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CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
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FM (b)(3):10 USC 424
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASH DC//DB-3E//
INFO RULPALJ/USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PN//SCJ2-AD
RUEAHQA/HQ USAF WASH DC//XQXXW//
RUEADWD/HQDA WASH DC//DAMI-FII//
RUENAAA/CNO WASH DC//DP-009/
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SUBJ: (b)(3):10 USC 424 (U)

THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL

1. (U) CTRY: ARGENTINA (AR)
2. (U) TITLE: MILITARY/POLITICAL - ARGENTINE JUNTA MEMBER
REVIEWS CURRENT US/ARG RELATIONS (U)
3. (U) DATE OF INFO: 800820
4. (U) ORIG: [redacted]
5. (U) REF REFS: (b)(3):10 USC 424
6. (U) SOURCE: [redacted]

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7. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ SUMMARY: GENERAL DMAR ((GRAFFIGNA)), COMMANDER OF THE ARGENTINE AIR FORCE (ARGAF) AND RULING JUNTA MEMBER, STATED IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS [Sec. 3.3(b)(1)] THAT THERE STILL REMAINS BASIC TIES OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN US/ARG DESPITE CURRENT DISAGREEMENTS. HOWEVER, HE SPECIFICALLY STATED HIS DOUBTS AS TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF US POLICY IN DEALING WITH PROBLEMS WITHIN THE HEMISPHERE, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO BOLIVIA, CENTRAL AMERICAN, AND ABOVE ALL ARGENTINA. THE UNDERLYING TONE OF THE

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CONVERSATION WAS THAT ARGENTINA WOULD CONTINUE HER INDEPENDENT POLICIES REGARDLESS OF US INTERESTS AND, MOST SIGNIFICANTLY, WOULD CONTINUE TO DEVELOP A MORE EXTENSIVE AND ACTIVE ROLE FOR ARGENTINA IN THE HEMISPHERE.

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8A, ~~(C/NORFORN)~~ DETAILS: ON 800820, Sec. 3.3(b) (1) PAID A COURTESY CALL ON GENERAL ((GRAFFIGNA)). DURING THE ONE-HOUR CONVERSATION, GEN GRAFFIGNA REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THE BASIC PHILOSOPHICAL TIES BETWEEN THE US AND ARGENTINA, BASED ON DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND COMPLETE DISDAIN FOR MARXIST-LENINIST IDEOLOGIES. HE ALSO DOWNPLAYED CURRENT POINTS OF FRICTION BETWEEN THE US AND ARGENTINA, SUCH AS BOLIVIA, GRAIN SALES TO THE SOVIET UNION, HUMPHREY-KENNEDY AMMENDMENT, ETC., STATING HE FELT THEY WERE PROBLEMS WHICH WOULD BE OVERCOME WITH TIME. HE DID, HOWEVER, TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO REITERATE SEVERAL BASIC ARGENTINE POSITIONS. THE FOLLOWING IS A SHORT SUMMARY OF BASIC POINTS.

(1) ~~(C/NORFORN)~~ THE US DOES NOT FULLY APPRECIATE THE MAGNITUDE OF THE THREAT POSED BY MARXIST-LENINIST MOVEMENTS IN THIS HEMISPHERE. AS A RESULT, US IS MIS-PLACING ITS TRUST IN SO CALLED "CENTER-LEFT" CANDIDATES TO STRENGTHEN DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES IN THE DEVELOPING NATIONS OF THE HEMISPHERE. THE END RESULT OF THIS "MIS-PLACED TRUST" WILL BE A COMMUNIST DOMINATED HEMISPHERE SOUTH OF US BORDERS. THE NEAR AND LONG-TERM RESULTS OF US POLICY CAN ONLY BE A CATASTROPHE, IN HIS OPINION.

(2) ~~(C/NORFORN)~~ GEN GRAFFIGNA SPECIFICALLY DEALT WITH THREE MAJOR ISSUES/AREAS WHERE HE FELT US POLICY WAS SHORT-SIGHTED AND INEFFECTIVE; CENTRAL AMERICA, THE CARIBBEAN, AND BOLVIA. IN ALL THREE AREAS, THE INFLUENCE OF MARXIST-LENINIST IDEOLOGICAL GROUPS BACKED BY CUBA AND IN SOME CASES, ACCORDING TO GRAFFIGNA, BY INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS MUST BE RECOGNIZED AND DEALT WITH DIRECTLY.

(3) ~~(C/NORFORN)~~ IN CENTRAL AMERICA, NICARAGUA, WITH CUBAN BACKING AND HARBORING FORMER MONTONERO TERRORISTS, IS SEEN AS A VERY REAL THREAT TO STABILITY. THERE IS ALSO A GREAT DEAL OF CONCERN FOR SITUATIONS IN EL SALVADOR, GUTEMALA, AND HONDURAS. THE GENERAL IMPLIED THAT US POLICY IN THESE AREAS WAS TOO "SHORT-SIGHTED" AND "SOFT" TO COUNTER THE THREAT WHICH FACES THE DEMOCRATIC FUTURE OF THE WHOLE AREA.

(4) ~~(C/NORFORN)~~ IN THE CARIBBEAN, THE GENERAL ADMITTED THAT IT WAS ONLY RECENTLY THAT ARGENTINA HAD DEVELOPED A SIGNIFICANT INTEREST IN THE AREA. IN FACT, ONLY WITHIN THE LAST FEW MONTHS HE HAD ORDERED THE ARGAF ON A FACT-FINDING TOUR OF THE NEWER ISLAND NATIONS OF THE AREA. AGAIN, THE US WAS NOT EFFECTIVELY

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DEALING WITH PROBLEMS ARISING FROM LEFTIST TENDENCIES WITHIN THE AREA.

5) ~~(C/NFORN)~~ WITH REGARD TO BOLIVIA, GEN GRAFFIGNA CATEGORICALLY DENIED ANY ARGENTINE ROLE IN THE RECENT COUP. HE, HOWEVER, FELT THAT SINCE IT DID OCCUR, ARGENTINA HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO SUPPORT BOLIVIA. HE, AGAIN, ARGUED THAT THE US EVALUATION OF SILES ((SUAZO)) AS A "CENTER-LEFT" REPRESENTATIVE OF A DEVELOPING DEMOCRATIC PROCESS WAS WRONG. THE ONLY RESULT OF A SILES SUARZO PRESIDENCY WOULD HAVE BEEN "A CUBA OR WORSE."

(6) ~~(C/NFORN)~~ WITH REGARD TO THE US EMBARGO OF GRAIN SALES TO THE SOVIET UNION, GEN GRAFFIGNA STATED THAT IT HAD CERTAINLY BEEN MIS-HANDLED WITH RESPECT TO ARGENTINA AND THAT IT HAD NOT BEEN FULLY ANALYZED AS TO ACTUAL IMPACT, NOT ONLY ON THE SOVIET UNION, BUT ON WESTERN SUPPLIERS AS WELL. HE ALSO ADVISED THE US NOT TO ACCEPT AT FACE VALUE THE SUPPOSED COOPERATION OF THE WESTERN SUPPLIERS WHO IN REALITY WERE NOT SUPPORTING THE EMBARGO FULLY. ABOVE ALL, TO REQUEST ARGENTINA PARTICIPATE WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION AND AT THE SAME TIME BERATE ARGENTINA FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS WAS CERTAINLY NOT A SIGN OF CONSISTENT POLICY.

(7) ~~(C/NFORN)~~ IN SUMMARY, GEN GRAFFIGNA RESTATED HIS FAITH IN COMMON US/ARG TIES. HOWEVER, THE US MUST BE MORE REALISTIC IN CONFRONTING THE THREAT OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM AND TERRORISM IN THE HEMISPHERE. ADDITIONALLY, THE US MUST COME TO REALIZE WHOM ITS TRUE FRIENDS ARE IN THE HEMISPHERE AND, ABOVE ALL, BEGIN TO DEAL WITH LATIN AMERICA ON A MORE REALISTIC AND EQUITABLE LEVEL.

8B. ~~(C/NFORN)~~ ORIG CMTS: THE OPEN AND FRANK MANNER IN WHICH THE CONVERSATION WAS HELD LEAVES LITTLE DOUBT Sec. 3.3(b)(1) THAT GENERAL GRAFFIGNA'S COMMENTS WERE AN HONEST ASSESSMENT OF THE ARGENTINE POSITION VIS-A-VIS HEMISPHERIC AND WORLD PROBLEMS. MOST OF WHAT WAS DISCUSSED HAS BEEN REPORTED IN THE PAST FROM ALL LEVELS. TWO POINTS WHICH DEVELOPED FROM THE CONVERSATION SHOULD, HOWEVER, BE NOTED. FIRST, THE GENERAL'S REPEATED REFERENCE TO COMMON US/ARG PHILOSOPHICAL BONDS AND HIS DOWNPLAYING THE SERIOUSNESS OF CURRENT US/ARG DISAGREEMENTS ARE PROBABLY AN EFFORT TO CALM THE RHETORIC UNTIL AFTER THE US ELECTIONS, WHICH THEY PERCEIVE TO BE A HOPEFUL TURNING POINT FOR BETTER RELATIONS NO MATTER WHO THE NEXT US PRESIDENT IS. SECONDLY, IN RELATION TO THE GENERAL'S CRITICISM OF THE AWARENESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF US HEMISPHERIC POLICY, WHAT WAS NOT STATED EXPLICITLY, BUT CERTAINLY WAS APPARENT, WAS THAT ARGENTINA INTENDS TO CONTINUE ITS CURRENT INDEPENDENT POLICIES BASED ON

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ITS PERCEPTION OF CURRENT CONDITIONS AND MORE OR LESS IRRE-
SPECITIVE OF US INTERESTS OR POLICIES. MOST IMPORTANTLY,
ARGENTINA'S RAPIDLY DEVELOPING POLICY INTERESTS THROUGHOUT LATIN
AMERICA, CENTRAL AMERICA, AND THE CARIBBEAN WILL CONTINUE TO
EVOLVE. THIS IS A RESULT OF PROBABLY BOTH A PERCEPTION OF US
INABILITY AND/OR UNWILLINGNESS TO ACT AND A DESIRE TO PLACE
ARGENTINA AT THE FOREFRONT OF HEMISPHERIC EVENTS AND TRENDS.

9. (U) PROJ NO: N/A

10. (U) CQ: MGMT CODES: N/A

11. (U) SPEC INST: DIRC NO

12. (U) PREP BY: (b)(3):10 USC 424

13. (U) APP BY:

14. (U) REQ EVAL: NO

15. (U) ENCL: N/A

16. (U) DIST BY ORIG: N/A

~~REYN ON: 29 AUG 2000~~

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