SUMMARY: PROGRESS BY GROUND FORCES, AIDED BY AIR FORCE BOMBING, IS RESULTING IN BATTLEFIELD SUCCESSES.
OUT OF COMBAT, AND 2 INJURED IN MINE EXPLOSIONS. SEE ENCLOSURE FOR A BREAKDOWN BY ILLEGAL ARMED GROUP (IAG) ON ENEMY RESULTS AND BY BATTALION FOR FRIENDLY STATISTICS.

2. (O) UNTIL RECENTLY, BRIM-7 HAD SEVEN COUNTERGUERRILLA BATTALIONS (BCG) ASSIGNED, BCGS 61, 62, 63, 64, 26, 35, AND 39. (b)(1)(i)(c) COMMENT. RECENTLY, COL MORENO MADE A CASE TO THE MAJOR GENERAL REINALDO ((CASTELLANOS)) TRUJILLO, AS TO WHY HE NEEDED AN EIGHTH BCG. UPON HEARING HIS CASE, MG CASTELLANOS INFORMED COL MORENO THAT ALL OF HIS BRIGADE COMMANDERS WANTED MORE BATTALIONS, BUT SINCE COL MORENOS BRIGADE HAD MORE THAN ANY OTHER BRIGADE IN THE JTF, HE WOULD INSTEAD TAKE ONE OF HIS SEVEN. THIS BATTALION, BCG-39, HAS SINCE BECOME THE JTF RESERVE FORCE IN LARANDIA.) THE BCGS 61, 62, 63, AND 64 HAVE ALWAYS BELONGED TO BRIM-7, BUT BCG-35 AND BCG-39 CAME FROM THE 1ST DIVISION WHILE BCG-26 CAME FROM THE 4TH DIVISION. BCGS-26 AND 64 ARE CURRENTLY STATIONED IN PUERTO CACHICAMO //GEOCODE: (b)(3)(i)(c) WITH BCGS 35 AND 63 FARTHER SOUTH (NFI). ONE OF ITS SIX BATTALIONS IS ON BLOCK LEAVE FOR A PERIOD OF TWENTY DAYS. ONCE THAT BATTALION RETURNS, ANOTHER IS SCHEDULED TO TAKE ITS PLACE, ROTATING OUT FOR TWENTY DAYS AS WELL. (b)(3)(i)(c) IT IS STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE FOR BRIMS IN THE JTF TO PUT ENTIRE BATTALIONS ON BLOCK LEAVE. THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCES (FUDRA) BRIM-1 AND BRIM-2, HOWEVER, ARE UNIQUE IN THAT THEY ROTATE AT COMPANY LEVEL. THE FUDRAS BRIM-3 ROTATES AT THE BATTALION LEVEL. LEAVE IS ACCRUED AT A RATE OF TWENTY DAYS FOR EVERY SIX MONTHS OF DEPLOYMENT. SOMETIMES LEAVES ARE TAKEN IN SMALLER INCREMENTS AT A RATE OF TEN DAYS EVERY THREE MONTHS.)

3. (O) ON 1 JUN 04, THE AIR FORCE (COLAF) BOMBED A SERIES OF TARGETS IN THE BRIM-7 AREA OF OPERATIONS (AOR). IN APPEARENTLY SUCCESSFUL STRIKES, THE COLAF DESTROYED THREE BRIDGES ALONG A FORMERLY WELL-USED FARC MOBILITY CORRIDOR THAT RUNS SOUTH OUT OF PUERTO CACHICAMO AND TWO FARC CAMPS ALONG ANOTHER MOBILITY CORRIDOR THAT RUNS EAST/WEST FARTHER TO THE SOUTH. (b)(1)(i)(c) THOUGH THE FARC HAS BEEN FREQUENTLY USING THESE MOBILITY CORRIDORS, THEY ARE GENERALLY ONLY VISIBLE FROM THE AIR AT THEIR INTERSECTIONS WITH OTHER MOBILITY CORRIDORS, MAKING THEM DIFFICULT TO TARGET. NEARLY SIMULTANEOUS TO THESE COLAF ATTACKS, ELEMENTS OF BRIM-7 INTERCEPTED A 7 TO 8-TON SUPPLY OF FOODSTUFFS HEADED TO THE FARC 7TH FRONT. INTERCEPTED FARC RADIO TRANSMISSIONS INDICATED THAT THIS CAME AS EXTREMELY DISAPPOINTING NEWS TO FARC TERRORISTS WHO WERE ALREADY VERY HUNGRY. (b)(3)(i)(c) THE BRIM-7 INTELLIGENCE SECTION HAS FARC MOBILITY CORRIDORS AND BRIDGES AS
WELL AS CAMPS IN THE AOR CLEARLY MARKED ON THE ENEMY SITUATION MAP.)
4. (c) (b)(3);10 USC 424 THE SINGLE MOST CHALLENGING FACTORS THAT NOW PRECLUDE HIM FROM PRESSING THE FIGHT AGAINST THE FARC FASTER AND FURTHER, ARE BAD WEATHER AND A LACK OF AIR TRANSPORT. ESPECIALLY FRUSTRATING IS WHEN AIR ASSETS ARE AVAILABLE, BUT MISSIONS ARE SCRUBBED DUE TO INCLEMENT WEATHER.
A. (c) (b)(1);1.4 (c) THE THREAT OF HELICOPTER AMBUSHES AND FARC SMALL ARMS FIRE NOW PRECLUDES COLMIL HELICOPTERS FROM FLYING AT TREETOP LEVEL. INSTEAD, THEY FLY AT APPROXIMATELY 4000 FT. AND DESCEND RAPIDLY TO THEIR LANDING ZONE TO AVOID GROUND FIRE. WHEN CEILINGS ARE LOW, AS THEY COMMONLY ARE IN THE RAINY SEASON, THIS FACT ENDS UP CANCELING A LOT OF HELICOPTER SUPPORT MISSIONS.
ACCORDING TO SOURCE B, BATTALION-LEVEL RESUPPLY MISSIONS THAT HAD BEEN CONDUCTED APPROXIMATELY EVERY FOUR DAYS ARE NOW BEING STRETCHED FURTHER, TO FIVE OR SIX DAYS, DUE TO WEATHER AND THE NEED FOR ROUTINE HELICOPTER MAINTENANCE THAT TAKES AIRCRAFT OUT OF THE LINEUP.
(b)(1);(b)(3);10 USC 424;1.4 (c)