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REFLECT	HAVANA 'S	CONTINUING	PERCEPTIO N	THAT	THE	US IS	DESIROUS
TO END T	HE BREAK	IN RELATIO	NS WITH THE	CASTRO	GO1	VER NM	ENT.

- 2. (S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) CUBAN LEADERS ARE REPORTEDLY CLAIMING
 THAT THE FORTHCOMING NEGOTIATIONS ON CUBAN FISHING RIGHTS WITHIN
 US TERRITORIAL WATERS ARE MERELY TECHNICAL AND SHOULD NOT BE
 CONSTRUED AS BEING A CHANNEL FOR FURTHER TALKS ON COMMON ISSUES.
- 3. (S/NOFORN/WNINIEL) PERHAPS THE MOST GRAPHIC SIGNAL IN THE EYES OF THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT WOULD BE A PARTIAL LISTING OF THE TRADE EMBARGO, ESPECIALLY IN THE AREA OF FOODSTUFFS AND MEDICINES. TRADITIONALLY, HAVANA HAS PLACED THE TERMINATION OF THAT EMBARGO AT THE HEAD OF THEIR OWN LIST OF DEMANDS TO BE MET BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS COULD START.
- 4. CEANGLOW WINTER) CUBAN PERCEPTIONS OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS, SHOULD IT BEGIN, REFLECT AWARENESS THAT THE PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WILL NOT DISAPPEAR IN SHORT ORDER. RATHER, HAVANA BELIEVES THAT THE RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE US WILL BE A LONG, DRAWN-OUT PROCESS. STILL, CUBA PROBABLY UNDERSTANDS

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i),(b)(3):10 USC 424

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THAT THE PROCESS IS OF BENEFIT TO THE COUNTRY, SEEING ITS COM-MENCEMENT AS "PRIMA FACIE" EVIDENCE THAT THE US RECOGNIZES THE LEGITIMACY OF THE SOCIALIST-STYLE GOVERNMENT IN POWER.

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(6)		

(XCDS -2 DECLASSIFY UPON NOTIFICATION BY THE ORIGINATOR)

BT

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)