Defense Intelligence Agency

Defense Analysis Report – Terrorism

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(U) Transnational: Former GTMO Detainee Terrorism Trends—Update

(U) The number of former Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) detainees confirmed or suspected of returning to terrorist activities is 36, about 7 percent of those transferred from U.S. custody. The identified rate of reengagement over three years of tracking has remained relatively constant between 5 and 8 percent.

- (U) In January, Ibrahim Shafir Sen was one of six individuals arrested in Van, Turkey, and charged for involvement with an active al-Qaida cell. Turkish authorities identified Sen as the cell leader. He was transferred to Turkish custody in 2003 after spending two years at GTMO.

(U) General Trends and Difficulties

(U) Of former detainees known or suspected of returning to terrorist activities, those transferred to Afghanistan and Pakistan generally have reengaged in local, tactical-level, anti-coalition activity. Alternately, those former detainees known or suspected of reengaging in terrorism who were transferred to Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa have more often reconnected with terrorist networks associated with transnational terrorist activity, usually the same networks they were associated with prior to capture. Those returning to the transnational networks are assessed as more likely to be involved in future major transnational acts of terrorism.

(U) In most cases, the time lapse between release and subsequent indications of post-transfer terrorist activity is approximately a year and a half, with reporting of such
activity often lagging actual events by months or even years. Upon return, many
detainees are held for varying lengths of time ranging from less than 24 hours up to
several years. Due to the reporting delay and a general lack of information regarding
former detainees, additional former GTMO detainees are likely to have been involved in
subsequent terrorist activities.

(U) Former detainees have participated in terrorist activities ranging from small-scale
attacks to transnational facilitation and attack planning. However, the former GTMO
detainees known or suspected to have returned to terrorism represent a small proportion
of the total transferred/released.

(U) Open-Source Reporting Identifies Detainees Reengaging in Terrorism

(U) Ibrahim Shafir Sen was transferred to Turkey in November 2003. In January 2008,
Sen was arrested in Van, Turkey, and charged as the leader of an active al-Qaïda cell.

(U) Ibrahim Bin Shakaran and Mohammed Bin Ahmad Mizouz were transferred to
Morocco in July 2004. In September 2007, they were convicted for their post-release
involvement in a terrorist network recruiting Moroccans to fight for Abu-Musab al-
Zarqawi’s al-Qaïda in Iraq (AQI). Recruits were to receive weapons and explosives
training in Algeria from the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, which has since
become al-Qaïda in the Lands of the Maghreb, before going to fight in Iraq or returning
to Morocco as sleeper cells. The organizers of the group reportedly intended to create an
al-Qaïda-affiliated network in the Maghreb similar to AQI. According to testimony
presented at the trial, Bin Shakaran had already recruited other jihadists when Moroccan
authorities broke up the plot in November 2005. Bin Shakaran received a 10-year
sentence for his role in the plot, while Mizouz received a two-year sentence.

(U) Abdullah Mahsud blew himself up to avoid capture by Pakistani forces in July 2007.
According to a Pakistani government official, Mahsud directed a suicide attack in April
2007 that killed 31 people. After being transferred to Afghanistan in March 2004,
Mahsud sought several media interviews and became well known for his attacks in
Pakistan. In October 2004, he kidnapped two Chinese engineers and claimed
responsibility for an Islamabad hotel bombing.

(U) Ruslan Anatolivich Odijev, transferred to Russia in March 2004, was killed in a
June 2007 gun battle with Russia’s Federal Security Service. Russian authorities stated
that Odijev had taken part in several terrorist acts including an October 2005 attack in the
Caucasus region that killed and injured several police officers. Odijev was found with
pistols, a grenade, and homemade explosive devices on his body.

(U) Ravil Shafeyavich Gumarov and Timur Ravilich Ishmurat were transferred to Russia
in March 2004 and quickly released. Russian authorities arrested them in January 2005
for involvement in a gas line bombing. In May 2006 a Russian court convicted both,
sentencing Gumarov to 13 years in prison and Ishmurat to 11 years.
(U) Mohammed Ismail was one of the “juveniles” released from GTMO in 2004. During a press interview after his release, he described the Americans saying, “They gave me a good time in Cuba. They were very nice to me, giving me English lessons.” He concluded his interview saying he would have to find work once he finished visiting all his relatives. He was recaptured four months later in May 2004, participating in an attack on U.S. forces near Kandahar. At the time of his recapture, Ismail carried a letter confirming his status as a Taliban member in good standing.

(U) Maulvi Abdul Ghaffar was captured in early 2002 and held at GTMO for eight months. After his release, Ghaffar reportedly became the Taliban’s regional commander in Uruzgan and Helmand provinces, carrying out attacks on U.S. and Afghan forces. On 25 September 2004, while planning an attack against Afghan police, Ghaffar and two of his men were killed in a raid by Afghan security forces.

(U) Yousef Muhammed Yaaqoub, better known as Mullah Shazada, was released from GTMO in May 2003. Shazada quickly rejoined the Taliban as a commander in southern Afghanistan. In this role, his activities reportedly included the organization and execution of a jailbreak in Kandahar, and a nearly successful capture of the border town of Spin Boldak. Shazada was killed on 7 May 2004 fighting U.S. forces. His memorial in Quetta, Pakistan, drew many Taliban leaders wanted by U.S. forces. At the time of his release, there was no indication he was a member of any terrorist organization or posed a risk to U.S. or Allied interests.

(U) Mohammed Nayim Farouq: After his release from U.S. custody in July 2003, Farouq quickly renewed his association with Taliban and al-Qaida members and has since become re-involved in anti-coalition militant activity.

(U) Definitions for Confirmed and Suspected Cases

(U) Definition of “Confirmed” — A preponderance of evidence—fingerprints, DNA, conclusive photographic match, or reliable, verified, or well-corroborated intelligence reporting—identifies a specific former Defense Department detainee as directly involved in terrorist activities.

(U) Definition of “Suspected” — Significant reporting indicates a former Defense Department detainee is involved in terrorist activities, and analysis indicates the detainee most likely is associated with a specific former detainee or unverified or single-source, but plausible, reporting indicates a specific former detainee is involved in terrorist activities.