




DEFENSE
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Intelligence Appraisal
Poland:
Martial Law (U)

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
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Intelligence Appraisal

POLAND
MARTIAL LAW(U)


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POLAND: MARTIAL LAW (U)Summary

(C) The recent resignation of Communist party First Secretary Stanislaw Kania and the appointment of his replacement, Prime Minister Wojciek Jaruzelski, indicate the party has taken a tougher stance toward Solidarity. Until recently, Jaruzelski's views were considered similar to those of the moderate Kania, but now his position appears to have been modified. Jaruzelski's new appointment at such a critical time in the Polish crisis places him in a very difficult situation and could mean that his position is tenuous, barring a successful tougher stance by the regime. Furthermore, the way has been cleared for Warsaw to declare a state of emergency or to impose martial law. Although factors indicate that full martial law may not be enforced immediately, events suggest that martial law may be imposed in Poland this winter.

Discussion

(C) Two major events have taken place in Poland recently: The Polish 4th Central Committee Plenum met, and talks resumed between the government and Solidarity.

(C) Opening the 4th Plenum, First Secretary Kania again criticized extremist elements in Solidarity and called for a purge of the party's ranks. He said it was not possible "to be at the same time a member of our party and one which is its enemy." His statement was directed at the 1 million party members who are also Solidarity members. Following Kania's opening remarks, a series of speeches were given by hard-liners accusing party leaders of being weak. These speeches may have resulted in a 1-day suspension of the session to allow discussion of motions to authorize the declaration of a state of emergency.

(C) On 18 October, Kania announced that he was resigning as First Secretary. Although he has long fought against using martial law to solve Poland's problems, he probably realized on the 17th or early 18th that he had lost the battle over how to resolve the crisis. His approach apparently was too moderate for this plenum.

Regime Tightens Control

(C) During August and September, the regime began to use tougher tactics in an attempt to tighten control throughout the country. In addition to political attacks on Solidarity, the following steps were taken:

- Military personnel were used to augment police forces;
- Commercial shops selling at black market prices were closed;
- Security patrols were increased; and

-- Bogdan Lis, a Polish Communist party member and elected representative of Solidarity's National Coordination Committee, was purged from the party.

(C) These steps, and the extension of military service by 2 months, probably were undesirable to Kania; however, the prospect of martial law apparently was unacceptable to him in principle. The martial law factor, and pressure from Central Committee hard-liners, resulted in his resignation.

(C) Prime Minister Jaruzelski was then elected First Secretary by the Central Committee. Jaruzelski had been a proponent of political dialogue with Solidarity; but because of his moderate stance, he fell from grace with some factions of the military. However, recent reports have noted a shift in Jaruzelski's view. His tougher stance may have been influenced by the following:

- Increased Soviet political and economic pressure;
- Results of the Solidarity Congress (specifically, a call for an independent judiciary, free elections, and a reduction in defense spending);
- Recent wildcat strikes after the conclusion of the Solidarity Congress;
- Threatened regional strikes;
- Nationalistic desire to save Poland from Soviet intervention; and
- Polish military hierarchy pressure to adopt a firmer approach in dealing with Solidarity.

Pressure from Moscow

(C) Jaruzelski's stiffened posture toward Solidarity undoubtedly has also been influenced by Moscow's pressure. The recent strong Soviet press releases, official visits, and threat of a cut-off of economic aid, which was publicly addressed by Politburo member Stefan Olszowski during Soviet Deputy Premier Nikolay Baybakov's visit in September, must all weigh heavily on his decisionmaking. Brezhnev hailed Jaruzelski as a "prominent party and state leader" who can rally the party "in the interest of defending the Socialist gains of the Polish working class ... against encroachments by counterrevolution (and overcome) the political and economic crisis of the country." A Czechoslovak press release probably more accurately reflected the view of the USSR and other East European countries by calling for Jaruzelski to turn words into deeds.


(U) Jaruzelski now holds all the formal instruments of state power. According to Polish law, the Prime Minister also serves as Chairman of the National Defense Committee, and the Minister of Defense serves as Deputy Chairman. Thus, party First Secretary Jaruzelski also serves as Prime Minister and Chairman of the National Defense Committee.




(U) During a period of martial law, Jaruzelski, as Chairman of the National Defense Committee, would control the military, police, and security forces. In addition, he could subordinate military units to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, thereby giving the regular armed forces an internal security role. According to the Polish constitution, the Council of State -- which carries on government functions while the Sejm (Parliament) is not in session -- may proclaim martial law "in parts of or in the entire territory." In such cases, areas of government administration, the national economy, and individual segments or organizational units that perform particularly important tasks can all be militarized. Theoretically, martial law could be enforced in a particular town or factory. Recent events indicate this may be the course favored by Jaruzelski.

Jaruzelski's Options

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(TS)  Although the Prime Minister seems willing to take a tougher stance toward Solidarity, the number of votes in favor of accepting Kania's resignation (54 percent) indicates that the party is still split and even Jaruzelski's position is tenuous. Several party members reportedly have turned in their party cards as a result of pressure by union activists. The cosmetic purging of party members and resignations will not unify the party, whose ranks comprised nearly 1 million Solidarity members out of a total membership of about 3 million. Therefore, Jaruzelski is faced with the difficult task of unifying the party. To accomplish this, he may call for party cards (purge the party). He has already hinted at personnel changes in the Politburo and government; therefore, additional military personnel are expected to be appointed to state and party positions.

(S) The Sejm's appeal to Polish workers to end strike activity was reinforced with a threat by Jaruzelski to enact extraordinary measures if the appeal were ignored. If martial law is approved at a later date, the Prime Minister might not press for nationwide implementation, but rather invoke such measures on a selective basis if necessary.




(b)(1),Sec. 1.4
(c),Sec. 1.4(d)





(b)(1), Sec. 1.4
(c), Sec. 1.4(d)



(c) The regime's approval of a martial law plan could give Jaruzelski bargaining strength in any future negotiations with Solidarity. However, the union has said it will not let the government renege on the Gdansk August 1980 Jastrzebie and Szczecin agreements, nor will it refrain from acts permitted under these pacts. Though Walesa reportedly has accepted the need to renegotiate parts of the August 1980 agreements, Solidarity's lack of unity would make it difficult for the union leader to speak authoritatively on this issue. Furthermore, Walesa's bargaining power appears to have been weakened from the election results of the second session of the Solidarity Congress -- and he may not be able to moderate a stance taken by the union at any meeting with the government.

(c) Solidarity and the regime, however, have reached some agreement on economic matters. The union has agreed to stop blockading certain food exports. In return, the regime will give Solidarity information on food exports and imports. In addition, the two sides had agreed earlier to a temporary price freeze on essential goods until terms could be reached on price reforms and worker compensation.


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(c) [redacted] The scarcity of food and its poor distribution have become major issues in Poland and the cause of strike threats and strikes. There has been speculation that the government is hoarding food. Recently, Solidarity allegedly stopped a train shipment to the USSR and found ham in cans supposed to contain paint. Such reports and rumors can only exacerbate the situation in Poland.

Outlook

(c) Some dialogue continues between Solidarity and the regime because the latter has taken steps to improve the availability of food in local stores. Although neither union-regime dialogue nor government efforts may produce satisfactory results for either party, such actions could delay a massive confrontation that could lead to a declaration of martial law.

(c) If Solidarity's National Coordination Committee fails to control regional members -- some of whom are striking for various reasons -- and food and fuel shortages continue, Poland will witness increased civil unrest this winter, probably resulting in the imposition of some form of martial law. Likewise, a potentially radical response by Solidarity to the government's attempt to revise the August 1980 agreements could also result in increased instability. [redacted]



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Page 8 of 8

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