

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

FEB 08 1977
TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep. AD Adm.	_____
Dep. AD Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	
Adm. Serv.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Fin. & Pers.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Intell.	<i>Thompson</i>
Legal Coun.	_____
Plan. & Insp.	_____
Rec. Mgt.	_____
S. & T. Serv.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

R 032233Z FEB 77 ZEX

FM DIA WASH DC

TO RUCRD IB/DIA

(b)(3):10 USC 424

POLITICAL MATTERS - Cuba

109-12-210

b7c

109-12-225

BT

~~SECRET / NOFORN / UNCLASSIFIED~~ 2601

FROM (b)(3):10 USC 424
~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED~~
DATE 11/10/05 BY 60329 AM BCS/TCG/ECH

SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIN) (U)

DIA DIN 34-4A (AS OF: 1140 EST 3 FEB 77)

CUBA-PER U: CUBAN AMBASSADOR MAY BE REPLACED. (S/NOFORN)

(b)(3):10 USC 424

09-12-210-7177

(b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(1), 1.4 (d)

FEB 8 1977

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PAGE 2




~~SECRET~~


THAT THE MAJORITY OF CUBAN PERSONNEL WILL BE ROTATED BACK TO HAVANA.

2. ~~(S//NOFORN//NOCONTRACT//NOINTEL)~~ CUBAN PRESIDENT CASTRO IS APPARENTLY UPSET THAT HIS AMBASSADOR CANNOT PROVIDE

(b)(1),1.4 (d)

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PAGE 3

~~SECRET~~

4. ~~(S//NOFORN//NOCONTRACT//NOINTEL)~~ THE LIKELIHOOD THAT HAVANA WILL MAKE AN ENTIRE SWITCH IN PERSONNEL IN PERU IS HARD TO GAUGE. IN RECENT MONTHS, REPORTS OF CLOSURES OF SCHOOLS ATTENDED EXCLUSIVELY BY CHILDREN OF CUBAN DIPLOMATS AND ADVISORY PERSONNEL HAVE SURFACED, AS WELL AS CLANDESTINE REPORTS THAT THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HAVANA AND LIMA WAS DETERIORATING.

5. ~~(S//NOFORN//NOCONTRACT//NOINTEL)~~ FURTHER, CUBA HAS APPARENTLY NOT BEEN CONSULTED ABOUT THE MOST RECENT SOVIET/PERUVIAN ARMS DEALS, INCLUDING THE SU-22 TRANSACTION. CONCURRENTLY, CUBA MAY FEEL THAT THE SOVIETS ARE MAKING BETTER EQUIPMENT OFFERS TO LIMA THAN TO HAVANA. FOR THE MOST PART, SOVIET DELIVERIES TO CUBA HAVE ONLY GRADUALLY IMPROVED THE CAPABILITIES OF THE ARMED FORCES. NONETHELESS, PERU PRESENTS ONE OF THE MOST FAVORABLE BASES OF OPERATIONS FOR CUBAN INTELLIGENCE AND DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS ON THE SOUTH AMERICAN CONTINENT. UNFORESEEN DIFFICULTIES MIGHT LEAD TO THE SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS, BUT CUBA WILL ATTEMPT TO MAKE

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i),(b)(3):10 USC
424

PAGE 4

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ITS REPRESENTATIVES ACCEPTABLE TO THE MORALES BERMUDEZ
GOVERNMENT, EVEN IF THIS REQUIRES A CHANGEOVER OF KE
PERSONNEL IN LIMA.

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(6)

~~(X)GDS 2 DECLASSIFY UPON NOTIFICATION BY THE ORIGINAL~~

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