
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13 JANUAR / 1966 DIA INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY 10-66

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13 January 1966

#### DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

#### Intelligence Summary 10-66

#### INDEX AND PRECIS

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC:	p.	1
IRAN/IRAQ:	p.	2
CYPRUS:	p.	3
TURKEY:	p.	4
PERU:	p.	5
FRANCE:	p.	5
CONGO (B):	p.	6
TURKEY:	p.	7
	p.	8
ITALY:		
FRANCE:		
USSR:		
NIGERIA:		

TOP SECRET

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#### Far East/Asia Section

LAOS:  NORTH VIETNAM:  COMMUNIST CHINA:  NORTH VIETNAM:  COMMUNIST CHINA/NORTH VIETNAM:  INDIA/ PAKISTAN:  INDONESIA:  Army-encouraged activities are hitting closer to President Sukarno.  JAPAN:  Supplement  p. F-9  Supplement  p. (1)	REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM:		р.	F-1
VIETNAM:  COMMUNIST CHINA:  NORTH VIETNAM:  COMMUNIST CHINA/NORTH VIETNAM:  INDIA/ PAKISTAN:  INDONESIA:  Army-encouraged activities are hitting closer to President Sukarno.  JAPAN:  Supplement  p. F-9  Supplement  p. (1)	LAOS:		p.	F-5
CHINA:  NORTH VIETNAM:  COMMUNIST CHINA/NORTH VIETNAM:  INDIA/ PAKISTAN:  INDONESIA: Army-encouraged activities are hitting closer to President Sukarno.  JAPAN:  Supplement  p. F-6  P. F-7  F-9  Supplement  p. (1)			p.	F-5
VIETNAM:  COMMUNIST CHINA/NORTH VIETNAM:  INDIA/ PAKISTAN:  INDONESIA:  Army-encouraged activities are hitting closer to President Sukarno.  JAPAN:  Supplement  p. f-9  Supplement  p. (1)  USSR:			p.	F-6
CHINA/NORTH VIETNAM:  INDIA/ PAKISTAN:  INDONESIA: Army-encouraged activities are hitting closer to President Sukarno.  JAPAN: p. F-9  Supplement p. (1)  USSR:  NOTE:			p.	F-6
PAKISTAN:  INDONESIA: Army-encouraged activities are hitting closer to President Sukarno.  JAPAN:  Supplement  p. (1)  USSR:	CHINA/NORTH		p.	F-7
JAPAN:  Supplement  p. (1)  USSR:			p.	F-8
Supplement p. (1) USSR: NOTE:	INDONESIA:		p.	<b>F</b> -9
NOTE:	JAPAN:		p.	F-9
NOTE:		Supplement	p.	(1)
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#### Next Move in Dominican Crisis Uncertain


The departure of six former rebel officers and the end of the strike have not resolved the crisis in the Dominican Republic. The Communist and Social Christian Parties are reportedly pressing Caamano not to leave, and the military chiefs are being urged not to go even if he does. Caamano, however, is trying to obtain from Garcia Godoy some guarantees for the welfare of his followers which could indicate he is considering the overseas assignment.

The walkout demonstrated that Juan Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) and other moderate elements in the former "Constitutionalist" ranks have split with the Communists and the leftwing of the Christian Socialists. The latter group cooperated closely — over Bosch's opposition — with Constitutionalist leaders Aristy and Caamano in developing the strike plan. These extremists are apparently trying to build up a political base from which to weaken Bosch's control of the PRD and thereby influence the choice of a presidential candidate or develop their own political front. They seem to be using Caamano as a figurehead in this struggle.

Representatives of the three Communist parties and the strike committee have reportedly concluded that the walkout was successful -- it had demonstrated the strength of the extreme left in the labor movement and caused President Garcia Godoy to agree that rebel personnel at the 27th of February Camp, including some ineligibles, should be moved inside the capital and integrated into the armed forces. Caamano had allegedly been trying to get his military personnel taken in as an independent brigade as part of the bargain for his departure, but there is no proof that he has succeeded. Should the president agree to this, a strong reaction could be expected from the armed forces which could include a move to oust him.

Many extreme rightist civilian groups, as well as air force and army elements, are pressing the military leaders not to leave under any circumstances. Defense Minister Rivera is allegedly ready to go abroad and be succeeded by Navy Chief Jimenez -- if

(Continued)



the "Constitutionalists" are ousted. Continued delay in sending the latter's other leaders out of the country or the reintegration of former rebel military personnel will increase the pressure on the military chiefs to stand fast.

Yesterday's reports of Dominican army movement out of Santo Domingo were erroneous and all units stationed in the area have been accounted for.

(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

#### Iranian-Iraqi Situation

Iraq and Iran are making gestures to settle their differences, however, mutual suspicions are deep and the difficulties are far from resolved.

The Iranian press is adopting a more conciliatory tone on the dispute with Iraq, and the Shah has personally ordered at least one artillery battery on the border to stop firing, but to remain in position; it may be the only Iranian unit supporting the Kurds. Iranian intelligence is still sending the Kurds materiel and is planning to give them guerrilla training.

In a lengthy press statement on 12 January, Iraqi Premier al-Bazzaz indicated an apparent willingness on the part of Iraq to reach agreement with Iran. The Premier lauded the "warm welcome" accorded their ambassador by the Shah, the Iranian ministers and premier. He indicated that there was now strong hope that the "opening of the dialogue and the continuation of correspondence" could result in a solution to their problems.


Iran is reportedly somewhat resentful that Turkey and Pakistan have not come to its support. According to Iraqi messages, Turkey has offered to mediate but, as of the 8th, Baghdad did not think the time was propitious.

Fighting has taken place near both Khanaqin and Panjwin, and the US Defense Attache in Baghdad says that some Iraqi units have been moved south to counter renewed Kurdish attacks there. This shift would relieve pressure against the Kurds around Panjwin and allow them to recoup their losses.

(Continued)

DIA Intelligence Summary
TOP SECRET TRINE

Page 2



The Shah is said to have told the new Iraqi Ambassador on 8 January that there was "no chance of settling our differences" while Soviet and pro-Nasser influence remained strong in Iraq. This new concern over the USSR's influence apparently derives from its arms aid to Baghdad -- Iran knows about the recent delivery of MIG-21/FISHBEDs.

The Shah is also disturbed over a possible Egyptian-Syrian-Iraqi threat to southern Iran (Khuzistan). However remote this possibility, the Shah's thinking reflects his suspicion of the Arabs. At the same time, UAR President Nasser is reportedly flatly opposed to Iran and Saudi Arabia creating an Islamic bloc, which he calls a Western plot designed to resurrect the Baghdad pact. (TOP SECRET TRINE NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

#### Cyprus Developments

Famagusta remains an area of potential trouble, and Gen Grivas might take action there in the absence of President Makarios at the Lagos Commonwealth Conference.

Grivas reportedly held a staff conference on 8 January at which he alleged that the Turkish Cypriots had hidden arms in the Famagusta area and that those in the walled city could attack the Greek Cypriots at will. Grivas is said to believe that any Turkish invasion would come in the Boghaz-Famagusta area and that the Greek Cypriots would be in a poor position to defend themselves. Both Greek and Turkish Cypriots have recently taken actions contrary to the early December Famagusta agreement. The Turkish flag has been raised over the school, and National Guard soldiers have been seen in the demilitarized area.

Grivas has long been at odds with Makarios who is publicly adopting a conciliatory line toward the Turkish Cypriots. The President has, however, rejected Turkish Cypriot leader Kuchuk's recent proposal for a conference to negotiate a settlement without any preconditions. Kuchuk's suggestion was supposedly made in reaction to Ankara's request for Turkish Cypriot views on acceptable alternatives if partition or federation could not be effected. The Turkish Cypriots apparently considered this position a "betrayal," and their morale is said to have reached a new low. They have reportedly asked Turkey to intervene militarily by early March and, if this is impossible, to provide compensation for those Turkish Cypriots who might then choose to leave the island. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

#### TURKEY-FORCES (In Seing) (1 January 1966)

Ground Forces Strength M-Day Divisions Tank Motorized Rifle Infantry (includes 1 Hountain Div		3,000 1 0 13 14	
M-plus-15 thru M-plus-90 Divisions, : strength	iane as A	-Day D	ivision
Tanks, Light (M-24) Tanks, Medium (M-47) (M-43)	Total	238 <u>- 276</u> - 76 1,295	979
Armored Personnel Carriers (%-113) Surface-to-air launchers		45 72	
Air Forces  Strength  Combat Aircraft  P-86E (Day Ftr)  P-84F (Ftr Emr)  F-100D/F (Ftr Emr)  F-104G/TF-104G (Ftr Emr)  P-84FF/RF84F (Recce)  *29 active of 56 on hand  F-5  Transport Aircraft  C-47  C-54  C-130E  H-19	a Total i	1,000 n Inve 107 155.* 44, 96 21 68 24, 14	ntory:
Trainer Aircraft T-6 T-33 T-37 T-34 T-11		87 41 20 24 29	
Mayal Forces Strength Destroyers (DD/DE) Submarines Mine Craft (MHC/LEC/MET) Fatrol Craft	3	6,000 9 10 25 18	

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#### Turkey's Views on US Flights Over Black Sea

Turkish Foreign Minister Cagliyangil has told US officials in Ankara that resuming US scientific flights over the Black Sea could give rise to "incidents" with the USSR, and he proposes that future missions be conducted only in Turkish airspace.

Cagliyangil claims that the Soviets consider the flights hostile and that to start them again on their former pattern is not in the best interests of Turkey or the US. The question of their resumption will reportedly be discussed first on the technical level by US and Turkish experts and then referred to the Turkish Government and the US Ambassador for a political decision.

Leftist press attacks and Soviet charges of dangerous provocation have aggravated Turkish sensitivies to US military missions in the Black Sea area. In spite of Ankara's official reserved position on the issue, Cagliyangil has publicly declared that the US has the right to fly in the "international skies" over the Black Sea and send its warships into those waters for up to 21 days. He emphasized that the US aircraft that recently crashed into the Black Sea "was not a U-2" but one used for "scientific and training flights." (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)



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#### Peru Promoting UN Denunciation of USSR

The Peruvian Foreign Ministry has asked its Ambassadors to find out how their host countries have reacted to the USSR's endorsement of Latin American "liberation movements" at the Tricontinent Conference in Havana. The Ministry wants to determine whether they would be willing to issue a simultaneous denunciation of the USSR in the UN.

The Soviet representative at the conference mentioned wars of liberation in Peru, Venezuela, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, and British Guiana. Lima says this action "openly violates" the UN's recently approved statement on nonintervention and constitutes interference in the internal affairs of the countries named. Peru also believes that the proposed denunciation would embarrass the USSR and call the attention of the other Latin American nations to Soviet involvement in insurgency.

# France Fails To Pursue Possible Bilateral Pact With Italy

Italian Defense Chief of Staff Gen Rossi discouraged French Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen Ailleret concerning the latter's proposed bilateral military pact for Mediterranean operations, and Paris has not followed up on the matter.

Ailleret had suggested to Rossi last month that their two countries enter agreements that would facilitate traffic control and identification of naval vessels and military aircraft in wartime. Rossi recognized the proposal as a step to weaken NATO. The Italians believe that Ailleret will now approach the US with proposals for trilateral technical discussions on the subject. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

#### Congo (B) May Get Soviet Aircraft

The Congo (B) may soon receive some MIG jet fighters now that several air personnel are about to complete MIG training in the USSR. The Soviets have reportedly also agreed to provide two Ilyushin transports for civil air operations.

Two of the some 60 air cadets sent to the USSR last February will return next month and have checked out in the MIG, according to a Congolese message. A third pilot is expected back in April, but his qualifications were not given. Several other cadets who have completed a navigator course are already en route home, and five more are taking signal communications instruction.

The MI-4 helicopter already provided is being piloted by Soviets. The French believe that some of the Cuban Air Force officers who reportedly arrived several months ago would operate the two Ilyushins. The Soviets may also be teaching the Congolese to fly these aircraft, and they are almost certainly providing aircraft maintenance training.

Probably only a small number of MIGs will be delivered initially, and it will be some time before the Congolese achieve a combat capability. The presence of even a few of these fighters will, however, cause uneasiness in neighboring states -- they are already worried about Communist-inspired subversive activities being conducted against them from the Congo. (SECRET LARUM NO-FOREIGN DISSEM)

#### Turkey To Receive West German Equipment

Turkey will apparently soon receive some of the equipment it ordered last year from West Germany and is seeking additional material for its national force.

A total of 123 155-mm howitzers is expected shortly, and at least two JAGUAR-class mortor torpedo boats are to be delivered early this year. The contract with Bonn reportedly also covers 60 F-84 jet fighters, M-48 tanks, 105-mm howitzers, mortars, small arms, and COBRA wire-guided antitank missiles.

Ankara has shown an interest in weapons and equipment used by West German paratroopers, presumably for its newly organized commando brigade which is to form the nucleus of the national force. London has also been approached for mobile radar sets to be used for air defense.

Besides its independent purchases of arms, Turkey receives materiel under the US military aid program. Twenty-one F-5/FREEDOM FIGHTERs and five F-104/STARFIGHTERs arrived at Izmir in December on board the aircraft carrier CARD. The F-5s will be based at Bandirma; the F-104s are replacements for the squadron at Ankara-Murted. (TOP SECRET TRINE NO FOREIGN DISSEM)



#### NOTES



ITALY: The Foreign Ministry has invited Soviet Foreign Affairs Minister Gromyko to visit Rome from 7 to 9 February. No specific agenda would be prepared, but Gromyko and Foreign Minister Moro would probably review bilateral trade relations and the international situation including Southeast Asia. Moscow has not yet replied to the invitation and may not be able to accept the proposed dates because Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak is scheduled to arrive on the 10th. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

FRANCE: Denison Mines, Ltd, a large Canadian uranium producer which has been negotiating with France for the sale of 50,000 tons of uranium oxides over a 25-year period, has opened a Paris office. France has been trying for a year to arrange the purchase of large quantities of uranium ore concentrates to fulfill future nuclear requirements but has balked at the safeguard restrictions imposed by Canada on uranium exports. Despite this, the establishment of a Denison Office in Paris indicates that negotiations are continuing. (CONFIDENTIAL)

USSR: An eight-hour round-robin training mission by a TU-95/BEAR over the North Pacific on 12 January was the first over-water mission by this type of aircraft since three of them were assigned to the Pacific Ocean Fleet Air Force (POFAF) in November. They are based at Khorol East Airfield in the Southern Maritime District. (SECRET SAVIN)

NIGERIA: The situation in western Nigeria is worsening and some Americans in the area have expressed concern about their welfare and safety. Heretofore they
have not been directly affected or prevented from
going about their work but a new situation appears to
be developing which could have serious repercussions.
Attacks on Americans' cars have become more frequent
and in the last two days some Americans have narrowly
avoided serious injury. The Embassy is watching the
situation closely and making emergency plans. There
are approximately 1,000 Americans in the area. (CONFIE
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
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
DIA Intelligence Summary

# FAR EAST/ASIA SECTION

DIA Intelligence Summary

TOP SECRET TRINE







#### Developments in South Vietnam

#### Military

The 108 Viet Cong-initiated incidents reported since yesterday show that the Communists are maintaining their campaign of terrorism and harassment. No major engagements were recorded.

Operation CRIMP in Hau Nghia Province, 25 miles northwest of Saigon, reportedly was meeting with only light and intermittent contact with the Viet Cong. Press reports indicate that an Australian element of this joint US/Australian search-and-destroy operation, had uncovered four truck loads of records, documents and diaries from an underground tunnel. The volume of documents tends to indicate that the area might be a main Communist political headquarters for the Saigon region.

Since its initiation on 8 January, operation CRIMP has resulted in 109 Viet Cong KIA (US body count), 80 captured, and 683 suspects detained. Eleven US and four Australians have been killed, 64 US and 16 Australians wounded.

Operation BUCKSKIN was initiated on 12 January by the 2d Battalion, 1st US Infantry Division in the same general area as operation CRIMP. Contact with the enemy has been light. Casualties so far include two friendlies killed and three wounded.

Operation JEFFERSON continues according to plan in the coastal province of Phu Yen. Viet Cong losses to date include 399 killed (Korean (ROK) body count), ll captured and 219 suspects detained. Allied casualties are 28 ROK, 13 South Vietnamese (ARVN), and one US killed; 65 ROK, 20 ARVN, eight US wounded and one ROK missing.

Poststrike ground operations continue approximately 19 nautical miles south of Da Nang in Quang Nam Province in the combined US/ARVN multibattalion operation MALLARD/LIEN KET 20. No significant contact has been reported. Current casualties are: Friendly - three WIA (two US); Viet Cong - 13 KIA (US body count) and six captured.

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13 Jan 66

DIA Intelligence Summary

Page F-1





Operation LONG PHI 951 has terminated. Casualties are: five ARVN WIA; seven Viet Cong KIA and two captured.


Operation AN DAN 570, an ARVN four-battalion search-and-destroy operation in Long An Province made contact with an unknown Viet Cong force. Casualties include 15 KIA (one US), 20 WIA; Viet Cong casualties are unknown.

Vietnamese intelligence has an unconfirmed report that the guerrillas are planning to attack Ben Cau Post in Tay Ninh Province before Tet. It had already been reported that the Viet Cong were maintaining close surveillance of Allied troop movements and dispositions in the Michelin Plantation area of Binh Duong Province, presumably to be prepared for an attack or ambush if the opportunity arose. They may be examining every tactical situation for a chance to win a major victory before the Tet holiday. Such an achievement would have far-reaching propaganda value.

COMUSMACV says that the enemy buildup in 1st Corps continues. Interrogation reports and documents recently obtained in the Quang Nam-Quang Tin border area provide increasing evidence that the 36th Regiment (PAVN) of the 308th Division has infiltrated into South Vietnam. Its presence and that of two other regiments said to be in Quang Tri Province along with the recent moves of the 18th PAVN and 2d Viet Cong Regiments into southern Quang Ngai would pose a formidable threat. Confirmed, probable, and possible units in 1st Corps are three PAVN regiments, three Viet Cong regiments, and 17 separate Viet Cong battalions.

A Viet Cong captive in Kontum Province has stated that the 13th AA Battalion is located 20 kilometers west of Plei Djereng and that the unit has 18 12.7-mm machine guns and 300 personnel. According to the prisoner, the 13th left North Vietnam on 19 September on foot and took three months to infiltrate South Vietnam. This is the first report of a 13th AA Battalion in either South or North Vietnam.

(Continued)









Three Viet Cong captives in Pleiku Province have stated that the 2d Battalion, 33d (Song Lam) PAVN Regiment was located on the northern edge of the Chu Pong base area on 2 January and that the 66th Regiment (PAVN) is east of Chu Pong. (TOP SECRET TRINE) NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

NR


#### Political

Recent developments indicate that no dissident group is acquiring enough power to supplant the present government even though potentially divisive forces are still active. Reports of friction among generals are still coming in. The latest concerns Gen Cao Van Vien, the frequently criticized Chief of the Joint General Staff (JGS), 1st Corps Commander Gen Nguyen Chanh Thi, and 2d Corps Commander Gen Vinh Loc. Thi and Loc allegedly ignore any JGS directive they disagree with or ask Deputy Prime Minister Co to rescind it. Vien has reportedly complained about this without success to Prime Minister Ky, Directorate Chairman Thieu, and Co. Co is also said to be interfering in routine matters and still seems to resent Vien's succeeding him as JGS Chief. A group of younger officers reportedly complained about JGS ineffectiveness in late November, and there have been several indications that military morale has been hurt by high-level disunity.

A new Catholic communique claims that "a political vacuum continues to exist" and that the government has not yet been able to "create a solid legal basis or rally wide popular support." It also says that it is necessary to "normalize the political life and actively improve the social fabric" and that "only the Vietnamese people can work out their own salvation."

The Congress of the Armed Forces approved current planning and budgeting for pacification projects on 5 January, and the next day the Directorate discussed government policy for the next 18 months and Secretary General Pham Xuan Chieu's "democracy-building" plan which calls for creating an advisory council to function as a constituent assembly. These two meetings were evidently held in preparation for a convention of the armed forces in Saigon on 14 and 15 January when the public will be told of the government's plans.

(Continued)



Vo Cong Trung, a member of the Algiers mission of the National Liberation Front says the New York Times erred in reporting that the Viet Cong might drop their demand for the withdrawal of US troops as a precondition for peace talks if Washington recognized the Front; the Viet Cong position on peace negotiations was "unchangeable."

National Police Director Col Pham Van Lieu has reportedly said that those Directorate members who are trying to have him replaced will not succeed since he is sure of 1st Corps Commander Gen Nguyen Chanh Thi's support. Lieu claimed that Chairman Thieu, Secretary General Chieu, and Deputy Prime Minister Co had been attempting to persuade Prime Minister Ky to replace him with someone more to their liking. Col Huynh Van Tu, Director of Security in the Capital Military Region, was said to have been considered the most likely replacement.

Military Security Service and the Directorate General of the National Police continue to furnish information concerning a possible coup headed by retired Gen Tran Van Don, to the Capital Military District Commander. The reports indicate that the group may be planning to seize control of the government by armed force. Plans indicate the possibility of a "Commando Strike" to capture or kill leading figures in the military government over the Tet holidays, 20-23 January.

Gen Don, late in November, said that he could mount a coup at that time if he desired but that he did not plan to do so because of the disasterous effect on South Vietnam. The leaders of the group plan to hold a strategy meeting in Saigon on 13 January.

Late press reports indicate that the South Vietnamese armed forces will observe a three-day truce during Tet. The Viet Cong have already proposed a cease fire for four days beginning midnight 20 January. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)



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#### Truck Traffic in Lao Panhandle

Roadwatchers have again reported heavy truck use of Route 911 in the Lao Panhandle. Those located about two miles south of its junction with Route 23 counted 191 trucks heading south and 212 north on the nights of 1, 2, and 3 January. In its first report from this point, the team had said 197 trucks were moving south and 64 north during portions of the last five days of 1965. Thus, in about eight days, 664 trucks were seen using Route 911. The team was allegedly driven from its position by enemy patrols at midnight on 3 January.

Heavy traffic on this road had been expected, but just when it began is not known. Although the reliability of the counts cannot be assured, the apparently large numbers of trucks moving along Route 911 suggest that the Communists are making a considerable effort to transport supplies toward the Tchepone area. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

# NR

#### Possible Drone Shootdown Over North Vietnam

On 13 January the Kunming air warning facility in Southwest China reflected a possible shootdown of a small type aircraft from an altitude of 60,680 feet. The last noted position of the aircraft was 60 miles northeast of Hanoi at 22,000 feet and losing altitude. Additional COMINT reveals that an unidentified "hostile aircraft" was destroyed by SAMS. (SECRET SAVIN)

13 Jan 65

DIA Intelligence Summary

Page F-5





## NR Shelepin Delegation in Peiping

Party Secretary Shelepin arrived in Peiping late in the evening, Washington time, on 12 January. He and his delegation will stay in Peiping approximately 24 hours before continuing on to Moscow.

Shelepin was met at the airport by Chinese Vice-Premier Li Hsien Nien in the same icy polite manner as on his way to Hanoi on 7 January; there was no formal airport ceremony. His talks with the Chinese are not expected to cover substantive matters although present plans are that the Chinese Government will honor the delegation with a reception at the Parliament Building followed by a theatrical or circus performance on the evening of the 13th. (CONFIDENTIAL)

NR

#### North Vietnamese Fly MIG-21/FISHBEDs

North Vietnamese pilots are now probably flying MIG-21/FISHBED jet fighters out of Phuc Yen Airfield.

Two of four pilots who operated out of Phuc Yen on both the morning and afternoon of 11 January spoke Vietnamese, the others Russian, and all four used a type of microphone normally associated with high-performance aircraft. The Soviet pilots, moreover, mentioned retracting the "nose cone," a procedure peculiar to the FISHBED. This activity probably represented area familiarization flying for the North Vietnamese under Soviet supervision.

Since MIG-21s were first detected in North Vietnam on 12 December, Soviet pilots have flown there on at least six occasions. The flights on 11 January, however, are the first in which North Vietnamese pilots have operated the higher-performance aircraft. (SECRET SAVIN)

TOP SECRET TRINE

NR

Indicated Strengthening of Chinese Communist-North Vietnamese Air Defense Arrangements

The Chinese Communists and the North Vietnamese have apparently improved their plans for a mutual air defense system.

In the two months before aerial bombing of North Vietnam was halted, the Chinese launched increasing numbers of jet fighter defensive patrols along the border as the tempo of US air strikes increased. Since 28 November, Chinese Communist jet fighters have penetrated North Vietnamese airspace at least five times. The first three were in reaction to US air strikes and high-altitude reconnaissance drone missions and the last two -on 8 January by Mengtzu- and Ningming- or Nanningbased MIGs -- were apparently practice exercises. Of particular interest, the practice penetrations were about 25 nautical miles each at roughly 26,000 feet rather than the higher altitudes used by reconnaissance aircraft. Altitudes of about 26,000 feet are compatible with past combat-air-patrol cover flown by US pilots in support of bomb strikes over North Vietnam.

COMINT has recently identified an organization associated with the Chinese Communist Air Force in North Vietnam. Its mission may be connected with some construction activity. A common air-warning-grid reporting system for Communist China and North Vietnam was adopted on 19 December to improve the air defense responses in southern China and North Vietnam. Moreover, since November the two countries have exchanged military air weather data.

The identification of an air force-associated organization in North Vietnam, the adoption of a common air defense reporting grid system, the exchange of weather data, and the recent increase of air defense patrol activity and Chinese air penetrations of North Vietnam's airspace indicate that, at the very minimum, Peiping is endeavoring to better the defense of its own airspace against all forms of US air operations. To further this capability, it would logically become more deeply involved with Hanoi on cooperative air defense measures. (TOP SECRET TRINE)

13 Jan 66

DIA Intelligence Summary

Page F-7

#### Initial Indian-Pakistani Reaction to the Tashkent Agreement

The response to the Shastri-Ayub accord in India and Pakistan has been one of general acceptance, although murmurs against it are evident in both countries.

Prime Minister Shastri's death has served to mute Indian criticism to a large extent, a factor which may enable his successor to carry out the unpopular provisions of the agreement. President Radhakrishnan and Acting Prime Minister Nanda have lent an air of sanctity to Shastri's commitments; news media have welcomed the pact by highlighting the provisions most favorable to India. Leftwing opposition has been sharply curtailed by the Soviet role in bringing off the Tashkent declaration. Criticism by influential nationalist elements has been subdued thus far, but they will undoubtedly be heard from if implementation runs into difficulty.

The reaction in the Pakistani press -- largely controlled by the government -- has been optimistic but definitely reserved as to how the agreement will help solve the Kashmir dispute. Radios in Pakistan have been directed to stop anti-Indian broadcasts, probably as part of President Ayub's effort to show that he intends to abide by the Tashkent declaration. Political opposition has been minimal, and open public criticism has been so far confined to a Punjab University student resolution rejecting the agreement and urging continued efforts to free the Kashmiris from Indian rule. Public opinion in Rawalpindi, probably typical of the rest of Pakistan, was unanimously against the accord at first, but the news of Shastri's death has softened the adverse reaction.

There is no indication as to how the military view the declaration, but it can be assumed that there is unspoken dissatisfaction on both sides over giving up hard-won territory. This consideration is of particular concern to Ayub who depends heavily on the Pakistani Armed Forces as an important segment of his political power. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

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
#### Indonesian Army Strategy To Neutralize Sukarno Government

The Indonesian Army and its political backers may be embarking on a program aimed directly at President Sukarno.

The apparent success of demonstrations against First and Third Deputy Premiers Subandrio and Saleh on 10 and 11 January has reportedly encouraged the army and its political allies to issue instructions for turning the agitation against the government as a whole. The demonstrations were to end on 15 January but are now to be continued indefinitely "until something gives" -- apparently a first step in a campaign against the President personally.

The press reports that hundreds of university students rallied in Djakarta for the third successive day on 12 January against rising prices; their activities are apparently part of the army's strategy to blame the country's economic straits on the Sukarno regime. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

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#### SUPPLEMENT

#### Communist Missile Test Range Activity for December 1965

December was the fourth month in a row in which there was a high level of operations on Soviet missile test ranges; at least 43 launches were detected. This total has been equaled only once during the last five years — in October 1965. Highlights during the period included the highest ICBM firing rate observed thus far, ICBM launches from an operational complex, ripple firings of the SS-9, and the announcement of a new impact area — closed from 16 December until 1 Jun 66 — in the northern Pacific for tests of a "variant of a system of landing space vehicles."

The Tyuratam Missile Test Range (TTMTR) conducted 22 firings, the most ever recorded. These consisted of 16 ICBMs and six space-associated launches. of the ICBMs were from the Plesetsk Complex to the Klyuchi impact area for operational training. Two of these firings have been identified as first-generation SS-6s; the remaining three were probably SS-7s or 8s, with the SS-7 considered more likely. was the highest level of ICBM firings from an operational site ever observed. The two previous firings from operational sites occurred on 22 Oct 63 in the Plesetsk region and on 14 Apr 64 in the Verknaya Salda area. The remaining 11 ICBMs -- three SS-7s, one SS-8, four SS-9s, and three SS-11s -- were launched from the Tyuratam rangehead. The SS-11 shots, two of which failed, were apparently directed to the 5,700-nm Pacific impact area and were probably supposed to be full-system tests to maximum operational range. An attempt to ripple-fire the SS-9 at three-minute intervals found only the first and third launches successful. The second may have been canceled just before lift-off. An SS-9 fired the following day may have been intended for the ripple series.

Space-associated operations consisted of the 3 December launch of LUNIK 8, another unsuccessful attempt to soft-land an instrumentated payload on the moon; COSMOS 99, a military reconnaissance satellite; and COSMOS 100, probably a meteorological

satellite. Two other ESVs -- COSMOS 102 and 103 -- were placed in orbit during the period, but their missions are not yet known. An unidentified vehicle, tentatively space-associated, failed in flight on 16 December; this operation may have been related to the new impact area in the North Pacific.

Kapustin Yar Missile Test Range (KYMTR) operations were at the low level considered normal for this time of year. Four launches were noted -- one SS-4/SANDAL MRBM to 1,020 nautical miles, one SS-12 MRBM to 450 nautical miles, and one SRBM to 100-150 nautical miles. COSMOS 101, a nonrecoverable ESV, was orbited, probably in continuation of the astrophysical program begun in early 1962.

The Sary Shagan Antimissile Complex engaged in three SS-4/SANDAL MRBM firings from the Makat area to Sary Shagan as a part of the antiballistic missile program. There is no present evidence that antimissile firings were conducted against these target vehicles.

The Vladimirovka Advanced Weapons and Research Complex supported seven AS-3/KANGAROO air-to-surface missile launches by Long Range Aviation TU-95/BEAR bombers for operational training.

An unprecedented correlation of a 60-channel telemetry signal associated with a TU-22/BLINDER that was flying in the Caspian Sea Special Test Range area was made during the month. The only ASM known to be associated with the BLINDER is the AS-4/KITCHEN, and there is tenuous evidence that this system may be undergoing tests to be used as an antishipping weapon. Since there was no indication of an ASM launch during the time of intercept, the BLINDER may have been performing a check-out flight.

The Northern Fleet Missile Test Complex conducted four firings -- two ballistic and two cruise missiles. The ballistic missiles consisted of one SS-N-5 fired to the 650-nm Vorkuta area -- possibly by an H-class submarine recently constructed or refitted for this system -- and one SS-N-4 launched to a range of about 275 nautical

miles. Two SS-N-3 cruise missiles traveled a distance of about 145 nautical miles. The launch platforms for the SS-N-3s and the SS-N-4 are not known.

Three SS-N-3 cruise missiles were launched from the Pacific Missile Complex to 165-170 nautical miles in about a 30-minute period, probably by an E-class submarine.

No activity was observed on the Chinese Communist Shuangchengtzu Missile Test Range. \_\_(TOP SECRET TRINE)

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