

# DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

**NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION**

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

**SECRET**

Classification/Control Markings

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: ARGENTINA (AR) 2. REPORT NUMBER: (b)(3):10 USC 424

3. TITLE: TERRORISM - Soldatti Attack/Montonero Organization and Objectives (U) 4. PROJECT NUMBER: N/A

5. DATE OF INFORMATION: 791114-791120 6. DATE OF REPORT: 791127

7. DATE & PLACE OF ACQUISITION: 791114-791120, Buenos Aires, Argentina (b)(3):10 USC 424

8. REFERENCES: (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

9. ASSESSMENT: SOURCE INFO 10. ORIGINATOR: (b)(3):10 USC 424

11. REQUEST EVALUATION No OPG 12. PREPARING OFFICER: 13. APPROVING AUTHORITY:

14. SOURCE: A. Press "Herald" 791120 (country)  
B. (b)(3):10 USC 424

## 15. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

ENCL #1-5 HAS NOT BEEN REPRODUCED IN HARDCOPY

16. SUMMARY: (U) This report forwards information describing the terrorist attack against Argentine Businessman Francisco ((SOLDATTI)) on 791113 which resulted in his death, the death of his driver, and four of the five assailants. Included is an Argentine report (translated copy) detailing Montonero forces organization and objectives in Argentina.

REQUEST PHOTOS DIRECTLY FROM RPT-2 ORDER BY  
IR AND PHOTO LOG NUMBER

REQUEST ENCL(S) FROM RDS-3A

## 18. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

DIA (original)  
DIA (RCI-1) w/o encl 6  
USCINCSO (SCJ2-AD) w/o encl 6  
CDR SFOD-D w/o encl 6  
CDR FSTC w/o encl 6  
NAVINSERV (NIS-27B) w/o encl 6  
HQDA (DAMI-DOI) w/o encl 6  
HQ USAF (AFOSI) w/o encl 6

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## 19. DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION DATA:

CLASSIFIED BY: [REDACTED]  
REVIEW ON: 27 NOV 1999  
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DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 19, 2018

## 20. ENCLOSURES:

- 6 Enclosures:
1. AMEMB msg 141951Z Nov 79, 2 pgs, 1 cy, (S)
  2. AMEMB msg 151904Z Nov 79, 5 pgs, 1 cy, (S)
  3. Press Article 791120 "Herald", 1 pg, 1 cy, (U)
  4. List of Weapons, 1 pg, 1 cy, (S)
  5. Special Report, 28 pgs, 1 cy, (S)
  6. 4 Photos of Montonero Members, 1 ea, 1 cy, (S)

21. This IR contains 3 pages.

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1 SEPT 62 EDITION MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 MAR 77

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22. ~~(S)~~ DETAILS:

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a. ~~(S)~~ On 791113, Dr. Francisco ((SOLDATTI)) (a prominent Argentine Businessman, former President of the Argentine Electricity Company (ITALO), and Bank Advisor to the Argentine Economic Team) was attacked by a group of five terrorists in the center of Buenos Aires. The attack resulted in the death of SOLDATTI, his driver, and four of the assailants (three were killed at the scene of the attack and one died in the hospital undergoing treatment). Enclosure (1) provides details of the attack as related to the AMEMB Regional Security Officer (RSO) during discussions with Argentine Intelligence sources.

b. ~~(S)~~ On 791114, the AMEMB RSO met with Argentine Intelligence sources to discuss recent attacks and infiltration by members of the "Montonero" terrorist organization into Argentina. Enclosure (2) provides the results of that meeting and includes a translation of Montonero activities in Spain (see para 4) as extracted from the Special Report contained in Enclosure (5).

c. (U) Source A, published an article on 791120 describing the SOLDATTI attack in detail as described in a 13-page statement released by the Army High Command. Included in the article is a list of weapons reportedly used by the terrorist in this attack (i.e., a Heckler Koch German-made rifle, a Chinese-made Kalashinov AK-47, two Israeli "UZI" repeating pistols, two Remington Carbines, and four Browning Pistols). The article states that the majority of the firearms used were newly manufactured and showed little use. Explosives used (according to source) were identified as an "ENERGA" grenade fired by a specially adapted Remington Rifle - reportedly used in other subversive attacks (cite (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 42). Additionally, the article states that some of the ammunition did not show any manufacturing identification which leads to the belief they were made in a clandestine workshop or came from behind the iron-curtain probably originating in Czechoslovakia, Cuba, or a Middle East country. The article states that some of the 9mm bullets are of a type unknown in Argentina and others apparently were made by the famous Gevelor plant in France. Source reports that the main weapon used in the killing of SOLDATTI was an assault Kalashnikov Rifle Model AK-47 of 7.62mm loading 30-rounds with a reach of 300M. Military-type uniforms worn by the terrorist were not of military units in Argentina and one of the dead attackers was wearing shoes with the words "Made in Libya" on the rubber soles. The three dead terrorist (at the scene) were identified as Enrique Horacio ((FIRELLI)), Remigio Elpidio ((GONZALEZ)), and Maria Emilia ((VIDELA)). The woman (VIDELA) had false documents so there are some doubts concerning her real identity (according to source).

d. ~~(S)~~ Source B, provided a copy of Enclosures (4), (5), and (6) on 791120. These three enclosures were obtained from Argentine Intelligence sources investigating the SOLDATTI attack and discreet use of the information contained should be taken to prevent compromise of sources' cooperation with this office.

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 209810-AR  
 209900-AR

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e. ~~(S)~~ Enclosure (4) provides the armament identification and serial numbers of the weapons used by the terrorist in the SOLDATTI attack. Request CDR FSTC assist in identifying possible sources of these weapons and any amplifying data on year(s) of manufacture, etc., be provided this office.

f. ~~(S)~~ Enclosure (5) is a translated version of a "Special Intelligence Report" titled, "Situation of the Montoneros". For a translation of the data pertaining to Spain (page 12) refer to paragraph 4, Enclosure (2).

g. ~~(C)~~ Enclosure (6) contains photographs of four known Montonero leaders. Their individual responsibilities are detailed in Enclosure (5).

~~(C)~~ COMMENT:

Sec. 3.3(b) (1)

b. ~~(C)~~ It is believed that SOLDATTI was targeted most probably due to his connection with the recent (1979) sale of the ITALO Utility Company from the Argentine government back to the private sector. Rumors that graft and corruption were involved in that sale circulated widely in Buenos Aires and terms of the sale drew outcries in various sectors; the event received prominent coverage in the local media.

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# TELEGRAM

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INDICATE  
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(b)(3):10  
 USC 424

STATION

CT INFO

FROM  
 AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION  
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E.O. 11652:

TAGS:

SUBJECT:

ACTION:

GDS 11-14-85 (BLYSTONE, JAMES) OR-A  
 ASEC PINS ARE  
 MONTONERO TERRORIST ATTACK AGAINST FRANCIS

SECSTATE WASHDC

~~SECRET~~ BUENOS AIRES 9339

REF: BUENOS AIRES 9305

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT. ~~WARNING: SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE~~  
~~SOURCES INVOLVED.~~

2. ARGENTINE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING  
 INFORMATION ON THE TERRORIST ATTACK ~~EM~~ COMMITTED AGAINST  
 FRANCISCO SOLDATTI ON NOVEMBER 13, 1979:

3. SOURCES STATED THAT A COVERED PICKUP TRUCK PULLED  
 IN FRONT OF SOLDATTI'S VEHICLE, THEREBY BLOCKING THE  
 PATH OF SOLDATTI'S VEHICLE AND THE OCCUPANTS OF THE TRUCK  
 BEGAN SHOOTING. A WOMAN MEMBER OF THE MONTONEROS JUMPED  
 OUT OF THE BACK OF THE TRUCK WEARING A MILITARY-TYPE  
 BLOUSE WITH TWO MONTONERO-FABRICATED GRENADES, ONE IN  
 EACH POCKET. THE WOMAN APPROACHED THE REAR OF SOLDATTI'S  
 VEHICLE AND WAS ABOUT TO THROW A GRENADE INTO THE VEHICLE  
 WHEN AN EXPLOSION OCCURRED. SOURCES ARE NOT CERTAIN IF

AMB  
 DCM  
 SY  
 POL/R  
 POL

CHRON

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 USC 424

DRAFTED BY:

SY/JJBlystone:wh

DRAFTING DATE

11-14-79

TEL. EXT.

313

CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

SY/JJBlystone

CLEARANCES:

DCM: MChaplin

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 (Formerly FS-413)



~~SECRET~~

POLICE, WHO ARRIVED ON THE SCENE, WHEN IN FIRING AT THE TERRORISTS HIT THE GRENADE THE WOMAN WAS ABOUT TO THROW WHICH CAUSED THE EXPLOSION. THE EXPLOSION CAUSED THE GAS TANK OF THE SOLDATTI VEHICLE TO EXPLODE RESULTING IN THE DEATH OF SOLDATTI AND HIS DRIVER BY FIRE. NEITHER SOLDATTI NOR HIS DRIVER WERE KILLED BY GUN FIRE.

4. SOURCES REMARKED THAT THE TERRORIST ATTACK WAS CARRIED OUT BY FIVE MEMBERS OF THE MONTONEROS, THREE MEN AND TWO WOMEN. SOURCES STATED THEY ARE CONFIDENT THAT NONE OF THE MONTONEROS ESCAPED. TWO OF THE MONTONEROS, A MAN AND A WOMAN, WERE APPREHENDED, ALTHOUGH BADLY WOUNDED. AS YET, THE SECURITY FORCES HAVE NOT IDENTIFIED ANY OF THE MONTONEROS. FINGERPRINTS AND PHOTOS HAVE BEEN TAKEN.

5. SOURCES REMARKED THAT THEY WERE LUCKY IN THAT WHEN THE ATTACK BEGAN, A POLICE PATROL VEHICLE WITH TWO UNIFORMED POLICEMEN AND A PRIVATE VEHICLE WITH AN OFF-DUTY POLICEMAN AND HIS FATHER, A RETIRED COMISARIO, CAME UPON THE SCENE AND IMMEDIATELY BEGAN TO OPEN FIRE WITH THEIR FIREARMS AGAINST THE TERRORISTS.

6. SOURCES STATED THAT THE TERRORISTS WERE ARMED, EACH WITH A BELGIAN-MADE 9 MM BROWNING AUTOMATIC PISTOL. THE GROUP ALSO HAD TWO REMINGTON SHOTGUNS AND ONE AK-47 RIFLE. SECURITY FORCES ARE DISTURBED WITH THE WEAPONS,

AS THIS INDICATES THAT THE MONTONEROS ARE ABLE TO SMUGGLE ARMS INTO THE COUNTRY.

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# TELEGRAM

FROM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES	CLASSIFICATION <del>SECRET</del>
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~~E.O. 11652.~~ ~~XGDS 4 11 14 99 (Chaplin, Maxwell) OR M~~  
TAGS: ASEC AR, PINS  
SUBJECT: ~~(C)~~ RETURN OF MONTONEROS TO ARGENTINA

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO: USCINCSO  
AMEMBASSY MADRID  
AMEMBASSY PANAMA  
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI  
DIA WASH DC//RCI-1//

~~SECRET~~ BUENOS AIRES 9360

DEPT FOR A/SY/CC/TAGS AND A/SY/FO; MADRID FOR RSO;  
PANAMA FOR RSS; TRIPOLI FOR PSO FROM RSO

AMB  
DCM  
SY  
POL  
POL/R  
CHRON

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT. WARNING: SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE  
SOURCES INVOLVED.

2. ON NOVEMBER 7, 1979, RSO MET WITH MEMBERS OF ARGENTINE  
INTELLIGENCE REGARDING THE RECENT ATTACKS AND INFILTRATION  
BY MEMBERS ~~KRX~~ OF THE MONTONEROS. ARGENTINE ~~KRM~~ SOURCES  
PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

--RAUL CLEMENTE YAGER (ALIAS "ROQUE") ARRIVED IN ARGENTINA  
IN LATE AUGUST AND IS THE COMMANDER OF THE "TEA" FORCES.  
(TEA STANDS FOR SPECIAL AGITATION TROOPS, THE GROUP  
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE AGITATION AND CLANDESTINE RADIO  
BROADCASTS ~~XAT~~ THAT INTERRUPTED THE AUDIO ON IN-PROGRESS

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DRAFTED BY: SY/JJBlystone:wh	DRAFTING DATE 11-15-79	TEL. EXT. 313	CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: DCM:MChaplin
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CLEARANCES

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(Formerly FS-413  
January 1975  
Dept of State

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TELEVISION PROGRAMS.)

--HORACIO ALBERTO MENDIZABAL (KILLED BY GOA SECURITY FORCES ON 9-17-79)  
(ALIAS "HERNAN" AND

"VASCO") WAS THE COMMANDER ~~XX~~ OF THE "TEI" FORCES AND HAD ENTERED THE COUNTRY IN APRIL. (TEI STANDS FOR SPECIAL INFANTRY TROOPS AND THESE ARE THE TROOPS WHO ARE CONDUCTING THE ATTACKS ON SPECIFIC GOA PERSONNEL).

--EDUARDO DANIEL PEREYRA ROSSI (ALIAS "CARLON" IS DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE TEI GROUP AND IS NOW IN COMMAND AS A RESULT OF MENDIZABAL'S DEATH.

--HORACIO DOMINGO CAMPIGLIO (ALIAS "PETRUS") IS IN CHARGE OF COMMUNICATION FOR BOTH THE TEI AND TEA FORCES.

3. ARGENTINE ~~XXXXXX~~ INTELLIGENCE SOURCES ADVISED THAT THE ABOVE INDIVIDUALS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF MENDIZABAL ARE STILL AT LARGE WITHIN ARGENTINA. SOURCES ADVISED THAT THEY WERE ASSISTED BY A MONTONERO ~~XX~~ MEMBER WORKING WITH THE SECURITY FORCES IN LOCATING MENDIZABAL. THEY ALSO STATED IN THE STRICTEST OF CONFIDENCE THAT THEY HAVE CAPTURED A MEMBER WHO WAS AN INSTRUCTOR FOR THE TEI GROUP WHEN THEY WERE BEING TRAINED IN LIBYA.

4. SOURCES ADVISED THAT THE MONTONERO MEMBERS OF THE TEI/TEA GROUP WERE ~~XXXXXX~~ <sup>TRAINED</sup> IN LIBYA BY MEMBERS OF THE PLO IN THE USE OF AUTOMATIC WEAPONS, EXPLOSIVES AND AGITATION TECHNIQUES AND THEN TRAVELED TO SPAIN FOR  
[ ADDITIONAL TRAINING AT A HOUSE LOCATED APPROXIMATELY ]

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TEN MILES FROM MADRID. WITH REGARD TO MONTONERO ACTIVITIES IN MADRID, ARGENTINE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES PROVIDED THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: THE MONTONEROS IN SPAIN HAVE MADE CONTACTS AT THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR LEVEL THROUGH OSCAR BIDEGAIN AND DANIEL VACA NARVAJA. THIS HAS GIVEN THE MONTONEROS A SEMI-LEGAL STATUS WHICH PERMITS THEM ACCESS TO PERSONS AT THE POLITICAL AND LABOR LEVELS AS WELL AS SPANISH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. THEIR SEMI-LEGAL STATUS HAS PERMITTED THEM TO PURCHASE A RESIDENCE WHICH THEY CALL "CASA DEL PUEBLO ARGENTINO" IN THE AREA OF PUERTA DE HIERRO IN MADRID, A FEW BLOCKS FROM PERON'S FORMER RESIDENCE. THE PERSON IN CHARGE OF THE HOUSE IS LILIANN GOLDENBERG (ALIAS "PASTITO"). THE POLITICAL SECRETARY OF THE MONTONERO PARTY, ~~PERDIA~~ ~~ROBERTO CIRILO~~, ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ VISITS THE HOUSE ON A DAILY BASIS WHEN IN SPAIN AND HANDLES MPM MATTERS AND RECEIVES VISITORS, BOTH TERRORISTS AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CONTACTS. THE HOUSE IS PROTECTED BY SPANISH GUARDIA CIVIL GUARDS WHO PATROL THE AREA WITH A VEHICLE. MOST OF THE MPM AND PARTY MEMBERS WHO ARE NOT RELATED TO THE INTERNATIONAL LEADERSHIP PROGRAM ARE HEADQUARTERED AT THIS LOCATION. THIS IS DUE TO THE FACT THAT ITALY AND FRANCE ARE LITTLE BY LITTLE GIVING THE MONTONEROS LESS SUPPORT (WHICH THEY PREVIOUSLY GOT FROM LEFTIST POLITICAL PARTIES AND OTHER LEADERS) AND BECAUSE IN SPAIN THEY HAVE NO

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(Formerly FS 4)  
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LANGUAGE PROBLEMS. THE TERRORISTS ARE USING DOCUMENTATION PREPARED FOR THEM BY EXCELLENT PRINTERS IN BARCELONA, ESPECIALLY THE PASSPORTS AND DNI (NATIONAL DOCUMENT OF IDENTITY).

5. SOURCES STILL DO NOT KNOW IF THE TEI GROUP WHICH ATTACKED KLEIN IS STILL IN THE COUNTRY OR NOT. THE ARGENTINE SECURITY INTELLIGENCE FORCES BELIEVE THAT THE TEI THAT BOMBED THE KLEIN HOUSE HAD ONE OBJECTIVE AND WERE THEN TO DEPART THE COUNTRY, AND THAT OTHER GROUP(S) WOULD ENTER AND FOLLOW THE SAME PLAN, I.E. ATTACK ONE SPECIFIC TARGET AND DEPART. THE ARGENTINES BELIEVE THAT THE TERRORISTS REQUIRE ABOUT NINETY DAYS TO PLAN THE ATTACK, CARRY OUT THE ATTACK, AND DEPART THE COUNTRY. THE SOURCE STATED THAT THE ATTACK ON SECRETARY ALEMANN CONDUCTED ON NOVEMBER 7, 1979 INDICATED THAT THE MONTONEROS ARE HARD PRESSED BY SECURITY FORCES AS THE ATTACK WAS SLOPPILY PLANNED AND EXECUTED. THE SOURCES INDICATED THAT ARGENTINE SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE FORCES ARE WORKING 24 HOURS A DAY ON APPREHENDING THE MONTONEROS AND BELIEVE THAT WITH SUFFICIENT TIME AND LUCK THEY WILL CAPTURE THEM. SOURCES ALSO INDICATE THAT THE DEATH OF MENDIZABAL AND DANIEL ARMANDO CROATTO (ALIAS "PETETE") HAVE HAD A TREMENDOUS PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT ON THE MONTONEROS.



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6. THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THIS TELEGRAM WAS PROVIDED BY A MEMBER ACTIVELY EMPLOYED BY ARGENTINE INTELLIGENCE. THEIR REPORTS HAVE BEEN RELIABLE AND THEY REPORT INFORMATION AS THEY KNOW IT. THE INFORMATION ITSELF HAS NOT AS YET BEEN CORROBORATED BY OTHER SECTIONS OF THE MISSION.

7. FOR MADRID: RSO WOULD APPRECIATE IF MADRID COULD CONFIRM ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED IN PARA 5.

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- Pistola BROWNING 9mm. BELGA  
Nro. 766.82682
- Pistola BROWNING 9mm. BELGA  
Nro.77C.46251
- Pistola BROWNING 9mm. BELGA  
Nro. 76C13401
- Pistola BROWNING 9mm. BELGA  
Nro. 76C19012
- Una (1) Escopeta REMINGTON  
Will-Master Nro.484619-V  
Cal. 12 Grande AMERICANA
- Uno (1) Fusil Asalto ALEMAN 6/3 Cal. 7.62  
Nro.M961263 -HK400109"
- Una (1) Pistola Ametralladora Marca UZI (Judia) con estrella de  
Producción Judia Cal. 9mm. Nro.72151.
- Una (1) Pistola Ametralladora UZI Idem anterior.  
Nro. 74462.
- Uno (1) Fusil de Asalto RUSO Cal.7.62  
Producción China AK 47 3/Nro. KALACHNIKOV.
- Una (1) Escopeta REMINGTON Cal. 17 Grande Will-Master.  
Nro.F-552485V. Está provisto con 1 Telemetro fabricación casera.

SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT

SITUATION OF THE "MONTONEROS"

A. EXTERNAL FRAME

1. Structure of National Leadership

From April 1977 (initiation of the MPM in Rome) to October 1978 (National Council Meeting in Cuba) the role of the party was not clearly defined and other structures were filling in the blank spaces left by, fundamentally, the MPM.

During this stage the terrorist group was formed, practically only by the MPM, which was creating political problems, creations of superstructures and competition and duplication of functions between similar structures in the party and in the movement, with the natural deterioration of ~~xxx~~ efficiency and harmony in the terrorist~~x~~ groups.

This created contradictory situations, such as public announcements on the part of MPM in favor of pacification, while MENDIZABAL, representing the Montonero Army also made public announcements, press releases etc., in favor of an armed fight. This caused a bad impression on the MPM, especially among the members who were not directly related to the party and the political branch such as BIDEGAIN and OBREGON CANO.

National leadership analyzed these contradictions and reached the conclusion that modifications were required to reach a centralization on leadership and policy in the hands of the party.

On the other hand, the centralization of all the terrorist activities in its three major structures (Party, Army and Movement) would give them more possibilities of ~~launching~~ starting the "counteroffensive"

(b)(3):10 USC 42

Therefore during the National Council in CUBA on October 1978 the National Secretariat was dissolved and two members were added to National Leadership.

Each function~~x~~ was reviewed and the responsibilities were distributed as follows:

27 NOV 1999

- a. MARIO FIRMENICH: kept the three previous positions: General Secretary of the Party, General Secretary of the Movement and Commander in Chief of the Army.
- b. ROBERTO CIRILO PERDIA: Political Secretary of the Party and Executive Secretary of the Montonero Peronist Movement (MPM)
- c. RAUL CLEMENTE YAGER, previously the National Secretary, now replaces ALBERTO MENDIZABAL in the leadership of the Montonero Army with the title of Military Secretary and ~~the~~ Chief of the Tactical Command starting during the "counter-offensive ~~campaign~~ strategic campaign" in 1979.
- d. HORACIO ALBERTO MENDIZABAL, responsible ~~for~~ of the former National ~~Rxxxx~~ Secretariat for Press, Propaganda and Indoctrination with the title of Secretary of Agitation, Press, Propaganda and Indoctrination,. He supervises the former chief of this area, EDUARDO DANIEL PEREYRA ROSSI.
- e. FERNANDO HUGO VACA NARVAJA, was incorporated to National Leadership as "second commander" with the title of Secretary for International Relations of the Party and the Movement.
- f. HORACIO DOMINGO CAMPIGLIA, ~~into~~ incorporated ~~into~~ to National Leadership as second commander and responsible of a new structure called Auxiliary Command Secretariat (S.A.C.)

The hierarchy of the individuals was taken into account when assigning these new positions and not their personal qualifications, especially in the case of YAGER-MENDIZABAL-PEREYRA ROSSI.

The headquarters of National Leadership, after the problems that arised in Mexico, with TULIO VALENZUELA, is CURA, although ROBERTO CIRILO PERDIA, for functional purposes, still stays in MADRID for long periods of time.

There are two different levels in National LEADERSHIP. A Strategic Command has been created in the strategic part, with mebers of national leadership living abroad. There is also a Tactics Command in the country, described in item B.

INTERNAL ASPECT.

## 2. CENTRAL COMMITTEE

The National Council which used to have meetings in different countries and consisted of members of National Leadership, National Secretariat and Major Officers, is now extinguished. With the termination of National Secretariat which is integrated into ~~the~~ National Leadership, an "~~national council~~ increased national council" was created. This Council was called Central Committee and all the members of National Leadership became members, to the level of "captains" (the ~~high~~ senior captains only).

This Central Committee is supposed to meet ~~at~~ once a year, the first meeting having been held in CUBA in 1979. At this time they decided to start two stages of "counter-offensive", the first called "~~maneuver~~" and the second "campaign".

## 3. SECRETARIATS OF NATIONAL LEADERSHIP

The old structures of the national secretariats no longer exist as such, i.e., the different departments belonging to the old secretariats no longer operate, with the exception of the Secretariat of International Relations which continues to operate as usual.

The ~~main~~ principal reason for this change is the need to have personnel of a higher rank to start the "counter-offensive" in the country, since the old party structures were considered inadequate, principally due to the lack of militants in the country capable of performing functions of the magnitude of a "counter-offensive"

### a. POLITICAL SECRETARIAT

— ROBERTO CIRILO PERDIA in charge and members at the rank of "captains", ~~all~~ of the MPM:

- 1) Labor Branch: ARMANDO CROATTO  
GONZALO LEONIDAS CHAVEZ
- 2) Agrarian Branch: OSVALDO LOVEY



- 3) Youth Branch: GUILLERMO AMARILLA
- 4) Feminine Branch: ADRIANA LESGART  
MARIA ANTONIA BERGER

b. MILITARY SECRETARIAT

RAUL CLEMENTE YAGER in charge. Not enough information available to determine its structure.

The Special Infantry Troups (TEI) instructed in LEBANON by the OLP to operate in the country belong to this secretariat.

c. SECRETARIAT OF AGITATION, PRESS, PROPAGANDA AND INDOCTRINATION

In the past HORACIO ALBERTO MENDIZABAL was in charge. There is information that he has been replaced by EDUARDO DANIEL PEREYRA ROSSI who has been incorporated as "second commander".

The Spécial Agitation Troops (TEA) belong to this secretariat.

d. SECRETARIAT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

FERNANDO HUGO VACA NARVAJA is in charge of this secretariat. Chiefs of Departments: ELBIO ALBERTONE in the American Department, DANIEL VACA NARVAJA & Middle East in the European Dept. ANDRES ERNESTO HIRSCHLER in the African/Dept, JUAN CARLOS CARULLO in charge of the party's embassy in CUBA and Pablo ABELARDO RAMOS responsible for the Solidarity Organizations.

1) AMERICAN DEPARTMENT

The American Department was organized after the press conference in 1977 (April 25 creation of the MPM in Rome) and each person's responsibilities was designated at that time. Until that time MANUEL PEDREIRA was responsible for this sector, especially in Mexico, where Argentine refugees started to go. At that time OBREGON CANO AND PUIGGROS were stationed there as political exiles.

After April 1977 RODOLFO GALIMBERTI was designated in charge of the Department. He went to Mexico and established himself in the "casa del pueblo Argentino", where montonero militants and PRT-ERP were already located.

for this reason he changed the name to "~~Manx~~ Casa del MPM".

This Department's objective is a closer approach with other countries in the continent; not only Mexico but VENEZUELA COLOMBIA and PERU where the Argentine colonies are numerous.

At the end of 1977 all the departments were -re-structured under the Secretariat of International Relations and GALIMBERTI, previously member of the Youth Branch of the MPM and responsible for the America Department ~~was replaced by~~ left the Youth Branch to dedicate himself exclusively to the America Department.

RLBIO ALBERIONE was assigned, and after a period in Mexico he went to Panama. HE reinitiated the contacts GALIMBERTI had left him in Peru Venezuela and Costa Rica, in the latter country with a well-known terrorist "GORDO CUESTA", a newspaperman from Cordoba.

The principal objective of the Department's policy is oriented towards the U.S., in a stage of change on the part of the U.S. towards Latin America. The objective is to get the most progressive political groups in the U.S. to support a political line, especially in Argentina, as they do in other countries in the Southern Cone such as Brasil and Bolivia.

These sectors are related to the Department of State and the Democratic Party (Kennedy Sector).

The formal way of doing this was through the human rights policy, but they issued memoranda of a political nature to these sectors through an English newspaperman, director of "Latin American Newsletter", CHRISTOPHER ROPER, who is connected with the English labor movement and the U.S. Democratic party.

The principal objective is to obtain U.S. government pressure on Argentina in order to obtain a political government.

The terrorists believe that after the VIETNAM war the U.S. have ~~lost~~ gradually lost positions and influence in WESTERN EUROPE and even more in THE EAST AND AFRICA and that in the meantime Russia is gradually advancing and filling in the gaps left behind by the U.S.

They~~also~~ consider that as the "American empire" crumbles, the "soviet empire" becomes stronger. On the other hand almost all the Orient has become independent from the U.S. with the examples of arab countries and Japan as samples most affecting the U.S. economic policy.

Therefore, the terrorists believe that the U.S. policy and economy will centralize in Latin America, which they plan to exploit to the maximum.

Another objective of the Department is to create a "movement for the liberation of the southern cone". An intermediate objective are the "movements for latin american liberation" but more than the movements themselves they take into account the movements of the masses more inclined with the terrorist ideologies, the U.D.P. of SILES SUAZO in BOLIVIA and the "rojaspinillismo" in COLOMBIA being the most important, as well as all guerrilla movements.

a) CANADA

JULIO CESAR RODRIGUEZ ANIDA, a Christian Democrat, Secretary for International Relations of the Political Branch of the MCP is headquartered in that country. His activities are not significant for the BDT.

b) UNITED STATES

The initial contacts with members of Congress were made by OLGA TALAMANTE CASTILLO, U.S. citizen, deported from our country in 1976 for subversive activities. She started a committee of solidarity with a small group called CADHU. She later abandoned the BDT and adhere to the "chicano movement" and

transferred her contacts to a terrorists AKA "FLACO DANIEL" who, it is known left the country "under option". A lawyer, called JUAN MENDEZ, also operates in the U.S. His mission is to distribute propaganda and ~~xx~~ recruit sympathizers among the Argentine residents.

They searched for contacts at the Department of State level (CYRUS VANCE and BRZEZINSKI), advisors and persons close to ~~the~~ President Carter, with the democratic movement of KENNEDY and with representatives of the economic sector, among those, ROCKEFELLER.

To all sectors mentioned above the terrorists presented a government plan of economic and political characteristics very similar to the socio-democratic movement because they considered that this political platform is most accepted by the U.S. and WESTERN EUROPE.

Although they have not been able to reach final agreements, their proposals have not been rejected and the terrorists in general believe that they have been accepted and considered feasible by those to whom they were presented.

c) MEXICO

At the beginning RODOLFO GALIMBERTI was the liaison between the terrorist group and the Mexican Government. ~~Referring to~~ OBREGON CANO AND RODOLFO PUIGGROS had been his predecessors.

The "casa del movimiento" was inaugurated to develop political activities. Since this was questioned by the Mexican Government, the terrorists changed its name to "Instituto de Estudios Generales San Martín" where the Superior Council and the Executive Committee of the MPM operate. They carry out meetings, interviews with local political contacts, with diplomatic representatives of other countries and, on some occasions, with MARIO FIRMENICH. Representatives of Argentine political forces who pass through Mexico also visit these headquarters.

"La casa del niño" also operated in that country. The objective was to take care of the children of Argentine residents, with the characteristics of a kindergarden-school. The sisters of VACA NARVAJA were in charge of that house after they ~~left~~ quit as militants. The "casa del niño" was part of the "casa del movimiento" and the Swedish government economically supported its inauguration and maintenance. In April 1978 a well-known terrorist by the name of "GRACIELA" was in charge of the "casa".

Although numerous, the Argentine colony in that country is not homogenous politically. The opposition sector is important and follows the lines of lawyer PEDRO GALIN and an ex-professor ROLANDO GARCIA, who, from VENEZUELA very successfully maintains/contacts with the professional group residing in MEXICO. It is estimated that these two professionals are more on the side of GALIMBERTI.

There is a recruiting center under the supervision of MARIO MONTOTO, operating fundamentally with argentinians who left the country "under option". They ~~are~~ have to pass a "counter-infiltration" test and are given training in the Special Agitation Troops in instruction centers in Mexico D.F., Cuernavaca and Taxco and another ~~location~~ <sup>rements</sup> undetermined location. The applicants who ~~have the required~~ meet the requisites are sent to the Special Infantry Troops in training camps in Lebanon with OLP militants.

They also have a documentation center in Mexico, taking advantage of the good printing techniques in that country. They manufacture the equipment for audio-interception in TV channels, ~~xxxx~~ utilizing U.S. technology and later used by the TEA. Furthermore all the terrorist propaganda for the World Cup was prepared there.

d) COSTA RICA

In Costa Rica the terrorists ~~xxxx~~ advertise their propaganda to all America through the radio channel "Radio noticias del Continente". Although



the BDT finance this radio channel, they have agreed to share their propaganda with other latinamerican illegal organizations which will later become part of the "movement for the liberation of the southern cone".

The BDT Activities in that country are carried out by an Argentine newspaperman from Cordoba known as "EL GORDO CUESTA".

The government's acceptance of the activities of these illegal organizations within their territory permits them to operate almost legally.

e) NICARAGUA

~~Although~~ During the latter period of the internal conflict which brought the FSLN to power, the BDT gave the latter logistic support, ~~and~~ obtained contacts with important leaders and was able to reach agreements of a tactical and logistical nature as well as political support, which the BDT consider ~~of~~ important.

f) EL SALVADOR

The terrorists are presently exploring the possibilities of establishing representatives to search for contacts and approaches with government sectors as well as ~~as~~ political sectors ~~xxx~~ which would politically support the terrorists.

g) PANAMA

Panama is the headquarters of "America Department" and, together with NICARAGUA and COSTA RICA the terrorists plan to project their ideology in the rest of LATIN AMERICA with the objective of having geographic and political branches nearer to Argentina than they presently have. In this sense their principal expectations are on BOLIVIA where they have the support of HERNAN SILES SUAZO if he ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ were to assume power.

Their best contact is OMAR TORRIJOS, who is trying to integrate in the latin-~~xxxx~~ american socio-democratic current and is considered as a "strong man" in that country.

Gradually the terrorists are moving from MEXICO to PANAMA AND NICARAGUA, ~~xxxx~~ strengthening their ~~xxx~~ bases as they go.

It is a transit location for all ~~xxxx~~ high-level terrorists from and to ~~xxxx~~ Mexico.

h) COLOMBIA

They maintain contacts with leaders of the guerrilla groups ~~xxx~~ "M-19" and leaders of the "rojaspinillismo" with the objective of reaching an integration of the "movement for the liberation of the southern cone"

i) VENEZUELA

The Argentine colony in that country consists of approximately 300 persons, most of which are professionals who have emigrated for economical reasons, some for political reasons. In the professional group there is a group opposed to the BDT, headed by lawyer PEDRO GALIN (former resident of Peru, where at the beginning he was a sympathizer of the BDT) and former professor ROLANDO GARCIA, who have indicated that they sympathize with RODOLFO GALIMBERTI's ideology.

j) The BDT maintain relations with the group "BUCARAN", brother-in-law of the president of Ecuador. This approach was reached in MEDELLIN with the leaders (militants and civilians) of the Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSR), previously followers of VELAZCO ALVARADO.

k) PERU

This country is used as a base, the same as VENEZUELA and COLOMBIA. It is of special interest to the BDT to increase the establishment of militants. At present they are using the country as a stop-over enroute to Argentina.

l) BOLIVIA

The relations are fundamentally with the UDP of HERNAN SILES SUAZO, with whom they obtained important agreements through a member of the Political Party of the MPM, OBREGON CANO. On the other hand they were not able to contact the MIR (bolivian) or have any relations with them. Bolivia is the

chosen country for changes in itinerary of the DT when they enter ~~the~~ Argentina coming from EUROPE or CENTRAL or NORTH AMERICA, from where they go to CHILE, PARAGUAY or BRASIL.

m) CHILE

They have contacts with the leader ALTAMIRANO of the Chilean Socialist Party who integrated with the Unidad Popular. This country is used as the last stage to ~~xxx~~ enter Argentina, by land.

n) PARAGUAY

There is no information on any contacts with local political groups in this country.

Their documentation base was recently destroyed. They continue to use the country as a means of entering Argentina through the north-east.

ñ) BRAZIL

This country is estimated to be an excellent base for residence or transit.

Militants operating actively have been detected, closely related to subversive movements and leftist politicians.

The BDT have a base to facilitate ~~xxxxxxx~~ the entry or transit to Argentina, either directly or through border facilities in other countries.

RIO DE JANEIRO, SAN PABLO and other southern important cities are the ~~xxxxxx~~ concentration centers chosen by the terrorists.

During his exile in the U.S. the PTB leader, LEONEL BRIZOLA was contacted by OBREGON CANO and they maintained a close friendship.

o) URUGUAY

they do not maintain any contact with M.L.N. Tupamaros because they consider the organization inactive at a national level, but they do consider the Uruguayan PC as an ally~~x~~ and direct all their efforts towards them, with favorable results. ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

2) EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT

DANIEL VACA NARVAJA, headquartered in Spain, is the leader of the European Department.

The objective of the Department is to contact european political forces related to capitals of the same origin to counterarrest the pressure of the U.S., since Europe is not so related to the process of economic domination and they can lift more freely the flag of human rights. They are also interested in <sup>contacting</sup> ~~getting contacts with~~ European firms in order to obtain their economic support.

Contacts have been made not only with the social democratic parties but also with the christian democracts who are well connected with European capital economic ~~xxxxs~~ (i.e. Fiat).

a) SPAIN

ALREADY TRANSLATED

b) FRANCE

Although this country is considered by the terrorists to be the political and geographic center of WESTERN EUROPE, they do not believe it appropriate as a base for militants since the French government would not support it; they have, however, very good relations with French socialism, especially with FRANCOISE MITERRAND. The BDT has not found a good response in the labor field, although they hope to improve relations with the French Workers Confederation.

c) ITALY

The relations with that country are deteriorating after the police raided FERNANDO VACA NARVAJA's house. They still maintain contacts with the PCI, but contacts have cooled off with the sector headed by the former LELIO BASSO after JUAN GELMAN, who was the natural contact, abandoned his position.

13.

The militant Argentine colony is large and the BDT consider that they are side on the part of the sector headed by RODOLFO GALIMBERTI, because of the prestige he has in different internal sectors and because CN dropped their base in EUROPE.

d) WEST GERMANY

Their relations with the sector headed by WILLY BRANDT have been gradually deteriorating since the II International Socialist meeting in CANADA.

The platform, in case the BDT were to assume power, would follow a social-democratic line in order to reinstate the German's leader's political support as well as the support of other socialist representatives in Western Europe.

e) HOLLAND- SWEDEN

Many exiles and individuals with option to leave the country are presently residing in these countries. They are the originators of international campaigns to defend human rights and BDT support.

SWEDEN totally financed "la casa del niño" in Mexico until 1978.

f) BELGIUM - SWITZERLAND

economically.  
They indirectly support the BDT through the purchase of films, festivals, etc.

3) DEPARTMENTS OF AFRICA AND MIDDLE EAST

ANDRES ERNESTO HIRSCHLER, headquartered in MOZAMBIQUE, is the leader of this Department.

The principal objective of this Department is to strengthen ties with all the countries related to the liberation movement of the THIRD WORLD, in order to obtain all types of support (political, military, logistical instruction, economic, infrastructure, etc.)

To get this support the BDT lean almost exclusively on the palestines-Al Fatah- and the Cuban diplomacy. They started contacts with the Palestines in



1972 through RODOLFO GALIMBERTI. In 1974 MENDIZABAL and GALIMBERTI travelled to ALGERIA and LEBANON and interviewed the chief of the Department for the Liberation of the KKKX Algerian FLN, who gave the BDT some weapons, which they never used. In October 1976 JUAN GELMAN and RODOLFO GONZALEZ travelled to organize a tour for FERNANDO VACA NARVAJA through the favorable mediation of the OLP delegate in MADRID.

Algiers indicated the need for the BDT to establish delegations in some key countries in the third world to develop their international policy in that area.

a. LEBANON

In November 1976 the following BDT travelled to Lebanon: FERNANDO VACA NARVAJA, JUAN GELMAN, RODOLFO GONZALEZ, who was taking charge of the third-world area; an individual known as "GALLEGO" from the logistic section of the Military Secretariat and another called "PETISO JOSE" of the "rest of the world" department. They had separate discussions regarding military and political affairs in that country.

They were able to obtain political support in April 1977 from the Department of International Relations of Al Fatah-ABU HATEM. Several delegations (youth, students, women, etc) were to be sent to the international organizations to gain territory for the PCA (~~Revista~~ Argentine Communist Party).

On the military side they agreed to install a plant to manufacture a plastic explosive (G-2) "exogen" for the BDT in exchange of weapons and instruction for the militants. This agreement went into effect mid 1977 with the travel to that country of a specialist in the production of exogen, aka as MARIANO or "TOTO", a doctor in chemical sciences from Cordoba.

At present the special infantry troops of the BDT (TEI) are being trained in that country.

b) TANZANIA

A BDT delegation visited that country in September 1977 with the help of the OLP delegate in TANZANIA, instructed in Lebanon. The delegation consisted of: MIGUEL BONASSO, RODOLFO GONZALEZ and JANE HUMPREY, British subject, friend of CHRISTOPHER ROPER, as interpreter.

They signed an agreement with the Tanzanian party known as COM, in which they reported the southafrican expansion, the ~~alliance between~~ SOUTH ATLANTIC alliance and the ~~oppression~~ oppression suffered by some African countries such as NAMIBIA and RHODESIA.

The COM supported the BDT cause and approved the installations of a delegation and MARIO EDUARDO FIRMINICH's visit.

Due to internal complications the local delegate of the OLF - FONAD - requested the motoneros to leave the country.

Later, without the government's approval, the delegation was opened ~~ix~~ through an agreement signed with the party. They received transitory visas and no legal ~~status~~ or local status were authorized for the operation. Therefore the delegation was established in the OLP, in DAR ES SALAAM and the members had serious housing problems. The montoneros believed they were losing time with the lack of support on the part of Tanzania government and although their relation with the party and the masses are ~~xxx~~ in a good shape.

c) IRAC

In Beirut contacts were initiated with the ~~party~~ Lebanese BAAS party in September/october 1977 and the BDT travelled to that country with the ~~general~~ same general objectives. They obtained an interview with the leader of the Baas Party, ZUHAIR EL KADIRI and they agreed on another visit.

d) SOUTH YEMEN

MARIA ANTONIA BERGER and RODOLFO GONZALEZ visited this country in June, July 1978. She was selected due to a resolution of the "secretariat of international relations" because that country has an inclination towards Russia and because she is well connected with Cuba, where she was assigned as "ambassador" of the BDT. They both travelled to CUBA via PRAGUE to request support from the Cuban PC to carry out this visit.

They had meetings with the third level of the Yemenite Official Party and government representatives. They carried a personal letter from FIRMENICH to President ROBAZA ALI. This was a mistake because a ~~few~~ little later the country had a coup which overthrew the government and the president was shot. The coup was supported by Cuba.

e) MOZAMBIQUE

The Chief of the Department HIRSCHLER and MABEL FERNANDEZ are headquartered in this country.

From TANZANIA they took the necessary steps to have a meeting at ~~ministerial level~~ Ministry of Foreign Affairs level. ~~They had a meeting with~~ HIRSCHLER and GONZALEZ had a meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs which lasted 45 minutes. During the meeting they requested authorization to open a delegation. The authorities replied that they would think it over. In 1978 (end of 1978) they were authorized to operate.

f) OTHER COUNTRIES

Tentative contacts have been made in countries such as: UGANDA, ZAIRE, LYBIA, ANGLO, MADAGASCAR and SYRIA.

4) DEPARTMENT OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES

Until 1976 this department was called "rest of the world" and was handled by a DT called "PETISO JOSE".

17.

~~xxxx~~ To date we have not been able to determine who is in charge of the department or where it has been established.

With respect to socialist countries, the only contacts have been with CUBA. The reason is due to an antagonism between the BDT and the PCA and Russia's permanent refusal to have any kind of contact with the Montoneros.

FIRMENICH's and other DTs travel through socialist countries have only been in transit, under cover, with the ~~xxx~~ help obtained from Cuba and with Cuban documentation.

a) CUBA

Following is the situation in this country:

- The Cuban Communist Party (PCC) holds a position similar to ~~xxx~~ Russia's in their contacts with the DT. However this is periodically corrected with ~~the~~ personal interventions of FIDEL CASTRO with the leaders of the party.

- The American Department of the PCC was headed by "Commander BARBA ROJA" called PINEIRO, who did not share the party's official position. He was more of a "guevarist" nature (guerrilla). With respect to Argentina, he clearly supported the BDT "prt-erp" with the limitations imposed by the PCC. The same thing did not occur with the BDT "montoneros" because they were clearly anti-peronist.

- The seet~~ee~~ which helped the BDT was the one denominated "Special Troops" direct consisting of approximately 500 men under the/leadership of F~~I~~DEL CASTRO, and not the Cuban Army. This corps has participated in guerrilla experiences throughout the world. For example, LATIN AMERICA, ANGOLA AND SOUTH AFRICA.

This same corps is a liaison for "national leadership" throughout the world and guards its members, ~~as well as instructing them~~ and trains the "special troops of custodia and security" created by the CN of the BDT.

- The political support is very poor. They have been unable to obtain the "unc de-blocking" of ~~the~~ Russia, which was the BDT's principal objective. In this case the most important thing was a meeting between FIRMENICH with a secretary of the Soviet Embassy in HAVANA, who periodically asks about his health.

- CUBAS principal support is handling funds, through the government. Another support is permitting ~~some~~ certain levels, in addition to the members of the CN, to reside in their country.

- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs ~~with~~ authorizes the BDT to use their diplomatic pouches to send subversive material and the use, with many limitations of their consular offices to establish contacts with other countries, at government level

- The BDT have an "embassy" in Cuba. Previously MARIA ANTONIA BERGER was in charge. At present it is CARLOS CARULLO.

- All activities of this "embassy" are carried out through the American Department of the PCC, responsible for the BDT. Their structure is as follows:

Chief of the Department: PINEYRO

Argentine Sector: known as "GUSTAVO" was assigned to the Cuban Embassy in Argentina.

In charge of BDT MONTONEROS: JESUS CRUZ, was in Mexico as cultural secretary.

b) RUSSIA

Their policy with Russia, in addition to several attempts to make contacts through Cuba, has not been successful, except for a visit in 1974/75

of FIRMENICH to Moscow where he was only able to interview a third-class leader and was unable to contact any high-level Russian officials.

The policy recommended by CUBA, especially by the Cuban Ambassador in BUENOS AIRES, ARAGONES NAVARRO, is a lateral approach through other socialist countries, for example EAST GERMANY.

While in Cuba Maria Antonia Berger tried to make these contacts while she was in Cuba with absolutely no results.

c) YUGOSLAVIA

Newspaperman CARLOS SUAREZ, militant in the PRESS Section of the MPM and member of the Radical Youth was responsible for contacts in this country. They reached an agreement of press relations and the commitment of exhibiting a picture on Argentina through Yugoslav TV. There is no information on whether this was ever done.

Yugoslavia participated in a congress on LATIN AMERICA, based on Chilean socialism. OBREGON CANO and JORGE REYNOSO participated. REYNOSO had travelled from ALGIERS.

They later tried to make new contacts through different Yugoslav embassies to be able to participate in the Movement of Non-Aligned countries. Their attempts were fruitless.

d) POPULAR CHINA

In 1977 FIRMENICH went to this country's embassy in PARIS and requested authorization to travel to PEKIN with negative results. The contact had been made by JUAN GELMAN who had collaborated with the New China News Agency.

c) AUXILIARY COMMAND SECRETARIAT

HORACIO DOMINGO CAMPIGLIA, war name "PETRUS" is in charge. There is no further information on this secretariat.

The principal mission of this secretariat is to centralize the communications of the different structures of the BDT, making liaison and coordinating their activities, and solving problems resulting from the dispersion of the members throughout the world.

4. STRUCTURE OF THE MONTONERO PERONIST MOVEMENT (MPM)

The new structure is quite similar to the old one. It has been adapted to the objectives of the Party ~~which~~ whose objective is to obtain a total leadership of the BDT through National Leadership.

a. Superior Council

Is the maximum acting authority of the MPM which directs the strategic action of the movement's policy.

It is presently distributed as follows:

- 1) General Secretary :: maximum authority until the Superior Council or the National Executive Board is in session. MARIO EDUARDO FIRMINICH ~~is the head~~
- 2) Executive Secretary: is designated and is directly supervised by The General Secretary. He in turn designates the financial, press and organization secretaries. ROBERTO CIRILO PERDIA, war name "PELADO CARLOS" ~~is~~ (Political Secretary of National Leadership, Montonero Party).
- 3) Foreign Affairs Secretary: FERNANDO HUGO VACA NARVAJA, war name "VASCO" who holds the same position in National Leadership of the party.
- 4) Financial Secretary: GREGORIO LEVENSON.
- 5) Press Secretary: MIGUEL BONASSO
- 6) Organization Secretary: The position was vacant up to April 1979
- 7) Eight members for each one of the six branches

The Secretary General votes last in the meetings of the Superior Council of a tie and in case ~~there is a tie~~, his vote counts double

b) National Executive Table???



The National Executive Table meets every two months, through the Executive Secretary, who sends the members a list of things to be discussed 15 days in advance.

This organization is the maximum authority of the MPM (while the Superior Council ~~xxx~~ is not operating) and ~~ix~~ responsibilities are divided as follows:

- 1) General Secretary
- 2) Executive Secretary.
- 3) Secretary of Foreign Affairs
- 4) The first secretaries of each one of the branches

In emergency cases, when members are dispersed, the committee can operate with only three members, but one of them has to be the General Secretary or the Executive Secretary.

c. Branches

Operation: By regulation the members ~~xxxxxxx~~ of each branch have to meet every six months, this time period has been dispersed decided because of the/geographic locations of the members which does not permit them to get together more often. The leadership of each branch is the responsibility of the First Secretary.

Effective April 1979 the first secretary has two assistants: one in charge of press and the other in charge of finances. The first secretary is authorized to select his assistants from one ~~xxxx~~ of the members of the branches.

The "secretario adjunto" (co-secretary) can be assigned any specific responsibility, although his main responsibility is to replace the First Secretary in case of necessity.

The Secretary for Organization is responsible for organizing the branch covering the Branch in national territory, where he is headquartered.

The Secretary for Foreign Affairs is obviously responsible for all international activities of the branch.

The members can perform any specific task assigned to them by the First Secretary or perform the duties of Press or Finances.

The Secretaries of Organization, Foreign Affairs and the persons in charge of PRESS AND FINANCES perform their duties with a certain degree of relations with the secretaries of similar structures at the level of the "Executive Table". For example, The Branch Secretaries of Foreign Affairs have a quarterly meeting with FERNANDO VACA NARVAJA, the same should happen with the Secretaries of Organization who have still not been nominated or the members of the Superior Council. In the same manner, the Secretaries for Press and Finance: MIGUEL BONASSO and GREGORIO LEVENSON ~~xxx~~ coordinate efforts with the "chargé's" of the same areas in each Branch.

The objective of this coordination between the secretaries<sup>es</sup> of the Executive Table and similar activities in each branch is to coordinate the MPM central policy bearing in mind the possibilities of each branch, since they are not always capable of carrying out the same activities.

The only coordinating meeting that has been held to date is the ~~SECRET~~ one organized by the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs. The Secretariat of Organization has not been able to have a meeting for reasons mentioned above.

GREGORIO LEVENSON centralized the entire financial area. In Press the activities were decentralized in a sub-branch established in MEXICO (MIGUEL in charge) and in ROME (Juan GELMAN in charge until he left the BDT early 1979). The reason for the centralization is to unit the different criteria observed by the Branches with respect to the contents of the internal bulletins. Therefore they decided

a Central Press ~~Branch~~ Headquarters of the MEM in MADRID under MIGUEL BONASSO and leave a small branch in MEXICO. As of that date they started to coordinate the contents of the documents of each branch with the Press Secretary of the Executive "Table".

Activities Developed: The different branches got together every three or six months, based on the organizing capacity of each. During those meetings they ~~decided~~ assigned responsibilities to each member, since the rest of the members of the Executive Table were working in matters related to international affairs. After the second semester in 1978 they started to implement the organization of the different branches in the country. Since there were no structures in Argentine territory, they <sup>had to</sup> ~~discuss~~ the ways of organization. At that time they started making contact with the labor branch (with the return to Argentina of GONZALO CHAVEZ) and with the Youth Groups, headed by MANUEL PEDREIRA.

With the loss of NORBERTO HABEGGER, the responsibility was given to PABLO FERNANDEZ LONG. <sup>In late 1978</sup> /The Feminine Branch sent a militant who used to cooperate with the relatives of persons who had been arrested. ~~During the last period of 1978~~. Her duties were to have interview with ~~relatives~~ of arrested DT and give them money. She had no specific responsibility ~~in~~ in the organization of the branch in the country. On the other hand the professional branch had no contacts in Argentina and was dedicated to the preparation of the "national ~~project~~ revolutionary project". (determining the political policy to be discussed in the meeting of the Superior Council).

The Press Secretariat in MADRID and MEXICO carried out the activities with the so-called "work-groups" ~~in~~ established in each of the European countries and was supposed to open a Press

office in Argentina

The Secretariat of Finances organized festivals to obtain funds for the MPM, which, up to ~~xxx~~ March 1979 was not put into action. They did obtain some funds through the sale of some pictures "To resist is to win" to the RAI (ITALY), French TV and Belgium TV. The CEDRON ~~XXXXXX~~ quartet had planned a series of festivals which they were to show with the picture. All these plans were not ~~put~~ put into practice because of GALIMBERTI's ~~separation~~ and his followers' separation.

Another frustrated activity was the ~~trip~~ visit and stay of the organization's secretaries in the country, with the exception of the Political Branch which had carried out some activities, first with HABEGGER and now with JULIO EVERTO SUAREZ CORIA.

With the creation of the Finance and Press Chargé's in each branch, the objective was to obtain economic resources for each branch through bonds or memberships, which should have been done in national territory and not abroad. This naturally brought about a serious risk to the militants responsible for this activity and that was the principal reason why it was not put into effect. With respect to Press, the objective was to print and distribute the Information Bulletins of each branch in the country. This was not achieved either.

#### Organization and Structure

##### 1) Political Branch

- First Secretary: OSCAR BIDEGAIN
- Co-Secretary: RICARDO OBREGON CANO
- Secretary of Organization: JULIO EVERTO SUAREZ CORIA
- Secretary of Foreign Affairs: JULIO RODRIGUEZ ANIDO
- MEMBERS: JAINE DRI
- RAFAEL YACUZZI (priest)

GERARDO BAVIO (Press Attaché)

he  
Although BIDEGAIN does not belong to the party/is ~~xxxx~~ considered practically as the second in importance in the MPM after ROBERTO CIRILO PERDIA, while OBREGON CANO is considered as ~~thx~~ BIDEGAIN's replacement and is the one responsible for contacts ~~with the government~~ at government level.

2) Labor Branch:

- First Secretary: ARMANDO CROATTO (dead)
- Co-Secretary: GONZALO LEONIDAS CHAVEZ
- Organization Secretary: JOSE DALMASO LOPEZ (dead)
- Secretary for Foreign Affairs: . . . . .
- Financial Chargé: EDUARDO BERROZPE
- Member: ALDO MORAN

RAMON HERRERA

3) Professionals, Intellectuals and Artistical Branch

- First Secretary: RODOLFO PUIGROS
- Co-Secretary: . . . . .
- Organization Secretary: . . . . .
- Secretary for Foreign Affairs: SILVIA BERGMAN
- ~~Press~~ Press Chargé PEDRO ORGAMBIDE

4) Agrarian Branch:

- First Secretary: OSVALDO LOVEY
- Co-Secretary: CARLOS SERVANDO PICCOLI (dead)
- Advisor: JORGE TORRES (priest)
- ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

5) Youth Branch:

- First Secretary: GUILLERMO AMARILLA
- Co-Secretary: MANUEL PEDREIRA

6) Feminine Branch

- First Secretary: ADRIANA LESGART (dead)
- Co-Secretary: MARIA ANTONIA BERGER
- Secretary for Organization: SUSANA SANZ DE LLORENTE
- Members: RENE CHAVEZ ~~and ELENA ROMERO~~  
ELENA ROMERO  
LIDIA MASSAFERRO  
NILDA RASPARI de LENCINAS

Reconstruction: After the meeting of the Party's National Council in October 1978 and the Central Committee Meeting in January 1979, the ~~the structure~~ structures of the branches were partially changed ~~as a result~~ because several of their members came back to the country ~~the~~ to start the "maneuver" or first phase of the "counteroffensive" with the responsibility of organizing the activities leading towards agitation, propaganda, contacts with labor bases and solidarity groups. The MPM was ~~dismantled~~ dismantled and a need of communication between the first secretaries and members of their branches abroad was necessary to coordinate activities both in the country and abroad. This was not carried out because communication of this nature was very difficult.

<sup>constructure</sup>  
This ~~restructure~~ was not organic or following regulations, but a necessity with the separation of RODOLFO GALIMBERTI and his followers.

GUILLERMO AMARILLA replaced GALIMBERTI in the Youth Branch and the rest of the First Officers became members of the Party's Political Secretariat (Annex 1) which operated until the counteroffensive campaign started in March/April 1979, when GALIMBERTI, CHAVEZ, LESGART and LOPEZ of the MPM WERE scheduled to return to the country. Replacing them abroad were CROATTO, AMARILLA, BERGER and LOVEY.

Once the "maneuver" was started GALIMBERTI was replaced by JESUS MARIA LUJAN and CROATTO and AMARILLA were added (originally they had not been designated).

##### 5. BDT Internal Situation

From the initiation of the MPM (April 25, 1977 in ROME) to the meeting of the Superior Council in October 1978 (in CUBA) the MPM were very independent ~~and~~ from the party and had a lot of freedom. The First Secretaries had press conferences, made public announcements ~~and~~ with statements political ~~backgrounds~~, all under the influence of OSCAR BIDEGAIN who was considered the undiscussed leader of the MPM.

It can be said that at present the BDT are going through an internal crisis due to:

- a. The lack of a clear political definition on the part of National Leadership and therefore the Montonero Party. This is because they never made a serious "auto-critic" to clarify their political ideology and to reach an adequate methodology to ~~reach~~ reach the necessary objectives. They also lost important assets such as HOBERT, ROQUE and ARRUE who would have been in a good condition to lead the policy of the BDT. They also lack a clear vision of the Argentine situation <sup>added to</sup> ~~which~~ FIRMENICH's ~~authority~~ total authority ~~over~~ ~~in his leadership~~ in his leadership program.
- b. With the initiation of the "maneuver" of "counteroffensive" during the meeting of the Central Committee, the proposal was ~~not~~ very resisted, especially by CHAVEZ and GULLO, who, coinciding with the "movement" sector, believed the timing was poor to have some important representatives ~~return~~ return to the country without the political and labor support of the country.



c. Consequently the BDT had three internal sectors:

- 1) ~~Partisan~~ Party Sector: under the leadership of FIRMENICH and PERDIA, who tried to conduct the entire BDT.
  - 2) Military Sector: Who tried to continue with the armed fight to reach their political objectives, although it was already proved impossible to be successful in this manner. The leaders of this sector ~~YAGNER~~ were MENDIZABAL (dead) ~~and~~ YAGER and (war name) EDGARDO.
  - 3) Movement Sector: Which tried to direct the BDT movement solely on the basis of the political sector, excluding the armed fight and contrasting with the two other sectors. This sector is inspired in two politicians who are not party members: BIDEGAIN and OBREGON CANO.
- d. To date the "party sector" under the leadership of FIRMENICH, has neutralized the ~~other~~ other two sectors. For that purpose they started working on the international reconstruction in October 1978-meeting of the National Council in CUBA-where they took out MENDIZABAL from the Army sector and BIDEGAIN and OBREGON CANO from the political leadership and introduced PERDIA as second figure of the Movement.

UNCLASSIFIED

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BUENOS AIRES HERALD 11

## Foreign weapons and Libyan boots

(b)(3): 10 USC 424

# Report on Soldati attack

THE extremists who murdered businessman Francisco Soldati and his bodyguard a few days ago, had a veritable armament of foreign makes, according to a 13-page statement issued yesterday by the Army High Command.

Last Tuesday the car in which Soldati was travelling to work was intercepted by a pickup at the corner of Cerro to and Arenales. The terrorists shot up the car, killing Soldati, and police corporal Ricardo Manuel Duran.

A police prowler car which happened to be in the vicinity engaged in a shootout with the terrorists and the vehicle from which they had been firing caught fire and exploded. Three of the terrorists were killed in the blast.

The army statement reports that among the firearms and explosives used by the terrorists were a Heckler Koch German-made rifle, a Chinese-made Kalashinov AK 47 Soviet designed assault rifle; two UZI, repeating pistols made in Israel, two Remington carbines and four Browning pistols.

The greater part of the firearms which were confiscated by the army are nearly new and show very little use.

The explosives used by the terrorists include an "Energa" grenade which can be fired by means of a specially adapted Remington rifle. The statement says this type of explosive has been used by terrorists in other subversive attacks.

It adds that some of the bullets do not show any manufacturing identification which leads to the belief that they were made in a clandestine workshop or behind the Iron Curtain. The statement also says that these probably originated in Czechoslovakia, Cuba or a Middle East country.

Some of the nine millimetre bullets are of a type unknown in Argentina, and others apparently made by the famous Gevelor plant in France.

The main weapon used in the killing of Soldati and his companion was an assault Kalashnikov rifle, model AK-47, of 7.62 millimetres loading 30 bullets with a reach of 300 metres.

The military-type uniforms used by the terrorists are not of a kind worn by military units in Argentina and one of the dead subversives was wearing shoes with the words "Made in

Libya" on their rubber soles.

The three dead terrorists were identified as Enrique Horacio Firelli, Renigio Elpidio Gonzalez, and Maria Emilia Videla. The woman had false documents so there are some doubts concerning her real identity.

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