

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC  
3024(i)

18 1976  
LETTYPE

POLITICAL MATTERS

~~SECRET~~ + Cu KA

P 132318Z MAY 76 ZEX

FM DIA WASH DC

TO RUECDIB/DIA (b)(3):10 USC 424

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ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 12/10/84 BY PAK 60290 BCE/KAL/LW  
#392226

BT

~~SECRET NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/NOINTEL~~ 8061

FROM (b)(3):10 USC 424

109-12-210 -

SUBJ : DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIN) (U)

NOT RECORDED  
25 MAY 20 1976

DIADIN 134-1A (AS OF: 1630 EDT 13 MAY 76)

PERU: CUBAN PRESENCE (U)

PS file 109-12-210 -

1. ~~(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/NOINTEL)~~ DESPITE FEARS AMONG

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

THAT THE NUMBER OF CUBANS IN COUNTRY HAS INCREASED

SUBSTANTIALLY, THE COUNTRY'S NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

SERVICE (SIN) UNOFFICIALLY ESTIMATES THAT THERE ARE

504 JUN 18 1976  
CUBAN MILITARY ADVISERS AND THAT 200 CUBAN CIVILIANS

Original Filed to 109-12-210-1917

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~~SECRET~~

LEFT PERU FOLLOWING A MODERATE SPEECH GIVEN BY PRESIDENT MORALES BERMUDEZ, LEAVING SOME 300 TO 500 IN COUNTRY. SIN HAS BEEN ORDERED TO KEEP A CLOSER WATCH ON HAVANA'S PRESENCE, BUT IT SEEMS UNABLE TO IDENTIFY THE EXACT


(b)(1),1.4 (c)

2. ~~(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACI/WNINTEL)~~ CONCERN ABOUT THE ALLEGED INFLUX OF CUBANS MAY BE PART (85 PERCENT, 9) OF A CENTER-RIGHT CAMPAIGN TO MOVE THE MORALES BERMUDEZ REGIME TOWARD MODERATION WHILE BLUNTING INROADS MADE BY COMMUNISTS AND LEFTISTS OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

CUBANS IN PERU, HOPING TO SPARK A GOVERNMENT CRACKDOWN ON ALL POTENTIAL SUBVERSIVES. THIS WOULD COINCIDE WITH THE PREVALENT FEELING AMONG SOME MILITARY LEADERS THAT THE CUBAN VICTORY IN ANGOLA HAS CONSEQUENCES FOR ADVERTURISM IN THIS HEMISPHERE.

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~~SECRET~~

3. ~~(S/NOPORN/WOCONTRACT/WINTEL)~~ FOR SEVERAL REASONS, HAVANA HAS LITTLE CAUSE TO INCREASE ITS CONTINGENT IN PERU AT THIS TIME. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES HAVE COOLED SOMEWHAT, AND HAVANA DOES NOT WISH TO SEE THEM RUPTURED BY CLANDESTINE ARRIVALS OF CUBANS. HAVANA'S LONG-TERM GOALS VIS-A-VIS LIMA MAY INCLUDE TRYING TO INSTALL A LEFTIST REGIME IN PERU, BUT FOR NOW CASTRO WILL MOVE CAREFULLY SINCE HE IS AWARE THAT THE US IS WATCHING HIS ACTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA. MOREOVER, HAVANA APPARENTLY DOES NOT WANT TO BE INVOLVED (80 PERCENT, B) IN THE DORMANT DISPUTE BETWEEN PERU AND CHILE, EVEN THOUGH SOME CHILEAN OFFICERS FEAR THIS OCCURRENCE. CUBAN PRESENCE IN PERU IS EXPECTED TO REMAIN STABLE (85 PERCENT, B), REFLECTING HAVANA'S DESIRE TO KEEP ITS MAJOR, ALTHOUGH SOMETIMES INDEPENDENT, ALLY ON THE SOUTH AMERICAN CONTINENT.


(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(6)



~~CXGD 5-1 AND 2 DECLASSIFY UPON NOTIFICATION OF~~

~~ORIGINATOR~~

BT



(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)