(b)(3): 10 USC 424, (b)(3): 50 USC 3024(i)
SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIN) (U)
DIADIN 321-2A (AS OF: 0755 EST 17 NOV 77)
VENEZUELA-CUBA: EMBASSY INCIDENT. (C/NOFOR)

1. (C/NOFOR) YOUNG CUBANS WHO DROVE INTO THE VENEZUELAN
EMBASSY COMPOUND IN HAVANA AND ACTUALLY CRASHED INTO THE EM-
BASSY BUILDING IN AN ATTEMPT TO REACH POLITICAL ASYLUM WERE
FIRED UPON BY CUBAN SECURITY GUARDS. THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT
HAS SINCE APOLOGIZED TO THE GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT PEREZ,
WHO IS IN BRAZIL ON A STATE VISIT. PRESS LEAKS, HOWEVER,
WOULD LIKELY FORCE CARACAS TO REACT PUBLICLY TO THE EMBASSY
VIOLATION.

2. (C/NOFOR) SEVEN CUBANS IN A TAXICAB REACHED THE EMBASSY
GROUNDS; SIX OF THE YOUTHS WERE SUCCESSFUL IN GAINING ADMIS-
SION TO THE MAIN BUILDING, ALTHOUGH ONE WAS WOUNDED BY GUN-
FIRE FROM ARMED CUBAN OFFICIALS STATIONED OUTSIDE THE COM-
POUND. THE SEVENTH WAS ARRESTED BEFORE HE COULD ENTER THE
EMBASSY. CUBAN GUARDS APPARENTLY ENTERED THE VENEZUELAN
GROUNDS TO FIRE AT THE CAR AND APPREHEND THE ONE ESCAPING
YOUTH. THE VENEZUELAN AMBASSADOR HAS SUBSEQUENTLY INDICATED
THAT THIS WAS THE THIRD SUCCESSFUL CUBAN DEFECTIOIN IN THE TWO
YEARS SINCE THE EMBASSY HAS BEEN REOPENED AND THAT HE EXPECTED
LITTLE DIFFICULTY IN ARRANGING A DEPARTURE FOR THE DEFECTORS
TO CARACAS.

3. [SECRET] RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS HAVE VACIL-
LATED IN THE LAST TWO YEARS AS VARIOUS ISSUES HAVE SIDETRACKED
THE PEREZ DRIVE TO REINTRODUCE HAVANA INTO THE MAINSTREAM OF
LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS. CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA AND THE
LARGELY FALSE — BUT NONETHELESS EXTENSIVE — REPORTS OF CUBAN
MILITARY ADVISERS IN NEIGHBORING GUYANA CAUSED A SLOWDOWN IN
DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY. THE LARGE EXILE COMMUNITY
IN CARACAS AND ITS IMPLICATION IN ANTI-CUBAN TERRORISM HAVE
ALSO CAUSED PROBLEMS. FINALLY, THE REMOVAL OF TWO CUBAN NA-
TIONALS FROM THE VENEZUELAN EMBASSY UNDER SUSPICIOUS CIRCUM-
STANCES — A SIMILAR INDICENT TO THIS LATEST OCCURRENCE —
PART 3
SECRET

HAD A COOLING EFFECT ON RELATIONS.

4. (S/P FORM) IF THE VENEZUELAN PRESS LEARNS OF THE INCIDENT THEY WILL LIKELY GIVE IT WIDESPREAD COVERAGE AS THEY DID THE REMOVAL OF THE CUBANS MENTIONED EARLIER. IN THAT CASE THE PEREZ GOVERNMENT, ALREADY CONSCIOUS OF ITS IMAGE IN THE LAST 12 MONTHS OF ITS ADMINISTRATION, MAY BE FORCED TO TAKE A HARD LINE IN REACTING TO THE SHOOTING INCIDENT. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES INCLUDE DELAYING CURRENT ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS OR REDUCING CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL CONTACTS. MOREOVER, THE VIOLATION COULD BE SEIZED BY THE OPPOSITION PARTY OR RIGHTIST FACTIONS TO CRITICIZE PEREZ’S FRIENDLINESS WITH HAVANA AND THE LARGE CUBAN REPRESENTATION IN CARACAS.

(b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)(6)

(b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)