

CASTRO VISIT TO THE US, PERHAPS TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR
ANOTHER CASTRO VISIT — THIS TIME TO ADDRESS THE UN GENERAL
ASSEMBLY. THIS TRIP COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT ANY PRO-

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i),(b) (3):10 USC 424

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PA GE	3	SECRET

GRESS IN US -CUBAN TALKS. CASTRO CAN CLAIM HE IS ONE OF THE MAIN SPOKESMEN FOR THE NONALI GNED MOVEMENT, A POSITION HE NEEDS TO REINFORCE BEFORE HAVANA HOSTS THE NONALI GNED SUMMIT IN SUMMER 1979.

4. (SYNOFORM.) CU BA REMAINS CAUTIOUS IN MOVING TOWARD FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH WASHINGTON. IT WANTS TO CHOOSE THE RATE OF PROGRESS AND TO BE TREATED AS AN EQUAL IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. WHILE WILLING TO TALK ABOUT SOME ISSUES LATER, HAVANA REPORTEDLY REMAINS FIRM IN ITS DETERMINATION NOT TO NEGOTIATE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUES SUCH AS CUBA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH MOSCOW AND ITS "DUTY" TO SUPPORT REVOLUTIONARY REGIMES AROUND THE WORLD WITH TROOPS. CUBAN LEADERS LIKELY SEE THEIR NATION AS THE ONE WITH THE MOST TO GAIN IN THE REESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONS, AND THEY WANT TO ENSURE THAT THE FINAL A GREEMENT BENEFITS CUBA ECONOMICALLY AS WELL AS POLITICALLY.

	(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(6)
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