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Defense Intelligence Agency

# Defense Analysis Report

Ac Timika

24 December 2003

# (U) Indonesia: Progress on the Timika Investigation

(S) The US Embassy reports Indonesian military officials cooperated closely with a just-departed FBI team investigating the August 2002 ambush murder of two American and one Indonesian mine employees in Timika, Papua province. The handover of a highly sensitive taped "confession" by separatist rebels reaffirms Jakarta's keen interest in resuming defense ties. Military plans for bringing the alleged perpetrators to justice still await further efforts to obtain "airtight" proof, although verification of the army's evidence will require eventual direct access to the rebel suspects and their weapons.

# (U) Two-Week Visit Considered Fruitful

- (S) The FBI team departed for home on 19 December with new materials provided by the military, intended to move the investigation forward.
- (S) This latest handover included a closely-held videotape containing accounts by three separatist rebels of their involvement in the Timika killings. Concerned that leaks would jeopardize their sources, the military demanded a strict nondisclosure agreement, although extracted photos of the rebels were approved for FBI release in dealing with witnesses.

(S) (b)(1);(b)(3):10 USC 424;1.4 (c) there was no known interference with the witnesses or the FBI's activities, and all interaction appeared very professional.

# (U) The Case against the Separatist Rebels

- (C) The released information reflects rebel-based accounts accumulated by the local military command from April to August of this year. Although details vary, most accuse separatist leader Kelly Kwalik of ordering a 21-man force to carry out the attack while he remained behind at his headquarters.
- (S) The accounts describe Kwalik lieutenant Antonius Wamang as the leader of a small ambush group and identify another rebel killed in an army shoot-out the day after the ambush.

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- (S) Additional statements were made by other members of Kwalik's group, which also appear generally in line with the videotape made on two occasions last July and August and appear broadly consistent with known forensic evidence.
- (S) Although potential motives for a rebel attack remain unclear, the local military points to Kwalik's known previous confrontations with the mine and believes he was angry over the mine's ties to the government and receiving inadequate largesse from the mine's local community assistance programs.

## (U) Hoping to Clear the Military's Name

- (C) In meeting the FBI team, Armed Forces Commander Gen Sutarto reaffirmed his intent to punish any military members that might be found complicit in the attack but, based on repeated investigations, felt military members were not involved.
- (S) There has been no recent intelligence to substantiate military involvement, although the regional army command earlier suspected that a Papuan soldier illegally provided or sold ammunition to the rebels, according to sensitive information.
- (U) Apparently to underscore the Army's openness, Army Chief Gen Ryamizard announced during the FBl visit that the military would allow its troops to be interviewed by the FBl, "as long as there is no spying," he said.

### (U) Continuing Complexities

(S) (b)(1);1.4 (c) the military is very eager to have the police take over responsibility for bringing the accused to justice, but has been reluctant to engage the police in the case due to rivalries and other sensitivities.

- (S) Military-police relations are poor, reflecting the military's low regard for the police and residual anger against earlier police accusations of military complicity in the killings, which now have been implicitly retracted by the involved police investigator.
- (S) The military sees the police as shirking its responsibility to investigate the case fully. According to the US Embassy, the local police command has made no discernible effort since the FBI's previous visit in January 2003.
- (S) The military fears any premature handover of the tape to the police would endanger its informants and jeopardize the case.

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(b)(1);1.4 (c)	that the military earlier located Kwalik's new
base camp, but has been hesitant to move against this facility, which purportedly contains many family members.  • (b)(1);(b)(3):10 USC 424;Sec. 1.4(b);Sec. 1.4(c)	
(C) Senior Indonesian officials, inc stepped-up cooperation will finally defense ties.	cluding President Megawati and Gen Sutarto, hope the value bring closure and speed the resumption of normal
(S) Seeking an "airtight" case, the to collect further evidence.	military currently is pursuing follow-on covert efforts
• (S) Believing the single video elements apparently are assess evidence until verified as credi	would be insufficient to convict, military intelligence ing new informants, but appear reluctant to turn over ible.
(b)(1);1.4 (b);1.4 (c)	
efforts, cooperation with the FBI	ions over a perceived U.S. failure to acknowledge their is likely to continue when the team returns early next looking for FBI reinforcement of its findings as the only
will likely remain necessary, part problems. Improved police-milita	ed witnesses and resolution of remaining discrepancies icularly due to the military's serious credibility ary cooperation likewise will be needed, but translation apuan dialect also could take additional processing time.
approach reflects concern to avoi	a particularly sensitive stage. The military's careful id further setbacks, although delays and further problems onths due to the continued political sensitivities and rity institutions.
Prepared by: (b)(3):10 USC 424	

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