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ACTION DIA:

DISTR CJCS DJS J3:(04) J5(02) NMCC SECDEF: ASD:ISA(10) :DIA(15)

- SWS(01)
- SECSTATE WASH DC
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- CSA WASH DC
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TRANSIT/261907Z/262017Z/001:10TOR3302016

DE RUESBAA #1156 3301923

ZNY ~~CCCCC~~

P 261907Z NOV 75

FM (b)(3):10 USC 424

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC

INFO RULPALJ/USCINCSO QUARRY HTS

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THIS IS IR (b)(3):10 USC 424

1. AR
2. PRESSURES FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION IN GOVERNMENT WITHIN ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES (C)
3. N/A
4. PRIOR TO 20 NOV
5. 1975, NOV 20, BUENOS AIRES
6. F-3

7. (b)(3):10 USC 424

9. 1975, NOV 25

10. N/A

11. (b)(3):10 USC 424

12.

13 &

15. 1. (C/NINTEL/NOFORN)

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Sec. 3.3(b) (1)

THEIR PURPOSE WAS TO KEEP INFORMED OF POLITICAL MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN ARGENTINA BECAUSE A COOPERATIVE US-ARGENTINE RELATIONSHIP FOLLOWING A CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT WOULD BE

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CRUCIAL TO THE SUCCESS OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT.

2. ~~(C//UNINTEL//NOFORN)~~ SOURCES VIEWED WITH ALARM WHAT THEY PERCEIVE AS A CONSTANT DRIFT TO THE LEFT IN ARGENTINE POLITICS. THEY HOLD EX-PRESIDENT LANUSSE LARGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE COUNTRY'S CURRENT PROBLEMS POINTING OUT THAT LANUSSE SUPPORTED THE LEFTIST TENDENCIES OF FRONDISZI AND WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR PERMITTING PERON TO RETURN. THEY VIEWED ONGANIA'S GOVERNMENT AS BEING VERY GOOD FOR THE COUNTRY, BUT DID NOT FEEL THAT HE COULD RETURN TO POWER. SOURCES CLAIM THAT MANY OFFICERS IN THE ARMED FORCES SHARE THEIR CONCERN OVER WHAT APPEARS TO BE A CONSTANT DRIFT TO THE LEFT AND THEIR FEARS HAVE BEEN REINFORCED BY THE EVENTS OF RECENT YEARS IN CHILE AND PORTUGAL.

3. ~~(C//UNINTEL//NOFORN)~~ ACCORDING TO SOURCES, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THERE WILL BE A CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT. THE ONLY QUESTIONS ARE WHEN AND TO WHAT DEGREE THE MILITARY WILL HAVE TO FORCE THE CHANGE. THEY CLAIMED THAT THE THREE ARMED FORCES CINCS REACHED A SECRET AGREEMENT THAT THEY WOULD NOT MOVE TO BRING DOWN THE GOVERNMENT BEFORE 11 DECEMBER 1975 AND THAT THEY WOULD CONFER AGAIN BEFORE TAKING ANY UNILATERAL ACTION. WHILE THE AIR FORCE DID NOT FAVOR DELAYING BEYOND 20 NOVEMBER THE NAVY CINC FELT HE COULD DELAY UNTIL 25 NOVEMBER. HOWEVER, BOTH CINCS LATER AGREED TO DELAYING UNTIL THE 11 DECEMBER DATE FAVORED BY THE ARMY. SOURCES STRESSED THAT THE 11 DECEMBER DATE WAS ONLY SIGNIFICANT IN THAT THE CINCS ARE NOT COMMITTED TO COOPERATIVE ACTION BEYOND THAT DATE UNLESS A NEW AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED. SOURCES ALSO IMPLIED THAT THE IMAGE OF SOLIDARITY WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES IS NOTHING MORE THAN A FACADE WITH TREMENDOUS PRESSURES BUILDING UNDER THE SURFACE.

4. ~~(C//UNINTEL//NOFORN)~~ SOURCES WENT ON TO DISCUSS THE POLITICAL STRENGTHS OF VARIOUS MILITARY LEADERS. THEY DISCOUNT AIR FORCE CINC FAUTARIC COMPLETELY AND DO NOT BELIEVE THAT NAVY CINC MASSERA WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARMY. ALSO, THEY BELIEVE THAT MASSERA IS LOSING CONTROL WITHIN THE NAVY, CITING THAT RECENTLY HE HAS BEEN RECEIVED COOLY AT THE MAJOR NAVAL BASE IN PUERTO BELGRANO. THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT ARMY CINC VIDELA IS NOT INTERESTED IN A POLITICAL ROLE. IT IS ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF VIOLA WHO MAY EMERGE AS THE STRONG MAN. SOURCES REPORT THAT VIOLA FAVORS A CHANGE IN THE SUCCESSION LAW WHICH WOULD PERMIT A MILITARY MAN (MEANING VIOLA) TO BE ELECTED PRESIDENT BY THE SENATE OR A CHANGE WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE SENATE TO ELECT A NEW PRESIDENT FROM A LIST OF CANDIDATES APPROVED BY THE ARMED FORCES. SOURCES DO NOT FULLY SUPPORT VIOLA, HOWEVER, BECAUSE THEY SAY THAT THEY HAVE FIRM EVIDENCE (COPIES OF LETTERS) WHICH SHOW THAT GENERAL VIOLA IS FLIRTING WITH

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LEFTIST LABOR LEADERS FOR THEIR SUPPORT.

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5. COMMENT: (C) UNINTEL/NOFORN [redacted] INTELLIGENT AND WELL EDUCATED AND [redacted] NO REASON TO DOUBT THE WIDE RANGE OF CONTACTS WHICH THEY ENJOY. HOWEVER, THEY ARE OPENLY "GOLPISTA" AND TEND TO EXAGGERATE AND TO INTERPRET EVENTS TO CONFORM TO THEIR PRECONCEIVED BIASES AND PREJUDICES. [redacted] UNABLE

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TO CONFIRM SECRET AGREEMENT BETWEEN CINCS ESTABLISHING 11 DECEMBER LIMIT TO MILITARY COOPERATION AND PATIENCE, BUT IT WOULD BE A LOGICAL TIME FOR THE CINCS TO MAKE A NEW ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION AS THE COUNTRY ENTERS ITS SUMMER VACATION PERIOD AND AS THE ARMED FORCES PREPARE TO DISCHARGE THEIR RECRUITS AND TRAIN NEW ONES. RECENT VISIT [redacted] TO

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PUERTO BELGRANO DOES NOT BEAR OUT CONTENTION THAT MASSERA IS LOSING SUPPORT IN PUERTO BELGRANO [redacted] AGREES WITH ASSESSMENT OF GENERAL VICLA AS THE OFFICER MOST LIKELY TO EMERGE IN A POLITICAL ROLE SHOULD THE MILITARY TAKE POWER. AT THIS TIME, HOWEVER, MOST SOURCES DO NOT BELIEVE THAT A MILITARY COUP IS IMMINENT. THIS MSG HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH EMBASSY.

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