TO (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)
DTG 281735Z JUL 87
FROM (b)(3):10 USC 424
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEOEHA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PN
CONTROLS (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)
SECTION 01 OF 02 (b)(3):10 USC 424
SERIAL: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424
BODY
PASS: (U) DIA (b)(3):10 USC 424; (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)
COUNTRY: (U) ARGENTINA (AR)
SUBJECT: (b)(3):10 USC 424 MOTIVES BEHIND THE RELIEF OF - ARGARM VICE CHIEF OF STAFF (U)
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY - EVALUATED INTEL
DOI: (U) 870720
(b)(3):10 USC 424
SOURCE: (U) OPEN SOURCE; LA NUEVA PROVINCIA, BAHIA - BLANCA PROVINCIAL DAILY.

SUMMARY: (U) PER SOURCE, THE RELIEF OF BG FAUSTO - ((GONZALEZ)), ARGARM VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, WAS - A CALCULATED MOVE WITH ROOTS IN THE EASTER - WEEK CRISIS.

TEXT: 1. (U) ACCORDING TO SOURCE, THE UNEXPECTED RELIEF OF ARGENTINE ARMY VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, BG FAUSTO - ((GONZALEZ)), IS OFFICIALLY EXPLAINED AS A "SIMPLE CASE OF INCOMPATIBILITY OF PERSONALITIES" WITH ARGARM CHIEF OF STAFF, MG JOSE DANTE ((CARIDI)). HOWEVER, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT GONZALEZ'S RELIEF WAS A RESULT OF THE EASTER WEEK CRISIS AND THE SO-CALLED "SIMPLE" CASE IS FAR FROM "CLOSED." EVEN SENATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE PRESIDENT, ANTONIO ((BERHONGARAY)), ACKNOWLEDGED THAT GONZALEZ'S ESTRANGEMENT WAS DUE TO THE "SEVERE UPHEAVAL" IN THE ARGARM CAUSED BY THE EASTER WEEK EVENTS. BE IT
A CLASH OF PERSONALITIES OR CONSEQUENCE OF THE EASTER WEEK REBELLIONS, ALL AGREE ON ONE POINT: THE ARGARM CHIEF OF STAFF'S DECISION TOOK MOST OBSERVERS, AND HIS OWN CADRES, BY SURPRISE. PERHAPS THE ONLY ONE WHO WASN'T TAKEN BY SURPRISE WAS GONZALEZ HIMSELF. ACCORDING TO SOURCE'S WELL INFORMED SOURCES, BG GONZALEZ, IN A PRIVATE MEETING ON 11 JUL 87, PREDICTED "SOMETHING WAS GOING TO HAPPEN," ALTHOUGH HE DIDN'T SPECIFY WHAT.

2. (U) INCIDENTALLY, IT IS ALSO WIDELY BELIEVED THAT GONZALEZ'S APPOINTMENT ON 21 APR 87, AFTER TWO UNITS IGNORED CARIDI'S AUTHORITY, WAS THE RESULT OF A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE "RICO GROUP" AND STATE INTELLIGENCE SECRETARIAT (SIDE) HEAD, FACUNDO SUAREZ. THE TELEPHONE CALL WAS REPORTEDLY MADE FROM PRESIDENT ALFONSO'S OWN OFFICE. ACCORDING TO SOURCE, FROM THIS POINT, BEFORE GONZALEZ WAS NAMED VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, THE "BREAK" IN THE ARGARM WAS "FORMED." THE FACT THAT BG MIGUEL ABBATE REMAINED ON ACTIVE DUTY, DESPITE HIS MORE YEARS IN SERVICE THAN BG GONZALEZ, PROVES GONZALEZ'S RELIEF FIGURED IN THE CHIEF OF STAFF'S GAME PLAN FROM THE VERY BEGINNING. MANY ALSO BELIEVE GONZALEZ, AN INFANTRYMAN AND PARATROOPER AND THE ONE MAN WHO "CALMED THE AGITATED SPIRITS" OF THE III ARMY CORPS DURING THE EASTER WEEK CRISIS, SET HIMSELF UP AS THE "DEFENDER" OF THE REBELS. SOURCE POINTS OUT THAT MAJ ERNESTO BARREIRO, WHO WAS REINSTATED BY A MILITARY JUDGE, WAS ASSIGNED TO THE SUPPORT COMMAND BY GONZALEZ AND WHEN CARIDI FOUND OUT, THIS "SPARKED" HIS REMOVAL. OTHERS CLAIM IT WAS GONZALEZ WHO ORDERED THE TRANSFER OF THE OFFICERS WHO REFUSED TO SWEAR ALLEGIANCE TO THE CONSTITUTION FROM THE CAMPO DE MAYO PRISON TO THE SUPPORT COMMAND. ALSO CONTRIBUTING TO GONZALEZ'S RELIEF WAS HIS UNFAVORABLE RESPONSE TO A 40 MILLION DOLLAR ACQUISITION PLAN FOR ARTILLERY. THE FORMER VICE CHIEF OF STAFF SAW THE PLAN AS GIVING "ONE BRANCH A LEAD OVER ALL THE OTHERS." HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO PERSONS CLOSE TO THE RELIEVED GENERAL, GONZALEZ CLAIMS "THERE WAS NEVER ANY INDICATION THIS DECISION WOULD BE MADE. THERE WAS NEVER ANY FRICTION OR ARGUMENTS WITH THE CHIEF OF STAFF." WHAT BG GONZALEZ DID TELL CARIDI WHEN THE LATTER INFORMED HIM OF ABBATE'S APPOINTMENT WAS THAT HE WAS MAKING A SERIOUS MISTAKE WHICH WOULD HAVE SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS
IN AN "ALREADY DEEPLY DIVIDED ARMY." PER SOURCE, INITIAL REACTION SEEMED TO CONTRADICT THIS PREDICTION, ONLY BECAUSE HALF OF THE CADRES WERE ON VACATION AND AWAY FROM THEIR POSTS.


BT
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NNNN
TO
TO

DTG
281735Z JUL 87

FROM
FM

TO
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEOEHA/USCINC/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PN

CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 02

SERIAL: (U) BODY
PASS: (U) DIA PASS TO
COUNTRY: (U) ARGENTINA (AR)

SUBJECT: (b)(3):10 USC 424 (b)(3):50 USC 3024
MOTIVES BEHIND THE RELIEF OF
VERSUS BRANCH AFFAIR, BUT RATHER WHAT WAS THE MISSION
OF ALL THIS EQUIPMENT FOR THE 2D ARMORED BRIGADE. FOR
GONZALEZ, IT IS A QUESTION OF USE OF THIS BRIGADE AS
A REPRESSION FORCE.

3. (G) LITTLE CAN BE MADE OF THE FACT THAT BIANCHI IS
AN INFANTRY OFFICER. GONZALEZ AND AUEL HAVE THE SUPPORT
OF THE INFANTRY BRANCH. BIANCHI NEVER HAS, AND IT IS
DOUBTFUL HE WILL.

4. (G) THE "IRON FIST" STYLE RULE OF CARIDI AND HIS USE
OF PROMOTION BOARDS AND ASSIGNMENT BOARDS ARE THE CONCERNS
OF THE EASTER WEEK PARTICIPANTS. IF CARIDI USES THESE TOOLS AS PREDICTED, HE WILL PURGE
THE ARGARM OF THE KEY PARTICIPANTS.

5. (G) THE ARGARM HIGH COMMAND (GENERAL OFFICERS) SUPPORT
CARIDI. THIS HAS BEEN KNOWN FOR QUITE SOME TIME. MOST
ALL THE GENERAL OFFICERS IN THE GENERAL STAFF WERE
RIOS ERENU'S ADVISORS. THEREFORE, THEY ARE VIEWED FROM
BELOW AS A CONTINUATION OF THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION.
ONE OF THE MAIN COMPLAINTS OF MIDDLE GRADE OFFICERS IS
THAT CARIDI RECEIVES THE SAME "BAD ADVICE" AS HIS
PREDECESSOR.

6. (G) GONZALEZ WILL MOST LIKELY NOT REQUEST RETIREMENT.
HE IS CARRYING OUT A POLITICAL ACT TO MAKE CARIDI UNCOM-
FORTABLE. HE GIVES HOPE TO THE MIDDLE GRADES BECAUSE
HE IS IN THE SHADOWS. HE WILL BE AROUND FOR AT LEAST ONE YEAR IN A STATE OF "DISPONIBILIDAD."

7. ALL INDICATIONS POINT TO NO CRISIS IN THE ARGARM PRIOR TO ELECTIONS. AFTER THE ELECTIONS, IT'S ANYBODY'S BALL GAME. HOWEVER, IT IS AN ARGARM INNER BATTLE AND NOT A GOA-ARGARM BATTLE.