

Continuation Sheet

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Classification/Control Markings

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2. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~

Sec. 3.3(b)(1)

reported that a second bomb, with about 50 kilos of explosives was found directly under the runway. It was connected in series with the device that did detonate. Both bombs were placed in an underground concrete-lined conduit which channels a stream under the airfield, and exits at Rio La Plata about 60 meters from the field boundary. Authorities assume that water or humidity corroded the wiring and prevented the second bomb from detonating. The second bomb was made up of two packages of explosives. It was fastened to the ceiling of the conduit with bolts driven into the concrete. The bomb was supported by steel cables and was encased in plastic.

3. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Source reports that the conduit through which the Maldonado Stream passes is almost ten kilometers long, and nine meters wide. Water to a depth of four meters flows through the conduit during this season, with surges which fill the entire waterway and overflow through access hatches to the streets above. Source stated that the people who placed the bombs could have entered the conduit from the river, in a small boat, or through one of many inland accesses. Access was available without penetrating any military controlled areas. Source estimated that a large amount of equipment, a high level of technology, and about a month of work were required to install the bombs.

4. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The method of detonation is still unknown. There was no evidence of wires leading to the first bomb. The distance underground, about seven meters, would seem, according to source, to preclude radio detonation, unless there was someone at the river exit (about 400 meters from the runway). In that position, another person would have to give instructions as to when to detonate the devices because the airport is not visible. Source stated that the ARGAF investigators believe the personnel responsible time the explosion, based on the performance of the Boeing 737's which operate out of Aeroparque every few hours. The investigators also feel that if the second bomb had exploded the presidential aircraft would have been destroyed, and extensive damage done to the civilian terminal area and fuel storage tanks, in addition to extensive civilian and military casualties.(See enclosure)

5. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Source indicated that security measures throughout the tunnel/conduit system in Buenos Aires have been increased in all sectors of Aeroparque, but particularly at the military section. According to source, court martial proceedings have been brought against the Aeroparque Base Commander, Comodoro (COL) POCCIONI, at the direction of the CINC, Brig Gen (Lt Gen) AGOSTI.

COMMENT: ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The large dimensions of the Maldonado Stream conduit would permit the gradual build up of personnel and equipment needed to place the bombs without ever going through police or military control points. The engineering and planning difficulties accompanying this attempt on

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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Videla's life demonstrate that some subversive groups still have personnel and materiel resources to engage in a major operation, although at a limited risk of contact with security forces. The planning for detonation of the devises was facilitiated by regular announcements in the papers of where, when, and how the President is going to travel. These announcements continue in basically the same form, but the President is now flying out of Palomar Air Base (b)(3) 10 USC 424 in the suburbs of Buenos Aires.


(b)(3) 10 USC 424

COMMENTS: (C/NOFORN) The nature of the attack (and assuming it was carried out by the montoneros) tends to indicate that there are no operational surface-to-air missiles available to the terrorists in the Buenos Aires area. An attack on the president while aboard an aircraft is precisely the type of operation where SAMs would be used by the subversives, (b)(3) 10 USC 424, if they had any available. This incident, and the absence over the last months of any indications that SAMs are present in-country, leads to the conclusion that the probability of the guerrillas having operational SAMs in Argentina is very low at present.

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