


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


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
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FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
TO (b)(3):50 USC 403-
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC//X000E//
(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC// (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
RUETIAH/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC



RUEALGX/SAFE
R 070736Z NOV 87
FM (b)(3):10 USC 424
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
INFO RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VATHINGEN GE (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)



(b)(3):10 USC 424

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EZ1:

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EZ2:
SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424
PASS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
COUNTRY: (U) IRAN (TR)
SUBJ: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 / VIEWS FROM IRAN - OCT 87 (U)
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY
EVALUATED INTEL. ~~THIS REPORT CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~NOFORN.~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 870600-871000
REQS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424
SOURCE: (C/NF) (b)(1), (b)(3):10 USC 424, 1.4 (e)

SUMMARY: ~~(C/NF)~~ OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS ON LIFE TODAY
IN IRAN TO INCLUDE ARMS DELIVERIES, THE TANKER WAR AND
SOME POLITICAL COMMENTS.
TEXT: 1. ~~(C/NF)~~ (b)(1), 1.4 (e) ASSESSMENT AND

(b)(1), (b)(3):10
USC 424, 1.4 (e)

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MSGNO 2 (MIR) RSB *07/11/87* *03:11*
OBSERVATION ON IRANIAN ARMS PURCHASES/PRODUCTION/
DELIVERIES, IRAN-IRAQ TANKER WAR, LIFE IN IRAN TODAY
AND SOME POLITICAL CHANGES AND COMMENTS.

A. ~~(S)~~ IRANIAN ARMS PURCHASE/PRODUCTION/DELIVERY.

(b)(1),1.4 (c) THAT IRAN WAS NOT EXPERIENCING ANY
PROBLEMS IN OBTAINING ARMS AND EQUIPMENT ON THE WORLD
MARKET. MAJOR COUNTRIES PROVIDING ARMS, EQUIPMENT OR
SPARE PARTS WERE LISTED AS CHINA, SOVIET UNION, AND
NORTH KOREA. RECENT MAJOR EQUIPMENT DELIVERIES AND
MOST IN THE NEWS IS THE CHINESE SILKWORM (HY-2), CRUISE
MISSILE. THE CHINESE HY-2 MISSILE, SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
AND SPARE PARTS ARE DELIVERED BY CHINESE MERCHANT SHIPS
AND (b)(1),1.4 (c) THE NEXT DELIVERY OF MISSILES
WAS EXPECTED IN LATE OCTOBER OR EARLY NOVEMBER IN
ADDITION TO THE STANDARD OR BASIC HY-2, (b)(1),1.4 (c)
THAT THE MORE ADVANCED CHINESE VERSIONS OF THIS MISSILE
THE C801, C802, C803 AND C804 WERE ENROUTE TO IRAN

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c) THE C801 THRU C804 WERE DESCRIBED BY (b)(1),1.4 (c) AS
A MUCH IMPROVED VARIANT OF THE SILKWORM (HY-2). (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c) THE C801 THRU C804, PRIMARILY ANTI-SHIP
MISSILES, WILL INCREASE SIGNIFICANTLY IRANIAN
CAPABILITIES AND REPRESENTS A MUCH GREATER THREAT TO US
NAVY FORCES IN THE GULF. THE "C" SERIES MISSILES WERE
(b)(1),1.4 (c) AS SIMILAR TO EXOCET, WITH EITHER
OR BOTH IR AND RADAR GUIDANCE. RANGE OF THE C801 THRU
C804 WAS GIVEN AS 45 TO 60 KM WITH AN EFFECTIVE RANGE
OF 40-45 KM.

(1) ~~(S)~~ ATTACK ON KUWAIT. (b)(1),1.4 (c) THAT IT WAS A
PAIR (NOT A SINGLE SHOT) OF STYX MISSILES CAPTURED FROM
THE IRAQIS THAT WERE USED IN THE ATTACK OF THE KUWAITI
OIL RIG. (b)(1),1.4 (c) SUCH A MAX RANGE SHOT WOULD IN
HIS OPINION REQUIRE A MINIMUM OF TWO MISSILES TO ENSURE
SUCCESS, ALTHOUGH ALL REPORTS AND INFORMATION AVAILABLE
MENTION ONLY ONE MISSILE. FURTHER, EXCEPT FOR THE MORE
PERMANENT SILKWORM SITES AT BANDAR ABBAS THE IRANIANS
WERE USING A "SHOOT AND SCOOT" TACTIC TO MINIMIZE
COUNTER-ATTACK OR FORCE A PREEMPTIVE STRIKE THAT COULD
BE USED FOR POLITICAL/PROPAGANDA PURPOSES.

(2) ~~(S)~~ DOMESTIC ARMS PRODUCTION. (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c) THAT IRANIANS WERE CONTINUING TO PRODUCE
MINES IN AT LEAST TWO LOCATIONS IN IRAN (LOCATIONS NOT
PROVIDED). THESE MINES WERE BEING STORED AT BANDAR
ABBAS FOR FUTURE USE. (b)(1),1.4 (c) IT WAS THE
COLLECTIVE OPINION OF THE FOREIGN COMMUNITY IN TEHRAN
THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARD "NAVY" WOULD BE GIVEN
APPROVAL FOR INCREASED MINING AND ANTI-SHIPING ATTACKS
IF CURRENT UN PEACE INITIATIVE FAILS. ANTI-SHIPING
ATTACKS WOULD BE CARRIED OUT BY SMALL HIGH SPEED BOATS
(CONVERTED PLEASURE BOATS IN SOME CASES). THESE BOATS
AND THEIR CREWS HAVE BEEN SHOWN EXTENSIVELY ON IRANIAN
TELEVISION. FUTURE NAVAL ACTIONS IN THE GULF, IN

(b)(1),1.4 (c) WOULD BE CARRIED OUT PRIMARILY BY THE
REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS VICE THE IRANIAN NAVY. IN
END OF MESSAGE

***** SECTION 2 *****

SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

PASS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

COUNTRY: (U) IRAN (IR)

SUBJ: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424

/ VIEWS FROM IRAN - OCT 87 (U)
RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ABOUT THE RECENTLY PUBLICIZED

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MSGNO 2 (MIIR) RSR *07/11/87* *03:11*
IRANIAN SUBMARINE, (b)(1),1.4 (c) IT WAS VERY PRIMITIVE
AND MAY HAVE BEEN BUILT/ASSEMBLED IN IRAN. THE
CAPABILITIES OF THIS SUBMARINE (b)(1),1.4 (c) ALWAYS REFERRED
JUST TO ONE SUB) WERE ASSESSED BY (b)(1),1.4 (c) AS SIMILAR TO
THE WWII JAPANESE "KATAIN" THAN MORE MODERN AND
SOPHISTICATED WESTERN OR SOVIET MINI SUBS. (b)(1),1.4 (c)
(b)(1),1.4 (c) THE SUBMARINE HAD AT MOST A THREE OR FOUR MAN
CREW AND COULD CONDUCT ONLY VISUAL ATTACKS. (b)(1),1.4 (c)
BELIEVED THAT THE SUB MIGHT HAVE A LIMITED CAPABILITY
TO OPERATE WITH SNORKEL AT A DEPTH OF A FEW FEET BELOW
THE SURFACE. THE SUBMARINE COULD CARRY EXTERNALLY TWO
TORPEDOS OR MINES. (b)(1),1.4 (c) STATED THAT PUBLICITY ON THE
SUBMARINE HAD CEASED AND ITS CURRENT LOCATION WAS
UNKNOWN.

(3) (C/N) ARMS DELIVERIES. IN ADDITION TO THE
COUNTRIES MENTIONED ABOVE, (b)(1),1.4 (c) OTHER EUROPEAN
AND MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES WERE CONTINUING TO SUPPLY
WAR MATERIEL AND PARTS (ESPECIALLY FOR AMERICAN
EQUIPMENT) IN EXCHANGE FOR OIL. (b)(1),1.4 (c) OF US
AND UN EFFORTS TO REDUCE THE FLOW OF ARMS AND EQUIPMENT
TO IRAN, BUT NO SLOW DOWN OF DELIVERIES AS YET HAS BEEN
NOTED IN IRAN. IRAN USES EITHER OIL OR HARD CURRENCIES
TO PAY FOR THESE EQUIPMENTS. A PRACTICE THAT MAKES
THEM COMMERCIALY VERY ATTRACTIVE. (b)(1),1.4 (c) HAD NO
INFORMATION OR KNOWLEDGE OF LIBYAN ARMS DELIVERIES TO
IRAN.

B. (C/N) IRAN/IRAQ TANKER WAR. (b)(1),1.4 (c) THAT
BOTH IRAN AND IRAQ CONTINUE TO ATTACK EACH OTHERS
TANKERS. BUT IN (b)(1),1.4 (c) IRAN WAS HOLDING
BACK SOMEWHAT, WHILE THE UN PEACE PROPOSAL/PLAN IS
UNDER CONSIDERATION. AGAIN IF THE CURRENT PEACE
EFFORTS BREAKDOWN, ESCALATION OF THE TANKER WAR BY IRAN
SHOULD BE EXPECTED. (b)(1),1.4 (c) ALSO STATED THAT IRAN HAD
POSITIONED TWO OR THREE ALREADY DAMAGED TANKERS AT KRAG
ISLAND TO ACT AS DECOYS, IE (FALSE TARGETS FOR IRAQI
EXOCET MISSILE ATTACKS. (b)(1),1.4 (c) THAT THIS
TACTIC WAS ENJOYING SOME SUCCESS AND COMPLICATING IRAQI
TARGETING.

(1) (C/N) HAWK MISSILES. (b)(1),1.4 (c) THAT HAWK
MISSILES STILL WERE DEPLOYED AROUND TEHRAN, AND KARG
ISLAND. IN ADDITION, (b)(1),1.4 (c) THAT HAWK MISSILES
RECENTLY HAD BEEN DEPLOYED TO BANDAR ABBAS.

C. (C/N) LIFE IN IRAN. (b)(1),1.4 (c) THAT THE BASIC
NECESSITIES AND MANY LUXURY ITEM STILL WERE AVAILABLE
ON THE DOMESTIC ECONOMY. THOSE ITEMS NOT AVAILABLE ON
THE OPEN EC.OMY WERE READILY AVAILABLE ON THE BLACK
MARKET, ESPECIALLY IF YOU PURCHASED THEM WITH US
DOLLARS. (b)(1),1.4 (c) HAS NOT EXPERIENCED NOR HEARD OF ANY
SHORTAGE OF FOOD, CLOTHING OR FUEL AND THAT EVERYDAY
LIFE IN TEHRAN WAS NOT AT ALL UNPLEASANT. TRAFFIC
DURING RUSH HOURS WAS HEAVY AND STREETS REMAINED
CONGESTED FOR SEVERAL HOURS. ALSO BECAUSE OF THE LACK
OF ENTERTAINMENT, A DRIVE IN THE FAMILY WAS NOW A
FAVORITE FORM OF ENTERTAINMENT. AVAILABILITY AND LOW
COST OF GASOLINE HAS CREATED RUSH HOUR TRAFFIC
CONDITIONS ON WEEKENDS. IRAQI AIR RAIDS HAD ALL BUT
CEASED IN TEHRAN. THERE WAS A GENERAL CONCERN OF
POSSIBLE IRAQI RAIDS IN RETALIATION FOR THE KUWAITI
ATTACK, HOWEVER, PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE, NONE HAD
OCCURRED. (b)(1),1.4 (c) THE CAR SEARCHES CONDUCTED
OCCASIONALLY BY THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS LOOKING FOR
ALCOHOL NOW SEARCHED AS WELL FOR VIDEO TAPES. THE LACK

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MSGNO 2 (MIIR) RSB *07/11/87* *03:11*
OF PUBLIC ENTERTAINMENT HAS CREATED QUITE A MARKET FOR
HOME VIDEOS. THE MUHALLAS WERE OPPOSED TO INTRODUCTION
OF WESTERN TV OR MOVIES INTO THE COUNTRY AND HAD SOUGHT
THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS HELP IN ELIMINATING THIS
LATEST WESTERN (READ AMERICAN) EVIL. EVEN SO, IRANIANS
CONTINUED TO TRADE/RENT/BUY/SELL THESE VIDEO TAPES
AMONG THEMSELVES.
(1) ~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c) THAT RECRUITMENT OF YOUNG MEN
FOR REVOLUTIONARY GUARD UNITS TO FIGHT AGAINST IRAQ HAS
END OF MESSAGE ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

***** SECTION 3 *****

SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424
PASS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
COUNTRY: (U) IRAN (IR)
SUBJ: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 / VIEWS FROM IRAN - OCT 87 (U)
INTENSIFIED. (b)(1),1.4 (c) THAT NEW FRESH
BATTALIONS/BRIGADES WERE BEING FORMED FOR A WINTER
OFFENSIVE AGAINST IRAQ. (b)(1),1.4 (c) MOST PROBABLE AREA
OF RENEWED FIGHTING WOULD BE AT BASRAH. (b)(1),1.4 (c) IS OF
THE OPINION THAT IN AN ANTICIPATED WINTER OFFENSIVE,
IRAN WILL TRY AND CAPTURE BASRAH.
D. ~~(S/NF)~~ POLITICAL CHANGES. (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c) IS THAT EVEN IF KHOMENI WERE TO DIE TODAY IT
WOULD BE YEARS BEFORE THE MUHALLA/RELIGIOUS HOLD ON THE
GOVERNMENT WOULD WEAKEN. THE RUTHLESS PURGES INCLUDING
THE MASS EXECUTIONS OF THE EARLY 80'S HAD ENSURED A
CONTINUATION OF THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES. IN
(b)(1),1.4 (c) THERE IS NO POLITICAL ALTERNATIVE TO
THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT. FURTHER, SAVAK (b)(1),1.4 (c)
AND THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS WOULD ENSURE THE
MAINTENANCE OF THE CURRENT REGIME. (b)(1),1.4 (c)
THAT OPPOSITION TO THE GOVERNMENT EXISTED BUT THAT IT
WAS UNORGANIZED AND THEREFORE UNLIKELY TO BE EFFECTIVE.
(1) ~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c) THAT TWO LEADERS OF THE
REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS THAT FORMERLY REPORTED THROUGH
(RAFSANJANI) HAD BEEN GIVEN SEATS ON THE
REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. THIS WAS VIEWED BOTH AS A
LESSENING OF CONTROL BY RAFSANJANI AND STRENGTHENING OF
THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS. AS AN
ASIDE, (b)(1),1.4 (c) THAT TO HIS KNOWLEDGE, ALL IRANIAN
CONTACT WITH LIBYA WAS THROUGH THE REVOLUTIONARY
GUARDS. ALL DELEGATIONS OR VISITORS FROM IRAN TO LIBYA
WERE HEADED BY AND CONSISTED MAINLY OF REVOLUTIONARY
GUARDS. FURTHER, ALL LIBYANS VISITING TEHRAN ALWAYS
WERE SHOWN ON TV OR PICTURED IN THE PRESS AS BEING
GREETED BY THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS VICE OTHER
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.
COMMENTS: 1. ~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

//IPSP: (b)(3):10 USC 424

//COMSOB

PROJ: N/A

INST: (U) (b)(3):10
USC 424

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MSGNO 2 (MIIR) RSB *07/11/87* *03:11*

PREP: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

APPR: (U)

ACQ: (U)

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END OF MESSAGE

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