DTG 090452Z OCT 96
FROM
TO TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
CONTROLS CONFIDENTIAL
SECTION 01 OF 02
THIS IS A RETRANSMITTAL DUE TO NON-RECEIPT BY SOME ADDRESSEES
SERIAL: (U)

/******* THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/

BODY
COUNTRY: (U) INDONESIA (ID).
SUBJ: (U) CAUTION IN RULES OF ENGAGEMENT IN JAKARTA. (U)
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DO I: (U) 960801.
REQS: 

SUMMARY: (G) ABRI USING CAUTION IN DEFINING THE PERMISSIBLE USE OF DEADLY FORCE IN JAKARTA CIVIL DISTURBANCES.
TEXT: 1. (C) DISCUSSED THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, I.E. THE PERMISSIBLE LIMITS ON THE USE OF DEADLY FORCE IN THE RECENT RIOTING IN JAKARTA WITH SEVERAL SOURCES. WHILE THE INFORMATION IS NOT IDENTICAL FROM ALL SOURCES, IT IS CONSISTENT WITH
OBSERVATIONS ON THE STREETS. LOCAL NEWS RELEASES IMPLYING A "SHOOT TO KILL" ORDER IS IN EFFECT ARE INCORRECT.

2. (b)(1),(b) (3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c) DESCRIBED FOUR LEVELS OF SECURITY ALERT USED BY ABRI. THESE ARE CODED A, B, C, AND D. LEVEL D IS THE LOWEST LEVEL AND REFLECTS A NORMAL SITUATION WHERE TROOPS ARE NOT DEPLOYED OR ARMED FOR SECURITY PURPOSES. LEVEL C DEPLOYS TROOPS WITH NON-LETHAL RIOT CONTROL EQUIPMENT ONLY, I.E. WICKER OR PLASTIC SHIELDS, BATONS, AND POSSIBLY GAS MASKS. LEVEL B INCLUDES A 50/50 MIX OF RIOT CONTROL GEAR AND PERSONAL WEAPONS. LEVEL A IS FULLY EQUIPPED, COMBAT READY TROOPS; TROOPS AT LEVEL A EXPECT TO USE DEADLY FORCE.

3. (b)(3):10 USC 424 ON 27 JULY, ARMY TROOPS DEPLOYED AS BACK UP TO THE RIOT POLICE WERE AT LEVEL C. RIOT CONTROL POLICE WERE ALSO AT LEVEL C, BUT HAVE A GREATER LEVEL OF PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT INCLUDING HELMETS WITH NECK PROTECTION AND EYE SHIELDS, PLASTIC SHIELDS, PROTECTIVE VESTS, GAS MASKS AND WOODEN STAVES. THE RIOT POLICE WERE NOT ARMED AT THAT TIME. ACCORDING TO THE POLICE WERE IN TACTICAL CONTROL OF THE SITUATION FROM 0500 UNTIL 1400 ON 27 JULY.

4. (b)(3):10 USC 424 AS THE SITUATION DETERIORATED ON 27 JULY, MG SUTIYOSO, MILITARY AREA COMMANDER FOR METROPOLITAN JAKARTA, ASSUMED PERSONAL COMMAND OF THE SITUATION AND AUTHORIZED AN INCREASED READINESS LEVEL OF B. IT TOOK SEVERAL HOURS BEFORE WEAPONS WERE DELIVERED.

5. (b)(3):10 USC 424 THE FOLLOWING ARE THE CURRENT RULES FOR USE OF DEADLY FORCE. FIRST, ONLY ONE OR TWO SELECTED MARKSMEN IN EACH PLATOON HAVE LIVE AMMUNITION. THEY ARE NOT TO LOAD UNTIL ORDERED TO DO SO, THEN ONLY IF ANY OF THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS ARE MET;
   A. A RIOTOUS PERSON IN CUSTODY FOR A VIOLENT CRIME CONTINUES TO ATTACK SECURITY FORCES.
   B. A RIOTOUS PERSON IS CAUGHT IN THE ACT OF COMMITTING A VIOLENT CRIME AGAINST PERSONS OR PROPERTY.
   C. A RIOTOUS PERSON ATTACKS SECURITY FORCES OR INSTALLATIONS WITH VIOLENT INTENT.

6. (b)(3):10 USC 424 THESE STRICT LIMITATIONS HAVE BEEN BRIEFED IN DETAIL TO COMMANDERS AND TROOPS, FOLLOWING THE ISSUANCE OF THE ORDER.

7. (b)(1),(b) (3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c) DESCRIBED THE SEQUENCE FOR
EMPLOYING DEADLY FORCE. WHEN NORMAL POLICE AND
MILITARY RESTRAINTS WERE EXHAUSTED AND THE ORDER IS
GIVEN TO USE FIRE ARMS, THE FIRST RESPONSE WAS TO USE
RUBBER BULLETS. IF THIS DID NOT SUFFICE, LIVE
AMMUNITION WOULD BE FIRED AS WARNING SHOTS OVER THE
HEAD OF THE INDIVIDUAL(S). IF THIS STILL FAILED TO
DETER THE INDIVIDUAL, THE TROOPS WERE AUTHORIZED TO
FIRE ONLY TO DISABLE OR WOUND. WHILE EVERY ATTEMPT
WOULD BE MADE TO AVOID ANY CASUALTIES STATED THAT THE SECURITY FORCES COULD NOT BE REFUSED THE RIGHT
OF SELF DEFENSE.

8. [TEXT REDACTED] NOTED THAT MUCH OF THE DAMAGE
AND AT LEAST TWO OF THE DEATHS THAT OCCURRED DURING THE
RIOTS ON 27 JULY OCCURRED BECAUSE ABRI WAS UNABLE TO
CONTROL THE MOB VIOLENCE. THIS WAS BECAUSE THE SECURITY
FORCES WERE STRICTLY UNDER ORDERS TO AVOID CIVILIAN
CASUALTIES AND NOT TO USE EXTREME FORCE. THIS OBSESSION
MEANT THE SECURITY FORCES COULD ONLY PROTECT LOCATIONS
WHERE THEY HAD LARGE NUMBERS OF POLICE OR TROOPS. THE
RIOTERS KNEW THAT ABRI WASN'T USING WEAPONS AND REACTED
WITH IMPUNITY. [TEXT REDACTED] POLICE FRUSTRATION NO
DOUBT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EXCESSIVE BEATINGS SOME POLICE
INFLECTED ON MEGAWATI SYMPATHIZERS.)

9. [TEXT REDACTED] EMPHATICALLY STATED THAT NOT A
SINGLE BULLET HAD BEEN FIRED DURING THE ENTIRE TIME
FROM 27 JULY UNTIL 1 AUGUST. THE RESTRAINT HAD NOT
BEEN REPORTED, ONLY THE DAMAGE AND THE POLICE ACTIONS.

1. [TEXT REDACTED] THOUGH MOST WEAPONS DO HAVE THEIR
MAGAZINES INSERTED, THIS IS COMMON PRACTICE WHETHER THE
MAGAZINES HAVE AMMUNITION OR NOT. WHERE WE HAVE BEEN
ABLE TO CHECK, WE HAVE FOUND AMMUNITION ONLY ISSUED
CONSISTENT WITH THE GUIDELINES PROVIDED BY
THIS IMPLIES DEADLY FORCE WHILE KEEPING IT VERY RESTRICTED.
IT ALSO EXPLAINS WHY ON SOME OCCASIONS WE HAVE OBSERVED
MAGAZINES IN AMMO POUCHES WITH LIVE AMMUNITION.

2. [TEXT REDACTED] ALL OUR CONTACTS TO DATE HAVE BEEN CONSISTENT
THAT THEY ARE KEENLY AWARE OF THE DANGER OF OVER
REACTION OR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. SEPARATE REPORTING
WILL DETAIL ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON CASUALTIES, CAUSES,
AND REACTIONS OF ABRI TO THE EVENTS OF THIS WEEK.

//IPS: (U) [TEXT REDACTED] (b)(3):10 USC 424
ADMIN