

MSGNO 6 (MIIR) ALL *04/09/90* *03:10*
ZCZC 08:09:44Z (MI)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



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MCR

TOR: 040622Z SEP 90

NC 1065488

(b)(3):10 USC 424

RR RUEAIIA
DE RUEHBJ #8932/01 2470607
ZNY ~~CCCCC~~
R 040604Z SEP 90

FM (b)(3):10 USC 424

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
INFO RUHQHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI// (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC// (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
RUFTTAA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD// (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC// (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC// (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

RUADWD/HQDA WASHDC// (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
(b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

BT
EZ1:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

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EZ2:
SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424
PASS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

COUNTRY: (U) CHINA (CH); SOVIET UNION (UR);
IRAN (IZ).

COMBINE: COMPLETE
SUBJECT: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 IRAN-PRC TANK SALES (U)
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT
FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT
CLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ --
~~NOFORN.~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 900830
REQS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SOURCE: ~~(C/NF)~~ (b)(1), (b)(3):10 USC 424.1.4 (c)

SUMMARY: (C) IRANIAN GOVERNMENT SAID TO BE INTENT ON
HAVING ITS MAIN BATTLE TANKS OUTFITTED WITH A MAIN
GUN LARGER THAN 125MM. CHINA'S NORINCO IS UNSUCCESSFUL
IN CHANGING IRANIAN POSITION. SOVIET UNION SEEN AS
MOST PROBABLE SOURCE FOR IRAN.

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TEXT: 1. (C/NF) (b)(1),1.4 (c) THAT THE IRANIANS ARE INSISTING THAT THEIR FUTURE TANKS BE OUTFITTED WITH MAIN GUNS LARGER THAN THE 125MM, PREFERABLY THE 135MM MAIN GUN. FURTHERMORE, THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT WANTS TO PURCHASE THE PRODUCTION CAPABILITY FOR THESE TANKS TO INCLUDE THE CAPABILITY TO MODIFY EXISTING TANK TURRETS TO ACCOMODATE THE LARGER GUN SYSTEM.

2. (C/NF) (b)(1),1.4 (c) THAT NORINCO HAS TRIED TO DISCOURAGE THE IRANIANS FROM THIS PROGRAM. THE CHINESE POSITION IS THAT ANY GUN SYSTEM LARGER THAN THE 125MM IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH EXISTING TURRET/CHASSIS TANK SYSTEMS IN THE IRANIAN INVENTORY. DESPITE THESE EFFORTS, (b)(1),1.4 (c) THAT THE IRANIANS ARE BEING STUBBORN AND ARE "SEARCHING FOR OTHER PRODUCERS."

3. (C/NF) (b)(1),1.4 (c) THAT THE "OTHER PRODUCERS" BEING COURTED BY IRAN ARE THE SOVIETS AND THE FORMER EASTERN BLOC COUNTRIES WHO ARE EAGER TO SELL OFF THEIR TANKS FOR CASH. WHEN PRESSED, (b)(1),1.4 (c) CONCEDED THAT CHINA'S MAIN COMPETITOR IN THE IRAN DEAL WAS THE SOVIET UNION, "BECAUSE THE IRANIANS INSIST ON HAVING THE PRODUCTION LINES FOR THEIR TANKS, AND THE SOVIETS ARE THE ONLY OTHER SUPPLIER WHO CAN SELL THE ENTIRE PACKAGE." (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c) IF THE SOVIETS WERE CURRENTLY ENGAGED IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH IRAN, AND WHAT THE STATUS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS WAS- (b)(1),1.4 (c) REPLIED THAT "YE, THE SOVIETS WERE NEGOTIATING, AND THAT THE SITUATION WAS NOT GOOD FOR (b)(1),1.4 (c) (NORINCO)."

4. (C/NF) (b)(1),1.4 (c) THEN LAUNCHED INTO A MONOLOGUE ON THE CRAZY NATURE OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND MIDDLE EAST-ERNERS. (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c) WANTED TO MAKE SURE THAT (b)(1),1.4 (c) UNDERSTOOD THE "HATRED" THAT ARABS IN GENERAL, AND IRANIANS IN PARTICULAR, HAVE FOR AMERICANS. HE QUICKLY FOLLOVED THIS LINE WITH A PITCH FOR SINO-U.S. COOPERATION IN SELLING WEAPONS TO THE MIDDLE EAST. (b)(1),1.4 (c) THAT "WITH OUR (PRC) ACCESS, AND YOUR (U.S.) TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL BASE, WE COULD MAKE A LOT OF MONEY SELLING TO IRAN." (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

(b)(3):10
USC 424

ACTUALLY THOUGHT THAT THIS WAS A GOOD IDEA, AND WAS PUZZLED WHEN (b)(1),1.4 (c) EXPRESSED SCEPTICISM AS TO THE LIKLIHOOD OF SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT.)

COMMENTS: 1. (C/NF) (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)



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//IPSP: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

//COMSOBJ: (U)

PROJ: (U)

INSTR: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

PREP: (U)

A.G: (U)

DISSEM: (U)

WARNING: (U)

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~~DECL. OADR~~
END OF MESSAGE

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