4 DECEMBER 1970
DIAIS 283-70

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~No Foreign Dissem~~

MASTER LIBRARY COPY
DS-4A1 PENTAGON

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Pages 4, 5, 9 and 13, as well as 5 charts without page numbers, are denied in full and are not included. 9 pages in total.

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

724189
COPY 351

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Defense Intelligence Summary is produced by the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency to serve the needs of the Department of Defense for appropriate current intelligence. It is furnished to non-Defense Department agencies for information only. Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete analysis.

Certain items may be designated specifically for limited distribution. Other items not bearing release restrictive markings may be provided to eligible recipients by authorized DOD releasing agencies and intelligence components of the USIB. The releasing authority is responsible that items so provided conform to a specific need-to-know of the recipient and are in accordance with security and disclosure regulations. DIA Instruction No. 50-4 is applicable concerning release to contractors of any item in this publication. (The titles of individual articles contained herein have the same classification as the article.

WARNING

This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States.

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) [redacted]

It is to be seen only by United States personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) [redacted] information; its security must be maintained in accordance with (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) [redacted]

DIA INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

CAMBODIA	Recent enemy moves increase the threat in the Kompong Cham area.	1
NORTH VIETNAM	South-bound infiltrators totaled over 17,000 last month.	2
CAMBODIA	The main obstacle to reopening Route 4, closed since 21 November, is the enemy's hold on Pich Nil Pass.	3

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 USC 798,(b)(3):50 USC 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

4

5

CAMBODIA	An estimated 300 Khmer Communists rallied to the government last month.	6

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 USC 798,(b)(3):50 USC 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

7

CHILE	Recognition of Communist China could come within a month or two.	7
INDIA	France is reportedly asked for assistance in conducting an underground nuclear explosion.	8

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 USC 798,(b)(3):50 USC 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

9

NORTH VIETNAM	Hanoi is pushing its anticorruption campaign.	10
BOLIVIA	Rumors of another military coup attempt are prevalent, but a successful move now is doubtful.	11
EL SALVADOR	Ambitious and powerful National Guard Commander is suddenly dismissed.	12

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

12

CAMBODIA



Recent enemy moves increase the threat to government forces in the Kompong Cham area.

The 272d VC Regiment is now on the west bank of the Mekong, 10 miles southwest of Kompong Cham. Its relocation increases to three the number of regiments in position to resist strongly the Cambodian Army's road-clearing efforts in this area. The move also increases the threat to any riverine resupply of Kompong Cham. Should the Communists force a showdown in the Prey Totung region, the army might have to withdraw from the Tang Kauk area, thus canceling the ambitious three-month-old clearing operation along Route 6.

East of Kompong Cham, ARVN elements have pushed farther into Cambodia and are now conducting operations on the eastern edge of the Chup Rubber Plantation. An ARVN position near there was probed on 30 November, and 11 of the defenders were killed and 29 wounded. Enemy losses were 64 killed. On 2 December, 50 rounds of mortar fire hit another ARVN position. These attacks, probably by elements of the 9th VC Division, indicate that the enemy intends to resist encroachment on his bases near the plantation.

The third Cambodian naval convoy to Kompong Thom, scheduled to leave Phnom Penh yesterday afternoon, consists of 14 naval vessels and six civilian ferries. The group was to arrive at Kompong Chhnang early today and proceed on order to Kompong Thom. Other naval resupply operations to Kompong Thom have been successful, encountering light enemy harassment. Because of the dry season and the receding waters of the Stung Sen River, this is probably the last convoy that can be dispatched until late June or early July. Kompong Thom will then be isolated unless Route 6 can be reopened. (~~SECRET~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) ~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~)

CAMBODIAN SITUATION



NORTH VIETNAMESE INFILTRATION ACTIVITY



NORTH VIETNAM



Hanoi increased the southward movement of personnel through the infiltration corridor in November.

Last month, 17,300 personnel were detected moving south. Of these, some 1,100 were heading for Military Region (MR) Tri-Thien-Hue in South Vietnam and are expected to arrive there in December or January. About 1,900 should reach their destination, VC MR 5, in January. Another 1,400 troops were moving to the B-3 Front and will probably arrive in January also. Some 10,300 personnel are en route to the COSVN area and should be there by March. The other 2,600 troops are destined for duty in southern Laos and will arrive late this month or in January.

The number of infiltrators in November was the highest for any month this year and more than double the 7,800 identified moving through the system in November 1969. If past patterns hold, manpower input into the pipeline will increase until a peak is reached in the December-February period. (~~SECRET~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

PICH NIL PASS



SECRET
4 DEC 70

CAMBODIA



Route 4, which links Phnom Penh and the deep-water port of Kompong Som, has been closed since 21 November.

Cambodian forces have been unsuccessful in their efforts to reopen the road. The principal obstacle is the enemy's control of the Pich Nil Pass, halfway between the capital and Kompong Som. The size of the enemy force there is not known but could total 2,000. Elements of the 1st NVA Division and Khmer Communist units are known to have operated intermittently in the area since last spring.

Cambodian Army troops committed to clearing the pass number about 3,000, but the terrain gives the enemy a marked advantage. The ground rises nearly 2,500 feet in the vicinity of the road, and the vegetation provides ideal concealment for harassment and interdiction. To take such ground from a determined defender would require a large number of aggressive troops.

The Cambodians will have to augment their force in the area to dislodge the enemy, if he is determined to retain control of the pass. Meanwhile, the movement of vital goods out of Kompong Som -- petroleum, foodstuffs, and medical supplies -- is being impeded. Once enough pressure is applied, however, enemy activity should be reduced to harassment. ~~(SECRET~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 USC 798,(b)(3):50 USC 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 USC 798,(b)(3):50 USC 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 USC 798,(b)(3):50 USC 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 USC 798,(b)(3):50 USC 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

CAMBODIA



An estimated 300 armed Khmer Communists rallied to the Cambodian Government last month.

An official government source states that the majority came from Svay Rieng and Kandal Provinces and have already been organized into guerrilla units and re-deployed on harassment missions to their home areas. According to a high-ranking army officer, this procedure has been employed for some time and is "working very well." He said the guerrillas were "working with the Communists in order to destroy them."

Increased defections are anticipated as the Communists are evidently having command-and-control difficulties in their sphere of influence. A lack of common doctrine and differing goals have strained relations between the indigenous and Vietnamese Communists. ~~(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)~~

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 USC 798,(b)(3):50 USC 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 USC 798,(b)(3):50 USC 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

CHILE

Santiago may recognize Peking within a month or two. President Allende made a campaign pledge to establish diplomatic relations with Communist China, and negotiations are under way between the two countries' embassies in Paris. A commercial mission from Peking arrived in Santiago this week and is said to be especially interested in acquiring copper. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)~~

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 USC 798,(b)(3):50 USC 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

INDIA



Prime Minister Indira Gandhi has reportedly asked France for assistance in conducting an underground nuclear explosion.

In spite of repeated public denials, New Delhi is apparently seriously considering development of a nuclear explosive device. Mrs Gandhi is reliably reported to have raised the subject with President Pompidou while in Paris attending services for Gen de Gaulle. The source would not say what type of aid was requested or what the French reaction was. He remarked, however, that "as in all deals with the French," it depended on the ability to pay.

India has a well-developed nuclear research and power program and could, if it so decided, produce an explosive device in about a year. The test would be experimental, and New Delhi would no doubt insist that it was exclusively for peaceful purposes. Knowledge gained, however, would be equally applicable to the development of nuclear weapons. India has not embarked on a nuclear weapons program, but it evidently desires to upgrade its technology by conducting an underground test, thereby keeping its options open for military application in the 1980s. ~~(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/ NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM)~~

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 USC 798,(b)(3):50 USC 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

NORTH VIETNAM



The anticorruption campaign Hanoi launched last fall evidently represents a serious effort to control a festering problem.

Radio Hanoi said recently that three high-level officials of the Ministry of Internal Trade had received stiff prison sentences for mismanagement. They were tried in public, no doubt to illustrate the government's new tough-minded approach to dealing with the situation.

Corruption, mismanagement, and general inefficiency have been long-standing irritants to the regime, but within tolerable limits. Over the years, much has been said but little done about such practices. The leaders were probably reluctant to crack down on a population hard pressed by the rigors of supporting the war and enduring US bombings.

After the end of the bombing in November 1968, incidents of malfeasance and inefficiency apparently increased gradually to a point where the proper level of population control and support for the war was being endangered. Stiff, preventive action was taken in October, when sweeping measures "to protect private and socialist property" were announced.

A public trial suggests that Hanoi views the situation with more gravity than previously indicated. Serious problems have reportedly arisen in an area essential to the war effort -- the allocation and use of materials supporting the war and the economy. Acts of corruption, thievery, and waste are described as being "all too common among both the civilian and military sectors.

Neither Hanoi's control over internal affairs nor the continued support of the war is in any serious danger, but the Communists are clearly worried lest the system's efficiency as well as public morale be jeopardized. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

BOLIVIA

Rumors that military officers are planning to oust President Torres continue to circulate in La Paz. Director of the Military Academy Col Hugo Banzer may move against the government before 9 December, the date for an expected armed forces general order dismissing him and others involved in the late October anti-Ovando revolt. It is doubtful, however, that successful action can be taken against Torres at this time because of military disunity and lack of organization. ~~(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)~~

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 USC 798,(b)(3):50 USC 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

(b)(2)