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(b)(3):10 USC 424

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/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

SUBJ: DIA COMMONWEALTH ASSESSMENT 076-98/4 AUG 98

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INDONESIA: SHUFFLING THE DECK IN EAST TIMOR (U)

INDONESIA: PROSPECTS FOR EAST TIMOR (U)

INDONESIA: ARMED FORCES' ROLE IN THE POST-SOEHARTO ERA (U)

BULGARIA: FUNDING PROBLEMS IMPEDE MILITARY REFORM (U)

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INDONESIA: SHUFFLING THE DECK IN EAST TIMOR (U)

AS OF 2200Z 30 JUL 98

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

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Pg. 3 is denied in full.

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(b)(1),(b)(3);10 USC 424,Sec. 1.4(c)

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9. (e) ESTIMATED SECURITY PERSONNEL IN EAST TIMOR BY MID-AUGUST 1998

DEPLOYED FORCES

COMBAT TASK FORCE (PURSUIT, ENGINEER,
MEDICAL UNITS)

1,500+

TERRITORIAL BATTALIONS

4,900

SPECIAL FORCES

400

MISCELLANEOUS SUPPORT PERSONNEL

500

TOTAL DEPLOYED

7,300+

PERMANENT ARMY PRESENCE (INCLUDING 2 LOCAL
INFANTRY BATTALIONS)

6,600

PARAMILITARY ELEMENTS

3,600

POLICE

3,400

TOTAL SECURITY PRESENCE

20,900

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INDONESIA: PROSPECTS FOR EAST TIMOR (U)

AS OF 19 JUL 98

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

2. ~~(S)~~ OLD IDEAS, NEW CONTEXT. HABIBIE PUBLICLY OFFERED "SUBSTANTIAL AUTONOMY" TO EAST TIMOR AS THE "CENTERPIECE OF A FINAL DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION" WITH PORTUGAL, WHICH THE UNITED NATIONS STILL RECOGNIZES AS THE OVERSEEING AUTHORITY. EAGER TO END THE COSTLY STRUGGLE AND SHORE UP WESTERN SUPPORT, JAKARTA HAS SOUGHT INTERNATIONAL BACKING FOR BROAD SELF-RULE, WITH LOCALLY ELECTED OFFICIALS AND PARLIAMENT RESPONSIBLE FOR EDUCATION, ECONOMICS, RELIGION, CULTURE, AND LAW AND ORDER. AS BROADLY OUTLINED BY FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS, **INDONESIA** WOULD RETAIN CONTROL OF FOREIGN AND DEFENSE AFFAIRS, CURRENCY, AND FINANCE. AS PART OF THE SETTLEMENT, JAKARTA WOULD WITHDRAW ITS OCCUPATION FORCE AND RELEASE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS--PARTICULARLY JAILED RESISTANCE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO--IN EXCHANGE FOR RECOGNITION OF **INDONESIA'S** ULTIMATE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE PROVINCE.

3. ~~(S)~~ THE PROPOSAL IS A MORE FORTHCOMING VERSION OF EARLIER SUGGESTIONS FLOATED BY SENIOR INDONESIAN OFFICIALS OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS BUT WHICH HAD BEEN STALLED BY FORMER **PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S** RELUCTANCE TO SURRENDER MEANINGFUL AUTONOMY. SOME INDONESIAN DECISIONMAKERS STILL WORRY ABOUT REVIVING SEPARATIST TENDENCIES ELSEWHERE IN THE ARCHIPELAGO, AND THEY ARE CONCERNED THAT GRANTING AUTONOMY WITHOUT THE OPPOSITION'S ACCEPTANCE OF INDONESIAN SOVEREIGNTY WOULD ONLY FURTHER THE REBEL GOAL OF GAINING ULTIMATE INDEPENDENCE. AS A RESULT, JAKARTA CONTINUES TO INSIST THAT AUTONOMY IS NOT A UNILATERAL INITIATIVE BUT AN OUTCOME THAT WILL RESULT FROM A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT BASED ON PERMANENT RECOGNITION OF **INDONESIA'S** ULTIMATE AUTHORITY.

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7. (S) GUSMAO AND THE EXTERNAL FRETILIN LEADERSHIP LED BY RAMOS HORTA OF OBTAINING TIMORESE INDEPENDENCE. AN EARLIER PLAN CALLED FOR A GRADUAL THREE-PHASE TRANSITION PERIOD OF 10 TO 12 YEARS, CULMINATING IN A REFERENDUM ON SELF-DETERMINATION. DURING THE FIRST 1- OR 2-YEAR "HUMANITARIAN PHASE," EAST TIMOR WOULD BE ALLOWED TO ELECT A TERRITORIAL ASSEMBLY, AND **INDONESIA** WOULD GREATLY REDUCE ITS SECURITY FORCES, RELEASE TIMORESE POLITICAL PRISONERS, AND COMMIT ITSELF TO ENDING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. THIS STAGE WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY A 5-YEAR "HOME-RULE" PHASE OF SELF-DIRECTED AUTONOMY UNDER INDONESIAN SOVEREIGNTY, LEADING TO A VOTE ON EAST TIMOR'S POLITICAL FUTURE. GUSMAO RECENTLY SUGGESTED THAT A REFERENDUM IS INEVITABLE, CONSIDERING **INDONESIA'S** DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS.

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Pgs. 7-8 are denied in full.

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INDONESIA: ARMED FORCES' ROLE IN THE POST-SOEHARTO ERA (U)
AS OF 2200Z 23 JUL 98

1. ~~(C)~~ SINCE **PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S RESIGNATION**, THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES HAVE STRUGGLED TO BALANCE POPULAR ASPIRATIONS WITH THE NEED TO MAINTAIN ORDER. ALTHOUGH STILL TOLERANT OF PEACEFUL DISSENT, DEFENSE LEADERS ARE DETERMINED TO STEM THE GROWING SOCIAL UNREST. PREOCCUPATION WITH NATIONAL STABILITY HAS PROMPTED MILITARY ACCOMMODATION WITH PRESIDENT HABIBIE--WITHIN LIMITS--AS THE ARMED FORCES CONTINUE TO CHART AN INDEPENDENT ROLE.

2. ~~(C)~~ MIXED SECURITY PICTURE. ORGANIZED PROTESTS AND LARGE-SCALE RIOTING, ALONG WITH CALLS FOR HABIBIE'S REMOVAL, HAVE DECREASED MARKEDLY SINCE SOEHARTO'S **RESIGNATION** ON 21 MAY. THE MORE PASSIVE POLITICAL CLIMATE HAS EASED IMMEDIATE PRESSURES ON THE NEW HABIBIE GOVERNMENT. NONETHELESS, INCIDENTS OF SOCIAL UNREST, INCLUDING RETRIBUTION FOR PAST INJUSTICES, STRIKES, LAND TAKEOVERS, AND LOOTING HAVE BEEN ON THE RISE. ADDING TO THESE PROBLEMS ARE GROWING SEPARATIST FERMENT IN EAST TIMOR AND IRIAN JAYA, ENCOURAGED BY RISING EXPECTATIONS AND THE MORE OPEN POLITICAL CLIMATE. THE BLEAK SITUATION--CHARACTERIZED BY HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT, SERIOUS INFLATION, AND FORECASTS OF AN ECONOMIC CONTRACTION OF MORE THAN 20 PERCENT--ENSURES CONTINUED HIGH LEVELS OF POPULAR DISSATISFACTION IN THE COMING MONTHS.

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4. (S) WHERE THE ARMED FORCES STAND. POLITICAL REFORM. MILITARY LEADERS CONSISTENTLY HAVE VOICED SUPPORT FOR THE REFORM PROCESS, INCLUDING FREE ELECTIONS AND LIMITS ON PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY. HOWEVER, CONCERNED ABOUT DEMOCRATIC EXCESSES, WIRANTO HAS URGED THAT ANY CHANGE BE "CONSTITUTIONAL, CONSISTENT, PEACEFUL, AND ORDERLY."

5. (S) PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS. THE MILITARY HAS OPPOSED AN IMMEDIATE ELECTION AS ONLY FURTHERING POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND NOW SUPPORTS HABIBIE'S PLAN FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN LATE 1999. THE ARMED FORCES WILL NOT TAKE PART IN THE VOTING BUT WILL RETAIN A DIMINISHED NUMBER OF SEATS--55--IN THE PROPOSED NEW 550-MEMBER PARLIAMENT.

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10. ~~(S)~~ LENDING SUPPORT TO HABIBIE. OVERRIDING CONCERN FOR POLITICAL STABILITY LED MILITARY LEADERS 2 WEEKS AGO TO SET ASIDE THEIR LONGSTANDING RESERVATIONS CONCERNING HABIBIE AND TO SHORE UP HIS POWER BASE IN THE RULING GOLKAR POLITICAL PARTY. THEIR CRUCIAL BACKING ENDED A SERIOUS POLITICAL CHALLENGE AND HEIGHTENED HABIBIE'S CHANCES OF REMAINING IN POWER UNTIL PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN LATE 1999. DURING DELIBERATIONS, SENIOR OFFICERS FOUND THEMSELVES OPPOSING FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER EDI SUDRADJAT, WITH WHOM THEY SHARED COMMON GOAL OF A PROFESSIONAL AND SECULAR MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. DESPITE INITIAL EFFORTS AT COMPROMISE, WIRANTO IN THE END BROKE HIS EARLIER PLEDGE TO REMAIN NEUTRAL, ANGERING THE DISSIDENT RETIRED OFFICERS ALIGNED AGAINST HABIBIE. INFLUENCING THE DECISION WAS WIRANTO'S CONVICTION THAT NOW IS THE TIME FOR HIS GENERATION TO LEAD.

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14. ~~(C)~~ STRUGGLING WITH CREDIBILITY. THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT ALSO CONFRONTS GROWING DEMANDS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY FOR PAST MISDEEDS. ITS /***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 007 *****/ CAUTIOUS APPROACH HAS BROUGHT CHARGES OF COVERING UP SEVERAL WIDELY PUBLICIZED CASES, INCLUDING EARLIER POLITICAL DISAPPEARANCES AND LAST MAY'S SHOOTING OF STUDENTS. SEEKING TO RESTORE MILITARY CREDIBILITY, WIRANTO HAS ADMITTED ERRORS AND STEPPED UP THE INVESTIGATIONS. SIGNIFICANTLY, WIRANTO IMPLICATED SPECIAL FORCES PERSONNEL NOW UNDER DETENTION FOR THE DISAPPEARANCES AND ANNOUNCED A SENIOR HONOR BOARD TO INVESTIGATE SENIOR OFFICER WRONGDOING. WIRANTO'S EARLIER MOVES TO WEED OUT POTENTIALLY DISLOYAL ELEMENTS APPARENTLY SET THE STAGE FOR THE ARREST AND PROBABLE EVENTUAL OUSTER FROM THE MILITARY OF SOEHARTO SON-IN-LAW LT GEN PRABOWO, WHO IS WIDELY SUSPECTED AS THE CENTRAL PLAYER IN THESE CASES. ALTHOUGH COMMITTED TO PUNISHING THE GUILTY, THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP REMAINS CIRCUMSPECT, REFLECTING CONCERN FOR LEGAL PROCEDURES BUT ALSO PROBABLY STILL HOPING TO LIMIT FURTHER DAMAGING DISCLOSURES.

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