ENVELOPE

(b)(2)

HEADER

R 020027Z SEP 04
FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEFLGX/SAFE WASHINGTON DC
R 311004Z AUG 04
FM HMSNG WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIA/JIA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC/J2/J5/
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC/J2/J5/
RUCXON/ONI WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/SECNAV WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RHEHWSR/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC
RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC

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RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

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INFO RHEFLGXS/SAFE WASHINGTON DC
RHEFSNG/HMSNG WASHINGTON DC

CONTROLS

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SERIAL: (U) IIR
COUNTRY: (U) IRAQ (IZ); JORDAN (JID).
IPSP: (U)
SECTION 1 OF 2

/******* THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *******/

BODY

SUBJ: IIR IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE CAPTURED AND RELEASED JORDANIAN TERRORIST MUSTAFA SAYYAM IN DECEMBER 2002 - (CORRECTED REPORT) (U) WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI (U) 20030101.
REQS: (U)

SOURCE: (C) (REL)

SUMMARY: (C) RELATIVE INFORMATION JULY 2002, JORDAN REQUESTED THAT IRAQ FIND FIVE SUSPECTED TERRORISTS, INCLUDING MUSTAFA SAYYAM. M5 AND M7 CONDUCTED AN UNPRECEDENTED JOINT SEARCH TO CAPTURE SAYYAM IN DECEMBER 2002. SAYYAM WAS RELEASED ON ORDERS FROM SADDAM HUSAYN.


2. (U) IIS REACTION.

A. (C) RELATIVE INFORMATION, FROM THE TIME THE IIS RECEIVED THE FIRST REQUEST FROM THE GIS, IIS DIRECTOR, TAHIR JALIL (HABBASHI), DIRECTED THE IIS M5 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE TO FIND SAYYAM

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AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. THE DIRECTOR OF M5 JORDANIAN BRANCH,
LAWRENCE (AZZAWI), PERSONALLY HEADED THE INVESTIGATION, BY 15
OCTOBER 2002, M5 HAD AMASEED A SIZABLE DOSSIER ON SAYYAM.

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IT WAS UNCLEAR WHY THE JORDANIAN REQUEST TO FIND SAYYAM
WAS SUCH A HIGH PRIORITY, THE IIS DID NOT SEEM TO BE AWARE OF, OR
FOCUSED ON, THE PRESENCE OF ANY OF THESE SUSPECTS IN BAGHDAD, OR
IRAQ, PRIOR TO THE GID REQUEST.)
B. [CIVIL] POSSIBLE AUTHENTIC MEMO. SEVERAL MEMOS WENT TO ALL
DIRECTORATES AND EVERY EXTERNAL IIS UNIT IN IRAQ TO ASSIST THE
SEARCH FOR SAYYAM. AN ORDER WENT WITH THE MEMO NOT TO USE THE
PASSPORT NAMES TO FIND THE SUSPECTS, BUT TO USE THE ENCLOSED
PICTURES.

3. (U) INTRA AGENCY COOPERATION.
A. [CIVIL] UNPRECEDENTED ACTION. BY NOVEMBER 2002, AZZAWI
APPROACHED M7 TO HELP LOCATE AND CAPTURE SAYYAM. M7 WAS EVEN CALLED
IN TO ASSIST THE SEARCH BEFORE THE INTERROGATION PROCESS WAS
INITIATED. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME M7 WAS ASKED TO PARTICIPATE IN A
CAPTURE, AND IT WAS NOT STANDARD PROCEDURE.
B. [CIVIL] PERSONNEL INVOLVED. BETWEEN THE DIRECTORATES, THERE WERE
A NUMBER OF PEOPLE INVOLVED IN INITIATING AND CONDUCTING THE SEARCH
AND INTERROGATION OF SAYYAM. THEY WERE:
- IIS DIRECTOR, TAHIJ JALAL HABBUSH
- IIS DEPUTY DIRECTOR, HASIB SABR ((AL-RIFAI))
- M5, DIRECTOR, AHMAD ((AL-JAFARI))
- M5, JORDANIAN BRANCH CHIEF, LAWRENCE AZZAWI
- M7, DIRECTOR, HAYTHEM ((AL-RAW))
- M7, ARAB BRANCH CHIEF, AHMAD KHALIL IBRAHIM ((AL-ANI))
- M7 INTERROGATOR, SAAD MUHAMMAD ((JAWAD))
- M7 INTERROGATOR, RUKAN ((AL-JANABY))
- M7 INTERROGATOR, FADIL MADOLOL ((AL-SHALASH)).

(b)(2) [CIVIL] WE WERE NOT AWARE OF A COMMITTEE CREATED TO
HANDLE THE SEARCH, ALTHOUGH IT WAS EASY TO SEE WHY IT
LOOKED AS SUCH TO AN OUTSIDER.) ONCE THE SEARCH HAD BEGUN, ORDERS
WERE DISPENSED IN A LINEAR CHAIN OF COMMAND. MOST COMMANDS INITIATED
WITH AZZAWI.

4. (U) THE SEARCH AND ARREST.
A. [CIVIL] SEARCH. THE IIS USED ALL TECHNICAL MEANS POSSIBLE.

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INCORRECTED WIRE TAPS, SURVEILLANCE, AND OTHER TECHNIQUES IN THE
SEARCH. MS RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT SAYYAM REGULARLY VISITED HIS
HALF SISTER AND USED THAT TO THEIR ADVANTAGE. WHEN AGENTS SEARCHED
THE HOUSE, HOWEVER, THEY ONLY FOUND THE HALF SISTER'S FAMILY.
B. [CIVIL] FAMILY CONNECTION TO M7 OFFICER. SAYYAM'S HALF SISTER
APPEARENTLY RECOGNIZED ONE OF THE ARRESTING AGENTS AS AHMAD KHALIL
IBRAHIM AL-ANI. THE HALF SISTER CLAIMED THAT AL-ANI AND SHE WERE
RELATED AND ASKED FOR CLEMENCY, BUT AL-ANI ARRESTED THE
HALF SISTER'S HUSBAND TO FORCE THE FAMILY TO ASSIST IN CAPTURING
SAYYAM. AFTER TWO DAYS OF DETAINMENT, THE HUSBAND AGREED TO ASSIST
IN SAYYAM'S APPREHENSION. THE HUSBAND REQUESTED THAT THE ARREST TAKE
PLACED OUTSIDE OF HIS RESIDENCE. IT WAS LATER DISCOVERED THAT AHMAD AL-ANI WAS DISTANTLY RELATED TO SAYYAM'S

(b)(2) [CIVIL]
HALF-SISTER THROUGH COMPLEX TRIBAL TIES ON HIS WIFE’S SIDE. AL-ANI
PROBABLY ORDERED THIS RELATIVE TO BE HELD IN CUSTODY TO PROTECT HIS
REPUTATION; HE DID NOT WANT TO BE SEEN AS BEING LENIENT TO HIS
RELATIONS.)
C. (COREL) AMBUSH. AROUND 5 DECEMBER 2002, THE COERCED HALF-SISTER
AND HUSBAND INVITED SAYYAM AND HIS WIFE TO THEIR HOUSE AND THEN
NOTIFIED M5. M7 AND M5 OFFICERS JOINTLY AMBUSHED SAYYAM AS HE
EMERGED FROM THE HOUSE. M7 AGENTS PERSONALLY ESCORTED SAYYAM, HIS
WIFE AND CHILD TO THE M7 DETENTION FACILITY. M7 WORKED IN A SEPARATE
BUILDING WITH ITS OWN DETENTION FACILITIES, WHICH WAS LOCATED ON 52ND STREET IN THE AR-RUSAFAH DISTRICT OF
BAGHDAD. IT WAS A THREE-STORY BUILDING ACROSS FROM THE DIRECTORATE OF PASSPORTS. THE DETENTION FACILITIES
WERE ON THE 2ND AND 3RD FLOORS.)
5. (COREL) INTERROGATION. M7 DETAINED SAYYAM FOR UP TO 15 DAYS,
DURING WHICH TIME THEY CONDUCTED FOUR OR FIVE INTERROGATION
SESSIONS. SAYYAM REMAINED UNCOOPERATIVE THROUGH THE FIRST THREE
SESSIONS. LAWRENCE AZZAWI THEN ORDERED M7 TO USE ROUGHER METHODS TO
EXTRACT A STATEMENT. EMPHASIZED THAT THE
IIS INTERROGATORS DID NOT TORTURE SAYYAM.) AHMAD AL-ANI SUPERVISED
TWO MORE INTERROGATION SESSIONS, WHERE RUKAN AL-JANABY AND FADIL
AL-SHALASH USED OPEN SLAPS TO THE FACE, FISTS TO THE CHEST, AND BEAT
THE BOTTOM OF HIS FEET WITH STICKS. AT FIRST THE
INTERROGATORS THOUGHT THE IIS WOULD BE TURNING SAYYAM OVER TO THE
JORDANIANS, SO M7 WAS LENIENT. THEY DID NOT WANT EVIDENCE LEFT OF A
HARSH INTERROGATION. ONCE IT WAS CLEAR THE IIS WOULD NOT TURN HIM
OVER TO JORDAN, HOWEVER, M7 USED THE ROUGHER METHODS.)
6. (U) RELEASE ORDERS
A. (COREL) M7 OBJECTIONS ON RELEASE. AFTER SAYYAM'S FIVE
INTERROGATION SESSIONS, LAWRENCE AZZAWI GAVE M7 RELEASE ORDERS FOR
SAYYAM, WHICH INFURIATED M7. AHMAD AL-ANI AND HAYTHEM AL-RAWI FELT
SO STRONGLY AGAINST THE RELEASE ORDER, THEY WENT ALL THE WAY UP THE
CHAIN OF COMMAND TO HABBUS TO EXPRESS THEIR OBJECTIONS. HABBUS
THEN INFORMED THE PAIR THAT THE ORDER FOR RELEASE CAME DIRECTLY FROM
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SADDAM ((HUSAYNI)). THE NEXT DAY LAWRENCE AZZAWI REMOVED SAYYAM FROM
THE M7 FACILITIES.
B. (COREL) REASONS FOR OBJECTIONS. AHMAD AL-ANI INITIALLY PROPOSED
KILLING SAYYAM AND SENDING HIS BODY BACK TO JORDAN, ALLEGING A
SUICIDE. AL-ANI REPORTEDLY BELIEVED THE RELEASE OF SAYYAM WOULD
PROVOKE THE AMERICANS, WHEREAS KILLING HIM OR SURRENDERING HIM TO
JORDAN WOULD BE IN IRAQ'S FAVOR. THE ACT WOULD DEMONSTRATE IRAQ'S
INTOLERANCE FOR TERRORISM.
C. (COREL) SPECULATION ON SAYYAM'S RELEASE. M7 AGENTS CONCLUDED
THAT THE DECISION TO RELEASE SAYYAM WAS MADE FOR SEVERAL REASONS
SENDING SAYYAM, DEAD OR ALIVE, TO JORDAN WOULD REVEAL THAT HE HAD
BEEN IN IRAQ IN THE FIRST PLACE, AND MIGHT SUGGEST TO HOSTILE
OBSERVERS THAT IRAQ HARBORED TERRORISTS. IN ADDITION, THE ARABIC
MEDIA MIGHT HAVE BEEN INCENSED THAT SADDAM WOULD SURRENDER A MUSLIM
TO JORDANIAN INTELLIGENCE.
7. (COREL) PREVIOUS AMNESTY DECREES ON 20 OCTOBER 2002, SADDAM
HUSAYN ISSUED A NATION-WIDE AMNESTY DECREES TO RELEASE ALL PRISONERS.
(b)(1)
THE DECREES ALSO AFFECTED M7, SINCE IT HAD ITS OWN
DETENTION FACILITIES. M7 EMPTIED ITS ENTIRE FACILITY, WHICH AMOUNTED
TO APPROXIMATELY 200 INDIVIDUALS. NONE OF THE DETAINES HELD BY M7
WERE THOUGHT TO BE AL-QA'IDA RELATED. M7 DETAINES WERE MOSTLY
SPIES, POLITICAL PRISONERS, ANTIQUITY SMUGGLERS, DRUG SMUGGLERS, EMBEZZLERS AND BLACK MARKETERS.

COMMENTS: 1. [C/REL]

2. [C/REL]

THE FIVE JORDANIAN INDIVIDUALS WERE SUSPECTED OF BEING INVOLVED IN THE MURDER OF A U.S. DIPLOMAT IN AMMAN AND THE ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF A GID OFFICER, COLONEL (BURJAKI). ABU YASIM SAYYAM WAS THOUGHT TO BE LIVING IN BAGHDAD. COULD NOT RECALL THE NAMES OF THE OTHER FOUR JORDANIANS.

B. [C/REL]

C. [C/REL] PREVIOUS REPORTING HAS CORROBORATED

4. (U) CONSUMER EVALUATIONS FOR THIS IIR CAN BE SUBMITTED ONLINE VIA

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ADMIN

INSTR: (U) U.S. NO.

DISSEM: (U) FIELD: NONE

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL

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DRV FROM: SEP 03

DECL: X1