

**ENVELOPE**

(b)(2)

**HEADER**

R 020027Z SEP 04  
FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

RHEFLGX/SAFE WASHINGTON DC  
R 311004Z AUG 04  
FM HMSNG WASHINGTON DC

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC  
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J2/J5//  
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J2/J5//

RUCXONI/ONI WASHINGTON DC  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC  
RUENAAA/SECNAV WASHINGTON DC  
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

RHEHWSR/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC  
RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC

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RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC  
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

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INFO RHEFLGX/SAFE WASHINGTON DC  
RHEFSNG/HMSNG WASHINGTON DC  
BT

**CONTROLS**~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED]

COUNTRY: (U) IRAQ (IZ); JORDAN (JO).

IPSP: (U) [REDACTED]

SECTION 1 OF 2

/\*\*\*\*\* THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE \*\*\*\*\*/

**BODY**

SUBJ: IIR [REDACTED] IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE  
CAPTURED AND RELEASED JORDANIAN TERRORIST MUSTAFA SAYYAM IN DECEMBER  
2002 - (CORRECTED REPORT) (U)  
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED  
INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~. [REDACTED]

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
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DOI (U) 20030101.

REQS: (U) [REDACTED]

(b)(1) SOURCE: (C) (REL) [REDACTED]

SUMMARY: (C) (REL) IN JULY 2002, JORDAN REQUESTED THAT IRAQ FIND FIVE  
SUSPECTED TERRORISTS, INCLUDING MUSTAFA SAYYAM. M5 AND M7 CONDUCTED  
AN UNPRECEDENTED JOINT SEARCH TO CAPTURE SAYYAM IN DECEMBER 2002.  
SAYYAM WAS RELEASED ON ORDERS FROM SADDAM HUSAYN.

TEXT. 1. (C) (REL) BACKGROUND. THE JORDANIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE  
(GID) REQUESTED THAT THE IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS) LOCATE  
FIVE INDIVIDUALS SUSPECTED OF CRIMES IN JORDAN. MUSTAFA ((SAYYAM))  
WAS INCLUDED IN THE LIST AND WAS CONSIDERED A TERRORIST. JORDAN  
INCLUDED SAYYAM'S NAME AND PICTURE IN AS MANY AS THREE REQUESTS  
BEGINNING IN AUGUST 2002.

2. (U) IIS REACTION.

A. (C) (REL) AGENCY-WIDE REQUEST. FROM THE TIME THE IIS RECEIVED THE  
FIRST REQUEST FROM THE GID, IIS DIRECTOR, TAHIR JALIL ((HABBUSH)),  
DIRECTED THE IIS M5 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE TO FIND SAYYAM

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AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. THE DIRECTOR OF M5 JORDANIAN BRANCH,  
LAWRENCE ((AZZAWI)), PERSONALLY HEADED THE INVESTIGATION. BY 15

(b)(2) OCTOBER 2002, M5 HAD AMASSED A SIZABLE DOSSIER ON SAYYAM. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] IT WAS UNCLEAR WHY THE JORDANIAN REQUEST TO FIND SAYYAM



WAS SUCH A HIGH PRIORITY. THE IIS DID NOT SEEM TO BE AWARE OF, OR FOCUSED ON, THE PRESENCE OF ANY OF THESE SUSPECTS IN BAGHDAD, OR IRAQ, PRIOR TO THE GID REQUEST.)

B. ~~(C//REL)~~ POSSIBLE AUTHENTIC MEMO. SEVERAL MEMOS WENT TO ALL DIRECTORATES AND EVERY EXTERNAL IIS UNIT IN IRAQ TO ASSIST THE SEARCH FOR SAYYAM. AN ORDER WENT WITH THE MEMO NOT TO USE THE PASSPORT NAMES TO FIND THE SUSPECTS, BUT TO USE THE ENCLOSED PICTURES. [REDACTED]

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3. (U) INTRA-AGENCY COOPERATION.

A. ~~(C//REL)~~ UNPRECEDENTED ACTION. BY NOVEMBER 2002, AZZAWI APPROACHED M7 TO HELP LOCATE AND CAPTURE SAYYAM. M7 WAS EVEN CALLED IN TO ASSIST THE SEARCH BEFORE THE INTERROGATION PROCESS WAS INITIATED. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME M7 WAS ASKED TO PARTICIPATE IN A CAPTURE, AND IT WAS NOT STANDARD PROCEDURE.

B. ~~(C//REL)~~ PERSONNEL INVOLVED. BETWEEN THE DIRECTORATES, THERE WERE A NUMBER OF PEOPLE INVOLVED IN INITIATING AND CONDUCTING THE SEARCH AND INTERROGATION OF SAYYAM. THEY WERE -

- IIS DIRECTOR, TAHIR JALIL HABBUSH
- IIS DEPUTY DIRECTOR, HASSIB SABR ((AL-RIFA'I))
- M5, DIRECTOR, AHMAD ((AL-JAFARI))
- M5, JORDANIAN BRANCH CHIEF, LAWRENCE AZZAWI
- M7, DIRECTOR, HAYTHEM ((AL-RAWI))
- M7, ARAB BRANCH CHIEF, AHMAD KHALIL IBRAHIM ((AL-ANI))
- M7 INTERROGATOR, SA'AD MUHAMMAD ((JAWAD))
- M7 INTERROGATOR, RUKAN ((AL-JANABY))
- M7 INTERROGATOR, FADIL MADLOL ((ALSHALASH)).

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[REDACTED] WAS NOT AWARE OF A COMMITTEE CREATED TO HANDLE THE SEARCH, ALTHOUGH [REDACTED] IT WAS EASY TO SEE WHY IT LOOKED AS SUCH TO AN OUTSIDER.) ONCE THE SEARCH HAD BEGUN, ORDERS WERE DISPERSED IN A LINEAR CHAIN OF COMMAND. MOST COMMANDS INITIATED WITH AZZAWI.

4. (U) THE SEARCH AND ARREST.

A. ~~(C//REL)~~ SEARCH. THE IIS USED ALL TECHNICAL MEANS POSSIBLE,

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INCLUDING WIRE TAPS, SURVEILLANCE, AND OTHER TECHNIQUES, IN THE SEARCH. M5 RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT SAYYAM REGULARLY VISITED HIS HALF-SISTER AND USED THAT TO THEIR ADVANTAGE. WHEN AGENTS SEARCHED THE HOUSE, HOWEVER, THEY ONLY FOUND THE HALF-SISTER'S FAMILY.

B. ~~(C//REL)~~ FAMILY CONNECTION TO M7 OFFICER. SAYYAM'S HALF-SISTER APPARENTLY RECOGNIZED ONE OF THE ARRESTING AGENTS AS AHMAD KHALIL IBRAHIM AL-ANI. THE HALF SISTER CLAIMED THAT AL-ANI AND SHE WERE RELATED AND ASKED FOR CLEMENCY, BUT AL-ANI ARRESTED THE HALF-SISTER'S HUSBAND TO FORCE THE FAMILY TO ASSIST IN CAPTURING SAYYAM. AFTER TWO DAYS OF DETAINMENT, THE HUSBAND AGREED TO ASSIST IN SAYYAM'S APPREHENSION. THE HUSBAND REQUESTED THAT THE ARREST TAKE PLACE OUTSIDE OF HIS RESIDENCE. [REDACTED] IT WAS LATER DISCOVERED THAT AHMAD AL-ANI WAS DISTANTLY RELATED TO SAYYAM'S

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HALF-SISTER THROUGH COMPLEX TRIBAL TIES ON HIS WIFE'S SIDE. AL-ANI PROBABLY ORDERED THIS RELATIVE TO BE HELD IN CUSTODY TO PROTECT HIS REPUTATION; HE DID NOT WANT TO BE SEEN AS BEING LENIENT TO HIS RELATIONS.)

C. (C//REL) AMBUSH. AROUND 5 DECEMBER 2002, THE COERCED HALF-SISTER AND HUSBAND INVITED SAYYAM AND HIS WIFE TO THEIR HOUSE AND THEN NOTIFIED M5. M7 AND M5 OFFICERS JOINTLY AMBUSHED SAYYAM AS HE EMERGED FROM THE HOUSE. M7 AGENTS PERSONALLY ESCORTED SAYYAM, HIS WIFE AND CHILD TO THE M7 DETENTION FACILITY. [REDACTED] M7 WORKED IN A SEPARATE BUILDING WITH ITS OWN DETENTION FACILITIES, WHICH WAS LOCATED ON 52ND STREET IN THE AR-RUSAFAH DISTRICT OF BAGHDAD [REDACTED] IZ. IT WAS A THREE-STORY BUILDING ACROSS FROM THE DIRECTORATE OF PASSPORTS. THE DETENTION FACILITIES WERE ON THE 2ND AND 3RD FLOORS.)

5. (C//REL) INTERROGATION. M7 DETAINED SAYYAM FOR UP TO 15 DAYS, DURING WHICH TIME THEY CONDUCTED FOUR OR FIVE INTERROGATION SESSIONS. SAYYAM REMAINED UNCOOPERATIVE THROUGH THE FIRST THREE SESSIONS. LAWRENCE AZZAWI THEN ORDERED M7 TO USE ROUGHER METHODS TO EXTRACT A STATEMENT. [REDACTED] EMPHASIZED THAT THE IIS INTERROGATORS DID NOT TORTURE SAYYAM ) AHMAD AL-ANI SUPERVISED TWO MORE INTERROGATION SESSIONS, WHERE RUKAN AL-JANABY AND FADIL AL-SHALASH USED OPEN SLAPS TO THE FACE, FISTS TO THE CHEST, AND BEAT THE BOTTOM OF HIS FEET WITH STICKS. [REDACTED] AT FIRST THE INTERROGATORS THOUGHT THE IIS WOULD BE TURNING SAYYAM OVER TO THE JORDANIANS, SO M7 WAS LENIENT. THEY DID NOT WANT EVIDENCE LEFT OF A HARSH INTERROGATION. ONCE IT WAS CLEAR THE IIS WOULD NOT TURN HIM OVER TO JORDAN, HOWEVER, M7 USED THE ROUGHER METHODS )

6. (U) RELEASE ORDERS.

A. (C//REL) M7 OBJECTIONS ON RELEASE. AFTER SAYYAM'S FIVE INTERROGATION SESSIONS, LAWRENCE AZZAWI GAVE M7 RELEASE ORDERS FOR SAYYAM, WHICH INFURIATED M7. AHMAD AL-ANI AND HAYTHEM AL-RAWI FELT SO STRONGLY AGAINST THE RELEASE ORDER, THEY WENT ALL THE WAY UP THE CHAIN OF COMMAND TO HABBUSH TO EXPRESS THEIR OBJECTIONS. HABBUSH THEN INFORMED THE PAIR THAT THE ORDER FOR RELEASE CAME DIRECTLY FROM

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SADDAM ((HUSAYN)). THE NEXT DAY LAWRENCE AZZAWI REMOVED SAYYAM FROM THE M7 FACILITIES.

B. (C//REL) REASONS FOR OBJECTIONS. AHMAD AL-ANI INITIALLY PROPOSED KILLING SAYYAM AND SENDING HIS BODY BACK TO JORDAN, ALLEGING A SUICIDE. AL-ANI REPORTEDLY BELIEVED THE RELEASE OF SAYYAM WOULD PROVOKE THE AMERICANS, WHEREAS KILLING HIM OR SURRENDERING HIM TO JORDAN WOULD BE IN IRAQ'S FAVOR. THE ACT WOULD DEMONSTRATE IRAQ'S INTOLERANCE FOR TERRORISM.

C. (C//REL) SPECULATION ON SAYYAM'S RELEASE. M7 AGENTS CONCLUDED THAT THE DECISION TO RELEASE SAYYAM WAS MADE FOR SEVERAL REASONS. SENDING SAYYAM, DEAD OR ALIVE, TO JORDAN WOULD REVEAL THAT HE HAD BEEN IN IRAQ IN THE FIRST PLACE, AND MIGHT SUGGEST TO HOSTILE OBSERVERS THAT IRAQ HARBORED TERRORISTS. IN ADDITION, THE ARABIC MEDIA MIGHT HAVE BEEN INCENSED THAT SADDAM WOULD SURRENDER A MUSLIM TO JORDANIAN INTELLIGENCE.

7. (C//REL) PREVIOUS AMNESTY DECREE. ON 20 OCTOBER 2002, SADDAM HUSAYN ISSUED A NATION-WIDE AMNESTY DECREE TO RELEASE ALL PRISONERS.

(b)(1) [REDACTED] THE DECREE ALSO AFFECTED M7, SINCE IT HAD ITS OWN DETENTION FACILITIES. M7 EMPTIED ITS ENTIRE FACILITY, WHICH AMOUNTED TO APPROXIMATELY 200 INDIVIDUALS. NONE OF THE DETAINEES HELD BY M7 WERE THOUGHT TO BE AL-QA'IDA RELATED. M7 DETAINEES WERE MOSTLY



SPIES, POLITICAL PRISONERS, ANTIQUITY SMUGGLERS, DRUG SMUGGLERS, EMBEZZLERS AND BLACK MARKETERS.

COMMENTS: 1. (C//REL) [REDACTED]

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2. (C//REL) [REDACTED]

A. (C//REL) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE FIVE JORDANIAN INDIVIDUALS WERE SUSPECTED OF BEING INVOLVED IN THE MURDER OF A U.S. DIPLOMAT IN AMMAN AND THE ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF A GID OFFICER, COLONEL ((BURJAK)). ABU YASIM SAYYAM WAS THOUGHT TO BE LIVING IN BAGHDAD. [REDACTED] COULD NOT RECALL THE NAMES OF THE OTHER FOUR JORDANIANS.

B. (C//REL) [REDACTED]

C. (C//REL) PREVIOUS REPORTING HAS CORROBORATED [REDACTED] STATEMENTS.

3. (C//REL) [REDACTED]

(b)(1) (b)(2)

4. (U) CONSUMER EVALUATIONS FOR THIS IIR CAN BE SUBMITTED ONLINE VIA

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#### ADMIN

INSTR: (U) U.S. NO. [REDACTED]

(b)(2)

DISSEM: (U) FIELD: NONE

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ [REDACTED]

HMSNG [REDACTED]

DRV FROM: [REDACTED] SEP 03

DECL: X1