

## SECRET

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority: EO 13526 DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices Date: Oct 18, 2018

This Notice is designed to provide intelligence in support of future decisions with respect to security policy or posture.

## ARGENTINA

## POLITICIANS BELIEVE COUP INEVITABLE.

(S/NOFORN) Several Argentine congressional leaders are convinced that their legislature can not effectively move to oust Mrs. Peron. They therefore believe that a military coup is inevitable.

(5/NOFORN) The Congress plans a joint session to discuss her removal; however, the politicians feel that it will be a classic case of too little -too late. For example, the session is only charged with studying the crisis and recommending solutions -hardly the kind of mandate indicative of strong and swift action. Furthermore, the session is not even scheduled to begin until next week at the earliest. Earlier reporting indicated that the coup would probably occur by 5 March. This means that the legislative session will probably not take place in time to avert a takeover.

(S/NOFORN) A key factor in congressional ineffectiveness is the refusal of a dissident Peronist group, the Anti-Verticalistas, to back efforts to remove Mrs. Peron. The Anti-Verticalistas apparently believe that a coup is likely in any event, and have decided that participating in Peron's ouster would only further divide the Peronist movement.

(S/NOFORN) A future military government will apparently follow a relatively moderate line. As reported previously, General Videla will be president. All cabinet positions, with the possible exception of the economic portfolio, will be held by the military. Congress will be closed, but political parties will be allowed to function, although perhaps within more restrictive guidelines.

(Continued)

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(S/NOFORN) Political parties are undertaking contingency planning to prepare for the coup. The Radical Civic Union and Anti-Verticalistas have stated they plan to initially go on record as being against a coup, but they nevertheless intend to cooperate with the military as much as possible. Their rationale is that success of a moderate government under Videla would be preferable to having him supplanted by military hardliners should the beginning stages of his military administration go badly.

(S/NOFORN) Although a coup may not be inevitable it is significant that many politicians believe it to be. Military preparations are already underway and the apparent acquiescence on the part of the politicians will serve to reduce internal turmoil if - as appears likely - a coup should occur. (GDS-31 Dec 84)

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