

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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Classification/Control Markings

1. COUNTRY: ARGENTINA (AR)      2. REPORT NUMBER: [REDACTED]

3. TITLE: (U) Political Military - Argentine Navy Views of US Policy      4. PROJECT NUMBER: N/A (b)(3):10 USC 424

5. DATE OF INFORMATION: 780120 -780217 (b)(3):10 USC 424      6. DATE OF REPORT: 780302 (b)(3):10 USC 424

7. DATE & PLACE OF ACQUISITION: 780120-780217, Buenos Aires & Comandante Espora      8. REFERENCES: [REDACTED]

9. ASSESSMENT: SOURCE [REDACTED], INFO [REDACTED]      10. ORIGINATOR: [REDACTED] (b)(3):10 USC 424

11. REQUEST EVALUATION [REDACTED], QPO [REDACTED]      12. PREPARING OFFICER: [REDACTED] (b)(3):10 USC 424

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15. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:  
~~ADVANCE REPORT FOR DEFENSE USE ONLY~~      D YES   
~~NOFORN TO AVOID EMBARRASSMENT TO HOST GOVT~~      R      C NO

16. SUMMARY:  
~~(C/NOFORN)~~ This report forwards comments by senior Argentine Naval Officers, including the Commander in Chief, regarding their perception of a policy singling out the Navy with regard to withholding US foreign military sales.

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

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19. ~~DOWNGRADING AND CLASSIFIED BY~~ [REDACTED] A:  
~~SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EO 13526~~  
~~AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DEC 1984~~

20. ENCLOSURES:  
 2 ENCLOSURES  
 1. AMEMBASSY BA Telegram 0833, DTG 021400Z, 1 Cy Pages (C)  
 2. AMEMBASSY BA Telegram 1251, DTG 172020Z, 1 Cy 3 Pages (C)  
 MICROFICHER BY RDS-3D2

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21. This IR contains 2 pages.

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Continuation Sheet

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

22. DETAILS: 1. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ on 20 January 1978,

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(b)(3):10 USC 424; Sec. 3.3(b) (1)

Having set the stage, source then described his great displeasure with lack of spare parts support for SP2 aircraft recently arrived in country with inoperative avionics components. Source A then described unwillingness of US contractors to overhaul these components when an export license could not be obtained. [redacted] responded that perhaps if human rights conditions in Argentina improved that spare parts flow might also improve. Source questioned [redacted] regarding background knowledge on terrorism in Argentina. [redacted] satisfied source A that he was aware of the recent history, then suggested that the war was won and it was time to get on with other business that could improve relations between our countries.

(b)  
(2), 10

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(2), 10

2. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ On 27 January 1978

(b)(3):10 USC 424

3. ~~(C)~~ As described in enclosure (1) and (2) there is a perception in the ARA that spare part support is being selectively withheld.

COMMENT: ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Chief, Navy Section, U.S. Military Group is aware of views expressed by senior ARA officers. Standing too close to this situation may limit (b)(3):10 USC 424 objective comments. In any case, the ARA feels pinched, but as seen in enclosure (2), ARA is showing a positive response to the human rights issue.

(b)(3):10 COMMENT: ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ While ARA actions can be interpreted as a positive response to US human rights initiatives, they also reveal an attempt by Admiral Massera to advance his own political ambitions by trying to give the impression that human rights advances are primarily the results of his personal efforts.

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# TELEGRAM

INDICATE  
 COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

FROM  
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION  
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~~0-11652:~~  
TAGS:  
SUBJECT:  
  
ACTION:

~~CDS~~  
SHUM, PGOV, PINT, MASS, AR  
AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON MASSERA

SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES

0833

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AMB  
DCM  
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1. Ambassador paid a half hour call on Admiral Massera afternoon February 1, responding to urgent telephone call early the same morning inviting him to "stop around for a drink." (That part of the invitation got side-tracked. Nothing was served during the interview, which took place at Massera's office at naval headquarters.)

2. EQUIPMENT FOR THE NAVY. The Admiral expressed great concern that both the Argentine Army and Air Force had recently been authorized to receive spare parts and military equipment from the United States, while the Navy has received nothing. Massera said that he had upbraided Ambassador Aja Espil

DRAFTED BY:  
POL:WHHallman:gcr

DRAFTING DATE  
2/2/78

TEL. EXT.  
278

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Ambassador Castro

REARANCES:

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DCM:MChaplin

(b)(3):10 USC 424

[Redacted]

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BA-17  
OPTION  
4-12-78

about this and gotten the answer that the Argentine Navy is unpopular with the US Government. "They say in Washington we have the nuns," Massera said. "You know that's just not so," he continued. "Well it's alright for the US not to like Massera," the Admiral added, "but you should hold nothing against the Argentine Navy."

3. HUMAN RIGHTS CASES. The Ambassador took the occasion to raise human rights problems. He raised specifically the Timerman, Deutsch and Vogler cases. On Timerman Massera gave his expected response: He had tried for Timerman's release, he said, but had been overruled by members of the Army. He seemed genuinely unaware of the Deutsch and Vogler matters, making notes and asking particulars. He said that he would attend a Junta meeting only a half hour later, and that he would raise these names while there. (Comment: On being told that Alejandro and Liliana Deutsch were being held in Cordoba, Massera mused that this was really too bad. If they weren't in the hands of General Menendez, he said, he just might be able to snatch the pair of them away for us.)

4. THE WASHINGTON POST ARTICLE. Massera said that he had read Karen de Young's January 27 "Post" article. He acknowledged that he and Videla often disagree, and said that he had never tried to disguise this. He had

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been frank with many people about this. Now that the de Young article is causing a stir, he said, the time has come to air his grievances and have candid words with his Army colleague.

5. ATMOSPHERICS. More interesting than what Massera said at the meeting--which seems almost trivial when compared with the urgency with which the meeting was arranged--was the publicity given it. First notice that the Ambassador would see the Navy commander came during a 1030 radio news broadcast. (The appointment was set 0900.) Afternoon papers carried the event--at about the time it was taking place.

6. We account for this by suggesting that Massera wanted it publicized he was meeting with the American Ambassador in order to throw his Army "opposition" off base. We were told on January 31 by a ranking civilian officer of the Presidency that Videla was fed up with Massera's politicking and apparent disloyalty, and would use the de Young story to "have it out with him" at a Junta meeting due to take place late afternoon February 1. The meeting with the Ambassador was, in effect, a Massera hole "hold card" for the tough conversation with Videla he probably expected.

7. On leaving Massera's office Ambassador encountered Foreign Minister Montes, which gave another opportunity

to lay out the human rights case concerns he had just given Massera. Montes promised to go over these again with his boss.

8. Ambassador is waiting for green light from ~~Emb~~ ~~Off~~ FonO to meet with Minister of Interior Harguindeguy and of the Governor/Province of Buenos Aires General St. Jean. Meetings are expected to occur early next week and again Deutsch, Timerman and Vogler cases will be discussed.

CASTRO *llc*

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PARTICULARLY WAS ABOUT TO BENEFIT FROM A FAVORABLE DECISION, TODAY (FEBRUARY 17), ADMIRAL MASSERA SENT A POLITICAL AIDE, CAPT. MONTEMAYOR, TO INFORM THE AMBASSADOR THAT DEUTSCH'S RELEASE WOULD BE EFFECTED SHORTLY. THE AIDE MADE NO MENTION OF DEUTSCH'S DAUGHTER LILIANA AND WE HAVE NO REASON TO ASSUME THAT SHE MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE REPORTEDLY IMMINENT ACTION.

3. CAPT. MONTEMAYOR STRESSED THAT ADMIRAL MASSERA WAS WORKING HARD TO RESOLVE THE HUMAN RIGHTS CASES OF HIGH INTEREST TO THE U.S. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE NAVY WAS AT THE AMBASSADOR'S COMPLETE DISPOSAL IN THIS REGARD AND IMPLIED, AS MASSERA HIMSELF HAS BEEN WONT TO DO ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, THAT THE ARMY WAS THE PRIMARY SOURCE OF OBFUSCATING SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM. COMING TO THE BOTTOM LINE OF HIS PROPOSITION, HE THEN ASKED WHY THE NAVY SEEMED TO BE SINGLED OUT FOR DENIALS OF U.S. MILITARY EQUIPMENT WHEN IT WAS THE NAVY THAT WAS DOING THE MOST TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION. THE AMBASSADOR RESPONDED THAT THERE WAS NO POLICY OF SINGLING OUT ANY SERVICE NOR DID U.S. DECISION-MAKERS HOLD ANYTHING PERSONAL AGAINST MASSERA. THE AMBASSADOR EMPHASIZED THAT TIME WAS RUNNING OUT IN WASHINGTON IN TERMS OF THE POLICY DECISION THAT HAD TO BE MADE WITH RESPECT TO ARGENTINA AND THAT IF THERE WAS ANYTHING THAT MASSERA COULD DO TO RESCUE THESE PEOPLE, THIS WOULD BE GREATLY WELCOMED--AND APPRECIATED--BY THE USG.

4. IT IS EVIDENT THAT MASSERA IS TRYING TO TAKE CREDIT FOR

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WHAT APPEARS TO BE IMPENDING JUNTA ACTION IN SOME OF THE HIGH INTEREST CASES. FOR WHATEVER HIS MOTIVES, WE BELIEVE THAT MASSERA HAS BEEN PLAYING A ROLE OF PUSHING A FAVORABLE DECISION THROUGH THE JUNTA AND WE PROPOSE TO CONTINUE ENCOURAGING HIM TO DO SO.

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