(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i) Hoy 14 5 28 PH '77 FECERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION R 142158Z NOV 77 ZEX FM DIA WASHINGTON DOZ (b)(3):10 USC 424 TO DIA **5T** NOV 21 1977 54NOV291977 109-12-210 Document not recorded dated 11/14/77 SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIN) (U)
DFADIN 318-3A (AS OF: 1115 EST 14 NOV 77)
SOMALIA: SOVIETS AND CUEANS EXPELLED. (U)

1. TS SOMALIA HAS CANCELLED THE 1974 FRIENDSHIP TREATY WITH
THE USSR AND ORDERED ALL SOVIET MILITARY AND CIVILIAN TECHNICIANS
TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY WITHIN SEVEN DAYS. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS,
HOWEVER, HAVE NOT BEEN BROKEN ALTHOUGH THEIR RESPECTIVE EMBASSIES
ARE REPORTEDLY TO BE REDUCED IN SIZE. SOMALIA DID SEVER DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS WITH CUEA AND ORDERED THE EXPULSION OF CUBAN PERSONNEL
WITHIN 48 HOURS. THIS DRAMATIC MOVE BY SOMALI PRESIDENT SIAD
BARRE IS THE RESULT OF CUBAN AND SOVIET SUPPORT FOR ETHIOPIA,
ESPECIALLY SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN THE TWO
COUNTRIES IN JULY. THE EXPULSION OF THE APPROXIMATELY 250 CUBANS
WILL HAVE LITTLE EFFECT ON MOGADISCIO AND IS A DEVELOPMENT THAT

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SECRET

THE EXPULSION OF THE APPROXIMATELY 2,532 SOVIET MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ADVISORS COULD RESULT IN PROPLEMS FOR THE SIAD BARRE GOVERNMENT. SIAD HAD DECIDED A CAINST SUCH A MOVE IN THE PAST BECAUSE HE FEARED A SOVIET-CENERATED COUP ATTEMPT, BELIEVED A SOVIET EXPULSION WOULD RESULT IN INCREASED SOVIET SUPPORT TO ETHIOPIA AND HAS FAILED TO FIND AN ALTERNATE ARMS SUPPLIER.

2 SOVIET CIVILIAN ADVISORS PERMEATE EVERY LAYER OF THE SOMALI GOVERNMENTAL BUREAUCRACY AND SECURITY SERVICE. THE LOSS OF SOVIET EXPERTISE IN THESE AREAS COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS. HOWEVER, IT IS POSSIBLE THE VOID COULD SE FILLED BY PERSONNEL FROM THE VARIOUS ARAB GOVERNMENTS THAT HAVE SUPPORTED SOMALIA IN THE PAST.

PERFORMED LIMITED FUNCTIONS SINCE THE OUTEREAK OF HOSTILITIES WITH ETHIOPIA, MOST WERE REPORTEDLY DENIED ACCESS TO MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AND SENSITIVE AREAS. THE ABILITY OF THE SOMALI MILITARY TO CONDUCT THE ETHIOPIAN WAR FOR OVER FOUR MONTHS WITHOUT SOVIET ADVISORY SUPPORT MAY HAVE LED STAD TO BELIEVE IT WAS NO LONGER NIEDED. OTHER FACTORS MAY HAVE SEEN THE

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SOVIET REFUSAL TO REPLACE EQUIPMENT LOSSES; SIAD'S FEELING THAT HE IS FIRMLY IN CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY; A PERCEIVED NECESSITY FOR A DRAMATIC MOVE TO GARNER WESTERN ARMS SUPPORT; SIAD'S PERCEPTION THAT THE SOVIETS NEEDED HIM MORE THAN HE NEEDED THEM; OR HIS PERCEPTION THAT THE SHOCK EFFECT ON MOSCOW OF THE MOVE MIGHT CAUSE THE SOVIETS TO REEVALUATE THEIR POLICY IN THE HORN.

AS FOR THE SOVIET UNION, LOSS OF ACCESS TO SOMALI AIR AND NAVAL FACILITIES WILL CAUSE PROBLEMS. IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR MCSC OW TO DUPLICATE THESE FACILITIES ELSEWHERE. THE MOST LIKELY ALTERNATIVE FOR THE SCVIETS WOULD BE ETHIOPIA, WITH ITS PORTS OF ASSAE AND MASSAWA. HOWEVER, THIS OPTION IS AFFECTED BY THE GENERAL ETHIOPIAN DISTRUST OF SOVIET INTENTIONS, THE MAJOR DEVELOPMENT REQUIRED OF ETHIOPIAN PORTS AND THEIR LACK OF DEVELOPED AIRFIELDS, THE FACT THAT BOTH PORTS ARE LOCATED IN ERITREA PROVINCE, AND THE FACT THAT THE LOCATION OF OTHER ETHIOPIAN AIRFIELDS WOULD REDUCE THE OPERATING RANGES OF THE IL-35/MAY.

5. (5) AT PRESENT, THEREFORE, IT APPEARS THE SOVIET ATTEMPT TO MAINTAIN INFLUENCE IN BOTH COUNTRIES HAS FAILED. PRESIDENT

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SIAD HAS DONE WHAT THEY GAM BLED HE WOULD NOT DO, AND IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHAT MOVES WILL NOW BE FORTHCOMING FROM SOMALIA AND THE SOVIET UNION IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

PREPARED BY: (b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(6)

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