SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIN) (U)
DEADIN 316-3A (AS OF: 1115 EST 14 NOV 77)
SOMALIA: SOVIETS AND CUBANS EXPELLED. (U)

1. SOMALIA HAS CANCELLED THE 1974 FRIENDSHIP TREATY WITH
   THE USSR AND ORDERED ALL SOVIET MILITARY AND CIVILIAN TECHNICIANS
   TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY WITHIN SEVEN DAYS. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS,
   HOWEVER, HAVE NOT BEEN BROKEN ALTHOUGH THEIR RESPECTIVE EMBASSIES
   ARE REPORTEDLY TO BE REDUCED IN SIZE. SOMALIA DID SEVER DIPLOMATIC
   RELATIONS WITH CUBA AND ORDERED THE EXPULSION OF CUBAN PERSONNEL
   WITHIN 48 HOURS. THIS DRAMATIC MOVE BY SOMALI PRESIDENT SIAD
   BARRE IS THE RESULT OF CUBAN AND SOVIET SUPPORT FOR ETHIOPIA,
   ESPECIALLY SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN THE TWO
   COUNTRIES IN JULY. THE EXPULSION OF THE APPROXIMATELY 250 CUBANS
   WILL HAVE LITTLE EFFECT ON MOGADISCU AND IS A DEVELOPMENT THAT
HAS BEEN EXPECTED INRECENT MONTHS. HOWEVER, IF STRICTLY ENFORCED,
THE EXPULSION OF THE APPROXIMATELY 2,500 SOVIE T MILITARY AND
CIVILIAN ADVISORS COULD RESULT IN PROBLEMS FOR THE SIAD BARRE
GOVERNMENT. SIAD HAD DECIDED AGAINST SUCH A MOVE IN THE PAST
BECAUSE HE FEARED A SOVIET-GENERATED COUP ATTEMPT, BELIEVED A
SOVIET EXPULSION WOULD RESULT IN INCREASED SOVIET SUPPORT TO
ETHIOPIA AND HAS FAILED TO FIND AN ALTERNATE ARMS SUPPLIER.

2. SOVIET CIVILIAN ADVISORS PERMEATE EVERY LAYER OF
THE SOMALI GOVERNMENTAL BUREAUCRACY AND SECURITY SERVICE. THE
LOSS OF SOVIET EXPERTISE IN THESE AREAS COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT
GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS. HOWEVER, IT IS POSSIBLE THE VOID COULD
BE FILLED BY PERSONNEL FROM THE VARIOUS ARAB GOVERNMENTS THAT
HAVE SUPPORTED SOMALIA IN THE PAST.

3. WHILE SOME SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORS HAVE PROBABLY
PERFORMED LIMITED FUNCTIONS SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES
WITH ETHIOPIA, MOST WERE REPORTEDLY DENIED ACCESS TO MILITARY
INSTALLATIONS AND SENSITIVE AREAS. THE ABILITY OF THE SOMALI
MILITARY TO CONDUCT THE ETHIOPIAN WAR FOR OVER FOUR MONTHS
WITHOUT SOVIET ADVISORY SUPPORT MAY HAVE LED SIAD TO BELIEVE
IT WAS NO LONGER NEEDED. OTHER FACTORS MAY HAVE BEEN THE
SOVIET REFUSAL TO REPLACE EQUIPMENT LOSSES; SIAD'S FEELING THAT HE IS FIRMLY IN CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY; A PERCEIVED NECESSITY FOR A DRAMATIC MOVE TO GARNER WESTERN ARMS SUPPORT; SIAD'S PERCEPTION THAT THE SOVIETS NEEDED HIM MORE THAN HE NEEDED THEM; OR HIS PERCEPTION THAT THE SHOCK EFFECT ON MOSCOW OF THE MOVE MIGHT CAUSE THE SOVIETS TO REEVALUATE THEIR POLICY IN THE HORN.

4. **As for the Soviet Union, loss of access to Somali air and naval facilities will cause problems. It will be difficult for Moscow to duplicate these facilities elsewhere. The most likely alternative for the Soviets would be Ethiopia, with its ports of Assab and Massawa. However, this option is affected by the general Ethiopian distrust of Soviet intentions, the major development required of Ethiopian ports and their lack of developed airfields, the fact that both ports are located in Eritrea Province, and the fact that the location of other Ethiopian airfields would reduce the operating ranges of the IL-38/MAY.**

5. **At present, therefore, it appears the Soviet attempt to maintain influence in both countries has failed. President**
SIAD HAS DONE WHAT THEY GAMbled HE WOULD NOT DO, AND IT REMAINS
TO BE SEEN WHAT MOVES WILL NOW BE FORTHCOMING FROM SOMALIA AND
THE SOVIET UNION IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
PREPARED BY: