

ENVELOPE

(b)(2)

HEADER

R 020027Z SEP 04
FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

RHEFLGX/SAFE WASHINGTON DC
R 311004Z AUG 04
FM HMSNG WASHINGTON DC

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J2/J5//
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J2/J5//

RUCXONI/ONI WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/SECNAV WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

RHEHWSR/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC
RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC

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RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

(b)(2)

INFO RHEFLGX/SAFE WASHINGTON DC
RHEFSNG/HMSNG WASHINGTON DC
BT

CONTROLS~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED]
COUNTRY: (U) IRAQ (IZ); JORDAN (JO).
IPSP: (U) [REDACTED]
SECTION 1 OF 2
/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

SUBJ: IIR [REDACTED] IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
CAPTURED AND RELEASED JORDANIAN TERRORIST MUSTAFA SAYYAM IN DECEMBER
2002 - (CORRECTED REPORT) (U)
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~. [REDACTED]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI (U) 20030101.
REQS: (U) [REDACTED]

(b)(1) SOURCE: (C) (REL) [REDACTED]

SUMMARY: (C) (REL) IN JULY 2002, JORDAN REQUESTED THAT IRAQ FIND FIVE
SUSPECTED TERRORISTS, INCLUDING MUSTAFA SAYYAM. M5 AND M7 CONDUCTED
AN UNPRECEDENTED JOINT SEARCH TO CAPTURE SAYYAM IN DECEMBER 2002.
SAYYAM WAS RELEASED ON ORDERS FROM SADDAM HUSAYN.

TEXT. 1. (C) (REL) BACKGROUND. THE JORDANIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
(GID) REQUESTED THAT THE IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS) LOCATE
FIVE INDIVIDUALS SUSPECTED OF CRIMES IN JORDAN. MUSTAFA ((SAYYAM))
WAS INCLUDED IN THE LIST AND WAS CONSIDERED A TERRORIST. JORDAN
INCLUDED SAYYAM'S NAME AND PICTURE IN AS MANY AS THREE REQUESTS
BEGINNING IN AUGUST 2002.

2. (U) IIS REACTION.

A. (C) (REL) AGENCY-WIDE REQUEST. FROM THE TIME THE IIS RECEIVED THE
FIRST REQUEST FROM THE GID, IIS DIRECTOR, TAHIR JALIL ((HABBUSH)),
DIRECTED THE IIS M5 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE TO FIND SAYYAM

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AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. THE DIRECTOR OF M5 JORDANIAN BRANCH,
LAWRENCE ((AZZAWI)), PERSONALLY HEADED THE INVESTIGATION. BY 15

(b)(2) OCTOBER 2002, M5 HAD AMASSED A SIZABLE DOSSIER ON SAYYAM. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] IT WAS UNCLEAR WHY THE JORDANIAN REQUEST TO FIND SAYYAM

WAS SUCH A HIGH PRIORITY. THE IIS DID NOT SEEM TO BE AWARE OF, OR FOCUSED ON, THE PRESENCE OF ANY OF THESE SUSPECTS IN BAGHDAD, OR IRAQ, PRIOR TO THE GID REQUEST.)

B. ~~(C//REL)~~ POSSIBLE AUTHENTIC MEMO. SEVERAL MEMOS WENT TO ALL DIRECTORATES AND EVERY EXTERNAL IIS UNIT IN IRAQ TO ASSIST THE SEARCH FOR SAYYAM. AN ORDER WENT WITH THE MEMO NOT TO USE THE PASSPORT NAMES TO FIND THE SUSPECTS, BUT TO USE THE ENCLOSED PICTURES. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

3. (U) INTRA-AGENCY COOPERATION.

A. ~~(C//REL)~~ UNPRECEDENTED ACTION. BY NOVEMBER 2002, AZZAWI APPROACHED M7 TO HELP LOCATE AND CAPTURE SAYYAM. M7 WAS EVEN CALLED IN TO ASSIST THE SEARCH BEFORE THE INTERROGATION PROCESS WAS INITIATED. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME M7 WAS ASKED TO PARTICIPATE IN A CAPTURE, AND IT WAS NOT STANDARD PROCEDURE.

B. ~~(C//REL)~~ PERSONNEL INVOLVED. BETWEEN THE DIRECTORATES, THERE WERE A NUMBER OF PEOPLE INVOLVED IN INITIATING AND CONDUCTING THE SEARCH AND INTERROGATION OF SAYYAM. THEY WERE -

- IIS DIRECTOR, TAHIR JALIL HABBUSH
- IIS DEPUTY DIRECTOR, HASSIB SABR ((AL-RIFA'I))
- M5, DIRECTOR, AHMAD ((AL-JAFARI))
- M5, JORDANIAN BRANCH CHIEF, LAWRENCE AZZAWI
- M7, DIRECTOR, HAYTHEM ((AL-RAWI))
- M7, ARAB BRANCH CHIEF, AHMAD KHALIL IBRAHIM ((AL-ANI))
- M7 INTERROGATOR, SA'AD MUHAMMAD ((JAWAD))
- M7 INTERROGATOR, RUKAN ((AL-JANABY))
- M7 INTERROGATOR, FADIL MADLOL ((ALSHALASH)).

(b)(2)

[REDACTED] WAS NOT AWARE OF A COMMITTEE CREATED TO HANDLE THE SEARCH, ALTHOUGH [REDACTED] IT WAS EASY TO SEE WHY IT LOOKED AS SUCH TO AN OUTSIDER.) ONCE THE SEARCH HAD BEGUN, ORDERS WERE DISPERSED IN A LINEAR CHAIN OF COMMAND. MOST COMMANDS INITIATED WITH AZZAWI.

4. (U) THE SEARCH AND ARREST.

A. ~~(C//REL)~~ SEARCH. THE IIS USED ALL TECHNICAL MEANS POSSIBLE,

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INCLUDING WIRE TAPS, SURVEILLANCE, AND OTHER TECHNIQUES, IN THE SEARCH. M5 RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT SAYYAM REGULARLY VISITED HIS HALF-SISTER AND USED THAT TO THEIR ADVANTAGE. WHEN AGENTS SEARCHED THE HOUSE, HOWEVER, THEY ONLY FOUND THE HALF-SISTER'S FAMILY.

B. ~~(C//REL)~~ FAMILY CONNECTION TO M7 OFFICER. SAYYAM'S HALF-SISTER APPARENTLY RECOGNIZED ONE OF THE ARRESTING AGENTS AS AHMAD KHALIL IBRAHIM AL-ANI. THE HALF SISTER CLAIMED THAT AL-ANI AND SHE WERE RELATED AND ASKED FOR CLEMENCY, BUT AL-ANI ARRESTED THE HALF-SISTER'S HUSBAND TO FORCE THE FAMILY TO ASSIST IN CAPTURING SAYYAM. AFTER TWO DAYS OF DETAINMENT, THE HUSBAND AGREED TO ASSIST IN SAYYAM'S APPREHENSION. THE HUSBAND REQUESTED THAT THE ARREST TAKE PLACE OUTSIDE OF HIS RESIDENCE. [REDACTED] IT WAS LATER DISCOVERED THAT AHMAD AL-ANI WAS DISTANTLY RELATED TO SAYYAM'S

(b)(2)

HALF-SISTER THROUGH COMPLEX TRIBAL TIES ON HIS WIFE'S SIDE. AL-ANI PROBABLY ORDERED THIS RELATIVE TO BE HELD IN CUSTODY TO PROTECT HIS REPUTATION; HE DID NOT WANT TO BE SEEN AS BEING LENIENT TO HIS RELATIONS.)

C. (C//REL) AMBUSH. AROUND 5 DECEMBER 2002, THE COERCED HALF-SISTER AND HUSBAND INVITED SAYYAM AND HIS WIFE TO THEIR HOUSE AND THEN NOTIFIED M5. M7 AND M5 OFFICERS JOINTLY AMBUSHED SAYYAM AS HE EMERGED FROM THE HOUSE. M7 AGENTS PERSONALLY ESCORTED SAYYAM, HIS WIFE AND CHILD TO THE M7 DETENTION FACILITY. [REDACTED] M7 WORKED IN A SEPARATE BUILDING WITH ITS OWN DETENTION FACILITIES, WHICH WAS LOCATED ON 52ND STREET IN THE AR-RUSAFAH DISTRICT OF BAGHDAD [REDACTED] IZ. IT WAS A THREE-STORY BUILDING ACROSS FROM THE DIRECTORATE OF PASSPORTS. THE DETENTION FACILITIES WERE ON THE 2ND AND 3RD FLOORS.)

5. (C//REL) INTERROGATION. M7 DETAINED SAYYAM FOR UP TO 15 DAYS, DURING WHICH TIME THEY CONDUCTED FOUR OR FIVE INTERROGATION SESSIONS. SAYYAM REMAINED UNCOOPERATIVE THROUGH THE FIRST THREE SESSIONS. LAWRENCE AZZAWI THEN ORDERED M7 TO USE ROUGHER METHODS TO EXTRACT A STATEMENT. [REDACTED] EMPHASIZED THAT THE IIS INTERROGATORS DID NOT TORTURE SAYYAM) AHMAD AL-ANI SUPERVISED TWO MORE INTERROGATION SESSIONS, WHERE RUKAN AL-JANABY AND FADIL AL-SHALASH USED OPEN SLAPS TO THE FACE, FISTS TO THE CHEST, AND BEAT THE BOTTOM OF HIS FEET WITH STICKS. [REDACTED] AT FIRST THE INTERROGATORS THOUGHT THE IIS WOULD BE TURNING SAYYAM OVER TO THE JORDANIANS, SO M7 WAS LENIENT. THEY DID NOT WANT EVIDENCE LEFT OF A HARSH INTERROGATION. ONCE IT WAS CLEAR THE IIS WOULD NOT TURN HIM OVER TO JORDAN, HOWEVER, M7 USED THE ROUGHER METHODS)

6. (U) RELEASE ORDERS.

A. (C//REL) M7 OBJECTIONS ON RELEASE. AFTER SAYYAM'S FIVE INTERROGATION SESSIONS, LAWRENCE AZZAWI GAVE M7 RELEASE ORDERS FOR SAYYAM, WHICH INFURIATED M7. AHMAD AL-ANI AND HAYTHEM AL-RAWI FELT SO STRONGLY AGAINST THE RELEASE ORDER, THEY WENT ALL THE WAY UP THE CHAIN OF COMMAND TO HABBUSH TO EXPRESS THEIR OBJECTIONS. HABBUSH THEN INFORMED THE PAIR THAT THE ORDER FOR RELEASE CAME DIRECTLY FROM

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SADDAM ((HUSAYN)). THE NEXT DAY LAWRENCE AZZAWI REMOVED SAYYAM FROM THE M7 FACILITIES.

B. (C//REL) REASONS FOR OBJECTIONS. AHMAD AL-ANI INITIALLY PROPOSED KILLING SAYYAM AND SENDING HIS BODY BACK TO JORDAN, ALLEGING A SUICIDE. AL-ANI REPORTEDLY BELIEVED THE RELEASE OF SAYYAM WOULD PROVOKE THE AMERICANS, WHEREAS KILLING HIM OR SURRENDERING HIM TO JORDAN WOULD BE IN IRAQ'S FAVOR. THE ACT WOULD DEMONSTRATE IRAQ'S INTOLERANCE FOR TERRORISM.

C. (C//REL) SPECULATION ON SAYYAM'S RELEASE. M7 AGENTS CONCLUDED THAT THE DECISION TO RELEASE SAYYAM WAS MADE FOR SEVERAL REASONS. SENDING SAYYAM, DEAD OR ALIVE, TO JORDAN WOULD REVEAL THAT HE HAD BEEN IN IRAQ IN THE FIRST PLACE, AND MIGHT SUGGEST TO HOSTILE OBSERVERS THAT IRAQ HARBORED TERRORISTS. IN ADDITION, THE ARABIC MEDIA MIGHT HAVE BEEN INCENSED THAT SADDAM WOULD SURRENDER A MUSLIM TO JORDANIAN INTELLIGENCE.

7. (C//REL) PREVIOUS AMNESTY DECREE. ON 20 OCTOBER 2002, SADDAM HUSAYN ISSUED A NATION-WIDE AMNESTY DECREE TO RELEASE ALL PRISONERS.

(b)(1) [REDACTED] THE DECREE ALSO AFFECTED M7, SINCE IT HAD ITS OWN DETENTION FACILITIES. M7 EMPTIED ITS ENTIRE FACILITY, WHICH AMOUNTED TO APPROXIMATELY 200 INDIVIDUALS. NONE OF THE DETAINEES HELD BY M7 WERE THOUGHT TO BE AL-QA'IDA RELATED. M7 DETAINEES WERE MOSTLY

SPIES, POLITICAL PRISONERS, ANTIQUITY SMUGGLERS, DRUG SMUGGLERS, EMBEZZLERS AND BLACK MARKETERS.

COMMENTS: 1. (C//REL) [REDACTED]

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2. (C//REL) [REDACTED]

A. (C//REL) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE FIVE JORDANIAN INDIVIDUALS WERE SUSPECTED OF BEING INVOLVED IN THE MURDER OF A U.S. DIPLOMAT IN AMMAN AND THE ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF A GID OFFICER, COLONEL ((BURJAK)). ABU YASIM SAYYAM WAS THOUGHT TO BE LIVING IN BAGHDAD. [REDACTED] COULD NOT RECALL THE NAMES OF THE OTHER FOUR JORDANIANS.

B. (C//REL) [REDACTED]

C. (C//REL) PREVIOUS REPORTING HAS CORROBORATED [REDACTED] STATEMENTS.

3. (C//REL) [REDACTED]

(b)(1) (b)(2)

4. (U) CONSUMER EVALUATIONS FOR THIS IIR CAN BE SUBMITTED ONLINE VIA

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(1) (b)(2)

ADMIN

INSTR: (U) U.S. NO. [REDACTED]

(b)(2)

DISSEM: (U) FIELD: NONE

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ [REDACTED]

HMSNG [REDACTED]

DRV FROM: [REDACTED] SEP 03

DECL: X1

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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD

ZEN/SCESTATE WASHINGTON DC/

(b)(2)

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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC

RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC

RHMFSS/FBI WASHINGTON DC

(b)(2)

RHEHWSR/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC

(b)(2)

BT

CONTROLS

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(b)(2)

SERIAL: (U)

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) IRAQ (IZ).

(b)(2)

IPSP: (U)

(b)(2)

SUBJ: IIR MOSUL - **DETAINEES** TO BE TURNED OVER TO IRAQI
POLICE FROM U.S. CUSTODY PRIOR TO RELEASE (U).

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY
EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET NOFORN~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

~~NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

DOI: (U) 20050305.

REQS: (U)

(b)(2)

SUMMARY: ~~(S)~~ MOSUL POLICE CHIEF REQUESTED AND RECEIVED APPROVAL FROM MULTI-NATIONAL BRIGADE NORTHWEST FOR A NEW **DETAINEE** RELEASE PROCEDURE, IN WHICH ALL IRAQI **DETAINEE**S IN U.S. CUSTODY DESIGNATED FOR RELEASE WILL FIRST BE TRANSFERRED TO MOSUL POLICE CUSTODY FOR IDENTIFICATION PURPOSES.

(b)(1)

2. ~~(S)~~ STATED REASON FOR THE REQUEST WAS FOR IDENTIFICATION AND DOCUMENTATION PURPOSES. THE MOSUL POLICE WOULD PHOTOGRAPH, FINGERPRINT AND DOCUMENT THE **DETAINEE**S AS A MEANS OF KEEPING TRACK OF ALL MOSUL AND NINEWA PROVINCE **DETAINEE**S, BOTH FROM COALITION FORCES AND IRAQI SECURITY FORCES (ISF).

(b)(1)

MOSUL POLICE DOCUMENTATION OF U.S. RELEASED **DETAINEE**S WILL ENABLE TRACKING OF REPEAT **DETAINEE**S AND SERVE AS A VETTING MECHANISM FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND SECURITY FORCES RECRUITING.

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IN THE ONGOING COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS OF MOSUL.

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(b)(2),(b)(3):10
ISC 424

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per
Department of
State 13 April
2006

6. (U) EMBASSY COMMENT. **DETAINEES** TRANSFERRED BACK TO THE DIVISIONAL LEVEL FROM MNF-I CUSTODY ARE SO TRANSFERRED BECAUSE THEY HAVE BEEN FOUND BY MNF-I TO POSE NO IMPERATIVE THREAT TO SECURITY AND HAVE BEEN DESIGNATED FOR RELEASE.

ADMIN

COLL: (U)

INSTR: (U)

PREP: (U)

ACQ: (U)

DISSEM: (U)

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WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~ - NOT RELEASABLE TO
~~FOREIGN NATIONALS.~~

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ENVELOPE

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HEADER

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[REDACTED]

RUEADWD/HQ DA WASHINGTON DC



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[REDACTED]



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RUEPWDC/DA AMHS WASHINGTON DC
**CONTROLS**~~SECRET~~

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SUBJ: IIR  INFORMATION REGARDING ALLEGED DETAINEE ABUSE
IN THE VICINITY OF GHECKO, KANDAHAR PROVINCE, AF (U)CITE: (U) SERIAL: (U) IIR **BODY**

COUNTRY: (U) AFGHANISTAN (AF).

IPSP: (U) ~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~SUBJ: IIR  INFORMATION REGARDING ALLEGED DETAINEE ABUSE
IN THE VICINITY OF GHECKO, KANDAHAR PROVINCE, AF (U)
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET-NOFORN~~.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 20040710.

(b)(2) REQS: (U)

(b)(1) SOURCE: (S//NF)

SUMMARY: (S//NF) INFORMATION REGARDING CHARGES BY MALEEM FIDEL MOHAMMAD REGARDING ALLEGED DETAINEE ABUSE IN THE VICINITY OF GHECKO, KANDAHAR PROVINCE, AF.

TEXT: (S//NF) MALEEM FIDEL ((MOHAMMAD)) HAS BEEN DETAINED BY U.S. FORCES IN THE PAST. AFTER HIS RELEASE, MOHAMMAD HAS SPOKEN OUT AGAINST THE AMERICANS BY STATING THAT THEY USED TORTURE ON HIM, WHICH INCLUDED SEXUAL ACTS WITH DOGS. MOHAMMAD IS CONVINCED THAT BY STATING THESE CLAIMS, HE WILL TURN THE LOCALS AGAINST THE AMERICANS AND THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT THAT THEY CURRENTLY SUPPORT. AMIR MOHAMMAD ((AGHA)) FROM JALAHOR VILLAGE (CNA), ARGHANDAB DISTRICT, KANDAHAR PROVINCE, AF, WAS ALSO DETAINED BY U.S. FORCES AND IS THE INSTIGATOR FOR THESE CRUDE STATEMENTS. AGHA ALSO CLAIMS THAT HE WAS PUT THROUGH THESE DEGRADING TORTURE METHODS.

(b)(2) COMMENTS: 1. (S//NF)

MOHAMMAD IS USING THIS EXAMPLE BECAUSE IN HIS CULTURE THE DOG IS LOOKED UPON AS THE DIRTIEST AND LOWEST ANIMAL. IT IS DEGRADING TO HAVE ANY CONTACT WITH THE DOG, LET ALONE COMMIT SEXUAL ACTS.

2. (U)

3. (S//NF)

(CJTF-76 HARC COMMENTS)--1. (S//REL TO USA/ISAF) THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASE IN SEXUAL RELATED REMARKS IN REGARDS TO U.S. AND COALITION TREATMENT OF DETAINEES AND OTHER AFGHAN NATIONALS. THIS IS LIKELY IN RESPONSE TO THE ATTENTION RECEIVED FROM IRAQI PRISONERS. ACM ELEMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN ARE LIKELY TO COPY THE TACTICS THAT THEY SEE AS SUCCESSFUL.

ADMIN

INSTR. (U) U.S. NO.

(b)(2) PREP: (U)

ACQ: (U)

DISSEM: (U) FIELD-- NONE.

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN. DRV FROM. (U) USAINSCOM SCG 380-2, 5 AUGUST 1996.

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

DECL ON: (U) X1.

DERIVED FROM: (U) USAINSCOM SCG 380-2, 5 AUGUST 1996.

DECLASSIFY ON: (U) X1.

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TO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC/ [REDACTED] (b)(2)

(b)(2) [REDACTED]
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC/ [REDACTED] (b)(2)

RUENAAA/SECNAV WASHINGTON DC

RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC/ [REDACTED] (b)(2)

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC// [REDACTED] (b)(2)

[REDACTED] (b)(2)
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CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 [REDACTED] (b)(2)

~~SECRET~~

SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED] (b)(2)

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) IRELAND (EI).

(b)(2) SUBJECT: IIR [REDACTED] IRISH SUSPICION OF A LINK
BETWEEN SHANNON FLIGHTS AND ALLEGED DETAINEE TORTURE
FLIGHTS ~~(S/NF)~~

IPSP: (U) [REDACTED] (b)(2)

(b)(2) [REDACTED]
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~~SECRET NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 20041212.

REQS: (U)

(b)(2)

SOURCE: A. (U) DAILY NEWSPAPER, "IRISH TIMES", DUBLIN, IRELAND, 20041119, (U), IN ENGLISH, CENTRIST CONSERVATIVE NATIONAL NEWSPAPER WITH A CIRCULATION OF ABOUT 112,000.

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D. (U) DAILY NEWSPAPER, "IRISH INDEPENDENT", DUBLIN, IRELAND, 20041119 (U), IN ENGLISH, MODERATE LIBERAL NATIONAL NEWSPAPER WITH A CIRCULATION OF ABOUT 170,000.

E. (U) WEEKLY NEWSPAPER, &SUNDAY BUSINESS POST8, DUBLIN, IRELAND, 20040929, (U), IN ENGLISH. LIBERAL NATIONAL WEEKLY NEWSPAPER WITH A CIRCULATION OF ABOUT 100,000.

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G. (U) DAILY NEWSPAPER, "IRISH EXAMINER", CORK, IRELAND 20041210, (U), IN ENGLISH, CENTRIST DAILY NEWSPAPER WITH CIRCULATION ABOUT 52,000.

SUMMARY. ~~(S/NF)~~ OPPOSITION AND ANTIWAR PROTESTERS SEEKING TO PROVE A LINK BETWEEN SHANNON FLIGHTS AND ALLEGED DETAINEE TORTURE FLIGHTS PRESSURE THE IRISH GOVERNMENT TO ACT.

TEXT. 1. (U) WRITING IN THE IRISH SUNDAY BUSINESS POST ON 26 SEPTEMBER 2004, FREELANCE JOURNALIST PAUL T. ((COLGAN)) NOTED THAT A JET CHARTERED BY THE UNITED STATES **MILITARY**, WHICH IS KNOWN TO HAVE ABDUCTED AND TRANSPORTED AL QUAEDA SUSPECTS, HAS LANDED AT SHANNON AIRPORT SEVERAL TIMES. BASED PRIMARILY ON TIPS FROM ANTIWAR ACTIVISTS AND PLANE SPOTTERS IN IRELAND AND ELSEWHERE, COLGAN STATES THAT CONCERNS HAVE BEEN RAISED THAT SHANNON AIRPORT IS REGULARLY USED AS A REFUELING POINT FOR THE US **MILITARY** PLANES AND THAT THE PARTICULAR JET NOTED IN THE SWEDISH DOCUMENTARY) A CESSNA CITATION JET WITH THE CALL SIGN N379P) HAD LANDED WHILE TRANSFERRING SUSPECTS TO CUBA. COLGAN THEN CLAIMS THAT THE PLANE IS WIDELY USED TO TRANSFER SUSPECTS TO COUNTRIES WHERE THEY CAN BE INTERROGATED

WITHOUT THE PROTECTION OF WESTERN LAW.

2. (U) ON 14 NOVEMBER 2004, STEPHEN ((GREY)), WRITING IN THE SUNDAY TIMES NOTES THAT CONFIDENTIAL LOGBOOKS FROM AN EXECUTIVE JET REVEAL SHANNON AIRPORT WAS ONE OF THE PLANES MOST REGULAR STOPPING POINTS USED BY AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES TO TRANSPORT TERRORIST SUSPECTS TO/FROM TORTURE SESSIONS. GRAY ASSERTS THAT THE GULFSTREAM V JET, WHICH IS LEASED BY DEFENSE DEPARTMENT AND CIA AGENTS, HAS STOPPED IN SHANNON FOURTEEN TIMES SINCE JANUARY 2002, ACCORDING TO LOGS OBTAINED BY THE SUNDAY TIMES. GREY FURTHER ASSERTS THAT MOVEMENTS DETAILED IN THE LOGS CAN BE MATCHED WITH SEVERAL SIGHTINGS OF THE GULFSTREAM AT AIRPORTS WHEN TERRORIST SUSPECTS HAVE BEEN BUNDLED AWAY BY US AGENTS. ANALYSIS OF THE PLANE,S FLIGHT PLANS SHOWS THAT IT ALWAYS DEPARTS FROM WASHINGTON DC AND OFTEN STOPS AT SHANNON EN ROUTE TO OTHER DESTINATIONS.COUNTRY: (U) IRELAND (EI).

(b)(2) SUBJECT: IIR [REDACTED] IRISH SUSPICION OF A LINK BETWEEN SHANNON FLIGHTS AND ALLEGED DETAINEE TORTURE FLIGHTS ~~(CONF)~~

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4. (U) CONCURRENTLY WITH SPECULATION IN THE PRESS, MEMBERS OF THE IRISH PARLIAMENT SOUGHT TO COMPEL THE IRISH GOVERNMENT TO CLARIFY THE PRESS REPORTS AND WEB SITE CHATTER. DEPUTY FINIAN ((MCGRATH)), AN INDEPENDENT MEMBER OF THE DAIL REPRESENTING NORTH DUBLIN, ASKED WHETHER MINISTER FOR TRANSPORT HAS NOTED THAT AN ALLEGEDLY SUSPICIOUS SMALL AIRLINE BASED OUT OF VIRGINIA, USA HAD BEEN TRANSPORTING PRISONERS. MCGRATH HAD PREVIOUSLY ASKED SIMILAR QUESTIONS IN MAY AND JUNE 2004 AND THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE HAD RESPONDED THAT ANY PERSON WHO IS ON THE SOIL OF IRELAND IS ENTITLED TO THE PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION. NO PERSON CAN BE BROUGHT

THROUGH THE STATE OF IRELAND IN THE CUSTODY OF ANY OTHER STATE EXCEPT IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW.

5. (U) LIKEWISE ON 24 NOVEMBER 2004, IRISH SENATOR DAVID ((NORRIS)) WARNED THE LEADER OF THE SENATE THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO STEP UP HIS DEMANDS FOR INFORMATION ON THE SITUATION AS HE DID NOT IMMEDIATELY GET THE FULL STORY. HE SAID IT HAD BEEN WILDLY STATED THAT THE GULFSTREAM JET IN QUESTION HAD BEEN ADAPTED TO FACILITATE THE TRANSPORT OF KIDNAPPED PRISONERS TO DESTINATIONS WHERE THEY MIGHT BE SUBJECTED TO TORTURE AT THE BEHEST OF THE US CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. SINCE SHANNON WAS BEING USED HE BELIEVED THEY WERE ENTITLED TO INFORMATION ON THE LEVEL OF USAGE AND WHETHER THE GARDA HAD AVAILED OF ITS POWERS TO BOARD THIS PLANE AND SEARCH IT. NORRIS WAS QUOTED IN THE IRISH TIMES AS SAYING, &I THINK IT IS VITAL THAT WE HAVE THIS INFORMATION IN THE LIGHT OF THE BEHAVIOR OF ALLIED FORCES IN IRAQ, WHERE THEY APPEAR NOW TO BE DRIVING TANKS OVER WOUNDED PEOPLE IN THE STREETS OF FALLUJA WHERE THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THEY ARE MURDERING UNARMED PEOPLE INSIDE MOSQUES. CAN YOU IMAGINE WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF SOMEBODY ATTACKED A CHURCH AND SHOT PEOPLE DEAD?

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

HE SAID THE ALLEGATIONS THAT THE TAIL NUMBER HAS BEEN CHANGED RAISE


~~SECRET~~

SUSPICIONS AND CAUSED CONFUSION WITHIN THE GOI, ALONG WITH THE HOPE THAT THERE IS A "BENIGN" EXPLANATION ABOUT WHY THE COUNTRY: (U) IRELAND

(b)(2) SUBJECT: IIR [REDACTED] IRISH SUSPICION OF A LINK BETWEEN SHANNON FLIGHTS AND ALLEGED DETAINEE TORTURE FLIGHTS ~~(S/NF)~~

TAIL NUMBER WAS CHANGED. HE CAUTIONED THAT IF IT WERE EVER TO BE DISCOVERED THAT THE U.S. WAS NOT GOOD ON ITS WORD OR HAD TRANSPORTED PRISONERS THROUGH SHANNON IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WAR ON TERRORISM, THERE WOULD BE ENORMOUS POLITICAL PRESSURE ON THE GOVERNMENT. AS FOR THE LEGAL ISSUE, HE SAID THAT IF A PLANE WAS TO INCLUDE SHANNON IN AN ITINERARY THAT ALSO INCLUDED TRANSPORTING PRISONERS, GOI LAWYERS MIGHT BE FORCED TO

CONCLUDE THAT THE GOI ITSELF WAS IN VIOLATION OF TORTURE CONVENTIONS. HIS COLLEAGUE CITED BREAKING PRESS REPORTS OF ICRC COMMENTS ABOUT **GUANTANAMO** AS ADDING FUEL TO THE FIRE.



(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

(b)(2) [REDACTED]

ENVELOPE

(b)(2) [REDACTED]

HEADER

R 172119Z MAY 04

[REDACTED]

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC

[REDACTED]

RUEADWD/DA WASHINGTON DC

RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE WASHINGTON DC

RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC [REDACTED]

RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
[REDACTED]

(b)(2)

RUEPWDC/DA AMHS WASHINGTON DC

RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC

RHEFSNG/HMSNG WASHINGTON DC

RUEADWD/HQ DA WASHINGTON DC

RUCXCAC/ONI WASHINGTON DC

CONTROLS~~SECRET~~

SECTION 1 OF 2

QQQQ

SUBJ IIR MEMBERS OF AN ALLEGED IRAQI NGO

CITE: (U)

SERIAL: (U) IIR

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

COUNTRY: (U) IRAQ (IZ).

IPSP: (U)

SUBJ: IIR MEMBERS OF AN ALLEGED IRAQI
NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION REQUEST A VISIT TO ABU GHURAYB PRISON.

IRAQ, IN ORDER TO SUBSTANTIATE ALLEGATIONS OF DETAINEE ABUSE (U)

(b)(2) WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 20040515.

REQS: (U) [REDACTED]

(b)(2) (b)(1) SOURCE: TS [REDACTED]

SUMMARY: TS [REDACTED] MEMBERS OF AN ALLEGED LOCAL IRAQI NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION, WATLI AL-RAFDIN, REQUESTS SIX INDIVIDUALS BE GRANTED ACCESS TO ABU GHURAYB PRISON, IRAQ, TO SUBSTANTIATE ALLEGATIONS OF DETAINEE ABUSE. ENCLOSURES.

(b)(2) TEXT: 1. TS [REDACTED] ON 15 MAY 2004, AT APPROX 1230L HOURS, FOUR U/I IRAQI MALES APPROACHED ENTRY CONTROL POINT FORWARD OF ABU GHURAYB PRISON [REDACTED] IZ, IN A 4-DOOR, ORANGE AND WHITE TAXI CAB. ONE OF THE U/I MALES EXITED THE TAXI CAB AND PRESENTED A U.S. MARINE GUARD WITH THREE, SEALED ENVELOPES. THE U/I IRAQI MALE RETURNED TO THE TAXI CAB THAT DEPARTED IMMEDIATELY. U.S. MARINE GUARDS WERE UNABLE TO OBTAIN IDENTIFYING FEATURES OF THE FOUR IRAQI MALES OR LICENSE PLATE NUMBERS FOR THE TAXI CAB.

2. TS [REDACTED] THE ENVELOPES WERE STAMPED WITH AN OVAL-SHAPED CREST BEARING THE NAME WATLI AL-RADIDAYN, ORGANIZATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. ALL THREE ENVELOPES WERE ADDRESSED TO MR JEFFREY MILLER, SUPERVISOR OF ABU GHURAYB PRISON. THE FIRST TWO ENVELOPES EACH CONTAINED SINGLE PAGE MEMORANDUMS BEARING THE SAME WATLI AL-RADIDAYN ORGANIZATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS LETTERHEAD AND DATED 12 MAY 2004

3. TS [REDACTED] THE FIRST MEMORANDUM WAS A REQUEST BY THE WATLI AL-RADIDAYN ORGANIZATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, A NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION (NGO), REGISTERED WITH THE IRAQI

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~~SECRET~~

MINISTRY OF PLANNING AS NGO NUMBER 895, FOR SIX MEN TO VISIT ABU GHURAYB. THE SIX INDIVIDUALS LISTED WITHIN THE MEMORANDUM ARE DOCTOR AQEL ABD ((AL-TA'AY)), DOCTOR JASSIM MOHAMMAD ((MESHAL)), DOCTOR KAREM KADHOM ((ATIA)), HAYDER JAWAD ABDUL ((ALLAH)), HEATHEAM HAMODI ((DHAHY)) AND MONTAHA KRAEDEE ((MOEZE)), NFI. //SIGNED// ORGANIZATION LEADER, BASEM JABAR HAYWEE ((AL-MOSAWEE)).

4. TS [REDACTED] THE SECOND MEMORANDUM WAS A DIRECT ARABIC COPY OF THE FIRST MEMORANDUM. THE THIRD ENVELOPE CONTAINED AN ARABIC MEMORANDUM, ON THE SAME LETTERHEAD, DATED 15 MAY 2004, FURTHER EXPLAINING THE DESIRES OF THE WATLI AL-RADIDAYN ORGANIZATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. TRANSLATION OF THE THIRD MEMORANDUM IS AS FOLLOWS--

-- IN THE NAME OF ALLAH THE MOST MERCIFUL AND GRATEFUL. ISSUE 124.

DATED 15 MAY 2004. TO ABU GHURAYB PRISON SUPERVISOR REGARDING OUR DEMANDS. REGARDS FROM WATLI AL-RAFDIN ORGANIZATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. WE PRESENT TO YOU THE FOLLOWING REQUEST THAT WE FEEL IS LEGITIMATE AND JUSTIFIED, HOPING THAT THESE REQUESTS WILL GAIN YOUR ATTENTION AND BE APPROVED. WE HOPE THE REQUEST WILL SERVE EVERYONE; THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS AND DEMOCRACY. OUR REQUESTS ARE AS FOLLOWS-- WE ASK THAT YOU ALLOW HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS TO VISIT THE PRISONS, ESPECIALLY ABU GHURAYB PRISON, REGULARLY AND AT RANDOM, IN ORDER TO MONITOR WHAT GOES ON INSIDE THE PRISONS IN REGARDS TO PRISONER TREATMENT AND RIGHTS. WE DEMAND THE STOP OF ALL TYPES OF PHYSICAL AND MENTAL ABUSE OF PRISONERS AND TREAT THEM ACCORDING TO THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS ACCORDS. DO NOT PRACTICE ANY PHYSICAL FORCE OR IMMORAL TREATMENTS DURING INTERROGATIONS. WE DEMAND THAT YOU HOLD THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MISTREATMENT AND ABUSE OF THE PRISONERS. THEY SHOULD BE SENT TO COURT AND JUDGED OPENLY AND FAIRLY. WE DEMAND THAT YOU OPEN JUST AND INDEPENDENT CASES FOR THOSE PRISONERS WHO WERE KILLED INTENTIONALLY DUE TO THE PHYSICAL ABUSE DURING INTERROGATIONS. WE DEMAND THAT YOU IMMEDIATELY RELEASE THE PRISONERS THAT STILL DO NOT STAND ACCUSED OF ANY TERRORIST ACTS. WE HOPE THESE DEMANDS WILL RECEIVE YOUR ATTENTION AND THAT YOU WILL ENFORCE DEMOCRACY, JUSTICE AND FREEDOM. THANK YOU FOR YOUR SUPPORT AND ATTENTION. //SIGNED// ORGANIZATION LEADER BASEM JABAR HAYWEE AL-MOSAWEE. ORGANIZATION LEADER - 07901420814, CONSULTING OFFICE MANAGER - 07901302071, PROGRAMS AND DEVELOPMENT MANAGER 07901385799, NFI.

(b)(2) (b)(1) COMMENTS:

1. (S)

(b)(2) 2. (S)

3. (S)

4. (U)

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~~SECRET~~

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 2 *****/

IIR [REDACTED] MEMBERS OF AN ALLEGED IRAQI NGO

ADMIN

PREP: (U) [REDACTED]

ENCL: (U) TO FOLLOW-- THREE ENCLOSURES

1. DIGITAL FILE-- SCANNED DOCUMENT, DIGITALLY SCANNED MEMORANDUM COPY (U), ONE FILE, [REDACTED] 20040515, IN ENGLISH (S//REL TO USA AND MCFI).

2. DIGITAL FILE-- SCANNED DOCUMENT, DIGITALLY SCANNED MEMORANDUM COPY (U), ONE FILE, [REDACTED] 20040515, IN ARABIC (S//REL TO USA AND MCFI).

3. DIGITAL FILE-- SCANNED DOCUMENT, DIGITALLY SCANNED MEMORANDUM
(b)(2) COPY (U). ONE FILE, [REDACTED] 20040515, IN ARABIC

(S [REDACTED])

[REDACTED]

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

DRV FROM: (U) USAINSCOM SCG 380-2, 5 AUGUST 1996.

DECL: (U) X1.

BT

#0359

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[REDACTED]
~~SECRET~~

(b)(2)

[REDACTED]
ENVELOPE
[REDACTED]

HEADER

R 211302Z APR 04
[REDACTED]TO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
[REDACTED]RUEANFA/NRC WASHINGTON DC
[REDACTED]RUCNSE/US SECRET SERVICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAADN/DTRA DULLES WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIJM/NIMA M3 WASHINGTON DC
[REDACTED]RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
[REDACTED]RUEPWDC/DA AMHS WASHINGTON DC
[REDACTED]RULSSEA/COMNAVSEASYS COM WASHINGTON DC
[REDACTED]RUCNFBA/FBI WASHINGTON DC
[REDACTED]RUEDMJB/NRO WASHINGTON DC
RUCXONI/ONI WASHINGTON DC[REDACTED]
~~SECRET~~[REDACTED]
~~SECRET~~
[REDACTED]

(b)(2) RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J2/J5//

RUEPINE/CIFAOPNS WASHINGTON DC
RUEPINS/HQ BICE INTEL WASHINGTON DC

CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~
SECTION 1 OF 2
QQQQ

~~SECRET~~ -- [REDACTED]
SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED]
/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) IRAQ (IZ).
IPSP: (U) [REDACTED]
SUBJ: IIR [REDACTED] MUHAMMED SADDAM, CORRUPT
IRAQI POLICE OFFICER COMMITTING ABUSE, TORTURE AND EXTORTION ON US
BASE IN BAGHDAD (U)
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~ -- [REDACTED]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 20031227.

REQS: (U) [REDACTED]

(b)(1) SOURCE: (C//REL) [REDACTED]

SUMMARY: (S//REL) MUHAMMED SADDAM HAD DETAINEE ARRESTED BY COALITION FORCES WHEN HIS EXTORTION ATTEMPT FAILED. WHILE AT A COALITION BASE IN BAGHDAD DETAINEE WAS BEATEN AND OBSERVED TORTURE OF OTHER DETAINEES BY MUHAMMED SADDAM AND A KUWAITI INTERPRETER WORKING FOR COALITION FORCES.

TEXT: 1. (S//REL) FIRST CONTACT. MUHAMMED SADDAM (LNU) IS AN IRAQI POLICE OFFICER WORKING FOR A UNITED STATES (US) ARMY UNIT LOCATED IN BAGHDAD, IRAQ (IZ). IN THE MIDDLE OF RAMADAN, MUHAMMED SADDAM ARRESTED DETAINEE'S BROTHER FOR REASONS UNKNOWN. DETAINEE SECURED THE BROTHER'S RELEASE AFTER SPEAKING WITH MUHAMMED SADDAM. THE FOLLOWING

(b)(2)

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NIGHT, MUHAMMED CAME TO DETAINEE'S HOUSE WITH COALITION FORCES AND SEARCHED IT, LOOKING FOR DETAINEE'S BROTHER. HE WALKED TO THE DETAINEE'S CAR, WHICH WAS PARKED IN A GUARDED PARKING LOT. DURING THE TEN MINUTE WALK, MUHAMMED SADDAM REPEATEDLY MENTIONED HIS BELIEF THAT DETAINEE'S FAMILY IS WEALTHY. DETAINEE PROMISED TO BRING THE BROTHER TO MUHAMMED SADDAM THE FOLLOWING DAY AND MUHAMMED AND THE COALITION FORCES PERSONNEL LEFT.

2. ~~(S//REL)~~ SECOND CONTACT. TEN DAYS FOLLOWING HIS FIRST INTERACTION WITH DETAINEE, MUHAMMED SADDAM RETURNED, AGAIN WITH COALITION FORCES. THEY FIRED ON THE FRONT DOOR OF THE HOUSE AND BROKE IT DOWN. ENTERING THE HOUSE, MUHAMMED SADDAM TOLD THE RESIDENTS THAT THEY WERE RESISTING ARREST. HE THEN JOINED COALITION PERSONNEL IN SEARCHING THE HOUSE. MUHAMMED SADDAM WAS THE ONLY PERSON TO ENTER THE MASTER BEDROOM. WHEN HE LEFT, A SIZABLE QUANTITY OF CASH WAS MISSING FROM THE MASTER BEDROOM. DETAINEE WAS ARRESTED AND TAKEN TO THE US UNIT. DETAINEE SAT BLINDFOLDED AND HANDCUFFED IN A BASEMENT ROOM, AND WAS SPOKEN TO BY MUHAMMED SADDAM AND THE UNIT COMMANDER. MUHAMMED SADDAM ASKED IF DETAINEE WAS RELATED TO ANOTHER PARTY DETAINED FOR NEBULOUS REASONS WHO ALSO ALLEGED THAT MUHAMMED SADDAM ATTEMPTED TO EXTORT A LARGE AMOUNT OF MONEY IN RETURN FOR A CESSATION OF HARASSMENT. DETAINEE REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. MUHAMMED SADDAM TOLD DETAINEE THAT THE OTHER PARTY WAS VERY WEALTHY, AND THAT DETAINEE MUST GET 10,000 US DOLLARS FROM THAT PARTY FOR HIM. HE AND THE UNIT COMMANDER LEFT. DETAINEE REMAINED IN THE ROOM WITH THREE IRAQI MALES, ONE OF WHOM WAS ADDRESSED AS SIR. THE THREE IRAQIS BEAT DETAINEE FOR FIVE HOURS, USING OPEN HANDS AND THE HOSE FROM A NARGHILA FROM WHICH THEY WERE SMOKING. DETAINEE'S HAND OR WRIST WAS BROKEN DURING THE BEATING. THE FOLLOWING NIGHT DETAINEE WAS RELEASED.

3. ~~(S//REL)~~ THIRD CONTACT. TWO MONTHS FOLLOWING THE SECOND CONTACT, MUHAMMED SADDAM SAW DETAINEE WALKING ON THE STREET AND HAD DETAINEE ARRESTED BY THE COALITION FORCES HE WAS TRAVELING WITH. AT THE US UNIT, MUHAMMED SADDAM ASKED DETAINEE WHERE THE MONEY WAS THAT HE WAS EXPECTING. DETAINEE PROMISED TO GIVE HIM THE MONEY, BUT MUHAMMED SADDAM SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT ACCEPT PROMISES THIS TIME. LATE THAT NIGHT, DETAINEE WAS PUT IN A ROOM WITH DETAINEE'S SIBLINGS. DETAINEE REMAINED IN THAT ROOM FOR SEVERAL DAYS. DETAINEE AND SIBLINGS WERE SLAPPED REPEATEDLY FOR HOURS, BY MANY PEOPLE (NFI) UNDER THE BLINDFOLD. DETAINEE WAS ABLE TO SEE THE SIBLINGS AND THE OTHER PEOPLE, ALL MALES, WHO WERE BROUGHT IN. A KUWAITI INTERPRETER WAS PRESENT. THE INTERPRETER HIT THE DETAINEES, AND FORCED WATER BOTTLES

(b)(2) INTO THE RECTUMS OF FIVE OR SIX OF THE MALE DETAINEES. DETAINEE'S BROTHER WAS NOT OBSERVED TO BE ASSAULTED IN THIS WAY, BUT LATER SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN, INDICATING THAT THERE WAS MORE OF THIS TREATMENT THAN DETAINEE OBSERVED. DETAINEE DID NOT RECOGNIZE ANY OF THE VICTIMS OF THE ABUSE. DETAINEE IDENTIFIED A 1.5 LITER WATER BOTTLE AS BEING THE TYPE USED IN THE ABUSE). MUHAMMED SADDAM CAME AND WENT DURING THIS PERIOD. HE SAID REPEATEDLY THAT HE WAS GOING TO BE

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~~SECRET~~

THE NEXT IRAQI MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR. ANOTHER BROTHER WAS BROUGHT IN, NAKED AND UNCONSCIOUS WITH BLOOD ON HIS HANDS AND LEGS. SEVERAL DAYS LATER, A DIFFERENT INTERPRETER TOLD DETAINEE THAT HE HAD DIED. IN THE ENSUING FOUR MONTHS OF CONFINEMENT, DETAINEE HAS SEEN OR HEARD NOTHING TO DISPROVE THIS REPORT.

4. ~~(S//REL)~~ MUHAMMED SADDAM. PICTURES OF MUHAMMED SADDAM ARE POSTED

ALL AROUND ADHEMIYAH, IZ IN PROTEST OF THE WAY HE INDISCRIMINATELY ARRESTS PEOPLE. HE CHANGES HIS APPEARANCE AS A RESULT OF HIS UNPOPULARITY, IN FEAR OF REPRISAL. ALSO FOR PURPOSES OF PERSONAL SAFETY, HE LIVES ON A COALITION POST, NFI. MUHAMMED SADDAM WAS A BODYGUARD FOR SADDAM ((HUSSEIN))'S BROTHER WATBAN ((HUSSEIN)), BUT WAS FIRED, NFI.

5. ~~(S//REL)~~ DESCRIPTION OF MUHAMMED SADDAM. THE DESCRIPTION OF MUHAMMED SADDAM IS AS FOLLOWS--

- AGE, 40-50 YEARS OLD;
- PLACE OF BIRTH, IZ;
- SEX, MALE;
- MARITAL STATUS, MARRIED TO A SUNNI MUSLIM WOMAN FROM ADHEMIYAH, BAGHDAD, IZ;
- CITIZENSHIP, IZ;
- FACIAL HAIR, HAD A BLACK-DYED MUSTACHE BUT SHAVED IT BEFORE LAST TIME OBSERVED;
- TEETH, GOOD CONDITION;
- GLASSES, NO;
- COLOR OF EYES, BLACK;
- BALD, NO, HAIR RECEDING AT SIDES;
- HAIR, DYED BLACK AND CUT VERY SHORT;

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 2 *****/

- HEIGHT, 65 INCHES;
- WEIGHT, 180-200 POUNDS;
- BUILD, FAT, HEAVY BUILD;
- CLOTHING, WESTERN CLOTHING;
- MEDIUM COMPLEXION;
- FACIAL FEATURES, ROUND, FAT FACE; ROUND NOSE;
- JEWELRY WORN, WEARS A WATCH ON RIGHT WRIST;
- AUTOMOBILE, BLUE FOUR DOOR LATE MODEL JAPANESE PICKUP.

6. ~~(S//REL)~~ DESCRIPTION OF THE KUWAITI INTERPRETER. THE DESCRIPTION OF THE KUWAITI INTERPRETER IS AS FOLLOWS--

- AGE, 50-60 YEARS OLD;
- PLACE OF BIRTH, KUWAIT.
- SEX, MALE;
- COLOR OF EYES, BLACK;
- BALD, NO;
- HAIR, SHORT BLACK WITH GREY HAIR;
- HEIGHT, 72 INCHES;
- BUILD, TALL, THIN, NARROW SHOULDERS;
- CLOTHING, PANTS AND SHIRT;

(b)(2)

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- VOICE, STRONG VOICE;
- VERY DARK COMPLEXION;
- FACIAL FEATURES, LONG FACE; LONG NOSE; SLIGHT SQUINT.

COMMENTS: 1. ~~(S//REL)~~ AT LEAST TEN DETAINEES AT ABU GHURAYB PRISON, FROM DIFFERENT FAMILIES AND GROUPS, ALLEGE THAT MUHAMMED SADDAM ABUSED THEM AND ATTEMPTED TO EXTORT MONEY IN RETURN FOR THEIR RELEASE.

2. ~~(S//REL)~~ DETAINEE IS WILLING TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY THE INDIVIDUALS DESCRIBED PROVIDED DETAINEE'S SAFETY IS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

3. ~~(S//REL)~~

4. ~~(S//REL)~~

(b)(2)

ADMIN

INSTR: (U) U.S. NO.

ENCL: (U) NONE.

PREP: (U)

ACQ: (U) (200400410).

DISSEM: (U) FIELD: NONE.

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~ --DERIVED FROM: (U) CJTF-7 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AND MARKING GUIDE
(VERSION 2), 18 SEPTEMBER 2003.

DECLASSIFY ON: (U) X1.

BT

#5598

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~~SECRET~~

(b)(3):10 USC 424

From: (b)(3):10 USC 424
Sent: Tuesday, September 02, 2003 2:34 PM
To: (b)(3):10 USC 424
Subject: FW: After Action Report AAR) on My Participation in ALSA Joint Working Group on Detainee Operations at Langley AFB, 5-8 Aug 03

-----Original Message-----

(b)(3):10 USC

From: (b)(3):10 USC 424
Sent: Tuesday, August 12, 2003 8:58 AM
To: (b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(6)

(b)(3):10 USC 424

Subject: After Action Report AAR) on My Participation in ALSA Joint Working Group on Detainee Operations at Langley AFB, 5-8 Aug 03

CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

(b)(6)

(U) Following is an AAR on my participation in the ALSA JWG at Langley AFB last week.

1. (U) Background

a. (U) The Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center is tasked by the Services' Doctrine Centers to develop multi-Service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (MTTP) publications, studies and other solutions to solve interoperability issues or fill doctrinal voids. In this case, ALSA has been tasked to produce an MTTP entitled "Detainee Operations in a Joint Environment." A Joint Working Group (JWG) was held 5-8 August 2003 at the ALSA facility on Langley AFB, Hampton VA. (b)(3):10 USC 424 and I represented DHS at the JWG.

(b)(3):10 USC 424

b. (U) Eighteen commands in addition to DIA were represented at the JWG, including USSOCOM, USSOUTHCOM, CMTD USCG, US Bureau of Immigration & Customs, CJTF 180, HQDA, HQAF, HQ USMC, HQ ACC, HQ AMC, the Army's Training and Doctrine Command and Military Police Institute, and Navy's Bureau of Personnel, COMLANTFLT, and Charleston Brig. Additionally, OSD's Detainee Policy Group was frequently consulted by telephone and email for informal guidance during the group's deliberations.

2. (U) Discussion

a. (U) The JWG is charged with producing a draft MTTP, as noted above. The intent is to produce a usable working document that will inform commands on how to organize for detainee operations, and at the same time provide the soldier in the field or at the detention

center with detailed instructions on how to perform his mission, whether at the point of initial capture, during transfer from the field to a rear area collection center, or in a long-term detention facility. ALSA personnel served as facilitators for the effort; after a brief organizational meeting in which a rough outline of the pub's structure was developed and agreed upon, the JWG broke into groups to draft each chapter, with groups formed based upon individual expertise and command interest. Chapter outline is as follows (chapter titles are rough and subject to change):

- I. Policy
- II. Initial Capture
- III. Collection Point/Short-term Holding Facility Operations
- IV. Transport
- V. Long-Term Detention
- VI. Return

(b)(3):10
USC 424

I participated in drafting Chapters on Policy and Return, while [REDACTED] was a principal drafter on a chapter dealing with Long-term Detention; [REDACTED] additionally contributed to the interrogation portions of Chapters on Initial Capture and Short-term Detention.

(b)(3):10
USC 424

b. (U) Over the course of the week, a rough draft MTTP was produced. ALSA is now formatting the document, and is expected to ship an electronic copy of the draft to each participating command within two weeks for initial review and coordination. Prior to departure, we were provided with CDs containing electronic copies of the major reference documents, as well as contact details on JWG attendees.

(b)(3):10
USC 424

c. (U) Our participation proved valuable both for the group and, I believe, for DIA; the proof, of course, will be in the quality of the draft we receive in two weeks time. [REDACTED] in particular was a valuable source of reason and experience in addressing interrogation issues and language, as well as classification issues. The reference documents on the CD, as well as other documents that have been provided separately by email, will be very helpful to me in drafting DIA's Interrogation Policy

(b)(1)

3. (U) Next Steps

a. (U) DIA participates in AO-level coordination on the first (rough) draft, due to be delivered to us electronically in the next two weeks; suspense for the coordination should be around September 10th.

b. (U) A second JWG is planned for late September/early October, to review proposed changes resulting from initial coordination and resolve any conflicting language, if necessary.

c. (U) A second round of staff coordination on the revised document will follow this JWG. The result will be a smooth draft that will then be formally coordinated with OSD, Combatant Commanders, Services, appropriate Defense Agencies and other interested parties.


d. (U) ALSA's professed goal is to have the published MTTP on the street within one year.

(U) End of report.

(b)(3):10
USC 424



(b)(3):10
USC 424

DERIVED FROM:  (b)(2)

DECLASSIFY ON: X1

CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

DERIVED FROM:  (b)(2)

DECLASSIFY ON: ~~X1~~

CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: ~~NONE~~



Defense Intelligence Agency
Office of the Inspector General
Office for Investigations
Report of Conversation

(b)(2)
(b)(3), (b)(6)

Date: 5 May 2004

Time: 1020

Name of Contact:

Office/Division:

Phone:

Address of Organization:

Employee Name:

Office/Division: IG

Phone #:

Circle One

HE/I

CALLED/VISITED

Subject: Concerns relating to IRAQ Prison Situation

What was said:

Met with [redacted] who related that [redacted] related that [redacted] recently returned from a 6 month rotation in IRAQ. [redacted] related that [redacted] told [redacted] while in IRAQ [redacted] was in charge of the interrogations of the prisoners, and during this time [redacted] and the senior leadership knew of, or were aware of the incidents going on at the prison, as it has been described in the newspaper (Washington Post, dated 4 May 2004). [redacted] provided a copy of the newspaper. [redacted] went on to say that [redacted] related that there were two incidents involving the rape of two female detainees. [redacted] was asked if [redacted] witnessed or knew who committed the alleged rape. [redacted] stated [redacted] did not know who committed the rape and did not know witness the act. Additionally, [redacted] briefly related that the detainees were treated very roughly, as described in the newspaper. Once again, [redacted] did not provide specific details. [redacted] related that [redacted] was despondent over the fact that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) had not been found. [redacted] also could not say with any certainty if [redacted] had control over or the flow of information from the interrogators or if [redacted] was directly somehow in charge of the interrogators. [redacted] was asked if [redacted] while in IRAQ, was in a supervisory capacity or position to report or intervene with any regulatory violations, or human rights violations. [redacted] stated [redacted] did not state or indicate that [redacted] was in any type of supervisory position. However, [redacted] did related that while in IRAQ [redacted] worked at Camp Slayer, the prison was in another location, but [redacted] had the opportunity on more than one occasion to visit the prison. Once again [redacted] related that [redacted] related that [redacted] was assigned to handle the interrogations. [redacted] stated [redacted] is not accusing [redacted] of anything. [redacted] is not sure if [redacted] has been interviewed by [redacted] or any other agency. [redacted] ended the conversation by saying [redacted] did not want [redacted] released to [redacted] for providing the above listed information.

[redacted] stated that [redacted] is currently on leave in [redacted] and upon his return will be transitioning to retire on or about the [redacted]

Reviewed by:

fcf 5/6/04

Defense Intelligence Agency
Briefing to the SSCI staff
DIA Interactions with
IRAQI Prisoners

The Overall Classification of this Briefing is

~~SECRET//NOFORN//X1~~

Agenda

Training, Policy and Procedures

ISG JIDC Operations

ISG Interrogation Standards

ISG Debriefing/Interrogation Methods

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)


Contract Interrogators

Other DIA Interactions

DIA Activities at Abu Ghraib

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Directorate of HUMINT Intelligence (DH) Training



(b)(1)

- DH established an Interrogation Familiarization course in 2003 to provide debriefers with interrogation skills – in response to increasing number of interrogation requirements

Policy and Procedures

- All DH interrogations are required to be conducted in accordance with Army FM 34-52 and within the guidelines of the Geneva Conventions
- Iraq Survey Group (ISG) published an interrogation SOP in October 2003 (updated May 2004) specifically addressing interrogation operations
- IAW ISG SOP DH interrogation approaches within Iraq are conducted IAW CJTF 7 guidelines published in October 2003
- DH disseminated a Draft DIA Policy Memo 73 providing specific interrogation guidelines for deployed DH interrogators

DIA Support to Phase III 1003V

(b)(1)

- [REDACTED] was responsible for interviewing, debriefing, interrogating detainees, walk-ins, referrals and others for HUMINT intelligence information
- [REDACTED] was established in Baghdad 22 April 2003
 - [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
 - [REDACTED] was responsible for oversight of interviews, debriefings and interrogations conducted by JIDC personnel
 - Interrogation approaches were in compliance with current Army Doctrine for interrogation operations

(b)

ISG Assumes [REDACTED]

20 June 03

(b)(1)

- High Value Detainees (HVD) are held at the Secure Confinement Facility (SCF). [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

- Established one week refresher interrogation course with professional instructors all selected personnel
 - Instruction included training on Geneva Convention
-

ISG Interrogation Standards

- Reasonable expectation that detainee possesses information of intelligence value
- Medical Staff determined fitness of detainee for interrogation
- Interrogator develops Interrogation plan which was approved by team chief for each detainee

ISG Team Methodology

- Teams consist of Debriefing/Interrogator, Subject Matter Expert, Analyst and Linguist
- Team uses all-source intelligence, information developed from documents in Iraq and information acquired from previous debriefing/interrogation sessions to question subject
- Teams develop best approach to obtain intelligence in response to identified requirements
- Debriefing/Interrogation plan is developed and approved

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN [REDACTED] [REDACTED] AND ABU GHRAIB


(b)(1)

[REDACTED] is the Detention Center for High Value Detainees. Operated by [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Those held at [REDACTED] are best described as having above average intelligence, a history of leadership, and persons regarded as having held elite positions within Saddam's Iraq. The average age is estimated to be 60. There are only approximately 100 detainees at [REDACTED] JIDC conducts debriefings of detainees primarily at this location

(b)(1)

Abu Ghraib is operated by [REDACTED] It contains suspected insurgents and common criminals. It has contained as many as approximately 7000 detainees. Detainees are interrogated by [REDACTED] assigned interrogators.


UPGRADES TO HVD FACILITY



(b)(1)
[REDACTED] was an Iraqi Air Defense NCO Academy. Interior walls and additional doors were added to existing building to create the individual rooms

- Early July 2003- Converted Interrogation booths from tents to trailers
- Late August 2003 – Air Conditioning and heaters installed
- Late March 2004 – Installed larger wattage light bulbs in rooms


- April 2004 – Ice and bottle water became available to HVDs
- April 2004 – HVDs received 2 hot meals a day
- End of April 2004 – Hot Tea became available to detainees
- First Week of May 2004 – Increased total water capacity for showers, allowing more frequent showers
- Currently MP's are painting the rooms to improve ambient light and are adding Plexiglas panels to allow for more natural light



(b)(1)

MONITORING AT CAMP CROPPER

(b)(1)

 monitoring is available in four of the six interrogation booths


- Monitoring is conducted regularly in order to:
 - Allow analysts a view of the debriefing without being in the room
 - Assess for deception by detainee
 - Enable quality control
 - Train debriefers/Subject Matter Experts/linguists

CONTRACT INTERROGATORS

- Contract interrogators began arriving at ISG in late March 2004 with the latest group arriving on 12 May 2004 based on ISG Request

(b)(1)



- Contractors conducted interrogations of HVD's IAW pre-approved interrogation plans. To our knowledge, all sessions have been professionally conducted in accordance with standing regulations, SOPs and doctrine. No problems have been noted
- One on One Contractor interrogation sessions ceased on 5 May 2004
- Debriefings conducted by contractors are now observed by DIA personnel
- ISG contracting company provided refresher training on Geneva Conventions for selected employees prior to deployment
- All contractors received law of land warfare briefings from 

(b)(1)

OTHER DIA INTERACTIONS WITH IRAQI PRISONERS/DETAINEES

(b)(1)

- Team traveled to [REDACTED] to debrief former Iraqi General Officers in August 2003
- One JIDC interrogator conducted interrogations of suspected terrorists in Sulymania during 7-13 February 2004 in support of ISG Counterterrorism (CT) screening process.
- JIDC conducted screening and interrogations at [REDACTED] Facility in support of ISG CT/Chemical Warfare (CW) Functional Team Mission (b)(1)
- One JIDC debriefer performed duties as Liaison Officer (LNO) and screener in detention facilities in [REDACTED]
- DH deployed a six-man debriefing team to [REDACTED] Team (b)(1)
consisted of four debriefers/interrogators, a Reports Officer (RO), and a Senior Officer to maintain oversight

JIDC ACTIVITIES AT ABU GHRAIB

- (b)(1)
- OCT- NOV 03 [REDACTED] debriefer met with former ISS officer who allegedly had information on Speicher
 - OCT-NOV 03 JIDC debriefer/interrogator and interpreter conduct follow up interrogation of detainee previously interrogated at Al Asad air base in Aug-Sep 03. Approx 30 total minutes with detainee
 - Early JAN 04 DIA CT debriefer conducted coordination with HOC and CT Team Chief on site. No Prisoner/Detainee interaction
 - FEB 04 JIDC debriefer traveled to Abu Ghraib to locate detainee for release. No detainee interaction
 - JAN-FEB 04 JIDC debriefer accompanied captured personnel to Abu Ghraib. JIDC debriefer acted as an observer behind a two way mirror to observe captured persons reactions to questions posed a non-DIA interrogator for signs of deception
 - 6 JAN 04 DIA debriefer/interrogators traveled to Abu Ghraib to check the status of three detainees on behalf of JIDC ISG HVD. No prisoner contact
-

CLASSIFICATION:

~~SECRET NOFORN//X1~~~~(CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN upon removal of attachment)~~

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY STAFF SUMMARY SHEET

DECISION
OFFICIAL: DRDECISION
REQUESTED: X Sign Coord X Approve Disapprove

DIA SUSPENSE:

EXTERNAL SUSPENSE:

TASKING NO :

CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL NO

SUBJECT: DIA Policy for Interrogation Operations (U)

1. (U) PURPOSE: To obtain DR signature on a Policy Memorandum promulgating DIA Policy for Interrogation Operations.

3. (U) DISCUSSION:

a. (U) Draft policy has been coordinated externally with Services, J-2, NDRC, Combatant Commanders, and USD(P) (see Enclosure One). This action promulgates the policy immediately as an Operational Policy Memorandum (OPM); the policy will be incorporated as a chapter in the next update to DIAM 58-11, DoD HUMINT Policies and Procedures, expected this summer.

b. (U) OPMs are normally signed out by [REDACTED] and DIA/GC views this as an internal document not requiring further external coordination. However, high level interest in this policy (see Enclosure Two), and that USD(P) coordination (see Enclosure One) states that we will seek USD(I) approval, dictates that OPM be reviewed by DR and forwarded to USD(I) for concurrence prior to release.

4. (U) RECOMMENDATION: DR approve ^{and sign} Interrogation Policy in OPM at right and sign covering desk note forwarding OPM to USD(I) for his concurrence prior to promulgating policy to the field.

Enclosures: 1. Coordination

2. USD(I) memo of 18 November 2003, Subject: Interrogation Guidelines (U)

1. (U) Establishes policy for the conduct of interrogation operations by military and civilian personnel assigned or attached to DIA.

ROUTING

OFFICE	ACTION	NAME/DATE	OFFICE	ACTION	NAME/DATE
[REDACTED]	COORD	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	COORD	[REDACTED]
DIA/GC	COORD	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	COORD	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	COORD	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	COORD	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	COORD	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	COORD	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	COORD	[REDACTED]	CS	COORD	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	COORD	[REDACTED]	DR	Approve/Forward	[REDACTED]

ACTION OFFICER/PHONE:

DATE PREPARED: 19 Mar 04

SOFTCOPY RETAINED BY:

FILE NAME:

Classified by: DH SCG Mar 02
Declassify on: X1

CLASSIFICATION:

~~SECRET NOFORN//X1~~~~(CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN upon removal of attachment)~~

ACTION MEMO

03/015271-SO

(b)(6)

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: [REDACTED] Assistant Secretary of Defense (SOLIC)

SUBJECT: Coordination on proposed DIA Policy for Interrogation Operations

~~(S//NF)~~ DIA requests your concurrence with its proposed guidance on interrogation operations (Tab A). This policy will be used by DIA personnel for interrogations. It includes direction, which is consistent with DOD policy, on interrogating detainees at Guantanamo Bay.

(b)(1)

~~(S//NF)~~ DIA has GC approval. Upon your concurrence, DIA will provide this document to the USD(I) for his final approval.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: Concur as written.

(b)(3)

USD(P) [REDACTED]

Approve 1003; Disapprove _____; Other _____

Attachments:

As stated

(b)(3)

(b)(2)

(b)(2)

(b)(3)

~~Classified by DHS-SCG~~

~~Reasons: 1.5(e)(4)(e)(5)~~

~~Declassify on: 4 November 2028~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



(b)(3)

(b)(3) From:

Sent: Monday, May 10, 2004 18:34

To:

Subject: FW: DR Guidance for SSCI mtg on Iraqi Prisoners

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

J2 is discussing the value question. Not sure what there is left for [REDACTED] to cover. Looks like (b)(1)
(b)(3) [REDACTED] is critical to this effort.

(b)(3)

-----Original Message-----

(b)(3) From:

Sent: Monday, May 10, 2004 18:25

To:

Cc:

Subject: DR Guidance for SSCI mtg on Iraqi Prisoners

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

Per discussion with VADM Jacoby on Mon. 5/10 afternoon, he directed the following:

-Friday, 14 May. DIA meeting with SSCI staffers on, SSCI requested:

- DIA interactions with Iraqi prisoners;
- Methods used in these interactions (debriefings, interviews, interrogations);
- Types of DIA contact with Iraqi prisoners/detainees;
- Value of Intell gained from these interactions. (J2 piece)

--In addition, VADM Jacoby tasked the following:

- DH is to prepare a bfn for this session with SSCI staffers;
- explain recent arrival of contract interrogators and that they are not used solo;
- Explain the difference between our HVT prison and the Abu Gharib prison;
- Describe the upgrades to the [REDACTED] facility;
- Describe the monitoring done at the [REDACTED] facility during interrogations,

(b)(1)

7/20/2004

- Send the charts to Gen Dayton for review;
- Explain the DHS activities at Abu Gharib—what, when, why.

(b)(3) The DR wants charts prepared and may want to meet with the bing team before the SSCI session on Friday [REDACTED] DR asked that the mtg be on Friday to give us more time to prepare). DR wants the charts reviewed by Gen Dayton; he wants [REDACTED] to call Gen Dayton and discuss the issues. DR would like us to send the expert team on Friday and try and address all the issues in one mtg, rather than going back over several weeks Prep session in 2D-246 on Tues, 5/11, 1400-1

V/R

(b)(3)

DERIVED FROM: MS

DECLASSIFY ON: X1

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

DERIVED FROM MS

DECLASSIFY ON: X1

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

DERIVED FROM MS

DECLASSIFY ON: X1

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

7/20/2004

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

SUBJECT: Draft Concept for Utilization of Cooperating Source (U)

1. (U) Purpose: To request coordination /comment on subject

2. (U) Security: The unclassified nickname for this project is [REDACTED]

(b)(2)

(b)(1)

(b)(6)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

- Phase 2: Movement coordination and movement [REDACTED] / DOJ / JTF GTMO). The actual request for movement needed to come from DoD. (DOJ/USA suggested DoD to the USA who would forward to Main Justice.) (DIA/SOUTHCOM)

(b)(2)

- Phase 3: GTMO - Employ [REDACTED] IAW JTF GTMO assessment & utilization plan (JTF GTMO).

(b)(1), (b)(6)

- DoD would be required to clearly and specifically articulate how [REDACTED] would be used in GTMO. General statements will not be acceptable.

(b)(1),
(b)(6)

- Phase 4: Operational assessment, lessons learned (DIA/ [REDACTED] SOUTHCOM/JTFGTMO)

(b)(2)

(b)(1)

7. ~~(S/NF)~~ [REDACTED]: Assist assessment operations

* Videotapes provided by JTF GTMO

~~SECRET~~

WORKING DRAFT
6 AUGUST 2004

Document Number: 1
Document Type: Letter
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Date of Document: 6AUG04
To/From: DIA
Subject: JITF-CT Guidelines for Personnel Supporting Interrogation and Debriefing Activities
Pages: 3
Document released in its entirety.

JITF-CT Guidelines for Personnel Supporting Interrogation and Debriefing Activities

Purpose and Scope

These Guidelines regulate the activities of JITF-CT analysts whenever they support any interrogation and debriefing activities, to include those conducted by DoD personnel, as well as by personnel from other U.S. Government agencies. These Guidelines apply to all JITF-CT members.

These Guidelines implement and require adherence to the principles of pertinent international treaties to which the U.S. is a party, and U.S. laws, directives, policies, and guidelines. These documents and legal provisions include, but are not limited to, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, primarily the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW) and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, both dated 12 August 1949; the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, entry into force on 26 June 1987; DoD Directive 5100.77, "DoD Law of War Program," dated 9 December 1998; and U.S. Army Field Manual 34-52, "Intelligence Interrogation," dated 28 September 1992 (hereinafter FM 34-52).

Support to Interrogations and Debriefings

The JITF-CT directs collection, exploitation, analysis, fusion, and dissemination of all-source intelligence for DOD counterterrorism (offensive) and antiterrorism (defensive) operations, planning, and policy.

As such, JITF-CT personnel may be directed or assigned to support DoD and other interrogation and debriefing activities conducted by interrogators, debriefers, other HUMINT personnel and law enforcement personnel relating to persons of potential intelligence value. Persons of potential intelligence value include cooperating assets, Prisoners of War, Enemy Combatants, Persons Under U.S. Control, and other special detainees or prisoners.

JITF-CT support consists of:

WORKING DRAFT

WORKING DRAFT
6 AUGUST 2004

1. Supplying information regarding intelligence gaps and requirements to interrogators/debriefers.
2. Supplying background intelligence materials to interrogators/debriefers.
3. Accompanying government employed interrogators/debriefers and interacting with cooperative or non-cooperative persons of potential intelligence value.
4. Directly posing questions to, and otherwise dialoguing with, cooperative or non-cooperative persons of potential intelligence value. However, contract analysts may only question detainees in the presence of government employed (e.g., GS or U.S. military) specialists. Contractor personnel will not be allowed unaccompanied access to detainees.
5. Providing post-interrogation assessments to interrogators/debriefers.

Other Activities

Generally during the course of supporting interrogations or debriefings, JTF-CT personnel will not have physical contact or other interaction with persons of potential intelligence value. JTF-CT personnel are authorized, however, to have physical contact with, or spend periods in proximity to, persons of potential intelligence value when such activity is required for self-defense, to enhance the temporary safety or security of other U.S. persons in local proximity, or to reasonably ensure the acquisition of combating terrorism intelligence information.

Proscribed Activities

As indicated in FM 34-52.

"The use of force, mental torture, threats, insults, or exposure to unpleasant and inhumane treatment of any kind is prohibited by law and is neither authorized nor condoned by the US Government. Experience indicates that the use of force is not necessary to gain the cooperation of sources for interrogation. Therefore, the use of force is a poor technique, as it yields unreliable results, may damage subsequent collection efforts, and can induce the source to say whatever he thinks the interrogator wants to hear. However, the use of force is not to be confused with psychological ploys, verbal trickery, or other nonviolent and noncoercive ruses used by the interrogator in questioning hesitant or uncooperative sources.

The psychological techniques and principles outlined should neither be confused with, nor construed to be synonymous with, unauthorized techniques such as brainwashing, mental torture, or any other form of mental coercion to include drugs. These techniques and principles are intended to serve as guides in obtaining the willing cooperation of a source. The absence of threats in interrogation is intentional, as their enforcement and

WORKING DRAFT

WORKING DRAFT
6 AUGUST 2004

use normally constitute violations of international law and may result in prosecution under the UCMJ.

Additionally, the inability to carry out a threat of violence or force renders an interrogator ineffective should the source challenge the threat. Consequently, from both legal and moral viewpoints, the restrictions established by international law, agreements, and customs render threats of force, violence, and deprivation useless as interrogation techniques."

To ensure compliance with these principles, JTF-CT personnel will not engage in the following activities relating to persons of potential intelligence value:

1. Physical abuse.
2. Mental abuse.
3. Contacting, questioning or dialoguing with persons of potential intelligence value without approval of the senior JTF-CT individual in charge of all JTF-CT personnel.
4. No JTF-CT contractors will be allowed unaccompanied (i.e., without a government employed specialist) access to detainees.

Education

Copies of the Geneva Conventions, appropriate DoD Directives and other guidelines are available through the JTF-CT General Counsel or the JTF-CT Chief of the Exploitation Branch.

WORKING DRAFT

(b)(3)

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, June 05, 2003 9:04 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]

(b)(1) (b)(2) Subject: [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

(b)(2)

~~(S//NF)~~ On 4 December 2002, the [REDACTED] notified the ATSD(IO) that a [REDACTED] officer, while assigned to (b)(2) [REDACTED] as an interrogator may have violated federal statutes during the interrogation of a Bosnian national. Because the officer was assigned [REDACTED] investigative jurisdiction was with [REDACTED] On 27 May 2003, the [REDACTED] notified [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] had (b)(1) completed its investigation and had found no credible evidence that the [REDACTED] officer and others had violated law.

~~(S//NF)~~ However, the investigation did determine "...that at the time of the incident, there were no specific guidelines regarding interrogation techniques of detainee operations in Bosnia or elsewhere." Based on the [REDACTED] (b)(1) comment I recommend you review interrogation guidelines and procedures governing [REDACTED] activities worldwide and ensure that DIA personnel are familiar with statutory and regulatory provisions affecting such operations.

(b)(3)

~~DERIVED FROM: DHS SCG, MAR 02~~~~DECLASSIFY ON: X1~~CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

6/5/2003

~~SECRET~~



05/19/2004 01:23 PM

To: [REDACTED]
cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

~~SECRET//NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS//X1~~

[REDACTED] please print and pass to [REDACTED]

Thanks!



----- Forwarded by [REDACTED] on 05/19/04 01:17 PM -----



05/19/04 07:30 AM

To: [REDACTED]
cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: [REDACTED]

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

(b)(2)

The SJA review of the AR 15-6 investigation is attached along with a copy of the letter of reprimand that was issued. [REDACTED] is waiting on his response. They'll forward his response and the Commanding General's recommendation for filing, along with entire investigative packet to us. We'll then add [REDACTED] recommendation and forward to [REDACTED] for a filing decision.

Please let me know if you have questions



----- Forwarded by [REDACTED] on 05/19/04 07:22 AM -----

(b)(2)



05/08/04 01:14 AM

To: [REDACTED]
cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

101 6/2/04

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED] as requested. FYI, [REDACTED] has not yet responded. Will let you know [REDACTED] recommendation before forwarding.

(b)(3)

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Thursday, May 06, 2004 8:24 PM

To: [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: [REDACTED]

(b)(2)

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[REDACTED]
DIA must do a "round up" of all possible detainee abuse cases. Can you please send me a copy of the reprimand (either via email or fax to [REDACTED] so I can answer the chain of command on the exact nature of the reprimand?

(b)(2)

Thanks, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~//



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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~//

~~Derived From: multiple sources~~

~~Declassify On: X1~~

~~SECRET//NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS//X1~~

~~SECRET~~

(b)(3) [REDACTED]

(b)(3) From: [REDACTED]

(b)(3) Sent: Tuesday, May 25, 2004 7:38 AM

(b)(3) To: [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: E-Mails Sent & EPW Abuse

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

(b)(3) [REDACTED]

Your instincts served us very well in the early days and got us off the right start. My thanks to you yet again. I know it was a difficult time for you, but your persistence in doing the right thing was always correct. We have been able to weather the storm as a result.

(b)(1) Hope you are well. I leave here (finally) [REDACTED]

(b)(3) [REDACTED]

(b)(3) -----Original Message-----

(b)(3) From: [REDACTED]

(b)(3) Sent: Monday, May 24, 2004 9:38 PM

(b)(3) To: [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: E-Mails Sent & EPW Abuse

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: ~~NONE~~

TERMS: NONE

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~


CAVEATS: NONE

TERMS: NONE

(b)(3) Actually, the info from [REDACTED] was first mentioned by her during our one day visit to Baghdad and then briefed during an end of day while we were still in Qatar. The dates are from my notebook; I didn't have our location noted and should have looked on the calendar. [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

(b)(3)



(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted]

Sent: Tuesday, May 18, 2004 4:59 PM

To: [redacted]

Subject: RE: E-Mails Sent & EPW Abuse

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

CAVEATS: NOFORN

TERMS: NONE

(b)(3):10 USC 424




(b)(1)

(b)(3)

There is an issue with the report coming to you on 8 June We did not arrive in Baghdad [redacted]

Otherwise, I also recall below events.

(b)(3)



(b)(3)

(b)(3)

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted]

Sent: Tuesday, May 18, 2004 12:08 PM

To: [redacted]

Subject: E-Mails Sent & EPW Abuse

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

CAVEATS: NONE

TERMS: NONE

You should have all the documents I have on the issue. Here is the background material you asked about on the reported cases of abuse we heard about when we initially set up the JIDC.

There were three, what I call "probably true/valid," reports of EPW abuse reported to me while I was in Baghdad between [REDACTED] (b)(1)

[REDACTED] The first was from [REDACTED] (b)(1)

[REDACTED] reported that one of the EPW [REDACTED] was interrogating complained of physical abuse during his capture and subsequent interrogation by [REDACTED] (b)(1)

This was reported to [REDACTED] and others of the [REDACTED] (b)(1)

[REDACTED] during the end-of-day [REDACTED] Another account of abuse was reported by [REDACTED] (b)(1)

[REDACTED] When [REDACTED] went to interrogate [REDACTED] (b)(1)

the EPW was in such poor physical shape from obvious beatings, that [REDACTED] asked the MP's to note his condition before he proceeded with interrogation. The EPW told [REDACTED] he had been beaten during interrogation prior to arrival at Camp Cropper. EPW was captured by [REDACTED] The final report of abuse that was reported to me was on [REDACTED] (b)(1)

[REDACTED] According to [REDACTED] (b)(1)

[REDACTED] who visited [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] was in such bad shape at the [REDACTED] (b)(1)

[REDACTED] that he was laying in his own feces. His condition was apparently not a result of physical abuse, but neglect. [REDACTED] (b)(1)

We also received the notes of [REDACTED] (b)(1)

[REDACTED] concerning an ICRC inspection of the [REDACTED] (b)(1)

[REDACTED] which [REDACTED] on [REDACTED] (b)(1)

detainee abuse. (The detainee abuse actually occurred at the Special Confinement Facility, Camp Cropper, run by the [REDACTED] (b)(1)

[REDACTED] You have a copy of my email on the inspection. All the suspected cases of abuse were reported by me [REDACTED] (b)(1)

[REDACTED] There were other issues, such as checking out prisoners by [REDACTED] and others, without an MP escort, and taken to other interrogation facilities not under MP control.

The [REDACTED] facility was ordered closed by [REDACTED] when it was disclosed that the [REDACTED] was running the camp and providing security for the prisoners instead of the MP's. [REDACTED] (b)(1)

[REDACTED] did not assume responsibility for interrogation of any of the detainees until the [REDACTED] was closed and the prisoners transferred back to the SCF at Camp Cropper and the EPW's were properly placed under the control of the MP's.

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424

What I can gather from his email, [REDACTED] reported the ICRC inspection plus all these suspected cases of abuse and prisoner check outs to the CENTCOM [REDACTED]


(b)(1),(b)(6)

(b)(1),(b)(6)

Hope this helps, [REDACTED]

(b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3):10 USC 424



CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

CAVEATS: NONE

TERMS: NONE

DERIVED FROM: [REDACTED] (b)(2)

DECLASSIFY ON: X1

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

DERIVED FROM: [REDACTED] (b)(2)

DECLASSIFY ON: X1

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: NONE

TERMS: NONE

DERIVED FROM: [REDACTED] (b)(2)

DECLASSIFY ON: X1

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: NONE

TERMS: NONE

DERIVED FROM: [REDACTED] (b)(2)

DECLASSIFY ON: x1

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

Tasking

UNCLASSIFIED

Task No: (b)(2)	Subject: UNCLASSIFIED GUIDANCE FOR RELEASE OR TRANSFER OF DETAINEES		Suspense: 08-JUL-2002 1600
Action: Assigned By DO DH 08-JUL-2002 1600 Assigned By Initiator [REDACTED] 09-JUL-2002 1600 (b)(2)			
Collab: Assigned By Initiator DI 08-JUL-2002 1600 DO 08-JUL-2002 1600 DP 08-JUL-2002 1600 [REDACTED] 08-JUL-2002 1600 (b)(2) [REDACTED] (b)(3)			
Guidance: UNCLASSIFIED Written By DO ACTION: DH - REVIEW INITIATOR'S GUIDANCE AND DOCUMENT. - PROVIDE PLANNER LEVEL COMMENTS TO [REDACTED] BY SUSPENSE DATE. - PROVIDE NAME OF THE ACTION OFFICER WITHIN 24 HOURS OF RECEIPT OF THIS TASKER. S: 8 JUL 02/1600 NOTE: - DOCUMENT SENT VIA E-MAIL - ENSURE COORDINATION WITH APPROPRIATE MANAGEMENT ELEMENTS. - ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH YOUR HEADQUARTER'S ESTABLISHED POLICY REGARDING TASKING CLOSURE. DO: [REDACTED] /2JUL02 (b)(3) Written By Initiator NOTE: ATTACHMENT WAS SENT ELECTRONICALLY TO [REDACTED] 1. ACTION OFFICE: [REDACTED] PLEASE REVIEW THE ATTACHED DRAFT IMPLEMENTING GUIDANCE DEVELOPED TO SUPPORT OUR APPROVED POLICY ON RELEASE OR TRANSFER OF DETAINEES. RESPOND USING LINE IN/OUT FORMAT. (b)(2) 2. DP, DI, DO, [REDACTED] PLEASE PROVIDE YOUR PLANNER COMMENTS TO [REDACTED] NLT 8 JULY. (b)(2)			
Status: OPEN	Flag:	Reference No: [REDACTED] (b)(2)	Scanned Pages: 0
Delegator: DO	Delegation Date: 02-JUL-2002 1510	Delegator POC:	Delegator Phone:
Initiator: [REDACTED] (b)(2)	Issued Date: 02-JUL-2002 0850	Initiator POC: [REDACTED] (b)(3)	Initiator Phone: [REDACTED] (b)(2)(b)(3)
Category: D DOCUMENT REVIEW/RELEASE		Consumer: J5 DIR, STRAT PLANS AND POLICY	

Unclassified

(b)(2)

DOCUMENT ID [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Implementing Guidance for release or transfer of detainees under DoD control to foreign governments

ACTION [REDACTED] Lead Sus 9 July
Collab DP, DI, DO, [REDACTED] Sus 8 July

.....
___AO comment/concurrence ___X___PLANNER comment/concurrence

(b)(2) (b)(3)

- [REDACTED]
1. Action Office: [REDACTED] please review the attached draft implementing guidance developed to support our approved policy on release or transfer of detainees. Respond using line in/out format (b)(2)
 2. DP, DI, DO, [REDACTED] please provide your planner comments to [REDACTED] NLT 8 July

Notebook Entry

UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(2)

Task No: [REDACTED]	Subject: UNCLASSIFIED GUIDANCE FOR RELEASE OR TRANSFER OF DETAINEES		
Office: DH	Date: 03-JUL-2002 1506	Name: (b)(3) [REDACTED]	Reason: REQUEST
Comment: UNCLASSIFIED PLEASE CLOSE FOR DH ACTION. [REDACTED] SPOKE TO [REDACTED] AND THEY CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THIS IS IN FACT A [REDACTED] ACTION. [REDACTED] HAS TAKEN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS ACTION. PLEASE RE-TASK THIS TO [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (b)(3)			

(b)(2)
(b)(3)



JITF-CT EXPLOITATION BRANCH

GUIDELINES FOR PERSONNEL SUPPORTING INTERROGATIONS AND DEBRIEFING ACTIVITIES

The Overall Classification of this
briefing is ~~SECRET NOFORN~~


~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Purpose and Scope

- GUIDELINES REGULATE ACTIVITIES OF JITF-CT ANALYSTS SUPPORTING INTERROGATION AND DEBRIEFING ACTIVITIES
- REQUIRED ADHERENCE TO PRICIPLES OF PERTINENT INTERNATIONAL TREATIES THAT THE U.S. IS A PARTY TO, INCLUDING, BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO, GENEVA CONVENTION
- APPLICABLE TO ALL JITF-CT MEMBERS

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Interrogation / Debriefing Support



JITF-CT PERSONNEL PROVIDE ANALYTICAL SUPPORT TO

- INTERROGATORS
- DEBRIEFERS
- HUMINT PERSONNEL
- LAW ENFORCEMENT

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

WHAT WE BRING TO THE GAME!!!

JITF-CT SUPPORT COSISTS OF:

- SUPPLYING INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND REQUIREMENTS TO INTERROGATORS/DEBRIEFERS
- SUPPLYING BACKGROUND INTELLIGENCE MATERIALS TO INTERROGATORS/DEBRIEFERS
- ACCOMPANYING INTERROGATORS/DEBRIEFERS AND INTERACTING WITH COOPERATIVE OR NON-COOPERATIVE PERSONS OF POTENTIAL INTELLIGENCE VALUE.
- DIRECTLY POSING QUESTIONS TO AND OTHERWISE DIALOGUING WITH COOPERATIVE OR NON-COOPERATIVE PERSONS OF POTENTIAL INTELLIGENCE VALUE.
- PROVIDING POST-INTERROGATION ASSESSMENTS TO INTERROGATORS/DEBRIEFERS

SECRET//NOFORN

Other Activities

- UNLESS IN SELF-DEFENSE, ENHANCING THE SAFETY OR SECURITY OF OTHER U.S. PERSONNEL IN THE LOCAL PROXIMITY OR TO REASONABLY ENSURE THE ACQUISITION OF COMBATING TERRORISM INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION, JITF-CT PERSONNEL ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO HAVE PHYSICAL CONTACT OR OTHER INTERACTION WITH PERSONS OF POTENTIAL INTELLIGENCE VALUE

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Proscribed Activities

AS INDICATED IN FM 34-52

- USE OF FORCE, MENTAL TORTURE, THREATS, OR INHUMANE TREATMENT IS PROHIBITED BY LAW
- USE OF FORCE IS NOT TO BE CONFUSED WITH PSYCHOLOGICAL PLOYS, VERBAL TRICKERY OR OTHER NON-VIOLENT/NONCOERCIVE RUES USED WHEN QUESTIONING HESITANT OR UNCOOPERATIVE SOURCES
- PSYCHOLOGICAL TECHNIQUES SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH UNAUTHORIZED TECHNIQUES, WHICH SERVE AS GUIDELINES TO OBTAIN THE WILLING COOPERATION FROM THE SOURCE

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**JITF-CT PERSONNEL DO NOT ENGAGE IN THE
FOLLOWING ACTIVITIES RELATING TO PERSONS OF
POTENTIAL INTELLIGENCE VALUE**

- PHYSICAL ABUSE
- MENTAL ABUSE
- CONTACTING, QUESTIONING OR DIALOGUING WITH PERSONS OF POTENTIAL INTELLIGENCE VALUE WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE SENIOR JITF-CT INDIVIDUAL IN CHARGE OF ALL JITF-CT PERSONNEL
- NO JITF-CT CONTRACTORS WILL BE ALLOWED UNACCOMPANIED (I.E., WITHOUT A GOVERNMENT EMPLOYED SPECIALIST) ACCESS TO DETAINEES
- EDUCATION- COPIES OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION, APPROPRIATE DOD DIRECTIVES AND OTHER GUIDELINES ARE AVAILABLE

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

The Overall Classification of this
briefing was ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Questions?



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 7, 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees

1. Our recent extensive discussions regarding the status of al Qaeda and Taliban detainees confirm that the application of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 (Geneva) to the conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban involves complex legal questions. By its terms, Geneva applies to conflicts involving "High Contracting Parties," which can only be states. Moreover, it assumes the existence of "regular" armed forces fighting on behalf of states. However, the war against terrorism ushers in a new paradigm, one in which groups with broad, international reach commit horrific acts against innocent civilians, sometimes with the direct support of states. Our Nation recognizes that this new paradigm -- ushered in not by us, but by terrorists -- requires new thinking in the law of war, but thinking that should nevertheless be consistent with the principles of Geneva.
2. Pursuant to my authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive of the United States, and relying on the opinion of the Department of Justice dated January 22, 2002, and on the legal opinion rendered by the Attorney General in his letter of February 1, 2002, I hereby determine as follows:
 - a. I accept the legal conclusion of the Department of Justice and determine that none of the provisions of Geneva apply to our conflict with al Qaeda in Afghanistan or elsewhere throughout the world because, among other reasons, al Qaeda is not a High Contracting Party to Geneva.
 - b. I accept the legal conclusion of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice that I have the authority under the Constitution to suspend Geneva as between the United States and Afghanistan, but I decline to

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 02/07/12

NSC DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW [E.O. 12958 as amended]
DECLASSIFY IN FULL
by D.Sanborn on 10/25/2004

Previously declassified 6/17/2004

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

exercise that authority at this time. Accordingly, I determine that the provisions of Geneva will apply to our present conflict with the Taliban. I reserve the right to exercise this authority in this or future conflicts.

- c. I also accept the legal conclusion of the Department of Justice and determine that common Article 3 of Geneva does not apply to either al Qaeda or Taliban detainees, because, among other reasons, the relevant conflicts are international in scope and common Article 3 applies only to "armed conflict not of an international character."
 - d. Based on the facts supplied by the Department of Defense and the recommendation of the Department of Justice, I determine that the Taliban detainees are unlawful combatants and, therefore, do not qualify as prisoners of war under Article 4 of Geneva. I note that, because Geneva does not apply to our conflict with al Qaeda, al Qaeda detainees also do not qualify as prisoners of war.
- 3. Of course, our values as a Nation, values that we share with many nations in the world, call for us to treat detainees humanely, including those who are not legally entitled to such treatment. Our Nation has been and will continue to be a strong supporter of Geneva and its principles. As a matter of policy, the United States Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva.
 - 4. The United States will hold states, organizations, and individuals who gain control of United States personnel responsible for treating such personnel humanely and consistent with applicable law.
 - 5. I hereby reaffirm the order previously issued by the Secretary of Defense to the United States Armed Forces requiring that the detainees be treated humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva.
 - 6. I hereby direct the Secretary of State to communicate my determinations in an appropriate manner to our allies, and other countries and international organizations cooperating in the war against terrorism of global reach.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



INFO MEMO

~~S~~-0517/DR

June 25, 2004

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE

FROM: L. E. Jacoby, Vice Admiral, USN, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Subject: ~~(S//NF)~~ Alleged Detainee Abuse by TF 62-6 Personnel

~~(S//NF)~~ During the afternoon of 24 June 2004, we were notified that DIA personnel serving with TF 6-26 in Baghdad had informed their ISG seniors of the following:

- ~~(S//NF)~~ Two DIA, Directorate for Human Intelligence (DIA/DH) interrogators/debriefers assigned to support TF 6-26 (SOF) have observed:
 - Prisoners arriving at the Temporary Detention Facility in Baghdad with burn marks on their backs. Some have bruises, and some have complained of kidney pain.
 - One of the two DIA/DH interrogators/debriefers witnessed TF 6-26 officers punch a prisoner in the face to the point the individual needed medical attention. This record of treatment was not recorded by TF 6-26 personnel. In this instance, the debriefer was ordered to leave the room.
 - One DIA/DH interrogator/debriefer took pictures of the injuries and showed them to his TF 62-6 supervisor, who immediately confiscated them.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ TF 6-26 personnel have taken the following actions with regards to DIA/DH interrogators/debriefers:
 - Confiscated vehicle keys
 - Instructed them not to leave the compound without specific permission, even to get a haircut at the PX
 - Threatened them

~~Classified by: Multiple Sources~~
~~Source Marked: X1~~
~~Declassify on: 25 Jun 2026~~

- Informed them that their e-mails were being screened
- Ordered them not to talk to anyone in the US
- ~~(S//NF)~~ The two DH strategic debriefers assigned to TF 62-6 reported the above information to the Operations Officer. He immediately contacted DIA IG Forward and asked that both individuals be interviewed. The IG representative made the recommendation that VADM Church's group be immediately apprised in order to get this into official IG channels as the issue fell directly under its charter. The Church IG Team senior investigating officer is conducting interviews of the interrogators/debriefers today. The DIA IG was informed and concurred with this course of action.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ The ISG Operations Officer contacted and briefed the Director of the ISG, who was in Qatar attending a Commander's Conference. The ISG Director informed the Deputy Commander for Detainee Affairs, MNF-I. He subsequently contacted the Commander of TF 6-26 and directed him to investigate this situation. In turn the TF 6-26 Commander informed his superior, the Commander JSOC. The Commander, CENTCOM has also been informed of this situation.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ The two interrogators/debriefers were directed to return to the ISG compound at Camp Slayer due to these events.

(b)(3)

Document Index: Intelligence Interrogation of Enemy Combatant Detainee Ali Saleh al-Marri

(b)(2) (b)(3) Compiled by: [REDACTED]

Date of compilation: 15 Jul 04

Index:

- (b)(1) (b)(6)
1. [REDACTED] ~~S/NF~~
 2. [REDACTED] ~~S/NF~~
 3. [REDACTED] ~~S/NF~~
 4. [REDACTED] ~~S/NF~~
 5. [REDACTED] ~~S/NF~~
 6. [REDACTED] ~~S/NF~~
 7. [REDACTED] ~~S/NF~~ [REDACTED]

Document Index: Intelligence Interrogation of Enemy Combatant Detainee [REDACTED] (b)(1)

Compiled by: [REDACTED] (b)(6)

Date of compilation: 15 Jul 04

Index:

1. Copy of e-mail traffic, originating on 18 Apr 02, detailing NR and FBI approval for [REDACTED] to contact detainee [REDACTED] ~~S/NF~~
2. After-Action Report, undated, detailing contact between [REDACTED] personnel and detainee [REDACTED] ~~S/NF~~
3. After-Action Report, undated, detailing the debriefing of detainee [REDACTED] AAR contains a list of IIRs produced as a result of the debriefing, ~~S/NF/ORCON~~
4. DRAFT Memorandum for Director, Joint Staff, dated 4 Sep 03, pertaining to detainee [REDACTED] ~~S/NF~~
5. SITREP, dated 16 Sep 03, detailing turnover meeting after transfer of detainee [REDACTED] ~~S/NF~~
6. INFO MEMO for SJA, JFCOM, Status of Norfolk Detainee, 25 Nov 03, ~~S/NF~~

(b)(1) (b)(6)

Document Index: Intelligence Interrogation of Enemy Combatant Detainee [REDACTED] (b)(1) (b)(6)

Compiled by: [REDACTED] (b)(3) (b)(2)

Date of compilation: 15 Jul 04

Index:

1. Copy of e-mail traffic, originating on 11 Sep 02, requesting GC comment and guidance on [REDACTED] of detainee [REDACTED] ~~S/NF~~ (b)(1) (b)(2) (b)(6)
2. Copy of e-mail message, undated, concerning the impact of visits by a Navy chaplain on the interrogation of detainee [REDACTED] ~~S/NF~~
3. Copy of interrogation approach plan, dated 13 Jan 03, for detainee [REDACTED] ~~S/ORCON/NOFORN~~
4. Agenda, dated 19 Mar 03, of IPR in case of detainee [REDACTED] ~~S/NF~~
5. Update, dated 20 Jan 04, from [REDACTED] to DIA GC, concerning detainee [REDACTED] ~~S/NF~~
6. Index of Interrogation Activity WRT detainee [REDACTED] written in response to Task [REDACTED] unclass
7. SITREPs detailing interrogation activity, detainee [REDACTED] There are [REDACTED] in all, dates between 3 Oct 02 and 2 Mar 04. Updates thru 5 Jun 03 ~~S/ORCON/NF, thereafter S/NF~~

From: [REDACTED]
 (b)(3) **Sent:** Tuesday, December 09, 2003 11:55 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: Interrogation Policy

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

(b)(3) [REDACTED] – Please see below from [REDACTED]. In speaking with [REDACTED] just now, he recommends bringing [REDACTED] into the fray. He has the institutional knowledge and expertise to best convey our argument to GC.

(b)(3) [REDACTED] you are not missing anything. It is the lawyers who are missing the point. The [REDACTED] (b)(2) interrogation mission is codified under JCS and combatant command doctrine, and included in the [REDACTED] founding documents. In keeping with this mission, [REDACTED] has routinely identified and deployed interrogators to assist JTFs and Combatant Commanders with interrogations. With the increased demand for interrogators post-9/11, [REDACTED]

(b)(1) [REDACTED]
 (b)(2) [REDACTED]

(b)(3) [REDACTED] Based on questionable conduct in the past by [REDACTED] interrogators, murky rules of the road, OSD interest in GTMO rules, significantly different [REDACTED] rules, and the central role [REDACTED] plays at GTMO, I directed a [REDACTED] interrogation policy be developed. I am pretty sure the DD was aware of this, [REDACTED] attended several OSD legal meetings on interrogation policy. I believe the legal view that we simply belong to the Combatant Commanders and fall under their rules is shortsighted. [REDACTED] It seems to me that these individuals need to be able to operate off of a fully coordinated and vetted interrogation policy. We have the experience and expertise to prepare such a document, and it definitely should be a joint document. If the lawyers want it to be a Joint Staff document, then I would argue the way to go is for DIA to coordinate and dispatch its policy, and then let the Joint Staff codify it in their doctrine, as we did with [REDACTED]. The Joint Staff does not have the expertise to prepare what you guys pulled together. I do not recall discussing this with [REDACTED] but I know he was aware of its development and of the meetings [REDACTED]. Frankly, it never occurred to me that anyone except [REDACTED] DIA would prepare and issue such a policy. We issue policies on everything else we do—why not interrogation?

(b)(3) [REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]
 (b)(3) **Sent:** Tuesday, December 09, 2003 9:28 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: Interrogation Policy
Sensitivity: Private

(b)(2)

HEADQUARTERS [REDACTED] INDEX.

1. PHONE LIST, [REDACTED] UNKNOWN AUTHOR, UNDATED, ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

2. PHONE LIST, [REDACTED] UNKNOWN AUTHOR, UNDATED,
~~CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN~~

3. EMAIL, LIST OF PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN CONSOLIDATED [REDACTED]

(b)(6)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(2)

4. [REDACTED] LISTING OF
INTERROGATION PERSONNEL (JIDC), JUNE 2003, AUTHOR, [REDACTED]
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

5. LIST OF DEPLOYED PERSONNEL - [REDACTED] DATED 15 JULY 2004, AUTHOR,
[REDACTED] ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

6. LIST OF DEPLOYED PERSONNEL - [REDACTED] DATED 16 JULY 2004, AUTHOR,
[REDACTED] ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

HEADQUARTERS [REDACTED] PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN TASKER SEARCH:

[REDACTED]

(b)(3)

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)

(b)(2) 1. 29 OCT 02: [REDACTED] SUPPORT TO U.S. CENTRAL
COMAND OPLAN 1003 ~~(S//NF)~~

2. 15 NOV 02: AUTHORIZATION FOR [REDACTED] OFFICERS TO PARTICIPATE IN
CUSTODIAL INTERVIEWS ~~(S//NF)~~

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(2)

12 JUL 04: [REDACTED] CONTACT [REDACTED] LIAISON CONTACT WITH [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] ~~(C)~~

(b)(1) (b)(2)

[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED] (b)(3)
Sent: Monday, May 10, 2004 10:23 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: Investigation and one of our own
Importance: High
CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

Note report below.

Has anyone in your office been appointed the POC for this or are you still evaluating [REDACTED] information? (b)(3)
CID is going to interview [REDACTED] at 11:30 at Clarendon. Does IG want some representative present or should I just take notes for you?

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, May 10, 2004 9:44 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: Investigation and one of our own
Importance: High

(b)(3)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~
CAVEATS: ~~ORCON~~; ~~NOFORN~~
TERMS: NONE

[REDACTED]

While none of our DHSers is under investigation for any detainee abuse as far as I know, there is one incident brought to my attention that warrants tracking. Keep in mind all that I'm relaying is hearsay and conjecture, i.e., I have no direct knowledge of the events, but am passing on what I've heard/done just in case you have or will.

An Uzbek detainee was turned over to US forces by local villagers. He appeared to have been severely beaten in the process of being captured by the villagers. Once in US custody, a [REDACTED] contractor working for CENTCOM, [REDACTED] allegedly threw a few punches of his own. When the detainee made his way to the Bagram Collection Point (BCP), the personnel there noticed the bruising and became concerned. An investigation (15-6) was launched. The JTF-180 investigators interviewed all that had contact with the detainee, including [REDACTED]. I understand, from [REDACTED], that the investigation cleared all concerned. [REDACTED] is checking the fact specifics of the investigation. (b)(3)

The link to DHS appeared when [REDACTED] called me and raised the specter of a possible/unsubstantiated detainee abuse allegation. I informed the acting J2 who, in turn, recontacted [REDACTED]. Apparently another DHSer, [REDACTED], was a witness to the event—I found out about this today. [REDACTED] and I will meet today at 1600Z to discuss the matter. I'll let you know what comes of this. They may want to call [REDACTED] directly—[REDACTED]. We drop the fig leaf for these guys in order for them to process end of tour awards anyway. (b)(1)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

5 10 2004

(b)(1)

FYI, I met w/the [REDACTED] this morning on another matter and they confirmed there were no incidences investigated or under investigation involving DHS personnel misconduct. There were two investigations, however, that involve me—the [REDACTED] issue; and a detainee incident while I was J2X in IZ. Neither one is a concern as I'm not the subject of the investigation and have only tangential involvement via a statement given in support of the investigation. They stressed there is no/no need for DHS concern on this. They requested any knowledge of this investigation be very, very close hold.

v/r,

(b)(1) (b)(3)

(b)(1)

CLASSIFIED BY: DH SCG February 2004
REASON: 1.4(a)
DECLASSIFY ON: X1

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~
CAVEATS: ~~ORCON/NOFORN~~
TERMS: NONE

DERIVED FROM: DHSSCG OCT 97

DECLASSIFY ON: X1

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

5 10 2004



Defense Intelligence Agency
Office of the Inspector General
Office for Investigations
Report of Conversation

Date: 15 June 2004

Project

Time: 0900

(b)(2)

Name of Contact: [REDACTED]

Office/Division: [REDACTED]

Phone

(b)(3) (b)(6)

Address of Organization: [REDACTED]

Employee Name: [REDACTED]

Office/Division: IG

Phone #: [REDACTED]

Circle One

1

CALLED/VISITED

Subject: IRAQ PRISON

What was said:

Met with [REDACTED] who related that [REDACTED] was deployed to IRAQ between [REDACTED] where [REDACTED] worked as a counter-terrorism analyst at the inlet fusion center located on Camp Slayer. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] visited the Brigade Interrogation Facility (BIF) during the early part of Jan 04. The purpose of [REDACTED] visit was to assist in an interrogation of a detainee suspected of making bombs. In addition to [REDACTED] there was a [REDACTED] interrogator, a [REDACTED] and a [REDACTED] interrogator. [REDACTED] stated that during the interrogation, there was no touching of the detainee by any of the interrogators, nor was there any rough treatment of the detainee. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] did notice that the detainee had bruises under both of his eyes, and that the bruises did not appear to be fresh. [REDACTED] stated they were not the first group to interrogate the detainee, as the detainee knew the procedures of the interrogation. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] did not visit the Abu Ghraib prison during [REDACTED] time in Iraq. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] did have multiple telephone conversations with the interrogators who worked at the Abu Ghraib prison, and during those conversations there were never any discussions of the activities that were going on at that prison. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] heard rumors of the detainees being subjected to sleep deprivation, and the use of dogs to instill fear in the detainees, but has no first hand knowledge of those incidents. [REDACTED] provided no additional information concerning either prison facility.

Reviewed by: [REDACTED] 6/21/04

~~SECRET~~



Defense Intelligence Agency
Office of the Inspector General
Office for Investigations
Report of Conversation

(b)(3):10
USC
424,(b)(6)

Date: 19 May 2004

Project 9999 (b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424

Time: 1300

Name of Contact: [REDACTED]

Office/Division: [REDACTED]

Phone: [REDACTED]

Address of Organization: [REDACTED]

(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424

Employee Name: [REDACTED]

Office/Division: IG

Phone #: [REDACTED]

Circle One
WE

VISITED

Subject: Knowledge of incidents relating to IRAQ Prison Situation

What was said:

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] met with [REDACTED] who was first asked if [REDACTED] had been interviewed by any other agency regarding the Iraq prison issues. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] had not been interviewed by anyone. [REDACTED] related that [REDACTED] was TDY to Iraq from 28 October 2003 to 21 April 2004. During [REDACTED] time in Iraq [REDACTED] was the [REDACTED] in which [REDACTED] was in charge of a 3-4 man team that helped focused the interrogations. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] had the opportunity to visit the prison on two different occasions, during [REDACTED] 6 months in Iraq. During [REDACTED] last visit to the prison, [REDACTED] only observation of any prisoners was a single detainee being escorted by two guards, during which [REDACTED] did not observed anything but gentle handling of the detainee. [REDACTED] was asked about any other DIA employees who may have been involved with the detainees, at which time [REDACTED] stated that DIA had no permanent representation at the prison until about February 2004, when a [REDACTED] reports officers arrived, there were two of them and they were contractors. [REDACTED] did not know the identities of the two individuals. [REDACTED] went on to say that when [REDACTED] arrived, [REDACTED] and three contractors arrive in Iraq, their DIA association stopped. They then reported directly to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was asked about [REDACTED] knowledge of abuses specifically "Rape" that may have occurred against female detainees. [REDACTED] related that [REDACTED] personally know of none, however, [REDACTED] does remember in a meeting held by [REDACTED] during which [REDACTED] discussed an interview [REDACTED] had with BG TAGUBA, where BG TAGUBA had stated that there was allegations that some female detainees may have been raped by US Soldiers, and that the detainees had been tested for pregnancy with negative results. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] has no eyewitness or direct knowledge of abuses at the prison.

[REDACTED] stated that the expectations of "Non Humanators" were that one had to break the detainees to get the information. [REDACTED] stated that "HQ" wanted the interrogators to break the detainees. The interrogators were members of the [REDACTED] based out of [REDACTED] (b)(2) [REDACTED] but [REDACTED] FBI also had interrogators working at the prison. (b)(1)

[REDACTED] was asked if there was some type of document, such as an SOP or regulation that stated what the interrogators could or could not do to the detainees. [REDACTED] stated there is a 35 page

Reviewed by: 69 5/24/04

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

document (Frag Order), which spells out the rules of engagement by which the interrogators were supposed to operate under. [redacted] went on to say the people were encourage to go to the outer limits to get information from the detainees by people who wanted the information, [redacted] was asked to whom [redacted] was referring and [redacted] stated LTG SANCHEZ. [redacted] said there was desperate need to get information from the detainees. [redacted] did not have additional information to provide, and provided a contact number [redacted] to reach [redacted] until [redacted] retires at the end of June 04.

(b)(3):10
USC 424



Reviewed by:

~~SECRET~~

(b)(3):10
USC 424

DOCUMENT:

DATE:

	Concept of Operations: [REDACTED]	20 May 02	(b)(2)
(b)(2)	Support to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] (U)		(b)(2)
(b)(2)	Memorandum FOR [REDACTED] SUBJECT: Request for Segregation	16 Nov 03	
	Info Memo FOR UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE, Subject: Update on Detention of the Former [REDACTED]	04 Aug 03	
(b)(6)	[REDACTED]		
	Summary Interrogation Report [REDACTED]	19 Oct 03	(b)(1)
(b)(6)	[REDACTED]		
	Interrogation Report [REDACTED]	07 Jan 04	
	Interrogation Report [REDACTED]	28 Dec 03	
	Interrogation Report [REDACTED]	22 Nov 03	
	Interrogation Report [REDACTED]	19 Dec 03	
	Interrogation Report [REDACTED]	15 Nov 03	(b)(2)
	Interrogation Report [REDACTED]	08 Nov 03	
	Interrogation Report [REDACTED]	08 Jan 04	
	Interrogation Report [REDACTED]	29 Dec 03	
	Email: OSD Policy for Release of Detainees	19 Aug 03	
	Email: RE: Interim Policy on Release of Detainee Names - [REDACTED]	03 Jun 04	(b)(1)
	Email: RE: Interrogations, Interrogations, Interrogations	13 Feb 04	

List of Interrogation, Debriefing and Detainee Documents

(b)(3)

<u>Document</u>	<u>Date</u>
Captured HVD Status, CCJ2X	1 July 2003
DIA Briefing to the SSCI Staff, DIA Interactions with Iraqi Prisoners	Undated
Memorandum: CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy	12 Oct. 2003
JIDC Memo: Mission Impact on No Contract Conducted Interrogation/Debriefings	9 May 2004
ISG Info Memo: Interrogations at the Abu Ghurayb Prison	2 May 2004
ISG Standing Operating Procedure for Nomination for Release, Parole, Transfer or Immunity of Detainees	8 May 2004
JIDC/ISG Interrogation Standing Operating Procedures (Updated 05/04)	3 Oct. 2003
JIDC Memo: JIDC Operational Review	5 May 2004
ISG Standing Operating Procedures for Nomination for Release, Parole, Transfer or Immunity of Detainees	13 Oct. 2003
Email: Dubious Detainee Disclosures (IIR 6 067 2804 04)	24 May 2004
Email: Brief to SSCI Staff	19 May 2004
Email: Briefing to the SSCI	11 May 2004
Email: DR Guidance for SSCI Meeting on Iraqi Prisoners	10 May 2004
Email: Justification for 25 Contract Interrogators	29 April 2004
Email: Question on Detainee Accesses/Conduits	28 April 2004
Email: Re: TF-Detainee	29 March 2004
Email: Can You Share? – Improved handling for detainee information	9 Feb. 2004
Email: J2 Meeting – Tactical HUMINT Requirements	15 Oct. 2003
(b)(2) Email [REDACTED] CENTCOM Detainee Database Solution	26 Mar 2004

memorandum

DATE 10 June, 2004

REPLY TO:

ATTN OF:

(b)(3)

SUBJECT Memorandum for Record - Report of Violations of The Geneva Conventions and the International Laws of Land Warfare (U).

TO:

1. ~~(S)~~ From [REDACTED] I was employed by the Defense Intelligence Agency as an Intelligence Officer assigned and under the operational control to [REDACTED]. I have been in the civilian employment of the Department of Defense in the capacity of intelligence officer for approximately 14 years. I have received specialized on-the-job-training in HUMINT operations, to include interrogation. I spoke about the incidents reported in the document during a meeting with [REDACTED] at approximately 12:15 pm. Present at the meeting were [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

(b)(6)

(U) This statement is in support of the following:

- a. (U) Two counts of violations of The Geneva Convention as it pertains to detainee abuse.
- b. (U) One count of violations of The Geneva Convention as it pertains to the illegal detainment of non-combatants.

3. (U) Details:

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ (1" count, ref para 2.a.) On or about 11 May 2004, in Baghdad, Iraq, I witnessed the mistreatment of a TF 6-26 detainee during the initial interrogation after his capture. During the interrogation, conducted by a US Army interrogator, four or five non-interrogator personnel from the Task Force entered the room and began slapping the detainee while he was attempting to respond to the questioning. After approximately 15 minutes, a senior NCO, going by call sign "XO3" entered the room and asked most of the personnel to leave, to include ALL of the interrogators. I am not aware of what specifically occurred during my absence. [REDACTED] officer assigned to the Task Force, was present as well and witness the incident. [REDACTED] was observing the interrogation and I was assisting the lead interrogator, A 1st SF Group interrogator also augmenting the unit. I am not aware if this matter has been previously reported.

(b)(3)

✓ FROM: DH HUMINT SCG, SEP 03
DECL ON: X1

(b)(1)

~~SECRET//NOFORN/X1~~

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ (2nd count, ref para 2.a.) During another TF 6-26 operation in Baghdad, a [REDACTED] of the Coalition Provisional Authority's Counterintelligence office (PA-CI) was arrested during a raid targeting an al-Qaida facilitator. [REDACTED] and two male family members were detained and moved to the TF 6-26 screening facility. [REDACTED] and his family members were released and during the initial debriefing of [REDACTED] he reported to TF 6-26 and CPA-CI handlers that he had been "slapped around" during initial interrogation at the place of his capture. The matter was reported in an internal TF contract report to the B Squadron commander by the DIA handling officer, [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ (Ref para 2.b.) On 9 May 2004, TF 6-26 personnel detained the wife of a suspected Iraqi terrorist, in Tarmiya, Iraq. The 28-year-old woman had three young children at the house, one being as young as six months and still nursing. Her husband was the primary target of the raid, with other suspect personnel subject to detainment as well. The house belonged to the primary target's in-laws, and it was believed his wife and children would be there as well. During the pre-operation brief it was recommended by TF personnel that if the wife were present, she be detained and held in order to leverage the primary target's surrender. I objected to the detainment of the young mother to the raid team leader, "XO3". I believed it was a dead issue, since I would be on-target and responsible for screening the occupants of the house for suspects to detain. During my initial screening of the occupants at the target house, I determined that the wife could provide no actionable intelligence leading to the arrest her husband. Despite my protest,

a raid team leader detained her anyway. I concurred with the arrest of one of her brothers, who had been identified as likely having knowledge of the primary target's location. I reported the incident to the HUMINT support element operations officer, [REDACTED] as I understand it, the matter was in turn reported to the Task Force HQ. Approximately two day later, the wife and her brother were released into the custody of their tribal sheikh.

(b)(3)

4. (U) Concluding statement: The tactical interrogation report is a record of the interrogation and is more often than not the only written record forwarded with the detainees as they are moved through the detention system from screening facilities to final detention centers. Since those interrogation reports, as a matter of record, contain the names of the interrogators, any mistreatment of detainees, whether in the presence of the interrogator or not, reflects adversely and directly on the interrogator named in the report. This is a liability to the DHS collector and the DIA. It is my recommendation that any direct interrogation support to a DoD element by DHS be supported with an MOU clearly defining DoD interrogation and detainee treatment policies.

(b)(3)

✓ FROM: DH HUMINT SCG, SEP 03
DECL ON: X1

~~SECRET//NOFORN/X1~~

~~SECRET~~



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-



U-50/DH

9 July 2004

TO: Commander
U.S. Army Military District of Washington
103 Third Avenue
Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C. 20319-5058

SUBJECT: Recommendation regarding filing of reprimand - [REDACTED] (b)(3)

1. I have considered the matters [REDACTED] submitted in response to your memorandum of reprimand dated 26 April 2004; the case file; MG Olson's recommendation; and [REDACTED] exceptional service, to include two deployments to Afghanistan.

2. In accordance with Army Regulation 600-37, paragraph 3-4a, I recommend that [REDACTED] (b)(3) reprimand be filed in his Local Unit File for a period of three years or until his departure from your general court-martial jurisdiction, whichever is sooner.

M. E. Ennis
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps
Deputy Director for Human Intelligence

~~SECRET~~

(b)(3)

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, July 19, 2004 7:37 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

Subject: RE: RFI from ADM Church re Interrogator Issues

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

I don't know about the Army fighting for an expanded role, at least in Afghanistan, but I do know that CENTCOM never requested additional [REDACTED] Strategic interrogation and debriefing was, and still is, generally conducted at GTMO. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

[REDACTED] Had CENTCOM requested more [REDACTED] we certainly would have provided them. I know of no RFF that was denied from CENTCOM. I can't speak for OIF.

(b)(1)

I recommend that future doctrine establish the JIDC as an umbrella interrogation/debriefing HQ which have separate Joint Interrogation Facilities [REDACTED] and Joint Debriefing Facilities [REDACTED] subordinate to it. [REDACTED]

Comments appreciated.

(b)(3)

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, July 16, 2004 5:15 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

Subject: FW: RFI from ADM Church re Interrogator Issues

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

7/19/2004

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

(b)(3)

(b)(1)

- I find the atch'd really interesting - [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] and that they fought for as large a piece of the pie as possible?

- The admiral is correct in stating the original intent in the consolidation of DoD HUMINT was that [REDACTED] would be responsible for interrogation at major EPW detention areas. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

- In any event, do any of you have any comments/observations you'd like to contribute to help us develop a response to the attached memo?

(b)(3)

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (b)(3)
Sent: Friday, July 16, 2004 4:11 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: RFI from ADM Church re Interrogator Issues

From: [REDACTED] (b)(3)
Sent: Friday, July 16, 2004 4:11:25 PM

Subject: RE: RFI from ADM Church re Interrogator Issues
Auto forwarded by a Rule

7/19/2004

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: ~~NONE~~

TERMS: NONE

ALCON:

(b)(3)

At 0900 hours on 19 Jul, we will meet in [REDACTED] office to discuss the issues in the attached RFI and sort out responsibilities for the input. Suspense has been moved to COB 23 Jul. [REDACTED] would like a draft by SOB Thursday, 22 Jul.
Thanks

[REDACTED]
(b)(3)

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: July 16, 2004 15:52

To: [REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

Subject: RE: RFI from ADM Church re Interrogator Issues

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

Gentlemen:

Attached is the subject memo for your viewing pleasure. [REDACTED] just spoke with [REDACTED] and said the due date is pretty tight for the info being requested, so we now have until next Fri to turn our response in.

(b)(6)

(b)(3)

[REDACTED]
(b)(3)

-----Original Message-----

7/19/2004

(b)(3)
From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, July 16, 2004 3:33 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: RFI from ADM Church re Interrogator Issues

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

[REDACTED]

(b)(3)

[REDACTED] is working a similar action for the DIA IG. Suspect the questions are similar.

[REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (b)(3)
Sent: Friday, July 16, 2004 3:29 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: RFI from ADM Church re Interrogator Issues
Importance: High

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

Gentlemen:

[REDACTED] received a faxed memo today from ADM Church re an RFI/statement of record on DHS's role in OIF/OEF, mainly focusing on interrogator issues. Response is due **20 July** to the ADM. I have copies of the memo, so who is best to take lead on this so I can give them a copy to work off of? I will give you all a copy as well. Thanks.

(b)(3)

(b)(2)

V/R,

[REDACTED]

(b)(3)

7/19/2004

(b)(3)

From: [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

Sent: Friday, July 16, 2004 5:15 PM

To: [REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]

Subject: FW: RFI from ADM Church re Interrogator Issues

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

(b)(3)

- I find the atch'd really interesting [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

and that they fought for as large a piece of the pie as possible?

- The admiral is correct in stating the original intent in the consolidation of DoD HUMINT was that [REDACTED] would be responsible for interrogation at major EPW detention areas.

(b)(1)

- In any event, do any of you have any comments/observations you'd like to contribute to help us develop a response to the attached memo?

(b)(3)

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Friday, July 16, 2004 4:11 PM

To: [REDACTED]

Subject: FW: RFI from ADM Church re Interrogator Issues

7/19/2004

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, July 16, 2004 4:11:25 PM

(b)(3)

Subject: RE: RFI from ADM Church re Interrogator Issues
Auto forwarded by a Rule

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: NONE

TERMS: NONE

ALCON:

At 0900 hours on 19 Jul, we will meet in [REDACTED] office to discuss the issues in the attached RFI and sort out responsibilities for the input. Suspense has been moved to COB 23 Jul. [REDACTED] would like a draft by SOB Thursday, 22 Jul.
Thanks

[REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: July 16, 2004 15:52
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: RFI from ADM Church re Interrogator Issues

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

Gentlemen:

7/19/2004

Attached is the subject memo for your viewing pleasure. [REDACTED] just spoke with [REDACTED] and said the due date is pretty tight for the info being requested, so we now have until next Fri to turn our response in.

(b)(3)
(b)(6)

[REDACTED]
(b)(3)

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, July 16, 2004 3:33 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: RFI from ADM Church re Interrogator Issues

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

[REDACTED]
(b)(3)

[REDACTED] is working a similar action for the DIA IG. Suspect the questions are similar. (b)(3)

[REDACTED]
(b)(3)

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, July 16, 2004 3:29 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: RFI from ADM Church re Interrogator Issues
Importance: High

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

Gentlemen:

7/19/2004

[REDACTED] received a faxed memo today from ADM Church re an RFI/statement of record on (b)(3)(b)(6)
 [REDACTED] role in OIF/OEF, mainly focusing on interrogator issues. Response is due **20 July** to the (b)(2)
 ADM. I have copies of the memo, so who is best to take lead on this so I can give them a copy to
 work off of? I will give you all a copy as well. Thanks.

V/R,

[REDACTED]

(b)(3)

~~DERIVED FROM: DH SCG SEP 2003~~

~~DECLASSIFY ON: X1~~

~~CLASSIFICATION: SECRET~~

~~CAVEATS: NOFORN~~

~~TERMS: NONE~~

~~DERIVED FROM: DH SCG Feb 04~~

~~DECLASSIFY ON: X1~~

~~CLASSIFICATION: SECRET~~

~~CAVEATS: NOFORN~~

~~TERMS: NONE~~

~~DERIVED FROM: DH SCG SEP 2003~~

~~DECLASSIFY ON: X1~~

~~CLASSIFICATION W/O ATCH: SECRET~~

~~CAVEATS W/O ATCH: NOFORN~~

~~TERMS W/O ATCH: NONE~~

~~CLASSIFICATION: SECRET~~

7/19/2004

(b)(3)

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, July 01, 2004 11:07 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: [REDACTED] "RFI in Support of Detainee Task Force (DH)" S: 20-JUL-04 (b)(2)

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

CAVEATS: ~~FOUO~~

TERMS: NONE

Provided as we discussed. Thanks for assistance. [REDACTED] (b)(3)

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, June 29, 2004 2:45 PM (b)(3)
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: [REDACTED] "RFI in Support of Detainee Task Force (DH)" S: 20-JUL-04 (b)(2)

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

CAVEATS: ~~FOUO~~

TERMS: NONE

THIS IS AN OFFICIAL EMAIL TASKER. [REDACTED] IS DELEGATED AS ACTION. THE DUE DATE IS 20 JULY. (b)(2)

ACTION: [REDACTED] (b)(2)

- Review initiator's guidance below
- Send your response to [REDACTED] by suspense date. (b)(3)

SUSPENSE DATE: 20-Jul-2004

REQUESTING COMPONENT: [REDACTED]
TASKING TYPE: NORMAL TASKING
PRIORITY: Priority

OVERALL GUIDANCE:

1. The IG point of contact is [REDACTED]

7/9/2004

2. References:

a. Department of Defense Inspector General memorandum, 19 May 2004, subj: Reporting on the Status of Component Activities Review of Detainee/Prisoner Abuse

b. Secretary of Defense memorandum, 25 May 2004, subj: Detention Operations and Detainee Interrogation Techniques

c. Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum, 23 June 2004, subj: Support to the DoD Detainee Task Force (DTF)

3. Recent allegations pertaining to alleged abuses of detainees and prisoners in Iraq have generated multiple, high level inquiries into the matter. At present the agency, through the IG, is coordinating responses to three such inquiries. The DoD IG requires, reference a., weekly reporting on all investigations or inquiries conducted by DoD components. The Secretary of Defense, reference b., chartered the Navy Inspector General to conduct a wide ranging review of DoD interrogation and debriefing policies, procedures, and activities. Additionally, the Deputy of Secretary of Defense, reference c., has requested documentation in support of the Detainee Task Force (DTF). These separate inquiries have stated their document search requirements and, while there are some redundancies in requests, it is in the interest of the agency not only to reply as promptly and thoroughly as possible, but also to maintain meticulous records of what has been submitted.

4. The most recent document search request, reference c., tasked all DoD elements to conduct a search of documents in support of the DoD Detainee Task Force (DTF) which is conducting a comprehensive review of allegations of abuse at DoD facilities from January 2000 to present.

5. The scope of the DTF search is:

"The search for documents should include all references to prisoners of war, detainees or civilian internees of the DoD, pursuant to the Global War on Terrorism or Operation Iraqi Freedom, whether located in: Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; the Naval Consolidated Brig, Charleston, South Carolina; Abu Ghraid, Camp Bucca, or other locations in Iraq; or in Afghanistan."

6. This tasking supplements the previous request for documents in support of the SECDEF initiated inquiry being conducted by the Navy Inspector General and applies to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Directorates will provide material documenting DIA interaction with OEF/OIF organizations, including the Iraq Survey Group (ISG).

7. Do not contact ISG for documentation. ISG will respond to tasking from U.S. Central Command.

8. Documents identified in response to this tasker which were previously supplied in response to reference b. need not be submitted. However,

7/9/2004

responding directorates will annotate on their responses, consistent with guidance in subparagraphs a. through c. below, that such documents exist and when they were submitted. Responding directorates will forward the following information along with each submission:

- a. An index identifying each document by date and author and including the document's classification level.
- b. The name, grade, duty location, and telephone number of the individual(s) who performed the search.
- c. An index of documents that are the subject of this request already disseminated outside the Department, including to whom, when, and why.

9. Specific Guidance: Search all files and collect all DIA directives, instructions, regulations, memoranda, requests for information and responses, letters, or other written materials applicable since 1 January 2000 that:

- a. Pertain to DIA interrogation policy, procedures, or "rules of engagement" with respect to prisoners of war, detainees, or civilian detainees of the Department or any of its components.

- b. Address the following:

- (1) Personnel detention policy, procedures, and organization.
- (2) Interrogation policy, procedures, and organization.
- (3) Relationship between detention and interrogation as they relate to force structure.
- (4) Training of regular and reserve personnel for these missions.
- (5) Use of contractors (e.g., interrogators, linguists, and interpreters) in connection with interrogation activities of missions of the DIA. Provide copies of contracts.

- c. Address DIA detention and interrogation as they relate to the Geneva Conventions and other applicable laws.

- d. Address DIA detention and interrogation policy, procedures or organization in relation to matters raised by the International Committee of the Red Cross.

- e. Show command relationships and operational practices that guided DoD detention and interrogation policies and procedures.

- f. Special access programs pertaining to DIA support for DoD/non-DoD interrogation and detention operations shall be identified by project name only with point of contact for access authorization.

10. Additional Guidance:

- a. DA/J2/DI: Identify all personnel assigned to DoD/non-DoD

7/9/2004

activities who participated in interrogations/debriefings in support of OEF/OIF operations. Provide name, grade, home assignment location, unit of attachment, dates of attachment, duty title, and, contact information.

b. DH: Provide a comprehensive list of all DIA documentation pertaining to interrogation and debriefing techniques that have been considered, authorized, used, and prohibited during OEF/OIF operations as noted below:

(1) For OEF/OIF, all specified material covering the period from initial DIA participation until present. For OIF only, required information is only until establishment of the ISG in June 2003.

(2) Letter of instructions issued by DIA personnel attached as supervisor in charge of the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Centers (JIDC) in support of OEF/OIF.

(3) Provide copies of all DH internal e-mails, memoranda, notes of meetings, etc., pertaining to the interrogation and debriefing of detainees/prisoners in Iraq or Afghanistan from January 2000 to date.

(4) Identify all personnel assigned to the DoD HUMINT augmentation teams or other tactical unit augmentations for OEF/OIF operations inception to date. Provide name, grade, home assignment location, unit of attachment, dates of attachment, duty title, and, contact information.

(5) Identify all personnel attached for HUMINT augmentation to non-DoD organizations for OEF/OIF operations from inception to date. Provide name, grade, home assignment location, unit of attachment, dates of attachment, duty title, and, contact information.

(6) Copies of all DIA generated SITREPs, operations reports, spot reports, and similar reports pertaining to interrogations and debriefing activities in which DIA personnel participated from inception to present.

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

CAVEATS: ~~FOUO~~

TERMS: NONE

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

CAVEATS: ~~FOUO~~

TERMS: NONE

7/9/2004

~~SECRET//NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS//X1~~

(b)(3)

Thanks.

This is the email we spoke about this a.m. Say Hi to [REDACTED] for me.....

Latest GC guidance on procedures concerning mail review/use is detailed below.

(b)(1) (b)(2) (b)(3)

(b)(5) (b)(6)

[REDACTED] is in [REDACTED] today on [REDACTED] case, but will also meet with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and will discuss procedures below with them. Believe what [REDACTED] has outlined below is "doable".

More to follow.....

(b)(3)

FYI. One more thing to incorporate into the process for these cases.

VR,
[REDACTED]

(b)(3) (b)(2)

To: [REDACTED]

cc: [REDACTED]

Subject: [REDACTED]

Search

(b)(3) (b)(2)

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, September 12, 2002 7:56 AM

To: [REDACTED]

Subject: FW: Search and Examination of Mail, [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

(b)(3) Here it is. Please send to [REDACTED] for info. Copy me,
[REDACTED] and yourself as well.

Thanks,
[REDACTED]

(b)(3) -----Original Message-----
From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, September 12, 2002 7:51 AM
[REDACTED]

(b)(2) Subject: RE: Search and Examination of Mail, [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

(b)(3) [REDACTED]

(b)(3) (b)(2) Really appreciate your quick response to our emails. We will ensure this is
passed on [REDACTED] for his meetings later on today [REDACTED]

(b)(2) The caveats you noted below do not seem unreasonable and we can certainly
work with them. Will let you know if [REDACTED] expresses any
concerns/issues
with them.

Have a great day and thanks again for supporting our operations. Who says
lawyers are all bad!

(b)(3) VR,
[REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----
From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, September 12, 2002 7:35 AM
[REDACTED]

(b)(2) Subject: RE: Search and Examination of Mail, [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

(b)(3) [REDACTED]

What a great idea, wish I had thought of it. We have no legal objection to the suggested process. The only caveats are: (1)

(b)(1) (b)(2) document the consent of the [REDACTED] permission (2) catalog (number or serial number etc. [REDACTED] may have already put a rec’d and or date stamp on it) all personal mail not just the pieces of interest to USI; (3) scan [1st choice] or photo copy [2d choice] the mail contents and envelopes (return addresses etc) of interest for our use. Putting the mail into electronic media may expedite our use [REDACTED] (4) return the mail to [REDACTED] folks to hold; (5) other than the process of opening the mail do not alter the contents in any way; and (6) insure that the [REDACTED] maintains and secures the mail from unfettered access for possible future criminal evidence or intelligence use, we don’t become the custodian of the mail itself, only the information we collect to use.

If these caveats are unworkable please let us know. We just don’t want to mess up possible future prosecution and at the same time get the Intel we need now.

(b)(3) (b)(2) [REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

(b)(3)

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Thursday, September 12, 2002 6:57 AM

(b)(2)

Subject: FW: Search and Examination of Mail, [REDACTED]
Importance: High

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

(b)(2) (b)(3) [REDACTED]

(b)(1)(b)(2) Email below outlines local [REDACTED] feedback to [REDACTED] inquiries about [REDACTED] viewing mail of enemy combatant/detainee in

(b)(1) (b)(2) (b)(3)

Request your guidance/comment on our recommendation to discuss this with [REDACTED] on separate but related business [REDACTED] and I would like him to address this issue with reps while in the area.

(b)(6)

Would appreciate your response soonest.

(b)(3)

(b)(2) If we don't get word on this before I depart [REDACTED]

(b)(3) please ensure GC guidance is passed on to [REDACTED]. Expect he'll be calling mid-afternoon today. Thanks.

VR,
[REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Wednesday, September 11, 2002 2:24 PM

(b)(2)

Subject: Search and Examination of Mail, [REDACTED]
Importance: High

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

(b)(2)

(b)(1) (b)(2) 1. Requested Action: Request GC comment and guidance with regards to [REDACTED] response (see below) to [REDACTED] request [REDACTED]

If [REDACTED] concurs with [REDACTED] position, request permission to discuss this issue with [REDACTED] Legal during tomorrow afternoon's meeting. Any additional guidance GC can provide will be much appreciated.

(b)(1) (b)(2) (b)(6)

2. Background: IAW GC guidance, I met with [REDACTED] on Monday, 9 Sep 02 to discuss [REDACTED] request to search and examine [REDACTED] detainee [REDACTED]. I discussed the case and provided him with copy of Procedure 8, DoD 5240.1-R. [REDACTED] was supportive of the [REDACTED] request and committed to talk to [REDACTED] about it.

(b)(7)

(b)(7)

(b)(1) (b)(2) (b)(6)

3. [REDACTED] Response: [REDACTED] called this morning to (b)(7)
communicate the [REDACTED] response. His advice, after consultation with [REDACTED]
was that [REDACTED] take an alternative course of action WRT [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] He stated that once the detainee [REDACTED]
is delivered to the [REDACTED] it is considered "out of
[REDACTED] He further stated that [REDACTED] has the authority
to [REDACTED] and should do so. Bottom line – [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] can/should [REDACTED] detainee [REDACTED] (Note:
Detainee's mail is currently being sent to [REDACTED] where it is
being stored.) [REDACTED] can allow [REDACTED] to read [REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED] Point of Contact: [REDACTED] (b)(7)

R/S

(b)(3)

ps. [REDACTED] (b)(7)

(b)(3)

DERIVED FROM: DHS SCG, Mar 02

DECLASSIFY ON: X1

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources

DECLASSIFY ON: X1

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

DERIVED FROM: DHS SCG Oct 97

DECLASSIFY ON: X1

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources

DECLASSIFY ON: X1

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources

DECLASSIFY ON: X1

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

•
Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: X1

~~SECRET//NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS//X1~~