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424

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DETAILS: (U) None

ORIGINATOR COMMENTS: (U) None

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SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

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1 ENCLOSURE(S):

1. Argentina - An Overview, 1 cy, 8 pgs ~~(S/NOFORN)~~

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ARGENTINA - AN OVERVIEW (U)

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A. (U) Counterintelligence Threat

1. (U) Local Intelligence Services

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The National Intelligence Center (CNI), established to coordinate intelligence activities, includes representatives of the military intelligence services. The civilian State Secretariat for Intelligence (SIDE) functions to collect and disseminate domestic and foreign intelligence, coordinate intelligence activities, and censor both domestic and foreign mail.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The Superintendency of Federal Security of the Federal Police has primary responsibility for countersubversive investigation in the federal capital, and throughout the entire country on questions of national security. It is charged with penetrating Communist party units and front organizations. Its division of alien affairs collects intelligence on foreign nationals in Argentina, whether in the country legally or illegally, who are considered to be threats to internal security. This division also maintains surveillance of foreign embassies, foreign journalists, secret lodges and societies, and certain religious groups.

2. (U) Local Security Forces

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Police forces include Federal Police, Provincial Police and the National Gendarmerie, a militarized border police force that comes under the control of the Army in time of emergency. The Argentine Naval Prefecture, similar to the U.S. Coast Guard,

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polices water boundaries, rivers and ports and performs certain security functions. The Federal Police have jurisdiction over crimes of a federal nature, including political offenses and internal security violations. Each province has its own police force.

3. (U) USSR Intelligence Activities

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ As of April 1981, there were 44 persons (16 known or suspected intelligence personnel) assigned to the Soviet Embassy and trade mission staffs in Argentina. No intelligence collection activities targeting U.S. military personnel have been reported. Additionally, 33 Parana Medio (26 Engineers) hydroelectric project personnel with translators are working in Argentina.

4. (U) People's Republic of China (PRC) Intelligence Activities.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ As of April 1981, there were 36 PRC citizens assigned to the PRC Embassy and trade mission staffs. Since the coup in March 1976, the PRC has kept a low profile in its relationship with the Junta. No intelligence activities targeting U.S. personnel have been reported. Primary interest is commercial with Argentine government.

5. (U) Other Third Country Intelligence Activities.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Brazil has much interest in following Argentine affairs and probably runs an active collection program. However, there is no information to indicate that Brazil is collecting against the U.S. in Argentina. Cuban involvement with leftist subversive groups in Argentina was reported in the mid-70's. No

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reports of Cuban intelligence targeting of U.S. personnel have been received. However, Argentine security officials have kept Cuban officials and embassy employees under investigation.

6. (U) Other Intelligence Activity.

(FOUO) No approaches to U.S. Navy members in Argentina for intelligence purposes have been reported.

B. (U) Political Climate/Subversive Activities.

1. (U) Communist and Communist Front Groups.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The Communist Party of Argentina (PCA) is the Orthodox Marxist party which is a faithful adherent to the international communist line as dictated by Moscow. Although it is the largest Communist party in Latin America, after Cuba, it has little influence nationally or internationally. The PCA is attempting to organize a broadly based support (including labor, students and church officials) for full and open political activity. Additionally, the PCA is discouraging any terrorist activity as they believe such activity would only bring harsh, repressive measures by the Junta.

2. (U) Non-Communist Dissident Groups.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ There are small non-Communist groups which have limited insurgency capabilities but offer no threat to visiting U.S. ships.

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3. (U) Violence Oriented Groups Including Terrorists.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Argentine measures to eliminate leftist terrorism have been very successful. Approximately 1,500 suspected subversives were reportedly killed during 1976/77. Improved intelligence efforts have revealed the locations of terrorist safehouses and caches of arms and funds.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The Argentine security forces have nearly obliterated the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), the Military Action Arm of the Trotskyite Revolutionary Workers' Party (PRT). The ERP has not carried out any terrorist activities in several years and there is no indication that it continues as an organized group within Argentina or abroad.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The Montoneros, a radical national liberation group, has been practically destroyed by government security forces. Exiled members of the group in Europe and elsewhere in Latin America continue non-violent attempts to encourage foreign opinion and foreign governments to sever their ties with the Argentine government. Within Argentina, the last terrorist activities conducted by Montoneros occurred in late-1979 with three attempts (one successful) to assassinate government economic officials or advisors. The failure of the Montoneros to attempt any terrorist activities since then appears to reflect the damage inflicted on the organization since the beginning of the governments anti-terrorist campaign in 1976.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The Montoneros have changed their organizational name to the Montonero Peronist Movement, both to expand the appeal of their Peronist origins and to "play up" their political rather than terrorist image. No reliable figures exist on the numbers of Montoneros in Argentina or in exile - the number within Argentina

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is almost certainly less than 100. The security forces occasionally detain individual Montonero members as they attempt to enter the country clandestinely - this would indicate that authorities have reliable sources of information within the movement itself.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Although the Montoneros have not attempted acts of terrorism since late-1979, they probably retain a limited capability to attack individual targets, especially when those targets permit careful planning in advance of the attack. Although U.S. personnel have not been targets of attack in several years, the Montoneros could decide to target U.S. personnel or U.S. ships if they see a significant improvement in relations between the United States and Argentina.

4. (U) Host Government Attitudes and Political Climate.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ A military coup occurred in March 1976, overthrowing the Peron government. The Junta government has stated its pro-US stand; however, the military expressed frustration and resentment over earlier cuts in U.S. financial and military support due to alleged Argentine violations of Human Rights. Argentine security officials feel their strict measures are necessary to curb terrorist activity and maintain internal stability.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The Junta government announced in the Fall-1979, a new law to regulate trade union activities. In its broad outlines, the law prohibits all political activities by the unions, removes from trade union control the administration of social welfare services, the source of labors vast economic power and dissolves the general confederation of labor, the Peronist-dominated national

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labor confederation. Reaction in trade union circles was immediate and continues to be negative. Their action is expected to be through appeals to international labor organizations, extensive court tests, and attempts to rally support from the domestic labor sector and the general public rather than through general strikes.

(U) Border tensions between Chile and Argentina increased when the International Court of Justice for Arbitration awarded all islands South of the Beagle Channel to Chile in May 1977. The intensity of this dispute reached its peak during the December 1978/January 1979 period when war between the countries was averted at the very last possible moment when the Pope agreed to mediate. Negotiations are moving slowly and a settlement of the Beagle Channel Dispute is still a long way off, but a military confrontation is remote as compared to the 1978 timeframe.

C. (U) Local Law and Order.

1. (U) Jurisdictional Matters.

(U) There is no Status of Forces Agreement in effect in Argentina. According to existing Argentine law, minor crimes (such as drunkenness and disorder) result in the USN offender being returned to his ship with the admonition that the offender not be allowed "liberty" during the remainder of the visit. In the event of a more serious crime (i.e., murder, robbery, drug possession/trafficking, assault and battery) the individual is placed at the disposition of a judge. He may or may not be allowed bail. In

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these instances, the U.S. Embassy would be advised of the arrest.

2. (U) Law Enforcement.

(U) While the Naval Prefecture (Argentine equivalent to U.S. Coast Guard) has principal authority in ports and harbors, the Argentine Federal Police (which has jurisdiction over the majority of offenses and crimes throughout Argentina) is the agency most likely to be encountered. Law enforcement agencies have been generally cooperative with the U.S. Embassy. Generally, shore patrols should not be landed. It is recommended that a shore patrol force be maintained on board in the event of emergency. Both the local police and Argentine Navy prefer to maintain a shore patrol themselves and will request liaison assistance as required.

3. (U) Drugs and Narcotics.

(U) Marijuana, amphetamines, barbiturates and cocaine are not readily available on the street. Local law requires a prescription to purchase amphetamines and barbiturates in pharmacies. Enforcement of drug laws has increased and the possibility of spot checks, especially of foreign-appearing personnel, cannot be discounted. Possession of drugs, except by prescription, is an offense punishable under the criminal code and penalties are severe. Imprisonment from 1 to 4 years can be expected for selling drugs. The penalty for illegal entry of narcotics, illegal possession or trafficking in Argentina is from 1 to 6 years imprisonment. Existing laws authorize detention of suspected individuals for up to 72-hours (sometimes longer) before notification of U.S. Embassy or other authorities is required. If detained for a drug offense, interrogation can be expected.

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~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Although narcotics trafficking has substantially increased in Argentina, availability of drugs on the street is low. The availability of drugs to USN personnel at possible liberty ports are: Low at Puerto Belgrano; Limited at Bahia Blanca; Limited at Puerto Madryn; and somewhat more accessible in Mar Del Plata and Buenos Aires.

4. (U) Crime and Punishment.

(U) Crimes prevalent in port areas which could affect USN personnel are narcotics violations, assault and gambling. Prostitution is illegal and results in penalties from 1-month to 1-year imprisonment. Conviction of rape carries a sentence of from 6 to 15 years imprisonment. Smuggling and blackmarketing penalties are unknown, but are believed to be severe.

D. (U) Port Facilities.

(U) No information is available.

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