Canberra B-2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>Harare/New Sarum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Canberra T-4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#6 Squadron (Training)</td>
<td>Conestoga AL-60</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>Gweru/Thornhill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marchetti (SF-260)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#7 Squadron (Helicopter Support)</td>
<td>Alouette III (16 operational)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Harare/New Sarum</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bell-205 (2 operational)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bell-412</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) Status of Equipment

Most aircraft are of British origin; other aircraft are primarily French, Italian, and Spanish. During the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) period, between 1965 and 1980, Rhodesia obtained a variety of aircraft from several different countries to include Alouette III utility helicopters from France and South Africa, AL-60 fixed-wing utility aircraft from Italy, and a number of Cessna 337s and Agusta Bell 205 helicopters from Israeli and European sources. In 1981, the Zimbabwe Air Force purchased five rebuilt Hawker Hunter aircraft from Kenya and two rebuilt Canberra bombers from the UK. In 1982, Zimbabwe took receipt of eight Hawk fighter/trainer jet aircraft from the UK.

By late 1982, the UDI era aircraft fleet was aging. Most of the Canberra bombers and Agusta Bell 205 helicopters were grounded. The serviceability of the AL-60 Conestoga utility aircraft was highly doubtful. To make matters worse, 6 Hunter fighter-bombers and 1 Hawk trainer were destroyed in a sabotage attack on Gweru/Thornhill Base in July 1982.

In 1983, Zimbabwe made some progress in replenishing to dwindling Air Force fleet. By July 1983, the Air Force had received five of the six Casa C-212 transport aircraft that had been ordered from Spain, and had reportedly placed an order for more of that aircraft. In September, Italy delivered 2 Agusta Bell 412 utility helicopters. In October, Zimbabwe signed a contract with the UK for 5 used Hawker Hunter aircraft to replace those destroyed in the sabotage attack. These aircraft were delivered in mid-1984. Zimbabwe has also reportedly signed an agreement with the People's Republic of China for F-7 fighter aircraft. In late 1983, Zimbabwe approached several US aircraft manufacturers about the purchase of aircraft such as C-130 transports, Northrop F-20 fighters, and Sikorsky helicopters. However, it is unlikely that Zimbabwe will be able to afford to purchase these aircraft in the near future.

* This squadron is inactive due to a lack of pilot personnel and spare parts.
(7) Logistics

The AFZ has had difficulty maintaining its operational effectiveness because of the continuing loss of many of its skilled technical personnel. This trend will probably continue during 1984 as personnel resignations continue.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

The AFZ receives a sufficient number of volunteers for training. Most serve a 4-year term of active duty. In addition, technically skilled civilian personnel are contracted.

(9) Training

AFZ training programs have been of high standard, and the force has retained a capability to train its own pilot and technical personnel. This may change during 1984 as personnel resignations continue and the Pakistani advisers take over positions formerly held by British advisers and Rhodesian personnel.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

The Volunteer Reserve is organized into ground servicing squadrons. Units are trained and equipped for specific tasks, and some are responsible for helping maintain forward airfields. Members join for a minimum of 3 years and receive training in regular courses during evenings and weekends. It is designed to augment the logistic capabilities of the force when air operations are increased during emergencies. Present strength is estimated to be 200-300.

(b) Mobilization

Present mobilization capabilities of the reserve forces are unknown.

d. Civil Aviation

(1) Approximately 12 civil transport aircraft with a gross takeoff weight of at least 9,000 kilograms currently are registered, owned, and operated in Zimbabwe:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Long-Range Transport Aircraft (greater than 3,500 NM or 6,500 km)</th>
<th>Owner/Operator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 Boeing 707-320-B</td>
<td>Air Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 McDonnell Douglas DC-8F-55 Jet Trader</td>
<td>Affretair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Medium-Range Transport Aircraft
(1,200-3,500 NM or 2,200-6,500 km)

5 Vickers-Armstrong VC-2 Viscount 700

(U) Air Zimbabwe reportedly plans to lease or purchase at least one Boeing 747 widebody aircraft in order to extend its route structure. In 1983, Air Zimbabwe purchased one more Boeing 707 and retired its 3 Boeing 720s from scheduled service. One of the 720s was converted to a VIP configuration for use by the Zimbabwean Government. The Affretair DC-7F was retired in 1983. During the final years of civil strife in former Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, Affretair based its operations in Gabon and Oman under different company names to avoid international sanctions. One of Affretair's DC-8-55Fs still carries Gabonese registration.

Air Zimbabwe is entirely owned by the Government of Zimbabwe. Affretair has reportedly merged with Air Zimbabwe.

(U) The total number of civilian pilots of major transport aircraft in Zimbabwe is not known. Air Zimbabwe reportedly employs about 70 pilots.

Most of Zimbabwe's civil aircraft and virtually all indigenous civilian aviation personnel could be mobilized for military or other Government use in the event of war or comparable national emergency.

e. Paramilitary Forces

1. Police Support Unit (PSU or "Black Boots")

(a) Mission

(U) To provide paramilitary support for urban and rural police districts faced with situations beyond their capability to handle. This includes controlling civil disturbances, suppressing large-scale banditry, and assisting in border security.

(b) Capabilities

The PSU appears marginally capable of performing its mission. It was heavily involved during 1982 and 1983 in suppressing dissidence in Matabeleland.

(c) Personnel Strength

The estimated strength of the force is 3,000. Its size was doubled in 1982 at the direction of Minister of Home Affairs Ushewokunze. All newly assigned personnel are former ZANU combatants.
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(d) Organization

The PSU is headquartered in Harare and is subordinate to Zimbabwe Republic Police Headquarters. Subordinate elements of the PSU usually operate in platoon strength when supporting local police or conducting security patrols.

(e) Status of Equipment

The PSU is equipped as light infantry. Weaponry includes FN and G-3 7.62-mm rifles, light machineguns, and some 60-mm mortars. The unit has organic transport assets that are allocated from headquarters. When in the field PSU elements either live off the land or purchase consumable supplies locally.

(2) Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP)

(a) Mission

To maintain law and order, aid in the lawful functions of the Government and of the community, supervise immigration, and assist the Armed Forces in maintaining internal security. The police have received a greater share of responsibility for border security in recent years.

(b) Capabilities

Due to a large number of commitments, the ZRP has been able to only partially perform its mission. The dissident problem in Matabeleland and refugee problems along the Botswana and Mozambique borders have placed a severe strain on ZRP resources. The organization's effectiveness was further damaged when it was politicized by former Minister of Home Affairs Ushewokunze in 1982-83. However, the ZRP is basically a professional force that can be expected to eventually overcome any weaknesses caused by internal security and political problems.

(c) Personnel Strength

The estimated strength of the force is 9,500, of which about 1,000 are white.

(d) Organization

Under a Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Police in Harare there are eight provincial headquarters, each divided into a rural and urban division. Urban police report through town police stations to provincial headquarters; rural police report directly to provincial headquarters. The ZRP employs military organization throughout its ranks.

Police reserves total approximately 20,000 men, including whites. Reserves consist of the following elements:
ZIMBABWE

"A" Reserve: (About 300 personnel) — This is a volunteer force of police reservists whose specific task is normal police work to relieve the regular force at urban police stations. It does not have a paramilitary role.

Field Reserve: (About 20,000 personnel) — Personnel are recruited throughout the country and employed whenever they are required as "emergency assistance." Their task is often paramilitary, such as escort and protection duties, and seldom involves police work.

(e) Status of Equipment

The ZRP has small arms, including 7.62-mm automatic rifles. The ZRP also has a small number of locally built armored cars fashioned from truck bodies. Light vehicles such as Land Rovers are in wide use. Weapons and equipment are believed to be adequate for the force and are maintained in usable condition.

f. Total Military Personnel Strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>40,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>2,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paramilitary</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militia (Reserve)</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>9,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Reserves</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>81,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

g. Foreign Military Presence

(1) Foreign Military In-Country

UK: 60 Army advisers (service school, brigade-level advisers)

China: 40 Army advisers (estimated) (Provide artillery and tank gunnery training and advise Presidential Guard Bde. To be replaced by UK advisors in late 1984.)

North Korea: 30+ Army advisers Most all North Korean advisers have departed. Small military training teams are working with the People's Militia and providing vehicle training.)

Pakistan: 42 Air Force advisers (Includes pilots, pilot instructors, and maintenance technicians. Air Force Commander is seconded from Pakistani Air Force).
(2) Presence Abroad

Cuba: 1 army trainee

North Korea: 160 army, 38 air force trainees (including 35 undergoing fighter-bomber training)

PRC: 40 army, 15 air trainees

Romania: 15 army trainees, 23 air trainees

Canada: 1 army trainee

Egypt: 21 army trainees, 6 air trainees

France: Unknown number in Officers Staff Course.

Greece: 4 army, 6 air trainee

Italy: 6 air trainees

Libya: Unknown number of pilot, air defense, and aircraft technician trainees.

Nigeria: 10 air trainees

Pakistan: 46 army, 1 air trainee

Spain: 11 air trainees

Syria: 32 army trainees

Tanzania: 4 army trainees

United Kingdom: 23 army trainees, 38 air trainees

West Germany: Unknown number attending Combined Arms Course.
Withheld pursuant to exemption
(b)(3) 10 USC 424
of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act.