NATIONAL SECURITY .	TMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMA	THOM NEPONT		
**FORMATION	. CONFIDENTIAL/NOTOKIN	This report contains unprocessed		
Griminal Sanations	CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN	mation, Plans and/or policing should		
	Classification/Control Markings	be evolved or modified solely on basi this report.		
1. COUNTRY: ARGENTINA (A	AR) 2. REPORT NUMBER: (b)(	3):10 USC 424		
2 7171 - (72)	The state of the s	-,		
3. TITLE: (U) ARGENTINA-T	TERRORISM THREAT  4. PROJECT NUMBER: N/	'A		
ASSESSMENT FOR 1979	THOSECT NUMBER: N/	n		
5 DATE OF INCOMINE	90110 6. DATE OF REPORT: 790	117		
5. DATE OF INFORMATION: 79				
7. DATE & PLACE OF ACQUISITIO	8. REFERENCES: (b)(3):1	10 USC 424		
Buenos Aires	(b)(3):10 USC 424			
9. ASSESSMENT: SOURCE	INFO	0.1180.424		
1	io. ORIGINATOR: (D)(S).	0 USC 424		
1. REQUEST EVALUATION	QPQ12			
	(country)	137 ROVING AUTHORITY		
. SOURCE: Amembassy Mem	orandum, 790110 (b)(3):10 USC 424			
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:				
. S. LOIAL INSTRUCTIONS:		D YES O		
NOFORN TO AVOID EMBARRA	ASSMENT TO HOCK COLLEDNATION	D YES		
SUMMARY:	TO MODE OVERHANDE	R C NO 🖄		
(C/NOTODAL) The C.11		NO E		
(c) noromy the rottomic	ng IR forwards the monthly			
	ng IR forwards the monthly status report			
past events of 1978 are	discussed as well as the minimum			
past events of 1978 are	discussed as well as the minimum	ant in that terrorist		
past events of 1978 are	discussed as well as the minimum	ant in that terrorist		
past events of 1978 are	discussed as well as the minimum	ant in that terrorist		
past events of 1978 are events could be expecte	ed in 1979.	ant in that terrorist		
past events of 1978 are events could be expecte	ed in 1979.	AREA CODES:		
past events of 1978 are	a by 0.5. Embassy R.S.O. It is significe discussed, as well as theorizing what and in 1979.	ant in that terrorist		
past events of 1978 are	a by 0.5. Embassy R.S.O. It is significe discussed, as well as theorizing what and in 1979.	ant in that terrorist		
past events of 1978 are	ed in 1979.	ant in that terrorist		
past events of 1978 are	a by 0.5. Embassy R.S.O. It is significe discussed, as well as theorizing what and in 1979.	ant in that terrorist		
BEST AVA	Rec'd RDS-3B/ 31	SUBJECT AND AREA CODES.		
BEST AVA	Rec'd RDS-3B/ 31.  19. DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION DATA:	ant in that terrorist (67 A)		
BEST AVA  COP  DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR: DIA (original)	Rec'd RDS-3B/ 31.  19. DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION DATA:	ant in that terrorist  67  17. SUBJECT AND AREA CODES:		
BEST AVA  COP  DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR: DIA (DS-6A)	Rec'd RDS-3B/ 31.  19. DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION DATA: CLASSITIED BI: DIAM 38-11, ENCE 9, dtd 5 DEC 78	aut in that terrorist for Subject and AREA CODES.		
BEST AVA  COP  DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR: DIA (DS-6A) SCINCSO	Rec'd RDS-3B/ 31.  19. DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION DATA: CLASSIFIED BI: DIAM 30-11, ENCL 9,	ant in that terrorist  20. ENCLOSURES:  1 Enclosure		
BEST AVECULATION BY ORIGINATOR:  OLIVER TO SECULATE THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPER	Rec'd RDS-3B/ 31.  19. DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION DATA: CLASSIFIED BI: DIAM 30-11, ENGL 9, dtd 3 DEC 78	20. ENCLOSURES:  1 Enclosure  1. Amembassy Memo.		
BEST AVA  COP  DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:  DIA (DS-6A) SCINCSO DR 193RD INF BDE 4 COMPW/IN	Rec'd RDS-3B/ 31.  19. DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION DATA: CLASSIFIED BI: DIAM 30-11, ENGL 9, dtd 3 DEC 78	ant in that terrorist  20. ENCLOSURES:  1 Enclosure		
BEST AVA  COP  DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:  DIA (DS-6A) SCINCSO DR 193RD INF BDE 4 COMPW/IN Q USAF WASH DC	Rec'd RDS-3B/ 31.  19. DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION DATA: CLASSIFIED BI: DIAM 30-11, ENGL 9, dtd 3 DEC 78	20. ENCLOSURES:  1 Enclosure  1. Amembassy Memo, 790110, 1 cy, 7 pgs		
DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:  DIA (DS-6A) SCINCSO DR 193RD INF BDE 4 COMPW/IN Q USAF WASH DC DMNAVINTCOM SCOMSOLANT	Rec'd RDS-3B/ 31.  19. DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION DATA: CLASSIFIED BI: DIAM 30-11, ENGL 9, dtd 3 DEC 78	20. ENCLOSURES:  1 Enclosure  1. Amembassy Memo, 790110, 1 cy, 7 pgs  (C) NC		
DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR: DIA (Original)  PIA (DS-6A) SCINCSO DR 193RD INF BDE 4 COMPW/IN Q USAF WASH DC OMNAVINTCOM SCOMSOLANT ST SOW/USAF SOS/HURL-	Rec'd RDS-3B/ 31.  19. DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION DATA:  CLASSIFIED BT: DIAM 30-11, ENGL-9,  dtd 3 DEC 78  DECLASSIFIEDINFULL Authority: EO 13526	20. ENCLOSURES:  1 Enclosure  1. Amembassy Memo, 790110, 1 cy, 7 pgs		
DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:  DIA (OS-6A) SCINCSO DR 193RD INF BDE 4 COMPW/IN Q USAF WASH DC DMNAV INTCOM SCOMSOLANT ST SOW/USAF SOS/HURL- BRT FLD, FLA	Rec'd RDS-3B/ 32.  19. DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION DATA: CLASSIFIED BY: DIAM 30-11, ENCL 9, DECLASSIFIED IN 17 DEC 1905	20. ENCLOSURES:  1 Enclosure  1. Amembassy Memo, 790110, 1 cy, 7 pgs  (C) NC		
DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR: DIA (Original)  PIA (DS-6A) SCINCSO DR 193RD INF BDE 4 COMPW/IN Q USAF WASH DC OMNAVINTCOM SCOMSOLANT ST SOW/USAF SOS/HURL- BRT FLD, FLA SI/COUNTER TERRORIST	Rec'd RDS-3B/ 32.  19. DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION DATA: CLASSIFIED BT: DIAM 30-11, ENCL 9, DECLASSIFIED NFULL Authority: EO 13526 DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices	20. ENCLOSURES:  1 Enclosure  1. Amembassy Memo, 790110, 1 cy, 7 pgs  (C) NC		
DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:  DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR: DIA (original)  IA (DS-6A) SCINCSO DR 193RD INF BDE 4 COMPW/IN Q USAF WASH DC DMNAVINTCOM SCOMSOLANT ST SOW/USAF SOS/HURL- BRT FLD, FLA SI/COUNTER TERRORIST DIV	Rec'd RDS-3B/ 32.  19. DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION DATA: CLASSIFIED BT: DIAM 30-11, ENCL 9, DECLASSIFIED NFULL Authority: EO 13526 DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices	20. ENCLOSURES:  1 Enclosure  1. Amembassy Memo, 790110, 1 cy, 7 pgs  (C) NC		
DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR: DIA (Original)  PIA (DS-6A) SCINCSO DR 193RD INF BDE 4 COMPW/IN Q USAF WASH DC OMNAVINTCOM SCOMSOLANT ST SOW/USAF SOS/HURL- BRT FLD, FLA SI/COUNTER TERRORIST DIV	Rec'd RDS-3B/ 32.  19. DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION DATA: CLASSIFIED BT: DIAM 30-11, ENCL 9, DECLASSIFIED NFULL Authority: EO 13526 DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices	20. ENCLOSURES:  1 Enclosure  1. Amembassy Memo, 790110, 1 cy, 7 pgs  (C) NC		
past events of 1978 are events could be expecte	Rec'd RDS-3B/ 32.  19. DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION DATA: CLASSIFIED BT: DIAM 30-11, ENCL 9, DECLASSIFIED NFULL Authority: EO 13526 DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices	20. ENCLOSURES:  1 Enclosure  1. Amembassy Memo, 790110, 1 cy, 7 pgs  (C) NC		
DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:  DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:  DIA (DS-6A) SCINCSO DR 193RD INF BDE 4 COMPW/IN Q USAF WASH DC DMNAVINTCOM SCOMSOLANT ST SOW/USAF SOS/HURL- BRT FLD, FLA SI/COUNTER TERRORIST	Rec'd RDS-3B/31.  19. DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION DATA:  CLASSITIED BI: DIAM 38-11, ENCL 9,  DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  Authority: EO 13526 DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices Date: Oct 17, 2018	20. ENCLOSURES:  1 Enclosure  1. Amembassy Memo, 790110, 1 cy, 7 pgs  (C) NC		
DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:  DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:  DIA (DS-6A) SCINCSO DR 193RD INF BDE 4 COMPW/IN Q USAF WASH DC DMNAVINTCOM SCOMSOLANT ST SOW/USAF SOS/HURL- BRT FLD, FLA SI/COUNTER TERRORIST	Rec'd RDS-3B/ 32.  19. DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION DATA: CLASSIFIED BT: DIAM 30-11, ENCL 9, DECLASSIFIED NFULL Authority: EO 13526 DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices	20. ENCLOSURES:  1 Enclosure  1. Amembassy Memo, 790110, 1 cy, 7 pgs  (C) NC		



## EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

January 10, 1979

MEMORANDUM

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority: EO 13526

DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices

Date: Oct 17, 2018

TO:

Chief, A/SY/OPS/FO

FROM:

RSO - J.J. Blystone - Buenos Aires

SUBJECT:

Monthly Status Report for December, 1978

## 1. Threat Assessment

A. At the end of 1978, RSO met with members of the Security Service to discuss past events of the year and to theorize as to what events could be expected in 1979 regarding terrorist activities.

The following points were brought out during the conversation:

Argentina is divided into military zones. Zones are under the control of the Army Corps within that zone. All operations against subversives which are carried out by members of the various security and military services within a zone must be approved by the commander of the Army Corps within the Zone where the operation is to take place. In spite of this, many operations are conducted without permission; further, there is very poor coordination and exchange of information among the security and military services regarding operations being planned or conducted.

The five military zones are described as follows:

Zone One - Under the control of the First Army Corps. Zone One surrounds the Province of Buenos Aires, except the suburbs of Buenos Aires, the Federal Capital, and the Province of La Pampa, up to the Rio Colorado river. (Note: a "Province" is similar to our state, as in "State of Illinois").

(RDS 1 (Shaplin, Maxwell) OR/A)

HOTOM

WARNING: NOT RELEASEABLE TO FOREIGN
SOURCES

Edwarty 17 per 1986

(b)(3):10 USC 424

2

<del>10.707.11</del>

Zone Two - Under the control of the Second Army Corps. Zone Two includes the Provinces of Santa Fe, Entre Rios, Corrientes, Misiones, Chaco, and Formosa.

Zone Three - Under the control of the Third Army Corps. Zone Three includes the Provinces of Jujuy, Salta, Santiago del Estero, Tucuman, Catamarca, La Rioja, Cordoba, San Juan, San Luis and Mendoza.

Zone Four - Under the control of the Military Institute. Campo de Mayo area, located outside of Buenos Aires. Zone Four also controls the suburbs of Buenos Aires, which are Vicente Lopez, San Isidro, San Fernando, Tigre, Exaltacion de la Cruz, Escobar, Zarate, Campana, San Martin, 3 de Febrero, General Sarmiento, and Del Viso y Pilar.

Zone Five - Under the control of the Fifth Army Corps. Zone Five inclues the provinces of Rio Negro, Neuquen, Chubute, and Santa Cruz.

Sources provided the following manpower resources of terrorist organizations remaining in the country and of those now in exile. The figures provided are approximate, with each figure being off anywhere from 3 to 7 points. The security sources did not wish to provide exact totals as the information is considered highly classified by the GOA.

OCPA - Terrorist organization, Communist Labor Power Organization (rough translation). Security forces estimate that 20 leaders now reside in exile. In-country members are located in the following zones: Zone 1 - 17 members; Zone 2 - 4 members; Zones 3, 4, and 5 - 0 members. Total: 21 members in-country. Security forces consider OCPA to be of no danger, as the organization exists in name only. Members are unable to communicate with each other, have no weapons, no explosives, no safe house, and no money, and no leadership.

(KUS-1 (Chaptin, Maxwell) OR/A)

3

Security force members believe that in the future, the OCPA could possibly produce pamphlets for propoganda purposes; however, the likelihood is remote for reasons outlined above.

PRT/ERP - This terrorist organization is estimated by security forces to have a maximum of 90 members residing in exile. This number represents the leadership of the organization with members located in Italy and France.

Sources indicated that approximately 138 PRT/ERP members remain in Argentina and are situated in the following zones: Zone 1 - 86; Zone 2 - 24; Zone 3 - 8; Zone 4 - 18, and Zone 5 - 2. Sources advised that the last PRT/ERP terrorist act was committed in May, 1978, when a vehicle with explosives exploded in the garage of the San Martin theater.

The PRT/ERP members in exile have joined the 4th International Organization (an organization which supposedly follows the Trotsky line) in France and have changed their organizational policy from violent revolution to one of achieving power through the use of political means. Sources advised the change is a result of losses in membership and equipment in fighting GOA military and security forces. The new Secretary General and leader of the PRT/ERP, Arnoldo Khremer has decided to use political means to gain support and aid for the PRT/ERP movement, i.e. support for the local unions, by distributing pamphlets, supporting wage increases, etc. PRT/ERP hopes that by using political means they will be able to recoup the support of the populace. Our source advised that PRT/ERP has not forsaken the idea of violence to obtain power, that the PRT/ERP still has in Argentina limited quantities of small arms, i.e. pistols, revolvers, and shotguns, and a small

(RDS 1 (Ghaplin, Name 11) -OR/A)

DECEMBER 18

amount of explosives. However, sources stated that the movement has limited funds which are being utilized by the leadership in Europe to produce propaganda and are unable to provide financial backing to the remaining elements in Argentina.

Sources added that they have broken the movement's lines of communication and that the movement no longer has any safe houses remaining in the country.

Security sources advised that due to their efforts to eliminate PRT/ERP members, the remaining members in country are in hiding or trying to leave. Further, the movement lacks leadership for any future terrorist activity. Sources admitted that there exists a possibility in the coming year that a member or members of the movement could plan some type of terrorist act, but that it would most likely be a bombing of a GOA installation. However, the general concurrence of the security forces is that the movement would distribute pamphlets.

Montoneros - This terrorist movement is estimated by security forces to have a maximum of 200 members residing in exile. This number represents members of the Montonero leadership located in Italy, France and Mexico City. Sources advised that approximately 245 members of the Montonero movement remain in Argentina and are located in the following zones: Zone 1 - maximum 90 members; Zone 2 - maximum 25 members; Zone 3 - maximum 50 members; Zone 4 - maximum 8 members, and Zone 5 - maximum 0 members.

Sources stated that the Secretariat for International Relations of the movement has changed the movement's political structure and renamed the movement "The Peronist/Montonero Movement." The Montoneros believe that by changing the name to include the Peronists, the movement will gain the support of the Peronists and be identified with the Peronist movement in Argentina.

(RDS-1 (Chaplin, Maxwell) OR/A)

5

Security forces advised that the Montoneros incountry no longer have any safe houses, are unable to recruit new members, are not receiving money from the leadership in exile, lack leadership, have no line of communication, and have limited quantities of weapons (small arms, pistols, revolvers, and shotguns).

Sources advise that terrorist acts resulting from bombings are still possible; however, they found and destroyed three months ago the last Montonero explosive factory manufacturing "Exogeno", which sources advise is a plastic explosive. (Note: Argentina military and security forces have PRT/ERP and Montonero terrorists in their service providing information. Further, the services are using terrorists to point out individuals they have seen but do not know by hame as members of the movement or movement sympathizers. This is being accomplished by having the PRT/ERP and Montoneros accompany security members in unmarked vehicles which traverse the city and areas which members or sympathizers are suspected to be located. Sources advised that both systems used have been highly effective, and will continue until the terrorists have been eliminated.)

The RSO was able very briefly to view statistical graphs compiled by GOA security services indicating the numbers of violent acts committed in the years 1977 and 1978 by terrorist and GOA forces while a security member read to the RSO from these graphs. Source provided the following statistical data to RSO:

## Violent Acts Committed in 1977

Montoneros - 700 PRT/ERP - 130

One figure which sources did not provide which the RSO was able to see was that GOA forces committed 1,576 violent acts in 1977.

RDS 1 (Chaplin, Maxwell) OP/A)



Violent Acts Committed in 1978

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority: EO 13526 DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices Date: Oct 17, 2018

Montoneros - 343 PRT/ERP - 45 Others - 3

Again, the RSO was able to see that GOA forces committed 696 violent acts during 1978.

Another statistical graph compiled by GOA security forces showed by month the number of bombing acts committed by Montonero and PRT/ERP groups, which are indicated below:

	2	1978	3 A	cts	of	Bombings
		Montenero			PRT/ERP	
Jan			2	2.6		
Feb			4	*		5
Mar	5 # U+5	160	1	27		•
Apr		ū.	-	•		- 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1
May			-			1
Jun			1			-
Ju1	** **		=			-
Aug		S <sub>11</sub>	1			-
Sep			1			è -

The graph also indicated a high number of bombings had been carried out by GOA forces. The RSO is unable to provide figures as the graph was held by source, who read above figures to RSO.

(RDS-1 (Chaplin, Maxwell) OP/A)

Other graphs which the RSO viewed very briefly indicate the following:

During 1978, PRT/ERP did not conduct any armed attacks; however, the Monteneros conducted 15.

The graph indicated attacks by GOA forces were much higher than the terrorists.

Propoganda action: The PRT/ERP conducted 27 acts involving the use of propoganda in 1978. The Montoneros conducted 207 actions involving the use of propoganda. The graph indicated that the GOA forces used a great deal of propoganda, as the graph showed GOA use to be greater than that of the terrorist groups.

Actions involving stealing of weapons or vehicles in 1978. PRT/ERP conducted one action in January, 1978. The Montoneros conducted 10 actions between the period of January and May, 1978, only. They conducted no actions during the period May to December, 1978.

<u>Kidnappings.</u> PRT/ERP conducted no kidnappings in 1978. The Monteneros conducted two, in January only. The graph indicated that the GOA was more active.

Acts of Intimidation. PRT/ERP conducted 10 acts of intimidation. The Montoneros conducted 20. Acts of intimidation were committed between May and June, and October and November. The graph indicates that GOA forces' acts of intimidation were greater in number than those of the terrorists.

## Montevideo

No change from the October report.

TRDS-1 (Chaplin, Maxwell) OR/A)

MUT COM