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SECTION 1 OF 3

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BODY

SUBJ:DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE TERRORISM SUMMARY U

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Non Responsive

2. (U) SPECIAL ANALYSIS

A. SOUTH AMERICA: (U) NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY SITUATION UPDATE.

1 (S) SUMMARY: THE NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY ELN, COLOMBIA'S SECOND LARGEST GUERRILLA/TERRORIST GROUP, HAS RECENTLY INCREASED THE NUMBER AND COMPLEXITY OF TERRORIST ATTACKS IN AN EFFORT TO WIN CONCESSIONS FROM THE COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT. THE MOST SPECTACULAR ATTACKS WERE THE HIJACKING OF AN AVIANCA FLIGHT BETWEEN BUCARAMANGA AND BOGOTA ON 12 APRIL, AND THE KIDNAPPING OF APPROXIMATELY 145 WORSHIPPERS FROM A CHURCH IN CALI ON 30 MAY. THE HOSTAGES FROM BOTH INCIDENTS WERE RAPIDLY MOVED TO CLANDESTINE HOSTAGE-HOLDING SITES, AND THE ELN IS DEMANDING POLITICAL CONCESSIONS AND RANSOM IN EXCHANGE

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FOR THEIR RELEASE. THE ELN HAS SUFFERED SIGNIFICANT LOSSES FROM FIGHTING WITH SECURITY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES, BOTH OF WHOM APPEAR TO BE INCREASING PRESSURE ON THE GROUP. HOWEVER, THE ELN'S SUCCESSFUL EXECUTION OF TERRORIST ATTACKS REFLECTS A GROUP WITH RISING CONFIDENCE IN THEIR TERRORIST CAPABILITIES AND THE POTENTIAL TO BECOME A GREATER THREAT TO US INTERESTS IN THE FUTURE.

2 (S) (b)(3) 10.U.S.C
1042.24(v)(1) THE ELN IS EXPERIENCING CONFLICTS AMONG THE LEADERSHIP DUE TO DIFFERENCES OF OPINION BETWEEN FRONT COMMANDERS, MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL DIRECTORATE AND ITS SUPREME COMMANDER, NICOLAS RODRIQUEZ BAUTISTIA AKA GABINO. HOWEVER, ALLEGED CONFLICTS HAVE NOT DEGRADED THEIR TERRORIST CAPABILITIES. GABINO ASSUMED COMMAND OF THE ELN FOLLOWING THE DEATH OF LONG-TIME SUPREME COMMANDER, MANUEL PEREZ IN FEBRUARY 1998. (b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c) (b)(3)
10 U LEADERSHIP CONFLICT ARE LIKELY THE RESULT OF THE LEADERSHIP STYLES OF GABINO AND HIS PREDECESSOR PEREZ. PEREZ ENGENDERED LOYALTY THROUGH EFFECTIVE USE OF HIS POLITICAL SAVVY AND CHARISMA, WHILE GABINO IS MORE OF A HARD-LINE COMMANDER WHO FOCUSES ON COMBAT ACTION RATHER THAN DIALOGUE. THE INCREASE IN TERRORISM REFLECTS GABINO'S INFLUENCE AND DEMONSTRATES THE ELN IS A VIABLE GROUP CAPABLE OF COMPLEX, SPECTACULAR ATTACKS. THE SUCCESSFUL ATTACKS ALSO STRENGTHEN GABINO'S POSITION AS SUPREME COMMANDER AND BOOSTS THE COMBAT CONFIDENCE OF THE GROUP'S MEMBERS.

(S) IN OCTOBER 1998, THE ELN LOST THEIR BID TO BE INCLUDED IN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WHEN GABINO ATTEMPTED TO BLAME GOVERNMENT FORCES FOR A SECONDARY EXPLOSION THAT KILLED 60 CIVILIANS DURING A BOTCHED ELN ATTACK ON THE OCENSA PIPELINE IN MACHUCA, ANTIOQUIA DEPARTMENT. THE ELN PERCEIVED IT NECESSARY TO REGAIN GOVERNMENT ATTENTION BY AN ESCALATION IN TERRORIST ATTACKS. THE ELN IS DEMANDING A DEMILITARIZED ZONE IN SOUTHERN BOLIVAR, POLITICAL CONCESSIONS EQUAL TO THAT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA FARC, AND CONTINUED COMMUNICATIONS WITH JAILED MEMBERS IN THE ITAQUI PRISON IN ANTIOQUIA, IN EXCHANGE FOR THE RELEASE OF HOSTAGES KIDNAPPED FROM THE AVIANCA FLIGHT AND CALI CHURCH.

(S) (b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c) THE ELN HAS SUFFERED SIGNIFICANT LOSSES FROM PARAMILITARY AND GOVERNMENT FORCES. ALBEIT, AS DEMONSTRATED IN THEIR RECENT ATTACKS, THE ELN'S TERRORIST CAPABILITY IS SUFFICIENT TO CONDUCT COMPLEX TERRORIST ATTACKS THAT FORCE THE GOVERNMENT TO ADDRESS ELN DEMANDS. THE LAST ELN ATTACKS AGAINST OFFICIAL US INTERESTS WERE THE 1988 AND 1989 LIGHT ANTI-TANK WEAPONS LAW ATTACKS ON THE US EMBASSY IN BOGOTA.

(S) THE ELN CURRENTLY HOLDS FIVE US HOSTAGES, MORE THAN AT ANY TIME IN THE PAST DECADE. ALTHOUGH IN CAPTIVITY, ELN KIDNAP VICTIMS RECEIVE

COMPARATIVELY DECENT TREATMENT AND ARE PROVIDED ADEQUATE SURVIVAL NEEDS. INDIVIDUALS KIDNAPPED DURING HIGH PROFILE OPERATIONS WERE FOR THE PURPOSE OF GAINING POLITICAL CONCESSIONS I.E. DEMILITARIZED ZONE AND PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. HOWEVER, THE ELN HAS ANNOUNCED PLANS TO EXTORT RANSOM FOR SOME OF THE VICTIMS, RESULTING IN THE COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO REVOKE THE ELN'S POLITICAL STATUS.

3 ~~(S)~~ ELN FRONTS RESPONSIBLE FOR 1999 KIDNAPPINGS:

~~(S)~~ HEROES AND MARTYRS OF SANTA ROSA FRONT: THIS FRONT OF 30 ARMED TERRORISTS WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR HIJACKING AVIANCA FLIGHT 9463 AND THE SUBSEQUENT KIDNAPING/TRANSFER OF ALL PASSENGERS AND CREW TO CLANDESTINE HOSTAGE HOLDING SITES. PRIOR TO 12 APRIL HIJACKING, THE FRONT HAD CARRIED OUT SEVERAL MULTIPLE KIDNAPPING INCIDENTS--INVOLVING MEDIA CREWS--IN BOLIVAR DEPARTMENT.

~~(S)~~ JOSE SOLANO SEPULVEDA FRONTS: CONSISTING OF AN ESTIMATED 180 ARMED TERRORISTS, THAT INCLUDES ONE ASSAULT COMPANY, THIS FRONT IS ONE OF THE ELN'S MOST CAPABLE. IN ADDITION TO KIDNAPPING AND EXTORTION, THEY MANUFACTURE AND EMPLOY ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AROUND BASE CAMPS AND HOSTAGE HOLDING SITES. THIS FRONT WAS ONE OF THE TWO RESPONSIBLE FOR KIDNAPPING AND MOVING A US GEOLOGIST TO 11 DIFFERENT SITES FROM 24 FEBRUARY 1997 TO 18 SEPTEMBER 1998 IN SOUTHERN BOLIVAR'S MOUNTAIN RANGE. THE JOSE SOLANO SEPULVEDA FRONT TRANSPORTED HOSTAGES FROM THE HIJACKED AVIANCA FLIGHT TO ONE OR MORE CLANDESTINE HOLDING SITES WHERE THEY ARE GUARDED BY FRONT MEMBERS.

~~(S)~~ JOSE MARIA BECERRA FRONT: AN ESTIMATED 50 ARMED TERRORISTS ROUTINELY CONDUCT EXTORTION AND KIDNAPPING CAMPAIGNS IN CALI. MOST VISIBLE IN THE JAMUNDI AREA, WHICH IS THE PROBABLE HOLDING SITE FOR THE HOSTAGES KIDNAPPED FROM A CHURCH IN CALI ON 30 MAY.

~~(S)~~ KALEB GOMEZ PARDON FRONT: THE 30 ARMED TERRORISTS PRIMARILY ORGANIZE POPULAR MILITIAS AND COORDINATE TERRORIST ACTIONS TO INCREASE THE PROLETARIAN CAUSE AND RECRUITMENT AMONG UNIVERSITY STUDENTS IN BARRANQUILLA.

~~(S)~~ JOSE DAVID SUAREZ FRONT: CONSISTS OF AN ESTIMATED 40 ARMED TERRORISTS PRIMARILY OPERATING IN BOYACA AND CASANARE DEPARTMENTS. PRIOR TO THE 23 MARCH AND 13 MAY INDIVIDUAL KIDNAPPINGS MOST OF THE FRONT'S TERRORIST ACTIVITY CONSISTED OF ATTACKS AGAINST THE OIL INDUSTRY. THE FRONT IS HEAVILY INVOLVED IN THE DAY TO DAY OPERATIONS WITHIN THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN YOPAL.

4 ~~(S)~~ US KIDNAPPING INCIDENTS:

~~(S)~~ SOGAMOSA, BOYACA DEPARTMENT: THE JOSE DAVID SUAREZ FRONT KIDNAPPED A NATURALIZED US CITIZEN ON 23 MARCH 1999 FOR ECONOMIC REASONS. TWO ELN TERRORIST WEARING CIVILIAN ATTIRE KIDNAPPED THE INDIVIDUAL, AS HE WAS APPROACHING HIS PARENTS RANCH. AFTER SEVERAL

WEEKS OF NEGOTIATIONS, ON 10 JUNE 1999 THE FAMILY PAID A RANSOM OF \$26,000 FOR HIS RELEASE; HOWEVER, THE ELN RENEGED AND DEMANDED AN ADDITIONAL \$300,000. SUCH DECEITFULNESS IS NOT UNCOMMON; IN 1998 THE
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GROUP HELD A US CITIZEN FOR SOME 18 MONTHS DUE TO INTERNAL FRONT RIVALRIES AND DEMAND CONFLICTS.

(Ø) BUCARAMANGA, SANTANDER DEPARTMENT: ON 12 APRIL THE ELN'S HEROES AND MARTYRS OF SANTA ROSA AND JOSE SOLANO SEPULVEDA FRONTS HIJACKED AVIANCA FLIGHT 9463 AND KIDNAPPED ALL 42 PASSENGERS AND CREW, TO INCLUDE A US CITIZEN AND THE DAUGHTER OF A US EMBASSY EMPLOYEE. TO DATE, 24 HOSTAGES HAVE BEEN RELEASED, AND 17 ARE HELD IN THE SOUTHERN MOUNTAIN RANGE OF BOLIVAR DEPARTMENT; AN AREA OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO THE ELN. BOLIVAR DEPARTMENT IS AN ELN STRONGHOLD, AND THE GROUP DEMANDED THE SOUTHERN REGION BE DECLARED ITS DEMILITARIZED ZONE. THIS HIJACKING DEMONSTRATED THE ELN'S HIGHLY DEVELOPED CAPABILITY TO PLAN AND EXECUTE A COMPLEX TERRORIST ATTACK IN A HOSTILE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT. THE DAUGHTER OF THE US EMBASSY EMPLOYEE AND THE FIANCE OF THE US CITIZEN WERE RELEASED ON 18 JUNE.

(Ø) YOPAL, CASANARE DEPARTMENT: ON 13 MAY A US CITIZEN, WORKING AS A HELICOPTER MECHANIC SUB-CONTRACTOR FOR BRITISH PETROLEUM BP, WAS KIDNAPPED WHILE HAILING A CAB OUTSIDE HIS HOTEL IN THE CAPITAL OF CASANARE DEPARTMENT. THE FOLLOWING DAY A CO-WORKER, STAYING AT THE SAME HOTEL, WAS INFORMED THROUGH AN INTERMEDIARY THAT HIS COLLEAGUE HAD BEEN KIDNAPPED. THE JOSE DAVID SUAREZ FRONT WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS KIDNAPPING.

(Ø) PANCE, VALLE DEL CAUCA DEPARTMENT: ON 30 MAY, SIX US CITIZENS AND APPROXIMATELY 140 OTHER WORSHIPPERS, WERE KIDNAPPED FROM THE LA MARIA CATHOLIC CHURCH IN AN UPSCALE CALI NEIGHBORHOOD. MEMBERS OF THE ELN'S JOSE MARIA BECERRA FRONT-- DISGUISED AS GOVERNMENT SECURITY PERSONNEL--ENTERED THE CHURCH BRANDISHING ASSAULT RIFLES, AND FORCED THE WORSHIPPERS INTO TWO TRUCKS THAT WERE ESCORTED BY TWO JEEPS. EIGHTY-FOUR WOMEN AND CHILDREN, INCLUDING ONE US CITIZEN, WERE LATER RELEASED AT A REMOTE AREA. AS IN THE AVIANCA HIJACKING, ELN TERRORIST'S DEMONSTRATED EFFECTIVE USE OF DISGUISE, PREPOSITIONED TRANSPORTATION ASSETS, AND COVER FOR STATUS/COVER FOR ACTION. ON 15 JUNE AN ADDITIONAL 33 HOSTAGES, INCLUDING TWO US CITIZENS, WERE RELEASED LEAVING ONE US HOSTAGE REMAINING.

(Ø) BARRANQUILLA, ATLANTICO DEPARTMENT: ONE US CITIZEN AND A COLOMBIAN COUNCILMAN WERE AMONG NINE PEOPLE KIDNAPPED ON 6 JUNE WHILE ON A FISHING TRIP ALONG THE MAGDALENA RIVER, APPROXIMATELY 15 KILOMETERS EAST OF BARRANQUILLA. AN ESTIMATED 30 ARMED TERRORISTS, WEARING HOODS, TRAVELING IN THREE CANOES WITH OUTBOARD ENGINES,

INTERCEPTED THE FISHING BOAT AND FORCED NINE OF THE 32 PASSENGERS OFF. THE DOMINGO BARRIOS FRONT--WHICH IS EITHER A NEWLY DEVELOPED FRONT OR AN URBAN MILITIA UNDER THE KALEB GOMEZ PARDON FRONT--CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY THIS OPERATION. THE ELN HAS NOT DISCUSSED THESE NINE HOSTAGES DURING ANY OF THE RELEASE NEGOTIATIONS WITH GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES; INDICATING THE KIDNAPPING WAS FOR RANSOM ONLY.

5 (S) OUTLOOK: NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE ELN AND THE PASTRANA ADMINISTRATION ARE UNLIKELY TO SATISFY ELN DEMANDS, AND THE GROUP IS EXPECTED TO INCREASE THE LEVEL OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN RESPONSE. IF THE ELN FAILS TO WIN CONCESSIONS BY ATTACKING COLOMBIAN INTERESTS, THE POTENTIAL FOR THEM TO TARGET FOREIGNERS, INCLUDING US INTERESTS, WILL INCREASE. AN UPSURGE IN ELN TERRORISM WILL ALSO INCREASE THE THREAT TO US PERSONNEL OF INADVERTENT INVOLVEMENT IN ELN-DIRECTED VIOLENCE.

3. (U) WORLDWIDE TERRORISM NOTES

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