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# International Terrorism: A Compendium Volume III— Latin America (U)

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INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A COMPENDIUM

VOLUME III - LATIN AMERICA (U)

DDB-2630-9-84

Information Cutoff Date: 31 July 1984

This publication supersedes International  
Terrorism: A Compendium, Volume III - Latin America (U)  
(DDB-2630-9A-83) August 1983

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PREFACE

(c) Despite various and increasing governmental attempts to counter terrorism, it has become a constant on the international scene. Of special interest to the Defense Intelligence Agency are certain groups which act transnationally, cultivate ties with counterparts in other countries, and pose an actual or potential threat to US or allied interests and personnel.

(c) Intended to serve as a ready reference, this report is part of a continuing effort to comprehend international terrorism as it exists today in Western Europe, the Middle East, Latin America, and Asia. The report consists of four regional volumes, published in a 12-month cycle. Each volume contains an index of all groups discussed in the Compendium.

(c) Following the section on the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR), the volume is organized alphabetically by country. Within each country the active groups are listed and described. Information is provided under the outline headings: orientation/goals; background; estimated strength; organization; key personalities, with biographic data when available; headquarters/bases; tactics/methods of operation; weapons/equipment; training; finances; foreign support; other international relations; and significant activities--significant in terms of a group's development or its impact on international perceptions--with specifics provided for more complex operations.

(c) The limitations of a task of this kind are self-evident. Because of the clandestine nature of terrorist groups, information gaps exist and some details of internal operations and external ties remain unknown. A few portraits are necessarily incomplete.

(U) Each classified paragraph, caption, title, etc. in this report has been properly marked; all those unmarked are unclassified.

(U) Questions and comments concerning this publication should be referred in writing to the Defense Intelligence Agency (ATTN: [redacted], Washington, D.C. 20301. Requests for additional copies should be forwarded through command approval channels, as appropriate, to DIA (ATTN: [redacted], using DD Form 1142, Interagency Document Request, in accordance with DIA Manual 59-3, DIA Reference Library.

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iii  
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IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: Oct 17, 2018

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DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR - Junta de Coordinacion Revolucionaria) -----	1
Argentina -----	3
Montoneros -----	5
Chile -----	17
Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR - Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria) -----	19
Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front ( FPMR - Frente Patriotica Manuel Rodriguez) -----	29
Colombia -----	33
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC - Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) -----	35
19th of April Movement (M-19 - Movimiento 19 de Abril) -----	45
National Liberation Army (ELN - Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional) -----	57

Non Responsive

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SECRET

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Non Responsive

Venezuela -----	185
Red Flag/Americo Silva Front (BR/FAS - Bandera Roja/Frente "Americo Silva") -----	187
Index -----	193

~~SECRET~~

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Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 17, 2018

JCR

Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR - Junta de Coordinacion Revolucionaria)

(U) The JCR section that was included in previous editions for reference purposes has been dropped for lack of evidence that it still serves any relevant purpose. The demise of the JCR has not meant a diminution of coordinating activities among the various Latin American guerrilla/terrorist groups, however. These activities are discussed in the individual country sections.

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Date: Oct 17, 2018

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ARGENTINA

Country Profile

(U) Leftist terrorism has been relatively quiescent in Argentina since late 1979. The Montoneros appear to be the only Argentine extreme leftist group with an organization still active in Argentina and abroad, although the now defunct People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) may still have some members in Argentina.

(U) In recent years, Montonero efforts have focused more on political activism than terrorism. International support of the Montoneros has waned, however, since the administration of democratically elected President Raul Alfonsin assumed power in December 1983. That month, the Montoneros opportunistically announced the establishment of their 'new' political party, the revived Authentic Peronist Party (PPA). Consequently, future Montonero terrorism is likely to be carried out under the guise of various ad hoc groups.

~~(S/NF/NC/WN)~~ The Montoneros' last anti-US terrorist actions took place in March 1982. However, there is no evidence that the Montoneros have disbanded their terrorist apparatus in Argentina. Furthermore, despite the resumption of democratic rule in Argentina, Montonero leaders are likely to continue to meet and coordinate with other Latin American guerrilla/terrorist organizations and to maintain close contacts with Cuba, Nicaragua, and other radical states.

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Date: Oct 17, 2018



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Date: Oct 17, 2018  
ARGENTINA  
MONTONEROS

## Montoneros

### Orientation/Goals:

(U) The Montoneros are an urban-oriented, anti-US, extreme leftwing organization whose ideology is a mixture of Peronism and Marxism-Leninism. Together with their political mass organization, the Peronist Montonero Movement (MPM), the Montoneros were engaged until late 1983 in a "national liberation movement" which aimed at reunifying the fragmented Peronist movement and opposing the Argentine military regime. After a democratic government headed by President Raul Alfonsin assumed power in December 1983, the Montonero leadership officially dissolved the MPM and revived the former Authentic Peronist Party (PPA). Despite this ostensible reorientation toward political activism, future Montonero terrorism cannot be ruled out.



LOGO

### Background:

(U) The Montoneros were named after the gaucho contingents who fought in Argentina's first war of independence in 1810. Organized as a legal Peronist youth group in 1968, the Montoneros emerged as a terrorist organization in 1970, receiving wide publicity for the May-June kidnaping, trial, and execution of Pedro Aramburu (President, 1955-58). They adopted a Marxist-Leninist orientation after the June 1973 merger with the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR). In 1974, the Montoneros absorbed a faction of the Peronist Armed Forces (FAP) and the Maoist-oriented Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL).

(U) In September 1974, in response to a stepped-up government antiguerrilla campaign, the Montoneros declared "war" on Isabel Peron's government. The Montoneros were not outlawed until 8 September 1975, however. During 1975 and 1976, the Montoneros were the most active and dangerous urban terrorist organization in the Western Hemisphere. They also became the wealthiest, accumulating millions of dollars from fundraising kidnapings, including a record \$60 million in mid-1975 for the Born brothers, owners of a large grain exporting company.

~~(C/NF)~~ On seizing power in a military coup in March 1976, General Jorge Videla mounted a major antiguerrilla campaign which crippled the Montoneros. By the end of 1976, Montonero strength had been reduced by 80 percent, leaving only 1,000 members, of whom about 300 were activists. Montonero leader Mario Firmenich claimed that Montonero casualties totaled 5,000. Despite continued setbacks, the Montoneros carried out numerous terrorist acts in 1977 and 1978.

~~(S/NF)~~ A major reorganization of the Montonero leadership structure was implemented during a meeting of the National Council (formerly the highest policymaking body of the Montonero Party) in Cuba in October 1978. The National Council was abolished at that meeting and replaced by a Central Committee. As a result of that meeting and a meeting of the Central Committee in June 1979, the MPM's structure was stripped of much of its independence and modified to meet the party's objective--the unification of the Montonero movement under the National Leadership of the Party.

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~~(S/NF/NC/WN)~~ In September 1979, Horacio Alberto Mendizabal and Armando Daniel Croatto, two top Montonero military leaders, were killed in confrontations with Argentine police. Due to this setback, the Montoneros did not engage in terrorist activities in Argentina in 1980-81. Instead, they carried out nonviolent activities--distributing pamphlets and painting walls with Montonero slogans in various parts of Argentina, using radio transmitters to override popular television programs and broadcast Montonero propaganda, and meeting with members of other subversive organizations.

~~(C/NF)~~ In late March 1982, the Montoneros renewed terrorism in Argentina with a series of bombings that appeared to be targeted against foreign multinational corporations.

(U) In May 1983, the Montoneros were dealt a serious setback with the deaths of two top leaders--Eduardo Daniel Pereira Rossi and Raul Clemente Yaguer--in confrontations with police. After the Alfonsin administration assumed power in December 1983, the Montoneros dissolved the MPM, simultaneously reviving the Authentic Peronist Party (PPA), in an apparent attempt to pursue a strategy of legal political activism. Increased arrests of Montonero leaders in early 1984 caused Montonero chief Mario Firmenich to warn cryptically that the Alfonsin administration's prosecution of Montonero leaders could "lead his government to a crossroads." Firmenich's veiled threat lacked credibility, however, because support for the Montoneros has waned both inside and outside the nation since Argentina's return to democracy.

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ During the first quarter of 1984, the Montoneros were left virtually leaderless following the arrest by Argentine authorities of Ricardo Obregon Cano, a political leader; the detention of Mario Firmenich in Brazil; and the return to clandestinity of Fernando Vaca Narvaja, who escaped arrest in Brazil, and Oscar Bidegain, another political leader. Argentine security authorities believe that Roberto Cirilio Perdia, among others, has assumed the internal management of the movement. In February 1984, he and several other Montoneros met in a downtown Buenos Aires cafe to discuss the reorganization of the movement's internal apparatus. In the first week of March 1984, Vaca Narvaja and other Montoneros held meetings in Managua, Nicaragua, to coordinate the return of exiled Montoneros to Argentina by mid-1984.

Estimated Strength:

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ The Montoneros probably have between 100 and 200 members in Argentina and another 300 to 400 outside the country.

Organization:

~~(S/NF)~~ The Montoneros are organized on a Marxist-Leninist model which includes the "military" organization and the PPA (formerly the MPM). Operationally, the military and political sectors of the movement are subordinate to the party's National Leadership, headed by Mario Firmenich. The PPA probably is governed by a Superior Council, as the MPM was. There are two levels of command within the Montonero National Leadership: the Strategic Command, encompassing the members operating outside Argentina; and the Tactical Command, responsible for the members based in Argentina.

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~~(S/NF/NC/WN)~~ Some details of a Montonero reorganization which may have been completed by late 1981 have been reported. Subordinate to Firmenich is the General Staff of the Montoneros, with at least four sections: Logistics, Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Political. The Logistics Section, headquartered in Mexico, provides the Montonero organization with its technical support, weapons, ammunition, explosives, and transportation facilities. Both the relatively small Intelligence Section and the more important Counterintelligence Section, which is designed to prevent medium- or high-level penetration of the Montoneros, are headquartered in Cuba. The Political Section, also headquartered in Cuba, is a small study group which does research on "subversive doctrine."

~~(S/NF/NC/WN)~~ Other foreign-based sections include: Communications, Financial, Technical, Foreign Relations, Agitation, Press, and Propaganda, Radio, and Publications. The Foreign Relations Section conducts relations with foreign countries rather than with other terrorist groups. It has contacts with Mexico, Nicaragua, Cuba, and Libya, presumably with individual, sympathetic members of those governments. One very important subsection, devoted to the Middle East, has Middle Eastern specialists who are in contact with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Libyan Government. Other subsections handle relations with Cuba and the "Socialist countries," and with governments in Western Europe. The Western Europe Subsection is small, reflecting problems the Montoneros have had with the governments of Spain, France, and Italy. Although not specified by the new organizational information, the Montoneros undoubtedly still have an America Department or Subsection. Traditionally the most important subsection of Foreign Relations, the America Subsection may still be based in Panama. Its primary objective has been the creation of a "movement for the liberation of the southern cone."

~~(S/NF/NC/WN)~~ The Agitation, Press, and Propaganda Section is composed of two subsections: Special Agitation Troops (TEA) and the more effective Press Subsection, either of which is capable of carrying out psychological warfare or propaganda activities. The Radio Section was responsible for the Montoneros' involvement with Radio Noticias del Continente, which operated in Costa Rica until it was closed in 1981 and moved to Nicaragua. The Publications Section controls the Montonero publication Veneer, published in Mexico, and deals with technical matters such as the acquisition of printing machines and paper for the Montoneros. The Montoneros used to publish the Federal Star.

(U) In Argentina, the Montoneros allegedly help subsidize La Voz (The Voice), described as the Montoneros' main instrument of "indoctrination."

~~(S/NF/NC/WN)~~ Although lacking in national leadership, the Montoneros in Argentina have a well-organized structure with 15 self-sufficient units capable of carrying out actions ranging from distribution of propaganda to assassination. These Integral Units replaced the Special Infantry Troops (TEI), formerly a commando group. Two Integral Units have operated in rural areas of Argentina and 13 others have worked with political, labor, and human rights groups. A cadre school provides training to medium-and high-level Montonero members and emphasizes political rather than military training.

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Date: Oct 17, 2018

Key Personalities:

~~(C)~~ Mario Eduardo Firmenich ("Pepe," "Abal Medina"). Born 24 January 1948 in Buenos Aires. (See photo.)

(U) Firmenich has been the principal Montonero military/political leader since 1970 and holds the title of Secretary General of the party. He moved to Rio de Janeiro in November 1983 and was arrested there in February 1984. An extradition request by the Argentine Government was approved in June 1984. Firmenich reportedly had made various clandestine trips to Argentina to meet with Montonero leaders, most recently in May and December 1983.



~~(C)~~ Firmenich, 1977

~~(C/NF)~~ Firmenich has traveled frequently in Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America on Montonero business. He also traveled into and out of Nicaragua freely. He provided logistical support for the Nicaraguan Sandinist National Liberation Front (FSLN) during the insurgency which overthrew President Somoza in July 1979 and has remained friendly with the FSLN leadership.

(U) Firmenich attended the July 1980 and July 1981 ceremonies in Managua marking the anniversary of the FSLN victory. In 1980, he was seen wearing a Sandinista commander's uniform and was seated in a place of honor on a reviewing stand.

~~(S/NF)~~ Firmenich reportedly was in Guanacaste Province, Costa Rica, in February 1981 helping to direct the smuggling of Cuban arms by plane from Panama to El Salvador via the "Ojochar" ranch in Costa Rica.

(U) Fernando Hugo Vaca Narvaja ("Facundo," "Nicolas," "German," "Vasco," "Daniel"). Born 7 January 1948 in Cordoba. (See photo.)

~~(S)~~ Vaca is second in command of the National Leadership, with the title of Secretary for Foreign Relations.

(U) Vaca has a long record of terrorist activities. He escaped from Rawson Prison in southern Argentina in August 1972 and helped commandeer a plane to Chile before going on to Cuba. He later reentered Argentina, was arrested and then released in the general amnesty of 25 May 1973. Vaca was in Nicaragua with Firmenich at the time of Somoza's overthrow in July 1979.



(U) Vaca, 1979

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DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 17, 2018

(U) Vaca reportedly met with Firmenich in Argentina's Santa Fe Province in May 1983. He attended the fourth meeting of the South American Democratic and Popular Parties in Brazil in 1983. He escaped arrest in Brazil in February 1984, and his current whereabouts are unknown.

~~(C)~~ Roberto Cirilio Perdia ("Carlitos," "Pelado"). Born 9 July 1941 in Buenos Aires Province. (See photo.)



(S) The principal Montonero leader still in Argentina, Perdia may still be Political Secretary of the Party and Executive Secretary of the PPA. He has worked closely with Firmenich to conduct the activities of the entire movement.

(U) Rodolfo Gabriel Galimberti. (See photo.)

(U) Galimberti, once a leading Montonero theoretician, claimed in an early 1983 interview that he quit the Montoneros in February 1979. At the time of the interview, he was a taxi driver in Paris. Galimberti has continued nonetheless to be involved in foreign propaganda campaigns against the Argentine Government and reportedly has maintained ties with numerous European terrorists whom he has instructed in kidnaping methods and weapons use.



#### Headquarters/Bases:

~~(S/NF)~~ The Montonero National Leadership operates mainly from exile, primarily in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Mexico, but also in Brazil, Spain, and other countries.

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ Following the detention of Firmenich in Rio de Janeiro in early 1984, Montonero members living in Brazil moved their center of activity to Porto Alegre. Some Montoneros returned to Argentina from Brazil without notice.

~~(C)~~ Within Argentina, most Montonero members are located in Buenos Aires Province, particularly in the Greater Buenos Aires area.

#### Tactics/Methods of Operation:

~~(C/NF)~~ As demonstrated by a series of bombings perpetrated in late March 1982 in the Greater Buenos Aires area and Cordoba, the Montoneros retain a capability to carry out selected terrorist actions. The bombings were directed against foreign multinational corporations--the Sheraton Hotel chain, Chase Manhattan Bank, and the Mitsubishi Corporation.

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Date: Oct 17, 2018

~~(S/NF/NC/WN)~~ Current Montonero strategy revolves around the infiltration of political and labor organizations, particularly the Peronist Syndicates Associations (ASP) and various Peronist Youth (JP) organizations. Montonero activities have been reduced primarily to recruiting new members, bringing members or sympathizers back to Argentina to operate in selected sectors such as labor unions or human rights groups, making contact with political, labor, and religious groups, organizing demonstrations of labor groups by taking advantage of the current socioeconomic situation, and distributing pamphlets and painting walls with Montonero propaganda.

~~(S/NF/NC/WN)~~ The Montoneros frequently use radio transmitters to interrupt popular television programs and broadcast Montonero propaganda. In April 1981, the Montoneros used a powerful clandestine transmitter called "Radio Liberacion" to broadcast antigovernment messages and Peronist songs in several working-class suburbs of Buenos Aires. The transmissions interrupted the sound portion of television programming for 6 to 8 minutes and were heard within a radius of 5 to 9 kilometers. Radio Liberation was used again once in July 1983 to interfere with a television broadcast.

~~(C/NF)~~ In 1978 and 1979, the Montoneros maximized their limited numbers and capabilities by carrying out small-scale attacks, including assassinations of government officials, in the Greater Buenos Aires area. They were very successful in bombing secure government offices and high-ranking personnel and their living quarters. Plastique bombs, rocket bombs, shrapnel bombs, and remote-controlled bombs all were used.

(U) Members of the Montoneros and the now defunct Argentine People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) allegedly cooperated in carrying out the assassination of Somoza in Asuncion, Paraguay, in September 1980.

#### Weapons/Equipment:

~~(C/NF)~~ The Montonero inventory contains unknown quantities of automatic weapons, including submachineguns and 9-mm machine pistols, .38-caliber revolvers, 12-gauge standard and sawed-off shotguns, 7.62-mm assault rifles, Soviet-designed Kalashnikov AK-47 rifles, and RPG-7 rocket launchers.

(U) In December 1979, January 1980, and May 1981, Argentine Armed Forces and security personnel discovered large arms caches belonging to the Montoneros. Arms, ammunition, and explosives were concealed in cartons, furniture, and electronic equipment which had been stored in furniture warehouses in Buenos Aires, Rosario, and Santa Fe. The discovery of these weapons indicated that the Montoneros' arms supply was not as limited as previously reported and that the group was still capable of smuggling arms into the country.

~~(C/NF)~~ Although the Montoneros had lost most of their formerly significant weapons manufacturing capability by 1979, the arms cache discoveries indicated that the Montoneros retained a crude grenade-manufacturing capability. Grenades with the designation "G70" and G40" were made with an exogenous plastique C-2 explosive and were favored by the Montoneros for attacks.

(U) By mid-1978, the Montoneros had obtained RPG-7 weapons from the PLO in exchange for making the exogenous plastique C-2 explosive base available to the PLO.

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DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 17, 2018

(U) An RPG-2 antitank grenade launcher was employed very successfully in the September 1980 attack on Somoza. The RPG-2 used in the assassination was of Soviet design and Chinese manufacture and was the type used frequently by the Sandinistas in the closing months of the insurgency in Nicaragua. Other weapons used in the Somoza attack included the M-16A1 Colt automatic rifle, 7.62-mm FAL automatic rifle, and M-10 Ingram submachinegun.

Training:

(U) The principal sources of Montonero guerrilla/terrorist training have been Cuba and the PLO in various Middle Eastern countries and Libya. In the 1970s, the Cubans backed both the Montoneros and ERP with advice on tactics and recruitment operations and with training in Cuba in urban and rural guerrilla techniques. Montoneros trained in the Middle East in 1981 as part of a cooperative effort between Palestinian groups and Cuba.

~~(C/NF)~~ The Montoneros operated a training base in Mexico in the late 1970s. There is no evidence that the facility still exists.

~~(S/NF/NC/WN)~~ In 1979, individuals recruited by the Montoneros in Argentina who had no previous Montonero ties were sent to Brazil for preliminary screening as to suitability for guerrilla life. If the recruit looked promising, he was sent to a base in Mexico where he received Montonero political indoctrination. At least 25 Montonero recruits were sent to the Mexican base during 1979. Those personnel with the greatest potential then were sent to Lebanon, Syria, or Libya for more specialized training, which was supported both militarily and logistically by the PLO.

~~(C/NF)~~ In Lebanon, three 30-day courses were offered, with PLO personnel probably serving as instructors. Course #1 instructed about six or seven individuals to become couriers and/or contacts; no military training was provided. Course #2 was designed to train approximately 10 members in armaments, explosives, and special operations techniques. Armament instruction included familiarization with and firing of all available weapons, marksmanship, arms maintenance, and weapons transportation and concealment. Special operations training included "hit and run" techniques and culminated in a practical exercise carried out by the entire class. Course #3 provided instruction to approximately 16 personnel in the theoretical and technical aspects of radio/television transmissions, with emphasis on techniques to interrupt broadcasts.

~~(S)~~ Argentine intelligence reports that some Montonero personnel received training in Libya from members of the PLO. They then traveled to a Montonero-owned house in a residential suburb of Madrid, Spain, for unidentified additional training.

(U) According to a June 1980 Brazilian press report, 23 Montoneros received training from the PLO at an Al-Fatah camp south of Damascus, Syria.

~~(S/NF/NC/WN)~~ Montonero cadre reportedly have received military training in Algeria and propaganda and intelligence training in Czechoslovakia. It is not clear, however, who provided the instruction in Algeria and Czechoslovakia.

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Date: Oct 17, 2018

Finances:

~~(S/NF/NC/WN)~~ The current status of Montonero finances is not known, but the Montoneros are no longer as wealthy as they once were. They probably continue to receive support from unidentified foreign groups and/or have some funds still deposited in Swiss banks, largely obtained from multimillion-dollar ransom payments in the 1970s. The Montoneros became one of the wealthiest terrorist organizations in the world in 1975-76. Following his capture in February 1977, the Montonero national secretary for finance cooperated with Argentine authorities in securing the withdrawal of \$85 million in monetary reserves from bank accounts in Europe and Argentina. These Montonero funds had accumulated from fundraising kidnappings, extortion, and armed robberies over the years.

(U) In April 1977, a political scandal resulted in Argentina when a Buenos Aires Provincial Police investigation revealed that, in 1974, the Argentine international financier David Graiver (who allegedly is dead), in collusion with former Peronist Economy Minister Jose Gelbard, had acted as the Montonero financial front man and invested \$17.8 million of Montonero money to provide the organization with interest payments of \$130,000 a month.

Foreign Support:

(U) In 1984, international support of the Montoneros waned. Relations between Argentina and other nations have become more cordial since Argentina's return to democratic rule. Better foreign relations are being established by Argentina with governments that formerly harbored Montoneros.

Latin America

(U) The Cubans have a long history of association with, encouragement of, and active backing for the Montoneros, especially with training, safehaven, and logistical support. (For details, see Training.) During the height of Argentine terrorism in the early and mid-1970s, the Cubans used their embassy in Buenos Aires to maintain direct liaison with Argentine terrorists. When the Argentine terrorists were defeated in 1978, Cuban President Fidel Castro permitted the Montonero national leadership to relocate its headquarters in Cuba. The Montonero top command, its labor and intelligence organizations, and other units have used Cuba as a headquarters. The Cubans facilitate the travel and communications of the Montoneros, supplying them with false documentation and access to Cuban diplomatic pouches.

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ On 7 June 1984, an Argentine intelligence service identified an Argentine citizen who is an employee of the Argentine Senate as a contact between the Montoneros and the Cuban Embassy in Buenos Aires. The Argentine citizen is a personal assistant of Montonero leader Roberto Cirilio Perdia; her contact in the Cuban Embassy is First Secretary Jesus Gonzalez (Cruz).

~~(C/NF)~~ Multiple sources reported the meeting of 20 to 30 Montoneros in La Paz, Bolivia, in November 1983. There was speculation that discussion revolved around the Montoneros' return to Argentina and that Montoneros were guaranteed security by the Bolivian Ministry of the Interior.

~~(C/NF)~~ The Montoneros have received Nicaraguan support, mainly in the form of safehaven, logistics, bases, and propaganda. The Mexico Government also has allowed the Montoneros to operate offices in Mexico City.

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Date: Oct 17, 2018

Middle East

~~(C/NF)~~ The Montoneros have received considerable training support from the PLO in various Middle Eastern countries as well as Libya and possibly Algeria. (For details, see Training.) A weapons exchange reportedly also took place between the Montoneros and the PLO in 1978. The PLO provided RPG-7 weapons in exchange for the Montoneros' exogenous plastique C-2 explosive base.

Other International Relations:

~~(S/NF/NC/WN)~~ Since mid-1975, the Montoneros have had a very active Foreign Relations Section maintaining contacts in Latin America, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and the Soviet Union.

Latin America

(U) The Montoneros have emphasized solidarity with the armed struggles in El Salvador and Guatemala and support for the revolutions of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada.

(U) The Montoneros allegedly financed a meeting of South American extremist groups held in La Paz, Bolivia, in January 1983, according to the La Paz newspaper Meridano. In addition to the Montoneros, the meeting was attended by the Chilean Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and Communist political groups from Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, and Uruguay.

(U) In the past, the Montoneros gave financial assistance to the now defunct Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR) and participated in JCR propaganda activities. The Montoneros continues to meet and coordinate with other Latin American guerrilla/terrorist and political organizations.

~~(S/NF)~~ In late January 1981, Montonero representatives met in Panama with representatives of the Colombian 19th of April Movement (M-19) and the Cuban Ambassador to Panama. The meeting was held in an apartment leased to the president of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) of El Salvador. The group discussed continued support to the leftist struggles in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Colombia. The international narcotics trade was mentioned as a lucrative source of money.

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ Reportedly, Montonero America Section head Galimberti met in early March 1981 with representatives from "many" South American subversive organizations at an undisclosed location in Maranhao State, Brazil. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss coordination of terrorist activities in Latin America. In late March 1981, Firmenich reportedly instructed Montoneros living in Europe to travel to Cuba, Mexico, and Nicaragua to "contribute to revolutionary activities" in Central America. He emphasized that those going to Cuba would be there for a short period, possibly to receive training, before being moved to other areas.

(U) Montonero leader Mario Firmenich attended a meeting of southern cone guerrilla/terrorist organizations held in Cuernavaca, Mexico, in late March 1982.

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Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 17, 2018

~~(C/NF)~~ The Montoneros contributed active combat support as well as a million dollars to the FSLN campaign to overthrow the government of former Nicaraguan President Somoza, according to Argentine military authorities.

(U) Firmenich denies that Montoneros actually fought with the FSLN, but admits that a Montonero medical brigade was present in the Masaya region of Nicaragua during the conflict.

#### Western Europe

(U) The Montoneros have maintained good relations with the French Socialist Party (PS). In September 1978, PS leader Francois Mitterrand put the Paris headquarters of the PS at the service of the Montoneros, which the PS described as a movement "fighting for freedom, independence, and democracy." Presumably, the Montoneros have contacts with the Mitterrand government.

(U) In July 1977, Firmenich held meetings in Madrid with Santiago Carrillo, Secretary General of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE); Enrique Tierro Galvan, head of the Popular Socialist Party (PSP); and Felipe Gonzalez, Secretary General of the Spanish Parliament (now Prime Minister of Spain), to discuss their political support for the Montoneros. The PSP made it possible for the Montoneros to attend the Socialist International meeting held in Barcelona on 15-16 October 1977.

~~(S)~~ The Montoneros purchased a house called "Casa del Pueblo Argentino" (Argentine People's House) in the wealthy Madrid suburb of Puerta de Hierro. The house apparently was to be used as a training center as well as a headquarters for most of the MPM and party members who are not involved in the international leadership program. Madrid reportedly was chosen as a headquarters because of decreasing support from leftist parties and leaders in France and Italy. The Spanish Civil Guard provided security protection for the house.

#### Middle East

~~(S/NF/NC/WN)~~ Intelligence reports have confirmed that PLO-Montonero contact was established in 1976. The Montoneros also have maintained contacts with the governments of Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Algeria. Selected members have visited some Arab countries in search of weapons, training, and financial support.

#### Africa

(U) The Montoneros have had contacts in several African countries. In December 1977, two Montonero representatives arrived in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, to establish a permanent office. The PLO granted them the use of its office for an indefinite period.

(U) An undetermined number of Montoneros were reported to be in Maputo, Mozambique, in January 1981. The Montoneros have had ties with the National Liberation Front of the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe since at least March 1978.

~~(S/NF)~~ Montonero combat elements who received Cuban training in Angola during 1977 reportedly were used in combat there in support of the Marxist regime.

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Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 17, 2018

(S) The Montoneros also made tentative contacts in Uganda, Zaire, and Madagascar.

Significant Activities:

May-June 1970 - (U) Kidnaped and later murdered Pedro Aramburu (President, 1955-58).

September 1974 - (U) Kidnaped Jorge and Juan Born, owners of Argentina's largest grain exporting company. They were freed on 20 June 1975 for a record \$60-million ransom payment.

November 1974 - (U) Killed the Federal Police Chief and his wife on their private yacht with a sophisticated remote-controlled bomb.

February 1975 - (U) Kidnaped the US honorary consul in Cordoba and murdered him 2 days later after the Argentine Government refused to show four leftist Peronists on television who had 'disappeared' to prove they were alive.

August 1975 - (U) Sabotaged an Argentine missile frigate in the final stages of construction by detonating an underwater charge on its hull, causing the ship to sink in shallow water.

- (U) Exploded a powerful remote-controlled bomb planted in the path of an Argentine C-130 Hercules transport plane carrying 116 soldiers as it was taking off in Tucuman; 5 killed, 50 wounded.

April 1977 - (U) Kidnaped the director-general of Fiat-France in Paris. The victim was released for a ransom payment of \$2 million. Swiss police recovered \$1.6 million.

August 1978 - (U) Exploded a powerful bomb in a vacant apartment on the floor below that of Vice Admiral Lambruschini, Chief of Naval Staff and Navy Commander-designate (a ruling Junta Member since September 1978). Two persons were killed, including the Admiral's 15-year-old daughter whose bedroom was closest to the impact of the blast, and 10 persons injured. Four floors of the apartment building were destroyed.

November 1979 - (U) Machinegunned and bombed the car of Dr. Francisco Soldatti, an adviser to the Minister of Economy and a former president of the Italo-Argentine Electric Company, in downtown Buenos Aires, killing him and his chauffeur.

September 1980 - (U) Allegedly participated with the ERP and Sandinistas in the assassination of former Nicaraguan President Somoza in Asuncion, Paraguay. Somoza's financial adviser and chauffeur also were killed in the antitank grenade and machinegun attack. Reportedly, the FSLN supported the operation, and Nicaraguan diplomats smuggled in the arms used in the attack. Nevertheless, no substantive evidence has been released by the Paraguayan Government to support these claims, and none of those involved in the assault has been apprehended.

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Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 17, 2018

March 1982 - ~~(C/NF)~~ Detonated four explosive devices in the Greater Buenos Aires area--one in front of the Chase Manhattan Bank, another in the ladies room of the Sheraton Hotel, and the other two in front of a Mitsubishi auto agency and a clothing store--and a firebomb in the house of an Argentine executive in Cordoba. No casualties resulted from any of the incidents, which occurred during late-night hours. Montonero pamphlets were left behind.

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Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 17, 2018

CHILE

Country Profile

—(C) Extremist violence in opposition to the military government of President Augusto Pinochet Ugarte increased markedly in 1983 and continued during the first 7 months of 1984. The wave of terrorism included an assassination campaign against military and police officials--the first in 2 years--and bombing and arson attacks against public property. The most active of the Chilean terrorist groups has been the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR), a small new group. The Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) is still Chile's most significant terrorist group. Both the MIR and FPMR are discussed herein.

(C) Other obscure groups have been operating in apparent coordination with the MIR; they include the Zero Front (FC), Salvador Allende Brigade (BSA), and elements of the Communist Party of Chile (PCCh) such as the Communist Youth (JC). The largest of these smaller groups may be the FC, which reportedly has 60 members organized in 4- to 5-man autonomous cells. Founded in Valparaiso in 1981, the FC is affiliated with either the PCCh or the MIR. Its members reportedly have received training in Spain from Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA). The FC reportedly also has ties with Peru's Shining Path (SL). The BSA reportedly is Cuban-trained and has 30 members. It may be synonymous with the MIR's Salvador Allende Liberation Command (CLSA).

—(C) Although both the MIR and FPMR lack the infrastructure within Chile to carry out any but isolated and sporadic acts of small-scale terrorism, their prospects for disrupting political stability may be improving as Pinochet's popularity wanes and economic conditions continue to deteriorate. Chile's economic crisis and political repression apparently have helped to unify the extreme left. Furthermore, there is evidence of increasing Cuban and East European training and support for Chilean terrorist groups.

(C) Rightwing terrorists also are becoming more active in Chile, particularly in attacks on the Catholic Church and human rights leaders. Groups that may practice terrorist activities include the Defenders of the Fatherland Commando, Movement against the Marxist Cancer, and Peoples' Commando.

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IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: Oct 17, 2018

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Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 17, 2018

CHILE  
MIR

Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR - Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria)

Orientation/Goals:

(U) The MIR is a Marxist-Leninist, anti-US, Castroite guerrilla/terrorist organization. Presumed goals are to threaten government stability and to provoke overreaction by the government. The MIR's ultimate aim is to establish a Marxist form of government in Chile.

Background:

(U) Chilean Trotskyites founded the MIR at the University of Concepcion on 16 August 1965. The MIR subsequently deemphasized its Trotskyite ties to accommodate its Castroite orientation. It carried out sporadic terrorist acts in 1969 and 1970. During the presidency of Marxist Salvador Allende in 1970-73, the MIR was active in promoting agrarian reform and led militant occupations of rural estates. Following the military coup in September 1973, most MIR members were forced to flee the country.

(C/NF/WN) By mid-1974, infiltration into MIR ranks in Chile by security agents led to the arrest of many important leaders and the disintegration of much of the remaining organization. The death of MIR leader Miguel Enriquez was also a major setback. In October 1975, security forces thwarted a plot ("Operation Red Boomerang") by the MIR and the now defunct Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR) to infiltrate some 240 guerrillas into Chile.

(S/NF/NC/WN) Since 1976, the MIR has attempted to rebuild its organization in Chile by recruiting new members, revalidating memberships of former activists and, since 1978, infiltrating exiled members back into Chile. In September 1979, the MIR adopted a strategy of "armed propaganda"--terrorist activities designed to destabilize the Pinochet regime, provoke renewed government repression, polarize Chilean society, and, by demonstrating the MIR's offensive capability, recruit new members. As many as 350 Cuban-trained MIR personnel were scheduled to return to Chile to implement the "armed propaganda" strategy, but less than half succeeded in doing so by early 1982, and many of these were killed or refused to participate in MIR terrorist activities. Most returnees were members of the Salvador Allende Liberation Command (CLSA), which probably was formed to coordinate the new MIR plan. Following Cuban advice, young, untainted, highly motivated Chileans unknown to Chilean security forces were selected for the CLSA. Some of these personnel were already MIR members; others came from dissident leftist groups such as the United Popular Action Movement (MAPU) Radical Garretton faction, the National Regional Coordinator (CNR) faction of the Socialist Party (PS), the pro-MIR faction of the Christian Left (IC), and the Communist Party of Chile (PCCh).



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Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 17, 2018

~~(S/NF/NC/WN)~~ The MIR's campaign of simultaneous bombings of separate targets, assassinations of members of the security forces, and bank robberies, conducted between late 1979 and early 1981, was mostly ineffective and failed to arouse public sympathy. The arrest of five important MIR activists in March 1981, combined with the failure of its offensive to generate popular support, forced the MIR to regroup and to broaden the scope of its antigovernment campaign by forming fronts and political alliances with other opposition groups.

~~(S/NF/NC/WN)~~ In late June 1981, MIR terrorist activity resumed. The MIR's decision to expand activities to southern Chile was costly, however. Sweeps by security forces from June to November 1981 effectively ended the MIR's operations in the south. By late November 1981, the MIR was reported to have lost 34 members through arrests, shootouts, and defections. The losses caused the MIR to reassess its organization, strategy, and objectives once again. The MIR High Command reportedly decided to reduce the size of guerrilla units and to focus training on tactical planning and intelligence techniques. In addition, beginning in mid-November 1981, the MIR appeared to have adopted a new strategy of selective terrorism directed against high government officials. The MIR's attempts to step up activities were unsuccessful, however. The detention of seven key MIRistas in late March 1982 was a major blow.

~~(C)~~ The MIR renewed its assassination campaign in September 1983, killing seven police and three military officials. It also perpetrated, often jointly with other extremist elements, about 3 dozen bombing and arson attacks against public property, causing 3 deaths and 25 injuries. However, the MIR also suffered heavy personnel and material losses. The most serious blow was a 7 September 1983 combined government security services operation that resulted in the deaths of five top MIR leaders and the arrests of nine other members or supporters. The MIR lost two of its most important military leaders in these raids--Arturo Jorge Villavela Araujo, a MIR founder and overall national and international military chief, and Pedro Vergara Vargas ("Jose"), who had been with the MIR since 1970. The remaining MIR leaders subsequently went underground and ordered MIR members to stop all military operations temporarily.

~~(C)~~ MIR terrorism resumed during the remaining months of 1983. With the planned return to Chile in March 1984 of about 50 MIR militants trained in Cuba, the MIR reportedly was preparing to renew terrorist actions with greater effectiveness. No new MIR campaign has materialized, however.

#### Estimated Strength:

~~(C)~~ The number of MIR activists in Chile may range from 100 to 150. In March 1984 the MIR planned to infiltrate approximately 50 Cuban-trained terrorists into Chile. Whether this plan was carried out was not reported.

#### Organization:

~~(S)~~ The MIR is organized on a Marxist-Leninist model with a Political Commission and Central Committee headed by Secretary General Andres Pascal Allende. The top leadership directs the MIR from abroad, primarily from Havana. Lower-level MIR leaders in Chile implement the basic strategic decisions conveyed by their exiled leadership, but probably are authorized to make operational decisions. The MIR leadership continues to be divided between the dominant,



SECRET

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Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 17, 2018

strongly pro-Cuban faction, headed by Pascal and Nelson Gutierrez, and the somewhat more moderate, European-based leadership, which has been pushing for a broader base and more moderate allies. A principal leader of the latter faction was, and may still be, Humberto Sotomayor.

~~(S)~~ The MIR in Chile is organized into an active force of between 100 and 150 members. They are divided into about six regional committees supported by a network of sympathizers. The MIR organization is mostly urban but may have a small, inactive rural guerrilla component seeking to promote a revolutionary peasant movement in southern Chile. Below the political leadership, the MIR in Chile is organized into small compartmentalized cells of about five members, each operating independently or occasionally with one or two other cells.

~~(S/NF/NC/WN)~~ A MIR subgroup, the CLSA (Salvador Allende Liberation Command) was formed in the early 1980s to infiltrate young, untainted Chileans into the country to conduct "armed propaganda" activities.

(U) The MIR membership encompasses five functional categories. "Professionals" usually are members trained abroad, committed almost exclusively to MIR work, and assigned important terrorist actions and operational leadership positions. "Regular members" are part-time MIR activists who usually carry out liaison duties. "Trainees" are those members who plant explosives and perform other similar tasks to prove their loyalty and skills to the MIR leadership. "Supporters" are members active in nonmilitary functions, such as taking part in resistance committees and agitation/propaganda activities. "Helpers" are sympathizers who support MIR activities by providing cars, homes, and even the use of their names when necessary.

~~(C)~~ Various extremist elements in Chile appear to operate in coordination with the MIR. These include the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR), Zero Front (FC), Salvador Allende Brigade (BSA), which may be synonymous with the MIR's CLSA; and elements of the PCCh, such as the Communist Youth (JC).

Key Personalities:

~~(S/NF/NC/WN)~~ Hernan Aguilo Martinez.

~~(S/NF/NC/WN)~~ Aguilo is chief of the MIR's Internal Directorate in Chile, a position he has held since November 1975. He returned to Santiago in November 1977 after living underground for 2 years in the Temuco/Concepcion area, where he failed to establish the MIR as a rural guerrilla organization.

(U) Nelson Gutierrez Yanez. Born about 1944.

~~(C)~~ On 22 February 1975, Gutierrez fled Chile for temporary political asylum in Sweden before traveling to Cuba. He has been the MIR's second in command since October 1975.

~~(S/NF/NC/WN)~~ Gutierrez left Cuba in February 1979 to enter Chile clandestinely to replace Hernan Aguilo as MIR chief. He was detained at a London airport with a false Spanish passport and on release fled to Libya, later returning to Havana. Gutierrez traveled to Mozambique in early 1981 on unknown business.

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(U) Andres Pascal Allende ("Pituto"). Born about 1942. (See photo.)



(U) Pascal, 1972

(U) Secretary General of the MIR since November 1974, Pascal has been a principal advocate of "armed struggle." He is the nephew of the deceased Marxist President Salvador Allende who was overthrown in the September 1973 military coup. Pascal took asylum in the Costa Rican Embassy in Santiago on 7 November 1975 and departed Chile on 21 January 1976 after being granted, reluctantly, safe conduct out of the country. He entered Costa Rica on 6 February 1976 and went to Cuba on 3 June 1976. He returned to Chile clandestinely in January 1979 to revitalize MIR operations there. Pascal secretly left Chile in May 1982 and arrived in Havana later that month.

Headquarters/Bases:

~~(S/NF/NC/WN)~~ The top MIR leadership probably remains in exile and directs the MIR primarily from Havana. Other exiled MIR leaders are based in San Jose (Costa Rica), Managua, Mexico City, Paris, Rome, Lisbon, Madrid, and possibly Moscow. In early 1983, the MIR transferred its headquarters units from the Chilean capital of Santiago to provincial cities, and began to establish a base of operations in Temuco, south of Santiago. In addition, MIR leader Aguilo reportedly moved his headquarters out of the capital to Valparaiso.

(U) The MIR has been gaining support in the universities of Santiago and Valparaiso.

~~(S)~~ A source of unknown reliability revealed in March 1984 that a MIR terrorist cell exists in Los Angeles, California, and cells purportedly also exist in San Francisco, Oakland, and San Jose. It is most likely that these are support cells if, indeed, they exist.

Tactics/Methods of Operation:

~~(C/NF)~~ The MIR probably has been responsible for most of the recent terrorist incidents in Chile. Primary tactics in 1983 and to date in 1984 have involved sabotage and selective assassination attacks on military and police personnel.

~~(C/NF)~~ In late 1983, 7 Carabineros (uniformed National Police) were killed and 11 wounded. Eight military guards and three members of the Armed Forces (including Major General Carol Urzua, Quartermaster General of Santiago) also were killed. Forty-seven members of the Armed Forces and security forces were wounded.

~~(C)~~ From January 1983 to February 1984, there were 204 bombings, mostly against public property, especially electrical transmission stations, transportation facilities, and banks. Relatively isolated property targets generally were chosen; bombings usually took place during hours when people would not be injured. However, a January 1984 subway bombing nearly caused casualties.

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Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 17, 2018

Numerous fires also were set, notably large-scale forest fires near Vina del Mar, and buses and taxis were burned as part of work stoppages. Fires also were set in public buildings and commercial buildings in poor neighborhoods.

(U) In the past, another MIR tactic has been to seize radio stations to broadcast prerecorded taped messages. The MIR also has made clandestine broadcasts under the name Radio Liberacion de Chile.

~~(S/NF/NG/WN)~~ In addition to its violent activities, the MIR has attempted to broaden its very limited support base by forming fronts and alliances with other opposition groups, as recommended by Fidel Castro. In 1981, the MIR formed a Democratic Youth Front at the University of Santiago with the Communists to try to provide support for propaganda and political agitation; it also signed a unity pact with the PCCh and PS/Almeyda Faction. Plans for an "anti-Fascist front" of the MIR and seven leftist parties developed as a result of meetings in France and Mexico in 1981, but this "armed path" convergence later fell on hard times. An attempt to recoup lost ground took place in Paris in July 1982 when Pascal, the PCCh, the Radical Party (PR), and the PS/Almeyda Faction agreed on a continued policy of unity in the armed struggle. In September 1983, the MIR, PS/Almeyda Faction, and other smaller groups joined the PCCh-dominated MDP. MIR leaders reportedly agreed to carry out terrorist activities only with MDP approval.

Weapons/Equipment:

(U) In addition to Czech machineguns, the MIR uses Soviet AK-47 automatic rifles, Swedish Carl Gustaf submachineguns, 9-mm pistols, and grenades. Reportedly, most MIR weapons seized by security forces were brought into Chile during the Popular Unity regime of Allende.

~~(C/NF)~~ Caches of AK-47 rifles were discovered in Chile in 1982. Between 12,000 and 15,000 of these rifles may be hidden in Chile for use in future MIR operations.

(U) In January 1983, Chilean security agents discovered a MIR arms cache in the northern zone of Santiago. The cache contained a Korean-made launcher, a Czechoslovakian-made machinegun, ammunition, hand grenades, and a radio transmitter.

(U) An 8 September 1983 raid in Santiago uncovered three B-25 submachineguns with four 40-bullet clips, a Mauser rifle, clockwork systems, and 1 kilogram of dynamite.

~~(C)~~ Weapons used in the assassination of an army general in September 1983 included a Belgian FNC 7.62-mm submachinegun, P25 automatic weapons, and a 9-mm weapon.

~~(C/NF)~~ In its June 1981 assaults on two police stations, the MIR used the US-made 66-mm HEAT rocket launcher M72A1 from an unknown source.

(U) The MIR has a limited bombmaking capability.

23  
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SECRET

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 17, 2018

~~(C/NF)~~ In most 1983-4 bombings, ammonium gelatin bombs were used. Watch mechanisms were often used to activate the detonators. In one bombing, a Spanish "Comma 2" bomb was used. This type is popular with the Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA), with which the MIR allegedly has ties.

~~(C/NF)~~ Equipment for making remote-controlled bombs was found in Vina del Mar in March 1983. Chilean security forces found a four-channel digital proportional transmitter/receiver and three proportional servos in addition to materials for explosives and detonators.

Training:

~~(C)~~ Approximately 50 MIR members planned to return to Chile in March 1984, having completed training in Cuba.

(U) In 1982, 90 percent of the MIR's training allegedly was being provided in Cuba at specialized Cuban officers' schools, according to the leading Chilean newspaper. Other sources have reported that MIR members received training in Cuba and in some cases instructed other Latin American revolutionaries throughout the 1970s. This training ranged from political indoctrination and instruction in small arms use to sophisticated courses in document fabrication, explosives, code writing, photography, and disguise. In addition, Cuban instructors have trained MIR activists in the Middle East and Africa, particularly in North Yemen and Libya. Cuba increased its training of Chileans beginning in 1979. By mid-1979, the MIR had recruited several hundred Chilean exiles and sent them to Cuba for training and eventual infiltration into Chile. At the same time, MIR members who had been living and working in Cuba since Allende's overthrow began to receive training in urban guerrilla warfare techniques. The training in some cases lasted 7 to 10 months and included organization and political strategy, small-unit tactics, security, and communications. Once training was completed, Cuba helped the MIR members return to Chile, providing false passports and identification documents.

~~(C/NF)~~ From 1976 to 1980, between 1,000 and 1,500 Chileans reportedly received training in Cuba at "Zone Zero," an unidentified Cuban training center. Many of the trainees probably had MIR ties.

~~(S/NF/NC/WN)~~ MIR members captured by Chilean security forces early in 1981 claimed to have received 7 to 10 months of training in Cuba during 1979 and 1980. Some were trained at "Zone Zero," others at a school known as Miramar or Muranao in an unidentified coastal region. Their training consisted of urban and rural combat operations, bank assaults, sabotage, communications, falsification of documents, infiltration, assassination, weapons familiarization, political/military strategy, photography, and political indoctrination. Reportedly, on completion of this training, MIR members returned to Chile by way of Prague, Paris, Madrid, and Buenos Aires.

~~(S/NF/NC/WN)~~ (b)(1):Sec. 3.3(b) (1) some CLSA recruits for the 1979-80 offensive were sent to Cuban training centers in Ethiopia, Cambodia, South Yemen, Angola, and Mozambique, where they received military and subversive training under Cuban instructors. The cadre then returned to Chile via other countries, primarily in Europe. The Cubans paid for all travel expenses as well as for resettlement in Chile.

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SECRET

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Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 17, 2018

~~(S/NF/NC/WN)~~ MIR members reportedly also have received Cuban training at centers in Algeria and Nicaragua.

~~(S/NF/NC/WN)~~ Reportedly, as part of its reorganization plans of early 1984, the MIR established an Agitation and Propaganda School for instruction in tactical and operational planning, defensive shooting, and other military tactics.

~~(C/NF)~~ In July 1981, a MIR terrorist training facility was discovered by Chilean security forces in the heavily forested Neltume region close to Lake Panquipulli in southern Chile. The camp probably was established in early to mid-1980 and was used to train as many as 500 extremists for urban combat groups. An estimated 100 MIRistas were involved in the camp's construction and operation; however, only 10 to 20 personnel were thought to use the camp at any one time. The camp's instructors were Cuban-trained and had returned to Chile via Argentina.

Finances:

(U) Bank robberies have been a principal fundraising activity of the MIR. Between November 1979 and September 1981, the MIR stole approximately \$1,500,000. The MIR can be expected to carry out more attacks on banks or Brinks armored trucks to replenish its depleted coffers.

(U) Cuba has paid training and travel expenses of MIR members and probably provides other funds as well.

~~(S/NF/NC/WN)~~ The MIR received Cuban financial support during 1974-78, and probably has continued to receive small amounts of Cuban funds.

~~(S/NF/NC/WN)~~ Libyan financial aid to the MIR came to light when a MIR member known only as "Victor" was arrested in July 1981 during the Chilean security forces operations against the MIR's training camp in southern Chile. He had recently returned to Chile from Libya by way of Spain, bringing money and instructions from the Libyan Government. Earlier Libyan financial contributions were reported in 1977.

~~(S/NF/NC/WN)~~ The MIR also has received funds from other foreign sources. After the MIR's 16th anniversary celebration held in Havana on 16 August 1981, MIR leaders Pascal and Gutierrez traveled extensively abroad, primarily to Europe and the Middle East, where they obtained financial support from a number of leftist individuals and groups. In mid-1977, the MIR allegedly was receiving financial assistance totaling \$200,000 per month, with the largest contributions coming from Mexico, Venezuela, and Libya. French, Belgian, and English Trotskyite groups and Chilean exile groups and the World Council of Churches have contributed funds.



Foreign Support:Cuba

(U) Cuban support of the MIR has consisted mostly of training; hundreds of MIR members have received extensive Cuban political-military training in Cuba and other countries since the late 1970s. Cuba also has provided advisory, logistical, and propaganda support but probably little direct weapons assistance. The MIR has long maintained close contact with the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee (PCC/CC) America Department. The top MIR leadership is headquartered in Havana. Largely as a result of Cuban efforts to unify the Chilean opposition groups, a unity pact among the MIR, PCCh, and PS/Almeyda Faction was signed at a meeting in Havana in January 1981.

~~(S/NF/NC/WN)~~ Cuban Politburo member Osmani Cienfuegos coordinated plans to form an "anti-Fascist front" of the MIR, PCCh, and PS/Almeyda Faction in 1981.

France

~~(S/NF/NC/WN)~~ The MIR has received moral, political, and safehaven support from the Socialist government of President Francois Mitterrand. The French President personally received MIR leader Pascal at the Elysee Palace. French Embassy personnel in Santiago are suspected of assisting MIR members.

(U) The French newspaper Le Figaro reported that the French Embassy in Santiago issued visas to MIR members, sometimes under false names. The Chilean Government officially asked France to recall its Vice Consul in Santiago and accused her of contacts with the revolutionary left.

Libya

~~(S/NF/NC/WN)~~ There were reports of Libyan financial contributions to the MIR in 1977 and 1981 as well as training provided by Cubans in Libya.

General

~~(S/NF/NC/WN)~~ Recommendations of aid to the MIR were made at a ~~secret~~ meeting of subversive groups held in Algeria in September 1980. Another reported meeting of subversive groups, held in Algeria in late 1981 or early 1982, was intended to give impetus to the implementation of the 1980 recommendations. Three specific offers were made to the MIR at the second Algerian meeting; all were predicated on the MIR's willingness to intensify the guerrilla struggle against the Chilean Government. The three offers made were for financial support, psychological preparation and training for MIR militants to be accompanied by the necessary logistical support, and assistance in infiltration and exfiltration by non-Chilean specialists with experience in operations of this type. In addition, a meeting of subversive groups of the Southern Cone countries reportedly was held in Paris in August 1981 to discuss specific plans for subversive groups in Chile's neighboring countries to assist MIR members to enter Chile clandestinely. It is not known, however, whether these plans and offers have been translated into tangible actions by the groups involved.

SECRET

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Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 17, 2018

Other International Relations:

~~(C/NF)~~ The MIR has maintained ties with some Latin American terrorist organizations.

~~(S/NF/NC/WN)~~ As a result of recent setbacks in Chile, the MIR may be seeking closer relationships with foreign terrorist groups. In one such effort, a MIR delegation paid a clandestine visit to Lebanon. The group toured Palestinian training camps and met with various Marxist groups and representatives of Al-Fatah.

~~(S/NF/NC/WN)~~ (b)(1);Sec. 3.3(b)(1) links between Pedro Vergara (a MIR leader killed in September 1983) and the ETA of Spain. Other indications also tend to corroborate a MIR-ETA link.

~~(C/NF)~~ There have been numerous reports of MIR contacts in Bolivia. Two MIR members believed to have trained an unknown number of Bolivians, five of whom were captured, in the manufacture and employment of explosive devices.

Significant Activities:

February 1979 - (U) Exploded a bomb at the United States-Chilean Cultural Institute in Santiago, causing extensive damage.

April 1980 - (U) Simultaneously robbed three banks within 100 meters of each other in Santiago and escaped with approximately \$675,000.

July 1980 - (U) Machinegunned the car of the Director of the Army Intelligence School, in downtown Santiago, killing the official and his chauffeur.

- (U) Simultaneously robbed the same three banks as in April 1980 in Santiago. A guard was killed and a policeman and two MIR members were wounded in the operation, which netted the MIR approximately \$260,000.

November 1980 - (U) Exploded bombs which destroyed two high-voltage electric power towers in Calera de Tango and Lo Herrera (municipalities to the south of Santiago), knocking out power for 2 hours in 70 percent of the Santiago metropolitan area as well as in Vina del Mar, Rancagua, and Valparaiso. In a simultaneous operation, two incendiary bombs were fired into a new automobile storage area, destroying 80 cars.

December 1980 - (U) Simultaneously robbed three Santiago banks located close to one another. The "Dagoberto Perez," "Bautista von Schowen," and "Augusto Carmona" combat groups, composed of about 30 to 40 well-armed terrorists, took credit for the assaults in which approximately \$126,000 was taken, two Carabineros and one bank guard killed, and two other Carabineros and one bank employee wounded.

June 1981 - (U) Simultaneously assaulted a branch of the state bank, a Carabinero station, and an investigations police substation, all in Santiago. The "Ambrosio Badilla" and "Juan Antonio Trujillo" combat groups took credit for the attacks in which three policemen and three civilians were wounded and one terrorist was killed. Approximately \$92,000 was stolen from the bank.

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Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 17, 2018

- July 1981 - (U) Assassinated a CNI employee in Santiago.
- October 1981 - (U) Hijacked a passenger train in the port city of Valparaiso.
- November 1981 - (U) Assassinated three members of the Investigative Police in front of the residence of the chief minister of the presidential staff.
- August 1982 - ~~(C)~~ Suspected of exploding five bombs in different sectors of Santiago. Four went off in municipal government offices, causing minor damages but no injuries. The fifth was discovered by three children, one of whom was killed and the others wounded seriously when it went off.
- February 1983 - (U) Hijacked a train after it departed the Vina del Mar station and later destroyed it by arson, after the passengers and crew had been freed.
- April 1983 - ~~(C)~~ Bombed the railroad line between Santiago and Valparaiso, destroying two segments of track.
- May 1983 - (U) Bombed Valparaiso's Investigative Police headquarters. Twelve people were injured.
- August 1983 - (U) Assassinated Major General Carol Urzua, Intendant of the Santiago Metropolitan Region, after intercepting his car as he pulled away from his home in Santiago. His driver and bodyguard also were killed in the hail of automatic fire from three angles. Six MIR members were detained shortly thereafter; four of them confessed to the assassination and were indicted.
- September 1983 - ~~(C)~~ Killed a Carabinero guard on duty in front of a judge's residence.
- October 1983 - ~~(C)~~ Exploded a bomb near the India Pavilion at the Santiago International Fair.
- October-November 1983 - (U) Bombed or attempted to bomb four US-associated targets in a 10-day period.
- December 1983 - ~~(C)~~ Detonated 14 bombs at three Santiago high-tension towers, cutting power in much of central Chile and northeast Santiago for an hour or more. In the coordinated attack, electric towers in 10 other Chilean cities were bombed as well.
- February 1984 - ~~(C)~~ Perpetrated a coordinated series of attacks on powerlines, blacking out sections of Santiago, Valparaiso, and Concepcion.
- March 1984 - ~~(C)~~ Bombed and disrupted the national electric power grid, blacking out most of the central valley north and south of the capital.
- ~~(C/NF)~~ Bombed a bus transporting Carabineros, killing 1 and injuring 12.

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Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 17, 2018  
CHILE  
FPMR

Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR - Frente Patriotica Manuel Rodriguez)

Orientation/Goals:

~~(C/NF)~~ The FPMR is a leftwing, urban terrorist group which has denied any connection with political parties. The group's goals probably are similar to those of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR)--the overthrow of the military regime of President Augusto Pinochet and the establishment of a Marxist-oriented regime in Chile.



LOGO

Chile's secret police have stated publicly that the FPMR is a terrorist front for the Communist Party of Chile (PCCh). This point of view is supported by speculation in US Embassy reports. A 25 May 1984 report speculated that the FPMR might be a Communist-inspired operation run directly from outside Chile with Cuban support. A July 1984 report stated that the FPMR is likely supported by the Communists and could be an armed branch of the PCCh. In addition, at least one FPMR detainee reportedly confessed that the FPMR is associated with the PCCh.

Background:

~~(C/NF)~~ Since beginning a terrorist campaign in December 1983, the FPMR has become one of the most active of the various extremist groups that operate in apparent coordination with the MIR. The FPMR derives its name from a 19th century Chilean independence fighter. The label "Manuel Rodriguez" was previously associated with the MIR, and the MIR's clandestine publication El Rebelde continues to give favorable coverage to the group's exploits. Since initiating terrorist activities, the FPMR has demonstrated a significant economic sabotage capability. In various counterterrorist operations conducted in June and July 1984, security forces apparently dealt the group a sharp blow, however, by killing 4 alleged members, capturing 11 others, and discovering 8 arsenals of weapons and explosives.

Estimated Strength:

(U) No information available.

Organization:

(U) No information available.

Key Personalities:

(U) No information available.

Headquarters/Bases:

(U) The FPMR has conducted its terrorist operations mainly in the Santiago area, but has perpetrated bombings in various other cities, including Antofagasta, Concepcion, Quilpue, San Antonio, Talcahuano, Valparaiso, and Vina del Mar.

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SECRET

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Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 17, 2018

Tactics/Methods of Operation:

(U) The FPMR has carried out numerous bombings. Targets have included electric power lines and substations, banks, radio stations, stores, and subway trains, as well as a police bus. The group frequently claims responsibility for its terrorist acts through telephone calls or letters sent to news media.

Weapons/Equipment:

(U) The FPMR's arsenal includes submachineguns and powerful bombs (including remote-controlled bombs). In March 1984, an FPMR commando raided an arms shop in downtown Santiago and stole 12 shotguns, 9 rifles, 1 pistol, 3 revolvers, and 3 knives. Eight additional FPMR arsenals were captured in July 1984.

Training:

(U) The group has demonstrated considerable effectiveness in carrying out a variety of sabotage operations. No reliable information is available on the training of FPMR members. An unidentified "intelligence expert" cited by El Mercurio on 29 July 1984 stated that the PCCh has mobilized the FPMR and is training its members in basic urban guerrilla warfare.

Finances:

~~(C/NF)~~ An alleged FPMR member detained in July 1984 claimed that the FPMR receives its funds from the PCCh.

Foreign Support:

~~(C/NF)~~ As noted above, the US Embassy has reported that the FPMR might be run directly from outside Chile with Cuban support.

Other International Relations:

(U) No information available.

Significant Activities (all entries are UNCLASSIFIED):

January 1984 - Raided the Radio Santiago station and aired a 3-minute subversive message after overpowering personnel.

March 1984 - Assaulted Radio Carrera in Santiago and broadcast an antigovernment proclamation.

- Carried out simultaneous predawn attacks in different areas of Santiago, Valparaiso, Concepcion, and San Antonio. The attacks included a series of powerful bomb explosions against shops, power pylons, and substations that caused blackouts in several Santiago areas and other cities. The bombings caused considerable property damage but no casualties. However, at least seven people were injured and dozens arrested in violent disorders after the terrorist attacks.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 17, 2018

- Exploded a powerful bomb near a bus in downtown Santiago, killing 1 police officer and injuring 17 others. The bomb, which contained hundreds of pieces of steel shrapnel, exploded as a bus carrying 25 policemen passed by.

- Perpetrated a number of attacks against the Chilean electric power network that caused blackouts affecting more than half of Chile and 75 percent of the population.

June 1984 - Sabotaged the electric power network, blacking out most of the northern sector of central Chile, including Santiago.

July 1984 - Staged a series of bombings in seven cities, including Santiago, against electric power line posts and transformers, facades of banks, railroad tracks, and buses.

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Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: Oct 17, 2018

Page 041 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

Authority: EO 13526

DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices

Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 042 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 043 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 044 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: *Oct 18, 2018*



Page 045 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: *Oct 18, 2018*

Page 046 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 047 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 048 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 049 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 050 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Other International Relations:

~~(S/NF/NC/WN)~~ The FARC reportedly has good relations with Nicaragua.

(U) The FARC is believed to have operational ties with the Venezuelan BR and probably coordinates with the BR in carrying out occasional cross-border raids.

~~(C/NF)~~ The FARC probably has links with the Shining Path (SL) of Peru. In 1983, 300 SL members reportedly were being trained in Colombia by the FARC and M-19 in exchange for arms.

~~(S/NF/NC/WN)~~ The FARC had confirmed ties with the former Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR). In the late 1970s, the FARC held several meetings in Colombia with JCR representatives.

Non Responsive



Page 052 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 053 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 054 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 055 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 056 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 057 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 058 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

Authority: EO 13526

DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices

Date: Oct 18, 2018



Page 059 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: *Oct 18, 2018*

Page 060 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 061 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 062 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

~~(S/NF/NC/LN)~~ In the mid-1970s, the M-19 reportedly established ties with the now defunct Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR).

(U) Jaime Bateman admitted in April 1982 that M-19 ties to Libya were well established.

Non Responsive

55  
SECRET

Page 064 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 065 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: *Oct 18, 2018*



Page 066 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 067 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 068 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

~~(S/NF/NC/WN)~~ The ELN has long maintained ties with leaders of the Nicaraguan Sandinist National Liberation Front (FSLN). In late 1978/early 1979, some ELN members probably operated with the FSLN in Nicaragua.

~~(S/NF/NC/WN)~~ In mid-1977, the ELN reportedly had ties with the now defunct Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR).

Non Responsive

Page 070 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 071 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 072 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 073 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018



Page 074 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

Authority: EO 13526

DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices

Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 075 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: *Oct 18, 2018*

Page 077 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 078 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: *Oct 18, 2018*

Page 079 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: *Oct 18, 2018*

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 081 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: *Oct 18, 2018*



Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed DIA FCI & Declassification Services Offices  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: *Oct 18, 2018*

Page 083 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 084 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: *Oct 18, 2018*

Page 085 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 086 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 087 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 088 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 089 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018



Page 090 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 091 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 092 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 093 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 094 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 095 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: *Oct 18, 2018*

Page 096 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 097 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018



Page 098 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 099 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 100 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 101 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 102 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 103 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 104 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: *Oct 18, 2018*

Page 105 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: *Oct 18, 2018*



Page 106 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 107 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 108 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 109 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 110 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 111 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 112 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 113 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018



Page 114 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 115 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 116 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 117 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 118 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 119 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 120 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 121 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018



Page 122 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 123 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: *Oct 18, 2018*

Page 124 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 125 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 126 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 127 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 128 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 129 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: *Oct 18, 2018*



Page 130 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 131 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 132 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 133 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 135 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: *Oct 18, 2018*

Page 136 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 137 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018



Page 138 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 139 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 140 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 141 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 142 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 143 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: *Oct 18, 2018*

Page 144 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 145 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018



Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed DIA FOIA & Dedassification Services Offices  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: *Oct 18, 2018*

Page 147 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 148 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 149 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: *Oct 18, 2018*

Page 150 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 151 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 153 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018



Page 154 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: *Oct 18, 2018*

Page 155 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 156 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 157 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed DIA FOIA & Dedassification Services Offices  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 159 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 160 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 161 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018



Page 162 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 163 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 164 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 165 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: *Oct 18, 2018*

Page 166 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 167 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 168 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 169 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018



Page 170 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 171 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 172 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 173 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 174 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 175 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 176 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 177 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018



Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: *Oct 18, 2018*

Page 179 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 181 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 182 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 183 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 184 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 185 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: *Oct 18, 2018*



Page 186 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 187 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 188 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: *Oct 18, 2018*

Page 189 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: *Oct 18, 2018*

Page 190 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: *Oct 18, 2018*

Page 191 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: *Oct 18, 2018*

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 193 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018



Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed DIA FCIA & Declassification Services Offices  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 195 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 196 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page 197 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: *Oct 18, 2018*

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Non Responsive

Training:

~~(C/NF)~~ Venezuelan subversives, who probably include BR/FAS members, reportedly have received some guerrilla training abroad in North Korea, Libya, and Cuba.

~~(S/NF/NC/WN)~~ In the last half of 1979, the BR spent most of its time training in rural areas. In mid-1978, a number of exiled members of the Argentine People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) and the Uruguayan National Liberation Movement (MLN)/Tupamaros reportedly were providing training to BR members.

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~~(C/NF)~~ A Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) colonel, an alleged director of Cuban "penetration, subversion, and terrorism" as well as commander of Cuban military personnel in Guyana, purportedly visited Caracas clandestinely in February 1982 and made contact with BR/FAS elements.

~~(C)~~ According to a December 1981 Venezuelan Army report, Venezuelan subversives, probably including BR/FAS members, have received training in Cuba, Libya, and North Korea.

~~(S/NF/NC/WN)~~ Some Argentine ERP and Uruguayan MLN training and/or logistical assistance reportedly was provided in the late 1970s.

Non Responsive

Page 199 of 208

Withheld pursuant to exemption

Non Responsive

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

~~SECRET~~

INDEX

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Non Responsive

Volume III - Latin America

Non Responsive

Non Responsive

Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional - ELN

III CO

Non Responsive



~~SECRET~~

Non Responsive

Frente Patriotica Manuel Rodriguez - FPMR

III CI

Non Responsive

Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - FARC

III CO

Non Responsive

Non  
Responsiv  
e

Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front - FPMR

III CI

Montoneros

III AR

Non

Movement of the Revolutionary Left - MIR

III CI

Non Responsive

Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria - MIR

III CI

Movimiento 19 de Abril - M-19

III CO

Non Responsive

National Liberation Army - ELN

III CO

Non Responsive

19th of April Movement - M-19

III CO


Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed DIA FOIA & Dedclassification Services Offices  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

194

~~SECRET~~

(This page is UNCLASSIFIED)


~~SECRET~~



Non  
Responsive

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - FARC

III CO



Non Responsive

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

195  
(Reverse Blank)

~~SECRET~~  
(This page is UNCLASSIFIED)

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

SECRET

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

SECRET


DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

SECRET

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: Oct 18, 2018

Secret

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices  
Date: Oct 18, 2018



Secret